said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If his attention has been directed to the following passages in the Report of the Totnes Election Commission:—

"1. While we were sitting John Heath, who had been the principal briber on the Conservative side since 1857, who, when examined as a witness before us, gave evidence the falsehood of which he afterwards admitted, who was accused by two witnesses of subornation of perjury, and who was under the imputation of being, with others, unable to account for the distribution over £1,200, was not only re-elected a member of the town council, but was, during the next week, offered the mayoralty of the town. 2. We find that a sum of over £3,700 passed into the hands of persons engaged in directly bribing voters, and that £2,450 has been accounted for as thus distributed, while of the remainder no account has been given to us. The persons who ought to give such account are Mr. Edmonds, Mr. J. Heath, and their inferior agents. It was alleged before us by John Heath, and considerable time was taken up in searching into the truth of the allegation, that this money had been in truth placed in the hands of an unknown stranger, and that he must account for the deficiency, but after considering all the evidence taken before us, the contradictory statements made, and the falsehoods told by John Heath and other of the witnesses, who swore to the existence of such a stranger, and the final avowal of two of these witnesses that they had invented the story of being paid by a stranger at John Heath's instigation, we much doubt whether there was any such person as the stranger at all, or if there were, whether had he been called he could have accounted for all the deficient money. 3. We think it right to report to Your Majesty that the following witnesses made statements on oath before us, the falsehood of which was afterwards either acknowledged by themselves or made plain to us in the course of the subsequent inquiry:—John Heath, senior, George Griffis, Thomas Blank, Henry Crawford, Richard Norrish, Thomas Gillham, William Satchwell, Robert Harris, Jubal Bartlett, Nicholas Manning, John S. Screach, junior, and Frederick Evens. Thomas Jacob Searle confessed himself guilty of subornation of perjury in trying to prevent witnesses from telling the truth before us; and John Heath, senior, was accused by two witnesses, and Samuel Parnell was also accused, of the same offence;"

replied that the Law Officers of the Crown had been directed by the Home Office to inquire into the cases mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, with a view to ascertain what proceedings should be taken with respect to them.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Whether he intends to call out the Irish Militia for training this year?

in reply, said, he was sorry that he could not give the hon. and gallant Gentleman a decided answer to his Question. In the Estimates a sum was taken for the Irish militia; but the period of the year at which they assembled for training was generally later than that at which the English militia were called out for the purpose, and no time had yet been fixed for calling them out this year.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether it is the intention of the Commissioners of the new Law Courts to accede to the request of the competing architects to the effect that two professional men, selected by the competitors, be added to the judges?

said, in reply, that a request of that description had been addressed to the Lord Chancellor, who had asked the opinion of the Government upon the subject; and they considered that it was at present too late to alter the arrangement which had been previously adopted.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to build fresh barracks for European Troops at Point de Galle?

replied, that in consequence of the recent transfer of the Straits Settlements, it was considered necessary that a wing of a European regiment should be settled at that station, and it was intended that barracks should be built for their accommodation. But there was at present a question pending between the colony and the Colonial Office with regard to the proportions in which they should respectively contribute to the expenditure which would thus have to be incurred.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Whether, having in view the proposed alteration of Clause 24 of the Mutiny Act, it is proposed to give the Military Authorities power to discharge men guilty of felony, or of disgraceful conduct which has rendered them liable to flogging, on the completion of their sentence?

in reply, said, it was not his intention to propose that any additional powers should be given in the direction referred to by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, because he did not think such powers were necessary. Under the 22nd Article of War it was now competent for Commanders-in-Chiefs, Courts Martial, and Generals commanding in the colonies to dismiss from Her Majesty's service such men as those to whom the hon. and gallant Gentleman referred.

said, he wished to ask the Vice President of the Council, Whether it is true that a disease has recently appeared amongst Cattle in Cornwall; and, if so, if he will inform the House what is the nature of the disease?

replied, that a disease did break out among cattle in Cornwall, and Professor Simonds was sent down to the spot. That gentleman stated that on his arrival there he found that the disease first appeared on the 8th instant, and between that time and the 8th instant eighteen cattle were attacked in a herd of forty-six. In the course of nine days twelve of the cattle died. The Professor caused a post-mortem examination to be made, and after noting its result he continued—

"The disease has been entirely confined to this herd, and no fresh cases have occurred since my visit. The cessation of the malady, and its limitation to eighteen out of forty-six animals, are sufficient evidence that it is not of an infectious nature. A microscopic examination of some parts has been made by Professor Browne, and did not lead to the detection of the presence of parasitic bodies, either vegetable or animal."

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, At what time the labours of the Cholera Congress at Constantinople were concluded; and (as the Report has not been received), whether any Paper in the form of a Report from any of the Commissioners has been received, and whether it will be distributed?

said, in reply, that the Cholera Congress at Constantinople closed its sittings in the month of October last. The Report of the Congress had not yet reached the Foreign Office. They had only received through the British Commissioner a kind of abstract of the work which had been performed. He did not know why the full Report had not yet arrived, and if it should be much longer delayed he would write for it; but he thought it would be better to wait for the entire document rather than to publish an abstract which might not give an accurate or complete idea of its contents.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Under what peculiar Law or privilege commanding officers of the Life Guards and Royal Regiment of Horse Guards discharge men from the regiment without the previous consent and authority of the Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the General Instructions for the Army contained in the Queen's Regulations?

in reply, said, the answer he had to give to the question of the hon. Gentleman would, he thought, be satisfactory. There was no doubt as to the existence of the power referred to. For a long period of time all colonels of regiments, in consideration of bearing the expense of recruiting, had the power to dismiss soldiers. This power was put an end to in 1784, by an Act passed on the Motion of Mr. Burke, but a special exception was made as respects the Household troops. Consequently, the power to dismiss still remained to the colonels of the Household troops. So lately as 1865 an action was brought against Colonel Marshall, who now commanded the Second Life Guards, on ac- count of dismissing a soldier without cause. The case was tried in the Court of Common Pleas, and the defence was allowed to be perfectly good.

said, he would beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, When an account of the yearly income and expenditure of Greenwich Hospital will be laid upon the table of the House, in accordance with the forty-ninth section of the Act 28 and 29 Vict. c. 89.

replied that objections were entertained by the Admiralty to the form of audit provided by the clause referred to; it was therefore intended to introduce a short Bill to alter the form of audit, when the accounts would be audited and laid on the table.

said, that in moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice, not one word would fall from him approving in the abstract of guarantees of colonial loans. He had always thought, and whenever the subject was under consideration, as it had been too often, he had expressed his decided opinion that they were a feature of the worst possible relations between this country and the colonies, bad enough for this country, but still worse for the interests of the colonies. He sincerely hoped that this colonial guarantee would be the last proposed to Parliament, or if proposed, the last that Parliament would be disposed to grant. This particular guarantee was an exceptional case, which, under the circumstances, it was absolutely necessary for the Government to propose. It was expedient, most expedient and advantageous both to this country and to the colonies, and on the other hand it might be granted by Parliament without the slightest risk. He had stated, in moving the Confederation Bill, that Parliament would come to the consideration of this proposal perfectly unfettered and unpledged. He now asked them to consider it freely, and if he did not make out that it was absolutely necessary as well as most expedient the Committee would be perfectly free to reject it. He thought he should best show the Committee the necessity of the proposal by giving a history of the subject. So far back as 1838, this country had to send troops to Canada in the depth of winter to resist the invasion of the sympathizers, as they were called, who had no doubt the intention and were equipped with the means for the conquest of that country. We had to embark troops at Halifax and send them across the country to Quebec, in the depth of winter, with the greatest difficulty and hazard, and at enormous cost. It was then forced on the attention of everybody that merely in a military point of view, to say nothing of commercial interests, it was necessary that railway communication should be opened between Halifax and Quebec. They had had, as the Committee knew, even more recent proof of this necessity only a short time ago. This was so evident that we proceeded at once to survey the country of New Brunswick lying between Nova Scotia and Canada. Major Robinson was sent out, and made a complete survey of various lines of railway that might be constructed between Halifax and Quebec. That able surveyor, who spent three years upon it, presented an elaborate Report to the House, and any Gentleman who was not acquainted with it had the opportunity of consulting it in the Library. He trusted that no one who had not availed himself of that opportunity would oppose the Bill. The survey ended in a preference announced by Major Robinson, on grounds principally military, for what was called the Eastern line, which was the longest. At that time Lord Grey was Colonial Secretary, and he did not hesitate, in the interests of this country, to offer to the colony a guarantee for the railway on two grounds—first, that it was essential to Imperial interests, and therefore that England ought to share the expense; and secondly, that the colony, even if called on, could not without the assistance of the guarantee and credit of this country, raise the requisite sum without a most unnecessary drag on its revenues. The offer then made by Lord Grey was first made on the part of the Imperial Government. He believed the intention of Lord Grey was that this country should not only guarantee the line but undertake the work itself. We had now different views of our relations to the colonies; and the colonies had taken a much more spirited view of their own responsibilities. The proposal since made was that whatever sum of money the British North-American Provinces should raise for that purpose the Imperial Government would gua- rantee the interest on the loan. He would not weary the Committee by referring in detail to the correspondence with every Colonial Minister—Sir John Pakington, Mr. Labouchere, and the Duke of Newcastle. It was sufficient to say that in 1862 the Duke of Newcastle, while rejecting a proposal of the colonies, made a proposal which was very much that which he now recommended. It was that the Imperial Treasury should guarantee the interest at the rate of 4 per cent on the loan to be raised by the Government of the North-American Provinces for the construction of a railway. Nothing had passed since then except the very material circumstance of the late Government having considered the Proposal on the subject made by the delegates of the provinces assembled in Quebec, and drawn up a Treasury memorandum, which funned the basis of the measure to be brought in. In 1864 the late Secretary for the Colonies expressed some regret at the delay which had taken place in proceeding with the scheme, for though New Brunswick and Nova Scotia both passed Acts on the basis of the memorandum, Canada had not; but, ultimately, their delegates adopted the proposal of the Imperial Government. An agreement was then drawn up between the Duke of Newcastle, the then Colonial Secretary, and the colonial delegates, which was to subsist for five years, and which expired next December, and it was upon that agreement that the present Bill was based, although several alterations in favour of this country had been introduced into the present Bill. The scheme had now become part of the proposed Confederation of the North-American Provinces. The two schemes of the Confederation and of the construction of the railway were bound up together. It was now clear that the one could not stand without the other, and every argument that had been cordially accepted by the House of Commons in favour of the union between the provinces applied with equal force to the guarantee of a loan for the construction of the line. It was impossible that the question of the construction of the line could be separated from that of the guarantee, inasmuch as the colony could scarcely raise £3,000,000, the amount required for the construction of the line, at less than 6 per cent on their own security, whereas with the guarantee of this country they could borrow that sum at 4 per cent. At present colonial stock was at par at 6 per cent, and to throw £3,000,000 of fresh stock on the market would be productive of great embarrassment. The construction of this line was the key to the success of the Confederation, and was essential to it in a commercial and a defensive point of view. Without this line for six months in the year, the inland portion of the Confederation would be entirely cut off from communication with the sea; and this country could not use it for the passage of troops, while the long line of frontier would be in an absolutely defenceless condition. The only way of making the new Confederation independent of the United States was to construct this important railway, which would enable Canada to develop itself, and rely entirely upon her own resources. Whatever risk the Imperial Government might run in guaranteeing this loan, it would run a still greater risk in refusing its assent to the only proposal that would enable the colony to maintain itself. If this guarantee were refused, the North-American States would remain in their old condition, in which they could hardly fail to invite aggression which they would be unable to repel. On the other hand, the guarantee might be given without running the slightest risk. The proposal now offered in the Bill was far more favourable to this country than that contained in the agreement which was assented to by the late Government, who had to deal with the question under much less favourable circumstances than at present existed. The late Government had to deal with three separate colonies, and to apportion the charges among three distinct revenues, whereas the present Government had to deal with one Confederated body politic, and with one revenue. It was possible, under the old conditions, that one of the colonies might have become exhausted before the scheme was completed, whereas now the scheme formed part and parcel of the united policy and enterprize of Confederation. The colonists were more deeply interested in it than they could have been under distinct Governments. Canada no longer looked to Portland for her outlet. Another alteration in the engagement favourable to this country was that instead of—as proposed by the late Government—the sinking fund being based on decennial periods, so that during the first ten years there was no provision made towards it, it was to begin from the very moment the line was commenced, and was to be calculated at the rate of 1 per cent upon the whole sum guaranteed, so that the entire loan would be repaid by annual and easy instalments, in about forty years, thus greatly reducing any possible risk incurred by this country. In one point, however, the present proposal was not so favourable as the former agreement. The late Government were enabled to stipulate that Parliament should not be called upon to legislate until the line of railway was actually fixed, whereas under existing circumstances it was necessary that Parliament should assent to the conditions required of them before they could know which of the three proposed lines was to be adopted. When the new Parliament of Canada assembled they would form a judgment as to which of the three surveyed lines it would be best to carry out, and would then refer their decision to Her Majesty for Her approval. Again, the security offered for the loan was a new revenue, instead of the three old ones; but he could show that the maximum of liability was more than covered by the minimum of security. The line involving the largest expenditure in its construction was the Eastern line running on the borders of the St. Lawrence, which was the one recommended by Major Robinson and by Mr. Light, who was for many years Chief Engineer of Works at New Brunswick. They had reports from these gentlemen and also a report from a gentleman who had been engaged in making a special survey by the Canadian Government. The calculation of Major Robinson gave £7,700 per mile as the greatest average cost of constructing either of those lines. The estimate of Mr. Light was rather higher, amounting to £8,300 per mile; but then Mr. Light acknowledged that Major Robinson's estimate would be perfectly sufficient to provide for the opening of the line, and stated that he had fixed upon a higher sum because he had taken into consideration some solid works which, after all, a railway might safely do without at its first starting. Some judgment might be formed from the cost of existing railways. The cost of the railway from Shediac to St. John's, in the construction of which the greatest engineering difficulties had to be overcome, averaged, £8,300 per mile. It was true that the Grand Trunk Railway, in its Eastern branch running to Quebec, cost £8,800 per mile; but that line was made under great disadvantages, not only from the disturbed state of the money-market at the time when means were raised for it, but also from other contemporary circumstances. Some hon. Members might, perhaps, think that the proposed railway was in itself an unpromising speculation. Hon. Members might possibly believe that it would be unprofitable, because it would be blocked in winter. Certain portions of the Grand Trunk Railway were much more liable to such accidents than any of the lines proposed, and yet that railway had scarcely ever been stopped in winter, the longest stoppage not exceeding three days. It was not, however, a guarantee of profits that he asked, but only of interest on a fixed loan to be paid off in forty years. He asked for the guarantee of interest, independently of the success of the railroad, and irrespective of any dividend upon shares, The security was wholly independent of the profit or success of the undertaking—independent even of the completion of the railway, though the Bill would take ample means to secure that object. Although the highest average sum expended upon any railway in Canada was £8,800, he would go still higher, and take the cost of the proposed line at £9,000 per mile. The length of the longest of the proposed lines was 470 miles, which, at £9,000 per mile, would give a sum exceeding £4,000,000. That would throw upon Canada the raising of an extra £1,000,000 beyond the £3,000,000 guaranteed, and they would have to raise it on their own credit, which they could not do at a less interest than 6 per cent. The maximum and greatly outside calculation of charge on Canadian revenue which he was offering was therefore a payment at the rate of 4 per cent on the £3,000,000 guaranteed, which would amount to £120,000 a year; a sinking fund at 1 per cent, which would amount to £30,000, and the interest at the rate of 6 per cent on the extra £1,000,000, which would be £60,000, making in all an annual payment for forty years of £210,000. He would ask the House next to consider the security—the consolidated revenue of Canada—upon which it was proposed to charge the interest of the sum guaranteed and of the sinking fund, and any sum this country might have to pay, and any extra suns Canada might have to raise. The only charges upon the revenue of Canada which would have precedence over these charges were those specified in the Confederation Bill—first, the cost of col- lecting the revenue; second, the interest of Canada's present debt, about £12,000.000; and third, the future salary of the Governor General, £10,000 a year. There was a difficulty in determining what the revenue would hereafter amount to, inasmuch as the intercolonial duties between one province and the other would cease under the Confederation scheme—a deprivation of revenue, however, which was attended with the certain advantage of conducing greatly to the development of the Confederated commerce and industry. The future Canadian revenue would, he believed, be fully able to bear this charge of £210,000, only £21,000 more than the separate Governments as surplus last year were able to devote in the payment of debt. But the revenue of the United Government was not a fixed sum, but was made to correspond with the requirements of their Government year by year. The revenue of Canada was likely to rise to its requirements. The debt of Canada was £12,000,000. But how was this debt created? The public debt of the country, unlike the debts of other countries, which had been, as a rule, incurred to meet the charges of war and of unproductive expenditure, had been incurred in the promotion of public and remunerative works. It had, too, been met by the establishment of a sinking fund, and under the operation of that fund the debt was gradually decreasing every year. Canada upon all occasions had been able and ready to meet her engagements, and he would ask the Committee to consider the important fact that when in 1842 this country guaranteed the loan of £1,500,000 for public works, the revenue of Canada was only £300,000 a year. The revenue now amounted to £2,500,000. With the former revenue of £300,000, however, Canada paid off the loan nine years before it because due. As it was, the taxation per head of the population was annually decreasing, and at this moment it was not more then 15s. per head—no very alarming amount compared with that of almost every other country. A short statement which he would give the Committee would show the progress and the state of the country. Between 1851 and 1864 the tonnage of vessels entering the North American ports had increased from 1,250,000 to 2,500,000, the exports from 4,000,000 dollars to 40,000,000 dollars, and the imports, exclusive of bullion, from 9,000,000 dollars to 21,000,000 dollars. During the same period the number of letters had increased from 3,500,000 to 7,000,000, and the number of post offices in the country from 843 to 2,197. The population, also, had nearly doubled in the same period. The increase of growth in a young colony like this went on not at an arithmetical, but a geometrical rate. The Confederation would take away the languor of dependence upon England which had hitherto paralysed the divided Governments. Having clearly shown that his exaggerated estimate of liabilities which he had set down at £210,000 a year, including the principal and sinking fund and any possible extra charge, would be more than counter-balanced by a yearly increasing revenue, and amply supported by growing wealth, he would proceed to state the provisions of the Bill. In the first place, it would enable the Treasury to guarantee interest at 4 per cent on £3,000,000, to be strictly appropriated to the construction of a line adopted by the Canadian Parliament and approved by Her Majesty. But the guarantee would not be given by the Treasury unless the Canadian Parliament had, within two years, passed Acts—first, for the construction of the line; secondly, for its constant use at all times for the conveyance of troops of Her Majesty; thirdly, for the prevention of any charges on the Consolidated Fund and security of the whole of the charge in respect of the loan on Canadian revenue; and lastly—he wished particularly to call attention to this—for the postponing, in order of security, of any other charge for any public works undertaken by the Canadian Government. Whatever public works might be from this time undertaken by the colony, to be charged on their revenue, such charge must come after the charge for the guarantee of £3,000,000, after the charge for the sinking fund, and after any extra sum which might be necessary to be raised by the Canadian Government for the completion of the railroad. A more complete and sure guarantee for the speedy and faithful completion of the railway could not, in his opinion, be framed. All the local as well as the central governing bodies of Canada, would unite in urging on the rapid completion of the scheme, in order that the revenue of the country might be at their command for the furtherance of other works. Objectors to the scheme had magnified the possibility of unfortunate contingencies in the future fate of Canada. They had said that the new scheme of Confederation was an experi- ment, and that it was impossible to tell whether Canada would be independent in the course of a few years, or be annexed to the United States. But such gratuitous considerations as these should not, in his opinion, weigh with the Committee. If Canada were ever annexed to the United States, which this Confederation would render most improbable, our separations would take place either amicably or hostilely. If amicably, Canada's liabilities would be taken by her new connections with Canada's assets. If it were attempted to wrest Canada from the mother country by the sword, England must trust to success in war for the power to make terms at its conclusion. Upon this point he wished to offer one remark. If England desired that Canada should remain with her—and he, for his part, hoped that the two would long be connected—the way to bind their interests was by taking a liberal view of any common enterprize. If Canada were one of the United States at the present time, they would not have to apply to the Central Government for a guarantee—Congress would furnish the required means as for a national undertaking. The right hon. Member for Calne (Mr. Lowe) appeared to doubt that statement; but there could be no doubt that this railway would be of far more value to the United States, if Canada were joined to them, than the Great Pacific Railway, for the opening of the far West, and they knew what Congress was doing for that. How unwise, then, would it be for England to disappoint the expectations which successive Home Governments had raised among Canadians with respect to this guarantee. He would make no further observations with respect to the risks and contingencies conjured up by objectors to the measure; they were all infinitesimal in character, and to the last degree improbable, if not wholly chimerical.

said, he thought the right hon. Gentleman's remark that he had the greatest possible dislike to guarantees was a very extraordinary introduction to an argument in favour of this particular guarantee, notwithstanding he had spoken of it as one of exceptional character, calculated greatly to benefit the colony. A very weighty objection to the Motion was that guarantees were diametrically opposed to principles of political economy. It had been said that this guarantee would not entail any loss to this country; but he should not be at all surprised if England had eventually to pay every penny of it. But whether she did or not, the proposition was unsound in principle and unfair to the taxpayers. At the present time money was exceedingly dear, railways at home were in difficulties from want of money, some having to pay 6 per cent for it. It would be a great advantage to them if they could get money at low interest and a Government guarantee; yet the Government denied them relief, and made English taxpayers liable for the debts of colonial undertakings. The proposal was totally contrary to the policy by which those on the chief Opposition Benches had gained their reputation, yet he was afraid that they also had given their consent to the scheme. It had been said that the Colonial Office had given pledges that almost amounted to a convention to do this thing; but he protested against the House of Commons being bound in matters of money by any such promises. He maintained that in a commercial and military point of view it was not expedient to depart from principle and grant a guarantee in the particular instance of that railway. The trade of Canada naturally flowed through the St. Lawrence, and its products were so bulky that they could not be advantageously conveyed by railway. An experienced railway engineer had stated that the line could never possibly pay one farthing. Then, in a military point of view, it would not only not be beneficial, but would be positively injurious to accede to this proposal, because it would hold out hopes to the colonists which it would not be in our power to fulfil. That railway traversed several hundred miles of country, and a portion of it passed in a line parallel with the St. Lawrence, at a very short distance from the United States frontier. It would be easy for the Americans, if they ever had the desire to invade Canada—which he hoped they never would have—to advance a force sufficient to cut the line and render it perfectly useless. We had difficulty enough already in obtaining an adequate supply of recruits for our army. We could never send out the forces requisite to protect that railway, or to cope with the enormous masses of men that would be thrown across the American frontier, if the United States ever seriously contemplated the invasion of Canada. Moreover, troops alone would not suffice for such a purpose. He believed the late Duke of Wellington had said that if they had not the command of the Lakes they could never defend Canada. We had now on those Lakes three gunboats, each with a crew of thirty-five men and an armament of one gun. The Americans had six vessels of double the tonnage of ours. The question was, which nation could increase its armament in the shortest time? It would be in the power of the United States Government to bring from their arsenals and sea-ports vessels of war, guns, and stores, and everything requisite for the speedy construction and equipment of a fleet, and thus obtain the command of the Lakes. He would be glad to hear from the Under Secretary of the Colonies in what manner he thought it was possible, under such circumstances, to prevent our flag from being driven from the Lakes of America within one year. They were asked to construct railways to convey troops when they had no troops to send and no fortresses in which troops could be concentrated. It would be of no use sending troops unless there were fortifications. Quebec was a strongly fortified city, and had been called by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxford (Mr. Cardwell) "the door of Canada;" and a proposal had also been made to fortify a strong position on the Lakes; but the defence of the country would have to be left to the colonists. Would the right hon. Gentleman tell them whether any military men of eminence were of opinion that it was possible to defend Canada, with their reasons for their opinion, and the amount of force they thought would be sufficient? The house had not been put in possession of such information; neither had they positive information in regard to the estimated cost of the proposed railway. The right hon. Gentleman had made a statement with regard to several lines; but he did not tell them that any line had been fixed upon. The House should be satisfied that no other guarantee would be required, and that no further cost should be incurred. The line was not fixed upon because the Parliament of Canada—that was to meet next year—was to fix upon the line to be adopted.

I mentioned that there are three lines from which the selection is to be made, and that the plans are in the Library.

But we do not know which of them is to be the line fixed upon.

I have mentioned the most expensive.

said, they should have an estimate of the cost for each particular line, and the basis on which the estimate was founded. He objected to the proposal of the Government because the proposed line would be useless in a commercial point of view, and worse than useless as a means of defence, and because they were not in possession of the estimated cost of the works to be constructed. He begged to move, as an Amendment, that the Resolution proposed by the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary be rejected.

said, he had enjoyed considerable experience with reference to the cost of railways, and begged to second this Motion. He begged to explain that he had some local knowledge of the place through which the proposed line would pass. He had listened with attention to the right hon. Gentleman, and was quite unable, with his experience on the subject, to agree with him. The only advantage he could see in the whole thing was that it would be a colossal job. He did not mean to say it would be a job on the part of the right hon. Gentleman or on the part of the Government; but from his knowledge of the conduct of the colonists and of the local authorities, he believed it would be a job for them—not merely during the period over which it was proposed to extend the construction of the railway, but for a generation at least. He believed that most of the stations led from nowhere to nowhere—and most of the residences referred to along the line were wooden huts. The circulating medium was greatly made up of grain, meat, and poultry, and he did not envy the ticket porters. The Colonial Government originally proposed that they should not only pay for the construction of the line, but work it. The projectors must know that it would never pay its working expenses at all, and that in a few years they would pass out of existence as a railway company, whatever guarantee might be given. The right hon. Gentleman said that this proposal was part of the Confederation scheme. He did not see the connection. The right hon. Gentleman said the Canadian Government could not borrow money under 6 per cent. That should be a proof to any man's mind that the security they offered was not good. Representing taxpayers of England, he could not see the advantage of guaranteeing a loan for men who could not raise money under 6 per cent, and he very much doubted if they could raise it at that amount. The right hon. Gentleman said that it would make the Canadians independent of the United States. He could not see how this country could have such a great interest in so entirely severing the Canadians from the United States. He thought the safety of that country consisted in friendly communication with the United States. Anything that would cause dissension would only provoke the very danger they were always apprehending. What produced most humiliation on the part of Englishmen in communicating with the people of the United States was the weakness of the Canadian frontier. It would be better to have the whole onus of its defence thrown on Canada itself, and no such measure as this so likely to produce the very danger they wished to avoid. If, instead of giving the colony £3,000,000 with the view of separating it from the United States, we were to give £10,000,000 of money to join and unite them, it would be more patriotic. The Americans knew the weakness of our Canadian frontier, and in the time of our trouble they would not forget it. The right hon. Gentleman said in one part of his speech there would be no risk, and in another part he said there would be a minimum risk. He said that Canada had paid a previous debt; but that was what was always done by men wanting to borrow money. They always paid small debts with the view of incurring large debts. The right hon. Gentleman said there was a surplus of income over expenditure in the colony; but if he (Mr. Thomas Cave) knew anything of figures, the reverse was the fact. In the way that some of the balance-sheets of railways were made up it was excessively easy to show anything plainly. He was reminded of his experience in America in connection with certain railways. Speaking to a railway director after dinner, he (Mr. Thomas Cave) complained that he had induced him to invest his money in a certain part of the world on certain promises made in a certain prospectus. To this remark the hon. director replied: "Why, you don't understand it, evidently. When we have to get up a railway, we draw up a prospectus and promise to the European public as much interest as we think they would like to get. We put down the estimated population between the two points, and we make the first issue of shares, and get the money." He (Mr. Thomas Cave) begged to remark that this director did not state to him what be (Mr. Thomas Cave) afterwards heard, that the director bought the land between the two places and sold it at an enormous profit. He (Mr. Thomas Cave) did not mean to say that these gentlemen would do anything so fearfully wicked. The director farther stated that with the prospectus in his hand he applied to London financial men, and was able to get enough of money to make one-third of the line. Then he published a statement announcing that in consequence of the difficulties they had to encounter, and the morasses through which they had to pass, they required more money, and proposed to raise it on first mortgage bonds. They always got this money on first mortgage bonds. Then they made another one-third—and, added the director, "We then always leave it to the shareholders and first mortgage bondholders to finish." He (Mr. Thomas Cave) feared that that must really be the result of this proposition. He had been selected as one of four Members of the House to investigate the affairs of the Atlantic and Great Western Railway, and that railway, with all its advantages—being able to carry all it wanted—running through a coal-field, and having its own coals—cost £24,000 a mile. He did not say all that money had been spent on the line; part of the money had been spent in jobbery; but there was jobbery in all parts of the world, and there might be jobbery on the railway they were going to make. In seconding the rejection of the Resolution he must express his belief that this money was nothing more nor less than hush-money.

My hon. Friends who have just addressed the House have both spoken with great ability. My hon. Friend who spoke last, especially, has made good use, and very naturally, of the authority which belongs to his American experience for the purpose of discrediting a proposal which does not, I think, fall exactly within the category which he has described. Of course, upon the question of the natural obstacles in the way of the commercial success of this railway, it would be unpardonable presumption on me to enter into a contest with my hon. Friend. I am not competent to pronounce an opinion on that part of the case. But I may, I think, without detracting from his authority, say, in reply to a charge that this undertaking is tainted by a spirit of jobbery, that it is not a device and contrivance of certain gentlemen meeting together on their own private responsibility, and trusting to their own wits for the purpose of taking in the public. It is a scheme that has had the sanction of a series of free Governments for a long period of years, who, representing a population of our own birth and race, have adopted it as calculated to be beneficial in its results. The amount of authority which may be brought in support of the plan is of such a character, that I do not think we should simply observe the rules of prudence, in the attitude we assume, in the face of the colonies, or that we should be justified, if we set down at zero the whole of the assurances already given, and all the practical steps taken by the responsible authorities of the colonies. Some confidence and trust we must have in the mechanism of free Governments. The devising of this plan has been the work of a long series of years, and now it comes before us with, at any rate, the recommendation which can be drawn from a sanction of that kind. At the same time, the question we have to consider to-night is one entirely different from that of the goodness or badness of this railway as a commercial speculation. Should my hon. Friend be accurate in his estimation of the paying qualities of the railway when he says it will never, or at any rate will not for a long time, discharge its own working expenses, still I hold that it would not be wise in us to enter too minutely into an investigation of that matter. The guarantee which we are asked to give does not relate in any way to the productiveness of this undertaking. It is a guarantee to be given for the Colonial Government, and the safety of that is to be estimated by the credit, revenue, and good faith of that Government. Therefore I ant not over-scrupulous with respect to the paying qualities of this railway, and I do not wish to see the debate turn on such a consideration; for then, if the augury of my hon. Friend proved true, we should give an excuse to our fellow-subjects to turn round on us and plead their disappointment and ask for the remission of this debt, which I do not believe they will do. This is a proposal with respect to which the late Government are just as responsible as the present; and therefore I am desirous of taking an early opportunity of stating the view which the late Government took, and which I hope the House will take of this proposal. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman first distinctly stated that neither we nor anybody are entitled to hold a free Parliament engaged or trammelled in any degree by the promises of two Administrations to apply to Parliament for a guarantee in respect of this proposal, which undoubtedly is brought forward in immediate connection with the great scheme already sanctioned by Parliament for the union of the British North-American Colonies. It was always made clear to the colonial authorities that it was not within our power or inclination to fetter the judgment of the House of Commons with respect to the liability to be fixed on the British Exchequer, and therefore I trust that hon. Gentlemen will look at this question with the feeling that they are about to exercise a free, and therefore a responsible judgment. It was always understood that this, which is called a guarantee on a loan to be raised for the construction of a railway, was, in point of fact, a financial transaction in respect to which we have no cognizance of railway companies, or anybody connected with them, but we deal simply with the exchequer of the State about to be created in British North America. I cannot but agree with those who are anxious to draw attention very fully to the serious nature of this proceeding. We may say with truth that we fairly expect that all the engagements about to be contracted with the province of Canada will be rigidly and exactly fulfilled; but it does not follow that the gift which the House is solicited to confer is a nominal or an empty gift. When we pledge the credit of England, we are laying an additional burden on the financial resources of this country. It matters not whether in a particular instance there will or will not be a call for the actual payment of the money. The principle is clear that a guarantee is a real obligation and burden undertaken by us. The real test of that circumstance is this. If, on the same day when in the City of London a large guarantee by the British Government was announced, it likewise happened that the Government had to go into the market and borrow £5,000,000 or £10,000,000 on their own account, they would not be able to raise the money on the same terms as they might have done before the guarantee was known. Therefore, let us not attempt to conceal from ourselves that the guarantee is a real burden. Many things have been said in this discussion in relation to the principles applicable to the military expense of the colony, in which I cannot but agree. The natural interpretation to be given to an expression which fell from the hon. Member for the Fife Burghs (Mr. Aytoun) is that it is to be inferred from this measure that the intention of the Government is to undertake increased responsibility and charge in reference to the military defence of the British North-American Colonies. A sentence, too, fell from my right hon. Friend (Mr. Adderley) from which, if criticized minutely, it might be inferred that, whereas Canada is without the means of defence, the construction of this railway is intended to enable this country to make greater efforts and undergo greater sacrifices in the ordinary and usual defence of that country. It appears to me beyond doubt that the construction of this railway will considerably increase the means of military defence or military aid to Canada if a case of necessity should arise. But while I say this, I must add that so far from considering this guarantee as an expression of the will and readiness of any Government of this country, or of Parliament, to undertake additional responsibility with respect to the ordinary work of the defence of the Province of Canada, I place on it exactly an opposite construction; and but for that opposite construction I should find it impossible to justify the proposal now made. I look on this guarantee as a measure auxiliary to the great work of Confederation. It is collateral to that great work the purpose of which is the development of the resources of the colonies, the increase of their wealth and strength, and along with that the gradual and, I trust, the speedy development of their self-reliance. I do not conceal from myself that we have been for a long time, to a great extent, in a false position with respect to the condition of colonial defence, and nowhere has it been so seriously exhibited as on the Canadian frontier. If Canada is to be defended, the main element and power in the defence must always be the energy of a free people fighting for their own liberties. That is the centre around which alone the elements of defence can be gathered, and the real responsibility for the defence must lie with the people themselves. But we have had a colonial system, which attempts have been of late made to modify, the characteristic of which was to throw the whole responsibility for defence not only on the Exchequer, but on the mind and thought of this country, and to place on our military department the charge and expense of the military service for the colonies, just as much as if those colonies were a portion of the there is hardly three kingdoms, and just as if they were not inhabited by an intelligent and free population. The escape from a false position of that kind is no easy matter. You cannot do it by a simple arbitrary modification of your military system. You must look to giving a higher civil and political position to these communities themselves. Much has been done in that way. We have for a full quarter of a century acknowledged absolutely the right of self-government in the colonies. But while we have made great advance in that sense, we have made very little advance with regard to many of the legitimate cousequences of that position. It is impossible to conceive anything more complete than our acknowledgment of those rights of selfgovernment. We do not expect the laws of Canada or of Australasia to be modelled according to our own ideas. We grant them a greater freedom from interference than as amongst the three kingdoms the Legislature grants to the peculiar ideas that may happen to prevail in one of those three. We have carried it to this point, that as far as regards the Administration, I believe it may be said that the only officer appointed by the Colonial Secretary is the Governor; and I believe there cannot be a doubt that if it were the well-ascertained desire of the colonies to have the appointment of their own Governor, the Imperial Parliament would at once make over to them that power. We have gone further: because if there is any one thing which we are entitled to insist upon as a limit to that self-government, it is that British merchandise should enter into these provinces upon certain terms; but instead of that, the assent of the Queen has been given to Acts imposing duties of 10, 15, 20, and 25 per cent upon products of English industry entering Canada. These, Sir, are very serious matters, and I hope that their very magnitude will secure for them attention according to their gravity and importance. How are we to rectify what requires rectification in our relations with British North America? I must say we are in the path of reason and prudence as well as equity and liberality. We have passed a measure by the unanimous assent of the House, and with a pumptitude which if it had been a matter of legislation affecting ourselves would have been precipitancy. But when one thinks it was an acknowledgment of the title of these colonies to deal practically with their own affairs—with a speed of which there is hardly an example—we have passed a measure for uniting these colonies together, and we hope—nay, I feel confident—that the result of that measure will be the development along that great extent of territory of a stronger sense of political existence, more self-reliance, and more self-relying habits. For we must not conceal it from ourselves, that if up to this time the sentiments of British North Americans with regard to self-defence has to some extent separated the burdens of freedom from the spirit of freedom the fault has been mainly ours. It was the overshadowing power and design and determination of this country which formed our colonial system by placing on us the responsibility of its defence. We have to bring about a different state of things. The best way to do it is to raise their political position to the very highest point we can possibly bring it, in order that elevated position their sense of responsibility may likewise grow. It cannot be too distinctly stated that it is in this light that we look upon the plan for uniting the Provinces of British North America. The evil which attends the old system, casting the burden of the responsibility of colonial defence wholly, or almost wholly, on this country, is not to be measured by the amount of pecuniary drain on our resources. Even if we were so to look at it it is a very serious thing. If we were to reckon and apportion the charge of our military Estimates occasioned by keeping a British force in these provinces it would startle many hon. Members. It is a very heavy charge indeed; and it is our duty in every way to get rid of it. But the evil in this particular case is by no means limited by that view. The system of vicarious defence—the system of having the burden of its frontier defence borne by another—enervates and depresses the tone of the country in which it prevails; and its withdrawal is necessary in order to bring the country to the full possession and enjoyment of freedom. Nay, more, in this instance who can doubt that the defence of the colonial frontier mainly by the force, and wholly on the responsibility of England has been recently a source of actual danger to Canada? Does any man believe that that most wicked outrage—hardly, I think, to be paralleled in the annals of piracy itself—the Fenian invasion of Canada, would ever have taken place if it had not been known that there was precisely the same power of wounding British honour through the medium of some success vainly hoped for against British troops as in case of an invasion of Great Britain herself? It is not necessary to pursue this line of remark. That illustration is a sufficient demonstration that for Canada to take on herself, as circumstances shall open themselves, the management and control of her whole frontier will be not only a means of raising her position in the world by the fulfilment of the duties of freedom, but it will be an escape from actual peril. I know of no objection that can be urged to the contemplation of a gradual, yet, I hope, speedy change of that kind, unless it be the idea that when you cease to take upon this country the ordinary burden of defence for the colonies you weaken the tie between them and the mother country. Now, when I have stated that it seems essential that British North America should largely undertake not only the charge but the responsibility of her own defence, I do not mean to say that in the event of the occurrence of danger the arm of this country would be shortened, or the disposition of this country to use its resources freely and largely in aid of that colony would be in the slightest degree impaired. On the other hand, my belief is that there would be no bounds to the efforts which this country would make for the purpose of aiding and supporting the North-American Provinces in their willing and energetic efforts to maintain their connection with this country. But that is a totally different thing from saying that this connection is to be maintained by the expenditure of large sums of money from the British Treasury, either by way of pomp and display in the colony or by way of attracting favour there by a lavish charge. No, Sir; the connection of this country with the British colonies is to be maintained on totally opposite principles. If there are those who think that the expenditure of money through the means of little standing armies kept in the colonies is to be the security for the maintenance of colonial connection, I ask why not do that with Australia? Has our connection with Australia been in the slightest degree weakened by the almost total withdrawal of British troops from the colony? The connection between this country and her colonies is not a selfish and sordid connection, and ought not to be so on one side or the other. No; it is at once a connection of interest, of honour, feeling, and duty. That feeling is never more recognised than at the present moment; and the more it is understood that there we are to look for the basis of the connection the more secure that connection is likely to be. These are the views that appear to me applicable to the present case. It is not administration, it is not interference, it is not imposing burdens on the colonies in any shape, to which we now look for maintaining our influence there and preserving the colonies as parts of the Empire. But if this be so—if our demands on them, such as they used to be, have been not reduced and diminished, but long ago abandoned, then undue demands on the other hand should not be made on the people of this country—more especially unjust and undue demands—as they do not belong to us and are mischievous, not more to us than to the people of the colonies themselves. This, Sir, is opening a very wide political discussion; but it is only by a survey of that field that the key to a measure of this kind can be obtained. It is not fair to say, how can you connect the construction of this railway with the development of these sentiments in the colonies—the creation of habits of self-reliance and the growth of the full tone of freedom? The ground on which it may be supported is this—that following the sentiments and convictions of the colonists themselves, this plan for the construction of a railway, for which we are now asked to guarantee a loan to the Colonial Government, has been associated with and incorporated in the scheme of Confederation itself. Consider it with reference to this scheme of Confederation, and if you believe the objects of that Confederation are such as are vitally important and beneficial to the relations of this country with our North-American Colonies, give the benefit of that consideration to the proposal now made. It is only on grounds of that kind that I support the proposal before the House. The general system of colonial guarantees is one which has come into just discredit within the walls of Parliament; and I would hope that only motives of the highest order will induce any Government to make proposals to the House of Commons for such guarantees. I believe the present guarantee does depend upon motives of policy belonging to a very high order, and intimately and inseparably associated with most just and most enlightened views of the true interests of the Empire.

Sir, the speech of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) naturally divides itself into two portions. The first, that in which he answered most of the arguments in favour of the measure before us, and the second, that in which he himself argued very forcibly against it. I thought that one of the arguments which would be principally relied on in favour of the measure would be that several Governments had agreed to this proposal and had pledged the faith of the House and of the country to it. But the right hon. Gentleman, with an authority second to none upon the subject, has taken upon himself to relieve us from this difficulty, and has told us that the matter is fairly and fully before us, and that we are not pledged in any way to anything. I have no doubt that the right hon. Gentleman is perfectly right in what he says; because, although it may be insisted that any treaty entered into by Government with a foreign Sovereign would bind us, however much we might disapprove, this does not apply to colonies governed by the same Sovereign as ourselves. I therefore entirely agree with the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that the House is perfectly free to adopt any course of action it may think fit to take in the discharge of its duty with reference to this question. The right hon. Gentleman has also relieved me from the necessity of showing, which I think it would be easy to do, that in a commercial point oh view, the construction of this line is perfectly useless, and in a military point of view it is highly dangerous. He says that he does not put the question upon the merits of the line, but upon other considerations. The House is perfectly aware that Canada has a communication already by means of the railway from Montreal with the town of Portland, in the State of Maine, which is a port open all the year round, so that for the purposes of commerce there is already a communication between Quebec and the Atlantic ocean. For commercial purposes, therefore, it is unnecessary to make this line. I am not competent to express an opinion upon the military ques- tion involved in the construction of this railway; but it does appear to me that if we make a railway within twenty miles of the frontier of Maine, the first act of the American Government in the event of a war with this country would be to seize the line. The question with us would be, whether it would not be preferable to destroy it rather than allow it to fall into their hands. Whether they would think it worth while utterly to destroy it or to use it for the conveyance of their own troops I leave it to a military man to determine; but it appears to me that seated on horseback—as is the military phrase—on that line, the American troops would effectually interpose themselves between Halifax and Quebec, between one part and the other of the Confederation, against either or both of which they might act at their pleasure. Therefore, in constructing this railway, I believe that we are making a formidable auxiliary to America if ever she chooses to invade Canada. Then, although I am already discharged by the right hon. Gentleman from the necessity of doing so, I may take the liberty of saying that a more hopeless undertaking than this railway it would be impossible to conceive. Any person conversant with the country will tell you that it is impossible it can pay its working expenses. Engineers will tell you that, owing to the severity of the climate and the desolate regions through which it passes, it must be closed during a large portion of the year, and yet this is the line that is to be constructed especially to enable troops to be brought up from Halifax to Quebec, when the St. Lawrence is closed. The country through which it is to pass is one most difficult for the construction of works of this description, since it consists of a succession of parallel ridges and of deep valleys, which will render it impossible for the line to be constructed without a great number of cuttings and viaducts being made. I am also informed upon authority that it is quite ridiculous to suppose the line could be made for anything like the highest estimate that has been laid before us. But we are discharged from considering all this. The question we have to consider, the right hon. Gentleman says, is not what is to be done with this railway when constructed—indeed it does not matter, according to the right hon. Gentleman, whether the money is spent upon the railway at all, or whether it is misappropriated, so long as we have good security for its repayment—because the loan is intended to serve a higher purpose. But I think it does matter to what use the money is to be applied. I think it is not consistent with the dignity or the good sense of the House that we should be calling upon the people of this country to take upon themselves a financial burden in order to facilitate the construction of such a line as has been described. If I am wrong in my calculation—and I certainly do not speak from personal knowledge of the matter—let us, at all events, have an inquiry into the matter. The right hon. Gentleman has relieved us from the necessity of discussing the ruinous fallacy that "It is only giving our name," for when we give our name we are incurring a pecuniary liability, and that we have no right to do unless this country is to obtain some equivalent advantage from the engagement. Proceeding a step further, I next come to ask why is it that, all these arguments being so satisfactorily refuted by the right hon. Gentleman, we are asked to give our guarantee for this loan? The answer is because it is auxiliary to the Confederation. This does not appear to me to be a very intelligible phrase; but I will endeavour to analyze it in a moment. Another reason given is that, as the right hon. Gentleman says, and says with truth, we have got into a false position with regard to our North-American colonies in connection with military matters, and that we must get out of it. We have in some degree debauched the minds of the colonies by being over-ready with our men in defending them, and over-ready with our money in the way of military expenditure. This is all exceedingly true; but how does this prove that we ought to guarantee them £3,000,000 more. It seems to me that the argument goes exactly the contrary way. If we are to teach our colonies self-reliance, and if they are really to undertake their own defence, we should not commence by furnishing them with British credit. This is essentially a military scheme. If we are to find the guarantee to enable the scheme to be carried out, how does that inculcate the principle of self-reliance among the colonies? I am not able to state the amount of our military expenditure for the purposes of Canadian defence, but it must be something enormous—certainly more than £1,000,000, and this has to be undertaken by a poorer country in favour of a richer; for, judged by any test, the inhabitants of Canada are indisputably better off than are the taxpayers of this country. And, notwithstanding this vast annual expenditure on their behalf, we are now asked to guarantee the loan of this large sum. This, then, is the way the question stands at this moment, and there only remains one other consideration, and that is, are we justified in guaranteeing this loan because it is "auxiliary to the plan of the Confederation?" As a plain man, what I understand by this loan being auxiliary to the plan of the Confederation is this—that it is the price this country is to pay for the Confederation being entered into by our North-American colonies. That is a very serious question indeed. I, as a Member of Parliament, was quite willing to give my consent to the Act for the Confederation, because the people themselves wanted it, but there I say our responsibility should end; and I protest against our taking upon ourselves the responsibility of inducing the colonies to enter into such a confederation. I do not see why, because we are assenting to the colonies adopting any form of government they may choose, we are to take upon ourselves to find the money for them to undertake this scheme. I think that by bribing them to enter into this Confederation by guaranteeing this sum, we are taking upon ourselves a responsibility which we shall one day deeply rue. I object to this measure for exactly the reasons that induce the right hon. Gentleman to advocate it—namely, because it is "auxiliary to the Confederation," It is because by voting this money for carrying out this scheme which the right hon. Gentleman truly says has been incorporated into and made a part of the Confederation, not with the view of any pecuniary advantage to this country, but only to smooth away the objections the colonies themselves might have had to the plan of Confederation, and perhaps to draw the colonies and the mother country into a closer relationship as borrower and surety, that I object to this proposal. For my own part, I do not think that this plan of Confederation is calculated to work satisfactorily; but it is the wish of the people of the colonies that it should be carried into execution, therefore I can make no objection to it. But I do object to its being supposed that they have been induced to enter into this scheme by pecuniary considerations. But I object to the measure upon much larger grounds. This plan of inducing the colonies by persuasion and by the influence of a loan of public money, to enter into a particular form of Government is fraught with this evil, that we represent ourselves to them and to the world as taking a peculiar interest in the manner in which they choose to regulate their internal affairs and their relations with the United States. Now that we have given them self-government, let them manage their affairs their own way, and do not let us Hake ourselves responsible for the manner in which they regulate their internal or foreign relations. The management of our own affairs is quite sufficient for us without our mixing ourselves up in matters with which we have no concern, and over which we do not for a moment profess to exercise the slightest control. I think the reason given by the hon. Member for Barnstable (Mr. Thomas Cave) against entering into this arrangement is of immense cogency. We are setting up this Confederation—or, at least, we shall not be acquitted of such an intention in the eyes of America—as a rival to the United States. ["No, no!"] It is said that we are setting up the Confederation in order that they may defend themselves against aggression; but I say that we are setting them up as a rival to the United States. ["No, no!"] To my mind nothing could be more foolish or more unworthy of us as a nation than such an attempt; while, at the same time, nothing could be more fatal or more ridiculous than such an act on our part. I am not going to repeat all that I have said on previous occasions upon this subject, as to the absurdity of thinking that we can defend these colonies against any attack by the United States; but I must repeat that I object to any step being taken that can be construed into a sort of challenge or defiance to the United States, or that would lead them to suppose that we contemplate by any act, by making a railway, or by any other job, to make these colonies a match for them. You have on the one hand a country like Canada, using the word in its new sense, with 1,500 miles of frontier, and a population of 3,800,000, and do you think you can make her a match for the United States, with its population of 35,000,000, merely by the aid of a few thousand men, whom, in all probability, in the event of a war you would not be able to send to her assistance? The idea is the most ridiculous and chimerical that can possibly be. It is because this scheme does point in this direction, it is because the ominous word "defence" is mixed up with it, that I more especially object to this House being dragged into this guarantee. The position I wish to maintain with regard to the American colonies is to do our duty towards them as far as in us lies, but not to undertake impossibilities. We are in America somewhat in the position of the Plantagenets in France about the time that the French Monarchy was consolidated—namely, encumbered with large dominions which a mistaken sense of honour forbade them to get rid of, although unable to defend them. What we ought to do is to cultivate the most peaceful relations with the United States, and for that purpose we should abstain from taking any measures which could be construed by that country into a hostile attitude. We are not able to carry it out, and therefore had better not attempt it. We are at peace now with the United States, and my hope is that Canada may be preserved from invasion by that country—in the first place, by the good sense and moderation of the people of that country, and next by a similar reason that would prevent Italy invading Norway—namely, by the climate. I hope the House will consider seriously the step they are about to take, and that if they determine to enter upon this step they will put in this Bill some very stringent securities to provide that the money spent under our guarantee shall be applied to the purpose for which it is voted, and that it shall not stick to any one's fingers in its progress to this charming railway that is to be constructed. Agreeing as I do mainly in principle with my right hon. Friend, I submit that I draw the more logical inferences of the two. Our principles are common; our conclusions are exactly contrary. It is for the House to judge which conclusions are better founded. I was examined before a Committee of the House of Commons three or four years ago on the military defence of the colonies, and I made an observation, which I beg to repeat—

"In the time of the American Revolution the colonies separated from England because she insisted on taxing them. What I apprehend as likely to happen now is that England will separate from her colonies because they insist on taxing her."

said, that in following the right hon. Gentleman he felt very much as a quiet Roman citizen must have done on passing the chief gladiator in the street—inclined to pass over to the other side, and to have nothing to say to him for fear of the consequences. But some years ago he was requested by the late Duke of Newcastle to make inquiries, which convinced him that the hobgoblin fears expressed that night in regard to the construction of this 375 miles of railway were unfounded. Let hon. Members remember that Her Majesty's American dominions extended over an area equal to one-eighth of the habitable globe. This railway gave us communication not only with Canada, and with 10,000 miles of American railways, but with the vast tract of British territory extending across to the Pacific. The consequence of making this railway would be that two days would be saved in going from England to the Northern Continent of America, including the great corn-growing district of the west. If the House had seen, as he had seen, the Canadian Volunteers turn out in bitter weather to repel a threatened invasion without a red coat near them, they would think that the right hon. Gentleman's taunts might have been spared. The British provinces had taxed themselves £360,000 a year for the execution of their portion of those works which Lord Durham had proposed in 1838, with the object of binding together by the means of physical communication the varied sections of the Queen's American dominions. The evidence of every military man, including Sir John Michell, the present Commander-in-Chief in Canada, was that this railway was absolutely necessary for the military defence of the colonies. It was, however, to be defended not merely on that ground, but on that of its great commercial advantage. There were now in the Government offices memorials from many of the large towns in the three kingdoms concurring in the commercial necessity and advantage of the measure which the House was now asked to agree to. Therefore, originating as it did with Lord Durham, sanctioned as it was by Lord Grey's proposals of 1851, adopted by the late and the present Government, demanded for purposes of defence, as also for the more genial and generous objects of commerce and of peace, he hoped the House would support the construction of the railway by a guarantee which would not cost this country a shilling.

said, he wished, before the Speaker left the Chair, to make a few remarks generally on the way in which this Bill had always been treated by successive Governments. He was far from imputing blame to the present Administration, who had merely followed the example of their predecessors; but he must blame on public grounds the habit that had grown up and been followed for a long series of years of treating with neglect one of the most important Bills that could be passed by Parliament. It was regarded at the Revolution as the very foundation of the liberties of Englishmen, and was estimated as the great bulwark of the Constitution; but in modern times it was treated as a mere matter of form, with no greater respect than an old almanack. Upon the principle that they should not look a gift horse in the mouth it was put before them on official authority, as if they were to swallow everything wholesale that might be tendered them at the hands of the officials. So much was this the case, that it was considered as a great favour when consent was given by the late Administration to place a few copies is the Vote Office to make this Bill accessible to Members. Last year his attention had been roused by a particular clause in the Bill, and he thought it his duty to look through it, and it was only by making a vigorous complaint that the Bill, which was not then printed, was made available to Members. Why should such a measure be treated in this cursory manner, when even a turnpike Bill was printed and circulated before the second reading? On many occasions the Bill had not been in print when the House was called upon to pass its early stages, and such conduct be considered was derogatory to the House. The officials had treated the Bill as a mere form. They produced it as they liked, and the question arose, were the officials superior to that House? The great office which had been established in Pall Mall, at a cost to the country of £200,000 a year, appeared to be under no control, and transacted its business in a manner no one could understand. The War Office was originally intended to act as a check upon the Horse Guards; but it appeared that the Secretary at War was nothing else but the humble servant of the Horse Guards. They could not tell at that moment with whom the chief command of the army rested, and all that they knew was that the authority of that House was almost set aside. A Motion was carried in that House the other day for the abolition of military flogging, and with what degree of respect was it treated? The Secretary for War (Sir John Pakington) announced that no manner of notice would be taken of it, and that everything would go on in the usual way. Since that he had heard that the right hon. Gentleman had not even the authority of the Horse Guards to make that announcement to the House. The right hon. Gentleman would be able to tell them how that was; but, if so, it was a very grave affair, and showed that the co-ordinate authorities were not in harmony with each other. The Mutiny Bill was generally passed at a late hour of the night and went through its succeeding stage next day. He contended that it should be circulated amongst Members in the usual way, and that proper intervals should take place between its different stages.

said, he quite concurred in the complaint made by the hon. Gentleman as to the non-distribution of the Bill. He believed the reason given was that it was to save the expense of a few additional copies, and the Yearly Indemnity Bill was treated in the same way. At present the arrangement was that the Bill was printed and deposited in the office, where a copy might be had by any Member who applied for it; but they were not distributed like other Bills, though in his opinion none that carne before the House deserved more serious consideration than the Mutiny Bill. The passing it was a mere farce, He was glad that the flogging clause was to be modified.

said, he en- tirely concurred with the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, and with his hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Darby Griffith), with regard to the great Constitutional importance of the Mutiny Bill; and he could assure his hon. Friend that he had not the slightest wish to treat the House with anything like disrespect, or to undervalue the importance of the question. He would remind his hon. Friend that the Mutiny Bill was introduced, if he was not mistaken, before he had entered upon his present office, and his experience was so short that it could hardly be expected that he should make any change in the usual practice. He believed his hon. Friend would find that the mode in which this Bill had been introduced in the present year was exactly in accordance with the practice of former years. The noble Lord opposite, who held the same position in the late Government, would confirm him when he said that the Mutiny Bill was not treated like other Bills, only because, year after year, it was, with some slight alterations, essentially the same Bill. [The MARQUESS of HARTINGTON: Hear, hear!] His hon. Friend had expressed some strong opinions as to the present relations between the War Office and the Horse Guards, having gone so far as to say that the Secretary of State for War was subordinate to the Horse Guards. Speaking from a very brief experience, he would say that his hon. Friend had taken a very erroneous view of the actual powers of the two Departments.

said, that what he meant when he spoke of the relations between the War Office and the Horse Guards was that it was difficult for the House and the country to understand which was responsible. He had spoken of the two Departments as co-ordinate, not of the the War Office being subordinate.

said, he wished to take that opportunity of noticing a fallacy which prevailed very much in military minds—namely, that it was by reason of the prerogative of the Crown that the power of the Sovereign over the army was established. That was not so. It was established by express Act of Parliament, without which the Crown could not make Articles of War or order courts martial.

moved the addition of the following words:—

"but no sentence of corporal punishment awarded by a Regimental Court Martial shall, except in the case of mutiny or aggravated insubordination next hereinafter mentioned, be put in execution in time of peace without the leave in writing of the General or other officer commanding the district or station in which the Court may be held."

said, he objected to the use of the words "aggravated insubordination," and he proposed to substitute "insubordination accompanied with personal violence." He did not think it would be an answer to say that "aggravated insubordination" was a technical term in use at courts martial. It was doubtful whether the term had a strict and well-defined interpretation even there. But as this was one of the three offences for which flogging was to be inflicted in time of peace, the House and the country ought to know distinctly what was meant by it. The words he proposed did not admit of a wrong interpretation. Taking into account the views held in the army with respect to flogging, he admitted that the concession made by the right hon. Baronet was a liberal one. He felt, however, that the definition of this particular offence ought to be put down in black and white, so that the most illiterate person might understand it. If the words, "insubordination accompanied with personal violence," were adopted, while he did not abate one jot of his opinions on the subject of flogging, he should be no party to pressing the matter further.

said, that the Government would meet the hon. Member in the spirit in which he had proposed his Amendment. The phrase hitherto used had always been "gross insubordination." That was nothing but a vituperative epithet. [Mr. OSBORNE: And so is "aggravated insubordination."] He admitted that there was some vagueness about it, and would therefore accept the words proposed by the hon. Member.

said, he would suggest the postponement of the clause. The question to be hereafter raised was whether corporal punishment in time of peace ought to be discontinued; but this clause anticipated the question. He thought it would be better to postpone this clause till after the new clause to be proposed by the Secretary at War had been discussed. As the question stood the House had expressed its opinion that flogging in the army should be abolished, and the clause if adopted would be inconsistent with that vote.

said, he thought would be better to postpone the clause. He hoped that before the Bill passed every officer and soldier in the army would know for what offences flogging might be inflicted.

said, he was of opinion that the Committee should not hastily postpone the consideration of the clause. There was no necessity to postpone it as it related to courts martial to be held in time of war, whereas the other clause referred to time of peace.

rose to move that Clause 22 be omitted, in order to substitute the clause of which he had given notice.

said, that the proper course would be for the right hon. Gentleman to say "No" to the proposal that Clause 22 should stand part of the Bill, and that the clause he proposed to substitute for it should be brought up as a new clause at the end of the Bill.

Sir, I propose to vote against retaining this clause in the Bill, and when the remaining clauses have been disposed of I shall move the insertion of another of which I have given notice. I take this step with the full concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief. In the course of my communications with his Royal Highness, I have found that nothing could exceed the sincerity of the desire entertained by him to show every deference to the views which have been expressed by the House of Commons upon this subject, so far as such views are consistent with his paramount duty as the officer charged with maintaining discipline in the Queen's army. I was very sorry to hear from my hon. Friend (Mr. Darby Griffith) during the earlier part of this evening that I am open to the charge of having treated the decision of the House with disrespect. I hope that is not the general opinion of the House; for, in taking the course I have, nothing was further from my intention. The House had arrived, by a majority of 1, at the decision to abolish altogether the practice of flogging in the army in time of peace; and it became my duty upon a subsequent evening to state that upon so important a question the Government could not look upon a majority of 1 in a House of 215 Members as a final decision of the House of Commons upon this question. As it was therefore necessary to give the House an opportunity for re-considering the point, I thought the easiest and most courteous method of doing so would be to retain the clause in the Bill, and I gave the most public notice possible of my intention, in order that hon. Gentlemen might have an opportunity of again raising the question. But, although I have since stated that I intended to retain the clause in the same form as it is now before the House, I was not aware, and I believe few are, that the clause in the Bill differed from the Queen's regulations upon the subject. That I thought was a state of things hardly defensible, and resolving to abandon the clause, I considered how I could frame a clause which would at once satisfy the House and those officers who were charged with the discipline of the army and at the same time be consistent with the Queen's regulations. The desire to get rid of this punishment must exist with us all, for notwithstanding the majority in favour of abolishing the punishment was represented by a single vote and the decision a matter of chance, I could not help thinking as I listened to the debate which preceded the division that there existed a strong and conscientious opinion among a large number of hon. Gentlemen that the discipline of the army could be maintained without resorting to flogging. I have therefore resolved to propose the clause which I have placed upon the paper. It makes large concessions, and I trust the House will deliberately consider it. In the course of the debate I was much struck with the very generally expressed opinion that if flogging were abolished some other punishment must be instituted. I watched anxiously, but in vain, for the mention of some substitute. The only alternative I heard suggested, was that dismissal should be substituted for flogging. I speak before military men, who I confess are far better judges than I can be of such a matter; but I must express my belief that if you trust to dismissal from the army as a substitute for the punishment of flogging you will find it wholly inadequate, and at the same time you will incur the danger of men committing offences with a view to incur the punishment of dismissal. Under these circumstances, and after consultation with his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief and other authorities in the army, and with their full concurrence, I have made two concessions which I hope the House will deem to be large concessions. I apprehend there will be no difference as to retaining the present law with respect to an army in the field in time of war. I therefore only propose changes with reference to punishment in the army in time of peace. The changes I propose are twofold. The first is that corporal punishment shall be limited to three offences of the gravest character—namely, mutiny, aggravated insubordination, and disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind. The hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) wishes to change the language I have used with regard to the offence of insubordination. I was assured that the word "aggravated" would lead to no difficulty, as they are technical terms and well understood in the army. But the words suggested by the hon. Member are more clear, and I have no objection to their being adopted. I propose that corporal punishment shall be limited to the three offences enumerated in the clause. There is another concession involved which I consider to be of a still larger character, and the House will see that it is a material change. It is that soldiers in the first class shall be exempted from corporal punishment altogether. I am quite aware that in making this proposal I am going further than many officers feel to be safe. They would retain the power of punishing even first-class soldiers for certain offences. My opinion is that, on the whole, it would be better to draw a broad line, and to enact that no man shall be subjected to corporal punishment until by his own misconduct he has degraded himself to the second class. At this time there are 170,448 soldiers of the first and 17,142 of the second class, so that 91 per cent of the whole army consists of men of the first class, who, under the proposed change, will be exempt from corporal punishment. The House will believe that in making these proposals we have endeavoured to show deference to its expressed opinion. The concessions cannot be regarded as otherwise than large in character; and I confess that, while giving credit for praiseworthy motives, I feel some little disappointment that they have not proved satisfactory to hon. Gentlemen opposite. In these few words I have explained to the House the changes I propose, and I shall have an opportunity of answering inquiries. Considering the immense importance of the discipline of the army, the great concession we now propose to make the decided opinion of many experienced officers that corporal punishment should be retained, and, I may add, the desire of many well-conducted soldiers that it should be retained, I hope a decided majority of the House will sanction the proposals I have now the honour to submit.

said, the question was strictly as to Clause 22; but the right hon. Gentleman had discussed the clause he proposed to substitute, and he therefore inferred that he might discuss not only the clause to be substituted, but his own Amendment to it. It was with considerable regret he felt compelled to press that Amendment, because he fully admitted that the right hon. Gentleman had in a fair spirit announced concessions by no means inconsiderable. He gratefully acknowledged the courtesy with which not only the right hon. Gentleman but all his Colleagues treated all those who differed from them. But to his mind this question went beyond considerations of courtesy. The clause as he proposed to amend it, by making it declare that no soldier should be subjected to corporal punishment, would initiate a policy capable of acting most beneficially on the British army. But, by the clause as proposed by the right hon. Gentleman, an unnecessary and undeserved stigma would still be attached to the army. In the amended clause of the right hon. Gentleman there were matters which he did not think the Committee could possibly agree to. He had introduced an offence not previously named in the Mutiny Act, and he had most unnecessarily cast a reflection on the whole army by making an offence of an indecent character specifically a military offence. Another objection was that the smallest punishment a civilian convicted of such an offence could receive was fourteen years' penal servitude, and yet it was proposed to make an exception in favour of the soldier, who was to be punished by the infliction of fifty lashes. Having due regard to the honour of the military profession, the House could hardly pass the clause with these words in it. He had no objection to the proposal that every soldier of the first class should, for certain offences to be specified in the Articles of War, be degraded to the second class; but he thought the word "degraded" was not a good or happy expression. It was important that the offences should be specified; because the number of offences that were visited with corporal punishment had increased from three to seventeen since 1833. Then a question arose as to the process by which a soldier was to be "degraded?" Was it to be on the authority and by the power of the commanding officer, or was it to be by a military tribunal? The expression "an army in the field" was vague and uncertain, and not recognised by law. It might be a corn-field or a coal-field. As the preamble of the Bill spoke of "time of peace," the corresponding expression ought to be "time of war," or "active service." The use of the word "misbehaviour" seemed tautological when the offences were specified. He would now ask the Committee to consider his proposal. The right hon. Gentleman had made some remarks with reference to the small majority by which the Motion was carried the other evening; but he might remind the House that many of the most important measures ever passed in Parliament had been carried by a majority of 1, and it was a remarkable circumstance that the clause for flogging in the Mutiny Act was only carried by a majority of 2 in a House of 90 Members, in 1863 or 1864. The right hon. Gentleman ought not, therefore, to taunt hon. Members about the smallness of the majority the other night. He should ask the Committee to vote for the Amendment which he was about to propose, because they would be thereby supporting their own decision. He should propose to omit all the words after "flogging," and the clause would then be in exact accordance with the previous vote of the House. Ho did not see how any Member who had voted upon that occasion in favour of the Resolution could, without the greatest inconsistency, decline to support his Amendment. If the right hon. Gentleman would accept that Amendment, and would bring up a Resolution for the purpose of regulating the punishments to be awarded to soldiers when engaged in active operations, and while being conveyed on the sea in merchant vessels, he would meet with no unreasonable opposition on the part of Members of the House. He wished to say a few words on the subject of corporal punishment, though before doing so he wished to dismiss a question of a more personal character. He had noticed with some surprise, and with great regret, that on each occasion on which the subject of corporal punishment had been discussed the name of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief had been most unduly and unnecessarily introduced. When he brought forward the question he had refrained from mentioning the name of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, not only because he felt convinced that his Royal Highness would be as much disposed as any man in that House to abolish flogging if he thought the discipline of the army could be maintained without it, but also because he was of opinion that the introduction of the name of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief into a discussion in that House on a question of military policy was a most injudicious and a most unfair proceeding. When the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State (Sir John Pakington), and the right hon. and gallant General the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel), paraded the name of the Commander-in-Chief as being entirely opposed to the abolition of flogging, could it be for one moment supposed that would not have an effect upon officers commanding regiments, and those in active service? There was not one who looked for promotion or favour at the Horse Guards who would not be influenced by it. ["No, no!"] Well, if not, military men must be very different from what he believed them to be, if, when informed that the man who was at the head of their profession entertained most decided opinions on a subject, they immediately set themselves in opposition to those opinions. Their ideas of discipline would of itself lead them to give way, when informed that his Royal Highness was against this or that, and therefore the introduction of his name into a discussion of this kind was unfair to the officers of the army. The opinion of his Royal Highness might probably be made known to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War; but the right hon. Baronet should not come down and give the Committee that opinion to influence them in their decision on a question which they, as the representatives of the people, had a right to discuss on its merits, and on which they were not to be guided in their decision by the opinions entertained by Field-Marshal the Commander-in-Chief. More than that, great and important as was the position of the Commander-in-Chief, the only authority recognised in that House was the authority of the Secretary of State for War, who ought not to shelter himself behind the authority of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief. Two arguments had been used, in reply to which he desired to say a few words. The right hon. and gallant General (General Peel) had complained the other day of his proposal to make a distinction between a time of peace and a time of war. The answer was, that throughout the whole of the Mutiny Bill, and at the commencement of the clause, that distinction was recognised. Then other hon. Gentlemen had objected that if imprisonment were substituted for corporal punishment extra duty would fall upon the good soldiers, in consequence of the misconduct of the bad. That objection, however, was wholly inconsistent with the argument that corporal punishment was of extremely rare occurrence. But there was an argument against the system beyond all this—one which went to the very root of the difficulty of recruiting our army. Recruiting would never be successful until the profession was raised instead of being degraded in the eyes of the people. Flogging had been abolished in every great army in Europe and America, and why should it be retained in our own? In the division list the other evening he was astonished to find among the minority the name of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Walpole), who not long previously had entertained so high an opinion of the soldiers that he proposed to confer upon them the right of citizenship and a vote. In spite of this, however, the right hon. Gentleman was in favour of putting upon them a stigma which could not be inflicted upon any citizen. ["No!"] Well, it might be in the case of convicts, but he hoped no hon. Gentleman regarded soldiers as convicts. He implored the right hon. Gentleman (Sir John Pakington) to re-consider even now his position in reference to this question. The right hon. Gentleman had considered it with an unprejudiced mind, and in a fair spirit; and if he carried out his own intentions, he believed he would abolish corporal punishment altogether. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would do so. It should be borne in mind that the question of flogging would not be finally settled, because the Mutiny Act was annually voted, and could not settle a question for ever, like the Reform Bill, This question could only be settled in one way. A new House of Commons was about to be called together, elected, he supposed, by household suffrage. Well, one of the very first acts of the new House of Commons would be to sweep away this corporal punishment, and lie should like the present House to have the credit of doing that before they separated. Public opinion, the Press, and, as far as he knew, military authority, was in favour of the abolition of flogging. The hundreds of letters which he had received from every part of the country showed what interest the subject had excited, and all those letters urged him to persevere. He earnestly hoped that when the clause came under consideration the right hon. Gentleman would accept the Amendment of which he had given notice.

said, he was astonished at the remarks made concerning the introduction of the name of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief into the discussion of a question of this nature. It was of the very greatest importance that the opinion of the officer at the head of the army should be known upon such a matter. He was surprised at the opinion given the other night by the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Captain Grosvenor), who, after citing his own corps—the First Life Guards—one of the best in the army, said—

said, be rose to order. He wished to know whether the Committee were discussing Clause 22 with a view to negativing it, or whether they were discussing the whole question of flogging in the army?

said, the question before the Committee was whether Clause 22 should stand part of the Bill. The Secretary for War (Sir John Pakington) had informed the Committee that it was his intention to say "No" to the Motion, in order that, at the end of the Bill, he might introduce a new clause on the subject of corporal punishment. Clause 22, however, raised the whole question of corporal punishment; and therefore he could not say that hon. Members were out of order in discussing that question, or in referring to what were the intentions of the Secretary for War with regard to the clause he proposed to substitute for the present clause. For the convenience of the Committee, however, he would suggest that Clause 22 should be negatived without further discussion, and they could then proceed with the other clauses of the Bill. At the end of the Bill the Secretary for War would propose his new clause, and hon. Members would be able to move the Amendments of which they had given notice, and which were being discussed now, without the possibility of being brought to an issue.

said, he hoped that the suggestion of the Chairman would be adopted.

said, he moved to omit that part of the clause which exempted a soldier from the duty of supporting any relation whom he would be compelled to support if he were not a soldier. The exemption operated mischievously, and put a stigma on soldiers which it was desirable to remove.

said, that while he appreciated the good feeling evinced by the hon. Baronet, he was bound to resist the proposed alteration.

said, he had now to submit to the Committee the clause which he proposed as a substitute for Clause 22. He substituted the Amendment of the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), by which the words "aggravated insubordination" were replaced by the words "insubordination accompanied by personal violence."

(No Soldier of the First Class to be Sentenced to Corporal Punishment).

"Every Soldier shall upon enlistment be placed in the First Class of the Army, and no Soldier in such class shall, in time of peace, be sentenced to the corporal punishment of flogging; every soldier in the First Class shall, for the commission of certain offences, to be specified from time to time in the Articles of War, be degraded to the Second Class of the Army, and every Soldier in the Second Class shall be liable to be sentenced by court martial to corporal punishment, not exceeding fifty lashes, for the following offences—namely, mutiny, insubordination accompanied by personal violence, or disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind; every soldier, when serving with a military force in the field or on board ship shall be liable to a like punishment by court martial for any of the offences before enumerated, or for desertion, drunkenness on duty or on the line of march, misbehaviour, or neglect of duty."

said, he wished to ask whether it was really intended that no soldier should be liable to corporal punishment as long as he was in the first class? There were many cases of the worst possible kind of insubordination that might be committed on a line of march, such as instigating a regiment to mutiny or knocking down a commanding officer. He wished to know whether a man who had been guilty of one of those offences was not to be made a signal example of merely because he occupied a place in the first class. He thought there must be some mistake in that.

Read the end of the clause.

in continuation, read the concluding portion of the clause, and observed that they ought to be told what was the meaning of the words "misbehaviour or neglect of duty" at the end of the clause. Every soldier knew what was meant by an army in the field; but he wished to know what was to be done in the case of such troops as those at present engaged against the Fenians in Canada or in Ireland; and whether one of those men, if he should have knocked down his commanding officer, was not to be liable to corporal punishment? His hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Westminster (Captain Grosvenor) had, on a former occasion, admitted that there were very grave cases of insubordination in the army; but he said that the remedy must be found in something else than the lash. He had been excessively sorry to hear his hon. Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Otway) allude specially to one side of the House, for the question was one, not of party, but of what was best for the benefit of the country. It was said that in the matter of discipline we ought to follow the example of foreign countries. Well, on one occasion when he was at Paris he met a number of troops returning towards the city, which led him to ask whether there had been a review. "Oh, no," was the answer; "we have been to shoot one of our men." For what crime? "For knocking down a non-commissioned officer." Were we to relinquish the system of flogging in the British army and adopt the Continental—of shooting every man who knocked down a non-commissioned officer? Periods of punishment again were punishments not so much of the offender as of the other men who had to perform the extra duty. The example of the Prussian army had been cited; but of what materials was that army composed? Was it likely that in this country regulations would ever be adopted compelling every gentleman to serve whether he liked it or not. A system of voluntary service gave us, of course, very different materials; but it was gratifying to reflect that the non-commissioned officers who issued from the ranks were second to those of no other country for gallantry and conduct. He understood the Secretary of State for War to have said that out of 100 men there were ninety-one of the first class, and nine only of the second. Was it intended that those ninety-one men should, under no circumstances, be liable to corporal punishment?

said, the first observation he had to make was that although the powers conferred by the Mutiny Act were very large with respect to corporal punishment, and the discretion very wide, yet, from his experience while holding the office of Judge Advocate General, he believed that those powers were practically exercised with very great discretion, and that the cases in which flogging was inflicted—assuming such a punishment to be right—were exactly those in which it ought to be administered. The fact was that the powers given by the Mutiny Act had been much limited by the regulations issued under the authority of the Crown, and also by the good sense and discretion of the commanding officers of the different regiments. Those regulations never had the force of law; and he was desirous of mentioning that, because it was asserted that there had been many instances in which men in the first class had been subjected to corporal punishment contrary to the regulations. It was true there had been a few cases of that kind. But they occurred very shortly after the regu- lations were issued, before they had become known, and the cases were very few in number. Wherever he had met with such cases he had of course commented upon them. For all practical purposes, those regulations were strictly enforced in the army. He had not himself officially had the means of ascertaining whether soldiers who were flogged afterwards behaved the better for it, or what was its effect upon the rest of their corps. But he had had the opportunity of conversing on the subject with military men of great experience, and he found them to be nearly unanimous in the opinion that corporal punishment, under some circumstances, was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the discipline of the army. The cases for which it was inflicted were those in which it appeared, on the face of the transaction, that the men to whom it was administered had no habits of self-control, were exceedingly violent and insubordinate, and very difficult to deal with. Another class of cases in which it was administered was where soldiers had stolen from their own comrades. There was also a third category of such cases to which it was not necessary further to allude. Looking at the matter in the light of the human suffering involved, it was rather difficult to say whether corporal punishment, or sentences of imprisonment perhaps for long periods, and often including solitary confinement, were the worse; and he could not say that he was able to give the House a strong opinion on the subject. But there was this great objection to corporal punishment, that it went against the sensibilities and the tendencies of the public mind in this country. If it ceased to exist, the army might possibly become more popular, while a stronger sense of professional honour might be introduced into its lowest ranks. He had no doubt that it had considerable effect in deterring men from entering the army. There was hardly a village in England from which young men had not enlisted; but there were few village families that took pride in the fact that one of their members had enlisted for a common soldier. How far that feeling was produced by the flogging it was not for him to say. What he should have preferred on that matter was that his hon. Friend (Mr. Otway) should not have moved the actual omission of that clause, but that the Secretary of State for War (Sir John Pakington) should have come down and stated, on the part of the authorities of the army, that they recognised fully the feeling of the House on that subject; and that, though they did not think it would be prudent altogether to give up the power of flogging, it was their intention to exercise it only in cases of extreme urgency. The proposed new clause was very vague and uncertain. It spoke of offences "to be specified from time to time in the Articles of War." This was not clear. It ought to be made as clear as noon-day, so that every recruit might easily know, without being obliged to consult any other document, what circumstances would bring him within the limits of that particular punishment. The clause, in its present form, proposed to retain corporal punishment for mutiny and aggravated insubordination attended with personal violence, but to abolish it in all other cases. Assuming it to be true that it was still necessary to retain it with the view of suddenly putting down a mutiny, then the punishment should be equally applicable to all engaged in the mutiny. He could not, however, understand on what principle it was that nine-tenths of the army—for that was the proportion, according to the right hon. Gentleman, in the first-class—might commit acts of mutiny, and yet that it should not be deemed necessary to flog them while flogging was maintained to be indispensable under similar circumstances in the case of the remaining one-tenth. If it was not necessary to flog any of the larger class it would appear not to be necessary to flog at all. He also found some difficulty in understanding the last part of the clause, in which it was set forth that—

"Every soldier, when serving with a military force in the field or on board ship, shall be liable to a like punishment by court martial for any of the offences before enumerated."

said, be believed that both sides of the House agreed in the opinion that the punishment of flogging was almost as degrading to the men who witnessed as to those who suffered it, and that its effect on the men who were flogged was anything but salutary. There could be no doubt that it ought to be abolished; and if it were retained, it was only because the service was not at that premium at which it ought to be. The commanding officers ought to be empowered to say that the man who committed a crime for which he deserved to be flogged should be discharged, and that discharge ought to be regarded as a disgrace to him. He thought the concession which had been offered by the Secretary for War (Sir John Pakington) was one which ought to be accepted, and he would suggest the withdrawal of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Chatham (Mr. Otway).

My right hon. Friend the Secretary for War began his speech by vindicating himself from the charge which he imagined—I think erroneously—was made against him of having treated the House with disrespect in not giving effect to the Resolution at which it arrived a few nights ago. All the circumstances of the case being taken into consideration—that the majority was a very narrow one in a small House, that the division came somewhat suddenly upon him, and that the change proposed was one to which he could not well assent without taking counsel with the military authorities—he was, in my opinion, perfectly justified in not acting on the Resolution without giving us, as he did very fairly, an opportunity of re-considering the matter. I, at the same time, must say that when it is taken into account that this is a question on which, as he must know, public opinion is growing very strong—if it be not altogether ripe—he would, in my humble judgment, have acted more judiciously, especially as he told us he has been in communication with the military authorities on the subject, if he had informed the House that he foresaw he could not long resist the tide of opinion which was rising against the infliction of corporal punishment. There can be no doubt that out of doors, at all events, corporal punishment in the army is looked upon as a punishment at once brutal and degrading. It might be tolerated in the days when the army was recruited from the dregs of the population; but it is not in harmony with our times, and does not accord with the spirit of the age. Though to-night the clause which my right hon. Friend proposes may be agreed to, yet he must remember that this Mutiny Bill will be, as the hon. Member for Chatham told him, an annual topic of discussion, and this question will be made the subject of annual debate. The probability, therefore, is that no Government will be able to maintain corporal punishment beyond another year. I would throw out for the consideration of my right hon. Friend whether it is well, by the retention of this punishment, to bring odium and unpopularity on the military authorities without any corresponding advantage? Public opinion, as I said, is opposed to the infliction of this punishment, and no opinion, I venture to contend, unless it be that of the military authorities, is in its favour. In speaking of the opinion of military men, I would not be misunderstood. No men are, I believe, more generous or humane as regards their fellow-creatures generally, while the soldiers under their command are to them objects of peculiar care and solicitude. They know their good qualities, they are proud of their loyalty, and they would do as much as any other class of men to raise their character. When, therefore, I speak of them as being in favour of corporal punishment, I am simply making a remark which applies to men of any profession, who, when any change affecting their profession is proposed, are liable to look on the proposal with a narrow vision, to prefer the familiar to the unknown, experience to experiment, and to regard any alteration as tending to unsettlement and uncertainty. I think we ought not to have had the name of the Commander-in-Chief so prominently brought forward in this discussion. The Duke of Cambridge is very popular, and deservedly so, both with the army and in this House; because we know that, while devoted to his profession, he is, more than any other man who has filled that important office, disposed to feel that the army ought to be popular as well as efficient, and to give his best attention to any suggestions that may be made for the welfare of the soldier. But I certainly think that if this Motion is to be resisted, if any unpopularity and odium are to be faced—as must be the case if this question has to be discussed from year to year—the Government ought to take it upon themselves. I should be very sorry, therefore, if we should again have a letter brought down, written by the Commander-in-Chief, and read with an effect which I do not believe my right hon. Friend intended to produce, for he indicated his personal feeling against corporal punishment, but stated that in the face of that letter he could not consent to the Motion.

I have no recollection of having given any opinion beyond saying that I should be pleased if the punishment could safely be abolished.

The right hon. Gentleman certainly indicated the opinion which he held; for no one could have heard his speech without perceiving that his feeling was strongly against corporal punishment, though he said that after receiving that letter he could not consent to the Motion. I feel sure that the impression which was produced by the reading of that letter was unintentional on his part; for if an unpopular system is to be kept up, it is hardly fair or judicious to put the Commander-in-Chief in the from, and make him bear the brunt of that unpopularity. The objection to the proposal of my hon. Friend (Mr. Otway) is based partly on argument and partly on apology. The argument, if it can be so called, is that the discipline of the army must be kept up. We all admit that; but the question is, whether or not this is a mode of punishment which tends more than any other to keep op that discipline. My right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington) said just now that he listened attentively to the debate the other night, and did not hear any substitute suggested for this punishment. He himself, however, gave an answer to that remark; because he said he intended to abolish it, except in 9 per cent of the whole army. He cannot intend that the remaining 91 per cent—the men in the first class—shall go unpunished. He must, therefore, have decided what the substitute is to be, and what punishment they are to undergo for the same offences for which the other 9 per cent are to be flogged. Why not, then, apply that substitute to the latter also? The argument that corporal punishment is essential to the maintenance of discipline we meet by facts. A very strong fact has been already referred to—namely, that in some of the Household regiments corporal punishment is not inflicted, and yet those regiments are as well disciplined as any in the service, I have been reminded, too, of another force which is not, indeed, part of the army, but is a military force in its character and organization—the Constabulary of Ireland. They are a well disciplined force, 12,000 strong, but there is no flogging; and if its introduction were attempted, the force would fall to pieces. It is said, however, in reply to the inquiry, why discipline cannot be kept up without it as well with the 9 per cent as with the 91—that those 9 per cent consist of an entirely different class of men; that they are the scamps and reprobates of the army, and that no other punishment would have any effect upon them. I will deal with that presently. The late Judge Advocate (Mr. Headlam) said he would retain flogging for violence, aggravated insubordination, and some other offences. But he did not tell us why it was specially applicable to those cases, or would be more effective in them. As for the amended clause, I do not see any practical difference between it and the original clause. Either corporal punishment is proper and effective, or it is not. If it is, you ought to continue it for all offences under the old Mutiny Act. If it is not, you ought to abolish it entirely. By discontinuing it for one class of offences and retaining it for another, you either do too much or too little, and you thus give up your own case. For what purpose is it to be retained for this 9 per cent? Is it that you wish to reform them, or that you wish to deter them? Two Returns have been presented to the House, one giving the cases in which corporal punishment was inflicted from 1862 to 1865, and the other stating the subsequent conduct of the men who were flogged. This very valuable information, what does it show? Did any good result from the flogging? In almost every case a man who is once flogged becomes a confirmed reprobate, the first punishment being soon followed by another. I have taken the trouble to analyze a single page of the Return, in order to show what the effect of the punishment is. The first case is that of a soldier who was brought before a court martial on the 2nd of December, 1862, for disgraceful conduct and for making away with necessaries. He was sentenced to fifty lashes, six months' hard labour, and stoppage of pay, the whole being carried out. On the 11th of June, 1863, as soon as the six months had expired, he was again tried and again sentenced to fifty lashes, six months' hard labour, and stoppage, the whole being carried out, with the exception of seventy-six days' hard labour. The week in which that sentence expired he was a third time sentenced to the like punishment, in that instance, however, the flogging being remitted. A fourth time he was tried, and condemned to six months' hard labour and stoppage; and on the 22nd of October, 1865, he was again sentenced to fifty lashes and 252 days' hard labour, with stoppage, the whole of which was carried out. So that this man in less than three years comes before five courts martial, is four times sentenced to be flogged, and actually undergoing it thrice, and is condemned to 982 days' hard labour, of which 766 are carried out, he being the whole time under stoppage. [An hon. MEMBER: What were his offences?] The first was disgraceful conduct and making away with necessaries; the second, absence and making away with necessaries; the third, making away with necessaries; the fourth, absence and making away with necessaries; and the fifth, absence and insubordination. The hon. and gallant Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North) told us the other night that there was a difficulty in substituting another punishment, because while a man was undergoing it some of his comrades would have to perform his duty; but here is a man who for three years had not done a week's duty, being the whole time under punishment. Surely, as the hon. Member for Fifeshire (Sir Robert Anstruther) has suggested, it would have been a great benefit to the service had this confirmed reprobate been turned out at once. The second case is that of a man who, in less than three years, was five times before a court martial, and was sentenced to flogging and 462 days' hard labour, as well as to 1,312 days' stoppage of 1d. a day. In another case, a man was seven times before a court martial, and sentenced to four floggings. The floggings were inflicted three times, and he received 150 lashes. He was also sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour, and to stoppages of 1d., his imprisonment lasting altogether 1,008 days. Another man was before six courts martial, was flogged three times, had 999 days' hard labour, was subjected to stoppages of 1d. for 2,688 days in all. These cases are all in one single page of the Return, and I put it to the House whether, in every one of these cases, it would not have been a saving to the public if the men had been dismissed from the service. They were continually in prison, and the country derived no good from their services. I heard my hon. and gallant Friend say that, if you do away with corporal punishment, you must give facilities for discriminating between the good and the bad men. Well, who objects to the authorities being furnished with any facilities that may be necessary? Gentlemen on this side of the House will feel it their duty to assist in getting rid of the men who disgrace the army. They are the men whom it is painful for the good soldier to associate with, who demoralize the new recruit, and keep better men out of the army. You have a positive difficulty in getting recruits, and the reason is because you retain these bad men, who are small in number, but who lower the standard of the army. If you dismiss them, you will get good men in their place. The fact is that the real mode of raising the discipline of the army is by raising its character, and thereby attracting men to the service who will take a pride in their profession; but nobody ever heard of the pride of a flogged soldier. It has been said that it is necessary for the preservation of discipline that the system of flogging should be upheld; and the Secretary for War says that it is only a very small number who get the punishment. Then it would appear that for an infinitesimal amount of benefit this scandal and reproach to the whole service is maintained. The Judge Advocate rather disputes the assertion that this mode of punishment is not in keeping with the spirit of the times. He points to our recent legislation, and says that we have passed an Act for flogging juvenile delinquents and garrotters. Yes, but the English soldier is neither a juvenile delinquent nor garrotter. The case of juvenile delinquents comes home to the experience of all of us. We have all been juvenile delinquents; but then there is a great difference between boys and men. In the case of a boy flogging is only a local application; but in the case of the soldier, flogging is followed by feelings of wounded pride and degradation ten times more painful than the physical operation. We are asked whether we would do away with the punishment altogether. We admit that in time of war, on board ship, on the line of march, and in campaign, you must adopt it, because there is no other mode of punishment available; but we declare that it is the worst of all punishments. This is no longer a question of argument, but it is one of those questions which will be decided by public opinion. When public opinion bears strongly against any practice, a change of system is but a question of time; and in this case I predict that it will be a question of short time. The change would be accepted thankfully if it were at once adopted; but, if it be long postponed, a time will come when the Government will acquire odium and unpopularity, and will be compelled to do by the force of public opinion that which they might now do gracefully and easily. I therefore call on them to give this matter their most serious consideration, so that when they come to discuss this subject next year they may be in a position to do that which will gain both popularity and efficiency to the army and satisfaction to the country.

said, that some years ago, when this subject was brought forward by the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. White), he (Major Jervis) had stated that flogging had to be retained because the House of Commons would not vote the necessary money for weeding the army of bad characters. What was the state of the case at the present moment, it not being a question of facing an enemy, but the country being at peace? He had asked the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War whether it was proposed to give the military authorities more power to get rid of felons and men who had been guilty of disgraceful conduct? The reply was, that it was not intended to give the military authorities any more power than they possessed at present. It was quite true that the Articles of War stated that no man should be dismissed the service except by sentence of a court martial or by the order of the Commander-in-Chief. But, in point of fact, though the Commander-in-Chief had the control of the discipline and of the promotion of the army, he had nothing to do with the financial affairs of the army, as the War Office took good care, for the sake of the saving, that men should not be dismissed. They looked to the cost. That was really the essence of the whole question. They would have to pay a man to supply the place of the discharged one. According to the Estimates they would be called upon to pay £18,000 this year for the maintenance of the law by court martial; but in truth that was but a small portion of the real expense, for the pay of the men in prison went towards this vote, and the real cost was £90,000 per annum. Now, what would be the cost of discharging a few bad characters compared with this enormous expense? According to the last Report there were between 5,000 and 6,000 soldiers in military prisons; of these, 5,000 were returned as of good, 600 of indifferent, and 600 of bad character. So that it was for the sake of these 600 bad men that the objectionable clause would be introduced. The right hon. Gentleman the Judge Advocate had defended the clause on the ground that we flogged our garotters, our juvenile offenders, and those who fired at the Queen. Well, but these were not the sort of men that we wanted in the army. The sooner they were got rid of the better. The right hon. Gentleman said, also, that unless flogging were maintained the non-commissioned officers would not be safe. A friend of his, since that statement was made, had asked every non-commissioned officer in his battalion whether they thought flogging necessary to maintain their authority, and every one of them replied that they would be sorry to maintain it at that price. The case brought forward by the hon. and gallant Member for Truro (Captain Vivian) of the man of disgraceful character in one of the regiments of the Guards, one of the greatest blackguards on the face of the earth, whom every effort had been made without success to get discharged, had struck consternation everywhere. It was incredible that the character of the army should be sacrificed in this manner for the sake of the three guineas that had to he given as bounty to recruits. The British soldier had a right to demand that his comrades should be men whom he was not ashamed of, not men fit only for the hulks. He should not object to preserving the power of inflicting corporal punishment in the case of troops on board ship, as some commanding officers seemed to think it necessary, though he had had some experience of men in that position, and he had never seen it had recourse to. Then it was argued that the other punishments now employed in the army were not sufficiently stringent to render it safe to do away with flogging. But in the last Report of the Inspector General of Military Prisons for 1864, a hope was expressed by Colonel Henderson that the increased stringency which it was proposed to introduce into our military prisons would render confinement in them a sufficient punishment for all offences committed by soldiers whom it was in any way desirable to retain in the service; and that all who, by the heinousness of their offences, had incurred the penalty of penal servitude, might never again be considered eligible to enter the service. All he asked was that the commanding officer should have the power, with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief, of discharging men of disgraceful character from the service; and he was confident that a few thousand pounds would cover all the ex-pence. Men were not likely to commit disgraceful offences in order to get discharged. He would even have no objection to continuing the punishment of flogging in certain cases, on condition that dismissal from the service followed it. Under the present system, when they had caught a blackguard they did their best to keep him; or they were so stingy that they would not get rid of him. What did it cost them? He believed it was the most expensive policy that could be followed. Men of this character were all their time either in prison or in hospital. If they went on foreign service they died like rotten potatoes, and other men had to be sent in their place. Commanding officers, inspectors of prisons, medical officers, all agreed in saying that you could never get a day's work out of such men, of whom there were between 1,000 and 2,000 in civil prisons, besides those in military prisons, who ought never to have been admitted into the army at all. For these reasons, he should feel compelled to vote against the clause as it at present stood; but he thought it might be altered to embody the views he had expressed.

said, he wished to say a few words on the present occasion, some remarks he made the other evening having been referred to by his right hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) and his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Harwich (Major Jervis.) His right hon. Friend was mistaken in supposing that he had referred to the Act for punishing juvenile offenders. His argument was that just as they had revived the punishment of corporal punishments in the case of firing at Her Majesty and in the case of garrotters, so in the British army, as in society at large, there was a number of persons of desperate character and unbridled passions for whom this punishment was necessary. It was asked by his hon. and gallant Friend, "Why not give power to commanding officers to discharge these men?" But already courts martial had the power of discharge; the Commander-in-Chief had the same power; the commanders of the forces in Ireland and in the colonies had the same power. But in addition to the great expenses occasioned by discharges well known to military men, and the difficulty of obtaining recruits, what would happen? The arguments now used against flogging would, on the score of humanity, be used against branding; and if those discharged were not marked "B. C.," they would re-enlist, get fresh bounty, and would never be got rid of. His right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. Headlam) had raised two objections to the clause—the first in point of substance, the second in a matter of form. In point of substance, he said, if the power were preserved it should be preserved for all classes. But the object of the clause was to give the good recruit, whom he hoped to attract to the service, that absolute immunity under all circumstances to which Lord Herbert pledged Parliament six years ago. Under no circumstances could the recruit entering the army, or so long as he continued in the first class, be sentenced to this degrading punishment. There were not only two classes of soldiers, but two classes of offenders; and it was only when offenders came under the second class that they were liable to be degraded. The objection to the wording of the clause, founded on the apparent inconsistency between the beginning and the end of it, would be obviated by the insertion of the words—

"Providing that no soldier in such class shall in time of peace be liable to corporal punishment, unless he is serving with a military force in the field or on board ship."

The arguments against and in favour of this punishment have been so fully stated on both sides that it was not my intention to offer any observations on the present occasion. But it seems to me the Committee is placed in rather a difficult position by the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. It is difficult to collect exactly what is the intention of the Government with reference to the various Amendments to be moved to the proposal of the Government. My right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. Headlam) stated with great clearness the objections felt to the form in which the clause is put; and I do not quite understand whether the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Mowbray) intends at any future stage to alter the clause so as to remove those objections. I must say it appears to me that to maintain House that he thought that the punishment that all soldiers shall be divided into two classes, and that under no circumstances shall this punishment be inflicted on those in the first class, is calculated to take away almost all utility in the punishment. If the Government assent to the proposal—leaving out the third offence, as probably they may—it will not be possible to punish by flogging during peace except for mutiny and aggravated insubordination—and only one-tenth part of the army even in those cases. If that be all that is intended, I really think it is scarcely worth while to retain the clause at all. But, although I feel this objection to the clause brought forward by the Government, if a division be taken on the second reading of it I must go out in favour of the clause. I am unwilling at present to abolish by law the punishment of flogging, which I think is almost the only punishment that can be inflicted in time of war, and which I also think is an appropriate one, and ought to be inflicted in cases of mutiny and aggravated insubordination. I think that this clause is faulty; but it may be improved after being read a second time. Under these circumstances, if the matter is brought to a division, I shall vote for the second reading.

I expressed my own opinion the other evening as strongly as possible upon the advisability of retaining the power of flogging in the army; and therefore I should not have risen upon the present occasion had it not been for the observations of the hon. Member for Chatham (Mr. Otway), repeated by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Horsman), as to dragging into the discussion the name of the Commander-in-Chief. If there be any impropriety in the manner in which the Commander-in-Chief's letter has been laid before the House I am responsible for it; because no sooner did the hon. Member for Chatham give notice of his intention to make a Motion upon this subject, than I, as the then Secretary of State for War, wrote an official letter to the Commander-in-Chief, who, as such, is responsible to the Secretary of State for War for the dis- cipline of the army, requesting him to inform me whether, in his opinion, it was possible to do away with the system of flogging in the army without interfering with its discipline. I confess I should have been most happy had the reply of the Commander-in-Chief been such as would have enabled me to have informed the House that he thought that the punishment of flogging could be done away with without interfering with the due discipline of the army. The letter which has been laid before the House is an official letter written by the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State for War on the subject of the discipline of the army, and I should like to know what more proper evidence on the subject could be adduced. But in addition to this evidence, there was the opinion of the Adjutant General, who said he could not hold himself responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for the discipline of the army were this punishment abolished. In certain cases, even in time of peace, such as when troops are on board transports, or when they are in the field, as they have been in Canada, I am informed that it is almost absolutely necessary to retain this system of punishment. I agree, however, with the view taken by the late Judge Advocate General (Mr. Headlam), that if the punishment of flogging is to be retained in cases of mutiny and of gross insubordination, the punishment should be inflicted upon offenders without distinction of class. If a man is a mutineer, or is guilty of gross insubordination, he should be flogged, whether he be in the first or the second class.

I rise for the purpose of explaining that, while I expressed myself as being of opinion that it was very unfortunate that the name of the Commander-in-Chief had been introduced into this discussion, I did not make use of the word "indecent," nor of any word to the same effect. I thought that the Government ought to have acted on their own responsibility.

I wish to say a few words in reply to the observations made by hon. Members in the course of this discussion. With reference to what has been said as to the division of the army into two classes, I have made no change whatever in that respect. The only change I have made is that, whereas at present the men in the first class are exempt from being flogged except for mutinous conduct, I have proposed that men in the first class should be exempted from corporal punishment altogether. It is for the House to say whether they approve this change, or whether they approve this change, or whether they desire that this system of punishment shall be retained for mutineers, whether in the first or second class. I have also proposed that even in the second class corporal punishment shall be limited to the three offences named. The hon. Member for Chatham appears to think that I have impugned the character of the army by naming the third of these offences as deserving of flogging. But the Articles of War have for years directed that corporal punishment shall be inflicted for offences of this description. It has been suggested that we should make dismissal from the army a substitute for the punishment of flogging. But it has been found to be necessary by one of the Articles of War to specify the punishment that shall be inflicted upon men who shall intentionally maim and injure themselves—to the extent sometimes of injuring their eyesight, in order to get turned out of the army. Under these circumstances, when I find that men will wilfully injure themselves in order to get turned out of the army, I think we must hesitate before we adopt dismissal from the service as a substitute for flogging. With regard to objections that have been taken to the wording of the clause, it has been drawn up by the legal adviser to the War Office, and I see no reason to alter it, with the exception of that part which refers to men "on board a ship," which should read "on board a ship not in commission." When men are shut up on board a transport it is impossible to subject them to the ordinary punishments that can be administered on land. [An hon. MEMBER: Is this to apply in time of peace?] Certainly. I think that I have made a very large concession by this clause. Should the House feel that the concession to the first class is too large, they have it in their power to determine how far the punishment shall be retained as regards this class. I confess I would rather keep the clause as it now stands, than introduce any alteration in it. I am in favour of exempting the best men in the army from corporal punishment altogether, and of limiting that punishment to those who by their misconduct have reduced themselves to the second class.

I intend to vote for the second reading of the clause; but I do not wish it to be understood that by so doing I pledge myself to the clause as it stands. I hope the right hon. Baronet will fully understand that I only assent to the clause being read a second time in the hope that it will be improved before it is finally laid before us.

said, that as this question had been fully discussed, he did not think it desirable to trouble the Committee with further observations. All he asked the House to do was to affirm their Resolution; and he proposed to modify the clause, so that it should read—

"Every soldier shall on enlisting be in the first class, and no soldier shall in time of peace be sentenced to the corporal punishment of flogging."

said, that if flogging were to be restricted to the two offences, as he thought it ought to be, he would ask the right hon. Gentleman (Sir John Pakington) whether it was necessary to keep up this classification? If flogging were necessary at all as a punishment for mutiny and insubordination, accompanied with personal violence, it was equally applicable to any soldier, independent of classification. He therefore proposed to omit the first words of the clause, "Every soldier shall, upon enlistment, be placed in the first class of the army;" and he should also propose to omit the third offence as one for which flogging should be inflicted.

said, he had already explained that in the proposal respecting classification he merely adhered to the existing practice. For seven years the army had been divided into these two classes, and the Committee ought hardly to do away with this broad distinction between the well and the ill-conducted men without notice. Still, the argument used by the right hon. Baronet (Sir George Grey) was a very strong one, and he should not be prepared to join issue with him.

said, there appeared to be some misapprehension as to the practice existing in the Prussian army. An officer who had written to him on this subject, said—

"I have by me Witzleben's book on the organization of the Prussian army, edition of 1864, by which it appears that the Articles of War then in force treated flogging as one of the minor punishments, to which any soldier of the second class was liable without trial. The colonel of a regiment could summarily award thirty strokes of the cane, or forty if the offender was undergoing punishment of hard labour, or was in a so-called punishment section. Any subordinate officer, if on detached command, could award fifteen."

said, the Amendment of the right hon. Baronet (Sir George Grey) was really a retrograde movement, which would do away entirely with the concession made by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir John Pakington) that under no circumstances should any soldier in the first class be flogged.

said, that according to the Queen's Regulations every soldier was liable to flogging for mutiny. That was the existing state of the law, and soldiers were only divided into classes with respect to crimes concerning which it was proposed to take away the punishment of flogging altogether.

said, he must congratulate the Government upon their "whip," and would not put the Committee to the trouble of dividing on his Amendment. The result was that no concession had practically been made. Next year, if he were in the House, he would again bring the subject forward on the bringing in of the Mutiny Bill, and he was convinced that the days of flogging in the army were numbered.

said, he was either unfit to understand the course the proceedings had taken, or they were of a very unusual nature. He hoped that somebody would explain what had taken place.

said, that the offences for which degradation was to be inflicted and the authority by whom it was to be done were not specified. He wanted to know was it to be done by the mere will of the commanding officer, or was the degradation to take place only after conviction by a court martial? He wished for some explanation of the views of the Government.

said, his proposal undoubtedly was to retain the division into classes, and to exempt the first class. But after the discussion which had taken place, he believed it to be the opinion of the great majority on both sides that it would not be prudent to part with this punishment for cases of mutiny and gross insubordination even in the first class.

said, they had got into such confusion that the best plan was to report Progress, and he would move that the Chairman be ordered to do so.

said, he wished to know how the clause really stood.

said, he would move, in the third line, after the words "first class," to omit the word "shall" in order to insert the word "may," his object being that the degradation should not be made imperative.

moved to report Progress.

said, that in the present state of the matter there would be considerable difficulty in bringing this question to a conclusion. The clause ought to be most seriously considered, and as there was no chance of doing that now, he thought the best course would be to agree to the Motion that the Chairman report Progress.

said, the operation of this Bill would be to exempt all property held my charitable or religious societies from the operation of the Law of Mortmain. But no property was exempt unless duly enrolled, and this Bill exempted such property from the necessity of being enrolled, the object of enrolment being that it should be known by whom the property was held in Mortmain.

said, the hon. Member was not strictly in order in doing so.