said, he wished to ask the Vice President of the Council, Whether his attention has been called to the Report of the Registrar General on the defective sanitary condition of Wales; and whether he is prepared to take any steps to remedy the serious evils complained of?

, in reply, said, his attention had been called to the Report in question, and during the course of last year medical officers of the Privy Council were sent down from time to time to various localities, on the outbreak of epidemic disease, for the purpose of giving advice to the local authorities, with whom it rested to initiate sanitary improvements. In default of their doing so, the inhabitants of a place might complain to the Government, which would institute inquiries on the subject.

said, he wished to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, If he will state at what date the new Regulations as to the amount of Drawback on Sugar, to be allowed by France, Holland, and Belgium respectively, as provided for by the recent Convention, are to come into operation; and, in the event of that being delayed beyond the 1st day of March, whether the change of the Duties and Drawbacks on Sugar in this country shall be postponed, in order that the change may take place simultaneously in all the countries which are parties to the Convention?

As soon, Sir, as the Resolutions were passed by this House they were communicated, through the Foreign Office, to the Powers who are parties to the Convention, with a request that they would furnish the British Government with information as to the date at which they would be prepared to carry out the arrangement. At present an answer has been received from Belgium only, stating that the Government of Belgium were prepared to carry out the arrangements on the 1st of March in case the other Governments would do the same. It would be obviously disadvantageous to our interests if the high drawbacks now existing in foreign countries should not come to an end at the time the new scale of duties here began, and therefore the Government propose, unless they are assured by the other three parties to the Convention that they will be prepared to make the change on the 1st of March, to delay the passing of the Bill through this House, so that we may be in a position to alter the date from the 1st of March to any subsequent date that may be agreed upon by the four Powers, and that the new scale may come into operation in all countries simultaneously.

Sir, as the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) thought fit last night to misrepresent what I stated on the subject of the treatment of Fenian prisoners, I have given private notice to the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland that I will ask him, Whether prisoners arrested under the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act in Ireland have not always been treated in the same way as untried prisoners and insolvent debtors?

The observation of the hon. and gallant Member is strictly true. The rule is that the prisoners apprehended under the Lord Lieutenant's warrant, no matter in what gaol they may be, are treated in regard to food, exercise, and other matters precisely in the same way as untried prisoners or persons imprisoned for debt.

said, he rose to call attention to the Estimates for the designs of the New Courts of Justice. He thought it his duty in the last Parliament to bring before the House on two occasions the unsatisfactory mode in which it was proposed that the New Law Courts should be built. It appeared then to be the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that by some proceeding or in some mode the House had parted with its jurisdiction over the subject, and handed it over to the Commissioners. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Lancashire (Mr. Gladstone) in the last discussion expressed himself to the effect that, as an independent body had been chosen to exercise an economical control over the work, the House ought to abstain from interfering with those to whom that charge had been committed. That view was so irreconcilable with the facts of the case that, coming from so great an authority, it required satisfactory explanation. It was for the purpose, therefore, of raising this question that he had placed his Notice upon the Paper. If the subject was a matter of interest last Session, it was now a matter of urgency, because they had the estimates of the competing architects before them. The scheme of a concentration of the Law Courts had been many years before the public, and had led to much adverse criticism, not because any one doubted that concentration was desirable, and that the officers of the law should have a proper place for carrying on their business, but because there was a strong opinion among high authorities that it was not right to appropriate the Suitors' Fee Fund to such a purpose, and that this was the beginning of an expenditure of which no human being could see the end. The Government of the day, therefore, when proposing their measures, were very strictly questioned, and their answers were most frank and explicit. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer), in his capacity of Attorney General, had charge of the Bill, and in introducing it in February, 1865, and on other occasions during the progress of the measure, stated that the estimate was one on which the utmost reliance might be placed. That Mr. Pennethorne had estimated the cost of the site at £703,000, and the cost of the building at £750,000, so that the entire expense would not exceed £1,500,000. His hon. and learned Friend added that with proper superintendence there was no reason to expect any great excess over the estimate. In the other House of Parliament a statement was made to the same effect by Lord Westbury, but that did not satisfy their Lordships, and, so desirous were they that there should be no mistake upon the matter, they inserted a clause in the Bill and sent it down to the House of Commons, where it was in principle adopted—that no notice for the purchase of the property should be given until it had been certified by the Commission to the Treasury that the cost of the building was not to exceed the sum provided by Parliament. So much for 1865. In 1866, during the repeated discussions on this subject, it was never suggested by the late Government that the estimate would be exceeded, and on the 5th of July last the certificate required by the Act was given to the Treasury, signed by his right hon. Friends the Members for South Lancashire and Hertford (Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Cowper), his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Richmond, and by several other distinguished persons. It was therefore with great surprise that he had observed the amounts of the estimates of the competing architects now made public. Eleven architects competed, and of the estimates sent in two amounted to about £1,100,000, four to £1,250,000, one exceeded £1,300,000, two exceeded £1,400,000, one was nearly £1,600,000, and last, not least, one exceeded £2,000,000. Now, he thought it hardly possible that such estimates should have been furnished had not the architects received an intimation that the Commission would not adhere to the sum to which they originally bound themselves. Indeed, it was reported that the Commission had applied to the Government for a further grant, and that they actually proposed to make use of the Common Law Fee Fund as security for the money to be thus raised. Considering, however, the animadversions which were passed on the appropriation of the Suitors' Fee Fund by the present Prime Minister and by the Home Secretary, he could hardly believe that the Government would entertain the proposal. The funds provided by the Act were £900,000 from the Suitors' Fee Fund, £200,000 from the sites of the present Law Courts, and £400,000 to be advanced by the Government on the security of taxes on the suitors. If, however, the costs of the building were to be doubled, he should like to know how the additional sum was to be provided. The Suitors' Fund was exhausted, and it only remained to tax the suitors further. Would the House permit this? It was said that this was a mere lawyers' hobby, with which the Government had nothing to do, and that the suitors were well able to bear the burden, but he hoped the House would not take that view, and would extend to suitors the same consideration as to any other section of the community. The true explanation of so grave a breach of faith consisted, as in the case of the Vote for the Paris Exhibition, in the existence of an irresponsible body acting behind the scenes and pulling the wires, and to whom the taxation of British suitors was of no account, and who had no motive for economy. It was, then, high time that the House should assume the responsibility of the works, and assert its own jurisdiction in matters of finance. There was another point to which he would advert—the defective tribunal which had been appointed to select the design. The Commission had named only five gentlemen as judges of the designs, and to these certainly no exception could be taken. There were the right hon. Member for South Lancashire (Mr. Gladstone) and the late Commissioner of Works (Mr. Cowper), who represented the Government; the hon. and learned Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer), and the Chief Justice of England, who represented the law; but there was only one Member who represented the general public. Architecture and art were without representation. Hence the country has had an insufficient choice, for no design in the modern style had been exhibited. Of ten bonâ fide competitors named, seven were "Goths," and from this unfair appointment as well as for other reasons, the three "Non-Goths," and the artistic public inferred that no design, except one in the "Gothic" style would have any chance of success. The designs exhibited were very curious, no doubt, as illustrations of Gothic cathedrals, feudal castles, and other mediaeval monuments, but they were most extravagant in their character, costly in their estimates, and barbarous in their details. He was satisfied that had the responsibility rested with the Government, a liberal-minded tribunal would have been appointed, as had been done by the noble Lord (Lord John Manners) in the case of the National Gallery. The Civil Service Estimates had always appeared to him to be the plague-spot of our expenditure, and he had brought forward this question as one of economy, in which hon. Members of all parties ought to co-operate.

was sorry that his hon. Friend should, in bringing the case before the House, have prejudiced it by giving an opinion on the merits of the designs, and so lending a colour to the supposition that there were some artistic or personal objection on his part to the designs underlying the general subject. The somewhat entangled and unconsequential statement of his hon. and learned Friend divided itself into four points, with some of which he agreed, but not with all. The hon. Member complained of what he called the sequestration of the Suitors' Fee Fund; he complained of the responsible Government of the country having delegated its duties to a Commission; he complained of the absence of the artistic element in the body of judges, and he complained of the castellated, monastic, et cetera, et cetera, character of the designs. These four objections stood on different bases, some of which would hold water, while others certainly would not; but to attempt to raise the question on all these issues would be to bring about utter confusion in the end. In the first place, as to the so-called sequestration of the Suitors' Fee Fund, he must say that, looking at that enormous sum of money which had gone rolling on, year after year, of no use to any one, simply a sort of "no man's land," a fund that seemed to be grinning and mocking in its own gigantic exuberance—to take that money and appropriate it to the real use of the suitors, to the service of justice, and to modifications in the system of our judicial administration, the benefits of which no one as yet, in all probability, adequately appreciated, would be a reform of a most salutary and satisfactory character. [Mr. BENTINCK: I did not complain of the sequestration of the Suitors' Fund.] Then the hon. Member gave the House a very good imitation of so complaining. He felt a personal interest in this question, for he had had the honour, when in the House, about nine years ago, of obtaining, on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society, that Royal Commission, on whose recom- mendation all that had since taken place had been effected. As to the second point—the personal superintendence of the Government—he also agreed with the hon. Gentleman. If we were to have a Minister of Works he ought to superintend the construction of all great works of the nation. He thought there was no worse feature of our political hierarchy than the subordinate position to which the Department of Works was reduced. Sometimes the head of this Department was in the Cabinet, and sometimes he was not; and he did not think there was any country in the civilized world, except England, where the Minister of Works was not ex officio a Member of the Cabinet. The Ministry of Works used to be called the Woods and Forests. He was a sort of land agent of the Crown. Some thirty years ago the superintendence of the national buildings was intrusted to him; but with the usual half policy of this country he was only set up as a sort of three-quarter Minister, while, true to the British feeling of setting two men to do the work of one, our reformers shortly after supplemented him with a half-Minister, the Vice President of Education, on whom they heaped duties of an artistic nature far more appropriate to the Commissioner of Works. As to the third point, the composition of the Board of Judges, he, as representing the architectural profession of the country, was the instrument through whom a memorial was presented to the Treasury on their behalf, suggesting certain changes; but the answer he received from the Secretary of the Treasury was simply—"You are too late," without any attempt being made to meet his arguments. In all these three points he thought his hon. Friend had established his case. But the great grievance of his hon. Friend was the barbarous mediaeval Gothic of the designs, which to him seemed to have the same effect as a scarlet cloth had on a certain most useful and meritorious inhabitant of our fields. There he (Mr. Hope) owned that he did not go with his hon. Friend. He did not go with him as to £750,000. Architects could not make their bricks without straw; and the arbitrary sum set down as the price of the building became inadequate when provision was required not only for Equity as well as Common Law, but for Probate Courts and Record Chambers, passages, and meeting rooms, and refreshment-rooms, and all sorts of arrangements to enable lawyers to get in and the clients to be kept out, and the general public to be civilly and quietly bamboozled. These additions did not come within the original £750,000 estimate, and when the architects were required to carry out these extra works, it was not right to blame them for producing plans which exceeded that estimate. Then as to choice of style, it was a remarkable thing that in the voluminous instructions to the architects not a single word about style was mentioned, directly or indirectly. His hon. Friend said, "Leave the matter in the hands of the Government," and then he went on to explain what he meant. The Government had now ordered the designs to be prepared in what he (Mr. Bentinck) called the "simple modern style"—that was, he (Mr. Hope) supposed, in the style which we all admired in Harley Street and Baker Street. They would have had a repetition, on a large scale, of 73, Upper Baker Street; but it so happened that the list of architects was not framed by the Commissioners but by the Government, by the late First Commissioner of Works; and in that list of architects, as originally drafted, about half the number were admirers of the simple modern style, and only the other half were Goths and Vandals. But two or three of the Italian architects withdrew, and their names had to be filled up. Still, the second names were chosen very impartially, and yet, when it came to the scratch, not a single Italian architect was found to stand to his gun. With one consent, but with no mutual deliberation, each man for himself came to the conclusion that for the temple of traditionary British law, the law that produced a Lyttelton, and a Bracton, and a Gascoigne, an Italian or Grecian edifice would be a startling anachronism. Every one of the architects, without any concert, came forward with a Gothic design. He pitied his hon. Friend. He knew what

"Affliction sore long time he bore"

since the designs had been hung up; but he (Mr. Hope) ventured to say that neither Government nor Commission would have made any difference in the matter. English Law Courts, built in English architecture, was what English common sense dictated. In conclusion, the hon. Member expressed a hope that his hon. Friend would not press his Motion to a division.

said, he hoped that the hon. Member for White- haven would not think it his duty to press his Motion, because it would put an end to the possibility of proceeding with other Notices on the Paper. No doubt, the responsibility in this matter must rest with the Executive Government, and could not be thrown upon any other person. The late Government in their Bill did not originally ask that this responsibility should be shared by any other body. That was a suggestion from independent Members on the opposite side of the House, who thought that it would insure the satisfactory prosecution of the work. He believed it was the present Attorney General who made that suggestion. The clause in the Act requiring the Treasury to consult with a Commission to be appointed for that purpose was introduced at his instance. That, however, was not a clause that took from the Treasury their control and responsibility: and no excess of the original estimate, or extension of the buildings beyond the site originally proposed, could be agreed upon by that Commission, without rendering it necessary to come again to Parliament for further powers. The hon. Member for White haven had correctly quoted his (Sir Roundell Palmer's) statement to the House that the late Government had done the best they could to ascertain for what sum the buildings could be erected. They had obtained the advice of Mr. Pennothorne and Mr. Hunt, who both thought that the estimate of £750,000 might be sufficient for the cost of the building. He (Sir Roundell Palmer) had, however, added at the time that, when a building was begun it was possible to exceed any estimates that might be made; but he stated that the Treasury were determined to watch narrowly over and check the expenditure, and to prevent any extravagant outlay upon ornament and decoration as distinguished from useful work. When we got into the region of architectural beauty it was impossible to impose any limit, and it was for the House to consider and determine what should be expended for the sake of architectural beauty. The primary object was to obtain practical utility, and there was reason honestly to believe that if no unnecessary ornament were adopted the buildings originally contemplated might be erected upon the site, and for the sum originally proposed. It was the duty of the Commissioners, at the outset, to inquire, and they did inquire, into the question of the probable sufficiency of the site, and of the outlay, provided for by the Act. They did so; and upon the evidence laid before them, they signed the necessary certificate upon that subject; but they had not, and could not have, before them, any definite plans; and they did not, and could not, take into account, for the purpose of that preliminary estimate, any excess of cost, or any extension of the site, which might result from any subsequent enlargement of the original design, or from any regard to considerations of architectural beauty. It was quite consistent with this, that the Commissioners might afterwards recommend the execution of the work, for the sake of greater perfection and public convenience, in a manner which, if sanctioned by Parliament, might involve greater space and increased cost. It was true that the Commissioners thought it would be an advantage to have additional land, not that the land was absolutely necessary for the work, but that the work would be made more perfect and the results more satisfactory if it were taken, of course, with the consent of Parliament. The Commissioners did not change their minds as to the practicability of erecting courts and offices on the site originally proposed for the sum that had been named; but they believed that if the opportunity of taking additional land was now lost that land would consequently acquire an increased value, and when it ultimately had to be taken the public would have to pay a great deal more for it. The Commissioners recommended, therefore, that an application should be made to Parliament for taking additional land; but the execution of the work would not necessarily depend on that land being taken. He could confirm the statement of the hon. Member for Stoke-upon-Trent (Mr. Beresford Hope) that neither directly not indirectly did any suggestion emanate from the Commissioners to any of the architects as to the style they should adopt in their designs, or the estimates they should make. They were simply told what were the practical requirements of the building, and no doubt this information was given in an ample and detailed form. The result was that the architects had produced designs and estimates according to their own taste and judgment, and the designs they had produced were doubtless of a highly decorative, ornamental, and expensive character, going (it might be) far beyond what would be absolutely necessary for the completion of the work, even with some reasonable regard to architectural beauty. Neither Government nor the House was obliged to adopt any of those designs or estimates. Of all this decoration and ornament a great and expensive part might doubtless be cut off, and the designs might be modified in any manner which might be thought proper; but when the architect was selected, it would be for the House to consider how far it might be expedient to expend, for the purpose of adorning the metropolis, more money than was absolutely required to carry out the practical object in view. He had no intention to say a word that would prejudice that question whenever it might arise; but he thought nothing could be more unjust than to say that the original project was one that had proceeded on insufficient grounds merely because the Commission had invited plans which were not to be limited to the exact area at present authorized to be taken, or because the architects had produced designs of a highly ornamental character and great beauty and extent, and had estimated their cost at very considerable sums. If it were thought desirable to accept one of these designs Parliament would be asked to sanction that step; if it were not thought desirable, the work might be executed on a scale of less completeness, and inferior architectural beauty, but still to the great practical benefit of the administration of justice.

said, he trusted that before the debate came to a close the House would be satisfied that the expense of the site for the New Courts of Justice would not be so much in excess of the original estimate as the expense of the building seemed likely to be. With reference to the source from which the money was to be obtained, he must remind the House that it would be raised by means of a charge in the nature of an annuity upon the fees; but the question for the House to consider was whether, for the sake of erecting a handsome building, it would consent thus to increase the cost of litigation of Her Majesty's subjects. As far as the excess of the cost over the original estimates was concerned, it could not fail to be remarked that the estimates of the architects, whoso calculations were based on prices ranging, say, from 9d. to 13d. per cubic foot, were far from extravagant, yet it appeared that they never expected anything else; for one of them had recorded the opinion that, considering the large space to be covered, the building could not possibly be raised for £750,000; while another indulged in a sportive vein, declaring that "he never expected that the building could be erected for anything approaching to £750,000, and he supposed every one else who knew anything about it felt the same." No one for a moment doubted the high character of the judges of the designs; but it was a fair ground for apprehension that six gentlemen, engaged in active life, and not all of them accustomed to the consideration of large questions connected with Art, might find some difficulty in supplying themselves with all the information that was necessary for arriving at a sound conclusion. He knew that some anxiety was felt that those who had to supply this information to the judges should be without any prejudice in favour of any particular architect or any particular style; and if there was any hesitation in arriving at a decision, he trusted that it might not be thought objectionable to appoint two or three architects to make a report more fully illustrating and explaining the nature of the designs. He did not agree with the unfavourable criticisms of the hon. Member for Whitehaven (Mr. Bentinck) upon the designs. Fault might perhaps be found with some of the details; but their general conception was eminently creditable to the architects; they showed the high degree of architectural skill now existing in the country; and if preserved (as he understood they were to be), they would prove hereafter that we do not live in an age of degenerate Art, but in one in which Art had attained great nobleness and richness, in proportion to the increase in the national magnificence and splendour.

said, there could be little doubt, from what had been stated, that some of the architects had disregarded the instructions that had been given with regard to the cost of the building. They reminded him of those troublesome tradesmen who, when asked for a particular commodity, would insist in offering another and more expensive article, which they said was a great deal better. He hoped the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bentinck) would persevere in his Motion. The designs might be very beautiful, but they were not the things that were ordered, and he hoped they would only be regarded as so many advertisements of the skill of the architects.

said, he quite agreed with the hon. Member for Whitehaven (Mr. Bentinck) that some responsible Minister of the Crown ought to undertake the control of such a large expenditure as that which was contemplated for the New Law Courts. This was another illustration of the practice, which could not be too severely watched, of the House being asked to vote hundreds of thousands of pounds without any satisfactory explanation from any responsible Minister.

said, he wished to assure his hon. Friend that there was no question at issue as to relieving the Government from responsibility with respect to the erection of the buildings to which the Resolution related. The Commission had been appointed simply to consider and Report on the subject, and to collect information, which they had done with great accuracy and success, for the preparation of detailed instructions in reference to the plans. On that Commission all branches of the legal profession, including several Judges, were represented; for no persons, it was thought, were likely to arrive at a sounder conclusion as to the requirements of the New Courts than those who would have to occupy them. It was quite true that when the Commissioners came to consider those requirements with regard to the future, they took a more enlarged view of the extent of accommodation which would be necessary, than entered into the contemplation of the Government when the Act was passed. The estimate of £750,000 was, he still maintained, quite adequate to secure the amount of space which it was then intended to provide. The Commission were, however, of opinion that as a great structure was to be erected in which all the Law Courts were to be concentrated, it would be a pity to lose the opportunity thus afforded of going beyond the immediate wants of the hour, and providing for those of some years hence, as well as of combining with the building offices which were not absolutely required, but which they deemed it desirable to have concentrated. The schedule, consequently, on which the architects had to proceed embraced a much larger number of rooms than was at first proposed. Next arose the question whether the Government or the House were committed to the expenditure involved in the estimates of these designs? His answer was that it would be quite open to the Government, after an award had been made on the designs, and an architect appointed, to determine that the building finally to be erected should contain no more accommodation than was originally intended. The excellence and talent of the designs would be admitted by almost every one, except the hon. Member for Whitehaven, who, although very fond of talking about Art, and claiming taste and knowledge, had showed himself on all occasions to be quite incapable of seeing any merit in the style best fitted for this purpose. The Motion of the hon. Member for Whitehaven, therefore, merely endorsed the adoption of the course that it had been intended to follow from the beginning; and as far as the complaints of the hon. Gentleman regarded the expense of the designs, he would remind the House that not a farthing of it would be paid out of the Imperial revenue. For the £200,000 to be advanced from the Consolidated Fund, a full consideration was given in the unused buildings—the value of which was believed to be in excess of that sum, while the balance would be obtained partly from the Surplus Interest Fund hitherto invested in Government securities, and partly from the Court Fees, which it was very properly proposed to levy upon the suitors who would have the benefit of the new building.

said, that as the appointment of the Commission had been decided upon before the present Government came into office, he thought it right to allow a Member of the late Administration to explain the circumstances of the case before he ventured to speak on the subject. Having heard from the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down that explanation, he had no wish to add to it a single word. One or two remarks had, however, been made in the course of the discussion to which he thought it right that he should reply. It had been stated that recourse had been had to the advice of two gentlemen of great eminence—Mr. Pennethorne and Mr. Hunt—and that, in accordance with their advice, the sum of £750,000 had been fixed on as the cost of the new buildings. That, no doubt, was so; but subsequently to the making of that estimate a very considerable addition to the building was proposed, and it was quite clear that a sum which might be adequate to the carrying out of the plans of 1865 might be totally insufficient for the execution of those of 1866. It was therefore unfair, under those altered conditions, to charge either those two able gentlemen with having submitted inadequate estimates, or the distinguished architects who entered into the competition with having produced in the latter year elaborate designs which, if adopted, would involve the expenditure of £1,000,000 or £1,500,000. He gathered from what fell from the hon. and learned Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer) that, in his opinion, a considerable saving might be effected by diminishing the amount of ornamentation. He thought, however, that that was to a great extent a fallacy, for he could not think that any very considerable reduction could be made in that way. The Secretary of State for War had often said that if the House would let him know the number of soldiers to be voted he would state what would be the cost of maintaining them. The same rule might be applied to buildings, for if they told the architect or builder how many cubic feet of building was required, he would be able to arrive at a pretty accurate estimate of the expense. Of course, everything would be done with a view of keeping the expenditure within reasonable bounds; but he must say that any Motion which at the present moment would intercept altogether the action of the Commission would be a great misfortune. He was not there to defend the origin of that Commission; but as it had been intrusted with this immense work, and had sustained all the weight and labour of the preliminary stages of this gigantic undertaking, and as they had, in a manner certainly abnormal, but with sufficient reason, appointed judges who were actually on the point of commencing their important labours, it would not be right for the House of Commons to turn round and throw the whole responsibility upon Her Majesty's present Advisers. Under these circumstances, he joined in the wish expressed by several hon. Members that the present Motion might be withdrawn.

rose to ask the Secretary of State for India, If the Government has come to any decision on the recent appeal of the Maharajah of Mysore with regard to the succession of his adopted son; and, if so, whether he is prepared to lay on the table of the House any Correspondence that may have passed on the subject? In order to render the Question intelligible it would be necessary for him to make a few explanatory remarks, not for the purpose of discussing the merits of the case—as that would be premature pending the announcement of the intentions of the Government—but merely in order to state his reasons for asking the Question. It had been often noted that the House was disinclined to discuss Indian questions, but he could not believe that it could be really indifferent to the interests of 100,000,000 of our subjects in India. The province of Mysore was of great extent. It contained 12,000 square miles, and had a population of 3,000,000, and yielded a yearly revenue of £1,000,000. This country was under the government of a native Hindoo dynasty for many generations, but about a century ago it was conquered by the celebrated Hyder Ali, from whom it descended to his son, Tippoo Sultan. In 1799 the united arms of the British and the Nizam re-took it from Tippoo Sultan, and it was then in the power of the Governor General to have divided the territory between the British Government and its allies. It was thought advisable, however, to re-establish the old Hindoo dynasty in order that it might act as a counterpoise to the Mahomedan Governments of the South of India. For that purpose the Governor General took a boy, the representative of the ancient Maharajah of Mysore, not from a dungeon, as had often been stated, but from private life, and by virtue of a treaty with the Nizam placed him on the throne. Surrounded by parasites, and having an unlimited command of money, it was not surprising that the young Prince turned out to be a weak and dissipated ruler, though he was neither cruel nor rapacious; and in due course, under the provisions of a treaty, the British Government stepped in and sequestered the country, and from that time to this the country had been under the administration of British officers. Although there might be some question as to the grounds on which we interfered, yet the benefits conferred on the country had fully compensated for the irregularity of that interference, and he was not prepared to advocate the restoration of the old Rajah, who had now for thirty-three years been unused to the toils of government. But there was another matter on which the Rajah had some ground of complaint, and that was with respect to the right of succession. For a long time it was believed, both in India and England, that the Rajah had an intention of bequeathing his territory on his decease in free gift to the British Government, and the probability was that, if he had been restored, he would have done so. But being disappointed in respect to his restoration, he lent his ear to other counsels and adopted a son and heir as his successor, according to the Hindoo law. Now, the Home Government had disallowed this claim to appoint a successor, and it was this point which he wished to bring under the notice of the House. The question might be considered both in a legal and in a political point of view. Firstly, whether the Rajah really had any right to appoint a successor; and secondly, whether it was expedient on our part to acknowledge that successor? It was contended by the late Government that the Rajah had no right whatever to appoint a successor; it was maintained that his claim to the throne was purely personal, as he had attained his position in virtue of a personal treaty, the conditions of which he did not observe, and thereby allowed his territory to be sequestered by the British Government. In reality, however, the Rajah did not become Sovereign of Mysore in virtue of any treaty whatever with us, either personal or perpetual. He acquired his position in virtue of our treaty with the Nizam. When once he was placed on the throne and declared to be a Sovereign he acquired all the rights inherent and indefeasible in a Sovereign, and one of those was the right of hereditary succession, and sequestration did not invalidate that right in any respect. The article which authorized sequestration in case of the non-fulfilment of obligations, which he read, contained nothing to invalidate the rights of the Pasha as an independent Sovereign, or to interfere with his leaving his territories to a successor. In reality, the payment of the subsidy had never fallen into arrear; where we were authorized to sequester territory merely as the equivalent of a deficiency we had sequestered the whole country, and what was to be temporary we had made permanent. Courts of Justice had, however, repeatedly ruled that the position of the Rajah was that of an independent Sovereign, and that Mysore was foreign territory, where a writ issued from a British Court of Judicature could not be executed. The Rajah, indeed, was admitted to be an independent Prince, although he lived as a private person, and it seemed an arbitrary exercise of power to disallow his right to appoint a successor. It must be remembered that in India the law regarded an adopted son in the same light as a natural born son, and to disinherit him was equal to saying that the property of a man who had been temporarily deprived of its administration—by the decree of a Commission of Lunacy for instance—should lapse to the Crown upon his death. If the legal view of the case was strong, the moral and political one was much stronger. Some years ago there was a perfect rage for the acquisition of new territory in India. Principality after principality was annexed, the annexation mania culminating in the acquisition of Oude, which was closely connected with, if it did not originate, the Indian rebellion of 1857. After the extinction of that rebellion a new era was inaugurated under Lord Canning. A Royal proclamation was issued, which had been described as the Magna Charta of India, confirming to the Native Princes their personal rights, their dignities, and privileges. Supplementing that proclamation, there came the famous despatch of Lord Canning, declaring that on the failure of natural heirs the adoption by Native Princes of a successor would be recognised, and that nothing should disturb that arrangement so long as the family was loyal to the Crown and observed the treaties faithfully. When the Rajah first expressed a wish to adopt a son, and signified the fact to the Governor General, a difference of opinion prevailed in the Council of India, to whom the subject was referred, and a vague answer was returned, leaving the question open. It was on record that there were two dissentients in the Council, Sir Frederick Currie and Sir John Willoughby, even in this preliminary stage of the matter. Subsequently the adoption actually took place, and on a second reference to England was formally disallowed, although three of the most experienced Members of the Council of India, Sir George Clerk, Sir Frederick Currie, and Captain Eastwick, again re-forded their dissent. That was the position of the case at the present time. It was considered that under the operation of the last order, in the event of the death of the Rajah, by some formal act of annexation the Rajahship of Mysore would be at an end, and the territory would be incorporated with the British dominions in India. Now, what effect would such a measure have on the feelings of the Natives in the face of the proclamation of Lord Canning? They would certainly see in it a mere desire to annex large revenues to the British Government. The other great Princes of India were in a position very similar to that of the Rajah of Mysore; and if in the treaties with them heirs and successors were not mentioned, we might, on their decease, say that they were Sovereigns for life only. The case was one of great importance, involving, as it did, the good faith and honour of this country. There were two other points which it was important that the House should also take into consideration, one being the general question of annexation, and the other the present state of India. With regard to the general question of annexation, he heartily agreed with the principles which Lord Canning had laid down in the despatch which he had previously read, and in which he stated that our supremacy would never be rightly accepted and respected so long as we left ourselves open to doubts, which our uncertain policy had justified, as to our ultimate intentions towards Native States. For the civil government already our English officers were too few for the work on their hands, and the annexation of territory would not make it easier to discharge our existing duties. To these sentiments he would add one or two remarks which seemed to him of great weight. It was his firm belief that independent Native States, under a good and friendly Administration, were a source of strength and not of weakness. They were a source of strength because, in the first place, they furnished a sort of safety-valve for the exuberant Native energy which could not find employment under our rule, and which, while unemployed, fermented and was a source of danger to us. They were valuable also as a breakwater to disaffection and mutiny; it had been said that the existence of the Native States of Hyderabad and Gwalior had really been the means of saving Madras and Bombay in the Mutiny of 1857. And Lord Canning had left it on record that but for the loyal Native States in the North West the tide of the mutiny would have swept in one wide wave over the country, from the borders of Bengal to the Indus. It was mainly owing, indeed, to the fidelity of these Native States that we were able to make head, and ultimately to suppress the rebellion. They should bear these things in mind, learning from the experience of the past how to act in the future. He had studied the subject with much care, and he believed that never in this century had it been of more importance than at present to conciliate Native feeling in India, and to endeavour to rule the people through their affections rather than through their fears. India at present was in a transition state both from within and from without, and it mainly depended upon our conduct during this interval of trial whether the crisis would end to our weal or to our woe. When he said that the country was "in a transition state from without," he alluded to an entirely new phase in our Indian rule, which was now imminent. India was rapidly coming in contact, for the first time, with the other great European Powers—he referred to the conquests of Russia in Central Asia on the one hand, and on the other to the opening of the Suez Canal, by means of which we might expect to see the swarming fleets of the Mediterranean transferred to the Indian seas and coasts. An entirely new phase was thus opening to India in her foreign relations; and the change in the interior of the county itself was even more important. India, indeed, was just now awakening from the lethargy of centuries. The country was stirred from one end to the other by the contact of European industry and civilization, but was not yet penetrated with its quickening influences; and it depended on the spirit in which the Government was conducted whether the change now in progress would lead to good or evil results. If we betrayed a sordid or scornful spirit, if we disregarded Native feeling, and proclaimed the doctrine of "India for the English," then the stronger and wealthier India might become, the more would the differences of race be deepened, the more would religious hatred become intensified; and if we continued to retain the country it would be at the expense of such a drain on our resources that it would be questionable whether it would be worth the cost. But if we acted with kindness and forbearance, if we led rather than drove, if we governed India for the Indians, then we might expect that in due course that great country would become the most loyal and the most prosperous, as it was already the most fertile and the most populous of all the dependencies of the British Crown. He would only fur- ther remind the noble Lord (Viscount Cranbourne) that since the last orders were sent to India a very numerously-signed petition had been presented to the House in favour of the Rajah's claim to adoption, and that a deputation had also waited on him last year to advocate the same cause, so that they might consider the whole question to have been re-opened and re-considered. He begged, in conclusion, to ask, Whether the Government has come to any decision on the recent appeal of the Maharajah of Mysore with regard to the succession of his adopted son; and, if so, whether they were prepared to lay upon the table of the House any Correspondence that might have passed on the subject?

said, he wished to say a few words in support of the appeal made to the House and the Government by his hon. Friend, because he felt that the position in which India stood was one of great difficulty and danger. If the decision of the late Government were allowed to take effect, it would carry dismay to the Native Indian mind, which would not be able to understand the grounds upon which it rested. When the question of the assumption and seizure of the Native Principalities arose it did not meet with the attention which it deserved, but opinions were expressed at the time which gave rise to those feelings of alarm which his hon. Friend had described. On that occasion Lord Dalhousie, who had only lately arrived in the country, announced in broad terms his opinion that the time had arrived when the Government should lose no lawful opportunity of extending their territory, though, at the same time, they should pay the most scrupulous regard to the rights of others. No wonder such a declaration caused alarm. He endeavoured to draw the attention of the House to the subject, but it was one to which the House would not listen at the time. The question, however, became aggravated from year to year, until at last the Government thought that the time had arrived to quiet the alarm which had been created on the subject. It was a remarkable fact that while those connected with the civil administration came eagerly forward to defend principles of confiscation by which their departments might be extended, those who had spent years in India, and were intimately acquainted with the feelings of the Natives, and with the law and practice on the subject, protested almost unanimously against the course on which the Government was embarking. With regard to this Mysore State, Lord Canning laid down a simple but broad principle, that the assurance as to the right of succession should be given to every chief who governed his own territory as a sovereign Prince; and it was alleged that the Rajah of Mysore was not included within that condition. It was a principle, in fact, that those cases in which sovereign rights were exercised carried with them an inherent right to succession. It was said that it was specially intended to exclude the Rajah of Mysore from the exercise of that principle; and perhaps, on the face of it, it bore that construction; but no one who knew Lord Canning would think that he entertained the idea of denying the sovereign rights of the Rajah of Mysore, for within thirty days after laying down that principle he wrote again on the subject of that Mysore State, expressing his hope that the titular ruler of that State might eventually be induced to bequeath his power to the British Government. His territory had been administered for more than forty years by British officers, and he admitted that this fact entitled the English Government to impose such conditions as might appear called for; but he maintained that, as a matter of right, the succession ought to be recognised. The present Governor General had described the Rajah as a dependent Prince, possessing only such personal rights as had been conferred on him by treaty; but that despatch was written in ignorance of all the facts of the case, and tended to re-open all those questions which Lord Canning had settled. It was true that the British Government at one time made a treaty with the Rajah in perpetuity, in which no mention of his heir was made; but he contended that the Rajah's rights of sovereignty did not depend upon that treaty, and a previous treaty between the same parties recognised the Rajah as sovereign of Mysore. The claim we had to interfere with the territory arose out of a treaty declaring that whenever the subsidy which should be paid should fail, then the British Government would have a right to go in and occupy the place, and administer the State laws, the terms implying that that should be merely a temporary measure; and all our rights depended upon that treaty. He hoped the British Government, in deciding this matter, would maintain its character for good faith.

Sir, this is beyond doubt a very important question, and has attracted a great deal of attention both in England and India. It has been usually discussed with considerable exaggeration both of argument and feeling; and I have to express my thanks to both the hon. Gentlemen who have spoken upon it for bringing it forward in so moderate and so candid a spirit. The hon. Member who brought the subject forward established what I thought was a very convenient division of it, when he said he would refer first to the legal and then to the political grounds of the question; and I shall adhere to his division, because, though upon the legal ground I may differ from him very considerably, I daresay that when we come to the political question we shall be found not very widely apart. The first question upon which I want to touch, although it does not concern my main argument, is one raised by the hon. Baronet (Sir Edward Colebrooke); I mean the question of the adoption despatch of Lord Canning. I feel bound, in justice to the Governor General, to point out the reasons why I think he was justified in stating that that despatch conferred upon the Rajah no right of adoption. The simple facts of the case are these:—Lord Canning carefully excluded all those who were not in the actual government of their own territories from its operation; and afterwards, by way of an illustration of what he meant, he sent a special sunnud to every individual chieftain upon whom he intended to confer the right. Prom that list the Rajah of Mysore was excluded; and I cannot conceive any more distinct or emphatic way by which Lord Canning could announce that the Rajah was not to enjoy the right of adoption. I think that the adoption question does not arise on the present occasion. I shall therefore prefer, in the few short arguments I shall use, to lay aside the question of adoption, to treat the young man as the lineal son of the Maharajah, and to inquire into his rights as that lineal son. I hope by doing that, among other objects, to establish in the mind of the hon. Baronet opposite, and, it may be, in the minds of any of the Native Princes of India who share the fears he attributed to them, a conviction that no thought ever entered into the mind of Her Majesty's Government—I am convinced that no such thought will ever enter into the minds of any British statesmen—of disturbing these solemn grants that Lord Canning made to the Native Princes. I believe there is no right which every Government in India will regard as more sacred than Lord Canning's concession on the subject of adoption to the Native Chiefs. The hon. Baronet who brought forward this Motion rightly said that the whole of the Maharajah's title depends upon the partition Treaty of Mysore. It lies in the four corners of that treaty, and what we have to inquire is—Did the Maharajah receive a full right of Sovereignty with succession; that is, in fact, his territory in fee simple; or did he receive only a life grant? Remember that this is not the case of an ancient Sovereign whom we found in that country, or with whom we made a treaty. This is the case of a man whom we took from a house in which he was confined when a child, dying from ill-usage, and whom we rescued and placed on the Throne. Therefore, it is to the treaty alone that we must look to see whether the Maharajah has any right to bequeath or hand down to his lineal son the territory then granted to him. Now, I confess that, when I came to examine this question carefully, though I was naturally in no way prejudiced in favour of the views of my predecessor, but I was quite surprised at the doctrines and the interpretation of the treaty which several of those who argue the case of the Maharajah had taken up. The Partition Treaty of Mysore was a treaty in which the Maharajah himself had no share. It was a treaty between the Nizam and the English Government, and its object was, as its name implies, to divide the territory which conjointly they had conquered from Tippoo Sultan. The Maharajah of Mysore is not mentioned at all in the preamble. The first article of the treaty declares that certain territories afterwards named shall be subjected to the authority, and shall be for ever incorporated with the dominions of the English East India Company. The second article says that, for the same reasons, certain districts afterwards specified shall be subjected to the authority and for ever united to the dominions of the Nawab Nizam. Then again, for reasons therein stated, the fortress of Seringapatam was to become part of the dominions of the said Company, in full right and sovereignty for ever. In each of these three articles the greatest care is taken to say that the grant is one "for ever"—first to Eng- land, and then to the Nizam. Then comes the fourth article, which declares that a separate Government shall be established in Mysore; and it is stipulated and agreed that for this purpose the Maharajah of Mysore, a descendant of the ancient Maharajahs, was to possess the territory thereinafter described. There is not one word in the article about sovereignty, perpetuity, or inheritance. Now, I cannot imagine that if you were dealing with any other case—with a case, for instance, of private property or International Law in Europe—you would doubt for a moment that with a contrast so striking between these several articles, the intention was that to the Maharajah alone should the grant of that territory be made, and that it should be reserved for subsequent decision what should be done with that territory after his death. The hon. Gentleman who introduced the question said that there were many Indian treaties from which the word "perpetuity" was excluded, and that there was no Native Prince in India who would feel himself secure if on that ground we disputed the right of this young Maharajah. I see that that statement was also made by a very distinguished member of the Council, with whom the hon. Gentleman is familiar. Now, I went very carefully through the seven volumes of Indian treaties to ascertain whether that was the fact. I am bound to say, that wherever territory in granted, as a rule the words of perpetuity are carefully inserted. There are some slight exceptions in the case of rectification of frontier, and where agreements are made with well-known reigning houses, with regard to whom it was wholly unnecessary to insert those words; but as a rule they were inserted, and I cannot subscribe to the doctrine that even if the case of Mysore and that of other States were analogous, such a construction would imperil other Native Thrones. But the case of Mysore stands by itself. There is no other case like it in India. The hon. Gentleman talked of Scindia, Holkar, and the Nizam. Well, but we found those Princes on the Throne. They were reigning Sovereigns before our time, and it was immaterial with regard to them whether we put into treaties with them words of perpetuity or not. But this man derives his rights from us, and it is only to ns that he can look for the exact definition of them. But there was one analogous case—the case of Sattara. That was exactly the same case of a territory carved out of a conquest, and given to the descendants of those who formerly reigned in the same region. But in the Sattara treaty the words "of perpetuity" are carefully inserted. Therefore the case seems to me complete that, so far as the construction of the treaty can guide us, the son of the Maharajah has no right to succeed to the sovereignty of Mysore. If that be so, I need hardly add that it is not necessary to enter into the question of adoption, because what the lineal son has no right to, it is clear that the adopted son cannot claim. I must therefore express most emphatically the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the rights conferred upon the Maharajah of Mysore by the Partition Treaty terminate with his life. So much for the legal question. Now for the political; and here, I think, the case assumes a different aspect. The hon. Gentleman is quite right in saying—although I do not think the feeling is very logical—that there exists a considerable feeling among many distinguished Princes in India in regard to the policy of the Government in this case. I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman introduced the question of fear into the argument that he presented to the House. I not only disclaim being actuated by such a motive, but I must state, in the most distinct manner, that there does not seem to me to be the slightest occasion for any appeal to our fears in this instance. I believe that we were never safer in India than at the present moment. There never was a time—whether we have to rely on our swords, or whether, which I hope is now the case, we may rely on the sense which the Natives entertain of the justice they may expect from us, or the security which our Government confers upon them—when we had a better right to calculate on the stability of our power in that country. But that fact docs not in the least diminish our desire to calm the minds of the influential feudatories who are in alliance with us—to do anything consistent with our duty to India, which may be pleasant and agreeable to their feelings. And therefore I freely admit that the wishes which have been expressed by several distinguished Princes on this subject have much weighed with Her Majesty's Government. Not that we concede to those Princes any right or title to interfere in this matter. But the feelings between us are naturally those of amity. We know that we are together engaged in a great work, which will task the strength of both of us. We are aware that the object we have in view will be much facilitated, and that we shall more readily obtain the good Government we seek, if we work thoroughly and heartily together, and if no jealousies disturb our common action. But there are other considerations, and I think the hon. Gentleman stated them very fairly and eloquently. I do not myself see our way at present to employing very largely the Natives of India in the regions under our immediate control. But it would be a very great evil if the result of our dominion was that the Natives of India who were capable of Government should be absolutely and hopelessly excluded from such a career. The great advantage of the existence of Native States is that they afford an outlet for statesman-like capacity such as has been alluded to. I need not dwell upon other considerations to which the hon. Gentleman so eloquently referred; but I think that the existence of a well-governed Native State is a real benefit not only to the stability of our rule, but because more than anything it raises the self-respect of the Natives, and forms an ideal to which the popular feeling aspire. It is not therefore the intention of Her Majesty's Government, whenever the Maharajah dies, that the State of Mysore shall be annexed. But then, if not annexed, what is to be done with it? Well, I must say that I do not feel inclined to adopt the opposite alternative. I do not think it would be consistent with our duty to hand it back to a Native Government unchecked and uncontrolled. The House will excuse me, I am sure, from entering into any further details on that subject. But no one can have examined the records of the Commission that inquired into this subject after Lord William Bentinck assumed the Government of India, without feeling that to such a course there are insuperable objections. Then the question really amounts to this—how far will you go in giving to this young man a share in the Throne and the Government of the territory that his father possesses? It is from no other feeling than a real belief, which I think is justified by the facts, that the time for a decision has not arrived that we hold that the decision of this question must be deferred. It must be obvious to anybody who reflects upon the subject, that the character of a Native Government, and the amount of blessings it is likely to con- fer upon the people, must depend more than is the case in our part of the world upon the character of the individual ruler; and nobody can tell what will be the character of the adopted child of the Maharajah. When this youth shall have advanced in years—when he shall have reached some twenty years of age—it will probably then be possible for those who may be charged with the responsibility of the Government of India to decide whether he is likely to imitate the bright example which has been set by the Native ruler of the neighbouring State of Travancore, or whether he is likely to fall into those habits of prodigality and favouritism which are among the besetting sins of Indian Courts. We shall leave the decision of that point to those on whom the responsibility will properly devolve. It is the wish of Her Majesty's Government by no word or action to fetter that discretion, or to bind beforehand the judgment of those who will have before them the facts with which we are now unacquainted, and who will therefore be better qualified to adopt the conclusions to which they may legitimately lead. But there is even yet another consideration. As the hon. Member justly said, the state of India is now one of transition. It is a state of rapid and violent transition; and no man can tell what the needs of that country will be ten or fifteen years hence. And, whatever treaties or engagements may be entered into, I hope that I shall not be looked upon by Gentlemen of the Liberal party as very revolutionary if I say that the welfare of the people of India must override them all. I quite admit the temptations which a paramount Power has to interpret that axiom rather for its own advantage than its own honour. There is no doubt of the existence of that temptation, but that does not diminish the truth of the maxim. Therefore, I should be sorry now to pledge any future Government to any course which might honestly and clearly seem to be at variance with the interests of the people of Mysore. But, reserving that point, as far as we can see it may well be hoped that a practical share in the Government of the whole or a portion of the country—probably that would be the best—might be given to this young man. I am only stating my own individual opinion—merely stating what the circumstances of the case as they stand before us now may seem to justify. But I wish again to repeat that I am uttering no pledge. We leave the decision of the case to those on whom the responsibility of that decision must rest. Our only object now is to so order our proceedings that they should be able to arrive at an easy and just decision. When the present Maharajah dies no change will be made in the form in which the Government of Mysore will be conducted. As to the young Maharajah, if we have the opportunity to do it, of course we shall be glad to do all we can to give him the advantages of a European education, and so prepare him, to the best of our ability, for the responsibilities which we hope it may one day be possible to commit to him. I need scarcely say that, of course, proper arrangements will be made for maintaining him in a condition suited to his rank; but beyond that, I think I should do my duty best by pledging the British Government no further. With reference to the last part of the hon. Gentleman's Question, I will only say that the despatch in answer to the application of the Maharajah of Mysore will be laid on the table; and it will then be competent for him, if he does not approve the views of Her Majesty's Government to ask for the opinion of the House on the subject.

*Sir, I am sure that no apology will be thought necessary from any hon. Member who endeavours to call the attention of the House to any defects which may appear to him to exist in so important a part of our institutions as the judicial system of this country. Were it otherwise it would, I think, be easy to give special reasons at the present moment for undertaking that task. In the Speech from the Throne, at the opening of this Session, we were told that our attention would be called

"To the Consolidation of the Courts of Probate and Divorce and Admiralty; and to the Means of disposing, with greater Despatch and Frequency, of the increasing Business in the Superior Courts of Common Law and at the Assizes."

It will be obvious to all who reflect on the matter that this is a subject which invites our consideration as a whole. Whatever may be the views of the Government of which we are now imperfectly informed—the present is a fitting opportunity for passing in review the whole of the subject to which our attention is thus called. The question discussed at an earlier part of this very evening—namely, as to the measures in progress for the erection of new Courts of Justice to facilitate the administration of the law, affords an additional reason for now bringing this matter forward. There is, also, another advantage in considering this subject at the present time, because we have now, and for a long series of years have had, such an administration of justice—as far as the Judges personally concerned are responsible for it—as disarms all censure or criticism, and deserves the strongest and warmest acknowledgments. Whatever defects I may endeavour to point out are defects in the system, not at all attributable to those whose duty it is to administer it. They have done all in their power, I believe, in every branch of our judicial administration, to encounter and overcome those defects. The Government have not yet had an opportunity of explaining to us their intentions as indicated by the passage I have read from Her Majesty's Speech. A measure, however, has been laid on the table of the other House of Parliament with reference to the Courts of Admiralty, Probate, and Divorce, which, if adopted, certainly will have one good effect—namely, that of relieving the Courts of Common Law from a duty lately imposed on them which it has been impossible for them conveniently to discharge, and which no doubt requires to be otherwise provided for. It is also said that we may expect a proposal to be made for a considerable increase in the number of Judges in the Courts of Common Law. With respect to that, as also with respect to the measure to which I have alluded, it would not become me now to anticipate discussion. But if such a proposal is likely to be made it appears to me very desirable that we should take likewise into consideration all other causes of obstruction and difficulty which may now exist in the administration of justice in the Courts of Common Law, in addition to such as may arise merely from the inadequacy of the number of Judges. Undoubtedly, at the present moment there is a great obstruction of business in those courts. There are considerable and accumulated arrears which the Judges have not been able to keep down by all the energy at their command. That, I believe, is found to be the case both in London and at the assizes. I understand that the Nisi Prius list for the present sittings is exceedingly heavy, and not by any means likely to be cleared. According to the figures with which I have been furnished of Common Pleas cases there are no less than 124 remanets from last sittings, and 145 new cases, making 269 cases altogether standing for trial at the present sittings. I am informed that there is very little probability indeed of getting through the whole of the 124 remanets, and that many of them are likely to go over till next November. Of course, the new cases must also be deferred; and unless a remedy is applied to such a state of things it will tend greatly to the detriment of the interest both of suitors and the public. Then as to rules nisi for new trials, I learn that the list of these which stands over for argument is getting much into arrear, and that some cases which arose as long ago as February of last year are not likely to be argued till May in the present year. The special cases in the Crown Paper are equally or more in arrear. In fact, there is almost a complete block up as to a great part of the business in the Courts of Common Law. At the assizes the power of disposing of the cases under the present system is similarly inadequate. The question before us is, what are the remedies to be applied? I cannot but think that under the present arrangements of the courts there is a very great waste of judicial power, and that to a great extent that waste might be remedied by a careful revision of the whole system, both as regards London and the assizes. I would strongly urge upon the House and the Government the importance and the necessity of looking the whole question fully in the face and examining it in all its departments and branches before applying a particular remedy—which is objectionable if it be not necessary, but which ought to be applied if it is—I mean that of an increase in the number of Judges. There are obvious causes of evil for which there are obvious remedies distinct from an increase in the number of Judges, and those remedies ought to be applied whether the number of Judges be increased or not. Some of these have occurred to myself, and others have been suggested to me by persons of high authority. Looking at the question broadly, the first thing which one encounters is that there are three Courts of Common Law, with fifteen Judges—five in each court, and the first question that occurs is how far is this division of jurisdiction between these three courts necessary or useful, and how far would the administration of justice be pro- moted and improved by abolishing the division of jurisdictions and making the three courts practically one? There is no sound reason for retaining any part of that division of jurisdiction; it is purely technical and artificial. The Court of Queen's Bench has exclusive jurisdiction in criminal informations, and in what are technically called Crown cases, though I believe there are other Crown cases, under Mr. Waddington's Summary Jurisdiction Act, which may be taken into the other courts. It has also exclusive cognizance of certain Poor Law cases. By other forms and processes, direct or indirect, questions of precisely the same nature may be introduced into the other courts; but, so far as relates to these particular modes of procedure, the Court of Queen's Bench has exclusive jurisdiction. The Judges of the other courts are selected from the same bar, and have in every respect the same qualifications with the Judges of the Queen's Bench. The distinction that exists is really quite arbitrary, and I maintain that it ought to be abolished. Whatever arrangements it may, at any time, be found convenient to make, for the distribution of business among the Judges, can, of course, be made; but there is a great difference between such arrangements, and an exclusive jurisdiction. I say the same thing of the special jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer. Revenue causes are tried in that court only: though petitions of right against the Crown, which may throw heavy charges upon the revenue, may be taken to any court. The Court of Common Pleas has less of peculiar jurisdiction; but that court only has cognizance of registration cases. I advocate the abolition of these technical and arbitrary differences altogether, and I would make all the courts practically branches of one, having a uniform jurisdiction, and capable of taking any business without distinction. I do not think the time of the Judges is now so occupied as that the most is made of them. Four Judges sit in a court at a time, and one often leaves in the middle of the day to go to Chambers. A great amount of Nisi Prius business accumulates for what are called the after-term sittings. Let three Judges constitute a full court, let one or more, if necessary, from each court sit at Nisi Prius all through term continuously as well as afterwards, and then the great arrears of business would be kept down. The sitting of Judges in Chambers might be greatly reduced or en- tirely abolished, the routine and uncontested business should be done by the chief Masters, and it should be in the power of suitors to put down in a list the cases which they wished to have disposed of before a Judge. One Judge, when not required to sit at the Central Criminal Court, might sit alone to dispose of practice cases, and in that way a considerable saving of the time of the Judges would be secured. In the Court of Chancery we do not permit suitors at their option to accumulate a list of arrears in one court, while other courts are insufficiently supplied with business. In the first instance, the suitor selects his own court, and when he has done so, and the case is ripe for hearing, if one court is overburdened and and another ill-supplied, cases are transferred from one court to another, and so the business is equalized and expedited. In the Courts of Common Law, there is at present no such power. Cases cannot be transferred from the Queen's Bench, to the Common Pleas or the Exchequer. One man favours one court and another man another. One court has a lack of business, while another is overburdened with arrears; but if the cases were transferred, a great deal of time might often be saved. It has also been suggested to me that in moving for new trials and in other matters there is a double process, which, in many cases, might be advantageously abolished, There is the motion for the rule nisi in the absence of the enemy, and there is the further argument when the enemy shows cause. Why should it not be here as in the Court of Chancery, where you summon your adversary by notice of motion in the first instance, and the matter is argued once for all? Why should not the party have at least the option to move upon notice for his rule absolute at once, some economy of time might result from the adoption of this plan. Another matter has often struck me with surprise, although I cannot say how far it occupies time. If there are issues of law joined by demurrers, and also issues of fact, although the issues of law may entirely exhaust the merits of a case, and the determination of them often settles the question between the parties; yet, they must, if they wish to go to a Superior Court upon the point of law, unnecessarily try, perhaps at great expense and delay, the questions of fact, upon which if the judgment is right nothing will depend. In the Court of Chancery, if a demurrer is allowed to a bill the matter goes to a Court of Appeal, and there is an end of the case unless the judgment is reversed, in which case the questions of fact are re-opened. Why should there be a trial of facts, when it is settled that it will be of no use unless the Court of Appeal should reverse the judgment? The good sense of parties often leads to an arrangement; but, on the other hand, there are cases in which the unnecessary trial is not avoided, and when there is no necessity for it, it must be a vexatious and useless waste of money and time. Another important matter to be considered is the relief of the Superior Courts from business which might be better disposed of elsewhere. There are two ways of doing that—first, absolutely excluding a certain class of cases which the County Courts have jurisdiction to try, and in which they might be trusted to do full justice; and secondly, imposing discouragements in the way of costs upon parties who, without good reason, choose the more expensive instead of the cheaper and simpler process. I have high authority, both of experienced Judges and of members of the Bar, for the principle of this recommendation. That many frivolous cases would be got rid of by compelling the parties to try them in the County Courts, unless a Judge saw special reason for their being tried in a higher court. I do not pretend to name the precise amount at which the line ought to be drawn, but I doubt whether any harm would be done by taking it in cases of contract at £50. Some might put it lower, but that would be a matter for consideration. It would probably not be right to apply, in all respects, the same rule to actions founded on wrongs. There may be cases such as libel involving a small pecuniary amount, yet in which, more than the verdict is sometimes at stake, and in these cases it might be unfair that the option of having them tried in a Superior Court should be wholly taken away. I venture to suggest, however, that if a person should bring an action of that description, which might be tried in a County Court into a Superior Court, without recovering more than a certain sum—say £10 or £20—he should not be entitled to costs unless the Judge should certify that the case was a proper one to be tried in a Superior Court. The adoption of that course would get rid of a number of cases which are a great obstruction in the Superior Courts, and which form an unnecessary addition to their business. With respect to the assizes, there are two other recommendations which I also venture to make with the sanction of some authority. The first and principal one is that the same practice should be adopted at the assizes in the transaction of criminal business which is followed at the Central Criminal Court. The Judges, who sit at the Old Bailey, try the more important cases, while in an adjoining room others are disposed of by the Recorder or the Common Serjeant. Now there is, I apprehend, no reason why the Judge of assize should not try the more important cases and let the others be tried before the local recorder or by an inferior Judge specially summoned for the purpose. In that way some relief might probably be obtained without any prejudice to the administration of justice. Another mode in which the same end might be promoted is by the entire abolition of separate assizes for counties of cities and towns. There is, it appears to me, no practical necessity for maintaining this separation, and if the assizes for towns were thrown into the counties to which those towns belong, and if, in some cases, the assizes for more counties than one could be held together, some time would, no doubt, by those means be saved. I have now submitted to the House all that I have to offer on that part of the case which relates to the general business of the Superior Courts of Common Law. I now come to the first subject mentioned in my notice of Motion, which I regard as a very important one, and which, I hope, may receive the early attention of the Government and of Parliament. I refer to the subject of appellate jurisdiction. We have four Courts of Appeal, two of final, and two of intermediate appeal. The two Courts of Final Appeal are the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; the two intermediate are the Exchequer Chamber, or Court of Error at common law, and the Court of Appeal in Chancery. From each of the two latter an appeal lies to the House of Lords. When that statement is made several questions of principle occur to my mind, and I should like to say a few words on those questions before I enter at any greater length into details. Let me suppose that we were about to construct, de novo, a judicial system, I do not think there could be much doubt that the best course to adopt would be—following the example of some neighbouring, and of, perhaps, most well-governed States—to establish one supreme court of final appeal. I cannot but hope that our efforts after improvement on the subject may take, as far as is practicable, that direction. To have two Courts of Final Appeal administering in several parts of their jurisdiction the same law, with the possibility of conflict, is, to say the least of it, inconvenient, and no sound reason can, so far as I am able to say, be given for it. Next, I would ask if the best plan to adopt be to have only one Court of Final Appeal, whether it would not be better also to have only one appeal? The contrary system, it seems to me, holds out inducements to those who are fond of litigation; and there are, therefore, in my opinion, two principles which ought to be aimed at in any reform which we may attempt. That we should, if possible, constitute a single Court of Final Appeal, and that we should, at all events, permit only one appeal in any case decided by a Superior Court. The next question is, is it expedient that there should be different Courts of Appeal in Equity and at Common Law, or only one Court of Appeal for both? The distinction between them is, as we know, in a great measure artificial, and the requirements of the times point to as great a fusion of the two as is consistent with some reasonable division of labour and the practical despatch of business. Their separation has a tendency to produce a certain narrowness, which may be corrected by bringing both together into a focus by means of one Court of Appeal. As things at present stand, we have the House of Lords administering English and Scotch jurisprudence, and the Privy Council administering not only English jurisprudence, but French, Dutch, Mahomedan, and Hindoo. Now it may be thought that English Judges, whose minds have been formed in the practice of the English law, might be incompetent to the discharge of such duties; but it is somewhat remarkable that, although no Scotch lawyer has ever taken a regular part in the judicial business of the House of Lords (Lord Mansfield and other eminent men whom Scotland has given to the English bar and bench, cannot properly be called Scotch lawyers), yet, by the general consent of those best qualified to give an opinion on the subject, the law of Scotland has derived great benefit from the mere fact that the decisions of its Judges have been reviewed by men free from Scotch prejudices, and bringing to the performance of their duties large views of jurisprudence. Everyone who knows how the business of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is administered, will, I think, admit that the difficulties arising from having to deal with different laws have been by them most successfully grappled with, and that, upon the whole, a regard for substantial justice rather than mere technical accuracy has grown out of the fact, that they have to administer justice in accordance with so many different systems. The conclusion I draw from these circumstances is that our equity decisions would be better reviewed by a court which comprised some Common Law Judges than by one from which they were altogether absent, and that our common law decisions would be better reviewed in a court of which some Equity Judges formed a part than if it were confined to common law Judges alone. I contend, therefore, that a fusion of the two would be an absolutely good thing in itself. There is also another point to which I must briefly advert, The conditions on which the right of appeal is given ought not to vary substantially with the court from which the appeal is brought. Some Members of the House may not be aware that if a man wants to appeal to the House of Lords from a Common Law Court he must bear the burden of a double appeal. He has no access to that House except through the Court of Exchequer Chamber. The case, however, is not so in Chancery. An appeal may there be made from the court of first instance—passing over the Court of Appeal—direct to the House of Lords. Now, one or the other of these two systems must be wrong, and there is certainly room for improvement in this respect, even though other things should remain as they at present stand. Again, there is a remarkable distinction between the rule applicable to Scotland and that which is applicable to England and Ireland in reference to appeals from interlocutory orders. Every order made by the Court of Chancery, in England or Ireland, may be enrolled at once, and carried by appeal to the House of Lords. And in practice this facility of appeal is not abused. In Scotland, the rule is that no matter which may there be determined in the progress of a case shall be taken to the House of Lords by way of appeal until the case is finished, unless the Judges either give leave or hap- pen to differ in opinion with respect to it. By reason of that rule, matters of the greatest importance may sometimes be hung up for a considerable time, and I cannot help thinking if not that the English rule is a better one, at least that it may be desirable that the Scotch should be made somewhat more flexible. Having made these general observations, I will address myself to each of the four jurisdictions which I have mentioned, and endeavour to point out the great necessity which exists for some reform in connection with the whole subject. I will commence with an institution which I will venture to say is the most unsuccessful and the most defective part of our judicial system—I mean the Court of Exchequer Chamber, the Court of Error at common law. I have not a word to say against the Judges who transact the business of that court; they are in no degree responsible for its failure. All that it is possible for men to do they accomplish; but the system is one which cannot be satisfactorily worked, and nothing can be more easy than to demonstrate to any one, however unfamiliar he may be with it, the crying necessity for some reform in both its principle and practice. Taking the principle, I must first explain in what the Court of Exchequer Chamber consists. There are three Superior Courts of Common Law—the Queen's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Court of Exchequer. By an ingenious device the Judges of each two of these courts are appointed to sit alternately in judgment upon the decisions of the third. Such a system is in many ways objectionable. It would not be difficult to put a case where the determination of the law might depend upon the mere accidental priority of an appeal. It has sometimes been found that upon difficult and debateable questions of law one court holds a view opposed to that held by one of the other two courts. Take, for instance, the two subjects of the extent to which a master is liable for the acts of his servants, or of persons in his employment, and of the extent of the liability of railway and other public companies whose operations are injurious to the property of others. Upon these two subjects considerable differences of opinion have prevailed in the Courts of Common Law, and it is possible that the law of the land as laid down by the Court of Exchequer Chamber might be determined one way or the other, according to the court whence the appeal was brought, Thus, if the appeal were from the Queen's Bench, the views of the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas, with or without the accession of one or more Judges from the Exchequer, might prevail in the Court of Error; while, if it were from the Common Pleas, the tables might be turned; so that the eventual decision of an important point of law might depend entirely upon the accidental constitution at a particular moment, of the court before which the appeal was brought. In many cases, also, by this peculiar system of appeal, the decision of the minority may overrule that of the majority of the whole number of Judges of equal and coordinate authority before whom the case has been argued. A case may be decided one way by the unanimous judgment of four Judges of the Queen's Bench, and their judgment may be reversed by four out of six Judges in the Exchequer Chamber, the other two Judges of the latter court agreeing with the decision of the Queen's Bench. Thus, under this ingenious system, the opinion of the minority of four would overrule that of the majority of six; and then, as a matter of course, the case would go to the House of Lords. The truth is that this court was intended to be a very important and solemn tribunal, composed of the whole of the judicial power of the other two courts. It was intended that if a majority of the Judges of the Queen's Bench decided one way, ten—or at least eight—Judges of the Common Pleas and Exchequer should bring their united wisdom to the review of that decision. On account, however, of the other duties which the Judges have to discharge, it has been found generally impracticable to bring together more than five or six of them for the purpose of reviewing the judgments of any of the courts—a number which gives the Court of Exchequer Chamber but little if any more weight than is possessed by the court whence the appeal is brought. Then again, the Court of Exchequer Chamber sits so seldom that it is scarcely possible for the cases to be properly disposed of by it at all. Thus, in 1866, this court sat altogether twenty-eight days, of which thirteen days were allotted to the Queen's Bench errors, eight to those of the Common Pleas, and seven to those of the Exchequer. The Courts of Common Pleas and Exchequer had each two days allowed for its errors in February, in May, and in June; the Common Pleas had also two days in November; the Exchequer one day in December; the Queen's Bench five days in February, one in April, and two in June and November. It must not be supposed that the court sat so seldom in consequence of there being no work for it to do, for there was much more business than it could get through, but the reason that it did not sit oftener was because it was impossible to get the Judges of the same two courts together oftener or for more than two or three days at a time. Thus it happens that year after year cases go on from sitting to sitting unheard; some are partly heard, and are then adjourned to some future sitting; and some are passed over when their chance appears to have come from the fear that they cannot be finished at once, and that it may be impracticable for the same Judges to be re-assembled at a subsequent sitting. Parties are sometimes induced or compelled to compromise their cases after all the delay and expense of legal proceedings have been incurred. It is also scarcely possible for the Judges of this court, amid their other pressing business, to find time for consulting together upon the cases which have been argued before them, and there are many accidents to which human life is liable that may render the opinion of the minority even of the Judges before whom the case in error was argued, that which determines the question of law involved in the appeal. A case known as the "Vibration Case" was decided the other day in the Exchequer Chamber, and it affords a good illustration of the working of the system. The question raised was as to the liability of railway companies to pay compensation to owners of property injured by the vibration caused by railway trains. The case was argued in June last in the Exchequer Chamber, before six Judges, two of whom were Chief Justice Erie and Lord Chief Baron Pollock. Lord Chief Baron Pollock resigned in July, and Chief Justice Erie in December, and in the February following judgment was pronounced by four only out of the six Judges who had heard the appeal argued, and of these four Judges one held that the opinion of the court below was right, and the other three that it was wrong; thus overruling the unanimous judgment of four Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench, with which, if the judgment had been sooner given, Sir William Erie and Sir Frederick Pollock might possibly have been found to agree.

remarked, that the judgment in the Court of Queen's Bench was delivered by two Judges only.

I may have been misinformed on that point; but that circumstance does not weaken the force of the argument, because had the judgment of the Queen's Bench been pronounced by four instead of by two Judges the result would have been exactly the same. It is, in truth, impossible now to get more than five or six Judges to attend in this court at one time. My duties took me into the Exchequer Chamber on the 4th of February last, when I found that the time allotted for hearing ten cases of error from the Common Pleas was three days, of which one, being the day of the opening of Parliament, must be regarded as a dies non. At that time there were three Nisi Prius Courts sitting; there ought to have been four or five; and Mr. Justice Blackburn was engaged in the Central Criminal Court, and the Lord Chief Justice was necessarily absent owing to ill-health. Thus, only two Judges from the Queen's Bench and three from the Exchequer could be assembled. No person can look at these facts without seeing that the Court of Exchequer Chamber is an institution which ought not to be allowed to continue, and that it is the duty of Government to adopt some means of substituting a better constituted tribunal in its place. I now come to the other intermediate court of appeal—the Court of Appeal in Chancery. Very eminent and able Judges have presided over that court, and have transacted, in an admirable manner, a vast amount of business; still, it is impossible to deny the existence of some obvious defects in the constitution of that court also. In 1851 two Lords Justices of Appeal were appointed to assist the Lord Chancellor for the first time, by Act of Parliament, on the ground of the necessity which existed for strengthening the court presided over by that noble Lord. It was originally intended that the Lord Chancellor and two Lords Justices of Appeal should sit together as one court, with power, however, of subdivision when occasion required; but since the passing of the Act, creating the Lords Justices, the three Judges have very rarely indeed sat together as a full court. At the present time, the Lord Chancellor, as a general rule, sits in one court, and the Lords Justices in another. The Legislature contemplated the possibility of the Lord Chancellor being a Common Law Judge, and therefore it was determined that in such an event he should be assisted in the Equity Courts by two Equity Judges, who were to sit with him. Every question of equity, which may happen to be reviewed in the Court of Appeal, is thus liable to be decided by a Common Law Judge. I have already expressed my opinion that the presence of one or more Common Law Judges in the Court of Appeal for Equity cases is most desirable; but that is a very different thing from a Court of Appeal in Equity, in which a single Common Law Judge sits alone. Some tribute however must, in passing, he paid to the Common Law Judges who have presided in the Court of Chancery. They sat there under undoubted disadvantages, but I must say the manner in which they overcame them merits the most pointed acknowledgments. Before my time Lord Brougham, within my time Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Truro, Lord Campbell, and the present Lord Chancellor, all of the Common Law Bar, have presided in that court; and I must say that the inconvenience which may have occasionally been felt, from the circumstance to which I have alluded, has been in practice very much less than any one could have anticipated, judging only à priori, owing to the very great patience and care with which those eminent men have discharged their duties. Still, the fact remains, that a Common Law Judge—and the Lord Chancellor must frequently be taken from the Common Law Bar—a Common Law Judge sitting alone as Judge of Appeal in Chancery must labour under serious disadvantages, and no doubt it would be a better constitution of the court which offered some security for having Equity Judges to assist him. Besides, the Lord Chancellor is constantly withdrawn from that court. He is absent from it four days a week during the Session of Parliament On Wednesdays and Saturdays alone he resumes his place in the Court of Chancery. Arguments are thus unavoidably interrupted—unavoidably protracted; and no one can say that is a satisfactory state of things, if means of avoiding it can he devised. With respect to the Lords Justices, nothing can be more admirable than the administration of their court, and I do not doubt it will so continue. But, at the same time, every one must see a most patent inconvenience in the sitting of two Judges together, because unavoidably they may sometimes differ; not only they may differ, but they sometimes do differ, and the consequence in such cases is that the appeal simply fails, all the expense is thrown away, and the parties must either acquiesce in the judgment of the court of first instance, with a sense of their not having had the benefit of an appeal, or they must go further and appeal to the House of Lords. If we can devise a system that would avoid this inconvenience, it would certainly be an improvement on the present state of things as existing in the Court of Appeal in Chancery. I now come to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This is a very eminent tribunal. It takes Indian and colonial Appeals; also domestic appeals of three classes—in Admiralty cases, in Ecclesiastical cases, and from the Lord Chancellor or Lord Justices in lunacy. What particular propriety there is in sending Admiralty, Ecclesiastical, and Lunacy cases to a different court of final appeal from that which determines cases in Chancery and Common Law, I cannot conceive. But that is a subordinate consideration. The court, undoubtedly, has worked well, and I cannot but think it, in some respects, a model of what a good Supreme Court of Appeal ought to be. I have no hesitation in saying that I take the constitution of the Judicial Committee as furnishing, on the whole, the best basis for the construction of such a court. Its merits are these:—It has administered a great variety of law, with great breadth of view, great regard to practical justice, comparatively little regard to technicality and mere form, and I believe greatly to the satisfaction of the country, and of the colonies and India, from which a great portion of the appeals have come. It has adopted a practice differing from that of the House of Lords in one important respect. It gives judgment by the mouth of a single Judge, usually well considered, and written or even printed, and suppresses the difference of views which may possibly exist among the members of the tribunal. I cannot but think the practice of the Judicial Committee, in that respect, a wise one—giving the authoritative judgment of the court, from which there is no further appeal, without the expression of individual opinions calculated to detract from or neutralize its authority. It has kept down business—there are no arrears, and no serious delays. Lastly and not least, it has cost, I may say, nothing to the public, for the total annual cost of the establishment is £1,500, and very nearly the whole of that is made up by the fees received for business. The business has a tendency to increase, but its working, hitherto, has been such as I have described. We cannot, however, safely rely on the perpetual continuance of the favourable working even of that tribunal. The constitution of the Judicial Committee has inherent difficulties which make it hard to keep it always going, without drawing away power from other courts. It is constituted thus:—All existing Judges of the Superior Courts of Law and Equity, and of the Admiralty, Probate and Ecclesiastical Courts, who are members of the Privy Council, are ex officio members of this Committee; so are all retired Judges of those courts, including ex-Chancellors. In addition to these there are two Judges specially nominated by Her Majesty. Nothing could be more excellent than the materials I have described, provided, of course, that they can be brought to bear with sufficient regularity, convenience, and despatch. We have men of great learning, great experience, and important position. But its judicial force is not such as to secure adequately the regularity of the administration of the court. Take the case of the retired Judges; of course, their number will be fluctuating. At present there are four very eminent Judges—Sir William Erie, Sir Edward Williams, Sir Richard Kindersley, and Sir John Coleridge—they have been most assiduous in their attention, as far as health and other circumstances have permitted, to the business of the court. In that respect, I do not think there could be a better state of circumstances than exists at present in the Judicial Committee. But you cannot expect that retired Judges, however mentally able and, willing, should long be physically able to give a constant attention to duties of this description. They have come to a time of life when they either already do, or soon must require, the rest which they have fairly earned. You cannot rely on more than occasional and precarious assistance as a general rule from that source. Then with regard to your present Judges. The Chief Justices and Chief Baron and the Admiralty and Probate Judges, are so occupied in their own courts that their attendance is generally impracticable. The Lord Chancellor and the Ex-Chancellors are wanted in the House of Lords. With regard to the other Judges of the Court of Chancery, the Master of the Bolls and the Lords Justices, they have been accustomed to I give a good deal of their time to that court. In Lord Langdale's time the Rolls Court used to be shut up for long periods together, while his Lordship attended the Judicial Committee. That does not so often occur now; but the Lords Justices have often been withdrawn from their own court to attend the Judicial Committee. In 1864 the Lords Justices sat thirty-seven days in the Privy Council; in 1865, fifty-three days; in 1866, nineteen days; in the present year they can hardly be expected to sit there at all. I need hardly say anything about the two nominated Judges, but the retirement of one of them, a man honoured by us all, who has done eminent service to his country in the Judicial Committee for many years, and to whom, in a great measure, it owes the high reputation it enjoys—I speak of Lord Kingsdown—must be severely felt. Such being the situation of things, I will venture to state what has occurred to me as the best way of meeting all these difficulties, before I say a word on the most difficult portion of the subject, relating to] the august tribunal of the House of Lords. Taking the three courts I have mentioned alone—the Court of Error in the Exchequer Chamber, the Court of Appeal in Chancery, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—I am of opinion, if the House agrees with the view I have expressed, that one Court of Appeal is sufficient—that out of the Court of Appeal now existing in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council you might, with some additions, form a most admirable Supreme Court of Appeal, capable of discharging the whole of the business which is now done by that court and also by the Courts of Exchequer Chamber, and of Appeal in Chancery. The constitution of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is most excellent, as far as it goes. I have no hesitation in saying that that court, powerfully constituted, with a sufficient number of Judges to render it capable of subdivision, and comprising men conversant with different kinds of law—common law, equity, and, it might he, Scotch law, as well as colonial and Indian law—would be able to dispose of the appeals most beneficially to our jurisprudence, with great satisfaction to the country, and at no very great additional cost. You might have the Lord Chancellor, though, if the House of Lords retained its appellate jurisdiction, he would be required there frequently. You might also have the Lords Justices, and all the other eminent persons now constituting the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. You might have two or three other permanent Judges with proper salaries, chosen with reference to qualities which are not ordinarily to be found in the Judges of the Court of Chancery; and you might from time to time offer an inducement by some acceleration and increase of pension to a few able men on the Bench in England, Scotland, and Ireland, to retire from their positions and become members of this court. Some such measures as these have been suggested by high authority as necessary to maintain in efficiency the Judicial Committee, even for its present purposes. I venture also to think that those who may hereafter fill the high office of Lord Chancellor might, considering the circumstances which often deprive the country of their services in that office, be called upon ex debito, in consideration of their pensions (which are ample though not too great), to give their services in the Supreme Court of Appeal as they now voluntarily give them from a sense of public duty in the House of Lords. It would be thus quite practicable to form such a Supreme Court of Final Appeal as might unite the various jurisdictions now exercised by different courts, and then I should certainly recommend that the court should assemble in the same place as the other Law Courts—in the future home about to be provided for justice in the neighbourhood of those who practise the law, and not, as the Judicial Committee now does, in such an inconvenient place as the Privy Council Office in Downing Street. I do not conceive that there would be any constitutional objection resulting from the relation of the colonies to the Crown to giving such a court jurisdiction over colonial and Indian appeals, because its Judges might be, and, in practice, would be, Privy Councillors, and, being so, would be qualified to advise Her Majesty on all matters of that kind. If such a court were thus constituted, and if the House of Lords retained its appellate jurisdiction unaltered, still it would be advisable to cut off the second appeal; and I see no reason why an option, at least, might not be given to suitors in Scotland and Ireland to carry their appeals to this high tribunal, if they should desire to do so. Having ventured to make these observa- tions, I will state what amount of judicial business such a court would have to transact, judging from the data furnished by the business of the existing courts, though by the changes I have suggested there might be some alteration in the amount of business, especially by reason of the abolition of double appeals. In 1866 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council sat for sixty-seven days. I think it better to take the number of days than the number of cases. The Court of Exchequer Chamber sat for twenty-eight days, making together ninety-five days. From Michaelmas, 1865, to Michaelmas, 1866 (I have not the exact Return for the year 1866), the full Court of Chancery sat fourteen days, the Lord Chancellor alone sat seventy-four days, and the Lords Justices sat 127 days, making together 215 days. These, added to the ninety-five days, made 310 days in all. Thus, if the court were ordinarily divided into two subdivisions, 155 days only would be required for the discharge of the business hitherto discharged by these three courts. I now come to the subject of the House of Lords, and I should be very sorry if anything were to fall from me which might be thought disrespectful to that illustrious body, and I think it my duty to bear my humble testimony to the excellent manner in which the Judges in the House of Lords have during the whole of my experience discharged their duty. It is not from any dissatisfaction at the performance of their duty that I venture respectfully, and I hope with due modesty, to approach for the purpose of criticism that august tribunal. The jurisdiction of the House of Lords underwent consideration in 1856, when Lord Westbury recommended an opposite policy to that which I now recommend. He recommended that the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should be transferred to the House of Lords. I cannot say that such a change would to my mind be an improvement. I own I cannot see why we might not venture even to ask the House of Lords to transfer their jurisdiction to another Supreme Court of Appeal, if there be not some strong political reasons to the contrary. It is really only nominally that the House of Lords now act as Judges of Appeal. Two or three, or four, eminent and learned Judges sit in the House of Peers, in a most inconvenient place, surrounded, no doubt, by the trappings of that august assembly, and discharge functions which they could perform equally well elsewhere. What happened in O'Connell's case? When a case involves principles of importance, political or religious, about which men's minds move in different directions, there is some danger even for Judges in a court of justice to be divided with respect to it, just in the manner which might be anticipated from their known opinions, although their decisions may be perfectly consistent with the most conscientious discharge of their duty. That happened to the Law Lords in O'Connell's case. Other Peers, however, were present who thought they might have been capable of forming an opinion on such a question, and one of those, hearing the opinions expressed by the Law Lords, thought that he, being a Member of the House of Lords, which was then exercising its appellate jurisdiction, had a right to express his opinion also. He had listened to the whole of the case, and had heard the entire argument, which he thought he understood. Accordingly, he desired to express his opinion; but it was held that neither the views nor the votes of any of the numerous lay Lords who attended at the hearing could be given. The result was that the sentence was declared against, possibly, the judgment of the majority of the Peers who were present. The majority of the Law Lords determined the matter, and some people thought they did so according to their political opinions; though that may, I believe, be accounted for without the slightest imputation being made on the character of those Judges, because on occasions of that kind general principles have a considerable influence, even over judicial minds. Still, this justifies me in saying that the House of Lords, as a great political assembly, does not now practically exercise this jurisdiction, which is in reality transferred to a small number of learned persons who, if the law allowed it, might render the same valuable service to the State in a place more suitable for the administration of justice. If, however, any value were attached to the form, that form might still be gone through, just as is the case with appeals from India or the colonies. An appeal from India or the colonies is made to Her Majesty in Council, and is referred to the Judicial Committee, who make a Report, which is afterwards adopted by Her Majesty, who gives judgment accordingly. In the same way the House of Lords might refer cases for argument and report to the Supreme Court of Appeal, and might adopt and act upon the reports of that court, though I confess I do not myself attach much importance to such forms. Whatever may be the political value of this association of the House of Lords with the administration of justice, I cannot but feel, and I think it my duty to impress upon the House, that, as things now are, this benefit is purchased at the cost of very serious public inconvenience, to which, if the jurisdiction is to continue, a remedy ought without further delay to be applied. Let us look, first, at the time which is lost under the present system. This great court of final appeal in the House of Lords sits only while Parliament is sitting: that is, for four days only in the week, during less than six months in the year. For the other six or seven months of the year, however great may be the urgency of the case, the doors of this Court of final Appeal are closed. I will give an illustration of the inconvenience which may be caused by this. Lately questions have arisen in consequence of the failure of the firm of Overend, Gurney, and Co. The shareholders in that Company have raised the question whether they are liable to its creditors. Well, if a decision on that question were given by the Court of Appeal in Chancery at the end of July, while Parliament was not sitting, it would be impossible to have the matter determined by the final Court of Appeal before the next Session of Parliament, notwithstanding the vast importance of the interests involved, and the shock which might possibly be given to credit throughout the mercantile community. I maintain that the final Court of Appeal ought to be always accessible. Then, with regard to arrears. In 1866 the House sat for judicial business on seventy-seven days only, and this Session there are forty-three cases, which are remanets from former Sessions, fourteen of them being remanets from Sessions earlier than 1866. Now this delay is felt most particularly in cases of error brought from the Court of Exchequer Chamber, in which it is often considered necessary to have the attendance of the Judges. This very day there has been a strong illustration of the inconvenience which arises. There was an appeal relating to the presentation to a church living, the parties being the Bishop of Exeter and the patron of the living. The Bishop had not instituted the clergyman presented by the patron, and the action was brought in 1858. The real issues between the parties were raised on demurrers, and decided in June, 1859; but it nevertheless became necessary to go into the trial of questions of fact, which occupied a considerable time more, and it was not until December, 1860, that the case could be taken, by way of error, to the Exchequer Chamber. In February, 1862, it was decided there, and then taken to the House of Lords, and set down for hearing. It waited four years, and then came on for argument. The argument began in June last year, and the Judges were summoned; but they were obliged to go on circuit before the argument could be concluded. The argument was resumed yesterday before Judges not altogether the same; and to-day it has had to be again interrupted in consequence of the Judges being obliged again to go to other duties. It is not probable that it can be a second time resumed before June next Now, is it possible to conceive anything more objectionable than such a system? For my part, I cannot see what is the use of the Judges attending the House of Lords in order that they may hear an argument a third time, and once more express their opinions. That practice ought, I think, to be put an end to, especially considering the pressure of their other duties, which make it most difficult for them to find lime for such a purpose. But now I come to a still more important point. In order to keep up this jurisdiction in the House of Lords, you must have a sufficient attendance of Law Lords; but you cannot always find childless men who can be transferred to the House of Lords to do judicial business. Is it convenient to the Law Lords themselves or to the country that you should be under the necessity of making a new hereditary Peer as often as you have to keep up the supply of judicial power in the House of Lords? There are some lawyers who are able to leave adequate fortunes to their children. But we know from past experience that there have been eminent men to whom, and to whose families, it would have been infinitely more desirable not to have had that burdensome dignity. As long as the Law Lord himself lives the country gets the benefit of his learning and services; but his son is not a Judge in the House of Lords, nor his grandson; and unless he has been so fortunate as to be able amply to endow his family you are inflicting an evil upon them, upon the Peers themselves, and upon the country by multiplying unduly the number of hereditary Peers. Not very long since an attempt was made to remedy this evil. It was supposed that Her Majesty possessed the prerogative of creating Peers for life, and that when She did so by Her writ, they might be summoned to sit in the House of Lords; and I confess, for my own part, I have never been able to discover in what part of the law or Constitution of this country authority can be found to show that a Peer so created and summoned has not a right to sit in that assembly. However, their Lordships have so determined, and have thus practically excluded every lawyer with a family which would forbid him to accept an hereditary Peerage. Therefore, unless the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords can be otherwise provided for, we must go on with this system of multiplying hereditary Peerages in order to keep that House sufficiently supplied with judicial power. The House of Lords themselves have confessed that this is a very serious evil. In 1856 they appointed a Committee, and a Bill was introduced on the subject. The sense of the evil entertained by that Committee was such that they recommended that there should be two paid Judges sitting in the House, and a limited number, not exceeding four, of life Peers, to secure a regular attendance. A Bill was introduced to give effect to that recommendation, and passed the House of Lords, but was thrown out in this House. The evil has been going on ever since without remedy. As often as I hear of attempts being made to supply the deficiency I am only reminded how inadequate they are, and how much they fall short of the exigencies of the case. We have all heard that two new Judges are now to be called to the Upper House. One of these is a Judge from Scotland (Lord Justice General M'Neill), whose presence, as long as he has health and strength, will, I doubt not, be a most valuable addition to the strength of that assembly. I hope he may long enjoy that dignity and prosperity which his services to the country so richly deserve. The other is an eminent person (Sir Hugh Cairns) who was, not long ago, one of the chief ornaments of this assembly, and who will be one of the chief ornaments of any assembly to which he belongs; one who is deserving of every honour which can be bestowed upon him, and to whom we are all delighted to see honour paid; but the only thing he will not be able to do is to add to the judicial force of the House of Lords, for as long as he has to discharge the duties of a Judge elsewhere he cannot do it in that House. His presence there will be welcome to the House and the country, but the difficulty will still remain. Now, is there any real difficulty in dealing with the case? In Lord Eldon's time Sir John Leech, who was not a Peer, assisted in the discharge of the judicial duties of the House of Lords for a considerable time, and therefore there is no reason why those duties should not be discharged by men who are not Peers, if you constitute a Supreme Court. But, if that solution cannot be accepted, there can, at least, he no good reason why the obstacle, which the Lords themselves have created, to the exercise of Her Majesty's prerogative to create life Peers, should not be removed by legislation. I thank the House for having heard me with so much patience. All I have to say in conclusion is that I hope I shall not he misunderstood. I do not profess to dogmatize, or to do more than propose to the House and the country those matters which have occurred to me as worthy of consideration, to meet evils which are, or ought to be, admitted by all. Such remedies as have occurred to me I have offered; but no one will be more ready to defer to the judgment of others, if the remedies which I have suggested should not be considered conducive to the public good.

Sir, the subject which has been introduced tonight by my hon. and learned Friend is one of the greatest importance. The mode in which it has been brought under our notice is not the most convenient for discussion. Were it not for the somewhat singular proposals with which the speech of my hon. and learned Friend concluded, I should express my regret that during the many years he sat on the Government Benches, with the influence and reputation his name has always carried, he did not introduce them for our consideration at an earlier period. Having regard to the nature of those proposals, I cannot regret that measures of such a character were not introduced with the authority of Her Majesty's Government. I shall not endeavour to follow in detail all the arguments of my hon. and learned Friend through his long and varied speech. It was divided, as the House will recollect, into two main points—the one referring to the original jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Law; the other to the jurisdiction of the appellate courts. My hon. and learned Friend made no complaint of the original jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, with which he and I are best acquainted; but with respect to those courts to which his experience does not extend much more largely than my own, he had several complaints to make. I shall not dwell upon this part of his case, being anxious to direct attention to those large and important proposals with which he concluded. Still, with reference to the courts of common law, I may say that my hon. and learned Friend admits that all the energies of the Judges now presiding there, are honourably and well directed to the discharge of all their duties, and that there is nothing to be hoped for in the way of an improvement of the machinery by which the business of those courts is conducted. When I say "the machinery" I speak of the intellect, the mind which is applied to the discharge of those duties, whatever other machinery there may be. My hon. and learned Friend admits there is nothing more to be hoped for in that direction. I agree with him. But he complains that there is a great waste of judicial power. Now, as far as he and I are concerned, this is not a question of knowledge; it is a question of hearsay evidence, and I venture to think that my hon. and learned Friend's evidence on the point is not more valuable than my own. For thirty years he and I have sat side by side in the Court of Chancery, and so engaged that neither of us can know from personal experience what goes on in the Courts of Common Law. Therefore, what my learned Friend and I say on the point is derived from information furnished by others. I believe that my information on the subject is derived from the highest authority, and I say that after every allowance made for possible improvement in procedure, an addition to the judicial power is necessary, and that it was right that in the Speech from the Throne the attention of Parliament should have been called

"To the Means of Disposing, with greater Despatch and Frequency, of the increasing Business in the Superior Courts of Common Law and at the Assizes."

I repeat that I do not pretend to personal knowledge on the subject; but, speaking from the information of parties who are familiar with it, I will proceed to consider the observations of my hon. and learned Friend. He says, first, that he would make all three Courts of Common Law practically one. Now let it be granted that this might be done, though I do not admit the expediency of it; still, what great saving would there be of judicial power? There is a special jurisdiction in the Queen's Bench, a special jurisdiction in the Exchequer, and some special jurisdiction in the Common Pleas. Throw the three into one, you have still the same amount of work to do. I do not think, therefore, there is much to be accomplished by that suggestion of my hon. and learned Friend. But he says that we ought not to have three Judges sitting in banco, that we should have one every day in term sitting at Nisi Prius, and one in Chambers. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Plymouth (Sir Robert Collier), in correction of one of those suggestions of my hon. and learned Friend, remarked that already one of the Judges sits at Nisi Prius every day during term. And as regards Chamber sittings, I may observe that already we practically have that course of procedure. Whenever an escape from duty in court is possible, one of the Judges does sit in Chambers in the middle of the day; and when this is not possible, Judges are to be often found discharging their official duties in Chambers to a late hour in the day. I think, therefore, that there is no ground in that direction for a saving of judicial power. Another suggestion of my hon. and learned Friend is to transfer arrears from one court to another. This might prevent arrears, and on that ground no one would object to it. But it would not prevent the necessity of additional judicial power. There were some other points in my hon. and learned Friend's speech directed to the same subject, but I failed to perceive how any of his suggestions disposed of the proposition in the Queen's Speech, that there is a necessity for strengthening the judicial powers of the Courts of Common Law. I now come to my hon. and learned Friend's argument respecting the ultimate Court of Appeal. I agree with many things he said; but I must confess that I heard with great surprise and regret that, in his opinion, it is right and proper that the main appellate jurisdiction of this country should be removed from that tribunal which has possessed it from the earliest period of our history. I will follow my hon. and learned Friend as closely as I can through the various portions of his argument. First he submits that there should be only one appeal. That I admit is an important consideration, but I do not intend to express an opinion upon it, because it is not at all material to the main question which my hon. and learned Friend has brought forward, and to which I propose to address myself. It is clear that throughout this vast Empire, and for as long a time as our judicial tribunals have existed at all, suitors have had a right of intermediate appeal. From the Courts of Chancery there have been appeals to the Lord Chancellor, and more recently to the Lords Justices, and thence to the House of Lords. From each of the Common Law Courts there have been appeals to the Exchequer Chamber, and thence to the House of Lords. In Scotland there have been appeals from the Lord Ordinary to the Court of Session, and thence to the House of Lords. In the colonies and in India there has almost always been an appeal from the court of first instance to the Supreme Court, and thence to the Privy Council. I quite agree to the proposition that, if you have an ample and exhaustive argument on the whole subject before two minds or two sets of minds, one after the other, one appeal is enough. The intellect of the appellate court is then fully informed, and a right decision is as likely to be obtained then as after a second appeal. But it constantly happens that the hearing of the first appeal is defective, that a case goes off on some point of form, that the arguments are not exhausted, and that questions of importance are not considered at all till the hearing of the first appeal. And this is not a thing to be cured by regulation. It is an infirmity of human nature and will always exist. There is therefore another side to the question, and it may well be that our old constitutional practice is right of allowing more than one appeal. I leave that question, however, without expressing any opinion upon it, and I wish it to be understood that I am throughout giving utterance simply to my individual sentiments with reference to my hon, and learned Friend's proposals, and that nothing I say is an expression of the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. The next point which was urged by my hon. and learned Friend is that there should be only one ultimate appellate court. Personally and in the abstract, I agree with him, pro- vided it can be done. But observe the great difficulties there are in the way of producing that result with an Empire so extensive and so varied in its interests as ours. If there is to be one appellate court for the whole Empire, it must be a court to which every portion of the Empire will cheerfully submit. It may be that Hindoos and Mahomedans and Her Majesty's colonial subjects would submit to a tribunal sitting in Lincoln's Inn Fields. Possibly even Jersey and the Channel Islands would submit, and perhaps if they did not my hon. and learned Friend might think he could compel them. Still, these are difficulties in the way which are not to be disregarded. But then comes the question which some hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House may be able to answer—What will Scotland say to the matter? Will Scotland submit to an independent tribunal sitting in Lincoln's Inn Fields to try her appeals? For my part, I believe Scotland will insist upon retaining the great benefit she has derived from an appeal to the Imperial Parliament, which is, in fact, her Parliament as much as it is that of England. Moreover, if you want only one Court of Appeal you have one already in the House of Lords, to which there can be no practical difficulty in referring every portion of our ultimate appellate jurisdiction. The argument of my hon. and learned Friend really tells against the conclusion which he endeavoured to establish. I agree with him that a mind schooled in law and accustomed to grapple with facts, will have no insuperable difficulty in dealing with the law that may be brought under its consideration from any part of our Empire. My hon. and learned Friend has spoken of the way in which Hindoo and Mahomedan law is administered by the Privy Council, and the law of Scotland by the House of Lords. These are admirable instances of the truth of his remark, and it is manifest that the benefit is reciprocal. The law of England is as much benefited by the familiarity of our supreme Judges with the law of foreign countries as the law of those countries is benefited by the law of England. The effect of that is that no narrow or prejudiced view is taken, and we find that the law of England receives light from the knowledge which is obtained by Judges hearing appeals on other systems of law than those with which they are most familiar. Then, as to what that ultimate tribunal of appeal should be, I may remind the House that in the debate of 1856, upon the Motion of Earl Granville for a Committee of Inquiry into a more effective exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords, the Earl of Derby used these words—

"Of this I am quite certain, that if it was necessary to take the alternative between the maintenance of any privilege of your Lordships' House, however important, or however valuable, and, on the other hand, the better administration of justice, there is not one of your Lordships who would hesitate in regard to that alternative, and say, let justice be fairly and impartially administered, whatever privileges this House may be compelled to forego."

It was not, therefore, a new sentiment to which my hon. and learned Friend gave utterance when he said that the consideration of primary importance was the perfect administration of justice, because that principle was insisted upon over and over again on that occasion. If I fail to show that the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords is the system most complete and perfect for securing the administration of justice, no subordinate considerations can be taken into account. Some general observations, however, naturally occur before we come to the particular history of that jurisdiction and the particular objections that have been urged against it. In the matter of judicial tribunals should not regard be had to the usage of centuries? Were the respect, the affection, and the confidence of the people in the administration of justice by a tribunal which had existed for centuries to be disregarded? I affirm that the subjects of the Crown have perfect confidence in the administration of justice by the House of Lords, and my hon. and learned Friend will not and cannot impeach it. His own experience as well as mine, for twenty years at least, will testify that though sometimes an advocate's sympathy with his client may lead him to regret a particular decision, yet on reviewing the decisions of that long period I believe that we shall agree in the opinion that in the House of Lords we have a wise and just administration of the law, and that everything that can be expected from an appellate jurisdiction has been obtained. Then, too, regard must be had to the place which the existing tribunal holds in the Constitution of the country. That argument would be of no avail with any Members of this House—if such there be—who do not admit that it is an advantage to have a House of Lords as one of our institutions in which the people have confidence, and the dignity and importance of I which it is proper to maintain. I do not to-night quarrel with their sentiments; let them be adduced at the proper time, and we will meet them. But those who believe that the House of Lords is a valuable, important, and venerated part of our Constitution must certainly give some weight to the fact that the confidence and respect which attach to its appellate jurisdiction add to the dignity and importance of that Assembly. In the debate to which I have referred, Earl Granville, adverting to the remarks which had been made by the Earl of Derby, and which I have already quoted, thus expressed himself upon that subject—

"I go still further than the noble Lord in holding that those functions are a very important part of the functions of your Lordships, and go far to support the dignity and utility of the House, and to increase the respect in which it is held in the country."

Lord Campbell, too, said—

"I entirely agree that it is of the greatest importance, not only to the dignity and usefulness of your Lordships' House, but to the public welfare, that the judicial jurisdiction should be retained. It has been looked upon for ages with veneration, and no supreme court of appeal can now be constructed which would be a substitute for this House."

These were the opinions of noble Lords in that House. Then, Sir, what are the feelings of each part of the Empire? I will not appeal to the colonies or the smaller dependencies of Great Britain. If you are to have an appellate tribunal such as the hon, and learned Gentleman recommends, are you to deprive Scotland of its privilege of appeal to the House of Lords? The opinion not only of every lawyer but of every Scotch gentleman capable of expressing an opinion would be against such a proposal. Having had some experience in arguing cases from Scotland, I will say that, whether you take the opinion of suitors or of the profession, you will find them agreeing that Scotland has derived the greatest benefit from the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords. Only this week the hon. and learned Gentleman who filled the office of Lord Advocate in the late Government (Mr. Moncreiff), in addressing the Lord Justice General of Scotland on his retirement from the Bench, said, "We are conscious of the many benefits which Scotland has obtained from the appellate jurisdiction." That is the universal sentiment of Scotland. Are you then to divide the appellate jurisdiction, and make it into two jurisdictions? That is not desirable as admitted by my hon. and learned Friend, and I am sure that the people of Scotland would not be satisfied with the shifting of the jurisdiction which he proposes. If you are then to reduce the appellate jurisdiction to one tribunal, the House of Lords is the place in which it is to be exercised. If you divide it into two, the House of Lords must retain its ancient jurisdiction. The judicial and appellate functions of the House of Lords are of great antiquity. They add to the dignity of that ancient and distinguished Assembly, and you cannot withdraw them without removing a stone from the edifice which, would not be unimportant. But what I rely upon mainly is this, that the House of Lords is the tribunal the best calculated to administer justice in every portion of this great and varied Empire. No existing tribunal possesses the same elements, nor will you find them in any tribunal which you may create as the appellate jurisdiction for the whole Empire. What are the objections the hon. and learned Gentleman urges? The small number of Judges, the occasional sittings, and the uncertain attendance. Let me ask, what is the most suitable number of Judges? If you get a tribunal of three Judges of the highest qualification you have enough. During the last twenty years the great majority of judgments in the House of Lords have been those of three of their Lordships. Out of 400 appeals a small number have been decided by two Lords and not one-sixth of the number have been decided by one only. That, at all events, is not an objection of so vital a nature as to induce you to remove the appellate jurisdiction from the House of Lords. Then as to occasional sittings, is there any difficulty in applying a remedy? I say there is no difficulty. With the aid of this House there would be no difficulty in passing a Bill through Parliament enabling a Judicial Committee of the House of Lords to sit for every practical purpose during the vacation. The hon. and learned Gentleman says it is a mere sham to call the sitting of noble and learned Lords as Judges a sitting of the House of Lords. But his argument equally goes to the functions exercised by the Sovereign. Her Majesty in Council hears appeals from India and the colonies, and refers them to a Judicial Committee. Is that tribunal to be dis- pensed with because the Queen does not herself determine the question? The fact that a large tribunal have always had an appellate jurisdiction, and that a portion of that body only are exercising it, forms no reason whatever for removing that jurisdiction, on the ground that they are delegating it to a portion of their number. How do men gain access to, and become members of, the appellate tribunal of the House of Lords? If my hon. and learned Friend took his seat there it would be because he is known to be a fit and proper person to sit in that House. He admits that those who sit upon this tribunal are competent to the task. I say that the interests of the law and of the public at large, that equity, that common law, that Scotland, England, and the colonies, alike receive benefit, not only from the existence of this tribunal for the ultimate decision of great questions, but also from the mode in which the tribunal is from time to time renewed or strengthened. I say we ought to be proud of the Constitution which leads to the elevation of men who have distinguished themselves in their profession. The road to this dignity is open and is known to the public. It is the road of honour, wisdom, and learning, and the people of this country, who know the path which leads to this high eminence, place confidence in that tribunal. I say it is no sham, and it would be as true and as just to call the decision of the Privy Council a sham because it is given in the name of the Queen. But then the hon. and learned Gentleman says there were sometimes only two Judges, and their sittings were only occasional. I deeply regret that my hon. and learned Friend did not call attention to these subjects when he was in office, because, with the power and influence he then possessed, any proposal coming from him would have been carefully considered by Parliament, and within reasonable limits might have been carried. At the same time, I do not believe that any such measure as my hon. and learned Friend now indicates would have been carried, and I doubt very much whether he would have proposed it under the responsibility of office. If he entertained these strong views, why did he not bring in a Bill when Attorney General and endeavour to carry it? My deliberate opinion is that maintaining the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords is the best way of administering the appellate jurisdiction of the country. The jurisdiction is as free from objection as is any legal jurisdiction in the country, and its defects, such as they are, admit of easy redress. Various remedies have been attempted. In 1834 Lord Brougham, then Lord Chancellor, brought in a Bill to refer appeals to a Judicial Committee to be appointed by the Lords, upon whose Report the Lords were to determine. That plan seemed to be in the mind of my hon. and learned Friend, though it has not received much favour till to-night. In 1841 Lord St. Leonards, then a Member of the House of Commons, introduced Resolutions, and a Bill in which he proposed the nomination of two Lords' assistants. In 1842, a Bill was brought in by Lord Campbell having for its object to establish one court of appellate jurisdiction, and to constitute the House of Lords the sole court of ultimate appeal for the Empire. In 1856 a Bill passed through the House of Lords and was brought down here, having its origin in the Report of a Committee appointed on the Motion of the Earl of Derby, and its object was to make better provision for the appellate jurisdiction of that House. That Bill was, in substance, to appoint two Deputy Speakers with salaries to assist in the judicial business of the Upper House, and provided that if the Crown should create any Lord Chancellor or Deputy Speaker a Peer for life, such life Peer should be entitled to sit and vote in the House of Lords, subject to certain provisions for limiting the number of such life Peers entitled to sit and vote. [2 Macqueen's House of Lords Reports, p. 675.] This would be a method, and, I think, a good method, of surmounting the occasional—and, in my experience, only very occasional—inconvenience arising from too limited a number of Judges. It is admitted that the jurisdiction of the Tipper House has been well and wisely exercised, and it is evident that the inconvenience that sometimes arises from the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of Judges might be remedied. I am of opinion that much of the difficulty, in cases of this kind, arises from the perhaps wise parsimony of this House in sanctioning expenditure for judicial purposes. I say "wise," because it is wise of this House always to look cautiously to the way in which public money is expended; but economy may be carried too far. At present you actually trust, as my hon. and learned Friend has pointed out, for the discharge of all the appellate business of the country to the sense of honour of Judges who, having by their former services entitled themselves to their retiring pensions, think it their duty, without salary or remuneration of any kind, to undertake those new and onerous labours. Look at the instance of the noble Lord who has rendered such eminent service to the country, Lord Kingsdown, who never held any judicial appointment, and never consequently had any retiring pension, yet who for years discharged duties of the highest kind, and added, not only to the lustre of the Bench, but, by his decisions, contributed to place upon a firm basis principles which before had been unsettled, and, at the same time, facilitated the administration of the law. Such labours were due entirely to his sense of honour and of the public duty incident to his high position as a Member of the House possessing the appellate jurisdictions, and examples equally honourable have occurred before now in our legal history. But is it wise for the country to trust to services of this character being often at its disposal? I have detailed to the House plans which at various times have been suggested for modifying the appellate judicial tribunal. At present, I do not think there is any necessity for adopting any of these plans. But if reform be needed, and the money forthcoming, all that is required might be accomplished by the appointment of Lords' assistants or Law Lords with life Peerages, as proposed in the Bill carried through the Lords in 1856. We have, however, now an ample staff for the business to be transacted. Three Judges attend constantly, without taking into account the addition of the noble Lord from Scotland who is about to enter the House. That the efficiency of the tribunal should be maintained to the fullest extent I am clear. A tribunal which has to comprehend, to weigh, and to apply finally the principles of law in force in almost every part of the Empire, and which discharges those functions ably, impartially, and to the satisfaction of the country, is a tribunal which I am sure this House will never think of weakening or destroying. It might be desirable that the whole appellate jurisdiction should be administered by one court, which should have the ultimate decision in all causes, whether Hindoo or Mahomedan, whether from our colonies or dependencies, or from England, Ireland, or Scotland; but no sufficient ground has been shown for removing the jurisdiction from the House of Lords. With reference to the Privy Council I have nothing to say but this, that it is a tribunal which has discharged its duties admirably. Into the small matters which my learned Friend has discussed as to the judgments of the court being pronounced by one for all or by all of its members, I will not travel; they are points which are not properly subjects for legislation, but which every court must determine for itself. But I think that it would be impossible to constitute the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the sole tribunal of appeal. Neither do I think it would be satisfactory to have one tribunal sitting at Lincoln's Inn fields to decide all the vast and varied issues growing out of the business of the nation. For these reasons I submit that if legislation on the subject be sanctioned, it must be such as shall retain the jurisdiction of the House of Lords, which has existed so long and so beneficially in this country.

said, that he had no intention of following the Attorney General and the Member for Richmond in their controversy on the subject of the appellate jurisdiction. As far as abstract principle was concerned he thought that there should be one court of appellate jurisdiction; but it would be admitted that to adapt that principle to our existing institutions must be a work of difficulty and of time. Without entering into this question, he desired to draw the attention of the House to a point of more pressing importance—namely, the present dead-lock in the Common Law Courts. At Middlesex the remanets in the Queen's Bench numbered 141, in the Common Pleas seventy-nine, and in the Exchequer twenty, making, a total of 240. Adding to these the remanets in London, the total number was brought up to 479, or close on 500 remanets. At present it might be observed that the Court of Exchequer was not so fully occupied as the other tribunals. But the very admirable manner in which the present Lord Chief Baron discharged the duties of his office was such that business had already returned to the Court of Exchequer, and there was every reason to suppose that before long it would be as much occupied as any of the other courts in Westminster Hall. Among the evils resulting from the pressure of business in the courts, as represented by these 500 remanets, were these. Actions just and capable of being maintained were not brought; others were settled disadvantageously or referred to arbitration at double or treble the expense; and defendants were encouraged to defend actions unjustly for the sake of wearying the plaintiffs out, and so obtaining the advantages to be looked for from delay. Those various evils taken together represented an amount of actual money loss greater than the salary of many Judges. But there were not only remanets at Nisi Prius, there were arrears on the new trial paper, and on the special paper. On circuit there were also remanets, or else, without any fault of Judge or counsel, when there was a long cause list and no time to try it, causes were crushed and ground to powder in a way that was highly unsatisfactory to suitors. On many of the circuits Judges were obliged to avail themselves for days together of the assistance of Queen's Counsel in trying the criminal cases. This state of things entirely bore out the contention of the Attorney General, from which he did not understand his hon. and learned Friend to dissent, that it would be absolutely necessary to take into consideration the passage of the Queen's Speech upon this subject. His own opinion was, and had been for many years, that a public necessity existed for adding to the judicial strength of the Common Law Courts. The number of Judges had been substantially the same since the Revolution. In 1831 the number, it was true, had been increased from twelve to fifteen; but the abolition of the Welsh judicature took place at the same time, so that there had been a corresponding increase in the duties. A statement in his possession from a learned Judge showed that from 1831 to the present moment the duties of the Common Law Judges had at least doubled. This had been due, in the first place, to the increase in the wealth, population, and commerce of the country; but next, to the great improvements which had taken place in the law itself. Cases, instead of being got rid of by technical objections, were now for the most part tried out upon their merits, which course, while it was much more advantageous and satisfactory, naturally consumed a great deal more time. Again, the examination of the parties, who were generally the largest witnesses, inasmuch as they knew most about the subject, had greatly added to the length of trials. Again, the Chamber business of the Judges had very much increased, owing to the Common Law Procedure Acts; and he was informed by a learned Judge that for one hour that used to be spent in Chambers there were now at least four. Moreover, additional circuit towns had been established, and the Judges now went to Liverpool, Manchester, and Leeds, and they were to go to Birmingham. All this had taken place since 1831. Winter circuits had also been established, and it was most desirable, nay, necessary, that they should be extended for the trial of civil as well as criminal cases. The universal feeling of the profession was that another circuit should be formed. But that was utterly impossible with the present judicial staff. Arrangements might, no doubt, be made for saving the time of the Judges to some extent. The business of the three courts might be equalized, and by abolishing the peculiar jurisdiction of each the business might be transferred from one court to the others; but that would only equalize the burden—it would not diminish it as a whole. He also agreed that four Judges need not sit at one time in banco, but four Judges scarcely ever did so. There were generally only three, so that no great saving could be effected in this way. His hon. and learned Friend suggested that the Chamber business might be transferred to the Masters; and, perhaps, a portion of it might, but not much, because the decisions of the Masters could not carry with them the authority of those of the Judges, and would probably give rise to many more appeals. Possibly some further business might be thrown on the County Courts, but it was not desirable much to extend the jurisdiction of those tribunals, for if they became courts for the trial of heavy cases their utility would in a great measure cease, and it would, perhaps, become requisite to have other small debts courts, thus leading to greater confusion. Again, the number of frivolous actions might possibly be somewhat reduced by depriving plaintiffs of costs in certain cases. Still, enough would remain to make it absolutely necessary that the present judicial strength should be increased. He did not think that the addition of one Judge to the Admiralty Court would suffice, and in his opinion none of the suggestions made would obviate the necessity of considering the important recommendation contained in Her Majesty's Speech.

said, the Attorney General had not answered the case made by the hon. and learned Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer), because he had contended that the appellate jurisdic- tion ought to reside in the House of Lords, but had not attempted to show that the appellate jurisdiction of that House, as at present constituted, was the best tribunal that could be constituted. That hon. and learned Gentleman had taken rather a rosy view of the present state of that tribunal. Indeed, Attorney Generals in esse were apt to entertain optimist views on matters of that kind. If the hon. and learned Gentleman thought the House of Lords the best tribunal that could be constituted, all he could say was that that was not in accordance with the opinion of the House of Lords themselves. For what had they determined? Their own Committee had reported that three Law Lords should always sit as an appellate court. But all knew that three Law Lords would not do that, and that appeals would virtually be decided by Lord Chelmsford and the Scotch Judge who had just been made a Peer. He asked, then, was it right that these two learned Lords should review and reverse—for that was what it came to—the decision of Lord Justice Cairns and the other Lords Justice, or the decision of the Exchequer Chamber? Such an appellate jurisdiction as that could not possibly give satisfaction to the country. As the House of Lords was at present constituted, they did not get the best Judges nor enough of them. If they were about to create a law Peer, they did not ask whether he was the best man they could find; but their first question was, "Is he married?" their next question was, "Is he likely to be married?" and, perhaps, their third question was, if so, is his wife likely to be a fruitful mother of children?" Under these circumstances, he maintained that such an appellate jurisdiction was not one that could be perfectly satisfactory to the country. The Lords' Committee had proposed that two Deputy Speakers should be appointed and made life Peers, as it had been said that barristers did not earn fortunes large enough to render them eligible to be hereditary Peers. The evidence given by the lawyers before the Committee went in favour of life Peer ages up to the number of four being created. That was utterly rejected by that House, not because life Peers ought not to be created, but—certainly as far as his own vote went—on the ground that as the measure then stood it would not secure the best men. £5,000 a year each for the Deputy Speakers were not such terms as would give them two of the best lawyers. The most satisfactory arrange- ment would perhaps be that the House of Lords should part with its appellate jurisdiction, but it was open to this objection, that the Peers' Report showed them to be unwilling to do so. Some persons thought that jurisdiction should be transferred to the Privy Council; but there were some constitutional objections to that. A Privy Councillor was only a servant of the Queen as long as it was Her will and pleasure that he should be so. It had also been proposed that all the chiefs of the superior courts should be made life Peers. But the gentlemen of the legal profession saw one great objection to that, because the chiefs of the Common Law Courts had not the time for such duties, and were wanted elsewhere. Moreover, from the manner in which legal patronage was bestowed, those chiefs were by no means always our best lawyers. They were probably appointed for their Parliamentary services, and they had generally entered that House because they were successful advocates. If the Peers were really unwilling to part with their appellate jurisdiction, it seemed to him that it would be necessary to consider the very broad question of life Peerages, and whether they ought not to be conferred on the best lawyers they could find, whether distinguished as advocates or not. He hoped that that suggestion would receive the serious attention of the Government.

said, he did not agree either with the present Attorney General in believing that our appellate jurisdiction was in a perfect state, or with the late Attorney General in the opinion that that appellate jurisdiction ought to be removed from the House of Lords. If we were starting afresh no doubt it would be well to establish some court akin in its nature to that of the Court of Cassation, and entirely separated from all political influence. But, under our Constitutional Government, our courts were in reality the débris of the ancient Curia Regis, and the largest fragment of that débris was the House of Lords. To destroy that, or to weaken its authority, would be to derange the balance of power, which was so ad vantageous in the Constitution of this country. It would not only be a violation of English history and a dangerous innovation, but it was not at all necessary to our obtaining a good Court of Appeal. It was evident that the Judges of the land formerly shared in the judicial powers of the House of Lords, which in the ancient records was said to consist of les grands etsages du, royaume. The former term included the Barons of the realm, and the latter the Prelates and the Judges. There were two ways of remedying the present state of things—one which he thought a very good one—was that all the Judges, both Common Law and Equity Judges, should also be Members of the House of Lords for judicial business, and on all judicial business should vote with the Peers, as they did formerly; and the other was to devise some mode by which the judicial strength of the House should be increased without its being encumbered by too great a number of Law Lords. There was little difficulty attending the solution of that problem, for it could be done by granting the Crown power to make the holders of certain high judicial offices, such as Judges, life Peers. This could be done without an unlimited power of creating life Peers being granted, which he had on a previous occasion opposed; for if such unlimited power were granted, the authority of the House of Lords would be gone, and a Minister would be able, by the creation of life Peers, to overbear all opposition in the Assembly by swamping it for the purpose of carrying a particular measure. He did not believe that the Judges sitting in the House of Lords were sufficient to constitute a Court of Appeal. There would be no objection to appointing Judges life Peers; and he thought that if the House were strengthened in either of the ways he had pointed out, it would have greater weight with the country than any court constituted upon à priori principles. It was contrary to common sense that the decision of ten Judges in the Exchequer Chamber should be reversed by three Judges in the House of Lords. The staff of the House of Lords must be increased. With respect to the Courts of Equity, the Lord Chancellor was the chief Judge of the Courts of Equity. It often happened that he had to sit in the House of Lords on appeals from himself, and, with the assistance of a Common Law Judge, who never held a brief in a Court of Equity, affirm his own decisions. This showed that the appellate jurisdiction was in an unsatisfactory state. He thought that either of the expedients which he had pointed out would enable the House of Lords to cope with all the difficulties which existed, and render it a satisfactory Court of Appeal. He agreed with the late Solicitor General (Sir Robert Collier) that the administration of justice at the assizes and at the sittings in London was unsatisfactory. The assizes were arranged on a very antiquated model. At the assizes, the cases frequently were hurried over, or referred to junior barristers, instead of being decided by the Judge. The time was approaching when there must be a thorough re-casting of the whole of our judicial system. With respect to the County Courts, they were unable to cope with the business heaped upon them. A County Court Judge did not possess the dignity and position which a Judge ought to hold. The country ought to be mapped out into judicial districts, and a court ought to be appointed in each capable of discharging all the duties of a court in the first instance. The Judges of that court ought to go circuits in their own district, and be fully responsible for the administration of justice, and from the decision of these provincial courts an appeal might be given to a separate court in the capital. That was a system which existed in every civilized country, and which had been found to work well. So far as the appellate jurisdiction went Parliament had the remedy in its own hands; but he hoped they would never destroy the time-honoured jurisdiction of the House of Lords, which was necessary for the maintenance of the mixed constitution of the country.

said, he entirely agreed with what had fallen from his hon, and learned Friend the Member for Richmond, that there ought to be only one court of appeal. He could not conceive a worse tribunal than the Court of Exchequer Chamber, for the calls upon the Judges who composed it were so numerous that it was impossible for them to discharge the duties imposed upon them as a court of appeal. He wished to call the attention of the House to the necessity of doing something to correct the defects which existed in the tribunals of the law, not only in Westminster but throughout the whole country. The present judicial system was universally admitted to be bad, and the first thing to be done was the consolidation of the Courts of Queen's Bench, Exchequer and Common Pleas. A great deal of mischief resulted from the independent jurisdiction of these several courts. He would take the Court of Queen's Bench as an illustration of the evils which existed in the other courts. In theory these courts consisted of five Judges each, and it was supposed that four of them were sitting continuously in banco. In the Court of Queen's Bench two days in the week were set apart for new trials and motions—two for the special paper and two for the Crown paper. Now, how did the matter stand in point of fact? One of the Judges had to hear cases at Nisi Prius, and four were left to sit in banco; but it not unfrequently happened that one of them was engaged in trying cases at the Central Criminal Court, leaving only three for the general business. One of them had to leave the Court at one or two o'clock to go to Chambers, sometimes rising in the midst of an argument. His time was thus entirely wasted, and he might as well be away from the court altogether. The same thing occurred with regard to the other courts, so that three of the Judges interrupted the business of the courts in order to go to Chambers. It would be much better to have one Judge continually at Chambers. He suggested to the Government the propriety of consolidating the three courts into one. But he would go further. The consolidation of the Court of Admiralty and the Court of Probate and Divorce was contemplated. If these courts were to be consolidated he did not see why the whole of the courts should not be consolidated. If that were done there would be no necessity for additional Judges in the Common Law Courts at Westminster, and the whole business of the country might be very well discharged without any increase in the number of Judges. He was quite satisfied that there ought to be an independent court of appeal, though that might involve some increased cost. He would suggest also that there should be an alteration made in the legal year; the present system of regulating terms was totally inadequate to the purposes of the present day. He would suggest the division of the legal year into six pretty equal parts, and then these might be divided in proper proportion between the metropolis and the country at large. The business of the provinces was largely increasing. Leeds already had assizes, and Birmingham would probably insist on them. At present the Judges were required to go down to every county in England, and it seemed to be an idle thing to require the Judges and sheriffs to go to a place to hold an assize where there was not a single cause to be tried, and perhaps not more than one or two prisoners. There ought to be central districts to which parties might be brought without requiring the Judges to go to every particular place as they did now.

Sir, I thank the hon. and learned Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer) for bringing this subject before the House this evening. The part of his speech to which I paid most attention was not that in which he showed that the judicial system of the Courts of Common Law had broken down, but that in which he pointed out the remedies for the evils of which he complained. It would appear from the hon. and learned Member's remarks that the panacea for the numerous defects of the Courts of Common Law is to alter the present system so as to divide the cases more equally between the different courts. The hon. and learned Member alluded to the arrears of business in the courts, and I listened in the expectation of hearing him state which of the courts was so devoid of business that it had been compelled to rise before the time allotted for the trial of its causes had expired. But, although it is true that there are large arrears in the Courts of Queen's Bench and Common Pleas only, still we find that the Court of Exchequer sat out the fourteen days allotted for its sittings at Westminster, and is likely to sit out the time allotted for the trial of its causes at Guildhall. It has been well and truly said that the Court of Exchequer will now regain its fair share of business, and it is evident that that court is not in the position in which, according to the hon. and learned Member, some of the Chancery Courts are—namely, sometimes starving, for want of work, and at other times overburdened with business. I fully admit that the state of things in the Common Law Courts is such that we cannot hope to cope with it without an increase in the judicial power. We cannot attempt to satisfy the demand which is now being so generally made for additional assizes without we have a larger judicial staff. I do not think it probable that the suggestion of the hon. Baronet the Member for Dundalk (Sir George Bowyer) to abolish the assizes altogether will be carried into effect. We may take it for granted that for our time, at all events, assizes will be held throughout the country, and that the number of assizes will be increased instead of diminished, and therefore Judges must be found to hold them. I am told by the hon. and learned Member for Richmond that, in order to utilize the judicial power we now possess, three Judges instead of four could sit to hear Common Law cases. All I can say in reply to that suggestion is that the I Will. IV., appointing the fourth Judge, was passed on the express ground that three Judges were not sufficient to form an efficient court for the decision of Common Law cases. Notwithstanding the provisions of that Act, it is rare that more than three Judges can sit together in the Common Law Courts on account of the press of business. Even if some of the defects of the courts could be remedied by a re-distribution of the business so as to render it more equally divided between the courts, the difficulty would still remain of having to provide Judges for the additional assizes which are so generally called for throughout the country. The hon. and learned Member for Manchester (Mr. James) suggested the propriety of establishing throughout the country certain district courts, resembling the Central Criminal Court of London. The supposition of the hon. and learned Member was that the work of the learned Judges on assizes would be much lessened by the establishment of such courts. I may, however, remind the House that it is the almost universal practice, in order to diminish the assize business, to hold courts of quarter sessions in boroughs and counties for the trial of prisoners charged with a certain class of offences. If greater judicial power is required at the assizes, and additional Judges are not to be appointed, I think the practice that at present prevails of appointing Queen's Counsel to act as assistant Judges is far preferable to the proposition of the hon. and learned Member. The cases that come before the court presided over by the right hon. and learned Member the Recorder of London (Mr. Russell Gurney), and by the hon. and learned Member the Common Serjeant (Mr. T. Chambers), are not such as come before the courts of quarter sessions, and I do not think that the plan suggested by the hon. and learned Member would in any way relieve the Judges from the duties which are now imposed upon them. It is impossible to help feeling that, with the peremptory demand for more frequent assizes and circuits, the legal business of London and of the country cannot be carried on without the creation of additional Judges. I must say one word regarding an institution which the hon. and learned Member for Richmond looks at in a different light from what I do—I mean the Court of Exchequer Chamber. It is very easy for the hon. and learned Member to say that, in a few isolated cases, this court has broken down. But when he says that this intermediate court of appeal is useless and worse than useless, and that the wit of man never devised a more ingenious system for rendering the law uncertain, I can only say that I do not agree with him. When the hon. and learned Member was pointing out certain defects in this court, did he remember in how many cases decisions in this court are practically final? I will venture to say that in numbers of instances the parties are satisfied with the decision of this court, and so are saved the trouble and expense of appealing to the House of Lords. The Court of Exchequer Chamber, in my opinion, when properly constituted, and when having a sufficient number of Judges, will be a peculiarly good intermediate court of appeal. So far as my experience goes, which is not so great as that of my hon. and learned Friends the Attorney General and the late Attorney General, I cannot help thinking that the court of ultimate appeal is as satisfactory a court as exists. When my hon. and learned Friend says it is small, I agree with him; but I thought I heard him say that he thought the judicial constitution of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, consisting of two Judges, was satisfactory; and, as far as the Courts of Common Law are concerned, that if three sat instead of four, that would be a sufficient staff. Then I do not see why three should not be sufficient for a Court of Appeal. In a large majority of instances three men of great learning and eminence and of large experience sit in the House of Lords deciding causes. Again, I differ from my hon. and learned Friend in this, that the Court of Appeal of the House of Lords, as now constituted, is weakened or less worthy of credit because they can, by their own summons to the House of Lords, ask the whole body of Judges to sit there as assessors. I was surprised to hear him say that, because, although it may be true that a large number of those Judges who came there as assessors in certain cases may have had to consider the case on which they sat in the House of Lords before, I do not think he will say that they are so bigoted to the judgments they before announced that if, on a re-hearing of the case, they find weighty reasons to show their opinion was wrong they will not give full effect to the argument and alter that opinion. But of this I am quite certain, that there are no judgments to be found in the books so valuable as those which have been pronounced in the House of Lords after consultation with the Judges, on whose opinion, after mature deliberation, the Law Lords are entitled to act as they think proper. I will not further trespass on the attention of the House upon this question; but, though I am quite conscious that many evils are found in our present system, I cannot help wishing that my hon. and learned Friend had not only given us a more mature plan for the remedy of those evils which he states exist, but also pointed out with more clearness that the remedies he has shadowed out to-night would really meet the evils which he supposes to exist.

rose to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Government mean to invite the House to come to a conclusion in favour of the reduction of the qualification for the Elective Franchise, without at the same time affording a clear indication of what that reduction is intended to be? He had no wish to throw any impediment in the way of the Government; but, understanding that Parliamentary Reform was not to be considered a party question, upon which the fate of the Ministry depended, they could now consider the question purely on its merits. The time had come when Parliamentary Reform should be treated as a broad and philosophical question, above the narrow purposes of party. They had authority for that view from the course taken by the Opposition, who, when in power in 1860, would not stake the existence of their Administration on the success of their Reform measure. The question of Reform, of course, depended upon details; much depending upon the extent to which the franchise should be extended. The Resolution referring to the proposed extension of the franchise in such a form as not to give a preponderating power to any particular class, had his entire adhesion. They might so reduce the franchise as to—

here interrupted the hon. Gentleman, reminding him that, although he was in order in asking a Question as to the form of proceeding, he was not in order in entering on the question of Reform, or the particular Resolutions which stood for discussion on Monday next.

resumed. The Resolutions appeared to him to be open to very much the same objections which were levelled against the proceedings of the late Administration last year. They were told then that they were asked to make a leap in the dark, which he thought was just the case with these Resolutions. They were told then the Government should treat the House with perfect frankness, and it struck him that the Resolutions were open to the same form of criticism. They were told then that Resolutions might involve a precipitate decision of the House, as they had no second and third readings in which the House could retrace its steps if in error, and that was the same with regard to these Resolutions. [Cries of "Question!"]

again interfered, recommending the hon. Gentleman to proceed to the Question of which he had given notice.

said, he would not occupy the House further, but at once put the Question which stood in his name.

It is not more than ten days since I came down to the House to suggest that on this subject it was, in the opinion of the Government, expedient that we should proceed by way of Resolution; and when I made that proposition I was very doubtful whether the House would accept it. Formally, it is not even now accepted, although, I believe, I may infer from the declarations which have been made that the House will not refuse the Government that form of procedure. Sir, I will not refer to the nature of the Resolutions that I have put on the table, although my hon. Friend referred to them so amply. I will merely say that the object of those Resolutions was to express certain principles on which the Government wished to proceed, and that we laid them on the table in order that hon. Gentlemen might have the opportunity of considering those principles, and applying them in the manner which they might think most expedient; and in that process they often arrive at this salutary result, that many applications of those principles in detail which at first blush they thought unanswerable and expedient, upon reflec- tion they find to be impracticable and even absurd. When they arrive at that conclusion, after a certain time for consideration has elapsed, they may come then to the interpretation which the Government put upon the Resolutions, and with a disposition more calculated to give an impartial consideration to the propositions of the Government. Sir, I do not think that the time the Government have proposed for the consideration of the Resolutions was extreme, and I do not think the House will think it unreasonable. In two or three days the House will be asked to form itself in Committee to take the Resolutions into consideration; and, of course, it will be my duty, in accordance with the custom of Parliament, before I ask the opinion of the House upon them, to show the manner in which, in their opinion, the Government think those principles should be applied. That, I think, is the Parliamentary and proper system. In the course of the last ten days a great many Questions have been asked of me by Members of this House. I have taken note of those questions, and at the right time, and in due season, those questions will be answered. I have also taken note of the Question of my hon. Friend, and that also will receive an answer.

rose to ask the Secretary to the Treasury for a further expla- nation of the sums required for particular items in the approaching Paris Exhibition. He said the hour was late, and the House exhausted, and Members might take his word that, not being a lawyer, he would not occupy two hours in saying what could be said in a few minutes. If any excuse were wanted for bringing the matter forward, it was to be found in the language of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury the other night, who said, that when this Vote was first brought before him, his feelings were first those of surprise, then of indignation, and lastly of resignation. When the Secretary to the Treasury, a man who was known to be not generally moved by the common emotions of the human heart, spoke officially in that way, the subject must indeed be one demanding the grave consideration of the House. The question before them was, in reality, nothing more nor less than this—whether the House was to have any voice or control over the public expenditure. This was a subject on which he had heard Chancellors of the Exchequer lecture in former years. He had heard them complain that the House was neglectful of the public interests. Although there were a few Members who said that this matter must be passed sub silentio, because it concerned a foreign Government, he believed there was enough public spirit left in the House, even at so late an hour, to endeavour to exercise some control over the public expenditure. What was the history of this Vote of £116,000? It was a curious fact that no detailed Estimate for this sum had ever been laid before the House. The history began with the constitution of the Royal Commission on May 2, 1865; and the Commission directed that the Estimates were to be laid before the House, and were to be managed through the Department of Science and Art. The Estimates never had been laid before the House. The Commission was constituted originally of eighty-four Members, including twenty Peers and twenty Members of that House, and eighteen gentlemen were afterwards added, which made a total of 102. It was said that the Commission was not composed of men of business, but many men of business were on it. Members of that House and of the other House were on the Commission, and they might be said to be in most senses innocent of science and incapable of art. This Commission was, in fact, a mere ornamental Commission. The hon. Member for Stoke- upon-Trent was a member of it, and he had already told them what its duties were. The Commission met once in about two months, some thirty gentlemen sat round a table, and they discussed nothing, but some unseen hand prepared resolutions, and, he believed, it was that of their trusted and well-beloved Henry Cole. The Commissioners discussed nothing, but it passed whatever was laid before it. What was every man's business, was no man's responsibility, and to that minute they did not know on whom responsibility rested or by whose direction the money had been spent. In June, 1865, the House was called upon to vote £5,000 for "preliminary expenses" on account of the management of the British department of the Universal Exhibition at Paris for 1867. That £5,000 was voted as a matter of course; it excited no curiosity. The next Vote was one of £12,000 in 1866, again for preliminary expenses; and that also passed without remark. But the other night the House was taken by surprise, by seeing a sum of £50,000 included among other things in the Supplementary Estimates, not for "preliminary expenses" but with real business connected with the Exhibition. Some little discussion then occurred, and the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Hunt) was kind enough to give them, for the first time, the estimates for this Exhibition. In the previous Paris Exhibition an Estimate was laid before the House in 1854. The House voted £50,000, and strange to say only £41,000 was spent, and the remaining £9,000 was returned to the Exchequer—a great contrast to our present management. The estimates now given by the officers of the Department of Science and Art included these items:—For internal fittings, £16,100; supplemental buildings and park, £23,065; ancient and modern art, £11,050; and management, £14,755. Respecting this management they were entitled to full explanations. He understood that a house was taken at the Champs Elysées, which made up about forty beds, and that there were forty-seven secretaries to this Commission. The next item was one of £17,190 for house and office expenses. Now, he should like to know what were the salaries given to the forty-seven secretaries, and especially how much was given to "their trusty and well-beloved Henry Cole." Then there came another very singular item of £8,250 for freight, which brought the House to a very curious consideration. He wished to know whether it was true that it was designed by the Commission that there should be an exhibition of blue books in Paris. [Laughter.] The House might laugh, but he had been informed by the Librarian of that House that that officer had received an intimation that it was the wish of the Commission that all the blue books and all the Parliamentary publications of that House and of the House of Lords should be sent to Paris to be exhibited. He believed it was only through the exertions of their respected Speaker that this profligate waste of money had been controlled, and that only a few specimens of the blue books were to be exhibited. If this extravagant, lavish, and foolish expenditure was to go on in this way, where was it to stop? Then there was another item which he did not under-stand, "Royal Commission," it said, for these 102 gentlemen, £2,750. There was no explanation given of that. Then there came another, and, he thought, a most extraordinary item—namely, "Exhibition of implements of war, £11,490." Now, that was a very contradiction to the title of the Exhibition, which was instituted as an "Exhibition of works of industry and agriculture, as well as of the Fine Arts." Put some evil genius on the Commission seemed to have suggested an exhibition of implements of war, and accordingly the expenditure would be enormous, because all the largest bits of ordnance which this country had produced were about to be sent to this peaceful Exhibition at Paris. He thought it was time for the House to step in and say, "We have no objection to cultivate the arts of peace, and even to send you a few blue books; but to send big guns into the bargain is not only ridiculous, but a waste of money." In the former Exhibitions, both in Paris and London, the jurors were not paid, but were thankful for a bronze medal; but here there was a grant of £12,000 for jurors. He had been so struck with this grant that he looked into the original constitution of the system of jurors, and he found that on the 26th of June, 1866, the number of Jurors for England and Ireland was eighty-five only. Now, a gentleman, who had lately been appointed a juror, informed him that each juror was to receive £50, so that these eighty-five gentlemen would receive £4,250. He should like to know what was going to be done with the rest of the £12,000? These were matters requiring explanation, for, though only £116,000 was asked for, it was well known that that would only carry them on to the opening of the Exhibition, but when it was closed his hon. Friend—and he hoped he would then be on the Treasury Bench, because he was so efficient—would be asking for another £50,000 or £60,000, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would say, that unless hon. Members wished to imperil the peaceful relations between the two countries they must agree to his Vote. For his own part, he had no wish to stand in the way of a grant of anything reasonable and proper; but while he held a seat in the House he hoped the House would assist him when he exposed lavish expenditure and equally lavish waste.

said, that having been under the late Government a Member of that Department which was immediately responsible for the outlay of sums granted towards the expenditure on the Paris Exhibition, the House would perhaps allow him to make an explanation respecting the state of our relations with the French Commissioners up to June last. In March, 1865, the Science and Art Department applied to the Treasury for a sum of £50,000 towards the expenses of the forthcoming Exhibition, in which this country had been invited by the Emperor of the French to take part. The reason why that sum was asked for was that a similar sum had been granted in 1855; and although the £9,000 had then been returned to the Treasury, there was reason to believe that the arrangements would be on a much larger scale in 1867, and that consequently more money would be required. The then Secretary to the Treasury, Mr. Peel, adverted to the fact that the whole sum of £50,000 had not been expended in 1855, and proposed that a somewhat smaller sum—£45,000—should be granted. The reply to him was that it was impossible to estimate, at that time, what the whole expenditure would be, but that there was a probability that it would exceed the previous expenditure. The sum of £5,000 was taken that year for preliminary expenses. In January, 1866, it became necessary to consider what would be required for the current financial year, and an estimate of £12,000 was thought to be sufficient. But, that being so, the House might ask how it was that before the year had expired a further sum of £50,000 had been asked for, and he would explain the reasons of this large difference between the first estimate and the second. It was not till February, 1866, a month after the estimates had been sent in, that the Commission first became aware of the different principles under which the French Government proposed to carry on this great Exhibition. From that time to the month of May there was an unceasing struggle with the French Commissioners to resist demands which would inevitably lead to an expenditure far exceeding the sum spent in 1855. He might mention that the French Commissioners made demands for expenditure upon every possible object, except the mere shell of the building—upon the flooring, the partitions, the places on which the articles were to be exhibited, even on the very roads from the Seine up to the Exhibition. A large building in the gardens was also required for the exhibition of marine and military engines, and a house had to be erected. On the 8th of May, 1866, the Secretary of the Science and Art Department, by the direction of the Lord President, addressed a serious letter on this subject to the managing Commissioner of the French Exhibition. In that letter he stated, that although they had made demands upon exhibitors entirely different from anything asked by this country, or by the French themselves in 1855, yet there might be some show of reason in asking manufacturers, who, in sending their manufactures for exhibition, might have a view to profit, to contribute to the expenses of the Exhibition. It was pointed out, however, that the case was entirely altered when gentlemen were requested to send over works of art, and that gentlemen who did so ought not to be expected to defray the cost of conveyance, and packing and unpacking. The managing Commissioner of the French Exhibition was informed that it was the opinion of Lord Granville that the matter ought to be brought under the notice of the French Minister, M. Rouher, and that, in the event of his insisting on these conditions being complied with, a formal communication to that effect ought to be drawn up with a view to its being laid before Parliament, as furnishing the explanation why a Vote so much in excess of that which had been demanded, or thought possible, was required. No direct answer to that letter was received; but he might say that, up to the period when the late Government went out of office, no concession to these unexpected demands had been made, except that it was agreed that the Admiralty should incur a certain expenditure in landing machinery at the Seine. He entirely agreed with what the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Osborne) had said as to sending implements of war to the Exhibition. Indeed, the Commissioners of this country came unanimously to the conclusion that as this was to be an exhibition of articles of peace, munitions of war ought not to be sent to it; but on its being found that all the other nations of Europe—France and Austria especially—were going to exhibit munitions of war, it was considered that it would be ungracious if this country did not show what she possessed. ["No, no!"] As to no detailed estimate having been laid before the House at an early period, it must be borne in mind that the scheme had been growing greater day by day, and it was therefore impossible for the Department of Science and Art to say what it would be called upon to contribute. The space allotted to British exhibitors was twice as Jarge as it had been on the last occasion, and he might mention that his hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-upon-Trent, who had so severely criticized the proceedings of the Department, had demanded, on behalf of the Architectural Society, of which he was President, not less than 110,000 square feet, which was one-third of the whole space allocated to British exhibitors. He had stated how the case stood up to the resignation of the late Government, which occurred at a most critical period in the history of the Exhibition, because it would have been their duty to decide what course they ought to take; whether, on the one hand, to imperil the success of the Exhibition, and inflict a blow on the pride of the French nation, or, on the other, to incur an expense altogether unprecedented, and to which they themselves strongly objected. In this dilemma the present Government succeeded to office, and it was they who were responsible, since the late Government had not authorized any expenditure which departed from the precedent of the previous Exhibition. He did not wish to throw any censure upon the Government, as their position was one of extreme difficulty. Much blame had been unjustly imputed to public servants during this discussion, and in order that Parliament and the country might be fully informed as to the real facts of the case, he had that night given notice that he would on the following Tuesday move for the Correspondence on the subject between the Department of Science and Art and the Treasury, and with the French Commissioners referring to expenditure.

, having been so pointedly alluded to by his right hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydvil, felt bound to explain that his large demand for space, on the part of the Institute of Architects, which he had urged, arose in this way. Very early in the day that Institute was anxious to bring together a large exhibition of works of industrial art cognate with architecture. The Executive Commission asked him how much space they would require. Their reply was, as much as the Commission was prepared to yield them. To this the Executive did not seem to demur, and they conceived they were only carrying out an intimation which they had received from it, when, in order to "regularize" their application, they put in a colourable figure, just as a man put £1,000 on his dog when he sent it to a dog show, and did not wish I to part with it. This meant that they were ready to use any space which might in reason be allotted to them. From that day forward, however, when the Executive was out of temper with them, which was not unusual, they had this thrown in their teeth, though the real cause of all the difficulty had been the unconscionable time during which they had been kept waiting.

hoped some explanation would be given satisfactory to the House and the country. He hoped some answer would be given with respect to the expenditure for jurors. The sum charged was £12,000. There were eighty-five jurors at £50 each. What was to be done with the difference?

said, that no Member of the Government would complain of the jealousy shown by the House with regard to the sums asked for the Exhibition. It was the wish of the Government to give the information asked for in the best possible way, but the most convenient mode of doing so would be as he stated a few days ago. In the Estimates of 1867–8 there should be a full account respecting the various sums, and he believed the Estimates would be in the hands of Members in a few days.

asked whether the implements of war had been as yet sent, or whether there was time to stop them?

said, they had not been sent yet.

gave notice of his intention to move on an early day that the implements of war should not be sent.

seconded the Motion, which involved a most important principle of Constitutional law—namely, that no man should be punished until he had been convicted of an offence. This was a principle which, though acknowledged in theory, was not sufficiently carried out in practice in this country, and certainly not in Ireland, where he trusted it would now be carried out.

said, he was afraid that in agreeing to the second reading of this Bill the House had consented to a departure from the principles of the British Constitution, and he was sorry that it had been his duty to ask them to do so. The Government had already done what his hon. Friend by his clause sought to have done. The strictest rule had been laid down with respect to the treatment of those prisoners. That rule was simply this—that they were to be treated in every respect as untried prisoners. And that rule was in every respect carried out. It was utterly impossible to keep them in Mountjoy Prison in association. In the best managed prisons—such as the one at Belfast, for instance—every untried prisoner was kept in separate confinement. This rule was carried out as far as possible in all gaols conducted on the new system, in order to keep the unconvicted from being contaminated by criminals. Formerly, the great blot on our prison maagement was the system of day rooms, which made our prisons colleges of crime, owing to young offenders being brought into constant contact with hardened felons. To keep the prisoners separate in Mountjoy Prison was necessary for the purposes of discipline. It was also indispensable for their safe keeping. He was sorry to say there was reason to believe that many of the persons arrested and sent there under the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act were violent and bad characters; and it would be highly dangerous to allow them to associate in a body. They were, however, allowed to wear their own clothes and to receive food which was bought and paid for by their friends outside. They were visited daily by the chaplain and by the warder, and were allowed books. Beyond separate confinement they were placed under no restraint. As insinuations had been thrown out respecting the treatment of those prisoners, the late Government directed their attention to the matter as far back as last March, and at that time Captain Barlow reported—

"I was present at the male prison, Mountjoy, when—saw several of the untried prisoners. When leaving the prison,—informed me that F. L., whom he states to be a very intelligent man, had spoken very highly of the kindness with which he was treated.—added the treatment of the prisoners was very satisfactory to him."

That was last year; but Mr. Murray, the Director, reported to-day—

"I have read every letter written by or addressed to the untried prisoners at Mountjoy Convict Prison, and I have never made any complaint of the treatment except in a few cases, in which association was wished for. In fact, the prisoners have repeatedly written to their friends, expressing great satisfaction at the-treatment and the food.—very lately told me that he had every reason to be satisfied with the treatment of the prisoners. The prisoners, when leaving the gaol, have invariably thanked the Governor for the kindness extended to them, and at the same time expressions of thanks have been addressed to me."

If the House wished it he could read extracts from letters written by prisoners themselves, which bore out those statements, and which showed that every indulgence, consistent with discipline and safety, had been extended to them. He had that day carefully examined all the Prison Acts, and found that they contained no provisions with respect to the treatment of untried prisoners, so that this was entirely a matter of regulation. He could only say that it was not the wish of the Government that these persons should be subjected to hardship or unnecessary severity; and that if any instance of the kind were brought to his knowledge, he would not fail to inquire closely into it.

The hon. Member for Clonmel should press the Motion to a division, which he deserves great credit for bringing forward and so ably advocating, unless the Government consented to its adoption. The Chief Secretary said there was no necessity for it, as the prisoners under the law, as it then stood, would be treated as untried. No doubt they were entitled to be so treated; but judging by what occurred in several cases he would cite in reference to Fenian "suspects," he believed it was very necessary to impress the subordinates of the Government with the fact that they would not be justified in treating men not only unconvicted, but even uncharged with any crime, as if they were guilty. If the Irish Executive could themselves see their intentions carried out, he would have no apprehensions that persons arrested under the Lord Lieutenant's warrant would be treated in an unexceptionally severe manner; but when the prisoners fell into the hands of underlings, who might be over-zealous in the cause of law and order, he much feared that restrictions and even severities might be inflicted neither justified by law or necessity, or contemplated by the Government. The late Administration, he believed, was just as well disposed to act right as the present one in the matter, and yet things were done in their name, and with perfect impunity, by their own officers, in reference to prisoners arrested under the Act the House was now asked to renew, as illegal, unjustifiable, and, he might add, as cruel as anything stated to have occurred in Austrian or Neapolitan prisons, about which the late leader of the House discoursed so very feelingly and eloquently. Now, he did not want the House to take his ipse dixit for all this; he would prove it by official Returns, and by the admissions of the Irish Executive. From these documents, it would appear that the treatment that "suspects" had been subjected to in Borne places was most unjustifiable. He would confine himself to the instances of Waterford, Limerick, and Cork, in all of which places it was proved to the House, by official documents and other testimony equally good, that men suspected of Fenianism were, until the matter was exposed in the House, treated worse than if they were convicted of heinous crimes. At "Waterford the stipendiary magistrate, outstepping his duty (and when the prisoners had legally passed out of his control), directed certain restrictions to be placed on them, contrary to law and local regulations, which directions, with equal impropriety, were carried into effect by the local inspector. He would read a few extracts from the Return, which, he was sure, would quite delight the hon. Member for Dungannon (Major Knox), who, in his speech of yesterday, appeared so anxious that no leniency should be shown even to those who were only suspected. Hang first and try afterwards appeared to be the rule which many in that House and out of it would apply to anyone charged with Fenianism before any proof was given of their guilt. On the 20th of February, 1866, the local inspector at Waterford wrote to the Inspectors General of Prisons—

"Under these circumstances the Governor has applied to me to know whether prisoners committed under the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act for no definite period, and awaiting Her Majesty's pleasure, should be treated as convicted prisoners, that is, given the gaol allowance of food and the gaol clothing. The Governor and myself would feel much more easy if these prisoners were treated as convicted men, when such instances as quoted above could not take place."

The Inspectors General replied, 21st of February, that the prisoners ought to be treated as untried, such being the opinion of the Law Adviser of the Crown. The local inspector, however, in the face of this, preferred, as appears from the following, to obey the behests of the stipendiary magistrate:—

suggested that under the Prison Act there were two classes of prisoners—those committed for trial and those who were convicted. Now the prisoners committed under the Lord Lieutenant's warrant did not belong to either of these classes. The late Government intimated that they ought to be treated as untried prisoners, and ought not to be subject to any discipline except what was necessary for their safety. It struck him that if the latter part of the clause were left out after "untried prisoners," that would leave the action of the local gaols unfettered.

said, he understood the prisoners at Waterford were treated as untried prisoners.

denied that this was the case. They were subjected to restrictions in regard to exercise, to communicating with their legal advisers, seeing their friends, and the supply of books.

said, in that case the officers of the prison had acted illegally, and were guilty of a breach of the law. If his hon. Friend would agree to stop at the words "untried prisoners," and insert the words "so long as they are in confinement" after the word "deemed," he had no objection to the clause.

urged on the Government the necessity of taking steps to induce other countries to adopt the new arrangements in this matter simultaneously with this country, in order that the British trade might not suffer disadvantage.

said, the Belgian Government had already signified its assent to join in the carrying out of the Convention, if the other powers did so, and within the last half hour they had received a telegram stating that the French Government had also given its assent. By Monday next he hoped to receive similar news from Holland. There would be no want of activity shown by Her Majesty's Government in this matter.