said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to the case of a girl, twelve years of age, crushed to death in a colliery near Wigan, and to the evidence given at the inquest; and, whether the girl was employed contrary to the provisions of the Act for the Regulation of Employment in Mines?

said, in reply, that his attention had been called to the matter by a private communication from Lord Shaftesbury. He had received a Report of the case from Mr. Higson, the Government Inspector. In his opinion the girl had not been employed contrary to the provisions of the Statute; but the employment of a child of such tender years was very reprehensible. If the hon. Member would move for it, Mr. Higson's Report should be laid on the table.

said, he would beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Bill for amending the Representation of the People, which he has given notice to ask leave to introduce on the 12th of March, applies to the whole United Kingdom; and, if not, on what day will the Bill to amend the Representation of the People in Scotland be brought under the attention of the House?

Sir, the Bill which, according to the notice I have given, I shall have the honour of asking leave to introduce on Monday next, will apply only to England and Wales, and on that day I shall, I hope, be able to inform my hon. Friend what is the course we propose to take with regard to the corresponding Questions for Scotland and Ireland.

I beg also to ask a Question with respect to the revision of the Electoral Statistics to which the right hon. Gentleman referred on a previous evening. I wish to ask for the information of the House, What is the nature of the revision to which these statistics have been subjected, and whether the Government Bill will be finally settled before that revision is concluded?

The revision of the statistics must be interpreted as a revision of the press only. Substantially, the statistics have been very nearly completed for some short time, but in particular cases there are answers which we have been expecting. However, they may come to be so slight that it may not be worth while to incur further delay, and I think I may venture to assure the House that the tables will be circulated in full not later than Saturday morning.

, in putting the Question of which he had given notice, To ask the Secretary of State for War a Question relating to the wording of the Patent by virtue of which the Secretary of State for War holds his Office, said, he thought the House would agree that he could not have selected a more fitting occasion for asking the Question of which he had given notice than the present. It concerned the amount of authority which the Secretary of State for War possessed over the other branches of the military administration. The present was the first occasion on which his noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington) had the opportunity of addressing the House as Secretary for War—a position for which there was every reason to believe he was eminently qualified, from the admirable manner in which he had performed the duties of Under Secretary. Having made these preliminary remarks, he wished to observe that he had brought forward the subject to which he was about to call attention, because in 1859 he had moved the appointment of the Committee on Military Organization, and had himself the honour of being a Member of that Committee. The Committee went very fully into the question of the authority which the Secretary for War exercised over the other branches of the Military Department, and very strong opinions were expressed, both by Members of the Committee and by gentlemen qualified by rank and position to pronounce an opinion on the subject, as to the wording of the Patent of the Secretary for War. He need hardly add that a very strong opinion had also lately prevailed out of doors, and the subject had been much discussed in the public press, that there were some restraints placed on the powers of the Secretary for War beyond those contained in his Patent. It was unnecessary, in dealing with the matter, that he should go into a detailed history of the War Department, beyond stating that as now constituted it was a comparatively new Department of State, dating as it did only from the period of the Crimean War. The old system had broken down under the pressure of that war. Up to that time the War Department and the Colonial Department had been associated together, and were presided over by the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. When the separation of the two Departments was made, the new office of Secretary of State for War was created, Lord Panmure was appointed, and a new Patent was made out, The Patent gave to the Secretary of State for War

"The administration of our army and land forces of every kind and denomination whatsoever," with the important reservation, "always so far as relates to and concerns the military discipline of our army and land forces, as likewise appointments and promotions in the same, and so far as the military command and discipline thereof shall be committed to our Commander-in-Chief of the Forces or our General commanding in Chief for the time being."

Such was the nature of the Patent under which Lord Panmure exercised the duties of the office. To him succeeded his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel). When his right hon. and gallant Friend had been in office nearly a year it was discovered that the Patent issued to him was simply a Secretary of State's Patent without the reservation which he had just read. His right hon. and gallant Friend thought the matter of such importance that he took measures to obtain the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown as to whether he was not responsible for the military control of the army, as well as for the civil administration of it. Before, however, the question could be settled by the Law Officers, a change in the political atmosphere obliged his right hon. Friend to retire from his post. He was succeeded by the late Mr. Sidney Herbert, afterwards Lord Herbert, whose Patent contained the same reservation as that of Lord Panmure. During his administration it was that the Committee on Military Organization, consisting of Gentlemen of eminence from both sides of the House, and who discharged their duty in the most searching and admirable manner, held its sittings. The question of the Patent was gone into, and it was by them recommended that the reservation which he had just mentioned should be expunged from the Patent. After that expression of opinion it did not surprise people generally that when Lord de Grey succeeded to the office of Secretary of State for War his Patent did not contain the same reservation as those of his immediate predecessors. Some surprise would be expressed, if it were true, as he had heard, that there was in existence a document of some kind which was sufficient to restrict the powers of the Secretary of State for War, in the same way as the reservation of the Patent to which he had called attention. It was not his purpose to enter at that moment into the important question of military organization. It was a great and important question, and well worthy of the consideration of that House, but this was not the time to discuss it. He would, however, say that he did not believe the noble Lord the Secretary for War would find it of any avail to attempt to make any great reforms in army administration unless he was prepared to grapple with that question. He wished to ask his noble Friend to give an explanation of the rumour which prevailed out of doors, and which had been discussed in the public press; to tell the House whether or not the patent which Lord de Grey held contained the reservation which the patents of Lord Panmure and Mr. Sidney Herbert did; and, if not, whether Lord de Grey was restricted by any Memorandum or document of any kind whatever which was or had been in his Department? The Question, the House would see, involved a matter of constitutional importance; because, if the reply should be in the affirmative, we should clearly have a great officer ostensibly unlimited in the administration of his Department, but substantially controlled by a document not of a public or official character. He intended to move for the production of the document itself, if there were any such document; but he felt assured the answer which he should receive from his noble Friend would be so frank and explicit as to render it unnecessary that he should move any further in the matter.

I shall have great satisfaction in giving my hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Vivian) and the House all the information which I possess on this subject. My hon. and gallant Friend has, I think, not with perfect, but perhaps with sufficient accuracy, stated what were the alterations made in the Office which in former times enrolled a army. He has also stated correctly the nature of the Patent held by the first Secretary of State for War. It is true that Sir George Cornewall Lewis, who succeeded Lord Herbert, received a Patent which did not contain any reservation whatsoever as to his responsibility or power; but Sir George Lewis himself drew up for the signature of the Queen, in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee to which my hon. and gal- lant Friend has referred, a document regulating the responsibility and authority of the Secretary of State for War and of the Commander-in-Chief. That document was, I believe, signed by the Queen, and it remains in force until it shall be revoked, whatever changes in the individuals at the head of the Office may take place. I am perfectly willing to lay, if my hon. and gallant Friend wishes me to do so, a copy of that document on the table of the House, and I think that if he compares it with the Report of the Committee on Military Organization he will no longer regard it with surprise, but will perceive that it is of the nature corresponding to the recommendation of the Committee. From this Report it will be at once seen that the Committee thought some document of this description was needed, for they say—

"It may be questioned whether these supplementary patents are at all needed. They only indicate the pleasure of the Crown, under seal, which, notwithstanding the patent, may always be conveyed in the ordinary manner through the Secretary of State; and they do not absolve the Secretary of State from his constitutional responsibility in regard to all matters where he is the Minister by whom and through whom the commands of the Queen are received and given."

Further on they call attention to a document, signed by the Prince of Wales, and countersigned by Lord Liverpool in 1812, defining the respective duties of Commander-in-Chief and Secretary for War, and they say—

"Your Committee are of opinion that this document points out the best and most satisfactory form for regulating the authority of the Secretary of State, and for defining the extent of the departmental functions of the Commander-in-Chief."

It is quite clear, therefore, that the Committee contemplated that the respective powers of Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of State should be defined by some document, and Sir George Lewis thought this view of the ease so evident that he at once prepared a document embodying their recommendations. I think my hon. and gallant Friend did well not to raise on this occasion the important subject of the respective duties of the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief; and it would also perhaps be better that I should follow his example, and should not now make any remarks on the general question, but wait until the document to which I have referred is in the hands of the House.

Sir, I hope that in moving the Vote which it is now my duty to bring under the consideration of the Committee, it will be possible for me to trespass for a shorter time upon the patience of the House than has been necessary on some previous occasions. I entertain this hope because, in the first place, there are not many subjects on which any change has been made in the Estimates of the present year; neither have any great changes been made in the administration of the army. As the right hon. and gallant Gentleman has just observed, there are many new Members who take an interest in the administration of the army, and I have no doubt we shall have on many subsequent Votes full discussions which will render it necessary for me to enter in any great detail into this Vote. I will therefore proceed at once to the consideration of the Estimates which I have to move, and more particularly the first Vote—namely, the number of men. The Estimates which we have laid upon the table this year show a reduction of over £250,000, as compared with the Estimates of last year. There are, I am quite aware, many hon. Members who think that a reduction of a quarter of a million on a sum of about £14,000,000 is a very trifling reduction. But I think they ought to remember that the reduction is made in a year succeeding four or five years in every one of which a reduction of the Army Estimates has been made—to such an extent indeed that since the Estimates for the years 1862–3 were brought forward a reduction of very little less than £2,000,000 has been made in the Estimates for the army. This reduction of a quarter of a million has been made notwithstanding several circumstances which would naturally cause an increase. We have had, for instance, to provide for a considerable increase in one item—the Commissariat, in consequence of the very greatly increased cost of provisions at home. We have also had to provide a considerably increased sum for the Militia, in consequence of several charges, which it was impossible for us to control, falling due this year. We have also, for reasons which I shall afterwards explain, had to provide for a considerable increase in the Vote for the Volunteers; and, in accordance with the decision of the House last year, we have had to provide for an excess of the Works Vote, in order not only to carry out the plan, but—as it was unmistakably shown to be the wish of the House—to carry on those works with all possible expedition. In the face of all these circumstances we have been enabled to make the reductions which we have carried into effect only by the termination of the war in New Zealand and the withdrawal of the troops from that colony. I am quite aware that our Estimates of last year were based upon the anticipations of a considerable reduction being made in our military force in New Zealand during the present year; I am also aware that the expectation has been to a very considerable extent disappointed. We anticipated that during the present year five battalions of infantry, besides a battery of artillery and military train, would have been withdrawn from New Zealand, and it was expected that they would have returned home by about the middle of the present financial year. That reduction has only just commenced, and up to the present time I think that only one or two battalions have returned; and therefore the considerable saving we anticipated from the withdrawal of these troops from New Zealand has not been realized this year. But I think we were quite justified at the time I moved the Estimates last year in expecting that the reduction would be effected. Positive directions had been sent out from this country that the force of infantry should be reduced by one- half, and all we had heard up to that time seemed to prove that the Colonial Government entirely shared in our view as to the expediency of making the reduction. It may be said that our calculations at present are as liable to error as those of last year; but I can assure the Committee that the instructions sent out from here to New Zealand are so imperative that I do not think there is any possibility of these being now misunderstood. I may also remind the Committee that the withdrawal of troops has already commenced, and that, according to the latest advices, arrangements have been made for withdrawing the remainder of the troops there employed. I am aware that criticisms have been already made upon the Army Estimates, pointing out that the reduction of £250,000 is a reduction to that amount on the Estimates which the House is asked to vote, and not on the net sum that will be required. I admit that there will be a reduction on the net charge of the army of only £6,500. The cause of the discrepancy between the saving of £250,000 on the Estimates and £6,500 on the net charge is that we have been obliged to reduce our Estimate of the extra receipts by the Exchequer by the sum of £230,000 or £240,000. That reduction has been entirely owing to causes over which we at the War Office have no control. It is owing to the diminution of the payments we expect to receive from the Governments of India and New Zealand. A considerable reduction has been made in the Imperial force next year to be maintained in India. As a large portion of the extra receipts is derived from the capitation grant of £10 per man for every effective, and £3 10s. for every non-effective, any reduction in the force maintained in India of course causes a considerable diminution in the extra receipts paid into the Exchequer, without at the same time enabling us to make any corresponding reduction in our Estimates. To show how this works I may explain, for instance, that the force in India is to be reduced by one battalion of infantry, and the return of that battalion to England will not only not enable us to effect any economy, but that battalion will itself come on our Estimates instead of the Exchequer being paid for it by the Indian Government. That Government has also determined to make a reduction in the number of men in each battalion; and the total reduction in the European force to be retained in India will amount to 5,000 men. But, although there will be this reduced number of men, and although the capitation grant will be reduced in consequence, it will be impossible for us to make any reduction in the charge for keeping up the Indian depots—we cannot maintain these dep6ts at a less establishment than 100 men, and therefore the expense to which we are put on account of the charge in respect of which the capitation grant is obtained is not reduced in the same proportion—in fact, is not reduced at all. It may be said, this is a reason why the capitation grant should be revised; and I quite admit if the Indian Government intend to maintain a smaller European force than formerly in India, there might be some reason for revising the capitation grant. The period for which that grant was fixed will expire next year, and we shall, of course, take the best means we can to ascertain how far the capitation grant does adequately recompense the Government for the force retained in India. Now, as to the number of men we propose to be voted this year. There is no change whatever in the establishment we propose to ask for in the Artillery, Cavalry, or Guards. There is a very small, trifling change, in the numbers of the Military Train. The only portion of the service in which we propose to make any material alteration is the Infantry of the Line. Last year our Estimates were based on the assumption that there would be on our colonial establishment 41 battalions of infantry; and that there would be on the India establishment 53 battalions; leaving for the home establishment 47 battalions. That calculation was based on the assumption that five battalions would return from New Zealand; but, as I have already mentioned, that expectation has not been realized. The force abroad has been greater, and the force at home less, than we calculated. We expect in the course of this year that two battalions of infantry, in addition to the five we expected last year, will return home. One battalion will return from China and one from India. The establishment will then consist of 39 battalions for the colonies, and 52 for India, leaving 50 battalions at home. We shall then have 91 battalions abroad and 50 at home. The usual proportion it has been considered necessary to keep up has been one battalion at home for two abroad; and this year the number of our battalions at home will be considerably in excess of that pro- portion. If, therefore, we saw any very certain prospect that it would not be necessary to increase our battalions for service abroad, it might be possible to make some reduction in the number of battalions at home. But, as the Committee are aware, there are a great many valid objections to the reduction of battalions unless the Government felt very much convinced that there was no probability of requiring them in a short time. In the first place, a great many officers would have to be placed on half-pay; and in the next place such a step would put it much more out of their power by any other arrangement to raise any considerable number of men at short notice if it was found necessary to do so. Under these circumstances, we did not consider it expedient to reduce the number of battalions. The great accession to our numbers at home will enable us to make some reduction in the infantry, but we considered that it would be better to continue the system adopted last year of reducing the battalions which first return from foreign service, and which, therefore, will not be again called upon for such service for a considerable time—of reducing, I say, those battalions to a somewhat lower establishment, and of gradually raising their number before they are again sent from home. The proposal, therefore, we make this year for the establishment of battalions of infantry of the line at home will be to keep four of the battalions destined for next relief to the colonies at 760; to maintain five of those next for reliefs in India at 840 rank and file, which is the present reduced establishment for battalions in India; but to reduce—and this is where considerable reductions occur—to reduce the six last returned from foreign service to the establishment of 600 rank and file, and to reduce 35 which have either returned within last year, or whose renewal of foreign service is still distant to 680 rank and file. Twenty-four battalions for serving abroad will be kept as at present—namely, 800 rank and file, one serving at Ceylon at 950, and the next four to return at 680. These arrangements will give a force of infantry of all ranks for this year of 76,164, as compared with the force of infantry last year of 80,574, showing a reduction of 4,410 men. That is the difference in the establishment of the infantry regiments. The difference, taking into account the depots, will be 123, which will give a total reduction of 4,533 men. The way in which the reductions I have mentioned are proposed to be carried into effect will be by reducing the battalions to which I have alluded, which are at home, by two companies each. This arrangement will be made more easy by the alteration in the organization of battalions at home last year, when the two depot companies, which had been formerly separated from head-quarters were united to the head-quarters companies. In effect the change will amount to a reduction during the period of home service of the two depot companies that were added to the head-quarters of the regiments during the last year. This arrangement, if carried out in 41 battalions serving at home, would place 82 captains and 164 subalterns on half-pay. We have, however, been desirous of carrying out these changes with as little inconvenience and hardship to officers as possible, and arrangements have therefore been made to obviate the inconvenience which might otherwise arise to regimental officers. The plan we propose is to give to the army 30 unattached lieutenant-colonelcies, and 30 unattached majorities. These will be given to majors and captains of long service and will of course provide for the vacancies of 60 reduced captains. The other 22 captains will remain supernumeraries on their battalions until an opportunity be found of absorbing them. The 164 subalterns will also remain supernumerary until opportunity be found of absorbing them; and with the object of absorbing them as speedily as possible, the intention is that alternate purchase and non-purchase vacancies will be employed for the purpose of absorbing these supernumerary subalterns. Of course, the reductions which we effect by these changes will not be so great as if the whole of these officers were placed on half pay; but the expense that will be involved in granting 60 unattached commissions will only diminish the saving that would otherwise occur during the present year by about £3,000, and after the present year the extra expense involved will not very much exceed £1,000. It is expected that at least half of the supernumerary subalterns will be provided for during the present year, and probably the other half year. The extra charge that will be incurred if this course be adopted will only be a very temporary one, and I think the Committee will see that it will be quite worth the slight ex- pense occasioned to prevent the great hardship and inconvenience which would otherwise fall on these regimental officers. Hon. Members may wish to know what, after these reductions have been made, will be the force we shall have at home during the present year as compared with the force we had at home during the former year. Last year, although our anticipations were not altogether fulfilled, we provided for a force at home of Infantry, including Guards and depâts of regiments, of 59,624 men. The Guards at home for 1866–7 will number 5,953, and the Infantry 52,038, making together a total of 57,991. Thus, the force which we estimate that we shall have at home is only 1,633 below the estimated number for last year. As, probably, many hon. Members are aware, the army has been considerably below its establishment. The establishment which we propose for the ensuing year is fully equal to, if not larger than, the establishment which we actually had at home during any part of the present year. Having mentioned that our establishment has been below what we estimated, that the actual numbers have been below the establishment almost during the whole of this year, I must state to the Committee that there is another unfortunate cause of reduction besides those which I have already enumerated. A paper which will be placed in the hands of Members within a very few days will show that for some years past, in fact since 1861–2, although we have usually started on the 1st of April with a considerable number in excess of the establishment, we have by the 31st of March in the ensuing year generally borne a number considerably below the establishment voted for that year. In 1861–2, on the 31st of March, the number fell to 574 below the establishment; on the same day of 1862–3 it fell to 1,068 below the establishment; in 1863–4 it was 3,911 below the establishment; in 1864–5, it was 5,472 below the establishment, and on the 31st of March, 1865, it was nearly 6,000 below the establishment. Now, it is possible that in some of these cases the numbers have been allowed to fall below the establishment in consequence of anticipated reduction; but in some instances, I regret to say, the numbers have been below the establishment not only at the conclusion of the year, but also at its commencement. Our present system of recruiting has not sufficed to raise within the year the number of men required to fill up the vacuum. The Returns to which I have just adverted refer to a period of five years. We should, therefore, be scarcely justified in thinking that this deficiency in the number of men was owing to any exceptional causes in any one particular year. The effect has been a constant one, and consequently I am afraid we must look upon the cause which has led to it as permanent also. No doubt, during the five years to which I have alluded there were a very large number of men—larger than the average number—who became entitled to take their discharge under the Limited Enlishment Act at the expiration of ten years' service, in consequence of the very large enlistment which was carried on during the Crimean War; but we must remember that a period is still before us in which the proportion of men who will be entitled to take their discharge will again be very numerous. The Government, therefore, think that the time has come when some serious inquiry should be made as to the causes which have prevented our obtaining an adequate supply of recruits for keeping our army up to its proper complement. No doubt, if the Government thought there was an absolute necessity for such a measure, we might add to our military establishment by increasing the bounty; but that is an expedient which I believe should never be adopted except during the time of war. It is an expedient which, although it invariably has the desired effect of raising a greater number of men, brings with it considerable inconvenience and creates considerable evils; and we think it would be undesirable to raise the bounty during time of peace, believing as we do that such a step ought to be kept entirely as a resource for the time of war. Into what the causes may be which have led to this deficiency of recruiting I do not think it needful now to enter. It may be either that our system of recruiting is not adapted to the wants of the present day; or it may only be that the great rise which has lately taken place in the price of labour, and the great inducements held out to the class from which our recruits are drawn to engage in other occupations attracts them to other employments. It may possibly become necessary for the Government at some future period to offer either to recruits or, perhaps, to men re-engaging after the expiration of their previous terms of servitude some inducement in the shape of extra pay. But, Sir, the Government do not feel themselves justified in asking the House of Commons, upon the information which they at present possess, and which naturally is extremely imperfect, to increase the rate of pay for recruits or for men of ten years' service. All we know is, that if the proposal often made to this House were adopted, of increasing the pay of men of ten years' service by 2d. a day, the effect of it would be at least to cost the country an additional £200,000 a year; while, on the other hand, we have no means whatever of knowing what number of men it would induce to re-enlist. The Government, therefore, think that the circumstances which I have stated, and which they have had under their consideration, are of such a nature as will require action after we have been enabled to obtain sufficient information and evidence. What we propose in the meantime to do is to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the whole subject, the scope of whose inquiry will not only include our recruiting system, but will also embrace the operation of the Limited Enlistment Act. The Committee are aware that when my right hon. and gallant Friend opposite (General Peel) was Secretary of State for War, a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into the present system of recruiting; but because, I suppose, the Limited Enlistment Act was not thought to have been in operation a sufficient length of time for an opinion to be formed of its results, the instructions then given to the Commissioners did not enable them to inquire into the working of that Act, neither did they enable them to do more than suggest changes and modifications in the enlistment system. Now, the instructions which we propose to give to the contemplated Royal Commission will not only enable them to inquire into the whole scope and operation of the Ten Years' Enlistment Act, but will likewise empower them to go as fully and minutely as they may think fit, not merely into any modification of the existing methods of recruiting, but into the consideration of all the various schemes which have at different times been proposed by different persons, military or civil, for improving our system of recruiting. I do not now offer any opinion as to whether that system can be improved or not, nor shall I say whether I incline to the adoption of a different system. All I can say is that the Commission will be left perfectly unfettered to inquire not only into the existing system, but into any other plan which any one may bring before it. I think I have now stated all that is necessary in reference to the Vote which we propose to take for the men; and upon the next few Votes it will hardly be needful for me to detain the Committee at any great length. Although there has been a slight reduction in the Commissariat Vote, that reduction has been caused only by the withdrawal of troops from Few Zealand and the consequent diminution in the item for the Commissariat, &c, in that colony. If you look at the Estimates, you will see a very large increase indeed made in one of the items of this Vote for the price of provisions at home in excess of the ration stoppages for the troops in England. This, of course, is an item over which we have no control whatever. It is caused by the high price of meat in this country; and, as I said before, if we had not been able to balance it by reductions in other items of this Vote, it would have caused a serious increase of expenditure. The next Vote to which it is necessary to call the attention of the Committee is that for the Militia. The numbers are the same as last year. We propose to call out the force for the same period for training and for the preliminary training of recruits as in the last year. But the Committee will see that there is a very large increase in this Vote, which is an excess that is not owing to any measure taken by us. It is almost entirely to the increased cost of clothing the Militia. Full dress clothing is given to the force every five years, and it happens that, it being now about five years since it was embodied, a great number of the corps are entitled to receive new clothing. The excess from this cause amounts to no less than £56,200 out of a Vote of £842,000, which the Committee will see is a very considerable increase. There is also a large increase in the Volunteer Vote, and that increase is again owing to causes entirely beyond our control. The excess, £13,200, is entirely caused by the increased number of men who are entitled to claim the allowances of £1 and £1 10s. for efficiency and for extra acquirements. On the 1st of December last year there were 178,000 enrolled Volunteers compared with 170,000 at the same date of the preceding year. The number of efficients last year was 133,000 compared with 123,000 in 1864; and 66,000 were entitled to claim the extra 10s. compared with 62,000 in 1864. These numbers are exceedingly satisfactory, showing, as they do, that the Volunteer force not only maintains, but also increases its number and efficiency. In order to be classed as an efficient a Volunteer, whatever branch of the service he belongs to, has not only to attend a certain number of drills in a year, but he has also to receive a certificate from the commanding officer and from the adjutant, who is in all cases an officer of the regular army, that he is well acquainted with his duties. In addition to this, the Inspecting Officer of Volunteers is obliged to certify to the efficiency of battalions or of companies collectively. Therefore, the men who are classed as efficients are not efficient in name only, but they must possess a considerable amount of efficiency in reality; and in this respect they are very different from the effectives who existed before the passing of the late Volunteer Act, when almost nominal attendance at a certain number of drills would make one. I come now to the Vote for the Manufacturing Department, in which no change of any importance has been made, but the consideration of it has included that of the ordnance question. Since last year the Committee which has been so long engaged deciding between the rival claims of Sir William Armstrong and Mr. Whitworth, has presented its Report, which we laid on the table of the House on the first day of the Session. It is very voluminous, and it may yet be some time before it is in the hands of hon. Members. Some may have expected that the Report would assign superiority to either the Armstrong or the Whitworth system; but it will be seen that they could not by any means have assigned absolute superiority to either inventor. They have, however, put on record facts which are most valuable as to the positive and relative merits of both systems. They show that either system possesses quite sufficient strength to be applied to any gun for heavy charges of powder and large projectiles; they also show that the rifle system adopted in either—the hexagonal system of Whitworth and the polygroove system adopted by Armstrong in his breech-loader, as well as his stud muzzle-loading gun—possess quite sufficient accuracy to be adopted as service guns. The Whitworth system has proved itself to be a good one. No doubt Whitworth guns made of steel will stand enormous charges of powder; but the difficulty in the adoption of this system is to find the quality of steel it requires and to test the quality before manufacture. On the other hand, Sir William Armstrong has also proved that his system of constructing the barrel of the gun of steel, strengthened outside by hoops of coiled iron, is sufficient to ensure the endurance required. No doubt the system of rifling advocated by Whitworth produces at extreme ranges the greatest amount of accuracy; but the system advocated by Armstrong, and adopted by us in the guns made on what is called the Woolwich system, while it possesses all the accuracy which can be required for heavy guns at the distance at which they are likely to be used in actual warfare, has the advantage of firing a larger projectile, which is more destructive in its effects upon a ship or fort than are the Whitworth guns. However, as I have said, the Report will show that both systems possess great merit, and that the guns constructed upon either possess quite sufficient merit to enable us to adopt them, and both have got their advocates in the two services. In the navy many entertain a preference for the Whitworth gun, which they consider is more simple than the Armstrong or the stud; in the army a great majority of officers are in favour of the Armstrong or the stud system. Under all these circumstances, of rival claims and undecided superiority, and considering that it might be very long before it might be possible to decide which system was absolutely the best, the Government thought that the time had arrived when Mr. Whitworth had so far established his case as to give him a claim for a practical trial of his system in the service. Therefore, two Whitworth 7-inch guns have been ordered for trial in the navy, and 20 to 25 9-ton guns, now in the course of construction at Woolwich, are to be rifled on the Whitworth plan. There may be some inconvenience in having two systems of rifling in use in the service at the same time, and it is an inconvenience which no doubt would be very great when applied to small arms or field artillery; but the inconvenience is very much less when it occurs in large guns, of which a much smaller number is required; and there will be no difficulty whatever so long as the guns rifled on the Whitworth system are placed on board ships which remain at home stations, or at stations where they can easily be supplied with the projectiles they require. There is no present intention of adopting the Whitworth system for the guns applied to the land forces; and, of course, the experience gained by the use of Whit worth guns on board ship will guide us in the future, Should experience establish their superiority on board ships there will be no difficulty in introducing them. During the time that the Armstrong and Whitworth controversy has been going on, we have, as the Committee are aware, not been altogether standing still with respect to the manufacture; we have not, however, been manufacturing faster than was actually necessary, because improvements have been made from day to day in these large guns, and it may not unreasonably be expected that further improvements may be introduced. We, are, therefore, only manufacturing such a number of heavy guns as is actually required. We have already on board ships in the navy, or finished ready for issue, 30 of the rifled guns of 12 tons, 27 of the 7-inch guns of 7 tons, and 229 of the 7-inch guns of 6½ tons, which are the 7-inch guns almost universally adopted in the navy. Then we have in hand at the factory—and the greater part of these guns are nearly finished, or are only left unfinished in consequence of the Report as to rifling being delayed—one 13-inch gun of 22 tons, 46 9-inch guns of 12½ tons, 76 8-inch guns of 9 tons, 23 7-inch guns of 7 tons, and 71 7-inch guns of 6½ tons. In addition to these, which will be finished either within this financial year or early in the next, and out of funds provided in the last Estimates, we propose, in the present Estimates, to make provision for the manufacture of 6 13-ineh guns of 22 tons, and 100 9-inch guns of 12½ tons. This year, however, we do not provide for many additional 7-inch guns, because the manufacture of them has been proceeded with more rapidly than has been the case with regard to other descriptions of heavy guns.

Are there any of the 200-pounder Armstrong guns?

That does not include any breech-loaders. There are no breech-loaders of a larger size than 40-pounders. And now I come to the question of small arms. When I brought forward the Estimates last year I hoped that by this time we should have arrived at some definite conclusion on the subject of providing the army with breechloaders. The Committee is aware that we invited in the first instance the competition of various gunmakers in order to obtain some system upon which we might convert a certain number of the existing rifles into breech-loaders. The Report of the Select Committee appointed to inquire into the system of conversion submitted to it has been laid upon the table of the House, and hon. Gentlemen were aware that none of the systems brought under the notice of the Committee turned out to be in all respects satisfactory. None of the systems proposed at that time came up to the requirements of the programme which had been laid down. It was thought, however, that the system proposed by Mr. Mont-Storm, though it fell below the requirements of the War Office, was nevertheless possessed of considerable advantages, the chief of which was that guns converted under that system could not only be used as breechloaders with a certain kind of ammunition, but, in the event of the failure of that kind of ammunition, they could be used as ordinary muzzle-loaders. This circumstance induced us to give the method a trial, and we accordingly directed Mr. Mont-Storm to convert 2,000 arms, in order that they might be placed in the hands of the troops, with a view to a practical trial of the system. I regret, however, to say that since the delivery of these arms several defects have been discovered in them. One is that the ammunition provided is unsuited for rough service, the skin cartridge not being sufficiently durable. Then, again, the arms have not passed the proof in a satisfactory manner. The contract with Mr. Mont-Storm, therefore, has been suspended, and I do not think it is at all probable that the Mont-Storm conversion will turn out what we could wish. One of the systems of which the Committee reported most favourably was that of Mr. Snider. It has been tried by Mr. Snider himself, and with his assistance by Colonel Dixon and Colonel Boxer at Enfield and Woolwich. He has overcome many inconveniences in it which were pointed out in the first instance, and as far as accuracy is concerned, the rifles converted on the Snider system and loaded with cartridges prepared at Woolwich, shoot as well up to a considerable range as our smallbore muzzle-loaders. The trials of the Snider system have not quite concluded, but they have been carried on so far and so satisfactorily that I think I may state that the system is one upon which some of our Enfields can be converted into breechloaders. At the same time I hesitate, after the failure of the Mont-Storm system, to express a positive opinion on the subject. Still, I believe that we shall be able with considerable rapidity to convert a considerable portion of our Enfields into breechloaders on Mr. Snider's system in the course of next year at a cost of not more than 12s. to 15s. per arm. While we were considering the question of the conversion of rifles, we also took measures to provide, if possible, a pattern of a breech-loading arm to replace the arms at present used by the troops; and in order to obtain the best information we could we drew up a statement showing what qualities we required such breech-loaders to possess, and we also invited competition. A considerable number of gunmakers and inventors sent in arms in answer to our advertisement, but I regret to say that only a very inconsiderable number of the eminent men in the gun trade competed. A considerable number of the arms sent in fell far short of the requirements of the War Office. In fact, the Committee to which the matter was delegated reported that none of them fulfilled all our requirements, and that very few possessed such merit as to render a trial of them desirable. This result somewhat astonished us; but we thought it must be owing to something stated in our requirements which had deterred the most eminent firms from coming forward, and we subsequently issued a series of inquiries to the most eminent men in the gun trade with a view of obtaining some hints as to how we could get such a serviceable weapon as we required. The answers to those inquiries have been received and are now under consideration. I hope that from them we shall obtain some information as to the way of obtaining the arm we require. I may, perhaps, be allowed to say that we are not the only nation which is in a great state of perplexity on this subject. I believe that almost every nation is as anxious as ourselves to obtain a good breech-loader; but all nations have experienced the same difficulties in the matter as we have. The members of the gun trade say that everybody is waiting for the production of the military breech-loader which they expect for the future, and no country any more than our own will give any orders for rifles at present. The Emperor of the French decided, I think not less than eighteen months ago, that his army should be rearmed with a breech-loading rifle, and he laid down with considerable precision the requirements of the weapon; but the French army is no nearer being provided with such an arm than ours is. If, however, as I hope, the Snider system of conversion will enable us at a comparatively small expense to convert a considerable number of our present rifles we need not be in a hurry about the adoption of a new pattern, and I hope the information we may receive from the gun trade will enable us to have a good weapon ultimately. Before sitting down I may say a few words on a subject to which attention has been called in the discussion of the Estimates—the establishments of the various departments of the army. Speeches have been frequently made by hon. Members, who have spoken as if those establishments absorbed a very large portion of our Estimates. Hon. Members who have paid attention to the Estimates will see that we have taken pains to show this year exactly what each establishment in every Department costs; and perhaps the Committee will allow me to say that for this and numerous other improvements in the forms in which the Estimates are presented to the House we are indebted almost entirely to the exertions of the Assistant Under Secretary, Captain Galton. They have been prepared not only for the information of the Committee, but for our own. They are presented in a tabular form, rendering it easier for hon. Members to judge upon the whole, and arrive at a conclusion as to any reduction that may be deemed necessary. I am anxious to state to the Committee that we have been for some time convinced that the charges of some of those establishments are no doubt greater than they ought to be; but the only way by which a more economical system can be introduced is to bring them more directly under the control of one head. The Committee will understand that the head of a department, such as the commissariat, or the purveyor's department, at any particular station, although he is subordinate to the General Officer, corresponds upon matters connected with the department with the head of his department at home. The General Officer at the station has many other important and arduous duties to perform, and consequently is not able to exercise any very minute supervision. This is not all; under the present circumstances it is necessary that each station should have an officer, or several officers of considerable rank. We have, therefore, made a proposal that a superior class of officers should be appointed at each station, to be called comptrollers, or by some similar name, who shall be placed at the head of the administrative departments. Each comptroller will be subordinate to the General Officer and responsible to him for the proper and efficient administration of the departments; and it will be his duty to advise the Secretary of State upon the organization of each department, and to point out where economy can be exorcised. We have made our proposal to the Treasury, and I believe I may say that in the main they agree with the principle we propose. They have, however, put some questions as to various details which have not yet been decided, and therefore it was not possible to bring this system into operation in time for the present Estimates. The pains we have taken in bringing the various departments into prominence in the Estimates have not been without an object. In answer to my hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Herbert), I may say that the change contemplated will be gradually brought into operation. We intend to try it somewhat experiment- ally at several stations, and only to adopt it on the condition of its effecting a saving in the expenditure. We shall first try the plan probably at one or two of the home stations, and experience will show whether it should be brought into general operation both at home and abroad. Another question to which I wish to advert concerns our army in Ireland, about which we have heard a great deal during the last few months. From some quarters most alarming reports have reached us of the existence of Fenianism in the ranks of not only our army in Ireland, but among our Irish soldiers in other places. I am not at all prepared to deny that there has been a considerable number of men in our army, especially in Ireland, who have belonged to the Fenian organization. During the last year or two, however, large numbers of men have enlisted into the army; before doing so doubtless they were Fenians, and they may have enlisted simply for the purpose of corrupting their comrades and inducing them to become members of the Society. It may possibly seem strange, that when so many civilians have been tried very few soldiers have been brought to trial. [Colonel NORTH: There have been some.] There have been several. [Colonel NORTH: But they have not been tried before the civil courts.] There have been none brought before the civil tribunals. Now, there is no intention on the part of the commander of the division in Ireland to shelter men suspected of Fenianism, but the fact is that very considerable difficulty has been experienced in obtaining evidence to bring them to trial by court martial. It was suggested that accused soldiers should be put upon their trial with civilians charged with being concerned in the Fenian rebellion; but the evidence against them has not been strong enough to induce the Irish law officers to think it desirable that they should be tried in that way. Some soldiers, however, have been brought before a court martial; but I do not think any of their sentences have yet been formally submitted to the Queen for approval; and therefore it is impossible for me to state what those sentences are, or the manner in which they will be carried out. I will therefore only say that although I do not wish to deny that there has been a considerable amount of Fenianism in the army, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose, has never had for a moment any serious doubt as to the general loyalty of the men. It is quite conceivable that a good many soldiers, drawn as they are from the class from which they must come, may be Fenians at heart; but it is also conceivable numbers may have joined them with the idea of getting a few shillings from the Fenian agents to be drunk in Fenian beer; but I do not think it follows because a man has enrolled himself, that when the time comes when he must declare himself on the side of the Fenians, or on the side of his comrades, he would prove false to his colours. On the contrary, I believe that the greater number of the reputed Fenians in the army would remain firm in their allegiance to Her Majesty. There is no doubt, however, that it is a subject which is not to be treated lightly. It ought to be most carefully investigated; and I can assure the Committee that nothing could have been investigated with greater care and pains than the existence of Fenianism in the army has been by Sir Hugh Rose. Although at first, as was natural, some officers were unwilling to believe that any of the men in the regiments under their command were Fenians, Sir Hugh Rose has had no reason to complain of the manner in which he has been supported and seconded in his inquiries. I am happy, also, to be able to say that within the last fortnight much better accounts have reached us from Ireland. The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act appears to have had as salutary an effect in the army as it has among the civil population. Since the disappearance of the American agents there is much greater facility in obtaining information with respect to Fenian societies in regiments, and there is a marked improvement in the tone of some of the detachments amongst whom Fenianism was supposed to exist. In future we shall have very little difficulty in obtaining sufficient evidence to procure the conviction of soldiers belonging to the Fenian societies; and I may further say that Fenianism in the army has received a blow from which it is not likely soon to recover. There is, I believe, no other subject on which I need detain the Committee, and it only remains for me to thank them for the great patience with which they have listened to the statement which I had to make. I have not even attempted to indicate the questions on which the discussion on the Army Estimates ought to turn. I have mentioned those simply which I thought required explanation; but I shall be quite ready to afford to the Committee any information which I can on any of those points on which I have not touched. The noble Lord concluded by moving—

"That the number of Land Forces, not exceeding 138,117 men (including 8,983 all ranks, to be employed with the Depots in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland of Regiments serving in Her Majesty's Indian Possessions) be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland from the 1st day of April 1866, to the 31st day of March 1867, inclusive."

Whatever differences of opinion there may be as to the merits of some portions of the Army Estimates, there can, I am sure, be none as to the great clearness of the speech of the noble Lord, or as to the gratification with which the Committee have learnt from his concluding sentences that neither the Commander-in-Chief in this country nor the Commander of the Forces in Ireland entertain doubt as to the loyalty of the great body of the Irish soldiers in the army. I now proceed to deal with the Estimates themselves. When the Estimates for last year were brought before us we were informed at the bottom of page 3 that there was not only a decrease in the amount of money to be voted by Parliament, but also a further decrease in the total charge on the Exchequer on account of the estimated extra receipts, &c, to be paid into the Exchequer. The noble Lord argued then, and I think justly, that this constituted the real diminution of the Estimates; but he now tells us that his estimated decrease for the present year has been reduced from £253,000 to the modest sum of little more than £6,000. It is, however, very difficult to ascertain what the exact amount of the reduction is, because, if you look to the bottom of page 3, you will find the total amount of extra receipts and payments for the year 1865–6 set down at £1,703,440; whereas, if you turn to page 7, you will find them set down at £1,625,341, making a difference of upwards of £70,000 between the two statements. I go a little higher in page 7 and I find in the comparison of these Estimates with those of 1864–5 an error in subtraction to the amount of £300,000. Last year there was an error in addition in the Estimates to the extent of £400,000; so that, whatever may be the merits of competitive examination, those by whom these Estimates have been drawn up do not appear to have made much progress in the first three rules of arithmetic, [The Marquess of HARTINGTON: Where is it?] You give the expenditure as per final account for 1864–5 at £14,642,310 19s. 7d., and the extra receipts and re-payments for the same period at £1,308,600 1s.; now if you deduct that from the previous sum the product is £13,333,710 18s. 7d., and not £13,633,710 18s. 7d. as given. But, be that as it may, I for one attach very little importance to the comparison of the Estimates for the present with those of the preceding year. We have no opportunity of ascertaining whether our expenditure in the other case will correspond with the amount at which it was estimated, because from fifteen to eighteen months elapse before the audited accounts are laid upon the table, and then no one takes the trouble to examine them. When, for instance, the Army Estimates were brought forward last year, I ventured to make two predictions with regard to them; I pointed out that the decrease depended upon the proposed withdrawal of troops from New Zealand, and my first prediction was, that they would not be withdrawn during the financial year, and consequently the saving would not occur; and my second prediction was, that this year the noble Lord would come down and propose another reduction of men, not because he did not require them, but because he could not get them. And I venture now to predict that, when the audited accounts of the present Estimates are laid upon the table it will be shown that the excess of expenditure on account of New Zealand will be made up of the saving arising from the want of the proper number of men to complete the establishment. It is no doubt satisfactory to find that we shall not be required to vote more money; but, at the same time, it shows that no reliance can be placed on the Estimates. Now, I ask the Committee to boldly look the facts in the face. It is evident that the want of the requisite number of men proceeds from one of two causes—either that our population is not sufficient for our requirements in time of peace (which I, for one, do not believe) or you do not hold out sufficient inducement for men to join the army. It is not from want of warning that the present lamentable state of things has come to pass, I have myself, year after year, said that the effect of the ten years' limited service would be to render it impossible to raise the number of men we require. I am not, at the same time, one of those who desire that we should have recourse to a long period of enlistment; but when you enlist men for the cavalry and artillery for twelve years, you find that they re-enlist much more readily than those who enter the service for a period of only ten years. I have always, I may add, desired to see more intimate relations subsisting between the Militia and the Line. I should like, if possible, to secure for the former force those men who will not re-enlist in the latter; but, as all these points are to be considered by a Royal Commission, I shall not advert to them at greater length. The noble Lord told us, with respect to officers, that the reduction was to be prospective; but I must say that I rather doubt the advantage to the country or to the individuals themselves of the proposed promotion on half-pay. After the Crimean War, for instance, all those officers who had obtained brevet rank in consequence of distinguished conduct in the field were allowed to convert it into substantive rank, and the result was, I believe, that 200 captains, young men who should have been retained in the service—who had obtained their promotion not by purchase, but by distinguished services in the field—became half-pay majors, and remain to this day unemployed. Although the system may be popular in the army, depend upon it that in the long run this placing of officers on half-pay will not expedite promotion; because it will be the duty of the Secretary of State to press the Commander-in-Chief to reduce that half-pay list by bringing in officers from it; indeed, whenever there is a half-pay list, it should be insisted upon by the Secretary of State for War. I have heard that part of the expense is to be met by selling first commissions, the amount of which is to go to the Army Reserve Fund, and I think the time has arrived when the House should appoint a Committee to go into the question of the Army Reserve Fund, and to ascertain from what sources it is derived, to what purposes it is devoted, and what effect it produces on the system of purchase in the array. The attention of the House was particularly directed to this fund by the Report of the Commission on Military Organization, and it was admitted on all hands that the principle on which it was based was bad, although it has, no doubt, in many instances been productive of beneficial results. Its real effect, however, is to produce a Government sale of commissions to such an extent as to render almost every commission one for purchase; and to diminish the number that can be obtained by competition at Sandhurst, or given away to deserving non-commissioned officers. It must be obvious to every one that the greater number of commissions that can be offered for competition the greater and better will be the number of candidates; and I am perfectly certain that there is no better method for encouraging recruiting and obtaining a better class of recruits than to give commissions from the ranks. I am not adverse to the principle of purchase, but I am to the Government dealing in it to the extent they do, and more particularly with first commissions. I should have thought that certainly this was not the time at which any one would have proposed to reduce the army. I think it would not be at all wise to discharge any of our well-drilled soldiers. I quite approve the proposal to reduce the number of companies from twelve to ten, because such is the present weakness of the army that in order to make up eight or ten companies you have to break up the others. It is a lamentable fact that our army is diminishing from 6,000 to 10,000 men annually, and the reduction in the present instance is a mere scratching of the pen through numbers on paper who do not exist, and notwithstanding this reduction of 4,360 men, there will be in April a deficiency of 1,000 men on the British establishment. How the reduction in the Indian establishment is to be effected I do not know, for ac- cording to the Estimates there is only one regiment to be withdrawn without relief. Let us take it in a financial point and see what the effect of the reduction will be in respect of money voted by Parliament. In the general staff and regimental pay, allowances, and charges you have a decrease of £72,16 7, and in the commissariat establishment services and movements of troops a decrease of £71,000, making together £143,167. But the sum to be paid into the Exchequer this year as extra receipts on these items is less than the amount paid in on the same account last year by £230,740; so that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will find that he will this year have to pay £87,573 more on account of these two Votes than he had to pay last year. Then we have New Zealand, which always does serve for an excuse. Two years ago the war in New Zealand was the excuse for the great expenses we were then called upon to defray; but at that time a portion of it was to be made up for by not calling out the Yeomanry. After a division in this House, in which the Government only got a majority of two, good news came from New Zealand; the Government were able to reduce the Votes, and the Yeomanry were called out. The Committee will recollect that a very numerous deputation waited on that noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) whose loss in this House no one more deeply laments than I do, and he had the good sense to come down and announce that the Yeomanry would be called out as usual. But the good news which enabled the Government to take that step was not realized during the whole of that year, nor during last year. I do, however, hope that there are better grounds for hoping that it will be realized this year, and that the inglorious war in that colony is now at an end. I cannot see why the colonists should not have conducted the war themselves in the first instance, as they will have to do now. In Vote No. 2 is a small reduction on the Consolidated Allowances, which is accounted for by the withdrawal of a regiment from China. I am afraid that the word "withdrawal" is a mistake—there are very few men of that regiment to withdraw. As I know my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North) has taken this question up, and that it will be fully investigated, I will not try to fix blame upon any one; but nothing that took place during the Crimean War—nothing that ever took place on the coast of Africa—exceeded the neglect exhibited in this case. There is a Vote which my noble Friend has not referred to—it is that for the Army of Reserve; and again I repeat my question—"Where is the Army of Reserve?" It is stated that the body of Enrolled Pensioners is decreasing; and I think it would be well if they disappeared altogether. At the time this corps was established circumstances were quite different from what they are now. At that time we had no Volunteers at all; and I very much doubt whether the Militia had been called out, but, if the pensioners be fit for any service at all now, it would be better that they should do duty with the Militia. I trust that this will be one of the first reductions to be made. I come now to the Votes for the Manufacturing Departments and Warlike Stores, the two Votes, next to the Vote for the number of Men, on which the whole of our military expenditure depends. I believe that if we took the whole of the Estimates for the present year and compared them with those of our highest expenditure in 1861–2 the difference between them would be found to correspond pretty nearly with the difference in these two Votes. The large expenditure on these two Votes during the past six years has been attributed to the necessity of making a great change in our guns and warlike armaments. Now, if we have effected a change for the better I would not complain of the money that has been spent; but I fear we are at this moment in the same position as when we started,—we are yet waiting for a proper pattern. I do not blame the War Department in the least for the hesitation they are displaying in adopting a pattern. I think the longer you can wait, consistently with safety, the better chance you have of getting a thoroughly effective weapon. It is better to take time in the final adoption of a pattern than to go head over heels in the affair; but I believe that, while you are making up your mind, there are several patterns in existence so superior to that with which our men are armed that a battalion so armed could not stand before half a battalion armed with breechloaders. An hon. Member (Mr. Dyce Nicol) has given notice of his intention to call the attention of the House to some American rifles. I have heard of a rifle called the Henry rifle—not the English one, but an American rifle. It is said that two companies armed with this wea- pon would be a match for a whole regiment. It is also told of a Federal soldier that, armed with this rifle, he met four Confederates—he was called upon to surrender; but he shot three of them immediately, and the survivor surrendered to him. I do not attach much importance to the accounts given by proprietors or inventors; but I will tell the Committee a circumstance to which I do attach importance. The Swiss Government being very anxious to procure the best rifle possible, offered a prize of £800 with that object. I think they got no less than eighty different patterns, and though none of those came exactly up to what they required, it appeared to the Committee who had the adjudication of the matter that the American Henry rifle was far superior to all others exhibited in competition with it. I am sure the Swiss Government would give every information on the subject to Her Majesty's Government, who, no doubt, will readily give them every facility for obtaining a knowledge of improvements in our establishments. If you attach any importance to the matter do not send it to a Small Arms Committee, from whom, probably, you will never hear anything more about it; but get a thousand stand of the rifles and send fifty to each of twenty regiments of the Line to be used during the approaching field day and reported upon for every quality. Why I call attention to these particular Votes is in order to express my opinion that until you have the best ship and the best arm, you will only be deceiving yourselves if you expect any great reduction of the expenditure of your army and navy. There is only one other Vote to which I will call attention. It is the one which always attracts the greatest amount of criticism—namely, the Vote for the Administration of the Army. I believe the House would much rather see an increase to promote the comfort of the combatant portion of the army than an increase for the civil branch of the War Department. And I must say it is with astonishment I see that this Vote for the present year amounts to exactly the same sum as it did last year; although, to the Vote for Superannuation Allowances there is a most extraordinary addition, in consequence of the number of War Office clerks placed on annuities. Mind you, I do not find fault with the superannuation system; but, when I see the names of young men of forty, or a little more, who have been al- lowed to go out on £300 or £400 a year, and when I perceive in this list some whom, from my own experience of the Department, I know to have been among the best men in the office, I cannot but think that when he took credit for the great care exercised in respect of the details of the various branches, the remarks of the noble Lord did not apply to this Vote. I do not believe that the list gives the whole of these retirements, and I certainly think that a great loss to the office was occasioned by the retirement of the first-class clerks. I hope the noble Lord will devote his first attention to the endeavour to put his own Department in a better position. I will not detain the Committee longer, because I know that there are many military officers present—Members of the House for the first time—who are anxious to address the Committee, and whose recent experience and acquaintance with the service entitle to them to great attention. The hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Sir Charles Russell) has a plan to suggest than which nothing would conduce more to the comfort and happiness of the soldier.

said, he could not congratulate the noble Marquess on the Estimates he had brought forward this year, because they exhibited no approach to that economy to which the House had for some years looked forward. Some years ago the right hon. Gentleman who had just spoken (General Peel) stated that £100 per man was the standard of expenditure for the army, and had pointed out how little change had occurred in that expenditure, no matter what change was made in the Estimates. He (Mr. O'Reilly) was prepared to show that there was a considerable increase in the absolute expenditure. After the drawbacks were taken away, he found that the expenditure had increased £5 per head for every effective man. There was no reduction except in the men, and they had reduced themselves. Taking £100 per man as the cost, there ought to be a reduction of £400,000 consequent on the reduced number of 4,000 men; but although the nominal reduction was £253,000, the actual reduction was only £6,000. While the expenditure went on increasing the soldier was no better off, and the noble Marquess had pointed out that a serious question was beginning to arise as to whether it would not be necessary to pay our soldiers better; but this would certainly not be afforded by the Estimates. He could show that in many of the Votes where there was an apparent decrease it was not real. For instance, in Vote 3 there was an apparent decrease of £119,856; but on turning to page 20 it would be found that there was an increase in repayments of a far greater amount—repayments which were not made in other years. With regard to the proposition to place a large number of officers on half-pay, that would not only cause an increase of expenditure, but would be a positive disadvantage to those officers, for it would put a number of effective officers on half-pay; it was uncertain whether they would return to active duty, and if they did return to their regiments they would create discontent among those over whose heads they were placed, by delaying their promotion. He could add nothing to what had been said as to the evils attending the present administration of the Army Reserve Fund. He thought a full and searching inquiry into that subject was necessary. He regarded it as an indirect mode of putting patronage and commissions at the disposal of the administrators of the army, and he contended that such patronage should be direct. Let the Government declare that a certain number of commissions should be placed at the disposal of the administrators of the army, but let the House know how they were disposed of. He wished to ask one question—namely, whether the twenty-two captains who were to be absorbed were to be taken into the strength of their own regiments or into the army generally? He had heard with little surprise the explanations given by the noble Marquess as to facts which were likely to be obtained from the Returns regarding recruiting. The object was to ascertain how many men were asked for every year and how many were got. We had been told that the number deficient had been gradually increasing year by year from a minimum of 400 until it had reached no less than 4,500 a year. At this rate it would be easy to calculate how soon our army would disappear altogether. However, he had heard with satisfaction that a Commission would be appointed to inquire into the whole subject of recruiting, and he hoped that such a Commission would inquire into it in a large sense, and not so much as the last Commission did with a view to coopering up and repairing the present system, but going into the principles and considering the basis of the present system with a view to the estab- lishment of a really good system, and on a permanent basis. The noble Marquess had mentioned different proposals which might be suggested to increase the number of recruits. One mode was by increasing the bounty on enlistment. He (Mr. O'Reilly) heartily agreed with the noble Marquess in condemning as unsound that method of raising men; and it did not seem certain to him that the proposal to give extra pay on re-enlistment would involve the increase of expenditure that had been stated, unless it was certain that the men would re-enlist, which was very doubtful. He concurred with the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) in the statement that what was essential was to increase the term of enlistment, not to twenty years, but to twelve; and he would supplement the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's remarks on the advantage of an intimate relation between the Militia and the Line, by suggesting that in certain cases the men should be allowed to complete a portion of their time by enlistment in the Militia. He also concurred that it would be expedient to give increased pay to good men—not to every man indifferently—on re-enlistment; that increase to be granted not only on account of the act of re-enlistment, but also for good conduct and length of service. As a further inducement for re-enlistment, he would offer increased facilities for marriage. He knew that there existed a great feeling against having a large number of married men in the ranks, and it certainly was desirable that men whose lives were exposed to danger, and who moved about to many quarters of the globe, should be fettered with few ties, so that their premature death might bring sorrow and desolation to as small a number of persons as possible. It was, consequently, right. not to have the great bulk of the army married. But the class of men who severely felt the impediments offered to marriage in the army were not the mere recruits, but the soldiers who had served a long time and were inclined still to continue in the service, and having arrived at that time of life when men in other professions married, they thought that they might be allowed to marry also, as a reward for their good conduct and prudence. To grant facilities to marry in such cases would be the greatest possible inducement to re-enlistment, and would not materially interfere with the discipline of the army. He heard with regret, that although largely engaged in manufacturing guns, the War Office were yet undecided as to what gun they would adopt. It was quite time that a definite conclusion were arrived at; and the best conclusion, in his opinion, would be that they should not manufacture any more guns for a time; for he believed the resources of the country were so great, both in our public and private establishments, that we might safely refrain for a time from the manufacture of weapons until the description of weapon to be manufactured had been definitely decided upon. With regard to the question of economy, it was a matter of regret, that while reducing the Estimates, which involved the number of men employed, no provision had been made for a reduction in the items of military education and the administration of the army. It was impossible for an independent Member to propose reductions affecting the administration of the army, because the useful and the useless were so mixed up together that it was only the Executive who could practically carry out reforms. All an independent Member could do was to show that the Estimates under particular heads were excessive. Public opinion out of doors must influence the preparation of future Estimates, and it was not by the action of individual Members that they could hope to control or cut down the Estimates after they had been presented to Parliament on the responsibility of the executive Government. On both the heads he had mentioned—namely, military education and the administration of the army, the Estimates were excessive, and greater economy might be introduced with advantage. At a later period in the Session he intended to call attention to the present mode of conducting the reliefs of the army in India.

said, he desired to call attention to the very large expense connected with the musketry instruction as at present carried on throughout the army, and especially to that portion of it which related to the maintenance of the schools of musketry at Hythe and Fleetwood. No doubt very effective service had been rendered by those establishments to the army. If they did not originate, they had organized and distributed through the army a system of musketry instruction which we were totally without before. But having done so, and the system being thoroughly understood from one end of the army to the other, there was no reason why these very expensive estab- lishments should be longer continued. In our various trials there was one system which in all the organization of the army had never yet broken down, and that was the regimental system, and there was no reason why the system of musketry instruction should not be carried on hereafter in precisely the same way as the system of drill. No doubt, if changes were suddenly made great inconvenience might be sustained; but the nine inspectors of musketry, who were more numerous than was required for the whole French army, and were chargeable to the amount of £3,560, could be retained for the purpose of supervising the system while it was undergoing a change to regimental instruction. So anxious was he to be informed of what was going on in France that he had communicated upon this subject with Général d'etat Major de Vaudrimez Davoust, to whom he had put certain questions. The questions and answers he would read to the Committee—

"Question: How many Schools of Musketry have you? Where are they; and how are they composed?—Answer: There is only one School of Musketry (perfections). It was established at Vincennes, but this year has been moved to the camp at Chalons. It is composed of the commandant, a chef de bataillon; professor, captain of Artillery; assistant-professor, captain of Artillery; assistant to the commandant, a sub-lieutenant. Question: How much do they cost yearly?—Answer: The expenses of material are insignificant. The professors and pupils being all military men receive the pay of their rank, augmented by a slight indemnification. Some gratuities are also given to the best shots."

[He then read an extract from the last edition of The Manual of Musketry for the British Army, and called attention to the fact that the word recruit, when used in musketry instruction, was not confined alone to the raw levy just taken from the plough tail, but applied equally to the veteran, upon whose breast were the records of many a hard-won fight.]

"This exercise is to accustom the recruit to the report caused by the explosion of the percussion cap, and to give him steadiness. The instructor is to watch the recruit minutely in this practice, which must be continued until the tendency to wink is overcome, and he becomes so perfectly indifferent to the report that the composure of the countenance is not in the slightest degree disturbed. Should the instructor meet with difficulty in teaching any of the recruits to aim correctly, or should he find any of them snapping in such a manner as to destroy their aim, he is to cause them to snap caps—aiming at the wick of a lighted candle, placed about a yard from the muzzle of the rifle, when if the aim is properly directed the candle will be blown out."

The treatment which some of our troops received in reference to instruction of this kind bore very hardly upon them. The 89th Regiment, which served with considerable distinction at Sebastopol, and which was subsequently employed in suppressing the Indian Mutiny, returned home last autumn from India. The colonel applied to the commanding officer at Hythe not to require the men to be put through the ordinary course of instruction in consequence of the inclemency of the weather, and his representations were backed by those of the medical officer of the regiment. But so important was the system considered that the application was overruled, and throughout the months of October, November, December, and January this regiment of soldiers was put through the course, and he left the House to judge what their sufferings were in consequence. The musketry instructor in the end was so completely laid up that he obtained a medical certificate and went away. When such treatment was received by the men was it a matter of surprise that the ten years' men should be found quitting the service when they had an opportunity? In one of the books issued for the guidance of the army, and which every officer was expected to possess, the necessity of making a man shoot well was strongly enforced, and it was laid down that a soldier who could not shoot was useless, and was an incumbrance to his battalion. On the 12th of May, 1859, the Emperor Napoleon had made the following order of the day on taking the command of the army of Italy:—

"The new arms of precision are only dangerous from a distance; they do not prevent the bayonet from being, as heretofore, the most terrible weapon of the French infantry."

But since that was written the American war had occurred. It was most destructive in its results. America was the country of rifles, and both the North and South were armed with that weapon; but the bayonet appeared to have been the most successful weapon of those engaged in it. Colonel Lippit, a good authority, had made the following observation in his work, entitled Tactics of the Three Armies, published in New York last year:—

"One cause of the indecisiveness of the results obtained in many of the battles of the late war, as compared with the great loss of life on both sides, has been that the opposing battalions were too often kept firing at each other at a distance, both sustaining nearly equal loss, until the ranks were so weakened as to disable either party from making a vigorous and decisive charge. When made resolutely, and without slackening the gait, bayonet charges have succeeded in nine cases out of ten. The bayonet is usually more effective than grape, canister, or bullets."

But it should be remembered that the phrase, "using the bayonet," does not actually imply crossing the steel; but the pressing to close quarters by which one body of resolute men dislodge another body of men somewhat less resolute. He would also refer to a statement made by Dr. Russell, the correspondent of The Times, who said—

"The experience of the American War is certainly in favour of those who maintain that fine and long shooting cannot and does not decide a serious affair in any campaign, and, though it is highly desirable that soldiers should shoot well, it is of far more consequence that they should be steady, courageous, and well-disciplined."

And the words of the text book said that a soldier who could not shoot was useless and an incumbrance to his battalion. Colonel Fletcher, the author of a history of the American War, had said how desirable it was that some means should be devised whereby men could be supplied with ammunition during action. On page 177 of his second volume, in allusion to the failure of the Federals at the Battle of Antietam, the following passage occurred:—

"There seems to have been little method in bringing the several divisions into action, or with supplying them with ammunition on the field; each successive line moved to the front, fired as long as their ammunition lasted, and then gave way to a fresh line, except when pressed by the enemy, when, as was the case with Hooker's corps it broke and fled."

The same absence of any system for supplying troops under fire with ammunition was felt in the English army, and up to the present time no attempt whatever had been made to devise a system which would mend the defect. He could speak from his own knowledge upon that point, for he had commanded in a case where he had felt the necessity of some such system. Colonel Fletcher made mention of the want in another portion of his book. At page 440 of the second volume he wrote—

"A well-organized method of supplying troops with ammunition in the field, and of replenishing its increased expenditure, is another difficulty that requires preparation to meet, and which does not seem to have been sufficiently considered by the Northern Generals."

He would, before sitting down, call the noble Lord's attention to a paragraph he had copied from the Army and Navg Gazette of the 3rd instant, in which it was stated that a young officer of the 95th had been brought before a medical commission suffering from intermittent mania, which first manifested itself by his stating that the rifle drill was all d—d nonsense. Now, although he did not go so fur as that young officer in condemning the rifle drill, yet he thought there was not a single officer in the army who would not sympathize with the sufferer if he were put into a lunatic asylum for having made that observation.

said, he desired again to call the Committee's attention to what he felt was the fault of the ten years' system. The noble Lord had made the following statement:—

"The Limited Enlistment Act is working exactly as we had reason to suppose it would. The proportion of men who re-enlist after taking their discharge remains exactly the same as it was at first, about 60 per cent."

That was to say that 40 of the best men out of every 100—those whom the officers most wished to retain—were lost to the army; and these were the men who were most eagerly received into the police force or on the railways, or into any other post of trust out of the army. Then, if they examined into the treatment of the men who re-enlisted, what did they find? A warrant of the 9th of June, 1864, showed that a soldier on re-engagement was to receive a fresh bounty of £1, and allowance of £2 in lieu of a free kit, and a payment of 1s. a day for twenty days, so that he received £4 altogether. If he were engaged at head-quarters, or the depot of his regiment, for a second term he would be entitled to a gratuity of £1, and a furlough of two months. But everyone who knew the character of a soldier would understand that this money would go in the course of two or three days, and the re-enlisted but experienced soldier found himself side by side with the raw recruit and with the same pay. An increase of pay would, in his opinion, be infinitely preferable to this system of allowances. Anxious that the country should know the cost it was put to in bringing home soldiers from the different stations after ten years' service, he had moved for a Return which had recently been presented. It showed that 4,022 men had been sent home from the different colonies at an expense of £133,961 12s. 2d., or at an average cost of £33 6s. 1½d per man. He had proposed last year and the year before that a man on re-enlisting, after ten years' service, should receive 2d. a day extra pay, which in the year would amount to £3 0s. 10d. If that proposition were adopted, he believed it would tend very much to induce the men to re-enlist, and the 4,022 men would have been retained in the service for another eleven years. The Return to which he referred was up to the end of the year 1863, but every year the numbers retiring became more and more alarming. In the year 1857 no less than 22 second battalions were raised, and consequently next year every one of these men might leave the service. The position of the re-enlisted soldier had been described with remarkable clearness in a letter addressed to the Editor of The Times on the 9th of June last. The writer said—

"As the matter now stands, the highly trained, experienced, and disciplined soldier, the man who has served his country and has proved the strength of his constitution by service in various climates, is no better paid by his employer than the raw un-trained recruit enlisted but yesterday. In the army the old soldier feels that the manufactured article does not command a better price than the raw material. Can we wonder at a ten years' man declining to re-engage in a profession where his technical knowledge, his disciplined character, his proved courage, and his tested constitution are absolutely ignored as elements of value when competing with an untutored 'chaw bacon' just trapped in the country, or at his seeking a livelihood in some line of life where his value is better appreciated? In any profession a healthy man of twenty-eight years can command a higher wage than a lad of eighteen. The truth is, that our system of pay is as crude, as clumsy, as antiquated, and as unfitted for the present age as many other parts of our military system, and requires a complete and liberal revision."

He was sure that those hon. Members on the opposite side of the House who employed such large numbers of men would not hesitate to increase their pay after a term of ten years' service rather than lose them. He would conclude his observation by quoting a remark made by the late Mr. Sidney Herbert, who had said with reference to the sale of commissions—

"The efficiency of the army is at stake, and in any change which we desire to make we ought to be careful to have with us the assent of the great body of the profession; and I can assure the House there is no member of the profession who approves of the present system."

It was all very well to talk of reduction of expense, but the real reduction was only on paper. He trusted the Royal Commission which had been promised would produce a more healthy state of affairs than that which now existed.

believed that, however opinions might vary upon the details of the Estimates, every hon. Member would give the noble Marquess credit for a desire to extend the information before the Committee—a desire which had displayed itself in the increased bulk of the Estimates from 135 pages and 5 appendices, to 161 pages and 14 appendices in the present Estimates. Still, however, without being hypercritical, he believed that there was room for further improvement. For instance, under the Manufacturing Votes the House was not informed of the quantity of material bought, the cost per cwt., the number of cannon manufactured, and the cost per cannon. The same remark applied to small arms and powder. Members would look in vain for the price of a rifle, or of a barrel of gunpowder. Our expenditure in the matter of small arms was considerably greater than that incurred on account of the French army, but then the French did not manufacture their small arms in their own establishments. The French Government have contracts with four large establishments in different parts of the country, and the contractors are required to furnish a certain fixed number of rifles, swords, and other necessary articles per annum, so that the amount required for those articles necessarily appeared in the French Estimates to be always a fixed quantity. Then, again, the French Budget supplied the information in which our own Estimates were defective—they stated the amount in kilogrammes of the quantity of metal used in the forges, the number of cannon cast, and their cost. The same information might with very little trouble be given in our Estimates. The noble Marquess had given satisfactory tables of the cost of each department and of their component parts, but though he had given the numbers, or designations separately, of those employed in the different departments, he had left hon. Members to do the addition themselves—a labour which the House ought, in his opinion, to be spared. He doubted, indeed, whether the noble Marquess himself could tell how many persons were employed in his own Department without first doing a little of this addition. The reductions of our forces in England and India were not attended by a reduction in the Estimates; indeed, the reduction of our military establishment in India entailed upon us, according to the Estimates, an increased expenditure, inasmuch as all European troops employed in India were paid out of Indian revenues, and the half-pay consequent on reductions in India fell upon the British Exchequer. As to the recruiting service, it was stated that there was latterly an indisposition on the part of young men generally to enlist in the military service. But considering the impulse given of late years to emigration, the increased demand for labour, and the general increase of wages, the supply of recruits must necessarily diminish, and young men from the country were less inclined to take military service than they were some few years ago. The increased bounty which had been suggested for soldiers after ten years' service would not only be of no advantage, but would be in reality offering a premium for desertion, unless indeed the bounty were placed to the soldier's credit, as in the French army, and he were permitted to draw a portion of it annually or half-yearly. It would be much better to enlist recruits in the first instance for a longer period, say twelve years, and at the end of twenty years' service to give them lump sums to enable them to set up in business, and if after fifteen years' service they were allowed to marry, they would probably be more contented, and continue many years longer in the service. The Estimates showed that our colonies absorbed a very large amount for military purposes without our receiving a suitable equivalent. The total amount was £3,004,714; of this Canada demanded £608,088, of which £121,363 were asked this year for fortifications and buildings. We got nothing in return for this expenditure but a hostile tariff to our manufacturing industry. £193,312 was demanded for Nova Scotia, of which £42,187 was for buildings. We received in return nil! In China the sum of £12,436 was set down for buildings. The military there cost us £ 189,287, and the navy upwards of £400,000. The return was £10,000, which he presumed came from Hong Kong. The charge for buildings at Hong Kong was unhappily necessary, as probably every hon. Member would think on remembering the sufferings that a portion of our troops had undergone there some short time since. Our men were sent there from the salubrious climate of the Cape of Good Hope at the time when the hot season was approaching, and consequently the havoc caused among them was frightful. The additional Es- timates contained a charge at Hong Kong for mud huts—mud huts for European troops in the torrid zone. With such accommodation it was no wonder that the regiments were decimated, while the country paid £189,227 for the troops maintained there. There were several other colonies, such, for instance, as Malta £327,220, and Australia £218,316, where the cost of the military establishments were considerable, while the returns were small, amounting in all from the colonies to £227,000 out of an annual outlay of £3,004,714. He would give the noble Marquess a hint on the subject of economy. It appeared from the Votes that certain West Indian and Ceylon regiments had each forty-eight officers, including a paymaster and adjutant, whereas Government thought that the black men in the Native regiments in India were sufficiently officered by six European officers. The result of such a system was seen in the Bhootan War, in which the regiments suffered greatly in consequence of the loss of their officers, in one instance only one officer being left fit for duty. If Government deemed it sound policy—but he (Colonel Sykes) took leave to call it fatuous—that six officers were sufficient for the Native Indian regiments, then to be consistent they should reduce the number of West Indian and Ceylon officers to six with each regiment, whereby a considerable saving might be effected. Not that he recommended Government to take such a step, as he believed that they had never adopted a worse policy than they had in reducing the number of the officers of Indian regiments from twenty-five to six. He would suggest to the noble Marquess whether the depot battalions in England were not over officered, as he observed that there were fifteen lieutenant-colonels in this country commanding fifteen depot battalions, when fifteen captains would be quite capable of performing that service. He feared the system of transferring officers to the retired list would operate most unfairly, as many of them would be unable to return to active service.

said, there were two more points to which he desired to draw the attention of the noble Marquess. The one was the proposal of the noble Marquess in reference to recruiting, in which he (Lord Hotham) naturally took a great interest, because he had had the honour of being President of the last Royal Commission that had inquired into the subject. The powers of that Commission were strictly limited to suggesting improvements in the existing system, and he was therefore glad to find that the noble Marquess intended to recommend the appointment of another Commission armed with the fullest powers to inquire into this important subject. There was none more important to the best interests of the country. He entertained a confident hope, if that Commission were properly appointed, its labours would be productive of the most beneficial effects. The other point to which he wished to refer was that which had been touched upon by his right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel), and also by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Longford (Mr. O'Reilly), he meant the subject of the Reserve Funds. He (Lord Hotham) coincided in their opinion that it was time some inquiries should be made into this subject, not only for the reason they had assigned, but also for certain other reasons which had occurred to him. One of those reasons should at all times have a very great weight with the House of Commons—namely, that under the existing system the Secretary of State for War had the absolute control and disposal of large sums of money of which he never gave any account, or, at all events, no account which could be made the least use of in the House of Commons. He was not able to lay his hands on the Return of the state of the Reserved Funds of last year, but he saw in the Return of 1863 that there was then in the hands of the Secretary for War a sum of £60,000. Now, considering the manner in which financial accounts generally were scrutinized in that House, he thought that the House of Commons should not allow sums of that magnitude to remain in the hands of any officer of the Government without some account being regularly rendered. He could not refer to what was the state of the Reserved Funds of the present year, because, although unintentionally, he was convinced the noble Marquess had failed in carrying out the pledge he had given last Session—namely, to present the Return of the Reserved Funds to the House at the same time as the Army Estimates were presented.

was understood to doubt that he had made such a promise.

The noble Marquess seemed to dispute the correctness of what he had stated. Now, in order to keep himself right in his remarks, he (Lord Hotham) had taken the precaution of asking his right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) whether he recollected the noble Marquess having promised to present the Return of the Reserved Funds at the same time as the Army Estimates, and his right hon. Friend, in reply, said he perfectly recollected it. He was satisfied that, among the multiplicity of the noble Marquess's duties it had been quite an inadvertent forget fulness on his part. After what had passed upon this subject to-night the noble Marquess would perhaps not be disposed to resist some inquiry into this matter in order that the House might know what were the sums that fell into the hands of the Secretary of State, and how, under what regulations, by whose authority, and in what manner they were disposed of.

said, that the ten years' system did a great deal of mischief to regiments in India. One grievance it entailed upon commanding officers in that country was that when they lost their non-commissioned officers at the expiration of ten years' service, the non-commissioned officers appointed in their room received no additional pay until the Return was sent from this country that their predecessors had been discharged. He trusted that the noble Lord would attend to this subject, and would enable commanding officers to give pay at once to the non-commissioned officers they appointed. It was unjust that one man should receive the pay and another do the work. He wished also to call the attention of the noble Marquess to what was felt to be a great grievance by officers who were serving in India. After a certain period of service an officer got six months' leave of absence, but he was not allowed to come to this country without losing his Indian allowances. He generally passed his time up in Cashmere or Thibet, or in some distant part of Asia, and during that time he received his allowances; but if he came to Europe he lost them, and that was felt to be a great hardship and injustice. It could be of no consequence to the authorities whether an officer spent his spare time in Asia or in Europe, while it might be of the greatest advantage to him so far as his health was concerned—indeed, be even the means of saving his life—if he were allowed to spend three or four months out of the six in returning to see his friends in this country. He con- curred with those who had spoken in congratulating the noble Lord on the appointment of the Royal Commission, which he thought would be extremely useful. There were various points in the Estimates to which he should call the attention of the Committee when particular Votes were proposed. At present he would only refer to one, the expense of the cadastral survey. He thought if, instead of taking twenty years to complete it, a larger sum were devoted to it, so as to furnish it in a much shorter period than was at first contemplated, very little additional expense would ultimately be thrown on the Government. It would be very valuable in public and other works; parts of the survey would be purchased separately; large sums would be paid for it, and would go into the Treasury; so that in the end it would entail no additional expense upon the Government. He hoped also that attention might be paid to an important subject brought forward some years ago by the hon. Member for the King's County as to connecting the regiments in the army with different counties.

said, he was glad to hear that a Royal Commission was to be appointed on recruiting. He believed men could not be got, simply because they found other positions in life in which they were better off were at their disposal. He wished to know if the proposed new branch of the service created by the appointment of comptrollers at various ports and foreign stations, which would cause a great additional expenditure, would lead to any reduction in the number of clerks at the War Office? It was generally thought that the gentlemen who held those clerkships, however efficient they might be, had very little to do, and it was considered that by decreasing their number a large additional sum of money might be applied for the benefit of the soldiers themselves. He believed some other reductions had taken place which had not been mentioned by the noble Lord. He understoood that the cadets at Woolwich had been placed on short rations. This was a matter in which the noble Marquess might not take much interest, but it was a matter of importance to the cadets themselves and their relations; and perhaps he would be kind enough to inquire into it. In the latter part of his speech the noble Marquess made—no doubt unintentionally—a very serious attack on officers commanding in Ireland. He said they were only now giving Sir Hugh Rose that support which it was incredible they did not give him before. He was sure the commanding officers of regiments in Ireland would at this time, if at no other, be most anxious to support him in putting down that most detestable conspiracy which was going on in that country.

said, he would not have troubled the Committee with any observation but for a somewhat remarkable omission in the speech of the noble Marquess. As he was the first civilian who had spoken, he might say that the civilians of this country did not look so much to the amount of money required by these Estimates, but they endeavoured to take a sort of guage of the amount of efficiency they got for the money. They did not mind an increase in the Estimates if it could be clearly seen that the administration of military affairs were in thoroughly able hands, and if increased efficiency followed increased outlay. The question of small arms had been touched upon by the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon(General Peel), and the noble Marquess had referred to the inventions of Snider and others, but not a single word had been said with reference to the great field for military experience afforded by America during the last few years of the Civil War in that country, and no reference had been made to the number of extraordinary and valuable weapons which had been invented and brought into use in that contest. Knowing that many of Her Majesty's officers had witnessed those operations in America, he thought that the House might have been favoured with the result of their experience in reference to those particular inventions to which he referred. One result of the American War was that the soldiers of the country were armed with a repeating rifle which made one man as valuable as from four to six men armed with the best weapon in use in this country. The life of the British soldier was valuable, and he deserved to be armed with the best weapon which modern invention could produce. The American practice in time of peace he understood was founded upon three very important principles. In the first place, they had a small but efficient standing army; secondly, they had an enormous militia population which could resolve itself into the army whenever it was required; and, lastly, they were armed with the most efficient weapons which could be procured. Every three or four years the autho- rities at Springfield took an account of the numerous inventions that had been produced all over the world, and they threw aside those weapons which the progress of invention showed were not of the best and most perfect pattern, substituting the more perfect weapons for them. The consequence was that the soldiers were armed with the best weapons existing. During the progress of the American War the moment a new invention appeared it was at once tested, and if the test were successful the invention was at once adopted. From what he had heard from distinguished American Generals, and from what he had seen himself, he believed that if a war were to break out between the United States and England to-morrow 1,000 American soldiers would be found equal to three, four, five, or even six times that number of English soldiers armed with the weapons which our soldiers were now using. He was also a little disappointed at not hearing some information from the noble Lord relative to the employment of soldiers. That was a question in which both sides of the House took great interest. An experiment was now going on at the fortifications of Quebec. There was a large outlay expended on one portion of the works, conducted on a system of open contract, and another by the officers of regiments stationed at Quebec. He had seen soldiers working on the fortifications of Quebec for an increase of pay, and looking both to the quantity and quality of the work performed, he believed it would turn out that military labour was far cheaper than the other; while the good order of the regiments was never better, nor the condition of the soldier more to be admired than when labouring as well as drilling. He hoped this information would still be supplied. The noble Marquess might rely on the support of the House if he showed a determination to make the British army thoroughly efficient, and to arm the British soldier with the best weapon that could be produced.

said, it gave him sincere pleasure to hear that the Government intended at last to take up the question of recruiting. During the last seven or ten years every military man in the House had impressed upon the Government the necessity of altering the period of service in the army, and making it twelve years in the infantry as well as in the cavalry. We had now in the colonies and in England altogether from 85,000 to 86,000 men, of whom 6,140 at this moment be- longed to the Indian depots, and were not available for any other service. It fell, therefore, upon some 79,000 or 80,000 men to discharge all the duties of the service. It appeared that about 37,000 or 38,000 men were to be kept at home, and about 35,000 in the colonies. The number for reliefs was therefore very small, and, consequently, the importance of recruiting became proportionally great. The reasons hitherto alleged were not the only ones which interfered with recruiting. One of the most powerful was the injustice with which pensioners were treated. He had brought several cases of the kind before the authorities at Chelsea Hospital, but without effect. Another reason was this—the soldiers objected to those large camps. Having returned from ten or fifteen years' service abroad the soldier wished to be allowed to go among his friends, and when he was sent to the Curragh or Alder-shot, where the discipline was very exacting, he actually hailed the return to foreign service as a relief. With regard to small arms, the system under which we sought to get them was very bad. We had what was called a Select Committee for the purpose of examining them; but the noble Marquess must own that the Committee had not the confidence of the manufacturers, because it consisted mostly of scientific men, many of them rival inventors, and the manufacturers complained, rightly or wrongly, that their inventions were taken from them. Accordingly, when the tender and specifications to which the noble Marquess had alluded were put forth many of the best manufacturers in the country would not respond, and the reason they assigned was, that they had no confidence in the Committee. What manufacturers said was this-—"Give us officers who are to use our arms." He understood that some of the Mont-Storm rifles burst in the proof. But if two or three burst, that might not show that the weapon was bad. Some 8,000 Whitworth rifles had been ordered by the Government and furnished. He wished to know what had become of them. They had been ordered in defiance of the Committee. The noble Marquess would have to alter the Select Committee by which these arms were judged, and if he got in their places men practically experienced in the use of arms as well as their construction so much the better. Another objection made by soldiers and non-commissioned officers was that they lost their good conduct pay on pro- motion. Now, it would cost the country but very little to secure the best men to the service. With regard to the Fortification Vote, he did not find that a single addition was proposed to be made to the defences of Ireland: and yet it was said that Ireland was in danger from an invasion from America. But if vessels from America were to run into Irish waters, there was not, he believed, a single gun from Bantry Bay all along the western coast to fire a shot at them; there were no fortifications at Belfast even—a place that an enemy's vessel could very easily run into. He knew that the late Sir George Brown had made a strong representation to the Government that the western coast of Ireland should be defended, and yet nothing had been done. It was absurd to say that the fleet was sufficient to protect our shores. If a few vessels from America ran into Bantry Bay they might form a nucleus around which all the disaffection of the country would gather. With regard to economy he would observe that while they could hardly hope ever to make any large reductions if they confined themselves to the infantry, in the administration very considerable reductions might be made. It was difficult in that House to go into details on the subject—the thing must be done by the War Office itself. What was the use of having an officer for making contracts, who got a large salary, and an inspector of clothing? At the head of the Clothing Department was a colonel of the Guards, a most efficient officer, and if they searched the army through a better could not be found. But he had two persons over him. Surely that officer could be at the head of the department as well as any civilian? He was a man who had served most efficiently both at home and abroad. There had been an increase in the administrative expenditure of the last year in consequence of having put young and most efficient men on retirement. But the fact was, since the breaking up of the old Ordnance Department the whole war administration had been in confusion, and there had been no man with ability or power to re-construct it. He hoped the noble Marquess would have the power as he had the will, and if so he would do good service to his country.

said, that it was hopeless for the House to expect a real army reform until they grappled with the great question of army administration. At present their army showed far too much of the "pomp and circumstance" and far too little of the "sinews" of war; there was a great array of generals and a comparatively small one of privates. He thought the noble Marquess should not claim credit for reducing the army, for the fact was that the army had reduced itself; and, therefore, he was extremely glad that a Royal Commission was to be issued to inquire into the recruiting question. It was made to appear that each regiment had its proper complement of twelve companies; but on examination it turned out that there was scarcely a regiment in which there were not two or three captains without any duties whatever. He did not agree with the hon. and gallant Member (General Dunne) in his statements with reference to the establishment at Pimlico. He had himself visited that establishment, and should say that the duties imposed on Colonel Hudson and Colonel Daubigny were extremely heavy. When he went into the first room there were 600 females at work, and if Colonel Hudson had nothing else to do but to keep that room in order, it could not be said that he was underworked. At that establishment clothes were manufactured for the army, and those for the police, and the Customs were examined there, and any hon. Member who visited the place could see how admirably the various officers performed their duties.

said, he desired to make a remark in reference to that branch of the profession to which he himself belonged. The noble Marquess had said a great deal about the weapons supplied to several arms of the service, but he had said nothing about the cavalry carbines. Now, the fact was, that all the cavalry regiments had been armed with breech-loading carbines, or some other arm of precision, with a single exception—namely, the Scots Greys. The men of this famous regiment were still supplied only with the old carbine. Prizes were offered for cavalry marksmen, and as the old carbine did not carry the necessary distance the men of the Scots Greys were entirely excluded from competing for the prizes. Military men know well the great advantage which a cavalry soldier derived from a breech-loading rifle or musket, and he hoped the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) would direct his early attention to the matter.

said, he found only two sums mentioned in the Estimates for home fortifications. Was it the intention of the noble Marquess to introduce a special Estimate for fortifications in the United Kingdom?

said, it was a very serious matter that the army should have reduced itself 10,000 men in two years: he was therefore glad that the noble Marquess had changed his mind with reference to the recruiting question, and that a Royal Commission was about to inquire into this most important matter. The other night, in replying to the speech of the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. White), the Chancellor of the Exchequer took credit for the economical spirit of the Government in reducing the army by 4,000 or 5,000 men, and said that was a diminution not to be despised. Now no reduction of expenditure was to be despised, if made bonâ fide, and with a clear reference to the exigencies of the public service. What are the real facts of the case? A few years since inquiries were made into the state of the army, and it was found that the strength of the army on paper exceeded the effective strength by 4,000 or 5,000 men. The Government had since endeavoured to raise the army to its proper number; they had failed in doing so, owing to the present Enlistment Act, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer then claimed credit on the ground of economy.

thought the public would be greatly disappointed at there being no reduction in these Estimates. He believed that reductions might have been made. All it wanted was a strong controlling hand for the central administration, and such a hand he trusted would be found in the noble Marquess. The noble Marquess had a great task before him, but it was one which he (Mr. H. Seymour) believed could be accomplished; and any energy and determination which he might show would be cheerfully seconded by that House, and approved by the country at large. The Estimates were calculated with the view of putting a certain number of men into the field. The whole expense of that calculation gave the cost of each man at about £100. But the amount of pay that went to the soldier was only about 40 per cent, and out of 60 per cent for administration there might surely be some reduction made. He was glad there was to be a Conmission on the subject of recruiting, and he trusted it would take into consideration all the causes which led to a disinclination on the part of the working classes to enter the army. A material cause was the difference between the rate of payment of the soldier and that of the skilled labourer. The pay was not more than that of the unskilled labourer, which offered no inducement even to the latter to enlist, whilst it was far below the earnings of the skilled labourer. Then there were those degrading punishments which he believed hindered a better class of men from enlisting There was the Irish constabulary, a body of 13,000 well-drilled men, drawn from a higher class without bounty, and for pay not much higher than that of the soldier. [An hon. MEMBER: It is about double.] Nominally, perhaps; but with bounty money, levy money, pay for deserters, hospitals, and such things, the pay of the constabulary was not so very much higher, as the hon. Gentleman supposed. They had had in past times armies such as he should like to see; for instance, the celebrated armies of Cromwell or Gustavus Adolphus, which had a high amount of good conduct united to the highest amount of bravery. He did not see why the British army should not reach that standard. A thorough change must be made in the system, but he feared it would never be brought about if the Commission were simply composed of old Generals trained in the service. In his opinion the Commission ought to be composed half of General Officers and half of civilians who had turned their attention to this important subject. His belief was that a proper system might be struck out, under which we should get a higher class of men into the army, and as a necessary consequence be enabled to abolish corporal and other degrading punishments.

said, he was glad that a Royal Commission was about to be appointed to inquire into the system of recruiting. He had no desire to see it composed exclusively of military officers. The system of corporal punishment to which the hon. Member who had just sat down (Mr. H. Seymour) had alluded, did not exist nominally in foreign armies, yet it was practically in force. Moreover, capital punishments were much more common, and he should be sorry to see an English soldier shot for striking his officer. He regretted to observe that the numbers of the regiments were still weaker than they were when he last drew the attention of the House to this subject. Some of the regiments were reduced to 600 rank and file, while others did not exceed 680. He would appeal to all the military men present, to say whether regiments of that strength were not unfit for service in the field, and for the emergencies to which they were subject? The strength of such a regiment would not be maintained without draughting into it men from other regiments, and thus spoiling both. He trusted the noble Marquess would tell the Committee the number of clerks in the War Office. It was singular that a sum of not less than £109,000 should be put down for clerks at the War Office, and that the number should not be mentioned. Another item of expenditure deserving attention was the cost of buildings and fittings in barracks and hospitals. At Hounslow there was a hospital attached to the barracks, all the windows of which were of plate glass. The hospital contained two very large wards, one of which was usually unoccupied, and the doors locked. The fact was that the hospital had been built twice as large as was required for the strength of the troops in the barrack. Moreover, the fittings in many instances were of a very expensive character, so much so, indeed, that the War Office, when a representation was made to them on the subject, had very liberally not charged the full price to the soldiers when they had been accidentally damaged. The new barracks at Chelsea were not very beautiful, but they were built under particular circumstances as model barracks. It was now complained that the hair of the soldiers' heads was almost blown off by the model ventilators. Then, again, the barracks at Chelsea were estimated to cost £194,000. Up to December last, £186,000 had been spent upon them, and the ultimate cost would be about £210,000 or £210 for every man—the accommodation being for 1,000 men—a cost which he presumed landed proprietors would never think of going to in providing a cottage for a labourer and his family. Although a large number of troops were quartered in Ireland, there was no mention in these Estimates of any barrack to be built or improved in that part of the kingdom. The Dublin barracks were very much in want of enlargement and improvement; and he trusted that something would be done in that respect in future, and all the barracks in Dublin could be put in perfect order at a cost of £10,000 or £15,000.

said, that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Poole (Mr. H. Seymour) had expressed a hope that the Royal Commission would not be composed of old General Officers. Now he (Major Dickson) thought the Commission would be hailed with satisfaction by the army, and for his part he trusted that the members placed upon it would have a more perfect knowledge of military matters than the hon. Gentleman had displayed. It was to be hoped that the proposed Royal Commission would not confine its labours entirely to the question of recruiting, but would also direct its attention to subjects on which the efficiency and discipline of the army depended. It was said that during the last fifteen years or so the army had somewhat degenerated, and certainly the troops now were not equal to those that fought in India and the Crimea; but this was not owing to any degeneracy on the part of the race to which it belonged, but because we had neither the same class of officers nor the same class of men in the service which we had not very long ago. That was owing to the absurdly strict examination through which officers had to pass, and to the insufficiency of the inducements held out to men to enlist, instead of entering into other employments. Officers should, no doubt, be properly educated, but many of the subjects in which they were now examined were of no earthly used to them. The system of examination had been adopted by stress of public opinion, and by stress of public opinion it was still maintained. The highest military authorities of this country were, he believed, opposed to that system, and those authorities ought to be firm and stable-minded, not men who were changeable like the vane upon a steeple that was moved about by every gust. If the commanding officer of a regiment were consulted upon the matter, he would say, "Give me the young men of energy and determination—the young men who can ride across country, for the army, rather than the senior wrangler of Oxford or Cambridge, who would do better at the bar or in the Church." If they wanted dashing soldiers they must have dashing officers and to secure men of the proper stamp for the ranks they must improve the pay and position of the soldier. Our whole system of recruiting was wrong and required remodelling. A regiment fell below its establishment, and recruiting parties were sent out to fill up the gaps in the ranks, and as it was the interest of these parties to get men as quickly as possible, men were placed in a branch of the service for which they were not suited, though they might make good soldiers in another branch. There should be one large recruiting establishment for the whole of the army, and the men enlisted should be distributed to the branches of the service for which they were peculiarly adapted. A regiment of 800 men was much too small to be sent to India, and after it had been three months there it would be unable to muster more than 600 men. It would be better to strike off a few battalions, if they must make a reduction, than to lower the strength of the regiments. We had to keep 60,000 British troops in India, because we could not safely trust so much as we had previously done to native levies. But if, unfortunately, we were involved in a European war, we should find it next to impossible adequately to recruit our army, so as to meet the heavy drain upon it occurring in both hemispheres. Why should we not, then, utilize the warlike races in our Eastern empire—the Sikhs for example—by employing them to serve in our colonies? He ventured to throw that out as a suggestion for the consideration of the noble Marquess. Our greatness as a commercial nation, and the security of our Empire and its numerous dependencies, could only be maintained by upholding the proper strength and efficiency of the two services.

So many questions and so many details have been touched upon in this debate that I am afraid I shall be able to answer only a few of the inquiries that have been made, deferring my explanations, if hon. Members think further answers necessary, until the particular Votes more immediately concerned come under separate discussion. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (General Peel) and some other Members have spoken of the scheme of unattached promotions for officers as though it were no boon at all to the army, and it has even been implied that officers would be compelled to accept these unattached promotions and be put upon half-pay. I would remind the Committee that it will be perfectly optional for the officers to accept them or not, and that if the offer of them should induce some officers of long standing to retire from the service, of course the officers of the army at large will be gainers by the measure. With regard to the supposition of the right hon. Gentleman as to the expense involved in carrying out this scheme being intended to be met from the Reserve Fund, I beg to say he is entirely misinformed. We have no intention of selling any of the first commissions for the Reserve Fund. With reference to the remarks of the noble Lord the Member for the East Riding of Yorkshire (Lord Hotham), I may say that I distinctly remember that noble Lord asking me whether I would lay the accounts of the Reserve Fund on the table along with the Estimates; and I replied, as far as I recollect, that I saw no objection to having the account of that Fund made up to the 3lst of December instead of the 31st of March. The account has accordingly been made up to the 31st of December last; it has been audited in the War Office by the chief Auditor, and it was laid on the table two or three days ago. Unfortunately it was not printed in time; but, as far as it could be done, I did carry out the promise given to the noble Lord last year. Very few observations have been made upon the events which have taken place in China, and the mortality among the troops there; and as no hon. Member has this evening gone fully into this subject, I shall also abstain from doing so. I only wish to say that ten or twelve days ago I laid on the table the papers moved for by the hon. and gallant Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North) relating to these occurrences, but owing to some delay in the printing they will not be in the hands of hon. Members till to-morrow. In common with every other hon. Member, I listened, with great interest and some profit, to the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Sir Charles Russell). I certainly do not venture to place my opinion against his, in reference to the merits of the musketry instruction system; still less do I wish to enter into a discussion of its merits and demerits. I must leave the hon. and gallant Member to settle with other officers the question whether the text-book contains directions that are too minute, and whether the system, as now conducted, is a good one. It is quite possible that, in course of time, we may be able to find officers competent to impart musketry instruction to their regiments, in the same way that the adjutants teach the drill. But a few years ago, musketry practice was quite new; it was necessary that men should be trained, in order to impart instruction to others; and I do not believe that the results we have witnessed could have been attained if the school of musketry had not been established. The hon. and gallant Member has referred to France, where he says no such elaborate system is maintained. I have no knowledge on the subject; but I have an impression, if a comparison were instituted between the French and English armies, not in warfare, but at targets, the good effect of our musketry system would become apparent. I could not, without much closer investigation than I have made, and without consulting several competent military authorities, say whether it would be possible to make any reduction in the expense of musketry instruction. I can assure hon. Members that we have been looking with great attention in the direction of America, but up to the present time we have not obtained anything very valuable or superior to what we have from American experience. First, with regard to heavy guns, owing to the great necessity of rapid construction from the immense numbers required, both sides were obliged during the late war to content themselves with guns of cast iron; but we know that Whitworth, Armstrong, Blakely, and other manufacturers all condemn cast-iron guns as utterly useless, and hold that serviceable guns cannot be made of any material which is not at least as strong as wrought-iron. In the matter of heavy guns, therefore, we have nothing to learn from America. With respect to the repeating rifle, which it is said would enable a couple of companies to destroy an ordinary army in a short time, I do not believe that this arm has been introduced as a weapon into the American army. The Americans have, indeed, lately reduced their army, but they still have a large standing army, and it is armed with a rifle; and if this repeating rifle has been found so successful, how is it that it has not been adopted as a weapon of the army? During the American War, soldiers were armed with almost every description of rifle; many had revolvers and breech-loading rifles, and, I daresay, under certain circumstances, they found them effective. But we must recollect we want a rifle which can be used not in any one particular set of circumstances, but a rifle which a soldier can take to New Zealand, India, or any other part of the world; and, therefore, it is impossible for us to undertake to change the arm of the soldier on the faith of second-hand accounts of the wonderful properties of some rifle, probably emanating from some inventor. I quite admit that a practical trial of any rifle intended for the use of the army is absolutely necessary before it is adopted in the service; and, in the first instance, I think a Committee is a proper tribunal to which to refer the matter. The satisfaction felt at the intention of the Government to appoint a Commission on recruiting has not prevented the expression of the views of individual Members, whose example, however, I will not follow. I will only say that it was necessary we should have full and conclusive evidence that we did not obtain a sufficient number of recruits under the present system before we proposed a change. For anything we knew, the difficulties of recruiting during the last few years might have arisen from temporary and exceptional circumstances. It has only been within the last two or three years that we have been able to ascertain at all correctly the percentage of men who left the army for good on the expiring of the period for which they had enlisted; and the fact that there was a considerable diminution in the number who remained was one of those circumstances which rendered investigation imperatively necessary. Hon. Members have spoken of twelve year terms as if they would provide all that is required; but, in some branches of the service, with enlistment for twelve years, almost as large a proportion have taken their discharges as in other branches. It would not be right that I should name the gentlemen who are to be asked to constitute the Commission; but I may say it is not at all intended that it shall be entirely military, nor is it intended that the military element shall consist of those who have been rather irreverently designated "old Generals." I must have expressed myself indistinctly in what I said about Ireland, if I was understood to have made any reflection on the conduct of the regiments in that country. Another topic to which allusion has been made was the existence of Fenianism among a portion of the troops. What I wished to say was, that at first there was some difficulty in obtaining accurate information as to the spread of Fenianism, because many commanding officers were unwilling, very naturally unwilling, to believe in the existence of such a blot in their regiments. I do not believe they ever dreamt of placing any impediment in the way of the Govern- ment. I believe that, owing to the confidence, by no means unnatural, which many of the officers felt, they did not take, on this account, such stringent measures to discover the existence of Fenianism in their own regiments as they afterwards found it necessary to take. One or two hon. Members have made some observations on the subject of fortifications, and the hon. Member for the Queen's County (General Dunne) has called upon us to fortify all the west coast of Ireland. My impression is that in the last two Parliaments the hon. and gallant Gentleman has not been a very warm supporter of fortifications, and that he has severely criticized the fortifications which have been erected in this country. Now, as to the fortifications erected at Portsmouth, Devonport, and other great naval arsenals, it must be admitted that whether they be well constructed or not, it is at all events a great object to defend those ports. I do not say that the defence of Ireland is not also a great object, but I maintain that there is a difference between defending points, such as dockyards and arsenals, where enormous property is collected, which, to say nothing of its intrinsic value, is absolutely necessary to the nation, and fortifying a whole line of coast like the west coast of Ireland. I do not say that it might not possibly be wise to consider the propriety of erecting some works on that coast, but I do not think the House of Commons is sufficiently enamoured with the idea of erecting such fortifications as would preclude the possibility of an enemy landing on any point of that coast. Another hon. Gentleman asked whether it was intended to bring in a Supplementary Vote for fortifications. Now, within six or seven years we have, I think, raised on loan no less than seven and a half millions of money for the purpose of constructing fortifications, and a great many of the works are now approaching completion; but as long as they are in hand we have quite enough to do in regard to fortifications, and I do not think that when we come to the discussion on the Fortification Bill this year any hon. Member will complain that we have not asked enough.

asked, whether the scheme by which officers would be put on half-pay, and at the same time promoted in rank would be confined to forty-one regiments, or spread over the whole array?

The question which I have just been asked relates to a point which has not at present been entirely decided. It would, no doubt, be most satisfactory that the promotions ahould be made throughout the whole army, as a great many officers of very long standing would thereby be enabled to obtain promotion and retire on half-pay; but, at the same time, there are serious difficulties in the way of thus disposing of the matter. Promotions throughout the army would necessarily occupy a great length of time, and in some instances the year would be nearly at an end before we could make the necessary arrangements for providing for all the captains and subalterns to meet whose case the scheme is mainly designed. The subject, however, is at the present moment under the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, and if the right hon. and gallant Gentleman will ask the Question again in a day or two I shall probably be in a position to inform him how the matter has been decided.

suggested that a great saving might be effected by employing the Militia staff throughout the country as a recruiting staff. At present they were doing nothing, being only employed for one month in the year in training.

said, that he objected to the fortifications at Portsmouth and other ports in England, because he was of opinion that they were constructed on a faulty plan. Many very eminent Engineers were of the same opinion. He thought a great deal of public money had been thrown away upon these fortifications. That, however, was no reason why he should not be in favour of fortifications of another class. As to fortifying the Irish coast, he might remark that he never thought of fortifying the whole line of coast—no one but a civilian would have imagined that he did. All he had said was that certain points, Bantry Bay for instance, where an enemy could easily land troops and it would be difficult to dislodge them, ought to be fortified, and he thought the noble Lord had no right to find fault with him for that.

inquired what was the number of officers at present on the unattached list, and what addition would be made to it?

I cannot at this moment answer the Question of the hon. and gallant Colonel.

As I forgot to refer to the Question of the War Office clerks I may state that a reduction was made in consequence of the inquiry instituted last year. It should, however, be borne in mind that the Estimate for the War Office was last year reduced by the sum of £10,000, and though this was not a pure reduction, because, in one or two cases it was simply a transfer of Votes, still a very large saving was actually effected last year. It was not likely, therefore, that any considerable saving could be effected this year. The reason why the numbers are not given this year is that the organization of the office is not complete, many branches not having been yet decided upon. As soon as the organization is completed the numbers will be again given. I may, perhaps, be allowed to say, that though I cannot hold out any very great expectation of a large reduction in this Vote, I entertain a confident hope that a small-reduction may be made. There is an enormous amount of work to be got through, but I believe much of it is of a kind which does not require the services of highly-paid clerks, and the system we have in view of employing a certain number of military clerks will, I think, work well. Some had already been introduced, and had performed the work assigned to them in a remarkably efficient manner.

suggested that to the circumstance of the number of the Native Indian troops being limited to 178 was owing in great measure to the lamentable mortality which had taken place at Hong Kong. Previous to last year one battalion in Hong Kong was exchanged, and it was generally believed that it had been removed in order to save the expense caused by the maintenance of troops placed side by side with the battalion in the Indian establishment. He believed that on every ground of justice it might be maintained that British troops quartered in Hong Kong should be kept on the Indian establishment. The vicissitudes of the climate of Hong Kong and the inroads which it made on the European constitution being taken into account, it was, he thought, but just and right that Indian pay and allowances should be provided for the troops quartered there, as well as for those stationed in India itself. It was, in his opinion, a disgrace to this country and to that House, in which such subjects were discussed, not to protest against a paltry saving by which so great an amount of suffering was inflicted upon troops who never shrunk from their duty, accompanied by a mortality unprecedented except in such campaigns as that in the Crimea. When we heard of British battalions which were a few months ago in the highest state of efficiency and numbering 800 or 900 men being reduced to little more than 100 effective soldiers, it could scarcely be denied that there was a degree of disgrace attaching to such a state of things which ought not to be passed slightly over. As to the precise person upon whom blame rested in the matter it would be well, of course, to await the production of papers before discussing that point; but the Vote under consideration presented, he thought, a fitting opportunity for asking the noble Marquess whether the Native troops were withdrawn from Hong Kong in order to reduce the pay and allowances of the officers at the station from the Indian to the ordinary rate of pay; and whether it was proposed to send back the Native forces to perform the duties previously discharged by that description of troops?

hoped that, notwithstanding the appeal of the hon. and gallant General, a debate would not ensue on the subject to which his Questions related. It was much too serious a matter to be dealt with in the shape of mere Question and Answer. He had given notice of a Motion on the subject, and as the papers with respect to it would be in the hands of Members to-morrow, it was desirable that no further remarks should be made upon it until it was brought regularly with full information before the House.

concurred in that view, and moved that the Chairman report Progress.

expressed a hope that the hon. and gallant Gentleman would not press his Amendment, but would allow the Vote to be taken. As it was the intention of the hon. and gal- lant Member for Oxfordshire to call attention to the unhappy mortality among the troops stationed at Hong Kong, it was, he thought, desirable that nothing further should be said on the subject that evening.

thought the case was one of so awful a character that the Vote ought to be postponed in order that the discussion might be taken upon it.

said, he did not see why that discussion should be raised on the present Vote more than upon any other Vote. He trusted, however, that the noble Marquess would not proceed with the Vote for Pay and Allowances that evening, as it involved numerous matters of detail.

said, he had no hesitation in stating that he should hereafter make a substantive Motion for a Committee of Inquiry into the recent mortality at Hong Kong. He thought it one of the most deplorable cases that had occurred since the Crimean War. Great blame attached to some quarter, and in the interests of the army the matter ought to be thoroughly and minutely sifted.

said, he thought that some mention ought to be made before it passed of the melancholy circumstance to which he had called attention; but he agreed with the hon. and gallant Member that it was not necessary to postpone the Vote in order to bring the Question before the House.

said, it was quite evident the subject could not be disposed of in a short conversation. As it was about to be brought forward in the form of a substantive Motion he saw no reason for postponing the present Vote.

said, that after the declaration of the hon. and gallant Member of his intention to submit a substantive Motion on the subject, he should not oppose the present Vote.

said, that for the reasons he had already stated he felt bound, in order to bring the Question to a practical issue, to move a reduction of this Vote by £10,000.

said, as the proposed reduction had reference to an item of expenditure which was incurred for the purpose of teaching the soldier the use of the rifle, he supposed the hon. and gallant Gentleman must be of opinion that such instruction was of no practical utility. He, however, entertained a contrary opinion, and could not help thinking that if a soldier had an accurate and useful weapon placed in his hands, it was of great importance he should be able to use it with efficiency. He admitted that it might, at some future time, happen that an officer might be qualified for the performance of the duties of musketry instructor without going through a school of musketry, but it would be, he contended, most unwise, by reducing the Vote, to place it out of the power of all officers to qualify themselves in that respect.

said, he had most distinctly and emphatically said that so convinced was he of the necessity of the soldier being trained to use his weapon, that he was only anxious to have instruction for that object carried out in the most simple and practical manner, and in a manner which would secure the sympathy of the officers of the army. But he thought when the Committee saw in this Vote a sum three times as large as that required to teach the French army, which was four times as large as ours, he could not be accused of cheese-paring economy because he objected to the Vote.

thought the discussion had taken a turn which made a postponement of the Vote desirable. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Berkshire had suggested a question of the deepest importance. The hon. and gallant Member thought that our system of teaching the use of arms of precision was being carried to an extent which injured the efficiency of the service. If Government held a decided opinion of their own, hon. Members might go at once to a division; but the noble Marquess had said the question was one on which he could give no opinion, it being a question for the opinion of military men. If that were so the War Minister seemed to abdicate his functions. If the Government had not made up their mind on the question it would be more advisable to postpone the Vote.

was of opinion that too much time was spent in the instruction. Besides, on scientific subjects lectures ought not to be given which excited the ridicule of those who had even an elementary knowledge of natural philosophy. But he thought musketry instruction of great value to the Army and the Volunteers, and was not prepared to join in knocking £10,000 off the Vote without knowing what the effect of such a step would be. He hoped the Government would take the subject into their attentive consideration.

supported the Amendment, observing that he presumed the object his hon. and gallant Friend who proposed it had in view was to take the sense of the Committee on the system of instruction.

was bound to say that he had heard complaints made by friends of his in the army as to the strictness of the rules, and the extent to which the system of instruction was carried. He therefore thought it would be well to postpone the Vote, though he was strongly of opinion that instruction in musketry was of the highest importance to the Army and the Volunteers.

observed, that the Vote could not be postponed. If they did not dispose of it now they must report Progress. He never had said anything to the effect that the military authorities had not an opinion in this matter; but after the observations made by so many gallant Officers in the course of this discussion, he thought it necessary that there should be some inquiry in respect of the system of instruction. There might be question as to the length of the course, or as to other details; but he asked whether the Army, the Militia, and the Volunteers were not satisfied with the instruction as a whole? If the Amendment was carried it would prevent any instruction being given them next year. He was quite ready to promise that, in connection with the Commander-in-Chief, he would institute an inquiry; and he was sure he might say that neither his Royal Highness nor himself would have any objection to such changes as would effect an improvement in the system.

said, there were two points requiring attention—one concerned the mode of instruction carried out at Hythe, and the other affected the principle of having a central school for instruction in musketry. He had spoken to many French and Prussian officers, who had expressed their admiration of the system of having a great central school for teaching musketry. The opinion had been expressed to him also by French Generals, that their army, as a whole, was by no means so well trained in musketry as the British army, which, therefore, showed greater results for its teaching than the French army could produce. From the introduction of a new system of instruction a division of interests between regimental authorises had arisen; but when those: systems had become ingrained in the army he had no doubt that things would work more harmoniously. He put it to the hon. and gallant Gentleman who had moved the Amendment, whether the question of the establishment of a school for musketry for the army could be solved by the reduction of £10,000 on this Vote? If an expression of opinion at all, it would be against the principle of central schools, the only one that could be adopted by that Committee.

asked how there was to be uniformity without a central school, and whether it was intended to abolish entirely the central school or merely to remove the absurdities connected with the system?

hoped there would be no opposition to the Committee's reporting Progress. He hoped the matter would be fairly considered, but after the Vote had passed the Committee it would be too late for any further discussion of the matter.

said, it would be impossible to suspend the Vote till an inquiry had been instituted into the subject.

said, he did not suppose a Committee would be appointed to inquire into the system of musketry instruction, but to consider how far the noble Lord could meet the suggestions that had been made. He begged leave to move that the Committee should report Progress.

said, that he had not made any promise whatever that he would undertake to re-consider the necessity of having a central school of musketry. As long as they had a central school it was not probable any very great reduction in the expenditure could be accomplished. Perhaps some modification of the system might result in a reduction. As long as they had no general system they must have a school; he had promised inquiry into the system pursued at the school, which was considered unnecessarily long, inconvenient, and faulty; but he had promised inquiry with a view to the abandonment of the school.

said, the question was, whether or not this system was carried on in the most efficient manner, and most conducive to the interest of the service, and that question ought to meet with the immediate consideration of the noble Lord the Secretary for War. Instead of one central school he thought it would be better to have two schools—one at Hythe and the other at Fleetwood. He believed instruction would then be given at less expense. The army ought to be thankful to the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Berkshire for the attempt he had made to urge the Government to re-consider this subject.

hoped that the Government would not proceed at that late hour. He hoped the Government would now consent to report Progress; and he moved accordingly.

said, the rate of every officer's pay was regulated by Royal warrant. A practice had grown up of offering an income less than that fixed by the Royal warrant, and this he thought highly objectionable. The late Lord Ma- caulay, when Secretary of War, proposed to an officer to go out to Ceylon at the low rate of pay. The officer demurred; on which Lord Macaulay said: "There are plenty of officers of your rank who would be pleased to go." The officer replied: "And if I ring the bell, I could find many who would be willing to fill your post for half your salary." But his Lordship did not see the force of that.