House Of Commons
Monday, July 6, 1863.
MINUTES.]—SUPPLY— considered in Committee—R.P.
PUBLIC BILLS— Resolution in Committee—Fortifications and Works
First Reading—India Stock * [Bill 212]; Growing Crops Seizure (Ireland)* [Bill 211].
Second Reading—Greenwich Hospital (Provision for Widows [Bill 200]; Pilotage Orders Confirmation * [Bill 206]; Waterworks Clauses * [Bill 207]; Companies Clauses * [Bill 209].
Committee—Removal and Punishment of Prisoners* [Bill 194]; Public Works and Fisherics Acts Amendment * [Bill 198]; Duchy of Cornwall Management (1863) ( Lords)* [Bill 182]; Alkali Works Regulation ( Lords)* [Bill 135], and re-committed.
Report—Removal and Punishment of Prisoners; * Public Works and Fisheries Acts Amendment; * Duchy of Cornwall Management (1863) ( Lords). * Considered as amended—English Church Services in Wales ( Lords)* [Bill 190].
Third Reading—Vaccination (Scotland)* [Bill 202]; Police and Improvement (Scotland) (Provisional Order)* [Bill 184]; Stipendiary Magistrates * [Bill 189]; Prisons (Ireland) * [Bill 178], and severally passed.
London, Chatham, And Dover Railway (No 1) Bill Lords—(By Order)
Second Reading
Bill read 2°, and committed.
said, he rose to move the following Resolution:—
The object of his Motion was to have the question of the proposed viaduct over Ludgate Hill re-considered. Since the Act enabling the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company to construct the railway over Ludgate Hill had been passed, the Metropolitan Railway had established the fact that railways might be safely, conveniently, and economically made beneath the surface. Unless some comprehensive system in regard to metropolitan stations were adopted by the Legislature, great inconvenience was likely to be sustained. The London, Chatham, and Dover Company proposed to construct a station in Farringdon Street eighteen or twenty feet above the level of the street, and that railway was to be connected, within an eighth of a mile, with another railway having a station twenty-five feet below the level of the street. A gradient was therefore required of 1 in 40, which would cause great inconvenience and danger to the public. He could not understand why the railway company should object to a tunnel under Ludgate Hill, which would get rid of all the inconvenience and difficulty. In 1860 the Company, no doubt, obtained leave to make a viaduct over Ludgate Hill; but the question had not then been placed before the public in its true light, and consequently had not been fully considered. The viaduct was opposed by all the great interests in the City. It was opposed not only by the Corporation of London, but by the bankers, merchants, the Commissioners of Sewers, the Corporation of the Dean and Chapter, and the Metropolitan Board of Works. He had letters from Mr. Hemans, engineer, and Mr. Penrose, surveyor, stating that the premises of The Times newspaper and Apothecaries' Hall, and the foundations of St. Paul's would not be injured by the tunnel, while a better gradient of 1 in 50 would be obtained. He would admit that the course he was proposing was unusual; but so were the circumstances in which the City was placed. The House injudiciously gave the company, three years ago, the power of making a railway with unsafe gradients, and he asked it to re-consider its former legislation. The Company had been waited upon by several deputations. They had, they said, gone to considerable expense, and that was, he believed, where the shoe pinched. If his Motion were carried and the question referred to a Committee, they would have the power of transferring a portion of such expenditure to the Corporation if they pleased. ["Hear, Hear!"] He would re-echo that cheer, and admit that as the Corporation were the Representatives of the City of London, they ought to pay a portion of the expenses incurred for the sake of obtaining so important an improvement. He did not, however, believe that any expenditure which would not otherwise have been necessary had been incurred in regard to the proposed viaduct. A similar case of interference took place upon a Bill promoted by the London and South Western Railway, when Parliament prohibited the construction of a viaduct which had been already sanctioned, unless the Company consented to meet the wishes of the public on some point. He trusted that the House would agree to the proposed instruction to the Committee."That it be an Instruction to the Committee on the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway (No. 1) Bill, that they do admit the Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London to be heard upon their Petition with reference to the Railway already authorized in the City of London, and for the insertion of a Clause prohibiting the Railway Company from carrying a Viaduct over Ludgate Hill."
said, that the Motion of the hon. Alderman was not only unusual, but absolutely unprecedented; and not only unprecedented, but if acceded to, it would establish a precedent little to the credit of Parliament, because it would shake to the foundation public faith in the rights guaranteed by Act of Parliament. The instruction would, if adopted, enable parties who had already been heard in opposition to a Bill to come down again and raise the same issue on another Bill with a view of unsettling the law. The Motion was not brought forward with a view of questioning any clause in the Bill now before the House, but to question an Act which had been in existence three years, under which vast interests had been created, and on the faith of which large sums of money had been invested. He would ask the House to separate the question of the viaduct from the discussion. The Bill now before the House authorized the construction of a small extent of line in another part of the metropolis, and authorized the company to raise money which was to be strictly appropriated to the execution of those works. The hon. Alderman did not question any of the works authorized by the Bill, but wished to repeal the clauses of an Act passed three years ago. He would not enter into the question of the merits or demerits of the proposed viaduct over Ludgate Hill whatever they might be, and even if the viaduct was objectionable, the present was not the proper mode of raising the question. If the question were to be re-opened, it must be by another form. All the parties interested must have notice, and no private individual could raise the issue. As the powers complained of were undoubtedly granted by Parliament, it would be the duty of the Government, if they considered the powers granted by the Bill ought to be withdrawn, to propose that the legislation of the year 1860 or the subject should be re-considered, that some other works should be substituted and that compensation should be given to the parties for the money they had ex pended under the former Act. The Motion before the House was so utterly a variance with the practice of the House and with the commonest rules of justice-it was, moreover, so dangerous as tending to unsettle the validity of titles enjoyed under Act of Parliament—that he trustee the House would reject it.
said, he wished to correct some of the statements made by the hon. Alderman, which had no doubt been made in error. It was not true that the Commissioners of Sewers were opposed to the viaduct; and as to the Board of Works, they had actually decided by resolution in favour of the measure, and that they would not oppose the construction of the viaduct. Trains were often detained on the bridge in consequence of the narrow approach to the Victoria station. One object of the Bill was to give to the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway power to improve the approaches. The hon. Alderman, however, proposed to stop that work because the corporation of London had changed their minds as to the viaduct across Ludgate Hill.
said, he had been a Member of the Committee before which the Bill was brought in 1860, and no Committee could have more carefully performed its duties. The Lord Mayor and several members of the Corporation were examined, and gave evidence in favour of the Bill.
remarked, that a deputation of persons who were opposed to the viaduct over Ludgate Hill had waited on him to request that he would oppose the scheme, and he informed them that he could not, in common honesty and justice, because they disapproved of the viaduct, vote against a Bill which had nothing whatever to do with that subject. He hoped that the House would stand by its established usages, and not accept so monstrous a proposition as that now before it.
said, he did not think that the hon. Alderman merited the obloquy which had been cast upon him, because a very strong feeling had been manifested out of doors, in the press and elsewhere, against what was regarded as the hideous viaduct proposed to be thrown across Ludgate Hill. When the former Bill received the sanction of Parliament, the corporation of the City of London were large proprietors of Metropolitan Railway stock, which the proposed line was to join and would very much benefit. They consequently supported the measure, and the Lord Mayor and only the Lord Mayor gave evidence in its favour. It had, however, been suggested by the Chairman of Committees, that the Government should bring in a Bill by which the expense to be incurred in an alteration of the plan from a viaduct to a tunnel should be provided for, and he thought it worth consideration whether that could not be done by a clause to be inserted in the present Bill.
said, the suggestion made by the hon. Alderman was not to throw out a distinct clause, but to give an opportunity of considering the question of the viaduct. It was a matter of great regret that the view of St. Paul's should be interfered with.
Motion made, and Question,
"That it be an Instruction to the Committee on the Bill, that they do admit the Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London to be heard upon their Petition with reference to the Railway already authorized in the City of London, and for the insertion of a Clause prohibiting the Railway Company from carrying a Viaduct over Ludgate Hill,"—(Mr. Alderman Sidney,)
—put, and negatived.
Ordered,
That Standing Orders 187, 188, and 216, be suspended, in the case of the said Bill, and that the Committee on the Bill have leave to sit and proceed upon Friday next, and that all Petitions praying to be heard against the said Bill be deposited upon or before Thursday next.
Hawkers' Licences—Question
said, he rose to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether poor men or women hawking pots, house sand, green groceries, or other articles of a like description, are required to take out a hawker's licence; if not, and the Excise Officers have compelled any persons to do so, whether he will give instructions for the money to be remitted?
said, in reply, that on former occasions he had been charged by the hon. Gentleman, in reference to this matter of hawkers' licences, with having ruined several thousands of poor men. He had, however, made no proposition on the subject, except one which would have an opposite tendency—namely, a proposition to reduce the duty. The state of the law was this, and it had been so for some very considerable time, that licences were required to be taken out for hawking all goods but victuals or articles which were the manufacture of the person selling them. It had been the custom of the Revenue Department in cases which appeared to them to be not in the contemplation of the law, though within its letter, not to enforce the law. Such being the provisions of the law, it was impossible for him to give any general answer on the subject. All he could say was that no complaint had been made to him of the operation of the law, and should any cases of hardship arise, the best way would be to send an account of them to the Government, who would then consider whether any proposal should be made for an alteration of the law. With respect to green groceries he apprehended that there was no liability to take out a hawker's licence.
said, he wished to know whether the right hon. Gentleman expected every individual case of hardship to be laid before him?
said, that no individual case had been laid before him, and he was therefore without the means of determining upon the expediency of altering the law.
The Banda And Kirwee Prize Money—Question
said, he had given notice of his intention to ask a Question of the Secretary to the Treasury; but as he was happy to see the First Lord of the Treasury in his place, he would put the Question to the noble Lord instead. His Question was, Whether it is true that the opinion of the Law Officers have been taken on the subject of the Banda and Kirwee Prize Money, and that the opinion they have given is in favour of the preferential claim of Sir George Whitlock's force?
replied, that it was not usual for a Minister to state to the House the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown; still he had no hesitation in saying that it was the opinion of those officers that there was no law regulating the division of prize money in the case to which the question of the hon. Baronet related. It was therefore left to the discretion of the Crown to say in what proportions and to whom that distribution should be made. The Government had come to a decision on the respective claimants; and the result would be communicated to the parties interested in a few days.
Alteration Of The Circuits
Question
said, he wished to ask Mr. Attorney General, Whether he will introduce a Bill for alteration of the Circuits before the next Assizes commence, or at what other time?
replied, that the intentions of the Government on the sub- ject were not finally formed. The Lord Chancellor was in communication with the Judges relative to the provisions of a Bill which had been prepared on the subject by the Attorney General. It was, however, impossible that any alteration could come into operation before the next Spring Assizes.
Affairs Of Greece
Question
said, he wished to inquire, in reference to the sum of £4,000 a year proposed to be given up to the new King of Greece. Whether it will be surrendered simply by the authority of the Crown, or whether it will be necessary to make a communication on the subject to that House; and, if so, when and in what form will that communication be made?
said, in reply, that in the opinion of the Government it would not be possible for the Crown to make any surrender of public money without the authority of Parliament. According to the practice of the Constitution, he believed that there were no means of compelling the Crown to receive any public money; and there was no doubt of the Crown having exercised the power in former years as to the non-receipt of some of the interest on foreign loans, which other countries had guaranteed to pay. But to make a convention to abandon the right to receive was a totally different thing; and with regard to the surrender of the sum of £4,000 a year, referred to by the hon. Member, it would be requisite for the Government to apply for an Act of Parliament. With respect to the time and form of proceeding, the Government had looked back to the precedent of the Austrian Loan, by which Austria was burdened with a debt to this country during and subsequent to the war which closed in 1815. A convention, dated in 1823, was formed between Great Britain and Austria for the settlement of that loan, and under that Convention Austria engaged to pay a certain sum of money, and Great Britain engaged to forego all claim in excess of that sum. After the Convention was formed, a Bill was brought into Parliament and received the Royal Assent in 1824. The sum of £4,000 a year, referred to by the hon. Gentleman, must, in the first place, be the subject of a diplomatic arrangement; and as it would not be until after such arrangement that Her Majesty's Government would be able to apply to Parliament for an Act, he apprehended that it would not be in the power of the Government to submit a Bill on the subject to the notice of Parliament during the present Session.
Case Of The "Margaret And Jessie"—Question
said, he wished to ask, Whether the Government have received and will lay on the table the Papers connected with the case of the Margaret and Jessie?
said, in reply, that the Government had received from the Governor of the Bahamas an account which tallied pretty well with the facts stated in the public press with regard to the Margaret and Jessie—namely the deposition of the commander of that vessel. At the same time, the Government had heard from Washington, that on a similar account having appeared in the American papers, Mr. Seward immediately wrote to Lord Lyons a note stating, that he had received from the commander of the Rhode Island, a vessel of war, an account of the same transaction, and that officer denied having fired into the Margaret and Jessie when within British waters. Mr. Seward stated that inquiries would be made, and that if it turned out that the vessel had been fired at in British waters, the most ample redress would be afforded.
United States—Recognition Of The Southern Confederacy
Question
I wish Sir, to ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government, Whether he will grant me some day for the resumption of the debate that has already taken place on the recognition of the Southern States of North America. I would ask him to give me next Thursday. If not Thursday, considering the importance of the debate, I hope Monday will be the latest?
Sir, I can assure my hon. and learned Friend that we have every desire to accommodate him. I must, however, remind the House that this is the 6th of July, and I suppose hon. Members would not like to sit much beyond the end of this month. I have therefore to propose a "give and take" arrangement to the House—that they should allow us to bring in the Bill on Fortifications to-night, and to take the second reading on Thursday, and then we will give the hon. and learned Gentleman Monday next for the American debate, I hope the House will consent to that arrangement.
I hope the noble Lord will allow me to ask one more question, or rather to make a suggestion, and that is, that he should fix the Motion as the first Order of the Day for Monday, and that he will fix it next Thursday; for the House has seen that the intentions of the Government have been frustrated when they have omitted to fix the Order beforehand. I hope, therefore, that he will do that on Thursday next.
We will concur with my hon. and learned Friend in giving the utmost fixity to the arrangement.
Affairs Of Poland
Question
said, he would beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether there is any foundation for a statement which has appeared in the newspaper La France, to the effect that England is so far committed upon the question of Poland that in the event of war arising out of it between France and Russia she could not remain neutral; whether there is any ground, so far as this country is concerned, for a suggestion which has been repeatedly put forward in French newspapers, and particularly in the Constitutionnel, that the negotiations relating to Poland might terminate in war; and whether Her Majesty's Government have laid down as a principle in those negotiations that this country will in no case intervene with armed force in the quarrel between the Emperor of Russia and his Polish subjects?
Sir, I am glad to answer the Question of my hon. Friend by stating that Her Majesty's Government have in this matter pursued that which is the standing policy of England—namely, not to contract prospective engagements with regard to events which cannot be precisely foreseen. We have entered into no engagements with any foreign Power on the subject to which my hon. Friend has alluded. We are therefore perfectly free to act in regard to any event which may occur in the manner which appears to be most expedient and consistent with the interests of this country.
Supply
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
Royal Commission Of 1851
Resolution
rose to move, that in the opinion of this House, the purchase money of land at Kensington should be applied by the Commissioners of the Great Exhibition of 1851 towards discharging the liabilities of the Commission, and that the Commission should be determined, and the property now held by the Commission be vested in Her Majesty's Commissioners of Works, subject to any interests now existing therein and to any charges thereon. The hon. Member said, that although no doubt the subject had lost some of its interest owing to its not having been brought forward on a previous occasion, yet in consequence of the purchase which had been sanctioned by the House, it had become necessary to go further, and to inquire into the nature of that body of Commissioners from whom the land at South Kensington had recently been purchased, and to take into its own hands the whole question in reference both to the land bought and to that remaining in their possession. That Commission was of a very peculiar character. He need scarcely remind the House that the Exhibition of 1851 was carried on by virtue of a Royal Commission issued to His Royal Highness the late Prince Consort and twenty-four other Commissioners. That body was authorized to take whatever measures might be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the Exhibition, to receive subscriptions and to apply them to that end; but the Commission contained no ulterior provision. On the contrary, it provided, that after the close of the Exhibition, the powers and functions of the Commissioners should cease. Every one would remember that the Exhibition was an immense success—that it resulted in a surplus of £181,000, therefore no sooner had the Exhibition closed than the question arose as to what was to be done with that large sum of money. The Commissioners had issued a notification, that whatever subscriptions they might receive from the public, the subscribers would have no control over them, but that the money would be at the absolute disposal of the Commis- sioners themselves for purposes strictly in connection with the ends of the Exhibition. The consequence was, that at the close of the Exhibition, the Commissioners found themselves in possession of a fund with which they had no power to deal. They reported that fact to the Crown, with their opinion that no measures could be so strictly in accordance with the ends of the Exhibition as those which might increase the means of industrial education and extend the influence of science and art upon productive industry; soon after a new Commission was issued, giving the Commissioners power to devise a plan for the disposal of the surplus money in accordance with the expectations held out to the public and to carry it into effect. The Commission conferred powers, among others, to buy and sell land. The fund was thus declared to be entirely a public one, derived from public sources, and intended for the benefit of the whole community. Some of the large towns which had subscribed towards it put forward claims to participate in it, and they proposed that institutions for the promotion of science and art should be established in all the chief seats of industry. The Commissioners rejected these applications, on the ground that the contributions were collected on the distinct understanding that those who gave them were to have no further control over the fund. The Commissioners at length came to the conclusion that the only course they could consistently take was to frame some great scheme to be carried out in the metropolis for the promotion of science and art. What that scheme was to be the Commissioners did not exactly state, but they strongly deprecated the frittering away of the money on small detached objects, and recommended that it should be devoted to one grand comprehensive plan. They further suggested that they could do nothing until they were in possession of land for the purpose, and they proposed to acquire a considerable estate in the suburbs as a preliminary measure, and they invoked the aid of the Government. Her Majesty, in consequence, at the opening of the Session of Christmas 1852 said, in Her Gracious Speech from the Throne—
The subject, therefore, now assumed a national aspect, and the House voted £177,500 to enable the Government to join with the Commissioners in purchasing a large extent of land at South Kensington, which was to be the foundation of future action between the Commissioners and the State, to carry into effect Her Majesty's recommendation. Thus assisted, the Commissioners proceeded to acquire the land; but as some of the proprietors refused to sell, and some of the occupiers to quit, and they could not enforce the negotiations by their own authority, they had to come to Parliament for compulsory powers. These were granted, and under these powers the Commissioners obtained possession of about eighty-six acres, at the price of £355,000. With this joint purchase of the land began the partnership between the State and the Commissioners for the advancement of science and art. The partnership was to be further strengthened by the Government being represented at the Board by four officials—the First Lord of the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Chief Commissioner of Works, and the President of the Board of Trade, That implied that the Government were always to be in a safe minority of one to five. That arrangement endured for two or three years. The land was laid out; about four acres were converted into roads, and a compact estate of eighty acres or upwards remained in the hands of the Commissioners. Some parts were let on building leases, hut, on the whole, very little annual profit was derived from the investment. At length, the partnership was found so irksome that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bucks, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced his intention to dissolve it. It had been proposed that all the great departments of science and art should be gradually concentrated at South Kensington, but none of the great institutions of London could be persuaded to transfer themselves to Kensington. Public opinion pronounced against the plan in the case of the National Gallery; the rich and independent institutions rebelled against the proposition, and the poor and dependent societies entreated the Government that they should on no account be removed to such an inconvenient suburb. The dissolution of the partnership between the State and the Commissioners, though involving great sacrifices, was therefore hailed with delight. When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bucks came down to the House and announced that the National Gallery was to remain where it was, and that the partnership between the Government and the Commissioners had better be dissolved, the announcement was received with great cheering. It might have been expected, that in parting company the State and the Commissioners would have followed the usual course when joint owners of a great estate desire to separate and have partitioned the land equally between them; but no such arrangement was proposed. The State got twelve acres valued at £60,000 and £120,000 in money; the rest of the estate, worth between £300,000 and £400,000, was left in possession of the Commissioners. For interest alone, the State lost about £20,000; it paid for its twelve acres more than they originally cost, but they had acquired no absolute title to the land; they were only allowed to occupy it so long as they should devote it to purposes of science and art; and the moment they diverted it from those purposes their former partners, the Commissioners, would be entitled to take possession of the twelve acres on refunding the £60,000, and they would also be entitled to all the buildings on the land, paying nothing in return. The State, therefore, had paid more than the land cost, and yet was not the owner of it. He thought that that was a most extraordinary relation for the public to be placed in towards a private body of Commissioners. The rest of the land was left in the possession of the Royal Commissioners. What had the Commissioners done since the dissolution of their partnership with the State to further the great ends of science and art? Before that dissolution they had erected an iron shed, and gathered together a number of miscellaneous objects—nothing more. They had not made a single step in advance since, but they had laid down a grand theory. A distinguished statesman used to say that a man with a theory was something intermediate between an animal under the dominion of an instinct, and a rational being. He could not pretend to decide to which category the Commissioners belonged; but they had a grand theory, that science and art were to be advanced by one comprehensive institution. It was somewhat remarkable that in all their Reports, when referring to this compendious institution, they never failed to add, "This plan will be developed according to the aid we receive from the public." That meant that the Commissioners could not carry out any scheme unless they practically became partners with the Government. One thing they had, undoubtedly, accomplished. With a view, he presumed, to promote science and art, they had provided an ornamental garden for the amusement of the upper classes at Kensington. They had given no fewer than twenty-two acres of their land in order to promote, not the science of horticulture, which could not be carried out at Kensington, but the art of amusing those who delighted in Saturday promenades and exhibitions of fruits and flowers. Not only bad they bestowed twenty-two acres upon a private subscription society rent free, but they had spent out of a national fund for the promotion of science and art, £50,000 for an arcade—the only condition being, that after all the expenses of the Horticultural Society, including its garden at Chiswick, were paid, a very limited portion of the surplus income should be given to them by way of recompense. Now, the English taste in gardening had gradually predominated over the whole of Europe, and one might naturally have anticipated that something great would be clone at Kensington. Quite the contrary. Under the name of science and art we had got a garden in which there was neither science, nor art, nor nature. People quitted it with the impression that they had been visiting the cemetery at Kensal Green, and great doubts were felt whether a place so revolting to English taste and feeling could be sustained. The Commissioners lad entreated the School of Music to come to Kensington, but the school begged to be excused, and as a substitute a band had been added to the other attractions of the Garden, but it had failed to draw the people away from Hyde Park and Kensington Gardens. The Commissioners had per-formed one other feat in the interest of science and art—they had established a Department of Domestic Economy, which was carried on in the place appropriately called the Brompton Boilers, where lectures were given upon food, teaching fat people how they might get lean, and lean people how they might get fat. But the Commissioners had resolved that the national taste should be further cultivated, if not in gardening, at least in one other respect. They had made arrangements to build one of the finest cafés in London, and to set up a great department of eating and drinking in connection with science and art. They relied upon the attractions of beer, cheap wine, and gin-sling. They intended to enlighten the people in all the science of adulteration, and to promote the art of drinking—it might be in moderation or it might be in excess. The grand central point and sine quâ non of the whole scheme was to be this great tavern, from which the visitor should never be able to escape; they might lose sight of other features of the exhibition, but of this never. He had no doubt that the Dilkusian party had already a new Cadogan in view who would draw a splendid income upon the refreshments supplied to rich and poor. What the tavern was to cost they did not exactly know; but twenty-two and a half acres were given for nothing and a grant of £50,000 for a stucco garden, to a society which had the right of excluding from it every one but its own members. That was the mode in which the Commissioners were disposing of a fund derived from the whole kingdom, which was confessedly national and which was to be devoted to national purposes. Then came the transactions connected with the International Exhibition. All the proceedings relating to that Exhibition were pervaded by a spirit of over-reaching and chicanery, so excessive as, he was happy to think, to have ultimately defeated its own object. Instead of being frank and open, they were entirely of a hole-and-corner character. In place of the beautiful creation of the native genius of the country which men saw spring up as if by enchantment in 1851, and which all admired, they had that extraordinary combination of brick galleries, iron and glass domes, with clerestory wooden naves painted after the fashion of an immodest casino, which had been so generally condemned. But, fortunately, the building and all its details had been disposed of, he trusted for ever, by the decisive Vote of the other night. The House had agreed to purchase the site for £120,000, and his Motion accepted that decision. But they had bought the land with a direct responsibility to this Royal Commission, that it should be appropriated to the purposes of science and art. Now, he had some doubt whether a legal question could not be raised, that, by the law of England it was not in the power of the Commissioners to attach conditions to the future use of the land which nobody had a right to enforce. On either side of the House sat Gentlemen who were well acquainted with the law, who could advise the Government whether it was a good condition, that this land, which was public property, should not be dealt with for any public purpose except that which the Commissioners prescribed—namely, for science and art. But there was another condition. However much the House, in establishing collections and galleries, might desire to refine the minds of the people, all those collections and galleries must be inextricably associated with the tavern and drinking-house of the Commissioners. Whatever might be the nature or the cost of public buildings erected on the land, the Commissioners stipulated that there must be free access between every building and the national gin palace. The partnership between the Commissioners and the public was again forced upon them by these conditions. And this brought him to the operative part of his Motion. There was but one remedy for that state of things. They had not been able to disentangle themselves from the Commissioners, and they never could do so as long as the Commission existed; and therefore the only way of getting rid of the partnership was by getting rid of the Commission altogether. Without doing that, they could not hope to see the end of those embarrassing and circumventing intrigues which had been witnessed in the present Session. The proceedings of Thursday last, however tumultuous they might be thought, did honour and credit to the House of Commons. For when the House found that there had been circumventing intrigues to mystify and ensnare them, it was high time that hon. Members expressed themselves in terms of such indignant disgust that there might be no attempt to repeat such practices. He claimed the whole of the property in the possession of the Commissioners as essentially national—as property with which the House was entitled to deal in common with the other estates of the realm, as guardians of the public interest. A constitutional question might have been raised whether the Crown had a right to dispose of the fund at all in favour of the Commissioners without the intervention of Parliament. But, while they had that illustrious Prince among them, who took a great interest in the subject—who had devoted his whole life to the study of science and art—who possessed most eminent powers of administration—who associated himself with men eminent in science and art, and had the benefit of their judgment—and while the control had not yet fallen into the hands of certain honorary associates, and mainly into those of the Dilkusian party, it might not have been worth while to raise such a constitutional question. The late Prince Consort could be trusted when he acted on his own judgment, and he might have accomplished some grand design; but, like all Princes, he was sometimes the victim of the mere parasites and intriguers, from whom it was the great misfortune of Royalty it could not always escape. But the case was now altered. He knew of no circumstance now existing which should withdraw this great national fund from the legitimate control of Parliament. He knew no reason why any persons should dictate to the elected guardians of the public interest how they should act in regard to science and art. He had always gone rather to extreme lengths in vindicating the rights of private property. But where property was in the hands of a mere Commission or corporation, without any local object, without any personal interest, without any ulterior right of ownership, where the property was acquired from the public and dedicated to the public at large, Parliament had a clear right to intervene and legislate for the public interest. ["Hear, hear!"] He was glad to learn that doctrine was admitted on the Treasury bench. The question of expediency then only remained. He ventured to say, that if this property were administered with judgment, as a whole, it would supply all the requirements of science and art for a century to come. The House must not be misled by a very remarkable Return which had been produced in relation to this Motion. When he recollected the circumstances under which this Return had been made—how it had been resisted as an intrusion into the private acts of the Commissioners—it appeared as if it had been prepared to give to the House as little information as possible; and its tendency certainly was to mislead the casual reader. He had desired to know what was the financial condition of the Commission, and the Return stated the total annual income at about £5,900, besides such rents as the Horticultural Society may pay, which he might explain as nothing. The total annual liabilities of the Commission were stated at £8,700. Thus it was made to appear at the first glance that his Motion would only impose a charge on the public to meet a deficit. The true state of affairs would never occur to any one cursorily perusing this Return. This was the conclusion of a partnership in which the country was entitled to an equal share of the property. They had now agreed to pay £120,000 for some of the land. The Commissioners, who now imposed the condition that the land should be applied to the purposes of science and art, had themselves, of their own authority, let land on building leases. The value of the ground rents was about £162,000. Then there were fifteen acres unbuilt on, valued, according to the Commissioners' own standard, at £225,000. Their assets would amount to £507,000. There was besides the reversion of the twenty-two acres, absolutely at the end of sixty years, which the Horticultural Society now held, and there was also the great tavern, which had cost a great deal of money. These were their assets. Their liabilities were £120,000, borrowed from Greenwich Hospital, and £50,000; an annuity to Messrs. Kelk and Lucas to be redeemed for £17,000. The total liabilities of the Commission therefore were £187,000; their assets being £507,000. He called on them to wipe away all this complication, which had arisen from the terms put on them by those who presumed to be their patrons and protectors in the disposal of this property. They were told that the Treasury were about to create a Department for the purpose of grappling with this question, and that that Department Would be responsible to Parliament. He had no objection to vesting in a Government Department the disposal of these funds under Parliamentary supervision, so as to evoke the hearty co-operation of all men in this country conspicuous for their attainments in art and science, and he hoped they might thereby obtain some guarantee that the buildings erected on the ground purchased should themselves be models of art and schools of design for the country at large. As the necessary complement, then, of this work, he called on them to hand over the whole of this property to that Department of the Treasury. They did not set up as arbiters of taste, but these great public affairs should be conducted so as to subserve the purposes of all the high science and real art of the country, and not the mere hole-and-corner interests of second, third, and fourth-rate men. He wished to get rid of the excrescence of the Commission, which was no longer justified now it had lost its great ornament and head, which had really no- thing to do, and which had accomplished nothing during its existence."The advancement of the fine arts and practical science will be readily recognised by you as worthy of the attention of a great and enlightened nation. I have directed that a comprehensive scheme shall be laid before you, having in view the promotion of that object, in carrying out which I invite your co-operation."
Amendment proposed,
To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, the purchase money of the land at Kensington should be applied by 'The Commissioners of the Great Exhibition of 1851,' towards discharging the liabilities of the Commission; and that the Commission should be determined, and the property now held by the Commission be vested in the Crown, subject to any interests now existing therein, and to any charges thereon,"—(Mr. Ayrton,)
—instead thereof.
said, he would, in the first place, state what was the exact legal position at this moment of the Commissioners for the Exhibition of 1851. The hon. and learned Gentleman had correctly stated that in 1850 Her Majesty had issued a Commission for the purposes of that Exhibition. In the same year, and therefore before the Exhibition of 1851, Her Majesty issued a charter to the Commission, and in December 1851 she issued a second charter to the Commission, the object being to give them a more extended field of action. These charters were recognised by an Act of Parliament passed in 1854, by which extended powers beyond those contained in the charters were further imparted to them. After the Exhibition accounts of 1851 were wound up, the Commission came into the possession of £187,000, the surplus which remained after defraying the expenses of that Exhibition; and the greater part of that sum, with £177,500 advanced by the Government with the sanction of Parliament, was applied towards the purchase of the Kensington Gore Estate. The Government and the Commissioners were therefore partners in respect of that transaction. That continued till 1859, when this joint ownership of the land was put an end to. The Government took the large piece of land, valued at cost price at £60,000, on which the Kensington Museum now stood, and they received from the Commissioners £120,000, which they raised by a mortgage on the remainder of the land. From that time the partnership between the Government and the Commissioners was dissolved, and the Commissioners assumed the same position as any other corporate body for trust purposes. They held their funds for the purposes of promoting science and art; and they were liable for any malversation or misappropriation of their funds—which they had derived partly from a fortunate land speculation, and partly from the success of the Exhibition of 1851—like the trustees of any hospital founded by private charity, to proceedings in Chancery. The Commissioners having repaid the public money which had been advanced, were strictly in the position which he had described. Of course, there were means by which the charter could be revoked. If it were shown that Her Majesty had been deceived, or that false representations had been made when the charter was granted, it could be revoked by a writ of scire facias: or, if it could be shown that the Commissioners had abused their powers, it could be re-remedied by writ of quo warranto. Those were the means known to the law by which the charter could be determined; except that there was a provision in the charter itself, by which, on its being certified by three Commissioners that the objects of the charter had been satisfied and accomplished, the charter itself might then come to an end. The proposition of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets was, that the House of Commons should by a Resolution—not put an end to the Commission, for that it was not in their power to do, but declare that the Commission ought to be put an end to. The point for the House to decide was whether it was desirable to pick out one from among the vast number of corporations that existed in this country, and declare that this corporation, having no public money, and no other privileges than Her Majesty had been pleased to bestow, and no other duties than were contained in the charter or added to by the Act of Parliament, ought to be put an end to at once. Of course, the House was aware that this corporation was formed of some of the most distinguished persons in the country, and that up to the period of his decease it was presided over by his Royal Highness the Prince Consort. So far, therefore, as regarded the mere personal qualifications of the Commission, it came before them with every claim to respectful consideration, with every claim to have its acts weighed dispassionately, with every claim not to have harsh and disparaging terms applied to those acts, unless they were clearly deserved. Before the hon. and learned Gentleman permitted himself to apply the word "chicanery" to such a body, presided over by such a person, be should at least have informed himself what were the duties of the Commissioners, how they were distinguished from other similar bodies, and he should have been able to place his finger on some act, established by clear and irrefragable evidence, in respect of which such a term might have been justifiably employed. He should have no difficulty in showing that this was not the case with regard to this Commission, when he reminded the House what the facts really were. The Commissioners of 1851 were not the managers of the Exhibition of 1862; and it was no proof of "chicanery" on the part of the former even if any disreputable or discreditable conduct could be established against the Commissioners of 1862—which no one believed. No act, good or bad, of the Commissioners of 1862 could affect the Commissioners of 1851, as they were distinct bodies. Before the hon. and learned Gentleman came down to the House and dealt in such terms with the honour of men highly respected in the country, he was bound at least to make himself acquainted with such an obvious fact as the one which he had just mentioned. He could not pretend to follow the hon. and learned Gentleman through the disquisition he had given them; but the main offences alleged against the corporation were two—first, that they had built a tavern; that having considered it desirable that an attempt should be made to form gardens for the exhibition of plants and the recreation of the public at South Kensington, and thinking it also right and proper that they should have Exhibitions such as that which took place last year, they had devoted part of their money and a portion of their land to providing refreshment rooms. If it had been shown that the purpose for which these refreshment rooms had been provided had been abused, that anything improper or disreputable had gone on there, there might have been some ground for accusation; but he wanted to know what fault there could have been in providing proper recreation for the public after the fatigue of going through the Exhibition last year. Persons came from a long distance to the Exhibition, many of them had no time to spare, having to return to the country the same day, and he thought it would have been a strong ground of complaint against the managers if no provision had beer, made for their refreshment; and how their having done so could be made a ground for Parliamentary interference he could not conceive. The other ground of offence in the corporation seemed to be, that their property amounted to more than £300,000 when all encumbrances were paid off. He believed the Commissioners must plead guilty to that fact—that having started with £180,000, the surplus of the Exhibition of 1851, and having so managed that they had sold land to the Government, on which the South Kensington Museum was built, for £60,000, which was worth £120,000 at the time, and was now worth £150,000; having also sold land to the Government for £120,000 which was worth £260,000 or £270,000; that having provided for the country funds for the promotion of Science and Art to the amount of £200,000—having done all this, they were still in possession of property worth, after all encumbrances were met, about £300,000, over and above a reversionary interest in the Horticultural Gardens, which might, if the Gardens failed, place them in possession of twenty-two acres of valuable land; and if the Gardens succeeded, would yield between £2,000 and £3,000 a year, and a contingent share of the profits. Such was the balance-sheet; and considering what they started with, this was a most astounding and wonderful result. Fortune had favoured them, it was true; but still the Commissioners could truly point to it as an instance of success in ten years unparalleled in the boldest and best-conducted commercial enterprises. This success they have been able to achieve without wrong to any one, without any one act inconsistent with their charter—and this success is now made a reason why Parliament should be asked to interfere by so violent and unheard-of a method as an Act of Parliament to put an end to the corporation that has achieved it. The hon. and learned Gentleman said, that whereas the corporation had power to sell or to let their land on building leases, when they sold land to the Government, they sold it charged with the condition that it should be employed for the promotion of science and art; whereas they had sold or let land to other parties not charged with any such condition. The thing was perfectly explicable. By the charter they had the power to sell the land freed from the trust on which they themselves held it, but in that case the trusts attached to the money they received for the land; or they might sell the land charged with the trusts. The Commissioners exercised this option—where it was deemed more convenient to charge the money they charged the money, and where it was more convenient to charge the land they had charged the land, in accordance with those Parliamentary powers. It would take him an immense time to follow the hon. and learned Gentleman through the many mistakes and misrepresentations in which, from his very superficial acquaintance with the subject, the hon. and learned Gentleman had become involved, and he did not propose to detain the House at that length. But he would merely say that there were concerned in this matter the Society of Arts, which was really the body that originated and managed the late Exhibition of 1862 by means of trustees, of whose existence the hon. and learned Gentleman seemed ignorant, and the Horticultural Society, with which the Commissioners had entered into a sort of partnership, the effect of which would be to reserve to the public, in that which would become a very crowded part of the metropolis, twenty-two acres of land free from building; the Department of Science and Art, at South Kensington, which had nothing to do with the Exhibition of 1862, the Horticultural Gardens, the tavern as the hon. and learned Member called it, or any one of those transactions, and which was only introduced to prejudice the case because the hon. and learned Member believed it to be an unpopular department; and lastly, there were the Commissioners of 1851 themselves. He had shown the House what the Commissioners had done, and upon what grounds they firmly believed themselves entitled to public confidence. But even if the hon. and learned Gentleman could have established some of the many charges which he had so loosely flung about, surely the House would not consent to so unprecedented a step as the introduction of an Act—which must be the next step if this Resolution were carried—to put an end to this corporation, without the slightest proof of misconduct or malversation on their part, but merely on the allegation that the money in their hands devoted to matters of taste had not been spent in the most judicious manner. This done, the money was to be confiscated for the use of the public. It was no longer to be devoted to purposes of science and art, but was to be carried to general purposes. That was the proposal of the hon. and learned Gentleman, and there was not a word to show that the trust was to remain impressed with the object for which it was created. He doubted whether a Commission comprising such names as Michael Angelo and Raphael would be able to satisfy the criticism of the House in such matters; and this pro- posal was, that as this charitable corporation—charitable, that was, in the sense in which the word was employed in the Court of Chancery—had not satisfied the taste of the hon. Gentleman and his constituents, it should be dissolved, and the large funds which by good judgment and good management it had accumulated, and by which it had been able to secure great advantage to the public, and which it held as a trust for the purposes of science and art, should be diverted altogether from the purposes of science and art, and, in fact, appropriated for the general use of the public.
said, the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lowe) had asked why the Commission should be dissolved. Now, he would ask why it should be continued? and be did not think that any reason had been offered for its continuance. This money was really public money, for it consisted of the shillings and sixpences of the visitors to the Exhibition of 1851; and the land was land which had been forcibly taken under the powers of an Act conferred by the Legislature. Neither was the corporation strictly a private one. The fact that the land was first obtained by a local Act, the proprietors being obliged to part with it, and that four official trustees still continued to serve in the Commission, brought the whole subject under the public eye, and seemed to give Parliament a certain control. He wanted to know upon what ground the corporation was to continue to be kept up, and for what interest the land was held by the Commissioners; and unless he obtained a satisfactory explanation on these points, he should vote with the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets. It was useless to disguise the fact, that the Commissioners had not given satisfaction to the public in the appropriation of the property in their hands. The Commissioners had sold portions of the land, or let it out to the Horticultural Society, and he believed that the only ground which they now held was that on which the refreshment rooms stood, so that this, and their reversion to the Horticultural Gardens, constituted their sole remaining interest in the land.
said, the Commissioners were in possession of land, besides the buildings, to the extent of fifteen acres—four acres in front of the Horticultural Gardens, and the land upon which the annexes stood.
Then they had fifteen acres of good building land, besides some assets. He thought that after fifteen years had elapsed, and nothing had been done for science and art during all that time, except the formation of the Horticultural Gardens, the right hon. Gentleman was bound to tell the House what this corporation intended to do, and why it should be maintained. Evidently the Commissioners had made a good building speculation, but they had done nothing for science and art.
said, that he was a Commissioner, of both the Exhibitions, 1851 and 1862, and was ashamed of no transaction he had been engaged in in either capacity, for he believed that both those Commissions had tended to the public benefit. He was at a loss to understand how the shillings and sixpences given for admission to a sight or show could be called public money, or how it could be argued that by a Vote of this House this money could be abstracted from the recipients to whom it belonged, because the House disapproved of the proceedings of the Commission. He denied that Parliament had a right to touch either the funds in their hands or to annul their charter. It was not the fault of the Commissioners of 1851 if, as his hon. Friend said, they had done nothing for the last fifteen years. They had been ready to apply the land to public purposes—they had refrained from letting it or selling it—and if they had done nothing, the fault lay mainly with the House, who had exhibited a feeling against availing itself of the land for the specific purposes to which only it could be applied. The charges made against the Commissioners had not been substantiated, and he trusted that the House would not interfere with the rights of corporations, or the management of money which had been applied most beneficially and profitably. Perhaps, in the course of time, the question might arise whether this Commission had not so fulfilled its office that it should cease to exist, or its duties might be devolved to other parties; but to say that this should now be done by an arbitrary Resolution of this House was a monstrous proposition, and he trusted that the House would not accede to it.
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
The House divided:—Ayes 165; Noes 42: Majority 123.
Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
Our Relations With China
Observations
Sir, the somewhat unexpected manner in which the discussion on the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell) terminated on a recent occasion, induces me to think I am taking no unusual course in endeavouring again to direct the attention of the House to the important question of China, and to elicit from the Government some explanation on the subject of our relations with that great empire. I am the more encouraged to do so because I believe that of late years those relations have entered upon a totally novel phase. It is evident that the policy which we have adopted since the peace in our dealings with China has been abandoned, and that we are now rapidly entering on an entirely new state of things. It will be needless to do more than remind the House how the empire of China differs from every other country in the habitable world. For ages that empire has been ruled by what is little short of a pure and absolute despotism. But slavery has never existed in any shape within its bounds, and the authority of the Central Government has never been upheld by a large standing army. The public service in China is also of a peculiar kind. For centuries, almost for ages, competitive examination is the principal mode by which admittance to that service is gained. Education and merit are supposed to be the only means by which a man can rise in China. No aristocracy—scarcely anything in the shape of a middle class exists in the country. It is extraordinary, that in an empire so governed there is to be found among the people a smaller amount of patriotism than is to be found among the natives of any other country in the world. Indeed, among the Chinese there is a singular absence of love of country, or pride of race; and little "religious sentiment," or reverence for sacred things, is to be found amongst them. Forcible resistance to authority has always been the only means by which grievances are redressed and wrongs remedied. The right and practice of rebellion appears to have existed as far back as the earliest days of the Chinese Empire. The right of rebellion has always been recognised by their great writers; and it must be owned that the people have been very consistent in reducing the doctrine to practice from time to time. Dr. Legge, in his remarkable book on Chinese classics, shows clearly the opinions of the great philosophers on this point; and these principles, though enunciated 3,000 years ago, I recommend to the attention of hon. Gentlemen opposite, as they might have well been written by an English Whig of 1688. Dr. Legge says—
"The government which Confucius taught was a despotism, but of a modified character. He allowed no jus divinum independent of personal virtue and a benevolent rule. He says—'Heaven, protecting the inferior people, has constituted for them rulers and teachers, who should be able to be assisting to God, extending favour and producing tranquillity throughout all parts of the Empire. The moment the ruler ceases to be a minister of God for good, and does not administer a government that is beneficial to the people, he forfeits the title by which he holds the throne, and perseverance in oppression will surely lead to his overthrow.'"
It is a curious thing, that though rebellions have been numerous, no particular dynasty in China has ever been overthrown without several years of armed resistance against its authority. Coups d'état are almost unknown in that country. As far back as 1279 the Soung dynasty was overthrown after nineteen years of insurrection. It took sixteen years to overthrow the Mongol dynasty; and the Sing dynasty, which now rules the empire, was not established till after twenty-eight or thirty years of rebellion against that which preceded it. The empire of China is now passing through one of those unfortunate crises; and I do not incorrectly describe the state of the country by saying that civil war rages almost from one end of it to the other. Apart from the Taeping rebellion, which has now existed for thirteen or fourteen years, there are constant disturbances in the districts bordering on the Canton provinces, where the rival factions of the Hakkis and Puntis still maintain their ancient feuds; in the western provinces the armies of the Emperor are vainly endeavouring to make head against disturbances there; until lately they were defending Hang-chow on the Yang-tze-Kiang, which was menaced by a body of rebels entirely distinct from the Taepings; and at Tien-tsin our Consul has, in the spring of this year, been severely wounded in repelling an attack on the town by a body of rebels under the general name of the Nien Fei. It was not impossible that that body of rebels might menace even the capital itself. In the far north, near the new treaty port of New Chiang, the foreign residents as we hear from Mr. Consul Meadows, has lately been in fear of destruction by another distinct body of rebels. Indeed, the whole empire, containing a population of 300,000,000 or 400,000,000, is convulsed from end to end. The movement, however, with which we have more particularly to deal, is the Taeping movement. Without pretending to give anything like a history of it, I will only say that it commenced in 1849 or 1850—that it is one of the most extraordinary movements that have ever taken place in any country—that at first small in its beginning, and commenced by a few insignificant individuals, it soon acquired such importance, and such numbers gathered round the standard of the chief, Hung Su Tsuen, that Nankin, the ancient capital of the Empire fell into his hands, and a sort of Government was established there; that the rebels then moved northward until they, almost menaced the safety of the capital, and that they then, without apparent cause, retired pretty much in the same way as they advanced, their principal object being plunder. It is, however, necessary for a moment to consider what were the causes of the Taeping movement. I am afraid that any person who has devoted attention to the affairs of China during the last twelve or fourteen years, must form the opinion that the constant interference of England, and her hostility to the Imperial authorities, have contributed greatly to the disorganization of the country. Those who have considered the subject thoroughly, agree in assigning the movement to three causes—British hostility towards the Government, the opium question, and the circumstance that for the last three reigns China has been ruled by princes of weak character and little influence. By a series of acts of hostility which I will not now enter upon, but which has lasted for years, we have weakened the Government and made it contemptible in the eyes of the people. In Mr. Meadows's book is, to be found the following curious memorial from a Manchou general, written soon after the outbreak of the rebellion:—"Mencius inculcates this principle with a frequency and boldness which are remarkable. It was one of the things about which Confucius did not much like to write—still he held it. It is conspicuous in the last chapters of The Great Learning, and its tendency has been to check the violence of oppression, and maintain the self-respect of the people all along the course of Chinese history."
Again, there is no doubt that our constant attempts to force the opium trade upon the Government of China have had a very serious effect, and have been the ever fruitful source of disquietude and violence. Monsignor Chauveau, a Catholic missionary in Yunnan, relates an instance—one in many—by which opium may be traced as one of the causes of the rebellion in the year 1850 or 1851. Six hundred opium dealers of the province of Kwang-si, travelling from Yunan to Canton, being short of supplies, forcibly borrowed or took money and provisions from two brothers of the name of Ischang. These men had no alternative but to comply with their demands. When the opium traders left, these two brothers, who were men of influence and position, were arrested, flung into prison, and severely punished by the Mandarins. This act of gross injustice so incensed the people that they joined the insurrection in great numbers. I might quote many examples to show how much we have to answer for in being the cause of the present state of anarchy in the empire, but I should not feel justified in troubling the House at any length upon past events in China. I wish rather to deal with the present aspect of affairs. But the House will recollect what has been the attitude of England towards China during the last twenty-five years. Almost ever since the East India Company's monopoly was done away with, and since the Chinese Government had determined forcibly to resist the introduction of opium, till within the last two years, our attitude has been one of continued and almost incessant hostility. We have had two, I may almost say four, great wars. Our position has always been one of antagonism to the Chinese authorities. I might describe it as one of armed commerce. The noble Lord at the head of the Government repeatedly told the House that we were not at war with China, at the very time that we were burning the suburbs of Canton and bombarding the forts; and at last our relations with that country had got into such an anomalous position, that we were actually at one time, in the south and on the east coast, supporting the authority, of the Chinese Viceroy in Canton, collecting a portion of the Imperial revenue at Shanghai and defending it against the rebels, transmitting I suppose a portion of that revenue to Pekin; while in the North we were bombarding the Taku forts, seizing the capital, and burning the Emperor's palace. Now, peace being made, we are bound to find a policy for the new state of things, and that is the question to which I particularly ask the attention of the House. A great rebellion exists in China; two parties are striving for the mastery. I have little sympathy for one or the other; least of all am I an advocate of the Taeping movement. At first considerable sympathy was manifested for it, as there was a belief that their religion was closely allied to Christianity. Further inquiries, however, showed, that though, with the aid of some European books procured in Canton, they might have manufactured a spurious sort of Christianity, yet their religion was a sheer imposture, and the assumption of divine attributes and of direct communications from the Deity, was so disgusting to those. Christians who at first had dealings with them, that it is now allowed that no sympathy can be felt for them on religious grounds. Nor have they shown any capacity for creating either a dynasty or a Government. They have been in possession of a large portion of the country for fifteen years, including Nankin and other great cities, but nowhere have they succeeded in establishing anything like an organized form of Government, But this contemptible position which, after all, the Taeping leaders hold, makes the case as against the Imperialists still stronger; for notwithstanding the weakness, the disorganization, and incapacity of the rebels, the Imperial troops have been continually worsted in the field; and with all the military, financial, and political resources of the empire at their command, they have never been able to make head against the Taepings, or to restore peace and order in a single province. Such being the state of affairs as between the rival parties, at the Treaty of Pekin a policy of neutrality was laid down and acted on for a considerable time. I am anxious that there should be no mistake as to the declaration made at that time. That treaty was Concluded in October 1860, and Sir Frederick Bruce, in making arrangements for the protection of the treaty ports, dis- tinctly laid it down that the British were to be entirely neutral as between the Tae-pings and the Chinese Government. Earl Russell writes to Mr. Bruce on July 24, 1861, as follows:—"The troops do not attend to orders, regard retreat on the eve of battle as an old custom, and the abandonment of places they should hold as an ordinary affair.…… The number of robbers and criminal associations in Kwang-tung and Kwang-si is very great, and they assemble without the least hesitation to create disturbances; all which arises from the circumstances of the army at the time the barbarian affairs were being transacted. Formerly they feared the troops as tigers; of late they look on them as sheep."
"I have caused the Admiralty to be informed, in reply, that I am of opinion that Vice Admiral Hope's measures should be approved, and I have now to instruct you to endeavour to make arrangements to secure the neutrality of all the treaty ports against the rebels.
"The Government of Pekin will, probably, make no difficulty in abstaining from using the treaty ports as bases of operations against the rebels, provided the rebels on their side refrain from attacking those ports; and it may be hoped that the rebels will see that it is not for their interest to run the risk of collisions with foreign nations whose trade is protected by treaties.
"You will understand, however, that Her Majesty's Government do not wish force to be used against the rebels in any case except for the actual protection of the lives and property of British subjects.
"I am, &c.,
(Signed)
"J. RUSSELL."
Again, on August 8, 1861, Earl Russell writes to Mr. Bruce—
"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done hitherto, neutrality between the two contending parties in China. If British subjects are taken prisoners by either party, you should do your utmost to save them from torture or capital punishment; but otherwise you should abstain from all interference in the civil war."
On February 1, 1862, Mr. Bruce writes to Consul Harvey—
"The policy to be observed and the language to be used to the insurgent Chiefs is this:—We have no cause of quarrel with the Taepings arising out of their insurrection against the Imperial Government, nor do we pretend to dictate to the Chinese people who is to rule over them; on the other hand, any Power that claims that Empire is bound by all the obligations of the treaties China has entered into with foreign nations."
The noble Lord in his place in this House was equally explicit in the declaration of his wish for the maintenance of neutrality. On the 12th of March 1861, Earl Russell laid down this principle in the following words:—
"I told Mr. Bruce that Her Majesty's Government entirely approved of his conduct; that we did not wish to interfere between the Imperial Government and the rebels; that we meant to be entirely neutral; but that we would not remain neutral when the towns where the English and foreign merchants were established were attacked by foreign forces…. With regard to our policy, the only course we can take is that of perfect neturality; at the same time not allowing the towns where our merchants are congregated to be destroyed." [3 Hansard, clxi. 1858.]
I shall now proceed to show how little by little, step by step, the policy of neutrality has been abandoned, and that we are now
interfering in every possible way in the internal affairs of China. The first step taken in this direction was at Shanghai, the principal of the treaty ports, where an attempt was made to carry out what was called the thirty-mile radius. Admiral Hope early in 1861 went up the country to the Taepings, entered into communication with the chiefs at Nankin, and succeeded in obtaining from them an assurance that they would respect the port and environs of Shanghai for one year. The Taepings kept their word; but towards the close of 1861, when the term of compact was nearly ended, there were evidences that they intended to advance upon Shanghai, and steps were taken in consequence to defend the town. Instead, however, of defending the settlement itself, which was absolutely necessary for the protection of British property, it was very unfortunately determined to seize and hold all the country for thirty miles round. Military operations began at the end of April 1862, when a force comprised of British and French troops, some drilled Chinese, and Imperial "braves" marched out from Shanghai, and took two large towns in the neighbourhood. They then went across the river, with the intention of seizing the right bank of the Woosung river, and occupying the peninsula, and took two more towns almost immediately. Whilst besieging another town, however, General Stavely, in command of these forces, heard that the Imperialists, who had been left in charge of the towns first taken, had been routed and destroyed, and that the rebels were marching upon Shanghai. It therefore became necessary to withdraw his troops; the towns he had taken were re-occupied by the rebels, and there was an end for the time to the thirty-mile radius. The first operation, therefore, was a failure. Towards the end of the year, however, the British Forces recaptured those towns—and no attempt has been made by the rebels to re-take them. But these operations involved the whole district in very serious troubles and misery. The position of the unfortunate inhabitants was anything but enviable. The rebels, when they took the towns near Shanghai, killed a great number of men. They ordered those that were left to let their hair grow to show they were rebels. When the English took the towns, they handed them over to the Imperialists, who beheaded many of these unfortunate creatures because they had long hair, and ordered the residue to shave. A few days afterwards
the Imperial troops were withdrawn, the rebels came in again, and killed some more of those who had in the interim shaved their heads. The atrocities and carnage that take place in this civil war are horrible to contemplate. On the score of cruelty one side is as bad as the other; there is nothing to choose between them. It is alleged that the rebels have laid waste the country for thirty miles round Shanghai. Great atrocities are, no doubt, committed on both sides, but I deny that the country has been devastated. The despatches speak of the troops as marching through highly-cultivated cornfields, with men at work in them, and there is reason to believe that the atrocities of the Taepings are very much confined to the towns which they seize. The result of these operations is, that though Shanghai is safe, we are responsible for the defence of a large frontier which may be at any time attacked. I will now advert to what has happened at Ningpo, which illustrates, in an instructive manner, how gradually we are being led into interference in Chinese affairs. Ningpo is a very large city, with upwards of a quarter of a million of inhabitants. At the latter end of 1861 it was in the possession of the Imperialists, but was seriously menaced by the rebels. English officers gave the Chinese authorities every advice and assistance by lending them guns, and instructing them how to fortify the city against the enemy, at the same time assuring the mandarins that they would not interfere personally in the struggle. The rebels, however, attacked the city, and drove out the Imperial troops in a few hours; the English gunboats did not interfere, and the rebels took possession of Ningpo, which they held for five months. Matters went on quietly during that occupation. I cannot say that the rebels were successful in attracting a large portion of the inhabitants back to the city, or to restore trade; but it is quite evident that friendly relations existed between the English authorities and the rebels, communications passed and repassed, and our Consul had no reason to complain of any breach of faith on the part of the Taeping chiefs. Almost immediately after the rebels took possession of the city Consul Harvey thought it a favourable moment to arrange the question of what was called the foreign settlement, and this is a good instance how matters of this kind are settled in China. Ningpo was situated at the confluence of two considerable rivers, and a piece of
ground nearly surrounded by the two rivers was much coveted by the Consuls as being admirably adapted for purposes both of trade and defence. Accordingly, they endeavoured to obtain the cession of that piece of ground. The American, French, and English Consuls and the captain of Her Majesty's gunboat Scout met one day and passed a resolution that this large piece of ground, almost as big as that upon which the city itself stood, should form the foreign settlement, and be devoted to the purposes of these foreign nations. The whole transaction is thus described by Consul Harvey in a letter to Mr. Bruce—
"Ningpo, January 14,1862.
"Sir,—I have the honour to inclose herewith, for your Excellency's information and approval, copy of a Minute of a Conference held yesterday, at the United States Consulate at this port, for the purpose of defining the limits within which will in future be comprised the 'Foreign Settlement' at Ningpo.
"Since this port was opened to foreign trade in 1843, no definite 'concession' or 'grant' has ever been obtained from the local authorities, in accordance with treaty stipulations; and as this want had long been felt by the increasing mercantile community here, but more particularly and pressings so since the capture of this city by the insurgents, the present appeared to me a very favourable opportunity for coming to a clear understanding upon the point. The inclosed Minute is a brief declaration and statement of the agreement so determined upon by the three Treaty Consuls in regard to this important clause of our respective treaties.
"I transmit also herein a rough sketch of the site and its boundaries; and I trust the steps taken on this occasion will meet with your Excellency's favourable approval, and that your Excellency will be pleased to obtain for them the sanction and confirmation of His Highness the Prince of Kung."
At that time the city of Ningpo and the country around were in the possession of the Taeping chiefs. They did not make much objection, the Consuls took possession, and some commodious residences were built on the land in question. Things went on in that way for some months, when one day in April, on the firing of a salute in honour of the arrival of one of the Taeping chiefs, some bullets struck the Ringdove gunboat. Some idle persons, also, wandering upon the walls, fired a few shots, which went near the boats. These were the only acts complained of by the British authorities, and they were amply apologised for by the Taeping chiefs. Captain Dew, of the Encounter, was sent down by Sir James Hope to obtain reparation and apology, and any one who reads the instructions of Sir James Hope will find there was nothing in them which authorized Captain Dew to
make any attack upon the city. However, he demanded that a certain battery should be destroyed. The answer to the remonstrance made by Captain Dew was so satisfactory that on the 27th of April 1862 he wrote to the Taeping chiefs to inform them that he would not insist upon the demolition of the battery, but only that the guns opposite the settlement and ships should be removed. The battery to which he referred was in a peculiar position. It was erected at the confluence of the two rivers, in order to defend the town from any attack that might be made by the Imperial forces. What Captain Dew therefore required was an ample apology, the removal of the guns from the battery opposite the settlement and ships, and that means should be taken to prevent anybody going on the walls opposite to the ships. With reference to the first point Captain Dew said he was perfectly satisfied; and with respect to the two other points General Hwang wrote to say, that though the guns were for the protection of the fort, yet, under the peculiar circumstances, and to manifest the desire of the Taepings for a lasting amity, the port-holes for the guns bearing on the settlement should be stopped up, and no one should be allowed to go upon the walls except the workmen who might be required to make repairs. In fact, everything demanded by Captain Dew was granted, the port-holes were bricked up and the letter concluded in this way—"We are desirous of remaining on good terms with you, and this is our reason for this distinct statement." After the receipt of that letter Captain Dew paid a visit to a large Imperial force, which was being collected for the purpose of taking Ningpo, and was rather curiously constituted. The Imperial Government, having but a small naval force at their command, made a convention with a notorious pirate of the name of Apak for the employment in the Imperial service of himself and eighty junks, which for a number of years had been engaged in piracy. Well, a few days before the attack on Ningpo was made Captain Dew went down the river and communicated with the Imperial Chiefs and their piratical ally. There was every reason to believe that Captain Dew was cognizant of what they were going to do, and the siege of Ningpo had his perfect approval; but it appeared rather a curious thing that a British captain should enter into communication with one whom, in the pursuit
of his well-known calling if he caught outside the bar at Shanghai, he would have felt hound to hang. This allied band of Imperialists and pirates advanced to the attack of Ningpo on the 10th May. Captain Dew and several gunboats were then in the river, moored in a line opposite the town, in such a manner that they were exactly in the line of fire of an attacking force. Shortly before the attack he wrote to the Taeping chiefs thus—
"We now inform you that we maintain a perfect neutrality; but if you fire the guns or muskets from the battery or walls opposite the settlement on the advancing Imperialists, thereby endangering the lives of our men and people in the foreign settlement, we shall then feel it our duty to return the fire and bombard the city."
So that having received an ample apology, Captain Dew gave up the three points, and then told the Taepings, that if they defend-ed themselves, he would join in the attack and bombard the town! The junks having advanced between the gunboats and the town, some shots were fired, whether from a Taeping battery or an Imperial junk is very doubtful; and then, without further provocation, at ten o'clock Captain Dew opened fire, the Imperialist fleet taking but little part in the attack. Captain Dew bombarded the town till two o'clock, then went to dinner; at three o'clock he landed his men, drove out the rebels, and in the evening handed over the city of Nankin as a present to the Imperial Toutae and his piratical allies. That story showed how British officers conduct affairs in China. There were friendly communications and professions of neutrality up to the last moment; and when the rebels, who had given them no provocation, attempted to defend themselves, their town was bombarded for four hours, after which they were driven out, and the city handed over to the Imperialists. But the policy of pretended neutrality and real interference culminated in an attack which was made by Captain Dew and the French contingent upon the town of Shou-hing in February of this year. After the taking of Ningpo Captain Dew remained in the city for some time, and a certain portion of Ward's force and the French contingent were occupied in garrisoning the place. No attempt was made to establish the thirty miles radius in this place. But in February last Captain Dew and a large number of boats accompanied a force of about 500 men to the attack of a walled town situated 110 miles from Ningpo.
He took with him some howitzers lent by General Stavely, and he was accompanied by Lieutenant Tinling, an officer of the Encounter. The force was called the French contingent, and was a very curious one. It was commanded by a French officer, who was called a General, but I cannot make out whether he was originally a military man; I believe he was a clerk in the French civil service. The first night was spent by the force in plundering an Imperialist village—it must have been Imperialist, because it was only fifteen miles from Ningpo. The next day they advanced up a canal to the attack of Shou-hing. Captain Dew accompanied the expedition, he said, in the character of a spectator, but really to advise the commander. There can be no doubt that he took an active part in the operations. A breach having been made, the French contingent were ordered to the assault, but they were ignominiously driven back, the French commander was killed, and Lieutenant Tinling so badly wounded in the neck that he died the next day. It is impossible for Captain Dew to say that he was not in actual command of this force, for, in a letter in answer to a vote of thanks from some merchants at Ningpo, Captain Dew glorified himself considerably on having performed these exploits with General Stavely's "honoured howitzers," as he calls them. With regard to Lieutenant Tinling, he thought justice had not been done to a gallant officer, It had been over and over again said that he was there only as an amateur, and that be met with his death at a time when he was not within the line of his duty. He was there, however, by the orders of his captain. He had accompanied him in this dangerous expedition; and whilst assisting in working the guns he was shot in the neck. I think that that young officer died as much in the discharge of his duty as if he had been on board of his own ship; and that his friends in this country who deeply deplore his loss have a good right to complain that his death had not been spoken of in a proper manner when the subject was referred to the other night by the Secretary to the Admiralty.
I have now shown how at Shanghai and Ningpo the policy of neutrality has been totally abandoned, and active interference by land and sea has been taken in this wretched civil war. I will now refer to two institutions which have grown up in China, and which are becoming to all intents and purposes thoroughly British. The first
of these is the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs, the other the Anglo-Chinese Contingent. I will take the description of the former from Mr. Lay's own words. That gentleman, who is Imperial Inspector General of Customs, in answer to a communication from Earl Russell, states that the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs was introduced into Shanghai in 1854; that the Chinese authorities were then too weak to levy the duties; and that in consequence the American, the British, and the French Consuls met together at the British Consul's house, and there nominated three persons to collect and take charge of the Imperial customs. This was a curious nomination. Ultimately, the Chinese Government placed the entire control of the customs in Mr. Lay's hands, so that in 1856 that gentleman became the head of the Chinese customs board. The personnel of the establishment is somewhat remarkable. The system is established at eight ports. The personnel of the establishment is constituted thus—
"Shanghai.—Mr. H. Tudor Davies (English), late Chief Magistrate at Hong-Kong, absent on sick leave, whose place is supplied by Mr. G. H. Fitzroy, late Attaché to Lord Elgin.
"Ningpo.—M. Giguel (French), late Interpreter Canton Commissioners.
"Foo-chow.—M. Meritens (French), late Interpreter to Baron Gros.
"Amoy.—Mr. Ward (American), late Secretary to the United States Legation.
"Swatow.—Mr. Wilzer (German), late Mercantile Assistant.
"Canton.—Mr. Glover (American), late United States Vice-Consul at Shanghai.
"Chin-kiang.—Mr. Leonard (English), late Mercantile Assistant in the firm of Dent and Company.
"Tien-tsin.—M. Klecszkowski (French), Major on half-pay.
"Mr. Hart, who was an Interpreter in the Consular Service, acts during Mr. Lay's absence as Inspector General."
Therefore, at eight ports there are—one English Inspector General, two English, three French, two American, and one German, chief officers. Those gentlemen levy an enormous amount of revenue. The customs duty at Shanghai alone is supposed to amount to £1,000,000 a year. And taking all the eight ports together it is reasonable to suppose that they collect something like £4,000,000 of revenue every year. Those gentlemen, however, practically speaking, are wholly irresponsible to any person or power whatever. It is true that their nomination was sanctioned by the Chinese Government, but they were not certainly appointed originally by
them. In fact, the representatives of Foreign Powers really appointed them, and they continue their services under the direction of Mr. Lay, who still retains his character as a British subject, and has been somewhat recently employed in Her Majesty's service in accompanying Lord Elgin to Pekin in the capacity of Secretary of Legation. Now, the important question arises—Whose subjects are these men? Suppose that Mr. Lay or any of his subordinates got into trouble with the Chinese authorities, and was presented with a silver cord, which is the fashionable mode of disposing of high authorities in that country, should we interfere and treat him as a British subject? I apprehend that Sir Frederick Bruce would immediately interfere in his behalf, and claim to protect him as a British subject. The other foreign representatives would doubtless do the same by their own fellow-countrymen. In truth, the system amounts to this, that a great portion of the Imperial revenue is collected and expended by foreigners under the control of an Englishman lately in the diplomatic service of his own country. In addition to the revenue collected at the ports I have named under this system, the mandarins collect a little revenue of their own. Constant complaints are made by merchants that they have to pay, besides the customs duties levied by the foreign inspectors, other charges which are demanded by local Chinese officials, for the payment of foreign contingents and the maintenance of local establishments. Under those circumstances, it is not surprising that there should be constant collisions between the Chinese authorities and the foreign and consular officers. I do not say a word against Mr. Lay. On the contrary, I believe that no more pure or worthy public servant exists. But I believe that he has undertaken duties which were beyond the power of any individual, and that the greatest difficulty will arise from the anomalous position in which he is placed; indeed, these difficulties have already commenced. The Shanghai Shipping List of April 2, 1863, contains an account of a fatal collision between the Chinese authorities and the foreign officials, arising out of a system of "squeezing," which was generally practised in China on all occasions and by all classes. The article I refer to mentions that such collisions are almost of daily occurrence. There was a considerable force at Ningpo under Imperial autho-
rity; the Inspectors of Customs had also a number of armed men under their authority; the French contingent was 1,500, and the Anglo-Chinese Contingent was 1,000 men. So that there were stationed in that single town four different authorities independent of each other, and each having large armed forces at its disposal. The occurrence to which I allude is thus described by a local paper—
"At Ningpo, we learn, that a few days ago a very serious disturbance occurred between some Europeans (custom-house officers) and Chinese officials. It appears that a system of squeezing had long been carried on by the custom-house boatmen; but meeting with a stout resistance, blows were resorted to, and a general mêlée ensued. The authorities succeeded in capturing the boatmen, and taking them prisoners into the city. The Tide Surveyor, Mr. Newberry, stationed at Chinhai, immediately on gaining information as to the whereabouts of his Chinese boatmen, mustered all the Europeans that he possibly could, proceeded to the prisons where they were incarcerated, and demanded that his men should be instantly liberated. The mandarin in charge, becoming alarmed at the threatening appearance of so many foreign faces who surrounded him, unlocked the door of the prison, and Mr. Newberry rushed forward, where he found the objects of his search in irons. These he speedily released, but on their return to the entrance he discovered that the door was locked upon him. Threats and the firing of his revolver inside the prison brought the other Europeans to the rescue, who succeeded in knocking down the door, and liberated the boatmen. It is supposed that several other prisoners effected their escape. One young man, a son of a Chinese merchant, was shot, and died shortly afterwards.
"The case has been investigated by the proper authorities, but the result has not yet transpired."—(2nd April 1863.)
Lately, however, the forces at the disposal of the foreign inspectorate have received an important augmentation. Mr. Lay and Captain Sherard Osborn, a most distinguished officer, who knows China well, came to this country last autumn to organize an armed European naval force. These gentlemen undertook this mission with the sanction of Sir Frederick Bruce, but he could not discover that they brought with them a single scrap of paper giving them the authority of the Imperial Government for these proceedings. At first Her Majesty's Government proposed to issue licences enabling a certain number of British officers to take service in the new force; but it was felt, on reflection, that that course would be very inconvenient. At the end of August an Order in Council was issued repealing the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and authorizing Captain Sherard Osborn and Mr. Lay to enlist troops for the service of the Chinese Empire, and to fit out and arm ships of war. The mode in which the funds for the force were obtained is described in a note in a Chinese newspaper, which, I believe, is authentic. A fleet of armed steamers has been purchased in England, to be placed under the command of Captain Sherard Osborn. The money remitted to England to meet the cost of these vessels has been drawn by the Emperor from his customs revenue under foreign inspection. The total sum so remitted has been 650,000 taels. Of this sum, Canton supplied 250,000 taels, Shanghai 200,000 taels, Amoy 50,000 taels. No more money being ready, the balance of 150,000 taels was raised by loan on the Foo-chow customs revenue; the loan was in the form of scrip receivable in payment of import or export duties a year hence, interest at from 8 to 10 per cent per annum. The scrip was rapidly taken up by foreign merchants; they preferred such a mode of paying their duties, as it would save them trouble and expense. These gentlemen had therefore a considerable sum of money placed at their disposal—I should say about] £200,000. Three gunboats were purchased from the English Government, and three other vessels were ordered to be built in private yards in England. The stores, guns, and other equipments were furnished from our arsenals. A code of laws was drawn up for the regulation of the force, a new scale of pay and rations was fixed, pensions and compensation for wounds were settled, a special book of signals was arranged, and last, not least, a new flag, green with yellow stripes, wholly different from either the British or the Imperial flag, was improvised under which these troops were to fight—in the service, not of the Emperor, but of Mr. Lay and the Anglo-Chinese inspectorate. It is rather difficult to ascertain the precise object of the force, as the Government do not seem to have any very defined notions on the subject. Mr. Lay, in his official application for permission to enlist men in England, himself said it was to be employed in re-establishing the Imperial authority on the Yang-tze-Kiang, and commercial security on the inner waters, and in suppressing piracy on the open sea. The latter undertaking might, however, be dismissed from view, as any ship of war might destroy a pirate at sea if she could catch him. Mr. Hammond, writing to the Secretary of the Admiralty to ask the approval of the First Lord, used a very remarkable phrase. He said that Her Majesty's Government approved of the establishment of a European naval force in order to restore order throughout the Chinese Empire. Now, the House will see that the order to restore-order in the empire of China is rather a large order. As the force number only 400 men, while the population of China number about 400,000,000, each man of the expedition was expected to restore order to a million of men. The Secretary to the Admiralty accepted the statement of the Foreign Office, and replied in the same remarkable phrase, that he saw no objection to the scheme. Now, I wish to point out to the House what will, in all probability, be the first exploit of the new force. In any attempt to-restore order on the banks of the Yang-tze-Kiang, they must begin with the capture of Nankin. As the House knows. Nankin is a city of enormous size—the second in the Empire. Since 1854 it has been in the hands of the Taepings, the Imperialists never having made any serious effort to dislodge them. The prospect of the English taking Nankin, and driving the Taepings out of it and into rich silk and tea districts adjoining, is regarded by a number of eminent authorities with just apprehension as the most unfortunate thing that can happen to our trade. That I am justified in assuming that this is one of the points against which the newly-raised force will be directed, will be seen from the following passage in a despatch written by Earl Russell on the 7th of July 1862, after Captain Osborn's expedition had been decided on:—a despatch in which he throws the old neutrality policy overboard altogether, and adopts in full the principle of interference which has been acted upon, by all the British officials in China.
"The rational course for us to pursue is, to defend our own trade, to protect the treaty ports, and to encourage the Chinese Government to arm a sufficient force of Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry, to overcome the rebels, and reduce them to subjection.
"You will arrange for the stay of the troops at Shanghai so long as that settlement is menaced by the rebels.
"Ningpo ought to be recovered by the Imperialists, and, when they have force sufficient for the purpose, they should undertake vigorous operations against Nankin.
"I am, &c.,
(Signed)
"RUSSELL.
"Foreign Office, July 7, 1862."
Sir Frederick Bruce, however, a year be-
fore, on the 16th of January 1861, said he did not see that the fall of Nankin would dissolve the bands which desolated the country, and gave this warning in these words—
"Should the capture of Nankin merely drive the rebels from the positions they occupy on the river, and the Imperialists he unable to follow them up with vigour and disperse them, they would Seize other points not assailable by us, and feeling secure from chastisement by our naval force, they would be less amenable to reason. We should be liable at the ports to sudden and unexpected attacks unless we had force sufficient stationed at each for its defence."
Again, on the 11th of July 1861, Admiral Hope wrote—
"I should consider the capture of Nankin as the most impolitic act which could be committed. There is not the slightest ground for the supposition that the loss of that town would have any material effect in the suppression of the insurrection, or any other, indeed, than that of the removal of the Taeping seat of government to some city in the interior out of our reach, and the creation of a feeling of inveterate hostility against us."
Even Earl Russell himself, in September 1861, concurred with Admiral Hope in condemning the capture of Nankin, which a year later he recommended so strongly-Consul Meadows states that a Yang-tze campaign against the Taepings would require a large fleet and a considerable body of troops. He describes the probable course of such a campaign in the following words:—
"A few years back the aid of a small British army and naval squadron, operating along a portion of the Great River, could perhaps have enabled the Manchoos to suppress this particular Chinese rising against their rule; but now it would require a large fleet of steamers, operating throughout some 1,500 to 2,000 miles of the Great River and its larger branches, and some 20,000 troops, operating in three or four complete small armies in different parts of the tract of country mentioned above as being more or less in the occupation of Taeping forces, and which extends about 800 to 900 miles from north to south, and 1,000 to 1,100 from east to west."
So what was dangerous, impolitic, and unwise last year, is sound and right to-day. Our whole line of conduct is changed, and changed without any good cause or reason. I have now shown that this foreign inspectorate of Customs, having the command of an armed force, and really irresponsible, is one of the most dangerous institutions which has ever been sanctioned by the British Government. Its dangers are well summed up in the following words of an able writer:—
"In conclusion; the dangers arising from the foreign inspectorate becoming an armed power with an immediately belligerent attitude, and that only now loom darkly in the future, are these:—The creation of a power in China which, though now under the control of an English officer, may pass successfully into the hands of Frenchmen and Americans; the probable use that may be made of such power to the detriment of English interests; the tendency of such a body as the foreign inspectorate of customs, when free from ordinary checks, towards degeneration and corruption, more especially when having a large armed force at their disposal; the complications that may arise from the absence of any clearly-defined understanding as to the position of foreigners in Chinese employ, with regard to extending protection to their persons in certain emergencies."
I will next give a short history of the Anglo-Chinese contingent, a force with which Mr. Lay has nothing to do, and which is quite separate from Captain Sherard Osborn's force. In the year 1860 Colonel Ward, whose origin was rather doubtful, and whose nationality was also somewhat obscure, but who, I believe, was a member of General Walker's filibustering expedition, arrived at Shanghai; and being a man of courage and capacity, proposed to form a foreign legion, consisting of Manilla men, Europeans, negroes, and, indeed, any one whom he could catch, for the service of the Emperor. There was plenty of material for the formation of such a force, for the ports of the eastern seas swarm with adventurers, filibusters, and scoundrels, who being unable to live elsewhere, have collected in that part of the world with no object but rapine and plunder, and whose doings have extended south to some of our own settlements, and are about to be brought under the notice of the House by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wakefield. Colonel Ward collected his regiment, and proceeded to drill them; but the Taepings formed a similar force, and on one occasion it was found necessary to send a man-of-war to Nankin to recover twenty-six British subjects who were in the rebel service, and among whom were seven seamen of the British navy. The scheme, therefore, was given up, and, greatly to Mr. Bruce's satisfaction, as thus expressed in one of his despatches, the foreign contingent was disbanded—
"I report with satisfaction that the foreign legion has been disbanded. A few days before Captain Dew's visit they advanced to attack Tsing-poo, having been promised the support of 9,000 Chinese troops and twenty gunboats; as usual, the Chinese did not appear, and the foreigners, after losing twenty-three men out of sixty, were forced to retire. Having been unsuccessful, though from no fault of their own, they were discharged; and I trust this example of the value of Chinese co-operation, and of their appreciation of military merit, will deter foreigners from joining them. The condition of those employed by the Taepings seems to have been little better; but as free license was given to plunder, their service may be more attractive to many of the adventurers who infest the coast of China.
I have, &c.
"July 22, 1861." "FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.
Colonel Ward then turned his attention to drilling Chinese, and in a few months he raised a considerable force, which on different occasions rendered pretty good service, although it was almost as often unsuccessful. His little army took part in all the military operations which were undertaken to clear the thirty mile radius around Shanghai. They worked harmoniously with General Stavely, and in fact were a part of the British force. Unfortunately, on the 20th of September 1862, Colonel Ward was killed in the attack upon a small town, and General Burgovine, whose nationality also was somewhat doubtful, was appointed to the command of the force, which he held till January last, when he lost it in a somewhat peculiar manner. The General was a man of large promises, which, however, he was seldom able to perform, and for some months he succeeded in persuading the Chinese authorities that he was always on the point of moving up the river to attack Nankin. At last a day was appointed for his departure, but, according to an account written by Consul Medhurst to Mr. Bruce, the General delayed the march, the line of transports went on accumulating, and 200,000 taels had been squandered without result. At this juncture the pay of General Burgovine's forces fell into arrear, his men mutinied, and he undertook to go to Shanghai to get the money due to them, amounting to about £40,000. Thither he proceeded with 150 armed men; but on his arrival one Ta-kee, a tea merchant and expectant mandarin, whose business it was to make the payment, told him that he should have the money when he started for Nankin. General Burgovine, who was said to have been drunk at the time, struck him, his followers ransacked the house, and finding in it a large sum of money, helped themselves. Some of this money, it was said, was afterwards paid to the troops. This high-handed proceeding incensed the mandarins, who determined to dismiss General Burgovine and cut off his head. This General took refuge with General Stavely, and afterwards proceeded to Pekin to lay his complaint at the foot of the throne; and Captain Holland, an officer of the Royal Marines, was appointed to command the force. General Burgovine obtained from the Emperor an order that he should be allowed to resume his command; but he could not secure obedience to that order at Shanghai, and he has now returned to Pekin to endeavour to obtain the command of at least a portion of the troops. That terminated the connection of the foreign officers with the force, which then passed under the command of Captain, or, as he was then called, General Holland. He was appointed by the British Commander-in-Chief at Shanghai, and retained the command until the 10th of February, when he marched to attack Tait-shan. Captain Holland had with him a force of 2,500 men with twenty-two pieces of cannon, including some 32-pounders belonging to the British army. He attacked the town; but the rebels fought admirably, and the attack was repulsed. No fewer than 500 men were killed, and the 32-pounders were captured by the rebels. Captain Holland shortly afterwards withdrew from the command; but about the time he retired an extraordinary occurrence took place at the head-quarters of the contingent, showing how impossible it was to carry on such a system in China without coming into constant collision with the native authorities. Four or five men had been punished for the offence of selling their arms and ammunition to the rebels. The men underwent severe punishment, but during the night some mandarins, under pretence that the soldiers had not been dealt with severely enough, dragged them from prison and cut off their heads on the parade-ground. Next day, when the men went on parade, there was a row; the men broke from their ranks and rushed to the residence of the mandarins, with the view of serving them as they had served the prisoners the night before. What added to their excitement and exasperation was, that a boat containing sixteen stand of arms, of precisely the same pattern as that supplied to the contingent, had just been seized on the river, and it was said to belong to one of the mandarins, who was suspected of trading with the rebels. The soldiers believed, indeed, not, I fear, without reason, that the mandarins had put their comrades to death in order that their own treason might not be discovered. Nothing further was needed to show the utter hopelessness of dealing with these people at all. Captain Holland was suc- ceeded by Major Gordon, and the notification of the appointment in the official papers clearly proved that both were appointed by no other person than General Stavely the Commander of Her Majesty's forces in China himself. The appointment was thus notified to the Chinese public—
Head Quarters, Shanghai,
March 24th, 1863.
"The Prince Kung and Sir Frederick Bruce having approved of the appointment of Major Gordon, Royal Engineers, to the command of the Ward Force, Major Gordon will take over charge from Captain Holland from this date.
By order,
"F. JEBB, D. A. A. General."
Major Gordon is one of the most distinguished young officers in the British army, having served in the Crimea and afterwards on the Turco-Russian Boundary Commission, and elsewhere, with great credit; and I Cannot but regret to see such a man's services lost to his country and given to a barbarous and foreign Power. According to a notice in the Gazette of last Tuesday, Major Gordon is placed on the seconded list, and has, therefore, withdrawn from the service of Her Majesty for the present. It is quite evident that the contingent in China is intended to be a permanent force, or the officers accepting appointments in it would not be prepared to sacrifice their prospects in the British army. I do not wish to say a single word against them. The fault lies with the Government at home; British officers will always fight when their doing so is sanctioned by their Government, and it is not part of their duty to inquire as to the justice of the cause in which they are engaged. I cannot think, however, that it is right or proper to hold out inducements to British officers to leave their own flag. Captain Osborn will, I apprehend, be more highly paid than the British Admiral commanding in the China Seas, while Major Gordon will draw nearly as much pay as a General on full pay; and it is currently believed that there are other pecuniary advantages to be gained in this service, which it is not necessary to specify. Nor can it be said that they are engaged in the service of the Emperor of China, and that we have nothing to do with the matter. Captain Osborn and his men, as well as the Anglo-Chinese contingent, will be looked upon both by the Imperialists and the rebels as servants of Her Majesty, obeying the orders of the British Government. Already, indeed, Prince Kung has conveyed to Mr. Bruce a formal expression of thanks
for the valuable aid rendered to the Emperor by the British, French, and Russian Governments, in most expressive words. I wonder it never occurred to those who inaugurated this policy, how dangerous was the example which they set the Tae-pings. The latest advices show that European officers and men take part, on the rebel side, in almost all the miserable conflicts between them and the Imperial troops; and although the British Government have endeavoured as far as they can to prevent the importation of arms into the rebel districts, yet all the regulations and proclamations which have been issued on the subject have totally failed in precluding the rebels from supplying themselves with as good arms as are to be found in the hands of the Imperialists; in fact, it is well known that Chinese, American, and European merchants are engaged in that very lucrative trade; pay and plunder is plentiful, and Europeans will soon be found in equal numbers in the ranks of both armies. I have now, I think, proved that this country is interfering in the financial, political, and military affairs of China, and that Sir Frederick Bruce, Envoy at Pekin, has assumed many of the functions of Prime Minister of China. It was quite impossible, owing to the policy pursued by the Government, that he could help placing himself in that position. But as his new policy becomes developed it must weaken, instead of strengthening the Government it is intended to support. Such a system as that which we have now adopted in China, of doing everything we can for the Chinese and receiving pay in return, cannot be continued without compromising the independence of the empire. If, indeed, China is to be governed on European principles, it must be ruled by Europeans; but if it is to be governed on Chinese principles, it must be ruled by Chinese. The further we proceed in the present direction, the greater will be the probability that we shall find ourselves embarked in a Chinese civil war, only to end in an Anglo-Chinese protectorate, or even perhaps in an Anglo-Chinese empire. That policy, I must remind the House, bad as it is, depends on the life of one man. Prince Kung is now Prime Minister, and has obtained his high position in a very curious way; for a conspiracy having been formed for the purpose of placing him in power, three of his leading opponents lost not only their
places, but their heads. Inasmuch, however, as those men were then representatives of what is called the popular party, who object to foreign interference, and have left behind them a party which is still very powerful at Pekin, it may happen that he may some day find himself treated in the same way as he has dealt with his political opponents; and should the other party come into power, the position of Sir Frederick Bruce will be somewhat difficult and awkward. But, if any further authority be wanted in support of the view which I entertain as to the policy of the Government in China, I need only refer to Sir Frederick Bruce himself, who, in writing to Earl Russell on the 10th of June 1860, says—
"There is, indeed, another alternative open to the people—namely, that of placing themselves under the protection of a foreign Power, in whose justice and force they have confidence, to preserve them from pillage and massacre. From the language held by some of the more influential native merchants, I think it not unlikely that sooner or later some such proposal will be made to foreign Powers, at the suggestion of commercial or religious influences, should anarchy increase, and should the decision of such questions be left practically to the people and the authorities of the provinces, in consequence of our being debarred from treating directly at Pekin on matters involving Imperial interest and considerations of general policy of such vast magnitude. I am further inclined to believe that foreign support thus given would render the re-establishment of the Imperial authority very difficult hereafter. In the mean time, however, the task of supplying the place of the foreign force would become every day more difficult. The Imperial authority would be entirely discredited in the eyes of the people. The Chinese officials, pressed for money, and relying on foreign support, would become more than ever cruel, corrupt, and oppressive; and the Chinese, deprived of popular insurrection, their rude but efficacious remedy against local oppressors, would with justice throw on the foreigner the odium of excesses which his presence alone would render possible. The consequence would be popular hostilities, reprisals, and that train of events which would render it necessary to appropriate permanently the province occupied, or to retire from it, leaving behind a bitter ill-will among the people. No course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation as to lend our material support to a Government the corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its weakness."
The dangers and objections to the policy we have adopted never were more ably stated; and that which Sir Frederick Bruce anticipated is, I think, not unlikely to occur. Foreign protection has been given, foreign interference has been established; and it remains to be seen whether the policy of Mr. Bruce of 1860 was sounder or
wiser than the policy of Sir Frederick Bruce of 1862. But I would refer also to another authority—that of Dr. Legge, a most distinguished authority—a man who has mixed little in politics, but who knows China well, who has spent the greater part of his life there, who is one of the first Chinese scholars of the day, and who pursues his literary and missionary labours at Hong-Kong, never engaging in trade, but living on the small stipend allowed him by the London Missionary Society; and I must inform the House that Dr. Legge has every personal reason to be in favour of the present system, inasmuch as he is nearly related to Mr. Lay, the chief of the Anglo-Chinese inspectorate of customs and the armed force placed at their disposal. Dr. Legge says—
"It behoves the British Parliament—the British people—to look to this new complication of affairs in China, to look it fairly in the face. If we are to pacify the empire, we shall require 50,000 troops, and may then find again that we have undertaken more than we are equal to. But I ask in whose interest we are to put down the rebellion? Hitherto Admiral Hope had been acting in the interest of the Imperial Government. Of course, if we fight its battles, it must pay all expenses. The British people cannot be expected to sacrifice the lives of its sons, and its treasure, to establish the Manchou rule, and all gratuitously. Now, I protest against our putting down the rebellion on behalf of the Imperial Government, however they may pay us for it, on two grounds. The first is the ground of its cruelty. I have read harrowing accounts of the devastations of the rebels—how the country is blasted by their march. The accounts are no doubt true. But I have seen also the ways of the Imperial braves, and kept company with them for hours together. Their march over the country was like the progress of locusts and caterpillars. Their thirst for blood was quenchless; their outrages on the young and old were indescribable. On the score of cruelty the case must be about even, inclining to the Imperialist side, if we may judge on the principle that the more cowardly are the more cruel. But the question is not about the masses, but about the officers of Government. And to know what will be the consequence if we put down the rebels on behalf of the Imperial Government, we have only to think of Yeh and his doings in Canton, when in almost twelve months he beheaded 70,000 people. I have heard Sir John Bowring, when other arguments for the Arrow war were exhausted, enlarge graphically on Yeh's barbarities. If we put down the Taepings, we shall kill our thousands on the battle-field, and the Governors of provinces will kill their tens of thousands in the execution areas. We shall be installing so many Yehs. Our high officers will be the ministers to so many butchers of human beings."
Such is the opinion of a man who knows China better almost than any other Englishman, and who is a perfectly unbiassed witness. The policy which has unfortunately been adopted in China, therefore, is equally open to grave objection whether it succeed or fail. If it fail in restoring order, and in re-establishing the present dynasty, it will inflict a great stain on the British name and on British arms. It will so infuriate the rebels that hostilities will be indefinitely prolonged; the solution of the Chinese difficulty—which seems only to lie in the appearance on the stage of some native of the country with sufficient powers of mind to raise himself to a position of supreme authority—will be indefinitely delayed. If we succeed in our policy, we shall establish in the Chinese empire one of the most intolerable tyrannies which the world ever saw. Every kind of cruelty will be committed in our name, deeds will be done which will cause a blush to rise to the cheek of every Englishman, until at last we shall be forced to put an end to the very power which we have vainly attempted to galvanize into a temporary existence. What we are doing in China has been done in India over and over again—the similarity of proceeding is very striking. In India our course has generally been, first, to make war against some native Prince; then having beaten him, we destroyed his army and weakened his authority in the eyes of his people; next we placed a resident at his Court, then we undertook to protect him from external and internal danger, and also to collect his revenue. Our help has generally been more fatal than our hostility. Thus, we gradually insinuated ourselves into every part of his Government, until he had nothing left but his great fortune, which he spent in riot and debauchery, and at last we often have been obliged, for very shame, to put an entire end to his power. What has happened repeatedly in India is certain to happen in China if we persist in our present course.
Now, what is the ostensible object of all these proceedings? Why, to maintain our trade and increase our commercial supremacy in the China seas. But has it never occurred to those who have recommended and are carrying out this new policy that they are pursuing a course calculated seriously to injure that trade? It is a remarkable fact that almost all the silk, and a great portion of the finest tea, comes from the very provinces which have
for years past been in the hands of the rebels. Yet what is the result? In 1848 we imported from China 20,000 bales of silk and 65,000,000 lb. of tea, the total value of both being seven millions sterling. In 1862 the exports to this country from China had risen to 90,000 bales of silk and 110,000,000 lb. of tea, the total value of both amounting to seventeen millions sterling, an increase of 130 per cent in seven years! As the trade has enormously increased, it is idle to say that it will be endangered by the success of the rebellion. Free access is afforded to traders in the districts occupied by the Taepings, and no obstruction is offered to the transit of commodities. On this point there can be no doubt, for General Stavely, writing on the 3rd of July 1862, said—
"Europeans continue to visit the rebel country for purposes of trade, and are treated with civility; large quantities of silk have been brought into Shanghai during the last fortnight, and trade seems in a thriving state."
But that is not all. Many of the British merchants think that our interference, by driving the rebels from the walled towns into the silk and tea districts, will create further ruin and devastation, and consequently, they look with much alarm on the new policy. They say that there is a probability that the Taepings will become so infuriated by our hostility to them that they will impede trade by shutting up the rivers and preventing our agents from buying or selling. They have never done so yet; but when they see British officers embarked in regular organized campaigns against them, when their cities are bombarded and their fortresses reduced, they are not unlikely to take steps for thwarting our great commercial objects. I have had an opportunity of consulting many London commercial houses engaged in the trade with China, and I find they are almost to a man opposed to Captain Sherard Osborn's expedition, and against an interference, calculated, as they believe, seriously to damage the commercial interests of England.
There is only one other point of view in which I wish to regard the question, namely, its probable effect upon our relations with foreign Powers. Two great European Powers have considerable interest in the far East. They are Russia and France. Russia has an interest in those seas which is increasing every day. Until quite lately the great river A moor formed the boundary between the Russian and Chinese empires, and Castreis Bay, near the mouth of the river, was the southernmost Russian settlement. In May 1858, however, Russia concluded at Pekin a treaty of boundary, as well as of commerce with China, by which it was agreed that the territories situated between the river Ousouri and the sea should be possessed in common between the Emperor of China and the Emperor of Russia. We all know what possession in common between two such Powers as Russia and China means. The new line of demarcation between the two Empires was obtained by taking the river Ousouri from its point of confluence with the Amoor, and up to its head waters, then drawing a line from its head waters to the sea. That gave to Russia a large portion of Manchouria, and a coast 900 miles in extent, possessing numerous valuable harbours, and 1,500 miles of inland navigation. At the most southern portion of this district is situated a fine harbour, called Victoria Bay. There the Russians have already begun to establish themselves, have founded a town called Novgorod, have commenced to build ships, and to create something like a trade. That place is situated within only three days' steaming of Shanghai, and is close to the frontier of China Proper. Schemes are, I believe, under constant consideration at St. Petersburg for uniting the port at Victoria Bay with Europe by telegraph; and it is not at all impossible that before long that new town on the Pacific will be thus connected with Moscow and the European telegraph system. The restoration of tranquillity to the Russian empire will, no doubt, be quickly followed by the execution of that project, for which the surveys have been made. This indicates the great interests and objects which Russia has in these countries. Furthermore, Russia has lately shown a decided inclination to follow our example in assisting the Chinese Government in the suppression of the Taeping rebellion, and Russian agents have lately been in communication with the authorities in various parts of the empire as to the best means of carrying their views into operation.
But France likewise is in a very curious position in relation to those regions. She has expended large sums of money in the attempted settlements of Cochin China, and her efforts have, to a great extent, been a failure. Yet, if France succeeds in restoring confidence to the inhabitants of those districts, a considerable trade will
surely spring up at Saigon and on the Cambodia. But France has other objects in view in China besides those of a commercial nature. At the present moment her commercial interests in China are very small—indeed, almost absolutely null. There is hardly a French mercantile house in China. But the French have several naval and military depôts in China, and a large native force at Ningpo, commanded by French officers. The rank and file are drawn from the scum of the Chinese, and many of the officers come from that class of Europeans which have not raised the character of the foreigner in China. This force is thus described by a journalist in The China Overland Trade Report, March 14, 1863—
"The constitution of this French contingent is as inexplicable as it is indefensible, and it is not doubted, nor Can it be, that territorial aggandisement is the motive power. At the present moment the situation of affairs in Annum has disabled the French from having the force at Ningpo which they otherwise would have, for the maintenance of those peculiar pecuniary claims which they so pertinaciously set up against the local authorities of that place. Consequently they have established this contingent force, which, though under the control of the French authorities and under the command of officers of the French army, does not otherwise consist of Frenchmen. The rank and file are recruited from the very scum of Chinese society, rendered desperate by oppression and destitution—the officers are those European outcasts which for years have made the foreign name so infamous on the China coast, and for whom Ningpo has long been the resort. The inducement to join this service is the absolute licence allowed to plunder. This may appear incredible, but what has occurred in relation to this second Shou-hing expedition proves it."
It is also stated that the Anglo-Chinese contingent are deserting to the French contingent, attracted by the superior advantages of pay and plunder which are offered them. But the objects of the French are principally ecclesiastical. For centuries the French Church has taken an active interest in the Chinese missions. At the end of the 17th century the Jesuit missionaries had spread all over the country. They established schools; they educated those who aspired to the higher offices of state, and for some years, under the name of tutors to the Emperor, they exercised many of the functions of Prime Ministers. In 1726 a great persecution arose. Numbers of the native Christians were killed, and whilst many of the Jesuits gave up their lives in the defence of their faith, others were glad to leave the country. But ever since that me there has always been a number of French ecclesiastics in China. The Lazarists have always had establishments in the country. The Jesuits have now returned; the exertions of Roman Catholic missionaries are increasing, and the French Government are actually laying claim to many sites in different parts, which were occupied by French ecclesiastics centuries ago, and not only laying claim but actually obtaining, possession of them. A French cathedral has risen at Canton, and a larger ecclesiastical institution has been erected close to Pekin. It is for these objects that the French wished to extend their influence. Can we object if, with higher aims and holier objects, they follow our footsteps, and enrol armies and man fleets, not for the purposes of trade and the advancement of commerce, but for the propagation of the true faith and the conversion of the heathen? I may be asked what practical steps should be taken to avoid the dangers I have referred to? I am fully conscious of the enormous difficulty of receding from such a course once entered on, and of turning back to the old line of neutrality, but it is quite possible to say, "We will go no farther." The Order in Council was only issued for two years. Her Majesty's Government might intimate to the Chinese Government that at the end of two years their officers must return to their duties, and there must be an end to their interference and assistance. A period would be named when intervention should end, and when no further help would be given. I am convinced that the further we pursue the course in which we have embarked, the deeper we shall get into the mire, and that public opinion will ultimately force the Government to retrace their steps. Our true policy is simple, straightforward, and easy of adoption. No interference on our part between the contending parties in China should be permitted, except so far as it is indispensable for the defence of British property and settlement. If measured by this rule, our course would be clear and the civil and military servants of Her Majesty would have no difficulty in acting on instructions so framed. I have now shown to the House, as well as my ability serves, what is the present state of affairs in China. A view of subjects so diverse and so important, compressed into the limits of a single speech, could be only a sketch, and I wish that the sketch had been made by some abler hand. Sir, I have asked the attention of the House to the subject, because I am perfectly convinced that our present policy, which is as novel as it is dangerous, is one from which we ought to recede as soon as possible. The old attitude of England to the Chinese Government was hostility. It passed to neutrality, and it is now gradually drifting into active interference with every department of Chinese public affairs. I have now done. I believe I have shown that the course which the Government are taking will, if continued, seriously imperil the character of the British name, injure our commercial interests in the Eastern seas, involve us in responsibilities and liabilities, the end of which it is impossible to foresee, and above all, will probably produce serious embarrassment in our relation with foreign Powers. These important matters I commend to the calm consideration of this House, and I own that I await with some anxiety the explanations which I hope are now about to be given on the part of Her Majesty's Ministers.
said, he did not at all agree with the noble Lord in the expression of his regret that the subject to which he had called attention had not fallen into abler hands; for a more able and interesting statement he had seldom heard in that House, or one which commended itself more generally to their sympathies. He regretted, however, that the noble Lord had thought it necessary to illustrate his view of their conduct in China by throwing anything like discredit on their conduct in India; because although there might have been occasions to which his observations would apply, still, generally speaking, the conduct pursued by the British authorities in India in circumstances similar to those referred to had been such as to bring great blessings on the country and diminish the evils under which different parts of India laboured. About thirty-three years ago the district of Hyderabad was one of the worst in India. It was utterly disorganized, and altogether in a most disgraceful condition. The Governor General of that day sent an officer with very high powers into that district, and the consequence was that for the last thirty years there had not been a more quiet or well-ordered district in India. The object of Her Majesty's Government in China had from the beginning been to raise the character of the Chinese authorities, and gradually, by good example and the conduct they should urge upon them, to fit them to govern their own country, and to maintain peace there, which was far more important to British interests than any authority they could exercise themselves. As the order in Council was only to last two years, it was manifestly the intention and desire of the Government that the Chinese authorities should within that period be able to conduct their own affairs. Having followed with much attention the proceedings of their authorities in China, he had learnt that they had interfered merely for the purpose of protecting British interests and the lives and property of our fellow-countrymen. The great increase that had taken place within the last six years in the value of property at Shanghai showed how beneficial their action had been, and he could not but think that the thirty-mile radius round that city was a very proper arrangement. He thought that justice was not done to Colonel Ward, who had been remarkably successful in drilling the native troops. As long as they exercised their influence in China only for the improvement and benefit of China, together with the fair interests of our countrymen engaged in commerce there, they had a reasonable hope of being able before long to withdraw their troops from that country, and he had no doubt but that such was the desire of Her Majesty's Government.
said, he could assure the House that he had no misgivings upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government in China. That policy had been pursued by the Government since he had the honour of being a Member of it, not only with regard to China, but to all Eastern nations. It would appear, from some observations which fell from the noble Lord, that when the question had been raised some time ago he (Mr. Layard) had abstained from saying anything upon the subject, because he did not dare to face the question. He thought he had before explained the reasons why he did not rise upon that occasion to reply to the hon. Gentleman opposite. It had been said that the question was one of the gravest interest; but when he looked at the state of the House then, and remembered what it had been upon a former occasion, he did not understand why, if this question was of such vast interest, it was so neglected by the House of Commons. He had said that he had no misgivings as to the policy of the Government, which agreed entirely with the views he had entertained as long as he had sat in that House. He was not surprised that the noble Lord—who had brought forward the question in a speech of great length and of considerable ability—should find fault with the Government. It was the duty of the noble Lord to find fault with the Government, and to censure everything they did. And so nothing that had been done in China had escaped the noble Lord's censure—the policy of the Government in relation to that country was fraught with mischief and danger. If all that the noble Lord had said was true, the Government deserved the strongest censure, and his only wonder was that the noble Lord had not concluded with a condemnatory Resolution; but he was surprised the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden), who cheered the noble Lord, should be of the same opinion, and should unite with him in condemning the Government. He should have thought the hon. Member for Rochdale and his Friends would have supported the Government in a policy, which, when he had the honour of sitting among them below the gangway, was the very policy they had suggested. He had been under the impression that they had thought it the duty of the Government to deal with China and other Eastern nations as with civilized nations, upon a footing of complete justice, and not to ride roughshod over them—not to treat them as barbarians, with whom no obligations were binding, and who had no rights, but to remember that we were under treaties with them which we were bound to respect. Such, he thought he could show, had been the policy of the Government, But the noble Lord, not satisfied with condemning Her Majesty's Government, had made them responsible not only for their own policy in China, but also for that of Russia and France. He thought he could, at least, show that there was nothing in the policy of the British Government analogous to that pursued by Russia. It was said that Russia, by following our example, had acquired possession of 900 miles of coast; but there was no such example set by us, for we had appropriated no territory. Our policy had been consistent with the true interests of China herself. He would remind the House that our relations with China had changed within the last few years—not that the opinions of the Government, or the principles on which they acted, had changed; but circum-stances had altered, necessitating a change of policy. Formerly we had no direct relations with the central Government of China, and the Government at Pekin was a mys- tery to us. We had to deal with small governors—each port being almost treated as a distinct capital. The central Government was as ignorant of us as we were of them, and it was the interest of the local Governments to deceive the central Government, and to delude us. That state of things brought about a serious evil, and the British Government had great difficulty in checking the proceedings of the consuls and naval commanders at the various Chinese ports. It became the habit, if such redress as the merchants deemed themselves entitled to were not accorded at once, and frequently even without inquiry, to adopt very highhanded proceedings. Our merchants and traders encouraged this conduct of our Admirals and Consuls, which was extolled at showing true British spirit and supporting British interests, and addresses of congratulation were voted, and services of plate were presented to them. China was called upon to observe treaties which we ourselves did not always observe, and many of our fellow subjects behaved in China upon the the buccaneer's maxim of no law across the line. But all that had changed within the last few years. After the treaty of Tien-tsin a Minister was appointed to reside at Pekin. When, on former occasions, the Chinese question had been discussed, it had been imputed to the Government that they had gone to war in order to obtain a resident Minister at Pekin. If the charge were a just one, the result had at least proved that the Government had not overrated the importance of having a resident Minister at Pekin. Instead of desultory negotiations with local governors, we now had direct communication with the central Government at Pekin, and, instead of exchanging shot and shell, we simply exchanged diplomatic notes. The central Government now could learn the truth, which before had been concealed from them, and they were beginning to understand that the treaties we had made with them were not one-sided, but were as much for the benefit of China as for the advantage of England. The power of direct communication with the Emperor and the Ministry had completely changed our position with regard to China, and had proved of very great advantage. We had shown the Chinese authorities that the best guarantee for internal peace, and the preservation of friendly relations with foreign Powers was the fulfilment of their treaty engagements. Our policy had in view two objects—to strengthen the Chinese Government as far as we could legitimately do so, as the best means of preserving tranquillity in China; and to secure the observance of treaties, not only with this country, but with all nations, without the necessity of that constant pressure which in former days used to end in war. In order to attain these objects, it was necessary to give such support as we were able to the Liberal party in China—to that party which was not oppposed to intercourse with foreigners; and most fortunately for the success of the British policy, there was at the head of affairs in China a very enlightened man, Prince Kung. The noble Lord said that this Prince was the only man of the class in China, and that if he failed, us we should recur to the old state of anarchy. Now, from the reports of Sir Frederick Bruce, he believed that there were in China many statesmen who shared the views of Prince Kung—men of great ability and determination, who would assist him in carrying out the policy which, fortunately for us, he had adopted. At the same time, we enjoyed the advantage of having at Pekin a very able Minister in the person of Sir Frederick Bruce, whose tact, prudence, impartiality, and high sense of justice tended greatly to the success of a policy of conciliation. But Sir Frederick Bruce had had a most difficult task to perform, and the difficulties arising from the Chinese themselves were small in comparison with those very frequently created by persons who ought to have supported him—namely, British subjects. The Government entirely approved the course which he had pursued in treating with the Chinese upon the principles of justice and of respect for treaties and engagements—dealing, in fact, with the Chinese Government as one capable of understanding and fulfilling obligations, and not as one with which we could only deal by constant appeals to arms. It would be impossible to follow the noble Lord in all his remarks, though, had time permitted, he thought he could answer almost one by one the objections taken to the policy of the Government. It was very easy to find in the blue-books isolated points for criticism, and the noble Lord appeared to have raked among them with great industry. In carrying out any policy, no doubt there must be some things open to objection. He admitted that such might be the case here; but taking a general view of the question, and looking at the broad principles on which Her Majesty's Government had acted in China, he believed that their policy was a just one, and that it was most consistent with the interests, not only of this country, but of China itself. From the little study which he had given the subject, the Chinese appeared to be a peculiar people, with what might be called innate good qualities; for they were industrious, they loved order, and they were easily governed. The latter quality, however, had led to such a degree of supineness in the Government that its control had gradually relaxed, and the country had fallen into much disorder. It was curious, that in the opinion of persons well acquainted with the country, the main cause of the difficulties in that country, was the reverse of what had been stated by his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Sykes.) Those persons declared that its disordered condition was owing, not to the presence of the Tartar element, but to the predominance of the Chinese element. It was because the Tartar element had declined, that a state of chronic anarchy had existed so long there. When the Tartar dynasty first governed the country, their courage and military qualities had enabled them to maintain order. But those qualities had grown gradually weaker, through the peaceful tendencies of the Chinese themselves, and after the lapse of some centuries, the control of the Tartar military police became so small, and the check upon the population so little, that brigandage arose in many of the provinces, and a state of anarchy existed, which the Government, not possessing an adequate military force, were unable to put down. Hence the present disorganised condition of the country. One of the principles of Chinese policy adopted by the Tartar conquerors was the exclusion of foreigners, contact with whom they believed would ruin the country. All they knew of us was, that we went to China, as they believed, to cheat them, and to bear them down by our high-handed proceedings; and the Imperial Government never had any communication with us except through local Governors. Now, the first thing Sir Frederick Bruce had to do was to remove this unfavourable impression, and lead Prince Kung to believe that we were ready to discuss points with him, to interchange ideas, and see whether a fair understanding could be come to without quarrelling and without war. Among the first-fruits of his new policy were two remarkable concessions given to us by the Chinese Government. Those acquainted with the details of the Treaty of Tien-tsin would know that one of the points most strongly resisted by the Chinese Government was the opening to British vessels of the carrying trade of a staple article of food—a kind of bean flour and pulse, which formed a considerable trade between the north and south of China. This trade was prohibited by the treaty. But Sir Frederick Bruce discussed the subject with Prince Kung, and after pointing out the advantages of a free trade system, and showing that a system of protection only increased the price of food to the Chinese themselves, he convinced the Prince of the soundness of these views, and British shipping thus acquired a great advantage. Again, by argument instead of force, our Minister had induced Prince Kung to extend the operation of the treaty, and to open that great river the Yang-tze-Kiang to British shipping, and to allow two ports there for the settlement of European traders. At one time the whole river was thus thrown open; but, unfortunately, a contraband trade sprang up, in consequence of which the restriction of the British to two ports became necessary. Both these important concessions were obtained entirely through talking the matter over with Prince Kung, and leading him to see that the advantages were as great to the Chinese as to the English. Now, formerly, in order to obtain such concessions, we should have had to go to war, and should have had to spend hundreds of thousands, or perhaps millions of money, instead of obtaining what we desired by diplomatic arrangements. In all those communications with Prince Kung and the other Imperial Ministers, they said—"You ask us to open our ports and allow British subjects to go into the country in all directions, in order to develop fresh sources of trade; but how can we do these things when this rebellion is going on? You complain of disorder, you say that protection is not given to your goods, and that extortions are sometimes practised on British subjects, and you make us responsible for them. Help us to procure disciplined troops, and to put our finances in order, and then we will do what you wish." Were these demands unreasonable? To listen to the noble Lord, one would fancy that no Power had ever before employed foreigners, either for the better regulation of its finances, or for the reorganization of its army. Why, Russia not two hundred years ago was in a far more barbarous state than China, and it then called to its aid English admirals, French generals, and German financiers, so that there was scarcely a minister in Russia who was not a foreigner. Through such foreign assistance Russia had become a civilized Empire. In our own time Turkey has followed much the same course, employing foreigners in its army and navy, while even at this time there was an English officer an Admiral in the Turkish service. An extraordinary fallacy ran through the speech of the noble Lord—namely, that what we had done was war, and that we were at war with a portion of China. Now it seemed to him, on the contrary, that what we had done was a proof not of war, but of peace, and we were never further from war with China than we were at the present moment. Then they were accused of a kind of solidarité with the Chinese Government against the Chinese people; but he was certainly very much surprised that, after making that accusation, the noble Lord should have read two extracts—one from a despatch of Earl Russell to Sir Frederick Bruce, and the other from Sir Frederick Bruce to Mr. Consul Harvey—laying down precisely what our objection was in furnishing the Chinese Government with assistance, and disclaiming altogether any intention to interfere between the Government and their rebel subjects, or to do anything else than to assist in organizing the Chinese troops, and in putting the finances of the country in order. Her Majesty's Government considered it necessary to defend the treaty ports, because in them was an enormous amount of British property. We defended them because we knew, that if they were captured by the Taepings, that property would be destroyed. [Colonel SYKES; No!] His hon. and gallant Friend said "No;" but he would prove to the House that the British merchants were of the same opinion as Her Majesty's Government. His noble Friend asked whether the English officers employed under the Chinese Government were still British subjects. To a certain extent they were; for all English officers remained so even after they took service under another Government in the way those officers had done; but for the time being they were actually under the command of the Chinese Government, and we were not responsible for their actions. The noble Lord seemed to think that in consequence of Her Majesty's Government having allowed the Chinese to employ British officers we should have for several years to keep British troops in China. Indeed, his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Sykes) had more than once stated that the number of our troops in China had increased; but so far from that being the case, the policy of allowing British and other officers to be employed in China—for the Foreign officers employed under the Chinese Government were not exclusively British officers, but were officers of all nations, French officers being among them—had resulted in a diminution in the number of British troops in China. In September 1860, immediately after the war, the number was 21,235; in September 1861, the number was reduced to 9,626; in September 1862, it was 4,679; and on the 1st of February in the present year, 4, 639. On the 7th of the same month the officer commanding was instructed to send back the 31st Regiment, 800 strong, a battery of Royal Artillery, and since then a wing of an Indian Regiment. With regard to the thirty-mile radius, of which so much had been said, and respecting which some Gentlemen contended the Government had gone a great deal too far, the question was a military one, and the Government had had nothing to do with it but to sanction the report of our own military officers, who thought that a radius of thirty miles was absolutely necessary for the defence of Shanghai. The noble Lord had made an admission in the beginning of his speech, which he seemed to have forgotten at the latter end of it, though the matter was almost the essence of the question—namely, that the Taepings had no recognised Government with which Her Majesty's Government could communicate. That was a point of the very greatest importance in the consideration of the question, because it was impossible for us to enter into relations with the Taepings if they did not admit the validity of our treaties, or had no Government which could be held responsible for their violation. But he was not disposed to again go over the question of the Taepings. Every one who had visited China, and who had an opportunity of forming an opinion on the subject—whether our own agents, independent merchants, or missionaries, agreed in this, that the Taepings were unable to found any Government; that they were mere plunderers going over the country and devastating right and left—destroying and not building up. As that point might be disputed by his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Sykes), he begged to read once for all an extract from a letter of one of the most distinguished English merchants in China, Mr. Michie—
It had been alleged that the Taepings would not have attacked our treaty port at Shanghai; but what took place when they threatened that city? If hon. Gentlemen turned to the blue-book, they would find that the English merchants there formed themselves into a hand to defend the city. They held a meeting and passed certain resolutions, among which was the following:—"I have no hope of any good ever coming of the rebel movement. No decent Chinaman will have anything to do with it. They do nothing but burn, murder, and destroy. They hardly profess anything beyond that. They are detested by all the country people, and even those in the city who are not of the 'brethren,' hate them. They have held Nankin eight years, and there is not a symptom of rebuilding it. Trade and industry are prohibited. Their land taxes are three times heavier than those of the Imperialists. They adopt no measures to soothe and conciliate the people, nor do they act in any way as if they had a permanent interest in the soil. They do not care about the ordinary slow and sure resources of revenue. They look to plunder, and plunder alone, for subsistence, and I must say I cannot see any elements of stability about them, nor anything which can claim our sympathy."
Now, as to Ningpo, a great misconception had arisen with regard to that place. The city of Ningpo was divided into two parts. The river ran between them. On one side of the river was a part of the city thickly inhabited by Chinese; on the other side the Europeans thought it right to make a settlement. On a former evening, his hon. Friend the Member for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell) made some observations on that settlement. He looked on it as if it was something peculiar and out of the general rule. [Mr. LIDDELL: I said we had no legal status there.] It was, however, one of the ports with which we were authorized to trade; but as to our not having a settlement there, that was a mere matter of detail. When the Europeans had settled themselves in one of these ports, they found it most convenient that they should have a portion of it to themselves, in order to avoid those strifes which so frequently arose from a mixture of European and Eastern populations. There was another reason for that arrangement, arising from Europeans being "extra-territorial"—that was, having rights differing from those of the native population, having different laws, and having those laws administered by their own officers. It was true that the formal settlement of that portion of Ningpo to which allusion had been made, had not been proclaimed, but that did not alter our legal status. At Ningpo, the Taepings came down on that part of the city opposite to the settlement of the Europeans—namely, on the part occupied by the Chinese—and the whole of the Chinese inhabitants fled. He had heard it said, by way of argument against the policy of Her Majesty's Government, that the trade with Ningpo was not interrupted after the Taepings had entered. Why, the fact was, that the Chinese inhabitants fled to that part of the city occupied by the English, and that being a treaty port, we held it. The Chinese took refuge under our laws, and the population became so enormous that the trade did not fall off, but on the contrary increased. But that part of the city which was held by the Taepings was entirely deserted by the traders, and was only occupied by an armed rabble. The noble Lord had somewhat mis-stated the state of things at Ningpo before Captain Dew interfered. If hon. Members would read the further papers which had been presented on this subject, they would see that the real cause of quarrel was that the Taepings insisted that they should have authority over the English settlement, and that that part of the town inhabited by Europeans should be placed under them. In a letter from Consul Harvey it was stated that the interference was just in time, for that the Taepings were meditating a treacherous attack on the European settlement, which was to have been put into execution in the course of a few days. If we had allowed the Taepings to occupy the treaty ports, the result would have been the entire destruction of our trade. That was the conviction of every merchant in China. Either we must have gone to war with the Taepings to defend our own interests and to support our traders, or we must have gone to war with the Chinese Government to compel them to make the Taepings respect the treaties we had entered into with that Government. Again, the noble Lord had not stated the case quite fairly as regarded Captain Osborn and the other officers who had taken service under the Chinese Government. Captain Osborn did not come from China to organize volunteers and a flotilla, nor was he, in fact, the agent and representative of the Chinese Government. Mr. Lay was the agent of the Chinese Government, with full powers: acknowledged by Prince Kung and Sir Frederick Bruce, and he was the only person authorized to act for the Chinese Government here. Captain Sherard Osborn had, with the permission of his own Government, entered into the service of that of China, The flotilla was intended to put down piracy, and for that object almost alone. The Chinese Government had pledged themselves to put down piracy; and if they did not do it, we should have to do it. The principal reason why we had to keep so large a force in the Chinese waters was to put down piracy, which was known to be the greatest evil our traders had to encounter; and if the Chinese Government were in a position by their own forces to effect this, we should be relieved of a responsible duty and of a great expense, and a great security would be given to British trade; so that Captain Osborn would remove a source of difficulty and of constant dissension between the British Government and the Chinese authorities. The same policy prevailed in regard to the custom-houses. The noble Lord spoke as if the customs were entirely under the authority of Englishmen, but the list which he could read contained the names of Germans, French, Americans—in fact, of all countries. Mr. Lay, a gentleman of great experience and ability, had been selected by the Chinese Government to be placed at the head of their customs; and if hon. Members would read the papers on the table, they would see how much the customs revenue had increased under his able management. Sir Frederick Bruce, writing to Earl Russell, said—"'That the committee be empowered to request from the Naval Commander-in-Chief increased protection for this settlement during the present emergency.' In conformity with the resolution, we would venture to point out to you the extreme probability that the present movement of the Taepings, or rebels, so different from former ones, both in the force reported to be employed and the avowed object with which it is commenced, may keep the settlement in a state of danger and alarm for many months to come. Should the Taeping forces not be dislodged from the surrounding country, they will probably lay a sort of siege to the city and settlement of Shanghai, and, according to usual Chinese tactics, keep up a constant annoyance. Under these circumstances, the small volunteer corps that exists here, and which is now, as you are aware, performing the duty of guarding nightly the inner lines of defences, will be quite inadequate to the labour; for it must be borne in mind that the gentlemen forming it have still to attend to their usual daily business occupations. We feel strongly, therefore, the advisability that the regular forces of Her Majesty should be so strengthened as at an early period to relieve the volunteer force of constant duty, and to give such a feeling of security to the residents of the settlement as may prevent these recurring panics, so utterly destructive to trade, and at all times imperilling the lives and property of Her Majesty's subjects. It having been understood that the policy of Her Majesty's Government is to defend the city and settlement of Shanghai from the Taepings, or rebels, it has led to a vast accumulation of population and wealth here. This latter is daily a greater temptation to the Taepings to endeavour to plunder, the more especially now as their armies are relieved from the siege of Hang-Chow, and are flushed with the capture of Ningpo. Hence, if the policy of Her Majesty's Government is to be maintained—and that it should be so we most cordially agree—we believe that a considerable permanent addition should be rapidly made to the force of troops stationed here."
It was perfectly true that the introduction of foreigners into the customs had been much attacked by the Europeans in China, and caused a considerable outcry there. But what had been the reason of that? Up to the present time foreign merchants had always been attempting to evade the payment of legal duties. They had recourse to all manner of fraud and deception. Of course, there were many exceptions. There were in China firms of the highest respectability, who would not be guilty of such practices; but there were also a vast number of adventurers, who went out to make fortunes as rapidly as possible, who had no regard for morality, or anything else, and whose only object had been to cheat and defraud the Chinese Government. He wished very much that hon. Gentlemen would read Mr. Lay's letter on that subject, which was to be found in the appendix to the papers presented last Session, and which showed the causes of the opposition to the introduction of foreigners into the management of the customs. Mr. Lay mentioned that several firms of the greatest standing had been concerned in these evasions, and in justice to two of them who had been named—Messrs. Lindsay and Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, and Co.—he wished to read to the House their explanation on the subject. Mr. Lindsay wrote—"Before the Treaty of 1842, when Canton was the only port open to foreign trade, the revenue from customs was assessed at 900,000 taels (£300,000.) On the opening of the four new ports stipulated by the treaty, the revenue from the customs diminished, and in 1857–8 it did not reach 400,000 taels (£133,000). On the introduction of the foreign element into its management the revenue rose, and in 1861 the receipts were 1,400,000 taels (£470,000.) Deducting 40 per cent (560,000 taels=£187,000) payable for the indemnities, there remain 840,000 taels (£280,000), being not far short of the sum derived from the whole foreign trade of China, when concentrated at one port. The results of foreign management have been the same at every port where it has been introduced; and looking to the recovery of the indemnities, and to the great importance of the Chinese Government not being deprived of funds at a moment when it is striving to restore tranquillity to the country, I think your Lordship will agree in the policy of upholding the system against the clamour of those who are interested in returning to the former corrupt and unsatisfactory customs administration. I have just heard the result of the first month's collection at Amoy. The estimate of the Chinese authorities was 5,000 taels (£1,666), and the receipts were 30,000 taels (£10,000)."
Mr. Jardine wrote in a similar strain. He said—"Two clerks in the employ of Lindsay and Co., in direct violation of their agreements, and without the knowledge of their partners, committed this act of smuggling. On discovery, they were justly punished by the confiscation of property worth £1,000. The firm bearing my name have throughout been consistent supporters of the new system, the object of which was that the legal duties should be fairly levied on all. Such an act of smuggling, discreditable under any circumstances, would, in my opinion, have been absolutely disgraceful and dishonourable had it been committed by a firm avowedly supporting the introduction of a new and better system of collecting duties, tinder these circumstances, I think I may injustice request that Lord Russell will allow this refutation of an unjust and injurious charge to appear in the next batch of Chinese correspondence laid before Parliament."
There, then, was the testimony of two of the largest houses in China that the new system worked well, and that it was favourable to trade. And he (Mr. Layard) believed that no greater boon could be conferred on the respectable British trader than the introduction of a regular, well-defined customhouse system. Moreover he must point out, that as the indemnities owing to this country were to be paid out of the Chinese customs, it was of great importance to us that the duties should be regularly collected. He trusted he had shown to the House that there was nothing extraordinary or against the policy of neutrality either in permitting the Chinese Government to have recourse to the services of British officers who were at the time on half-pay, or in allowing British subjects to undertake the organization of the Chinese custom-houses. Another difficulty which Sir Frederick Bruce had to contend with, and to which he had directed the attention of the Govern- ment, was that of dealing with our own subjects. No doubt many of them were highly respectable, but a large portion were the very reverse. The Europeans of that class were almost the worst portion of the population of China. They supplied Members of the House with complaints against the British and Chinese authorities, and they did their utmost to thwart the policy of Sir Frederick Bruce. How was it possible for Sir Frederick Bruce to persuade the Chinese authorities that the British Government were acting in good faith, when they too often saw British subjects acting in direct violation of treaties, and in a manner discreditable to the nation to which they belonged? Sometimes they took possession of land, for which they refused to pay. Sometimes they smuggled goods, and, when detected, came to the representative of the Government to support them in such practices. That was one reason why hon. Members were so often getting up and reading letters and extracts from newspapers containing charges against the Chinese authorities and the English Government, which were entirely unfounded. He believed that the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers was just and humane towards China. It was calculated to prevent, instead of encouraging war, and we were never so far from war with China as at that moment. If, indeed, the Government were to revert to the old state of things, and refuse to support their officers in controlling British subjects, it would be better to allow the old East India Company to deal with China, and to confine the trade under severe restrictions to one or two ports. The noble Lord talked of Sir Frederick Bruce as being the Prime Minister of China; but it was to be remembered that Sir Frederick Bruce had colleagues at Pekin; he was acting cordially with the American and French Ministers, and the assertion that he was Prime Minister of China was therefore without foundation. The authority of Dr. Legge had been quoted, Dr. Legge said, "Talk about the cruelties of the Taepings, but what cruelties have I not seen committed by the Imperial braves!" But Her Majesty's Government were putting an end to the system of employing these braves by the introduction of disciplined troops, who would not be guilty of these atrocities. He believed, however, that the Imperialist atrocities had been much exaggerated. [Colonel SYKES: No.] Yes, he would take the word of Admiral Hope in preference to that of the informants of his hon. and gallant Friend. Dr. Legge talked of the Government putting down the rebellion, and sending 50,000 troops for that purpose; but Her Majesty's Government were not engaged in putting down the rebellion. They were, on the contrary, withdrawing British troops, of which there was a smaller number that year in China than the last. The more the Chinese disciplined their troops, the less necessity there would be for the British Government to defend the treaty ports, which were so important to the trade of this country. The noble Lord talked of the Government as withdrawing the filibusters, and giving the command into the hands of English officers. Was it not, however, much better that the Chinese troops should be commanded by men who would not permit acts of cruelty to be perpetrated? Then the noble Lord drew an analogy between China and India. But in reality there was no analogy between the two cases. In India a portion of territory had been acquired by British subjects, and from small settlements they had attained to a large empire. But the British Government went to China, not to establish themselves as rulers; on the contrary, they desired the independence of China, and to support the Chinese Government in maintaining it by putting an end to disorder and disorganization. The noble Lord was correct in saying that the tea trade had not fallen off, because tea was for the most part grown in districts still occupied by the Imperialists. The noble Lord added that the silk trade had increased. A considerable portion of the silk district was occupied by the Taepings, but not the whole; and the reason why the supply of silk had not diminished was that the Taepings did not generally interfere with the agricultural population, but only sacked the cities. The noble Lord had fallen into the error of supposing that all the country overrun by the Taepings was occupied by them. If he had read the statement made by Consul Parkes, he would have seen that after they had sacked one city they went to another, and did not attempt to occupy the agricultural districts which they overran. The only place they had occupied for any length of time was Nankin. The latest accounts from that city represented it as deserted, except by the Taepings and the young women they used as slaves, for they did not permit marriage. Nothing had been done to rebuild the city, or to introduce commerce. The Taeping leaders had stated, that if they had not interfered with the treaty ports, it was only in consequence of the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government at those ports. That admission of the Taeping leaders showed that the policy of Her Majesty's Government, in regard to the treaty ports, was just and right. If, however, the Government had done nothing; if the treaty ports had been allowed to fall into the hands of the Taepings; and if the trade had been stopped, the noble Lord would have been the first to denounce the inaction of the Government. It was his belief that the Taeping rebellion was gradually breaking up. Already some of the more important Taeping leaders had gone over to the Chinese authorities, and when Nankin fell, the whole Taeping rebellion would probably fall with it. The despatches of Earl Russell and Sir Frederick Bruce, which the noble Lord had quoted, were penned under circumstances very different from the present, and when the rebellion was at its height, and the Imperial Government had not organized an army to put it down. In addition, he would state to the House, from the reports which he had heard, that the discipline of the Chinese troops, not only under European, but under Chinese officers, was greatly improved, that fewer cruelties were now committed, that cases of plunder were rare, and that the troops were supported by paying for what they obtained from the population. That was a great step in advance, and would go far to show that Captain Sherard Osborn, who was as well known for his humanity as for his gallantry, would introduce great improvements into the Chinese army, and that Her Majesty's Government were deserving of praise, and not blame, for allowing such men to go to China. He might be over sanguine, but looking at what had gradually taken place in China, he had very great hopes. He saw in the distance tranquilllity restored; that vast population again engaged in agriculture; the fields teeming with that produce which, once a luxury, had now become a necessity to this country; the canals once more covered with boats; new markets opened to our industry;—and if those hopes should be realized, he believed the policy of Her Majesty's Government would have contributed as much to the general interests of humanity as to the particular interests of this country."There is nothing which we desire more than an efficient custom-house system established on the coast of China, and we have from the commencement cordially approved the principle of a foreign inspectorate."
said, they had listened to two very long and important speeches made that evening, and the House must have derived considerable instruction from what had passed. There was not a Member of the House who had listened to the speech of his noble Friend but must have admired the research and knowledge which it evinced, and the clear and lucid way in which a speech of nearly two hours length presented the whole subject to the House, to their great information and instruction. But they might also obtain some information and instruction from the speech of the hon. Gentleman opposite, because he had shown, that after listening to the long and important speech of his noble Friend, he could get up and meet a difficult case, where defence was impossible, by a speech of an hour's duration, which conveyed no information to the House, and touched on no single point which, as an advocate of the Government, he was bound to have noticed. The hon. Gentleman had accused his noble Friend of having made a speech founded on isolated points taken from the blue-book, but those who heard that speech knew well that that was not a fair representation of it. On the contrary, his noble Friend had taken up and attacked the whole course of policy of Her Majesty's Government, and shown that it was systematically contrary to that which they had professed as the only policy upon which we could deal with the Chinese Government, and that it was likely to bring us into collision with vast forces in that distant empire. But the hon. Gentleman contented himself with getting up and making a speech, one hall of which was devoted to the abuse of those who were engaged in commercial transactions in China. The hon. Gentleman spoke for nearly an hour, and only once, and that by accident, did the word neutrality drop from his lips. It was two years since the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, speaking in that House, said that the only policy which could be followed with advantage by the Government in dealing with China was a policy of strict neutrality. That declaration of the noble Lord met with the universal of acceptation the House and the sancniot of the country. But that policy had been entirely reversed by Her Majesty's Government. The hon. Gentleman had misrepresented in a most wonderful manner the speech of his noble Friend; for he said that it was now proposed that we should abandon the defence of the treaty ports. But nothing which Would give a colour to such a supposition ever fell from his noble Friend. His noble Friend not only admitted that policy, but absolutely insisted on defending the treaty ports. But what his noble Friend pointed out was, that having, with a view to the defence of these ports, adopted the principle of the thirty-mile radius, in concert with the Taeping chiefs, we had engaged in operations beyond that—operations which we were not called upon to undertake, and which seriously compromised our neutrality in China. The effect of that policy upon Ningpo would be best shown by a despatch from Consul Harvey to Sir Frederick Bruce, in which he said—
Were these the words of the agent of a Government which professed a strict neutrality between two parties? It was perfectly obvious, that within the last two years the policy of Her Majesty's Government, to use the words of the hon. Gentleman, "had altered with events." The policy now pursued by Her Majesty's Government was not for the interest of this country. The evidence which his noble Friend had produced with respect to Ningpo showed some of the most extraordinary conduct on the part of an officer of Her Majesty's Government that could be imagined. The last letter of Captaint Deow the Taeping chiefs contained a passage so remarkable, that though had been qituoted by his noble Friend, he could not help calling attention to it again—"We must all be agreed upon the point that the Taepings are essentially a destroying, as we Englishmen are a constructing Power. Let us, therefore, for ever live apart; we are not made, nor can we afford, to breathe the same air, or to mix in congenial pursuits. For my part, let me state that it Will be a source of great satisfaction, and, I may add, of pride, in after-time, to think that I have been placed in a position to use my feeble pen, and to have exercised my humble powers (always within the limits of my official duties) in weakening and undermining, as perseveringly and indefatigably as I have been able, the most gigantic imposture and the most blasphemous structure that ever disgraced ancient or modern ages."
This neutral officer says, "I profess neutrality; but if you venture to pull a trigger in your own defence, we shall bombard the city." What was the consequence? The British poured shot and shell into Ningpo as evidence of their perfect neutrality. The hon. Gentleman had made representations which would mislead the House as to our position with respect to that settlement. He said, "The city is divided into two parts, one occupied by the Chinese population, the other where the traders have taken up their residence with a view to trade." But that was not what was meant by a settlement. What was meant by a settlement was this—it was land positively ceded, within the limits of which British law and not Chinese law, was to have effect. He should like to know at what time British law had been established at Ningpo. At no time had any concession of that kind been made by the Imperial Government of China, and yet Captain Dew said, that if the Taepings allowed a single musket to be fired on a certain portion of the town, the English would fire on the Taepings. It was perfectly clear that the English had no right or title to hold that language; and the use of it reflected very little credit on the discretion of Captain Dew, whatever might be his character for gallantry. The hon. Gentleman had made use of very extraordinary arguments. When they complained of their prompting the Chinese Government to employ foreign forces, he said that in Russia and Turkey foreign forces had been employed, and no objection had been made. But from the peculiar circumstances of China the employment of British officers on one side would be sure to bring us into collision with the other. That was the ground of complaint. One point which his noble Friend dwelt on the hon. Gentleman had studiously avoided a reference to, and that was that the course of policy being pursued was sure, sooner or later, to bring this country into collision with other European Powers who were struggling to establish great and permanent interests in China. His noble Friend pointed out that the policy pursued by Russia for many years had led to the extension of her territory in the Chinese seas, and that the Russians had obtained as the result of that policy a seaboard of 900 miles, approaching within three days' sail of Shanghai with most valuable ports on it. The efforts making by France in China were well known; and he was convinced that the policy of Her Majesty's Government was such as, sooner or later, would lead to a collision of interests with France and Russia. He begged the House, therefore, to consider in what a position this country might be placed by seeing its trade crippled, by having half the population of China against it, and finding itself led into dangerous complications with European nations having interests in that part of the world. It would be no consolation to be told by the hon. Under Secretary that all that might be true, but that the Imperialists were increasing their revenue and the efficiency of their armies. He was convinced that the old policy of the Government was the true policy—that of neutrality, and he, for one, hoped that it would soon be resumed."We now inform you that we maintain a perfect neutrality; but if you fire the guns or muskets from the battery or walls opposite the settlement on the advancing Imperialists, thereby endangering the lives of our men and people in the foreign set- tlement, we shall then feel it our duty to return the fire and bombard the city."
Sir, I have listened with great attention to the very long and, I must say, able speech of the noble Lord who began this discussion. He showed that with, the greatest industry he had gone through the details of all the events which have happened in China for several years past; but I own that I was at a loss to understand the conclusion that he wished to draw—that of censure on Her Majesty's Government for the course of policy that they have followed. In the first place, it was rather surprising to hear from a Gentleman on that side of the House such an enthusiastic defence of rebels—to be told that rebellion is so sacred an institution that it is quite culpable in the Government to give any help to a friendly Power to suppress it. These are new doctrines. Does that principle apply to Italy? Are hon. Gentlemen prepared to say that they would apply the same protection to those who have cast off their allegiance to former Governments in Italy which they are prepared to show to these Taepings in China? One principle, I presume is applicable to one country, and another to another. But the main question is, has the policy which Her Majesty's Government has pursued in China been attended with good results? Is it founded in good faith, and is it likely to produce advantage to the country? In years now gone by, though not long gone by, we were perpetually in hostility with the Government of China, hostility of squabbles, of complaints, or with arms. What is the case now? We were then attacked and condemned, and were told, "You are en- gaged in hostilities with one-third of the human race, you are needlessly risking all the commercial interests of the country by these quarrels and conflicts with the Government of China." We were told to abstain, and let things take their course. Well, the state of things is now altered; these very hostilities which were found fault with have resulted in this, that we are now on the most friendly terms with the Government of China; that we have access to the supreme Government of China, from which we were hitherto debarred by local and provincial authority; and the noble Lord himself has quoted Returns showing the enormous increase of our trade with China during the last three or four years. Compare the state of our commerce with China some years ago, when we were contented with the limited intercourse of the East India Company with one portion of the Chinese Empire; compare that, I say, with the great development now given to industry and commerce over the whole surface of the Chinese Empire. Look at the extension which that commerce, I trust, is destined to receive when, by our friendly assistance, we shall have been enabled to place the internal arrangements of China on a better and more regular footing. A great portion of the noble Lord's speech seemed to me to be high praise of Her Majesty's Government. If I had been listening to any one moving a vote of approbation, I should have expected him to narrate the very things that the noble Lord, in the simplicity of his mind, brought forward as the gravamen of the complaint against the Government. What does he say? He says you are teaching the Chinese Government the arts of Government practised in Europe. You are enabling them to collect their revenue on a systematic principle and to increase that revenue by the equal way in which the customs duties are levied; you are giving them the means of preserving order in their territory; you are allowing your soldiers and sailors to enter into their service to suppress those disturbances that have laid waste and desolate from time to time the fines portions of that Empire. We admit the charge; and we consider it a great merit in the Government in having done these things and in continuing to do them and I was surprised and gratified to fine that the noble Lord, having bestowed all his industry in the collection of facts to fabricate a grave charge, having come to curse, was obliged to stay to bless, and laving come to lay a charge against the Government, was compelled to state things that I think do infinite credit to them. I hold, that as the Government of China has altered its policy with regard to foreign nations, and with regard to the English nation—as the policy of China is now conducted by Prince Kung and associates equally liberal with himself—as they are prepared to enter into intimate relations with foreigners, instead of, as formerly, keeping them at arm's length and endeavouring to prevent all intercourse with them—as the policy of China is now to encourage commerce, and to endeavour to extend it with the nations of Europe, I say it would be suicidal policy on our part not to endeavour to assist the enlightened Government of China in pursuing that course of policy that they are now prepared to adopt. The noble Lord and the hon. Gentleman say, we admit that you are entitled and indeed bound in duty to defend your treaty ports and to have a radius of thirty miles round them; but one of the great charges made was that we took steps to rescue one of these treaty ports from the hands of the Taepings, who had violently seized and occupied it—I mean Ningpo. If the noble Lord admits that it is our duty to maintain the freedom of those treaty ports, why does he complain that we have employed our officers to rescue the important port of Ningpo from the Taepings? The admission of the noble Lord is an answer to the accusation that he made against us. There is nothing inconsistent with the practice of nations in one friendly Government lending to another officers to drill and instruct their troops, to manage the police of their coasts, and therefore we have done nothing when we authorized the Queen's officers to enter the service of China that has not been done in innumerable instances and in a perfectly justifiable manner. The noble Lord said—and it amused me—that one of the duties of Captain Sherard Osborn would be to destroy pirates; he says that it is not necessary to send a ship of war to do it, for anybody might do it if he meets a pirate on the high seas. Yes, but you must first "bell the cat." It is all very well to say that you are at liberty to destroy any pirate that crosses your path, but the chance is that the pirates destroy you, and that is what is happening on the coast of China. We know that the coast of China is infested by fleets of pirates, some Chinese, some Europeans, who prey on all the ships of commerce they meet with. There is no use in saying these ships of commerce may destroy pirates. One of the great objects which Captain Sherard Osborn has in view is to sweep these pirates from the Water by the squadron under his orders, and to restore security to the commerce of Europe on the coast of China; and I hold that to be a very meritorious occupation. The noble Lord went into a description of the great encroachments that Russia is making upon the coast of China, and he told us that France has also views of ambition in parts of Asia in connection with China, and he says, "I warn you that the course you are pursuing will lead you into conflicts with these two great Powers." But what Was the course that he proposed we should follow in order to avoid this possibility of conflict? One course Was that which we are pursuing—that is, strengthening the Chinese empire, adding to the revenue of China, and enabling her to provide herself with a better navy and army. That is one method of inspiring other countries with caution as to any future encroachments they may think it desirable to make in China. But what is really the natural inference to be drawn from the Warning the noble Lord has given us—that we should retire from China and abandon it to Russia and France. Withdraw your Minister, withdraw your settlements, and withdraw your merchants, because, remember, France and Russia are encroaching in China, and if you are there at the time, you will be in conflict with them; and therefore get Out of the way, and allow Russia and France to proceed, because they will be stronger than you, and the only course to avoid the conflict will be to abandon China, to give up your trade and political interest, and everything that you think of real value, to the mercy of those great Powers, and leave China to the future policy of Russia and France. Well, I do not admit at all the wisdom of that policy. I admit it is quite true that Russia may have of late made serious encroachments in the northern provinces of China. It is quite true that France—a Power which has a great tendency to extend itself, has certainly carried her operations into Asia. But, nevertheless, France, and Russia, and England are perfectly agreed, for the present at least, in their policy in regard to China. They all concur in supporting the Imperial Government, and therefore our policy as at present directed has no tendency to bring us into collision with the other Powers. Our Minister at Pekin is on the best possible terms with the representatives of France and Russia, and so far from there being any fear of collision or of any antagonistic policy between the three Powers, I am happy to say that they all concur in feeling that it is their mutual interest to restore, if possible, tranquillity to the interior of China, and to extend the commercial relations of all the countries of Europe with China. I am, therefore, Sir, at a loss to know in what respect we are blamable. In scanning the future the noble Lord anticipates that European wars will arise out of our commercial relations with China. Now, Sir, on the contrary, I think that the policy we are pursuing will open a still larger and more extensive sphere of industry in that quarter of the world. Depend upon it, a country peopled by one can't tell how many hundred millions of men must afford great resources and means of development for trading enterprise. The Chinese are a commercial population, and there is no hostility to the Europeans amongst them as a people. The hostility is confined to a certain number of mandarins, whose interest it is to keep everything that does not actually belong to them out of the field of commerce. That hostility, however, has been swept away. The Chinese Government has been rendered friendly towards Us, instead of being hostile; and I have no doubt, that if these internal disorders could be suppressed, and if tranquillity could be restored in the interior of China, We should find in our Commercial intercourse with the Chinese an important source of wealth and national prosperity, which could be hardly anticipated even by those who talk so much of the advantages of the suppression of the East India Company, and the enlargement of our commercial relations with China. I trust that by this time next year we shall find the result of that faithful and straightforward and friendly policy which we have adopted towards the Emperor of China; and I am convinced if this House will only agree to await the result of that experience, we shall find, that so far from our deserving the censure of the noble Lord and the hon. Gentlemen opposite, oh the contrary, the course which Her Majesty's Government have pursued is eminently advantageous to the country, and deserving of the thanks of Parliament.
said, he was glad to find that an exposition of the policy of the Government had been elicited. But the noble Viscount, in supporting his own policy, bad ingeniously evaded the real question at issue—namely, the effect of the English policy in China at that moment. The effect of the policy of the Government had been to destroy authority in China; but at that time they were attempting, by very doubtful and illegal means, to prop up a Power which they had themselves destroyed—he meant the Imperial Power. Their own envoy at Pekin stated that within the last few months the capital was in danger, and that the mandarins were making no effort to defend it, because they relied upon the English troops that were there. Their interference in China was wholly unnecessary, and no Member of the Government had attempted to show that there was any attempt to injure British person or property. That interference was not only unnecessary but most mischievous, inasmuch as it tended to prolong that unhappy struggle, and to teach the Chinese Government to trust to British arms rather than to themselves. The noble Viscount said, that their envoy was acting in concert with the representatives of other foreign Powers at Pekin. He did not know how to reconcile that statement with the previous observations of the hon. Gentleman. The hon. Gentleman said, "Never mind what the policy of France and Russia is—there is no analogy between that policy and ours." He believed, if the policy of the Government were continued, that the time would come when China would become a great theatre of political intrigue. The hon. Under Secretary said that the rebellion was waning; but Mr. Oliphant, who accompanied Lord Elgin to Pekin in 1858, and had consequently better opportunities for observation, used precisely the same phrase. The value of those prophecies might be judged from the fact that the war was raging with greater vigour than ever, and the richest producing districts in China had fallen into the hands of the rebels, who still continued to hold them. The truth was, that the rebels were gaining, instead of losing, from the want of faith of the Government, who violated their pledge of neutrality. The last accounts from China undoubtedly conveyed that impression. The action of the French contingent in Ningpo tended seriously to injure our trade; and in proof of that they learned by the last mail that a British contingent had been formed to keep in check the action of the French contingent, on account of their lawless acts of rapine and violence. The first duty of Captain Sherard Osborn would be to control the lawless operations of our French allies. He could not conceive a more difficult position for an English officer, even though he was in the employ of a foreign, power. These were some of the complications which the policy of our Government was leading to. He thought, however, that he had detected in the language of the Government that evening some glimmerings, at least, of an intention to retire from the untenable position which they had assumed, The observation that his noble Friend, if he had any cause of complaint, ought to have proposed a vote of censure was a very old argument, The country had, it was true, once declared in favour of the noble Lord upon a Chinese question, but the people were in his favour not because they approved of his policy in China, but because he was defending public servants in that country. Had they understood to what difficulty, embarrassment, and danger the policy of the Government was likely to lead they would have acted in a different manner.
begged to thank the noble Lord opposite for having brought the question forward, and for having in his luminous details testified to the accuracy of almost every statement which he (Colonel Sykes) had made in the House during the last two years in regard to events in China. The noble Viscount was mistaken in supposing that the Tartar Government of China existed in its ancient Imperial power and in that character was entitled to consideration and forbearance. The fact, however, was, that there was no such Government. It was a myth, and had no executive power whatever. There were constantly-recurring proofs that the decrees of Prince Kung were not obeyed a hundred li from Pekin, and in the provinces persons and property were at the mercy of cruel and rapacious mandarins or the rebels, and at the treaty ports and for a radius of thirty miles around them, the people had to look to the protection of the bayonets of British soldiers. In the districts of China which were nominally under Imperial Government, numerous outbreaks against the authorities were taking place. They were told that on the 4th of January 1863 fifty robbers landed and plundered the custom-house at Swatou, and on the 18th December 1862 pirates landed and burnt the docks and village of Whampoa, near Canton, and the Imperial Government could afford no pro- tection nor redress. In the neighbourhood of Canton the Imperial Government attempted to tax pork, and the butchers rose and drove the officers out of the place. At Fatshan taxes on bricks caused a rising of the makers, and they also put the tax-gatherers to flight, and many other instances might be named. The drilled Chinese under European officers have been in a state of mutiny half a dozen times; in short, anarchy reigns in China. Where, then, was the Imperial authority? As to the cruelties of executions in China, he held in his hand a statement from an eyewitness at Canton, the editor of the Friend of China, who saw ten men executed, one of them being tied to a cross and skinned while alive, the process beginning at the brow and proceeding downwards. And that atrocity was sanctioned by the so-called civilized Government which England was supporting at the expense of her blood and her treasure. It had been alleged by the hon. Under Secretary of State that it was impossible for the British Government to communicate with the Taepings, because the Taepings had no regular Government to communicate with. But the Taepings had occupied nearly one-third of China for thirteen years. Could it then by possibility be true that they had no Government to administer this enormous extent of territory, Mr. Griffiths John, who had visited those called the rebels at their capital of Nankin, which they had held for twelve years, and written, an account of what he had observed of their institutions, said there were six administrative boards at Nankin similar to those at Pekin. He added, that as the districts were under martial law at present, the civil law was under subordination to the military; but that, of course, when the Taeping authority was firmly established, this state of things would be reversed. But meanwhile there was a Government of the Taepings with which we could have established diplomatic relations. Why, Sir Harry Parkes and most of the Consuls and our naval and military authorities had been in repeated communication with the Taepings, and Sir George Bonham had assured them that the English Government would recognise any chief they might like to set up. The Taepings had custom-houses throughout the territories which they occupied, and a gentleman was with him the other day who told him he had paid these customs duties, and that the Taepings had a regular tariff, a copy of which he (Colonel Sykes) had sent to Earl Russell. The statement, therefore, was unfounded in fact, that the Taepings had not a Government with which diplomatic relations could be established. So far from it, that in all cases where our subordinate officers exacted pledges from the Taepings, they had been scrupulously fulfilled, without an exception. The Taepings themselves had made repeated overtures to us to establish amicable relations with them; in some instances their letters were returned to them unopened, and in all cases we had rejected their friendship. One of the alleged reasons for our conduct was that British persons and property were endangered by the lawlessness of the Taepings, but he (Colonel Sykes) invited the noble Lord at the head of the Government to lay upon the table of the House a single case of injury done to British persons or property with the knowledge of the Taeping Chiefs. They had certainly been made responsible for the plunder of a vessel off Plover Point by the Cantonese Pirates, who held the towns of Chang-soo and Fooshan, on the Yang-tze-Kiang, and they had to make good the plundered property. To save themselves from a future similar infliction, they immediately laid seize to these two towns and took one of them, but the other threw itself under the protection of the Imperialists, and it was Saved from capture by the drilled Chinese force under British and other European officers; Another apology for treating the Taepings as brigands and land pirates was, that they caused desolation wherever they moved. No doubt, in fighting for the laud they took, there was necessarily desolation; but when once in possession, the ordinary industries of life were encouraged and protected. He (Colonel Sykes) held in his hand the diary of two European agents of the house of Hart & Co., of Ningpo, copy of which he had sent to Earl Russell. They were employed to buy silk in the Taeping provinces, and they made two successful ventures, travelling in the districts for seventy-seven days with entire safety, and meeting with great kindness from the Taeping authorities; and they describe the whole country from Ningpo, until they approached the battle-fields around Shanghai, as in a state of luxuriant cultivation. He would ask, therefore, are these eye-witnesses to be believed, or is the House to pin its faith upon contrary statements in blue-books? The fact is, the British public has not been made acquainted with the whole truth respecting events in China; and he again thanked the noble Lord (Lord Naas) for his vigorous and successful exposure of the facts illustrative of our policy in China for the last two years.
remarked, that the gallant Colonel advocated the cause of the Taepings on all occasions. The fact was, there were faults on both sides in China. No doubt the Imperial Government was imperfect, but it was improving; and he had no doubt that Captain Osborn would soon restore its authority, and put an end to the atrocities hitherto committed. Our merchants were perfectly satisfied with the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government, and we were never in a better position than at present with respect to China. Compared with former years, our commerce with China had of late years wonderfully increased. China, well governed, would be a source of wealth and prosperity to any country connected with it by the ties of commerce.
said, that the policy now being pursued by this country in China would rise up again and again against them. What his noble Friend who brought forward the subject objected to was, that they were assuming all the powers of Government in China. Step by step they were undertaking to do that for China which the empire of China ought to do for itself. If their trade were interfered with, it would, of course, be their duty to protect it; but that was quite a different thing from taking upon themselves the collection of the revenues of a country like China, and sending the most distinguished officers of their army to fight her battles, as well as gunboats. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had relied on the fact that trade with China had vastly increased, but his noble Friend (Lord Naas) had pointed out that the great bulk of their trade with China lay in the provinces occupied by the Taepings, and that point had in no way been answered. The Taepings were in possession of a great part of the empire, they were willing to trade with us, and to respect our rights, and it appeared to be an incomprehensible policy to send gunboats and soldiers to a foreign Power to serve against them. Such must be a mischievous and bad policy. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had argued that the policy tended to encourage a liberal party in China; but what, he should like to know, did he mean by a liberal party. Did he mean a Whig party? Did he mean a party of ancient and respectable Whigs? He said that a new idea was being developed at Pekin, and the Government was being conducted in the most happy manner. If that were so, what need was there for the gunboats? He (Mr. Whiteside) had no hesitation in saying that the present policy would end in an unfortunate result; and he had heard nothing in the course of the discussion to convince him that it was right to send out British officers, to double and treble their pay under a foreign Power, and he should not be surprised to hear the Chancellor of the Exchequer make as eloquent a speech in reprobation of the policy of the Government as he had done on a previous occasion when China was concerned.
Question put, and agreed to.
Supply
SUPPLY considered in Committee.
House resumed.
Committee report Progress; to sit again on Wednesday.
Fortifications And Works
Resolution
Considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
I rise substantially to move for leave to bring in a Bill, in continuation of the Bill of last year and the year before, for the purpose of authorising a further issue of terminable annuities, with the view of carrying on those works which have been sanctioned by Parliament for the defence of our dockyards and other stations. The sum which was authorized to be issued last year has not been entirely expended. A sum of about £600,000 is still available, but it will not be sufficient to pay for the amount of work which we may reckon on being done between this time and the month of July in next year. We therefore propose to ask for a further issue of £650,000, which amount, together with the balance now on hand, will enable us to prosecute these works till the end of July 1864, by which time we shall have an opportunity of coming to Parliament for further authority to continue them. I am happy to say that the works in progress have been exceedingly well conducted as far as they go, and will, I think, be found very useful for the defence of the country. Generally speaking, the works which will be found mentioned in the schedule of the Bill are all that have been already sanctioned. But last year the construction of the forts at Spithead was suspended in consequence of some doubts which then prevailed as to the relative merits of forts and ships. We think, however, that the experience we have derived from the War which is going on in America tends to prove that forts are formidable antagonists to ships; while the progress of the improvements made in cannon in this country also shows that at 600 or 800 yards solid shot and even a shell will pierce Vessels constructed like the Warrior. The same thing could, I have no doubt, be done at 1,000 yards, and the only reason why it has not been done hitherto is that at Shoeburyness there is not a range of that extent. Arrangements have, however, been recently made to have a range of 1,000 yards, and I feel assured that the progress of improvements will prove that we can penetrate at that distance ships constructed on the principle of the Warrior. The proper time to enter into details will come when the Bill and Schedule have been placed in the hands of hon. Members. The Motion which I am about to make being substantially one for leave to bring in a Bill, I should propose that that Bill be read a second time on Thursday next, and we can then take the Committee on the first convenient day. The noble Lord concluded by moving the following Resolution:—
"That, towards providing a further sum for defraying the Expenses of the Construction of Works for the defence of the Royal Dockyards and Arsenals, and of the Ports of Dover and Portland, and for the creation of a Central Arsenal, a sum not exceeding £650,000 be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, and that the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury be authorized and empowered to raise the said sum by Annuities, for a term not exceeding thirty years; and that such Annuities shall be charged upon, and be payable out of, the said Consolidated Fund.
said, he wished to know whether it was proposed this year to make provision for the construction of a central arsenal which had formed part of the original place?
We ask for no sum this year for a central arsenal. We are going to pursue the same course as last year.
said, he did not think that the actions which had taken place in America had at all altered the question of the Spithead forts as it Stood last year. In an engagement between forts and ships, if the ships were anchored at a moderate distance, and sup- posing the forts to be well constructed and heavily armed, and the ships to be well built and heavily armed also, he maintained that the result would always be in favour of the forts. But the proposed forts at Spithead would never prevent a determined officer of the navy from passing them even by daylight; while nobody Would contend that ships of war would not pass those forts at night, and take up an anchorage in the Solent, from which they could bombard the dockyard. We had the same power to prevent vessels remaining in the Solent from the shore that we could have from the forts. The forts would add nothing to the strength of the position. They would cost a large sum of money, and only create disappointment. He protested, therefore, against the Vote, and trusted the Government would not press it upon the House. No gun had yet been found which could pierce the Warrior's side at 3,000 yards, as they had been told would be the case. He would not oppose those works which were already advanced; but the Committee ought to be distinctly informed which of the works Were in a state of progress and which were not.
said, he did not intend to oppose the introduction of the Bill; but he hoped they would be furnished with ample details of the different works with which the Government proposed to proceed, in the form of a schedule. He could not agree with the noble Lord that the events of the American war had changed the position of the question in regard to the Spithead forts, as it had been shown on several occasions in America that forts were powerless to stop the passage of vessels of war. In the Mississippi ships had been able to pass forts, and at Spithead they would do the same. He trusted the House would assemble on Thursday in sufficient numbers to insure a fair and full discussion of that important subject.
said, he would ask the noble Lord what was the meaning of putting a central arsenal among the objects for which the Resolution was to provide, if in the Committee no Vote was to be taken for the prosecution of that very object?
All I meant to say was, that we do not intend to propose any Vote for it this year.
said, he knew something of Charleston Harbour, having been there sixty-two years ago. He was also acquainted with Spithead; and, speaking simply as a representative of the commercial interest, he must say, he believed that forts were a material means of stopping ships from ascending rivers, and that it was very desirable that our harbours should be well protected by forts.
said, he did not intend to oppose the introduction of the Bill, not, however, because he had been convinced by the statement of the noble Lord, but because he despaired, with the elements then composing the House, of being able to resist with success. He was the more confirmed in that opinion by the observations of the hon. Member for Greenwich, who sought to oil the machinery for the proposals of the Government. The worthy Alderman, who had gained his knowledge of Charleston sixty-two years ago, forgot that across that harbour it was possible to lay a boom. With all his knowledge of Portsmouth, would the worthy Alderman tell him that it was possible to lay a boom across Spithead? There was no similarity between Charleston and Portsmouth. He rejoiced to see the noble Lord once more amongst them—[Cheers]—and he should be ready on Thursday to move the same Amendment as was moved last year. There was nothing new to warrant the building of these forts on the Spit; and if the House was at all prepared to maintain its consistency, it could not rescind the decision which it came to last year.
said, that although not offering opposition to the measure at this stage, hon. Gentlemen had sought to discredit it in advance. The hon. Member for Liskeard had made a very broad statement, but one, he imagined, without the slightest foundation—namely, that there was no similarity between the harbour of Charleston and Spithead. There was a remarkable similarity between Spithead, as it would be made by the proposals of the Government, and Charleston Harbour, as it existed when it repelled the immense force of the Northern fleet. The report of the Defence Commission recommended, and he presumed the proposals of the Government would follow their suggestion, that the distance between the three chief forts at Spithead should be about 2,000 yards, so that the fire would cross at a distance of about 1,000 yards from each fort. Now, Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumter were just 1,900 yards asunder, and the vessels of the Fe- deral fleet did not approach so near the forts as to be in a line between them. There had been an extraordinary advance in gunnery since last year. The Warrior target had been set on fire in its backing by a Whitworth shell at 800 yards, and artillery officers were of opinion that the same result might be produced at 1,000 yards, whereas last year nothing of the kind had been done at a greater range than 200 yards. It was utterly at variance with the experience of the naval action at Charleston to suppose that no determined officer would be deterred from taking his ship past the Spithead forts when armed with such artillery. The Federal vessels were not, perhaps, as powerful as the vessels of a European power, but they were the best which the Northern arsenals could produce, and in point of guns they were vastly superior to the guns of the forts to which they were opposed, those guns being also very inferior to the guns which would be placed in our forts. There never was an attack upon which a greater stake depended than the attack on Charleston; and the officers conducting it had every motive to do all they could to obtain success.
said, he wished to ask whether the Government had any information to give the Committee with regard to the material of which the American ironclad vessels were formed, as it was reported that the plates were only nominally of the same thickness as the plates used in our navy, and instead of being composed of solid iron were made up of several sheets bolted together?
said, it was true that the ships which attacked Charleston were not coated with the same quality of iron as the vessels which would be brought against the forts at Spithead. It was perfectly true they were coated with iron five inches or six inches thick, but formed of plates bolted together, and not solid plates. The difference was immense between the ships of America and the ships which would be brought against the forts of Spithead. At the same time, the artillery brought to bear against the ships at Charleston was very different from that which we could now place in the Spithead forts, and still more inferior to what we might hope to place there in two or three years, fie could state from his own personal knowledge that no boom could be placed across Charleston Harbour. Piles were driven in the shoal water, and across the deep water was carried an obstruction of cordage and net, the object of which was not to present an insuperable bar, but to foul the screws of the vessels and impede their progress. The same floating obstruction could be placed at Portsmouth. The Federal vessels were not stopped by the obstruction, for they never ventured to approach the forts. He did not wish the statement to go forth uncontradicted, that there was a boom at Charleston, as he knew no boom was in existence shortly before, and none could have been in existence at the time of the attack.
said, there was this difference between Charleston and Portsmouth—Portsmouth dockyard could be bombarded by guns outside the forts altogether, whereas at Charleston the place must first be captured. He had the same objection as last year against forts. They were not movable, and could be of no use against movable ships, unless the ships ran their heads against them. The object of an enemy would be to bombard Portsmouth dockyard, and that could be done easily by vessels at a distance sufficient to prevent their suffering from the fire of the forts. The ships at Charleston were not the best which the Northern arsenals could send out, but only the best which the Northern contractors chose to build, and would bear no comparison with the ships of any European Power. He had no doubt that with guns of long range a ship, remaining at a comparatively safe distance, could throw shells into the dockyard, and he should therefore oppose the second reading of the Bill.
said, he had voted all through for the forts, and he intended to vote for them again. They were not pleasant things for an enemy's ship to pass, and with the addition of floating batteries would make a good defence for Portsmouth harbour.
said, that notwithstanding what had been said, he should maintain that there was no parallel between the harbour of Charleston and Spithead. It would, for instance, be impossible to drive any piles near Spithead.
observed, that, as a matter of fact, the forts proposed to be built outside Portsmouth were 2,000 yards further out than were the forts out-side Charleston.
said, he should vote in favour of the proposition of the National Defence Commissioners. Nothing could be stronger than the opinion of the naval and military officers appointed to consider the subject in favour of the erection of the forts; and he thought that the House did very wrong last year in neglecting the sea defences of Portsmouth, and securing it from attack on the land side, the effect of which would be to arm Portsmouth against ourselves in case of its being entered by an enemy.
said, he had always been of opinion that Spithead should be defended by forts, and thought it might be made impregnable by the forts being connected by a line of chains with iron-plated vessels. A slack and taut chain would effectually stop any hostile vessel, because the first would check and the second would stop any vessel that attempted to force its way.
Resolved,
That, towards providing a further sum for defraying the Expenses of the Construction of Works for the Defence of the Royal Dockyards and Arsenals, and of the Ports of Dover and Portland, and for the creation of a Central Arsenal, a sum, not exceeding £650,000, be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, and that the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury be authorized and empowered to raise the said sum by Annuities, for a term not exceeding thirty years; and that such Annuities shall be charged upon, and be payable out of, the said Consolidated Fund.
House resumed.
Resolution to be reported Tomorrow, at Twelve of the clock.
Greenwich Hospital (Provision For Widows) Bill
Bill 200 Second Reading
Order for Second Reading read.
expressed his approval of the Bill so far as it went. He only regretted it did not go further. If Sir Charles Napier had not stirred in the matter, they would not have had before them the Report of the Commissioners; and that Report would have been left in abeyance if it had not been for The Times newspaper. He had seen many of the evils of the present system when his late father Sir Charles Adam, was Governor of the Hospital. The great evil was the absurd and ridiculous constitution under which it was governed. The Commissioners might be excellent men of business, but they did not live at Greenwich, and only came there about once a week, and could know nothing of the wants of the pensioners. The present distin- guished Governor of the Hospital was in the same difficulty that his predecessors had been in. It was true, that in the time of Lord Auckland, when the Governor was Sir R. Keats, the latter was consulted, but that good practice had been given up. It might be said, that if the Governor was to be consulted, he would in effect have a seat at the Board, and that he maintained to be the right principle. When the Bill went into Committee he should endeavour to introduce a clause to empower the Commissioners to deal with the 10 Geo. IV., c. 25, so as to alter the constitution of the Hospital.
said, he was glad to hear that the hon. Gentleman intended to propose an Amendment that would in effect carry out the recommendations of the Commissioners. It had been said that the Admiralty could of its own power remove all existing evils, but the greatest evil was that of the double or treble government, which could only be altered by Act of Parliament. The matters to be deal with by the Bill did not require the sanction of an Act of Parliament.
said, he also wanted to know what necessity there was for the Bill. The charter provided among other things for the sustentation of widows. He would also like to know what the Admiralty proposed to do with the 144 widows already provided for out of the funds of the Hospital and within its walls?
said, the object of the Bill was to make permanent provision for widows of seamen killed and drowned, and it was upon the advice of counsel that the Admiralty had thought it best to introduce a Bill for that purpose. As to the second question, he would say that the Bill did not affect the widows within the walls of the Hospital. His hon. Friend seemed to think that a fit opportunity to introduce a clause to make alterations in the government of the Hospital; but in 1861, when a Bill for that purpose was introduced, it was so unfavourably received in the other House that his noble Friend (the Duke of Somerset), as he thought wisely, declined to proceed with it. He would not undertake to say that the government of Greenwich Hospital was perfect; but, notwithstanding all that had been said about the double government, he did hope that in future the Governor and the Commissioners would be able to work amicably together. Perhaps there had been as much fault in individuals as in the system, and the hon. Gentleman himself said that in the days of Sir R. Keats it had answered well. It might hereafter be the duty of the Government to introduce alterations into the mode of governing the Hospital; but he did not think that it was advisable, in a Bill dealing simply with a provision for widows, to introduce such alterations, and therefore he hoped the Bill would pass without any attempt being made to mix up with it the question of the government of the Hospital.
Bill read 2°, and committed for Thursday.
Growing Crops Seizure (Ireland) Bill
On Motion of Sir ROBERT PEEL, Bill to amend the Law relating to the Seizure of Growing Crops in Ireland, ordered to be brought in by Sir ROBERT PEEL and Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL for Ireland.
Bill presented, and read 1°. [Bill 211.]
India Stock Bill
Bill to give further facilities to the Holders of India Stock, presented, and read 1°. [Bill 212].
House adjourned at half after One o'clock.