, in rising to move the second reading of this Bill, the object of which was to enable districts in Scotland to raise contributions by means of a new assessment for the construction of roads, and to provide for their management, said, it had been prepared in accordance with a general desire expressed by Members from Scotland. Its principle had been generally approved in Scotland, but some suggestions had been made for its Amendment, which he should be willing to consider in Committee.

did not object to the principle of the Bill, but thought that some modifications of its provisions must be made, especially with regard to the assessments for repairs of roads. He was glad to find that the Bill was permissive only; but he would suggest that a permissive power should be given to trustees of districts, if they should see fit, to vary the proportion of assessment to be levied upon the owners, limiting that proportion to a sum not exceeding one-half of the whole amount to be levied. This would practically leave it to the landowners to assess themselves for more extensive works than the mere ordinary repair of roads.

assented to the principle of this Bill, but said he thought the details would require very careful consideration in Committee. The Bill would cast a burden upon property which before had not been liable to assessment, such as railways and minerals. He did not say that railways ought not to contribute; but it would have to be considered upon what proportion of their value they should be assessed. He doubted the propriety of making the Bill permissive only, as he thought the law should be the same all over Scotland.

supported the Bill, which he thought would be very beneficial, and thought the House were much indebted to the exertions of his hon. Friend (Sir John Ogilvy).

said, that having been a Member of the Royal Commission which considered this subject, he hoped that hon. Members who desired that the Bill should be made compulsory, would remember the difficulties which were found to prevent the passing of a more comprehensive measure some years ago. The Commissioners were of opinion, that whatever might be the change in the mode of raising the money for the improvement of the turnpike roads in Scotland, that improvement should not be delayed. It was desirable now to take one step towards the general improvement of the roads of Scotland, which the Royal Commission wished to bring about.

said, he also objected to the Bill being made a compulsory measure, as he thought the best course was to proceed cautiously at first.

gave notice that at a future stage he should propose a clause in favour of gas and water companies, and also a clause giving greater powers to the ratepayers in the election of trustees.

, approving the principle, thought the Bill had been drawn to suit the cases of particular counties, and therefore would require considerable alterations in Committee.

said, that while he supported the principle of the Bill, he thought it necessary that they should proceed with great caution. He hoped his hon. Friend would not listen to any suggestion to make the Bill compulsory.

suggested that the Bill should be committed pro formâ, that it might be considered in Scotland during the holydays.

would adopt the suggestion offered by the hon. Member.

rose to move the second reading of this Bill, which, as many hon. Members knew, had obtained the almost unanimous approbation of the legal profession; and the Law Societies of Yorkshire, Liverpool, Manchester, and Chester, had petitioned in its favour. He did not know what objection could be raised to the Bill, especially as it had no retrospective operation, and did not affect Ireland. The object of the Bill was to place real estate on the same footing with regard to future judgments as personal property—that was to say, that no purchaser or mortgagee should be obliged as at present to make searches for judgments. From a Return for which he had. moved, it appeared that in one year and ten months 3,051 judgments were registered, and, of this number, 1,894, or somewhat more than three-fifths, were for sums under £200. What possible interest could the House have in prolonging such a state of things? Every power should be given to a creditor to enforce his claim, but that power should not be allowed to affect transactions which were not his own. Yet, for the sake of these 3,051 judgment creditors, every purchaser, according to Lord St. Leonards in his invaluable work on Vendors and Purchasers, was obliged to search the registry to see whether a judgment was recorded against the vendor; and this search must extend to the very morning of the day on which the purchase was completed. He was acquainted with a case where a judgment was discovered and telegraphed on the morning of the day which had been fixed on to complete an important purchase. He estimated the yearly number of conveyances of all kinds, that were affected by the present law, at 30,000 and upwards; and this opinion was confirmed by an official Gentleman connected with the Stamp Office department. Was it to be tolerated that every honest purchaser, against whom there was no pretence for saying that there was any collusion between him and the vendor, should he put to such a risk? It added to the perplexity of conveyancing that there was a difference of opinion amongst eminent men learned in the law. He had stated what Lord St. Leonards advised as to the necessity of searching for judgments, and the same doctrine had been held by conveyancers generally for a long time past; but the Master of the Rolls had decided (see Lane v. Jackson, 20 Beavan, 535) that "it was not incumbent on a purchaser for valuable consideration to search for judgments." This decision would be important, if it could he depended upon as sound in law; but, unfortunately, that was not the fact. It had taken counsel by surprise; but assuming it to be law, the case added to the difficulties thrown on a bonâ fide purchaser. This learned judge held, that though a purchaser was not obliged to search for a judgment, yet if he, or his solicitor or agent, had notice of one, he would be bound by such notice, and could recover against the purchased property. In that same case an unsuccessful attempt was made to fix the purchaser with the consequences of a verbal notice alleged by the vendor to have been given to the purchaser's solicitor, but positively denied by that Gentleman. If the notice had been deemed to be sufficient, these consequences would have followed—namely, the vendor would keep the money he had received on the sale of his property, and he would have enabled a judgment creditor of his own to recover his debt from the purchaser, to whom the property had been sold, and paid for; and, as he (Mr. Hadfield) considered, the law would have given the creditor precedence over the purchaser, who had previously held a mortgage upon the property. Five Acts had passed during the present reign in order to soften the asperity of the law on this particular subject, and he hoped that the House would now go a step further, and say that it was not wise to throw a doubt upon transactions between the buyer and seller of real estate. In the year 1860, the House of Lords sent down a Bill, which provided, in addition to all other requisites, execution should issue within three months from the date of the judgment, and the House of Commons sanctioned it; but that did not obviate the necessity of a search within those three months. This state of things was what he sought to put an end to by this Bill. Why should a purchaser in Northumberland be put to the expense of consulting the registry in London? And why should every purchaser of real estate in the country be under such a responsibility? The cost of doing so formed a serious item in a small conveyance; and if there was more than one necessary party to the conveyance, the expense was, of course, proportionally increased. As to notice, the Bill provided that no judgment should affect transactions between the seller and a bonâ fide purchaser or mortgagee, for full and valuable consideration, and whether such purchaser or mortgagee had notice or not. He thought notice a very dangerous thing. It was of importance that the existence of a judgment against a person who wanted to go into the market to sell his property, should not be known; because a person having a judgment against him was not in a position to demand as fair a price as could be ob- tained by a person who had no judgment against him. It was known that a commercial society was formed, to report on registered judgments, and warn against giving credit to persons in embarrassed circumstances. The question might present some difficulties, but Parliament ought not to adhere to old abuses and obsolete laws which throw such obstacles in the way of purchasers. He moved the second reading of this Bill, with a strong conviction that the profession throughout the whole country would hail it as a great improvement, and that it would tend most beneficially to facilitate the transfer of real estate.

rose to second the Motion, and trusted that the House would assent to the second reading, for he thought that the law as it stood was extremely vexatious both to buyers and sellers of landed property. He had himself known a case in which a large estate had to be sold in lots; but, in consequence of the existence of judgment debts, and in consequence of no one purchaser being able or willing to pay the judgment debts, great delay took place in the sale of the estate; and as there was at the time a falling market, the value of the property was much depreciated, and the most ruinous results ensued to the owner of that property as well as to the creditors. He did not see the slightest use in retaining the law in its present state. No banker would take a judgment of this kind as security; they would only take the security of a deposit of deeds or a mortgage. The absurdity of the law became at once apparent by supposing it applied to personal property. With respect to personal property a judgment was of no value until execution issued, and that was an intelligible state of things; but suppose the law affecting real property were extended to personal property, and that a purchaser had to search for judgments before he could buy a picture at Christie & Manson's, the thing would be absurd. To make a judgment a lien on real estate only had the effect of clogging the transfer of that estate with unnecessary restrictions and imposing upon the conveyance of property unnecessary expense. He thought, that if they abolished this law, they would only be following in those steps of legal reform which they pursued last year, when they passed an Act with the object of simplifying titles and making the purchasers of land secure.

gave his cordial support to this Bill, and trusted that the House would agree to pass it without delay. When he first commenced the practice of his profession, the law with respect to the liability of personal property to judgments was in precisely the same position as it was at present. Whether it was a picture worth a thousand guineas, or a chair or table, until the sheriff had in his hand the writ of execution, and took the personal property into his possession, a judgment was not of the slightest value; but with regard to land, whether the estate were great or small, as soon as a creditor obtained judgment that judgment became a lien upon the land; and at that period a purchaser was obliged to search the records of every Court of Record in the kingdom—the King's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer—for twenty years back, in order to ascertain whether or not the estate he was about to buy was liable to any judgment debts. That was the state of the law until 1838. It was found, however, to entail such monstrous evils that an Act was then passed—the 1 & 2 Vict., c. 110—by which it was enacted that thereafter a judgment should be binding upon every kind of estate in land—(before that it had applied to freehold estate only, and not to copyholds and leaseholds)—but no judgment was to be binding unless it had been registered in one Court—the Court of Common Pleas; and it was also provided that a registered judgment should be binding for five years only. That was an immense improvement on the former state of the law. Lord St. Leonards, however,—a man more distinguished, than any one else for his knowledge and experience of the laws relating to real property, and who had spent a lifetime in framing measures which would simplify and facilitate the transfer of land—saw that to make judgments a lien upon landed estates, even to the limited extent of the Act of 1838, was still a very great evil; and he introduced a Bill in 1859 which enacted that no such judgment should bind land unless a writ of execution were issued on such judgment within a limited time. He (Mr. Malins) thought that the matter would be intelligible if they said that a judgment should either bind all the property of the debtor or none; but he was unable to see any reason why land should be bound when the personal estate was not bound. He did not see the slightest difficulty in the creditor taking a memorandum of security, charging the land for the amount of his debt, in the same manner as a banker or other person took the title deeds, or a mortgage. The fact was, that the creditors who had these judgment bonds were in many instances men who had lent money at 60 or 70 per cent. The law as it stood before was better than it was at present, because the passing of the Act of 1859 had introduced a most ridiculous and inconvenient state of things. That Act took one step in advance, it was true; but his hon. and learned Friend now proposed to take another, and to enact that no judgment or recognizance entered after the passing of the Act should affect land, as against purchasers and mortgagees, whether the purchaser or mortgagee had notice or not of the judgment or recognizance. That went a little beyond the Act of Lord St. Leonards, which enacted that the purchaser of an estate from a man who had judgments against him, perhaps far exceeding the value of the estate, should maintain his purchase against all the judgment creditors, provided that no one of them had issued an execution. Still, that Act made it imperative on the purchaser of any estate, however small its value, to go to the expense of sending up to London to search the register of the Common Pleas, in the first place, to see whether any judgment had been registered; and, in the second place, to search in another place and see if a writ of execution had been issued. The law would be much more simple as between the debtor and creditor if the judgment were still made a judgment upon the land; but that if the debtor proceeded to sell, the lien should cease in favour of the mortgagee or purchaser for valuable consideration. The proposition before the House was very simple, and he trusted his hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General would not oppose the second reading.

said, that if the House were to pass this measure, it would alter the whole law of debtor and creditor as it now existed in this country. It might have been supposed from the speech of the hon. Member who introduced the Bill, that the world consisted of but four classes—vendors, mortgagees, purchasers, and solicitors, and that these classes were suffering under some intolerable hardship. Yet the whole grievance from which it was now proposed to relieve persons who might be engaged in these transactions amounted to no more than this—namely, that if the purchaser took the course which strict prudence would suggest, and which might be necessary in some cases, though not in all, he would have to make a search, which would cost 30s. if he was buying from one individual, and somewhat more if he was buying from more than one. Would they, in order to relieve those persons of such a grievance as this, subvert the whole law of debtor and creditor as it was now to be found on our statute book? The preamble of the Bill stated that it was desirable to place freehold, copyhold, customary, and leasehold estate on the same footing as personal property with regard to judgments as against purchasers and mortgagees. But personal property might be delivered from hand to hand; whereas they could not deal with real estate in that way. The old remedy at law against real estate was by the writ of elegit, which enabled the judgment creditor to get possession of an undivided moiety of the proceeds of an estate, and there to remain until the debt was paid. The Act 1 & 2 Vict. was intended to supply a defect which existed in the law, and to give to creditors security against the lands of their debtors. It enacted that the effect of the registration of a judgment should be the same as if the debtor had done that which every honest debtor ought to do in the first instance, namely, to give his creditors the best security in his power. In order to avoid any risk of the creditor unduly pressing his debtor, it was provided that until the judgment had been registered for one whole year no step could be taken under the Act for realizing of the debt against the land of the debtor. The policy of that restriction was, he admitted, a fair subject for consideration. But the present Bill proposed that no judgment entered after the passing of the Act should affect any land, of whatever tenure, as against a bonâ fide purchaser or mortgagee. In other words, that although the Act 1 & 2 of the Queen gave the creditor a specific security upon land, the owner might sell that land over the head of his creditor, and that the purchaser should be able to maintain his purchase against the claims of the creditor, even although he might have had notice of the judgment. In point of justice there could be no comparison between the creditor who had given his money and the purchaser, whose dealing for the estate was at his own risk and for his own benefit, without any previous right or obligation, and whose desire it ought to be that the purchase money should be honestly distributed amongst the parties having charges on the estate. The purchaser had only to search the regis- try in order to ascertain who were the parties whose acquiescence in the sale was necessary to the making out of a good title. He agreed with his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wallingford (Mr. Malins) that Lord St. Leonard's Act, which passed in 1860, imposed forms which were inexpedient. He was not in the House when that Act passed, and washed his hands of it; but the inconveniences arising from it afforded no reason for taking away the securities provided by the 1& 2 Vict., merely in order that purchasers and mortgagees should be saved some slight trouble. The memorandum spoken of by his hon. and learned Friend would cost more money than the present searches. The Bill of the hon. Member for Sheffield would have a mischievous tendency, which could only be mitigated by multiplying work for lawyers, which work would in the end do no good to either purchasers or vendors.

, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said, he appealed to hon. Members to dismiss from their minds all preconceived prejudices, and that its provisions would receive careful consideration, so that the railway companies might have the satisfaction of knowing, if the decision of the House were against the Bill, that that decision was the result of deliberate conviction, and not of a foregone conclusion. An idea seemed to exist in the public mind that railway companies should be treated as public enemies, and should, on every possible occasion, be made to pay heavy damages. He frankly admitted that this Bill was brought forward in the interest and with the consent of the railway companies, a body who had conferred greater benefit on the public than any other improvement of modern times; but that admission was no reason why the measure should not be considered in an impartial spirit, or for supposing that there had been any banding together of the railway companies to promote their own interests in opposition to the interests of the public. Such a combination he certainly should feel it inconsistent with his duty to support. The measure expressed the sense felt by the great companies of the grievance of which they had to complain, arising from operations of the law which had never been contemplated by its authors. In the remedy they proposed they did not seek to divest themselves of the just responsibility which attached to all carriers —they merely asked for relief from a misinterpretation of the law, which was not necessary for the protection of the public. By the old common law, while carriers were bound to carry every person presenting himself and every article offered to them for the purpose of being carried, within the limits of what they professed to be their business, it was also incumbent on the persons bringing articles to be carried, to declare their value at the time of delivery, and in the absence of any such declaration no compensation was recoverable in the case of loss or destruction. By the Registration of Traffic Act, which was commonly known by the name of Cardwell's Act, it was enacted that companies should not be liable for animals above a certain value, unless the value was stated, and they had full knowledge of the risk they were incurring. If a race-horse, for instance, were killed during its journey by a railway train, the company would not be liable for the full value, unless they had had full notice before. The only portion of the contracts into which railway companies entered over which they had no control, so far as their liability was concerned, and the full extent of which was absolutely uncertain, was the carriage of passengers. It had been said that the object of this Bill was to upset Lord Campbell's Act, but it was a great mistake to suppose that the responsibility of railway companies rested on that Act. That statute cured an acknowledged defect in the law by extending the liability, which the old common law imposed in cases of accidents to cases of death, so that the representatives of persons killed were able to recover compensation. What he was asking the House to do, was not to reverse Lord Campbell's Act, but to regulate and limit its operation, which Lord Campbell himself in his lifetime acknowledged had been carried too far. The first great injury inflicted on the railway companies by the operation of the law was the inequality of its operation. Two gentlemen, for instance, would take a ticket for the same place and would pay the same fare; the one would be a gentleman of £10,000 a year—he might be the Lord Chancellor of England; and the other somebody, whose life was of no pecuniary value to any one but himself—a subaltern in a marching regiment, or a younger son. An accident happened in which both of them were killed, and then the company found out, for the first time, into what different contracts they had entered. In the one case the compensation they had to pay was comparatively trifling, in the other they were liable to damages of an enormous amount. There never yet had been a case of damages to an enormous amount, but there had been many cases of extravagant damages; but, greater or smaller, the companies had no means of judging of the nature and extent of the contract into which they were entering. There was the case of an inequality of another kind—if a man were killed in an accident, leaving a wife and children of whom he was the support, the company were liable; but if he were a man with no such direct responsibilities, but who assisted his relatives, not in any fixed regular way, but just as they needed it, unless they could show a substantial loss, they could not recover. This Bill would so far extend the operation of Lord Campbell's Act as to give the surviving relatives of a man who was fatally injured, and those who were dependent on him to any extent, a right to compensation. He admitted that the Bill was of an exceptional character—that to a certain extent it proposed to take railway companies out of the category of persons liable for neglect. But it must be remembered that in many respects railway companies differed widely from private persons, who were affected by, and subject to, the provisions of the common and statute law of England. A great railway accident might be brought about by some small matter or derangement, against which it was almost impossible to provide. No matter what care might have been exercised by railway companies in the choice of materials, or in providing officials capable of discharging their duties, accidents might occur. There was an instance in which an accident occurred to a mail train with a new engine, the very part which gave way having been previously examined, and the driver being a most careful man, of twenty years' experience; but a frost had set in, and every possible precaution that could have been taken was baffled. Similar accidents were of constant occurrence, and would constantly occur unless they could insure a certainty which did not belong to human affairs. But the greatest evils in connection with the present state of the law on the subject wore the enormous frauds which it encouraged. Claims were often so long delayed—and delay in many cases was unavoidable—that the truth could not be ascertained. There were many instances in which persons had obtained sums of money from different companies on account of accidents at which they had not been present. Pettifogging solicitors and compassionate doctors were always to be found to do their utmost to enforce claims, no matter how lightly founded, against the companies. A conviction existed on the part of railway companies that there was a sort of partnership between solicitors and doctors in those cases. There was a class of solicitors and doctors who made it a practice to get them up. A small lawyer took up a case, and there was no difficulty in getting half-a-dozen doctors to come forward to support it—for, without casting any imputation upon professional men, it was a matter of fact that almost any number of professional men could be got to give evidence on any side whatever, and often of the most contradictory character. The mass of professional evidence which was brought forward on these occasions was wholly unnecessary, and was produced merely to increase costs. The juries, too, were often swayed by passion and prejudice. Often, contrary to the charging of the Judge, juries gave penal damages when the Judge recommended moderate damages, and they sometimes gave a higher compensation than the claimant himself asked for. Numerous cases of injustice had been brought before him, and the difficulty he experienced was in selecting from them. In the case of an accident on the North Western the plaintiff claimed £5,000. The company lodged £1,000 in the hands of the court. Mr. Justice Willes charged in favour of the company, but the jury gave large damages. In another case a person got £700 damages, on the ground that he was permanently injured for life; but the day after he had obtained his compensation, this person went back to his business. In another case a person got a large com- pensation for the shock to his nervous system in witnessing a railway accident. One individual was so successful in this way that he built a house in Shrewsbury, which his friends called "Compensation Hall." Mr. Saunders, a barrister, got £3,500 compensation, although all that had been proved was that he was in the habit of getting headaches, and could not pursue his usual avocations. It was proved that this gentleman had a fall from his horse some time previously. The hon. Baronet having cited other cases in which large damages were awarded for slight injuries, and even for accidents with which the parties had nothing whatever to do, proceeded to say:—But the worst case of all was that of the Whitehaven Junction Railway accident. This accident took place in 1861; but there was not a bone broken, and not a carriage injured. There were thirty-four passengers, and thirty cases of compensation were brought. The result was that the company had to pay £9,436 as compensation, and £741 as law costs, which was more than a two years' dividend at the rate of 5 per cent. Now, the company had to pay this enormous sum, although not a single carriage had been injured, and although several of the cases had been compromised at the rate of £14 per head. Those on whoso behalf the Bill had been introduced maintained that a specific contract ought to involve definite liabilities, and that railway companies alone ought not to be led into contracts the extent of which they could not tell. It was proposed, then, that the liabilities of the companies should be equal—that as there were equal payments, there should be equal liabilities; but where any individual estimated the value of his life to his representatives higher than the limitation of the Bill provided for, he should be entitled to insure with the railway company to the higher amount which he thought fit. Definite terms of insurance and details might be settled in Committee, or by the Board of Trade. He begged to move the second reading of the Bill.

seconded the Motion.

said, that in rising to move the Amendment which was equivalent to the rejection of the Bill, he must appeal to the general sense of justice of the House. He saw around him a great many hon. Gentlemen who were connected with railways; hut, nevertheless, he had that confidence in the justice of the House as to believe they would reject this Bill. He must say that this was one of the most indecent propositions that had ever been submitted to the House. No doubt it was introduced with the sanction of the railway companies, and that was all the merit it had. Were they to be called upon to legislate for the life of human beings as for cattle—for the beast that perisheth—and to sanction the principle that the life of the poor man was not to be put in the same scale with that of the duke? [Sir JAMES FERGUSSON said, the object of the Bill was exactly the reverse.] The hon. Baronet seemed to complain that a railway company should be obliged to carry a subaltern and a duke on the same conditions. Of all the monstrous Bills that were ever introduced, this Bill, which the hon. Baronet had brought in on behalf of the railway companies, was the most monstrous. The Bill was said to be founded on the abuse of juries, medical men, and solicitors—it pretended to give increased facilities to claimants against companies; but it gave them not a single facility that the law did not give them already. The Bill was, in fact, an appraisement of human life according to the valuation of railway directors. The first section of the Bill provided that no person should be entitled to compensation beyond a certain amount, in consequence of an accident, from the railway company, unless his life were insured—thus limiting arbitrarily and indecently the amount at which human life was to be valued. But what was the rate at which railway directors proposed to appreciate human life? The Bill, on their behalf, divided railway passengers into three classes, the lives of which were appraised by the hon. Baronet at the rate of £400 in the ease of a first class, £300 in the case of a second, and £200 in the case of a third class passenger; that being the estimate which the directors had the modesty to put upon human life as represented in those three different classes. The hon. Baronet estimated the value of human life as he would estimate the value of cattle. In the days of Athelstan, indeed, there was a tariff of human life, in accordance with which a man was fined £13 for killing a peasant, the tariff increasing in amount up to £1,500 in case of a monarch. He could not say what was charged in the case of Baronets, for they came later. There was also under the Irish law what was called an eriach, or stipulated rate of payment in the case of persons who happened to be killed by accident or negli- gence. If the present Bill passed, the various companies would have to keep not only railway offices, but also insurance offices, of which the tariff was to be regulated by the Board of Trade, the directors, in addition to their other powers, being now anxious to have the privilege of killing the public at the rate of so much per head. He regarded the proposition as most indecent. If such legislation were sanctioned, it would, he supposed, shortly come to pass that a regular fixed scale would be established, and posted conspicuously at the various stations, by which the life of a sheep would be appraised at 40s., a cow at £15, a horse at £50, the loss of a man's eye at so much, lock-jaw and tetanus so much, general mutilation at so much more, until the maximum of £400 was reached in the case of the life of a first-class passenger. Such was the nature of the legislation which the hon. Baronet proposed—legislation called for by the existence of no grievance which he had proved, by nothing stronger than the assertions of railway companies themselves. He would remind the hon. Baronet that Committees had sat to inquire into the subject of railway accidents, and that reports in reference to it had been made from time to time, not by pettifogging lawyers, but by most competent and disinterested persons connected with the Board of Trade, and he would direct his attention to the evidence. Mr. Lowe, in giving his evidence before one of those Committees, that of 1858, stated that he regarded Lord Campbell's Act as the only security which the public had against railway accidents. He might add that, one of the reports which had been made to the Board of Trade in relation to these accidents showed that thirty-eight persons had been killed and 498 injured, as the result of two collisions; while, in the case of one of them, the accident was proved to have been attributable to neglect on the part of the signalman, a youth of nineteen, who was paid only 14s. or 15s. a week. Now, he had no compassion whatsoever for persons who were guilty of such miserable economy as not to secure the services of competent and experienced men, and who were ready to place the amount of their dividends in competition with human life. But that was commonly the case with the companies to which these reports referred. In twenty-eight instances the negligence of the inferior servants of railway companies had been the cause of accidents, and it was monstrous, he contended, that the House should be asked to throw its protection over those companies to the extent which the hon. Baronet proposed. He, for one, objected to human beings being placed in the same category as cattle, and to having human life sacrificed to the greed and cupidity of railway directors, and for all these reasons he should move the Bill be read a second time that day six months.

, in seconding the Amendment, said, that no one could doubt but that the hon. Baronet who moved the second reading was actuated by the purest and most honourable intentions in bringing forward this Bill, and it was a matter of surprise to him (Mr. Bentinck) that a man possessed of such feelings of justice should have allowed himself to be mixed up with so extraordinary a measure as the present. The hon. Baronet, in introducing the measure, stated that there was a great prejudice against railway companies, which this Bill endeavoured in some degree to remedy, and appeared to think that railway directors were, generally speaking, the purest philanthropists, who were associated together exclusively for the public benefit. Now, he (Mr. Bentinck) denied the existence of any such prejudice as had been asserted; neither was he disposed to consider railway directors such disinterested gentlemen as his hon. Friend seemed to think them. He believed them to be very respectable men, who in consulting the convenience of the public were at the same time very properly alive to their own interests. But it was the public, and not the railway directors, that would be injured by the proposed Bill. If any legislation respecting this subject were to take place, it appeared to him that it should be in the opposite direction to that which the measure before the House went. The hon. Baronet had relied much in support of his case on the argument that railway accidents might be occasioned by very trifling causes, or causes entirely beyond the control of the directors. But it was his (Mr. Bentinck's) conviction that the main cause of railway accidents was attributable to the great speed at which railway trains were now driven, for the purpose of competing with rival lines and filling the pockets of the shareholders, regardless of the interests of the public. The hon. Baronet had said that medical men and lawyers combined in considerable numbers with the view of obtaining larger damages from railway companies than it was just they should be called upon to pay; but the very fact that a great number of persons were enabled to make a livelihood in that way, would of itself show how great the number of accidents must be. That in several instances juries had granted larger sums in the shape of compensation than had been asked for also, he thought, seemed to prove with how much moderation those claims had been preferred. But the point to which he wished chiefly to draw the attention of the House was the danger resulting from over-speed, which he could, from the knowledge which he had acquired as Chairman of the Committee on Railway Accidents in 1858, state was the main cause of many of those disasters which we had to deplore. On that subject he might observe that an hon. Friend of his, who was also a Member of the Committee of 1858, had informed him that at the beginning of last Session, having at his request endeavoured to ascertain privately from the railway directors of the principal companies, who had assembled together at a meeting which he was about to attend, why it was, that when they all admitted that great and serious danger was the result of over-speed, and that it would be a great benefit to the companies and a great source of security to the public if the rate of speed could be diminished, they had so strongly opposed the proposal which he himself had made to effect that object. Their answer to the question was, "We are quite alive to the force of all you say; but we will suffer any amount of loss so far as our dividends are concerned, we prefer exposing the public to any amount of risk, rather than submit for one moment to have our authority over the companies we direct controlled by Government interference." The present was not, however, the occasion to dwell upon that point, although it was, in his opinion, quite clear the railway directors, in thus acting, cut, as it were, the ground from under their own feet as petitioners to Parliament for a diminution of their liabilities. He regretted not to see the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade present, as he wished to place some facts connected with this subject before him. But as the right hon. Gentleman was not in his place, he should defer those observations to another opportunity. He had frequently pressed upon the right hon. Gentleman the importance of legislating on this subject, but he invariably received a reply expressing his unwillingness to proceed in the matter. Much, he might add, had, of late years, been said about cheap travelling; but safe travelling was entitled also, he thought, to have something said in its fa- vour in these days when railways had a monopoly of the whole traffic of the country, and when persons were virtually compelled to use them as a means of locomotion. The public were under such circumstances, he could not help thinking, entitled to the best precautionary measures possible by legislation against railway mismanagement, and consequent danger to life and limb.

said, the hon. and learned Member who had preceded him had laid great stress on the enormity of valuing human beings like cattle or pigs at so much per head, but no one had ever heard in courts of justice any attempt to make reparation for wounded feelings, or for the severance of human affections, for the simple reason that it was quite impossible to make any adequate compensation for the loss of life. The only point which was or could be considered in giving compensation for the death of an individual, was the money loss which it occasioned to his family and relations; and the decision of the jury was necessarily confined, to an estimation of what that loss was. The damages were, in fact, questions of loss of property. The objection to the present system was, that this money value was regulated by totally different rules of law to those which regulated the estimation of the value of all other property. Now, railway companies claimed that they should be allowed to apply to the cases of loss of life, treated as they now were as property—but always remembering that the loss of life itself could not be compensated—the same rules which applied to all other descriptions of property when it was lost by negligence or accident. The object of this Bill was to give, instead of the excessive damages now occasionally recovered, a moderate and fair compensation, which would be promptly and readily paid, and without those expenses in which a considerable portion of the compensation now awarded leaked away. Allusion had been made to the danger arising from the speed at which railway trains were run, but these dangers were very much exaggerated. As instances, he would mention one or two facts, which were better than a volume of declamation. During the last eight years the North Eastern Eailway—a company with which he was connected—had carried 55,160,000 passengers. The number of passengers injured, including the most trifling hurts, was 18⅜ per annum, and the number killed only per annum, or one every two years. The number of deaths, therefore, was about 1 in 14,000,000 passengers. Was there any other mode of conveyance which could be said to be equally safe? On Easter Monday, the London and Brighton Railway Company conveyed, in addition to their ordinary traffic, 112,919 persons, without the occurrence of a single accident. Other railways could show returns equally favourable. He admitted, that unless it could be shown that this Bill would benefit the public, it ought not to receive the sanction of the House. He had already referred to one way in which the public would be benefited, but there would be the additional advantage that railways, relieved from the losses to which they were now subjected by vindictive or excessive verdicts, would be able to provide better for the safety of the public. Railway Companies had great reason to complain of the tendency of the legislation of this House. He might instance the excessive competition to which they were subjected by the multiplication of lines between the same terminal points and the heavy local burthens imposed upon them in consequence of the unequal assessment of railways as compared with other property. He would not dwell on these points on the present occasion further than to point out that the accidents arising from the poverty of railway companies were far more numerous than those caused by excessive speed. The amount of capital expended by railway companies was £362,000,000, and the receipts for last year amounted to about 4 per cent upon this outlay. Of this average profit some companies received hardly any at all; and if they were to be exposed to these enormous claims for compensation, as well as to the other legislative hardships he had pointed out, they would soon become utterly unable to defray the expenses which were necessary to secure the safety of the public. He should support the second reading of the Bill.

said, he desired to state the views which the Government took in regard to this measure, which had been introduced with great ability. It appeared to him that the principles of the Bill, though no doubt they had been carefully considered, were such as to make it impossible that it should receive their support. The hon. Gentleman who had last addressed the House, in a very temperate speech in support of the Bill, had urged arguments which it was very easy to prove to be fallacious—yet it was upon these arguments that the Bill principally rested. It was true that ordinary carriers were, under the Acts of Parliament, relieved from carrying goods of special value, unless that value was declared and special rates were paid; but, that while some lives were of more value than others, railway companies were not entitled to make any difference in the rates charged. In this argument there was a fallacy. Carriers were absolutely responsible for the safe custody of the goods which they carried, and Parliament had provided that they need not carry certain goods unless their value was declared and special rates were paid. But railway companies were not absolutely responsible for the safety of their passengers. It was only when damage resulted from their negligence and wrong—only when they had failed to do their duty—that they were responsible at all. If, through unavoidable accident, life was lost, no liability was imposed upon them. By this Bill, it was for the first time, proposed to fix a purely arbitrary value upon injury arising from wrong and negligence; while, at the same time, a provision was made for an additional sum, for which the passengers were to pay by way of insurance; and insurance against what? Not against unavoidable accident, but against the wrong which they might suffer at the hands of those who had contracted for their conveyance. This was of itself an admission that the arbitrary valuation was absurd; because, if it was suffiicent, where was the necessity for superadding anything to it? The provision was entirely opposed to all the principles of insurance. The principle of an insurance was, that it should be to provide against things for which the insurer would not otherwise be liable. In this case, however, it was proposed that the passenger should enter into a contract with the company to insure him against their own wrong. Without denying that the administration of the existing law might sometimes press hardly upon companies, or that it was a matter deserving of consideration whether some safeguards consistent with the principles of justice might not be thrown round their liability, he was bound to say that the principles of this Bill were such as to disentitle it to the support of the House, and he hoped that the Motion for its second reading would be rejected.

said, he rose to defend railway companies against the charge that they were frequently guilty of false economy; they were always most anxious that the materials they used were of the very best quality, and he would fearlessly assert that their servants always exerted themselves most praiseworthily to secure the safety of the public. Under the existing law, most extravagant and outrageous claims were frequently made against railway companies. He knew nothing of the Bill, or how or from whom it originated; but he could say that the railway directors never desired to shrink from their responsibility when cases of injury arose—in fact, they always exhibited great liberality in dealing with them. On the occasion of the Wimbledon accident, the cause of which the most able engineers and scientific men were unable to discover, and in the case of which the jury at the inquest on the body of Dr. Baly found a verdict of "Accidental death," claims were made to the amount of £30,221; and the London and South Western Railway Company actually paid £15,191. He did not entirely approve the provisions of this Bill, and should have preferred the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the whole question; but he should support the second reading.

, having reminded the Solicitor General that carriers were not liable for accidents occurring by the act of God, said, that this Bill was not the result of a great organization of railway companies. He was Chairman of one of those companies, and he could state that he had never seen the Bill until it was laid upon the table of the House. He approved of it, however, and should vote for the second reading. It was a mistake to suppose that the interests of railway companies were opposed to those of the public. The only way in which companies could obtain large receipts was by giving the best accommodation to the public, and nothing injured a railway more than the occurrence upon it of some great disaster. So long as the public would travel by fast trains, it would be necessary for the companies to run them; and if Parliament would pass an Act limiting their speed, it would be as great an advantage to the companies as to the public. Being the Chairman of a company which insured against accidents, he knew a good deal about fraudulent claims. He could tell stories that would make hon. Members laugh, and others that would make them shudder—including, he was sorry to say, the suspicion of more than one murder—which had been made for the purpose of recovering compensation for alleged rail- way accidents. He hoped that the Bill would be read a second time.

said, that it was not against railway companies alone that fraudulent claims were made; insurance companies were constantly cheated, and it was not long since that the owner of a common street cab was constantly bringing actions against gentlemen for damage to his cab, alleged to have been occasioned by their carriages. It was in vain that the coachmen protested that they had had no collision; the claimant was known to be a person of no means, and the defendant paid, rather than incur the expense of a law suit with a man of straw. The man was at last tried and convicted of extortion. This measure would have no effect whatever in preventing the setting-up of fraudulent claims, while, on the other hand, it would have the effect of hindering persons having honest claims from recovering fair compensation. The Bill was one which assumed that the railway companies were responsible for gross negligence, and it asked the House to absolve them from their liability. The hon. Member for Whitby (Mr. Thompson) had stated, that during a period of two years, out of 14,000,000 travellers on the North Eastern Railway only one person was killed, and eighteen or nineteen injured. But that very circumstance went to show how infinitesimal was the charge for accidents upon the companies, as compared with the enormous revenues which they derived from the traffic. The object of the House ought to be to secure the interests of the public, and the best way to do that was to allow of large damages being given against any company which failed in its duty. Why should these powerful associations have an exemption which was not enjoyed by the poor cab and omnibus proprietors? Suppose a company chose to continue in their employment a guard who had been found drunk three or four times, and the consequence was that the train was smashed; some lost their lives, and several were injured; who would say that such a company ought to be absolved from liability beyond a certain amount? Were they to be protected against the consequences of their own negligence and their own misconduct? But, if that sort of legislation were to be applied to railway companies, it ought to be carried much further, and gas companies and millowners and others ought to be exempted from the consequence of their own misconduct.

said, he would make an appeal to the hon. Baronet to withdraw the Bill, on the understanding that the House would endorse the proposition to refer the whole subject to a Select Committee. He was one of those who thought the subject ought to be considered; but unfortunately the Bill was so framed that it would be impossible to vote for it without committing oneself to principles which were wholly indefensible. There was not a clause or sentence of the Bill which anybody could undertake to justify. Last year he (Mr. Ayrton) submitted the subject to the House in one form, and the year before in another. But the fact was, the whole question was surrounded by great difficulties. The hon. Baronet did not propose that his measure should apply to carriers in general, whether by sea or land, but he had chosen a particular class for special legislation.

said, he hoped the House would agree to refer the Bill to a Select Committee, as the whole subject of damages for loss of life required revision.

, in reply, said, the speech of the hon. Member for Mallow (Mr. Longfield) was in answer to a speech of his own, not to any speech which he (Sir James Fergusson) had delivered. If the House would allow the Bill to be read a second time, in order that the whole subject might be referred to a Select Committee, that was all he wanted.

said, that was a very unusual course to take. The House, on a former occasion, had refused to read the Bill a second time, and now the hon. Gentleman, taking advantage of a point of form, and without any explanation, moved that the Bill should be read a second time on the 10th of June. He should oppose the Motion.

said, he should appeal to the Speaker. The principle of the Bill had been already disposed of; but because the form was not used that the Bill be read a second time this day six months the hon. Gentleman made his present Motion. They were all agreed that nothing could be done on the subject this Session, and therefore he did not see what the hon. Gentleman could have in view in the course which he was now taking.

said, the division took place the other day very prematurely, and he knew that many Members voted without being aware how they were voting.

This is a question of form. The decision of the House upon a former occasion was upon the Question that" the Bill be now read a second time; and the decision was, that the Bill should not be then read a second time: but that decision, though adverse, did not preclude the assumption that the House might be more favourably disposed to it on another day. But if the House had decided that the Bill should be read a second time that day six months, that decision would have been final.

said, he did not see that there could be any objection to the Motion.