in rising to move the following new Standing Order,

"All questions before Committees on Private Bills shall be decided by a majority of voices, and whenever the voices are equal the question shall be resolved in the negative,"

said, he hoped that the House would not agree to this proposal of the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He could not help thinking that they were altering the Standing Orders without due deliberation, and with more chance of doing harm than good. Although the principle now recommended by the hon. and gallant Gentleman prevailed in the courts of law and in the House of Lords, he had never known a case in which the members of a Committee of that House being equally divided the decision had passed in the negative. Indeed he had been informed by noble Lords who had acted as Chairmen of Committees that the almost universal practice in case of equality of voices was not to take a decision, but to adjourn. He should prefer to revert to the old number of five members; but if the number was to be four, it would be better to abide by the Standing Order of last Session than to hold out to parties and counsel the temptation to be continually fighting to get the Committee into such a fix that the voices might be equally divided. He should oppose the Motion, and if he received sufficient promise of support would divide the House against it.

said, that he should prefer to increase rather than to diminish the responsibility which was cast upon Chairmen of Committees, because he was convinced that it was by the former course only, and not by the latter, that the private legislation of that House could be improved. He strongly recommended the House to make the experiment which was decided upon last year. The Chairmen of Committees who were chosen for their fitness, had most onerous and responsible duties to perform, and the House ought to strengthen rather than to weaken their hands.

said, that when reference was made to the practice of the House of Lords they ought not to overlook the circumstance that in dealing with the Private business of that House great authority was left to be exercised by Lord Redesdale, the Chairman of Committees. In one instance in which he had sat as the Chairman of the Committee upon a Bill, the agent for the promoters afterwards pointed out to him alterations in about 150 clauses, which he said were suggested by the Lords, and upon his inquiring whether he meant the Lords' Committee or Lord Redesdale, he replied that in every instance he meant Lord Redesdale. When they were asked to alter their practice that it might conform to that of the House of Lords, it was important that they should bear in mind that their Committees had a practical authority to exercise and work to do. Having acted as Chairman of Committees, he could imagine the possibility of a Committee being placed in circumstances of great embarrassment by the Chairman being deprived of the authority which might lawfully belong to him, and by two members being enabled to neutralize his influence.

said, it appeared to him that there were two objections to the proposal of the hon. and gallant Gentleman which were worth considering. First, it would have the effect of neutralizing the influence of the Chairman, They had been accustomed to believe, and he thought they were right in believing, that the Chairman of one of these Committees on Private Bills generally knew more about the matter upon which they were called upon to decide than any of his colleagues, and he suspected that that would continue to be so even if they were to reduce the number of members to three, instead or four. If his authority was neutralized he was afraid the Chairman would feel less sense of responsibility than he had hitherto done; and therefore, as Chairman, he would be less to be relied upon, and less useful under the proposed change. But there was another objection which seemed absolutely fatal to the proposition. It was to be presumed that parties appearing before a Committee to promote a Bill for any great public work, were engaged in doing what was likely to be beneficial to the public, and their proposals ought not to be suspected, or to be rejected upon inconsiderable grounds. According to this proposal, however, any great measure which might have taken many months to prepare, which might have involved a vast expenditure and engaged the labours of the most able men in many departments of science, would, if two members of the Committee voted against it, be rejected, although an equal number voted for it. In his opinion the presumption of a Committee in the case of equal division ought to be in favour of the measure which was before the Committee, as one which was calculated to be of public advantage; and the acceptance of a contrary presumption would be a manifest injustice to the great engineering interest, and to those who were engaged in directing the enterprise of the country, as it would infer that a measure which they sought to have decided in their favour, was one which a Committee ought to reject. In his opinion, the number four was a clumsy one to deal with matters of this kind, and no reasonable argument had been given for having four members instead of five, except that the House had undertaken more business than it could properly carry through. As the number was to be four he should certainly vote against this proposition of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, which might lead to the rejection of some great and useful enterprise, because two members out of the four, for some cause or other, did not think fit to vote in its favour.

said, that for his own part he was sorry that the number of the Committees on Private Bills had ever been changed from five. He was still strongly in favour of a Committee of five. What was the position of the Chairman in a Committee of that number?—because the influence to be possessed by the Chairman was now the question at issue. The Chairman was in the position that in order that his opinion should prevail he should get two out of four Members to agree with him; while in the case of a Committee of four he must get two out of three to agree with him, so that if he were in the latter instance to have only a single vote, as in a Committee composed of five, the chance of his moral influence prevailing would be diminished, inasmuch as he would find it more difficult to get two men to agree with him out of three than out of four. Now, it was not, so far as he could see, the wish of the House to lessen the influence of the Chairman, who, as a general rule, might be presumed to have more experience than the other Members of the Committee. The question was how this influence was to be made up to him. He saw no other way in which that influence could be upheld in a Committee of four than by giving him a second vote in the event of there being an equality of voices. Therefore, much as he was disposed on all occasions to agree with the hon. and gallant Member he thought on the whole the argument prevailed for giving the Chairman a casting vote. If in those cases in which there happened to be that equality it was to be considered that no decision at all had been arrived at, an obstructive effect would, he thought, be produced; nor could he admit that when a Committee of four had been agreed to by the House there had been any general understanding that the Chairman was to have only a single vote.

thought the hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. Arthur Mills) was scarcely correct when he said that the Motion had been brought forward with the view to assimilate the practice of the House of Commons to that of the House of Lords. It was brought forward rather to carry into effect a promise which the hon. and gallant Member for North Lancashire had made on a previous occasion when the Motion for the substitution of the number three for four was rejected—a Motion which he regretted to say he did not succeed in getting the House to adopt.

asked why the Chairman should not have a casting vote in the present instance as well as in the case of other proceedings before the House? With a Committee of five, if one Member was prevented from attending the inquiry was conducted by four Members and the Chairman had a casting vote; and he did not see any reason for adopting any other practice when four was the original number. If that privilege were not accorded to him, an ingenious Chairman might secure a decision in accordance with his views by the mode in which he might put the Question. Suppose he were anxious that a clause should stand, and that he put the Question thus, "That this clause be struck out," the decision, being in the negative in the event of there being an equality of votes, would be in his favour. He considered three a better tribunal than four, but as that number was fixed at four he saw no reason for departing from their usual practice of giving a casting vote to the Chairman.

thought it extremely probable the House would find it expedient to return to five, which was much better than the number four, or adopt the proposition of the hon. Member for Walsall (Mr. Charles Forster) and fix the number at three.

said, all this discussion would have been avoided if the House had agreed to a Committee of three, and he believed the House had been induced to reject the Motion of the hon. Member for Walsall on the understanding that the proposition of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Lancashire was to be agreed to. It now appeared, however, that whatever influence his hon. and gallant Friend might have with the President of the Board of Trade, the influence of the hon. Member for Birmingham was still greater, for the right hon. Gentleman seemed to have departed from the views which he held on a former occasion, when he professed to regard the respective merits of three and four as a sort of Schleswig-Holstein question, and to be rather in favour of such a proposal as that under discussion.

was of opinion that if the Motion before the House were adopted the House would not be laying down a rule for the guidance of Committees, but rather raising a number of points tending to embarrass them. The result, indeed, would be that, unless a regular code as to the manner in which the proceedings should be conducted and the Question put were drawn up, the Chairman would get back in an indirect way that influence of which it was now sought to deprive him. During the last week, he might add, the Chairman of Ways and Means, under a power given him by a Standing Order of last year, had issued certain regulations, in accordance with which he would have a casting vote in the event of there being an equality of voices among the Referees on Private Bills. If, therefore, the present proposal were agreed to the House would be making inconsistent and conflicting rules with regard to the transaction of Private business.

said, it was only a Chairman utterly unacquainted with the rules and mode of putting Questions in the House who would act in the manner suggested by the hon. Member, seeing that it was the duty of the Chairman to be guided by the rules of the House in that matter. The only reason for changing the system of the House in these matters was, that in practice it had been found by the Committee of Selection so extremely difficult to obtain five Members to serve upon each Committee that it became necessary to consider whether it was absolutely requisite to adhere to that number. A great deal was to be said in favour of both views, but the House last Session adopted the Resolution for the reduction of the number by a considerable majority. From the expressions of opinion now put forward, however, it seemed that there were many who were strongly in favour of going back to the number five; and if that view should prevail, if hon. Members thought that the Private Bills could not be properly entertained by a less number, by all means let that course be adopted. He must say, however, as Chairman of the Committee of Selection, that their duties in framing the Committees would be very considerably increased. If he were quite certain that Committees composed of three Members would be fully attended in every case, he should be willing to vote for three as a proper number. But knowing the enormous amount of capital with which the Committees were called on to deal, he was quite certain that the large companies, having enormous interests at stake, would not be satisfied if by any accident the number were reduced to two. With two Members, the House must bear in mind that all the objections urged against the casting vote of the Chairman applied with still greater effect. He entirely disclaimed any personal feeling on this question. His only object was to get the Private business as satisfactorily disposed of as possible, with the least practicable expense to the parties, and the least practicable inconvenience to hon. Members.

said, the mass of Private business had certainly worn a sufficiently alarming appearance to justify the hon. and gallant Gentleman in entertaining the subject originally, but he was not without hope that the difficulty would prove less overwhelming than he anticipated. Having to choose between two inconveniences arising under the new system, he should give his voice in favour of the Chairman's casting vote.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If it be the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce this Session any Measure to regulate the Law of Marriage in the United Kingdom, or to institute any inquiry by means of a Committee of that House, or a Royal Commission, with a view to future Legislation?

Sir, Her Majesty has been advised to issue a Royal Commission for the purpose of inquiring into the state of the Marriage Law.

Sir, I rise to ask leave to introduce the Bill of which I have given notice, the purport of which is properly described in the terms of that notice as a Bill to provide for the better distribution of the charge for the relief of the poor in Unions. That is the limit of the Amendment which the Government intend to propose in that branch of the law which affects the settlement and removal of the poor. Greater purposes have been ascribed to their intention in another place, and it has been supposed that the object of this Bill would be to abolish at once the laws of settlement and removal. That was, however, a gratuitous assumption, and was not made upon the authority of any Member of the Government. I am not ignorant of the evils of the law of settlement and removal, but I am also aware of the difficulty of dealing with that subject, When I entered the Office of the Poor Law Board I was no stranger to the operation of the Poor Laws, either as they existed before the Amendment made in 1834 or since the passing of that Act. I was associated with the great inquiry that took place in 1832, and I believe that there has not been since that time one important inquiry into the operation of the Poor Law in this House on which I have not sat. I am, therefore, acquainted with the operation of the laws of settlement and removal, and also, as I have said, with the great difficulties of dealing with that subject. I certainly received an impression during those inquiries which I have never seen reason to change; which was, that the abuses, mismanagement, and malpractices which the inquiry disclosed were, more or less, directly or indirectly, to be attributed to the operation of the laws of settlement and removal. The system of settlement, as the House knows, was a device of the 17th century, that cast the burden of the support of the destitute poor upon the realized property of the country. Having operated for a length of time with great injustice and very capriciously, the remedy was devised of conferring upon the parochial divisions of the country the power in certain cases of removing the poor that sought relief and had become settled in those divisions. The right of claiming relief was given to the poor in the district where they became destitute, and the remedy was given to the owners of property there, subject to the conditions of law, to remove these claimants to some other district. The first enactment on this subject was passed in the reign of Elizabeth, and the second in the time of Charles II., and the parochial divisions having been extended to all the townships, and being altogether of the number of about 15,000, the practical operation of the law of settlement and removal has been for two centuries to array the arbitrary divisions of the country in active hostility to each other upon this matter, each being obliged by law to bear a burden, without reference to its extent or to the ability to bear it, and each having the right, subject to certain conditions, of casting the burden on its neighbours. That is the history—or, at least, the character—of the Poor Law for two centuries—15,000 arbitrary divisions saddled with the burden of relieving the poor within its own limits, and each trying to cast its burden upon the other without the slightest reference to the interest, the morals, or the well-being of the poor in any respect. We know in this House what has been the result of that system. The statute-book has been encumbered with every variety of enactment to mitigate the mischief and correct the errors of the system. Every one who is familiar with the proceedings of courts of justice is aware that the Law of Settlement and Removal has been the fertile source of litigation, expense, and discontent. It would have been well if the evils of the system ended there, but we know what irritation, discontent, and disaffection among the poor themselves have been occasioned by the schemes and devices invented by the parochial authorities in order to escape from their burdens. What might be called a climax, indeed, in the system was reached, as it were, in our own time. In 1830 this result manifested itself in something like a servile insurrection, the like of which had not occurred for five centuries before in this country. There are many persons still living who remember the terror which for the moment was produced by the riots and disturbances in the agricultural districts, and how universally they were ascribed to the long-continued maladministration of the Poor Laws. There was, perhaps, one redeeming circumstance in these events—namely, that they seemed to have first thoroughly awakened the State to the great importance of that policy that provides for the wants of the poor by a compulsory system of relief. These events seemed to have impressed the Government with the necessity of some closer relationship of the State with the responsibility of a proper application of this law. It was a question, before that time, among philanthropists and philosophers, whether a system of compulsory charity could be an advantage to society, or to the poor, and whether it was not dangerous to property. But of late years it may be said to be a settled conviction that this is a matter of sound policy, and that in a densely peopled country like this there must always be a great number of persons who, from a variety of circumstances—from sickness, infirmity, and bad habits of life—must be in danger of experiencing the extreme consequences of want, and that our present system of compulsory relief is deemed a matter no less of wisdom than of humanity. These views led to the appointment of the great Commission of Inquiry of 1832, composed of many of the ablest men in the kingdom, assisted by gentlemen who went into every part of the country, and made the fullest and most searching inquiry into the operation of a Poor Law, which had endured for upwards of two centuries and had produced such disastrous effects. I may here say with confidence that the first conclusion to which all the Commissioners came was that the parochial system had utterly broken down and failed, and that with such capricious and arbitrary divisions it was impossible to obtain an authority equal to the difficult and delicate task of distributing public relief to the poor. The foremost remedy determined upon then, was to extend the area of relief, and to accomplish this by a system of combination or union of parishes, each to be represented at a Board. The extension of the area and creation of the Board was not objected to, because the principle of representation, those who contributed to the rates, was recognised in the constitution of the Board. A house was then established for the maintenance of those who were relieved within, and officers of the union were appointed to distribute the relief to those who were to be relieved without. The next Amendment necessary was to establish such a system of supervision that would effectually prevent the recurrence of all the great irregularities that had existed throughout the country. A central authority was required that might gather experience from all parts of the country, enabling them to frame rules and regulations that they might then prescribe to the local boards, and thus secure uniformity and something like a wise and proper administration of the law. That was effected, and a great improvement was accomplished by the system that was thus established in accordance with the recommendations of the Commissioners. Rule and method took the place of confusion and disorder. The administration of relief to the poor was taken out of the hands of ignorant, illiterate, and irresponsible men, and placed in those selected for their competency, and many of the mischievous practices were put an end to that had prevailed throughout the country, and had been at the root of much of the riot and disaffection to which I have referred. The Commissioners, however, at that time, were not satisfied with what they had accomplished, because they had not completed the system which they had in view, in the changes they proposed. The principle of their system was based on the failure of the parochial system, and they considered that if those arbitrary areas were still left with power that many of the objectionable features of the former system would re-appear. But at that time there was considerable alarm among the influential ratepayers, who were afraid of having to contribute a greater share of the burden than they had had formerly. These persons were fully represented in Parliament, and they succeeded in preventing the Commissioners carrying out the plan they had in view, which was to do away with the parochial liablity for maintaining the poor, and to have Union administration and Union chargeability commensurate. I well recollect the disappointment of the Commissioners at being unable to carry out the principle to this extent; and the fact that the new Poor Law, although it has been attended with many advantages, has not succeeded to the extent its great advocates expected, is doubtless much to be ascribed to the failure of the Commissioners in this respect. To this circumstance are owing many of the malpractices and measures adopted by parishes for reducing their liability, such as that of driving the poor from their own into adjoining parishes, and the many evil results of that system, and which fall upon the poor in consequence. These have been frequently the subject of Complaint both in this House and in the columns of the press, and it is known that many parishes have been overburdened with poor driven there by others to escape their fair share of the burden. This is owing to the parochial chargeability having been continued in deference to the opinions and interests of persons in this House. I doubt, indeed, if anything would have changed the system, but for what may be considered to have been accidental, which led to important alterations, and I trust will form the ground for still further improvement. This was in 1846, when there were great appre- hensions that the landed interest might suffer from the change in our commercial system, and in resisting which, many statements were made in this House as to the peculiar liabilities to which that class of property was subject. Among those liabilities were particularized the consequences which resulted from the system of the removal and settlement of the poor. It was stated that those engaged in trade and manufacture induced the people to leave their villages when trade was brisk; but when the trade was bad the operatives were forthwith removed hack to their parishes, where they were not required, and the burden of supporting them was thrown upon the land. The matter was then much discussed in this House, and among several other compensations that Sir Robert Peel devised for the relief of the landed interest a perfectly new system was proposed, namely, that wherever the poor had lived for five years they should not be removed to the place of their settlement. This, however, was not felt in practice to be a great boon to the landed interest, and, in fact, the parishes generally throughout the country were greatly incumbered by it. The overseers, acting in the full belief that they were properly discharging their duty, by every possible device, as by inducing the poor prematurely to accept relief, or to leave the parish when about to become irremovable in order to break the residence, endeavoured more zealously than ever to get rid of their poor in order that they might go before the expiration of their five years' residence. Then Mr. Bodkin, a Member of this House, proposed that, inasmuch as there was this serious aggravation of the charge which parishes had to bear, that the charge should be cast upon the union fund, that is the common fund, which had always been collected from the parishes in proportion to the number of their paupers, and distinct from the several parochial funds which were only applicable to the relief of their settled poor. But the instant this was put upon the union fund the parishes having always been charged to this fund, according to the number of their own poor, said, "We submitted to this regulation; but when you put other charges upon that common fund than those which relate to our own poor, it is a hardship to charge us upon that principle, for, by this means, those who have no poor at all are entirely exempt." When I entered upon my present office, I became Chairman of a Committee which had sat for two years, and I found the evidence overwhelming as to the extreme injustice of charging parishes according to the number of their poor, and relieving those parishes that had no poor altogether from contributing to the establishment charges, which was the case before the new system of irremovable poor not settled in the Union at all was adopted. This Committee then came to the conclusion that the whole system was faulty, and declared that the area of rating ought to be extended to the Union, that the whole cost for the poor in each Union should be chargeable on the common fund of the Union, that the establishment charges should be defrayed by the parishes in proportion to the valuation of their property, and not in proportion to the number of their poor, and that no person should be removed who had resided three years in the parish. This was a sort of revolution in the whole system of rating the property, and of relieving the poor of the parish, and the House then, much to its honour, carried a Bill, introduced for the purpose, giving effect to this Resolution, whereby every person who has lived in a parish for three years, without any other qualification, becomes irremovable, and his maintenance is to be provided for out of the union fund, to be contributed towards by everybody according to the value of his property. This is a very important change, effected three years ago, and which has been attended with such remarkable results so satisfactory indeed in their nature, as I think now justify me in asking the House to make a further advance and another change in the same direction. The general idea is, that if you do away with the Law of Removal particular districts would be overwhelmed with paupers, and property would be consumed by the rates. But what has really been the result of this experiment so far as it has gone? The results are, that the number of removals has decreased greatly, the number of irremovable paupers has largely increased, and the common fund, now subject to the control of the guardians, has been greatly augmented. The House, therefore, has an opportunity of considering how far the objections which have been taken to the principle of Union chargeability are just. No one will say—even of those who contend it is necessary—but that the removal of the poor is a very great evil—these, then, have diminished. In 1857 the number of poor removed was 16,546, at a cost of £21,500; in 1863, the year after this Bill was passed, making them irremovable after three years' residence, the number of removals had fallen to 13,601, at a cost of £18,717. Of course the passing of the Bill led to an increase in the number of irremovable poor, but one would hardly have been prepared to find that while in 1861, the year before the Act passed, the cost of irremovable paupers was only £852,372 it had increased in 1863, the year after the Act passed, to £1,413,610, and in 1864 to £1,433,990. There is one branch of this subject which received much attention from my predecessor, Mr. Baines—namely, the removal of the Irish poor. He was under much apprehension on this point—indeed, he was so little prepared to deal with it, that he left out the Irish altogether, in a measure he had proposed on this subject in the year 1854. In proposing the Three Years' Residence Bill, I did not omit then, but provided for all alike becoming irremovable, and required that if they were removed, that it should be done with humanity and care, not distinguishing between Irish and other removable paupers. In the year Mr. Baines proposed his Bill—1854—there were 16,047 Irish removals, and in the year 1857–8, 10,308, while in the year after the Three Years' Residence Bill was passed, there were only 1,212. The Irish removals from Liverpool alone, a great place for this class of removals, were in 1856, the last year we have had any account of them, 5,043. Last year there was not one, and the year before the number was very small indeed—I understand something under twenty. And I ask, if any one supposes that if these 1,212 Irish paupers had not been removed in the year 1863, any evil would have followed from it? But there is a general apprehension that if the guardians were allowed to apply the relief for the poor from so general a fund as the common or Union fund, they would be lax in its administration, and relief would be given indiscriminately. Well, we have some means of judging of that from what has already occurred. The total expenditure for relief in unions for the year ending Ladyday 1864, was £4,835,953, of which £2,468,508, or 51 per cent was charged to the common fund. Therefore the guardians have been administering during the last year out of this fund half of the whole sum raised for the relief of the poor. I ask whether there are any persons in this House conversant with the administration of the law who have ever heard of any evils or mischiefs that have arisen from the application of the funds from this particular source. I have made particular inquiry upon this point among persons of experience, and have directed the Inspectors to do the same, and the answer has always been that there has been no more laxity in administering this fund than the other whatever; the only thing is that at present there are two classes of paupers who come before the guardians—one class who are to be relieved from the union and the other from the parochial fund, and there is a great temptation to them to be more strict with regard to their own fund than that of the union. But that is an evil which can he remedied, and which will at once be cured by the operation of the Bill I am proposing. But there is evidence of a general kind with respect to this expenditure for the irremovable poor which is calculated to allay alarms on the ground of profuseness on the part of the guardians. In 1855, when the expenditure for the irremovable poor was only £793,648, the total cost of relief per head was 4s. 11d. upon the population; whereas in 1864, when the expenditure had increased to £1,433,990, the ratio per head was only 4s. 8d., which was actually less, therefore, although the expenditure for the irremovable poor was very much more. I ask the attention of the House to these results, because it is the main point in the discussion as to carrying out this system farther. I say, then, there is no proof whatever that upon economical grounds there is any danger in casting the relief of the poor upon the general fund, or that danger will arise from the carelessness of guardians. We know they are particularly careful—some people say, too rigid, a great deal—when they have to provide for salaries or charges which fall upon the general fund. The question, therefore, is, whether these considerations should not lead you to carry the principle which you have already adopted still further, so as farther to diminish the number of the removable poor, to allow them to circulate, at least, freely in the unions, and prevent them from being carted out of places to which they are attached into places to which they are hardly known. I cannot help thinking that moral considerations connected with this subject will weigh with this House. The enormous evil of casting off poor people from a parish in which they have resided for a great part of their lives because they become chargeable should have an end. It is impossible to doubt that the system of settlement and the calculations which the poor and their employers make on this subject, and the means which parishes devise in order to escape from their liability of supporting the poor, produce the most injurious results upon their conduct and character. We have very high authority also for tracing to this source the lamentable want of cottage accommodation that still exists in the rural districts. I remember hearing my late distinguished relative, Sir George Lewis, in his evidence before the Committee on Settlement and Poor Removal in 1847, speak thus—

"One of the principal effects of the law of (Parochial) Settlement is on the building of cottages, and that effect it has exercised ever since its first introduction. I could refer the Committee even to pages in Arthur Young's Letters, in which he deplores the effect of the Settlement Law as leading to the demolition of cottages."

"It is with regard to the residence of the labouring classes that the law is productive of the most cruel hardship of all.… Many respectable witnesses examined before the Committee of 1847, and before the gentlemen appointed by the Poor Law Board in 1848, give numerous instances, within their own knowledge, of labourers having to walk several miles to work every morning, and as far home every night.… The labour which the farmer thus procures is deteriorated in value, and the open parish in which he (the labourer) dwells is often so overcrowded with labourers driven into it from the neighbouring close parishes that the greatest evils, social, sanitary, and moral, are found to be the result."

"Whether after fifteen years have elapsed since the Docking Union was constituted a union for settlement, &c, I and my colleagues have any reason to regret that our union has been thus constituted?—For myself, and also for those guardians with whom I have been associated mainly, in conducting the weekly business of the union, I can answer that we have discovered no reason to entertain any regret that our union has been constituted one parish; but, on the contrary, that our united experience has resulted in a conviction that much benefit has been derived from its establishment."

"Whether second rate, or partially able-bodied, labourers have failed to find employment, because no longer directly chargeable to their respective parishes?—I believe this class of labourers now experience less difficulty in finding employment, as they have less repugnance to move about the union in search of work. But that which to me seems of the most importance and the most valuable result of this measure is that the character of the able-bodied labourer is now much more appreciated by himself, from the knowledge that there exists no longer any reluctance on the part of employers to find good and constant work for a good, steady, and industrious man, come from whatever parish he may in the union, an employer having, in fact, a decided preference for such a labourer, to one, in his own parish, of a doubtful character."

"Whether removal by orders of magistrates have been fewer?—As a consequence of our present system, removal orders from one parish to another in the Docking Union have entirely ceased, a not very inconsiderable advantage; and I believe I am justified (judging from the reports of our county sessions) in adding that removal orders to other unions have greatly diminished, from the fact that the guardians are now more vigilant in investigating all cases of doubtful settlement ere they run hastily into the expenses entailed by re-sorting to a court of law."

"One important result I anticipate from the transfer of all relief to the common fund; it will have a tendency to obliterate any spirit of selfishness in those who are intrusted with the responsible duties of a Poor Paw Guardian, They will no longer feel, as some men possibly do, that their principal mission to the board room is to watch the particular interests of their own parish, and that they have no concern in the general business of the union. There will be no longer an arena for conflict as to chargeability between one parish and another. The attention of the guardians will be directed to consider the necessities of the applicants and the assistance which their eases require; to supervise the general business of the union and the conduct of the officers. In fact, they will have one object in common."

said, he had no intention of offering any opposition to the introduction of this Bill; but the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Poor Law Board, in the last portion of his speech, had touched on a matter respecting which it would have been a great advantage if he had afforded some information—namely, what the amount of the shifting of burdens would be. It would be very desirable before they came to decide the question that he should give the House that information, for, no doubt, it was in his power to do so. The right hon. Gentleman stated that the change made in the law as regarded the removal of the poor was one made in the interest of the landlords on the repeal of the Corn Laws. Now, that great boon to the poor arose out of the terrible distress resulting from the sending back from the manufacturing districts in 1840, 1841, and 1842, of great masses of people who had gone to work in those districts. That was the foundation of the change. It had nothing whatever to do with the Corn Laws. The right hon. Gentleman said, also, that the riots of 1831 and 1832 were owing to the settlement laws. He was old enough to remember them; and, living as he did in the middle of England, had seen something of them, and he never heard them attributed to that course before. There was great distress in the country; the changes from the great war were just working out; there were changes in the currency also; the agricultural interest died hard, and the repeal of the beer duty no doubt had a great deal to do with them. They were "swing" riots, and took the form of breaking machinery. But though he was in them, he had never before heard them attributed to the Settlement Laws. The right hon. Gentleman also touched upon the question of the desire to get rid of people in cottages. Since the new Poor Law, and since the different modes of settlement had been done away with, a poor man could not easily get a settlement in a cottage, and he believed that the right hon. Gentleman's Bill, if it passed into law, would lead to a very extensive pulling down of cottages. Looked at in a proprietary view, cottages were a dead charge on the owners of estates, and did not pay the expense of keeping them up; and a system like the Scotch was growing up, he believed, of letting a certain number of cottages with each farm for a few labourers—such as carters and shepherds—and leaving the farmer to get the rest of his labourers where he could, away from the spot. He thought that system would extend under this Bill. The thing which ought to be kept in view was the amount of shifting of the burden. He could not understand the reason for the right hon. Gentleman saying that the overseers, in whose hands the removals were, were ignorant, uneducated men, for they were of the same class as the guardians. A man who was overseer one day was guardian the next, and why he should be educated when he was guardian and ignorant when he was overseer could only be explained by some peculiar information in the private possession of the Poor Law Board. The right hon. Gentleman had put the common fund charges at 51 per cent; and he hoped he would be able to tell them how much of that 51 per cent was establishment charges, and how much relief charges; because, with all the flourish of trumpets which accompanied the administration of the Poor Law system, he believed the establishment charges were very heavy. When the House almost unanimously agreed to do away with the removability of certain persons who had resided for a certain number of years, the charge was put on the common fund, without any consideration of the proportion in which the common fund was contributed. But when those charges came to increase, of course the common fund showed an inequality, and there was greater reason for complaint, as it was a new charge to which people had not been liable before. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would allow some time to elapse between the printing of the Bill and the second reading, in order that hon. Gentlemen might take counsel with their constituents. As it was to be a short Bill, there was more reason for delay, as it was the principle rather than the details which would have to be considered. He hoped, therefore, the measure would not be unduly pressed forward.

said, that he regretted that the right hon. Gentleman, in bringing in his Bill, had not complied with the recommendation of the Committee that in any legislation to extend the area of charge or management particular attention should be paid to the requirements of the metropolis. When the Bill of 1861 wa3 before the House he had showed that so far from the substitution of three years for five years being a relief to the metropolis it would be a burden to it, casting an extra charge upon the large single parishes; and he hoped his right hon. Friend would in his Casual Poor Bill pay particular attention to the peculiar requirements of the metropolis. This Bill, like the three years' Bill, would be a detriment to the several parishes, especially those that were unions in themselves. This he had shown to be the case with respect to St. George the Martyr, in Southwark. A statement had been prepared by the Board of Guardians of that parish showing the number of persons who had become chargeable as irremovable poor there, who, but for that Act must have been relieved in other parishes where they had a settlement; and this statement he had the honour of laying before the President of the Poor Law Board, when he introduced a deputation from the Guardians of St. George the Martyr, on the subject of the equalization of the poor rates in the metropolis. From this statement it appeared that a great number of persons who had no legal settlement in St. George's parish had become irremovable in consequence of their three years' residence, and this poor parish had to bear the consequent expense. Now, what advantage did this Bill afford to the poor parishes in the metropolis? Why, none whatever; and it would seem strange only to pass a Bill such as this, which left out of consideration the interests of the metropolis, consisting now of between three and four millions, or nearly one-fifth of the entire population of England. Recent legislation had cast great burdens upon parishes in the poorer parts of the metropolis. They had passed Bills for new streets, new railways running through London, and they were about to pull down a large number of houses for the new courts of law. Now, the poor people who were removed to make way for these improvements were driven across the water into districts where they were crowded in the most deplorable manner, into small tenements which had, some of them, nine people in a room. No provision was made for them in the richer parishes from which they were dislodged. Two thousand poor persons were driven out when Victoria Street was made, and the dean and chapter, when asked, said that they had made no provision for them, and that they must go across the water. They did so, and remaining three years became chargeable there. There was no doubt that great grievances occurred in reference to the inadequate supply of cottages in the rural districts; but the evil was much more severe in London, where it affected thousands instead of hundreds of people. The borough of South-wark was a gridiron of railways, for there was scarcely a street but was crossed by one or more of them. There was the South Western, the Brighton, the South Eastern, and the London, Chatham, and Dover, which passed through whole districts covered with houses. To such an extent had this affected the locality that the constituency even had decreased, and of course the effect was much more serious upon the poorer classes who had no votes. He hoped that his right hon. Friend would take this question into his serious consideration. He (Mr. Locke) had proposed an Amendment in Committee, on the Irremovable Poor Bill of 1861, that for the purposes of that Act the metropolitan district should form one union, which was rejected. And in the Committee which concluded its labours last Session, he had moved the resolution—

"That the circumstances of the metropolis are so peculiar that in any legislation to extend the area of charge for management, it would be necessary to have regard to those circumstances."