said, he wished to state shortly some two or three points in which the Bill had been amended, leaving the smaller details of Amendments for explanation when they came to the clauses in Committee. The Bill had been re-printed with his proposed Amendments and largely circulated among those who were interested in the subject. There was one point, however, upon which no alteration was proposed, and as it was a matter of much importance, and had been greatly misunderstood, he should like to explain the position in which it stood. It was said that what he was proposing to do was to extend the power of arrest on final process instead of abolishing it, but that was not the case. The matter stood thus. After the abolition of imprisonment for debt on mesne process there still remained a power of arrest on final process on judgment debts to any amount, even down to £5. That was thought a great evil, and by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, it was enacted that arrests upon action for debt on final process should be abolished in every case under £20. So that the judgment creditor under £20 had no remedy except execution against the debtor's goods, which, in many cases, was of course no remedy at all. In the next year the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 107 was passed. It was now generally known as "The Small Debts Act." The portion of that Act to which he was about to call attention related to judgment debts under £20. The County Courts were not then in existence. The Act gave this additional remedy to that of execution against the debtors' goods. It enabled the judgment creditor to summon the judgment debtor before any Small Debts Court, and power was given to these courts to examine into the nature of the debt, to inquire into the debtor's means of payment, and to make order for payment by instalments according to his means. If the judgment debtor refused to attend, or to answer as to the circumstances under which the debt had been incurred, or as to his means of payment, or to pay the instalments ordered, the Court had power to employ coercion, which was clearly requisite under the circumstances supposed. A power of imprisonment for a period not exceeding forty days was therefore given simply as a punishment of recusancy, and it was provided that it should not operate by way of satisfaction of the debt. In the next year the first County Courts Act was passed—for the three Acts were passed in three successive years—and the original jurisdiction then given to County Courts was in like manner limited to £20. In the last-named Act similar provisions were made as to enforcing payment. The operation of the County Courts Act was afterwards extended to £50. Now none of these provisions was it proposed to alter, but it was proposed to abolish imprisonment for debt simpliciter on final process, except in certain cases, such as libel, slander, &c, which had nothing to do with the matter in hand. Under these circumstances the question arises for what amount, when a judgment had been recorded against a debtor, should there be power to summons the debtor before a Court of Bankruptcy and make him bankrupt if he did not answer. Hitherto the amount had been £50. It was a question of policy whether persons should be made bankrupts on a debt of £20, or whether £50 would not be the proper limit. That was a matter upon which there was a difference of opinion. After the best consideration he had been able to give to the subject he thought it would be wise to keep the sum at £50. If the House thought differently it could be altered to £20. Then the case stood thus:—If they took £50 as the amount at which they made a debtor bankrupt, and the power of enforcing payment under the Small Debts' Process was limited to £20 upon judgment, there would be a gap between £20 and £50, as to which there would be no means of enforcing payment except by execution against the goods. What he proposed to do therefore was to extend to the Small Debts Courts the power of summoning the judgment debtor for judgments amounting to £50, and giving the remedies already existing of examining the debtor, and committing him in cases of refusal to obey the orders of the Court. That was not an extension of the power of imprisonment for debt, but was a necessary remedy in cases of contumacy. It would be for the House to say whether they preferred that a man should be made a bankrupt for so small a sum as £20. If that should be thought right it would not be necessary to make this extension. It might be useful in connection with this subject to give the number of plaints and summonses ordinarily issued, and in general to show the way in which the jurisdiction of the County Courts had been exercised. This would prove the necessity of a remedy for debts of small amount. From Returns which had been presented to the House of Lords in 1864, and which related to the two years preceding—namely, 1862 and 1863—it appeared that the average number of plaints was 822,000 for each year. These resulted in about 450,000 judgments, and the summonses issued upon these judgments were 121,000. Of the summonses issued, one half were heard, the remainder having been settled out of court. About 61,000 were heard, which resulted in 27,000 warrants issued, and the number of persons actually taken to prison was 8,900 and odd, or within a fraction of 9,000. The average number of days during which persons were actually imprisoned was fourteen; the average amount of debts was £3 12s. The present policy had been to give powers for the recovery of small debts, seeing that credit was taken to a large extent by the labouring classes. But it was an error to say that there was any intention in this Bill to extend the power of imprisonment for debt. Therefore he had not altered that part. Having explained his reasons for retaining this part of his original scheme, he would mention two or three particulars in which he had modified it. A complaint was made on his introducing the Bill that it provided no effectual system of auditing trustees' accounts, on which it was said the success of the Scotch system of sequestration materially depended. His attention was called to it by his hon. Friend the Dean of Faculty (Mr. Moncreiff), who pointed out that the system in Scotland very much depended on an effectual system of audit. He (the Attorney General) had consequently introduced some new provisions to meet this objection. In the 20th, 54th, and 283rd sections of the new Bill he had provided that an accountant should be appointed, who should be a person versed in mercantile accounts, and that the system of audit should be worked out by general orders of the Court, so that changes might be made whenever they were required. A copy of these orders would be laid on the table of the House. Another point to which he wished to refer was the protection of an estate between the date of the adjudication of bankruptcy and the appointment of trustees by the creditors. By the system now proposed the creditors would be able to take the estate into their own hands, to appoint trustees for the management of the estate, and to have the entire control in their hands. There must always be an interim of from ten days to a fortnight at least between the adjudication and the time at which the trustees could be appointed by the creditors. That could not be avoided, for there mast be time to call the creditors together. He had not followed the Scotch system in this point. In Scotland, it was said, they were able to dispense with any interim protection; but all the communications which he had received from persons and commercial bodies of great experience went to show that such protection was necessary. He proposed, therefore, to retain the official assignee, changing his title to that of provisional trustee, who would perform this and various other necessary duties. He would act, for instance, when there were vacancies in the office of creditors' trustee; and when the work of the latter was substantially over, there remained duties which the provisional trustee would discharge—such as with reference to the after-acquired property of the bankrupt. Provisions were also contained in the Bill for making the future-acquired property of the bankrupt—acquired, perhaps, years afterwards—subject to the payment of his debts, and here again it would be found that the existence of a provisional trustee would often be necessary. There was a purely legal question on which he proposed to legislate. It often happend that there were goods in the possession of a bankrupt in reference to which there was a question whether they belonged to him. According to the existing law, though he were merely the reputed owner, if he had obtained credit by means of having them in his possession, he was to be deemed the owner. The procedure for determining this point was unnecessarily complicated. The adjudication did not vest the property in the assignee, but he had to obtain an order of sale from the Commissioners in Bankruptcy, and had then to meet an action on the part of the claimant. The Legislature had of late years shown a disposition to give to all Courts power to determine all questions of fact or law necessary for the exercise of their jurisdiction. He proposed that it should be competent for the Court of Bankruptcy to do so in questions of order and disposition, thus saving parties the inconvenience of resorting to one Court to ascertain the law, and to another to have it administered. He also proposed a slight addition to the order of discharge. The Bill, as originally framed, provided that notwithstanding such order the future property of the bankrupt should be liable, so as to make up the dividend to 10s. in the pound. To this, Amendments had been given notice of, some favouring the bankrupt, and others dealing with him more severely. Retaining this clause as it stood, he proposed that a condition might be attached to an order of discharge with respect to any income or salary which the bankrupt might at the time be in the receipt of, setting aside a portion to meet his debts. At present a Commissioner had this power under clauses relating to fraud, but he saw no reason why the condition should be necessarily connected with fraud. These were the chief alterations which he had made in the Bill. With regard to the existing interests which were affected, he hoped the arrangement which had been made by the Government would be deemed satisfactory. It was thought equitable that when an officer had served fifteen years and upwards, if his office were abolished he should receive full salary, but if he had served a less period he should be entitled to two-thirds only. Most of the Amendments suggested by the new point of the Bill were formal merely, and he had no doubt that in Committee the Bill might be so framed as to give general satisfaction to the House and to the country.

said, he regretted that the hon. and learned Gentleman had not stated the principle on which this Bill was founded. Was it a creditor's remedy, or a debtor's escape from responsibility? He found it difficult to answer the question. The whole course of modern legislation had been in the direction of freeing the debtor from the obligations he had deliberately incurred. This immunity had increased the difficulty of the creditor recovering his debt. For the last thirty or forty years this tendency of the law was to be traced in Lord Brougham's Bill, in the Bill proposed by Lord Lyndhurst, and subsequently and still more clearly in the Act of 1861, on which the present measure was based. The result of the last Parliamentary inquiry was a recommendation by the Committee that the rights of creditors should be more cared for, and that the assets of persons unable to meet their engagements should be more readily available for distribution than under the present law. So strong was the opinion of the Committee that they recommended the abolition of all the present machinery of bankruptcy. The present Bill, however, while it modified that machinery in some respects, maintained its injurious action in others. The creditors special and individual interests were so small that they could not be expected to take any trouble in looking into the insolvent's affairs. The insolvent had no object but to make the arrangement as quickly as he could, and as advantageously as possible to himself. The assets were not collected as they ought to be. The creditor wrote off the debt as a bad debt, and ceased to trouble himself about the matter. This was a grievance and a hindrance of the gravest character to the commerce and trade of the country. The greater facilities they gave to bankrupts and insolvents to settle with their creditors without a thorough investigation of their affairs, the more they encouraged fraud and lowered the mercantile character of the country. When a man stopped payment, and declared himself unable to pay 20s. in the pound, he had from that moment no more right to the assets than any gentleman walking in the streets had to the watch of the Attorney General. Those assets ought to pass immediately to the creditors by the simple process of the Scotch law, and not into the hands of costly and obstructive officials. He thought they had got rid of their old friend the messenger in bankruptcy; but in the present Bill he cropped up again to take possession of the assets. He really did not know why this official should be resuscitated. The Scotch system provided for the prompt security of the assets. The English system, as laid down by the hon. and learned Gentleman, did not make such provision, or at all events did so in a very imperfect manner. He objected to the spirit of officialism which pervaded the Bill. In Scotland there was no such thing as a Court of Bankruptcy. When a man became insolvent the law vested his assets in the creditors, who appointed a trustee. The assets were distributed as between the trustee and the creditors themselves. The hon. and learned Gentleman provided a trustee, but wrapped him up in officialism to such an extent as to prevent the creditors from getting at the assets which were their property. There were fraudulent creditors as well as debtors. One valuable point in the Scotch system was that the trustee had the power to check the fraudulent proofs of that class of creditors. The English system, contrary to that of Scotland, and in defiance to common sense and honesty, allowed a creditor to prove the full amount of his debt, although he might hold collateral securities for the whole of that amount. [The ATTORNEY GENERAL said, that the Bill made a change in this respect.] Did the Attorney General intend to reduce the cost of bankruptcy? The average charge on estates in England varied from 20 to 40 per cent on the assets collected. In Scotland the average cost was only from 12 to 14 per cent on the assets. There were in the London Court three Commissioners, who were to be Judges, in regard to whose salaries there was a suspicious blank in the Bill. Those salaries, he believed, were to be raised to £3,000 a year. Who paid these heavy sums? They were not paid out of the Consolidated Fund, but out of the proceeds of estates in bankruptcy. In the London Court only there were to be three Judges, say at £3,000 per annum each; a chief registrar at £1,400; seven registrars at £1,200 each; a taxing master at £1,400; an assistant taxing master at £1,000; three new provisional trustees and three new messengers. These were valuable pieces of patronage for the Lord Chancellor, but very valueless and costly appointments for the creditors. In Scotland there were none of these charges. There was collected altogether in bankruptcy in this country little more than £600,000, and for the collection of that sum they proposed to inaugurate several new officers, and to pension others out of property of estates in bankruptcy. He challenged his hon. and learned Friend to point out where, in his numerous series of clauses, he proposed to reduce the expenses connected with the working of the system of bankruptcy, or to simplify the procedure. He must protest against the right given to the debtor to make himself a bankrupt. It ought to be left entirely at the option of the creditors, whether the debtor should go into bankruptcy, or whether his affairs should be settled by composition or other arrangement. Another point most onerous against the creditors was, that the order of adjudication was to be conclusive against all the world. As the law stood at present, with all its imperfections, there were constantly cases in which deeds of assignment that had been fraudulently made were not detected till months or years afterwards. Under this Bill the rights of creditors who now obtained justice would be expressly barred. The Committee on the Bankruptcy Law had recommended that the insolvent should obtain his discharge when he paid 6s. 8d. in the pound to his creditors. He had not himself been enamoured of that provision. It was open to two objections. First, it might operate as an inducement to debtors to defraud their creditors of the other 13s. 4d. in the pound; next, it might induce them to exaggerate the amount of debts immediately before suspension of payment, and swell the assets in order to bring them up to the limit which would entitle them to their discharge. The provision proposed with reference to the order of discharge offered the feeblest remedy to the creditors. His hon. and learned Friend had started with the announcement that he proposed to make the after-acquired property of the insolvent liable for his previous debts. He now cut down that principle to this. By an onerous and clumsy process, the creditors was to have power of going against the debtor's after-acquired property up to 10s. in the pound. To obtain this partial remedy an individual creditor must first prove that the debtor had enough to pay him and every other creditor the 10s. in the pound. It was very improbable that any single creditor would encounter the trouble, the cost, the risk, and the obloquy attending such a proceeding. This part of the Bill would be a practical shield to a debtor against his creditors. The Select Committee had recommended that the non-assenting creditors should have the right of questioning the validity of any deed of assignment or deed of composition. He looked in vain through that ponderous Bill for any provision of the kind. The measure would not restore public confidence in the administration of the estates of insolvents. It had the taint throughout which attached to every Bankruptcy Bill that had been introduced. It was almost all in favour of those gentlemen who wished to make bankrupts of themselves. There were only about 600 petitions to the Court coming from creditors in the year, whereas there were between 6,000 and 7,000 petitions made at the instance of debtors. That circumstance clearly showed what little confidence the public and creditors had in the existing system. Practically, the only remedy creditors at present possessed was in assignments. That remedy would be materially weakened by the Bill. He traced a good deal of the imperfections in our bankruptcy system to the sources from which it had emanated. Since Lord Brougham introduced his measure the Bankruptcy Law had been a pet subject with Lord Chancellors and Chancery lawyers. He should be glad if bankruptcy reformers would consult mercantile men. If the House wished to appreciate what had been the effect of their legislation on that subject, it could not do better than look at the operation of the law during the three years before the passing of Lord Westbury's Act. During the first of those years (1858) the amount of money collected by the Court was £1,780,000; in the next year £1,057,000; in the third year £1,249,000. The average for those years was £1,364,000. The number of bankruptcies in those three years were as follows:—In 1858 the number was 1,520; in 1859 it was 1,054; in 1860 it was 1,430. The amount of assets collected in 1864 was £677,536; that collected last year was only £730,361. The number of bankrupts in 1863 was 8,470; in 1864 it was 7,224; in 1866 it was 8,126. From the time of the passing of the Reform Act the Bankruptcy Laws had engaged the attention of Chancery authorities, practitioners, Lord Brougham, Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Chelmsford, Lord Westbury, and the two distinguished Chancery barristers (Sir Roundell Palmer and the Attorney General), who were now applying themselves to the subject. He wished his two hon. and learned Friends could go among mercantile men and hear from them how extremely injurious the present elaborate system of our Bankruptcy Laws was to business operations, how it facilitated the commission of fraud and defeated creditors. His hon. and learned Friends would arrive at the conclusion that what was wanted in this country was a simple and plain system like that which was in operation in Scotland. There had been a long experience of the Scotch plan. The Scotch people would not give it up for the English system. He had to express his regret that the Bill of his hon. and learned Friend was not more efficient. He trusted that his hon. and learned Friend would carefully re-consider the subject. His enormous Bill required great alteration. He hoped the hon. and learned Gentleman would subject it to extensive revision and simplification, and trusted that it would not be pressed in its present shape, as so far from being of service to the country, it would perpetuate the evils of the existing system.

said, that in 1861 he had raised the question of making the after-acquired property of the insolvent chargeable with his debts. Though the opinions he then advanced did not prevail, subsequent experience had given great force to the observations made by those who concurred with him. Under the old law a marked distinction was drawn between bankrupts and insolvents. The latter after passing their examination obtained a protection and a discharge. But they were obtained only on condition of a warrant of attorney being entered up, giving the Court, at all times and under all circumstances, an opportunity of making their after-acquired property available for the discharge of their debts. This power could only be exercised at the discretion of the Judge, and could any one allege that it had ever been used in a harsh or unjust manner? Why should such a provision be given up? He was told that it was desirable to have "uniformity." The bankrupt, under the old law, was not fettered in the future, because it was assumed that he had proved that he had honestly endeavoured to discharge his obligations, and that he had been unable to do so owing to losses in his trade. But that was not the case with an insolvent. There the debtor, knowing his means, chose to exceed them and spend the property of others. Anything such a man acquired belonged to those whose property he had expended until his debts were discharged. The acquittance given to the bankrupt was a sort of premium to encourage trade. It could not be regarded in that light when extended to the insolvent. The system of uniformity had been attended with very mischievous results. He repeated now what he had stated before, that for every article we purchased we paid an enhanced price by reason of the bad debts of persons who did not pay for what they had; and he believed that the sums we paid in this way amounted to more than any tax we paid to the Imperial Exchequer. The question was in what manner ought the evil to be remedied? The Bill of last year proposed to free the insolvent after a limited time on his paying a dividend of 6s. 8d. in the pound. The present Bill went a little further in the creditor's favour, but it was open to exactly the same objection in point of principle. There was a general concurrence of opinion that the present state of the law was extremely unsatisfactory; and the evil would not be remedied by the provisions of this Bill. A man under these provisions might contract a debt of £10,000 without any reasonable expectation of paying it, and by fraudulent means obtain a further sum of £10,000. The utmost penalty the Bill would impose upon him was the suspension of his certificate for three years; and supposing he should be able to pay a dividend of 10s. in the pound he might set all his creditors at defiance, protect all property he might afterwards acquire, and live in luxury, while the man whom he had wronged might perhaps be in penury. Therefore, a man who had acquired £10,000 by fraud, and had thereby succeeded in paying 10s. in the pound, would go scot free after three years. The law enabled an honest debtor to charge all his future property with his debts; and why should a man be in a better position because he had given all the security he could to his creditors? Until a debtor repaid the sum due by him, the after-acquired property was not his own, but came to him subject to the payment of the debts he had previously incurred. That was an answer to the objection that they should not tie a millstone about a man's neck all his life. If a clause were introduced in reference to the case of an honest trader, who had failed in consequence of the unavoidable risks of trade, giving to him the same indemnity as he would have obtained under the old Bankrupt Law, he (Mr. Selwyn) would not object to such a claim; but it should not be universally applied. He hoped his hon. and learned Friend would consider the points to which he had referred. He (Mr. Selwyn) did not wish to press his Amendments hostilely, and would rather see them incorporated by his hon. and learned Friend in his Bill.

said, that if this Bill did not give complete satisfaction to the House and the country that would not be owing to any want of ability or care bestowed on the subject by his hon. and learned Friend, but solely to the great difficulties it involved. It would not be easy to exaggerate those difficulties. One of the chief was to reconcile the different opinions entertained by those who took a judicial and those who took a commercial view of it. The attempts made last year, and in the present Session, to consolidate and amend the Bankruptcy Law, if they did not show how to remove all anomalies from it, at least tended to put it in a much more satisfactory condition than it was in before. The House would naturally expect that he should address his observations to those points of the Bill which involved questions of principle, and more particularly to the deviations from the Bill of last year. Notwithstanding the remarks of the hon. Member for Southampton (Mr. Moffatt), he thought that the Attorney General had proceeded on the correct idea of administering the property of a bankrupt for the benefit of his creditors. But there were some points in the arrangements which it might be desirable to amend. As to the means to be taken to make a man a bankrupt, there were one or two deviations from the Bill of last year. He was by no means satisfied that the changes were improvements. Now that imprisonment was to be abolished and bankruptcy was to remain the creditor's only remedy, it did not seem expedient to retain the provisions of the present law, which required that the debt of one petitioning creditor must be £50, those of two petitioning creditors £70, and those of three or more £100. He did not see on what principle of justice the power to make the debtor bankrupt could be refused to a creditor whose claim was £49 10s., when it was given to one to whom the debtor owed £50. The answer to the objection that if there were no limitation creditors might lodge petitions for trifling sums was, that if a debtor would not pay a small sum, it was so much the clearer that he was a person who ought to be made bankrupt. If the sum were small, and he had the means, he ought to be made to pay. He was sorry the hon. and learned Gentleman had reversed the decision arrived at last year as to debts of non-traders contracted before August 6, 1861. In 1861 non-traders were for the first time made liable to bankruptcy, all other legal remedies being then left untouched. It was enacted that debts contracted before the day on which that Act came into operation should not be debts in respect of which a non-trader might be made bankrupt. But six years had since elapsed; and there could be no reason for continuing the exemption if such debts still re-remained unpaid, especially as the remedy against the person was now to be taken away. He had understood the Attorney General, when he introduced the Bill, to say that he proposed to allow a debtor to call his creditors together and to enable them, on a declaration of insolvency by him, if they thought it necessary, to take measures for making him bankrupt. That would not be objectionable. But the Bill empowered the debtor himself to make a declaration of insolvency and afterwards to obtain an adjudication as a matter of course. What right could a trader have to take away at his own option the legal remedies of his creditors? If they did not think it their interest to make him a bankrupt, and preferred to rely on ordinary common law remedies, the debtor had no right to take away their common law remedies, and to force them at his own time and in his own way into the Court of Bankruptcy, to take what they could get. What sound reason could be given, under such a Bill as this, for allowing the debtor to make himself bankrupt? By abolishing imprisonment for debt they took away the only sound reason which ever had been given for enabling a debtor of his own motion, and against the wish of his creditors, to make himself bankrupt. He hoped that that point would be carefully considered by the House. As to the steps between bankruptcy and discharge, he was glad that effect had been given in the present measure, as it was in that of last year, to the recommendation that the Scotch system should be in the main adopted. The benefit of the Scotch system was that it removed the administration of a bankruptcy as far as possible from the Courts of Law, and made it as much as possible a self-acting system, under the management of those to whom the property virtually belonged. It placed the matter as nearly as possible on the same footing as administration under trust deeds. He objected, however, to the proposal that the Court of Bankruptcy should have jurisdiction to determine whether property found in the hands of the bankrupt was to be treated as part of his estate on the ground that it was placed in his apparent ownership with the consent of the real owner. It seemed very much like a departure from sound principle to say that a Court intrusted with the administration of the bankrupt's property for the benefit of his creditors should be empowered to determine the adverse title of a third party. Supposing the question to be the right to land, he was sure that his hon. and learned Friend would say that that was a question to be decided by another court. Why should not the same principle hold good in the case of personal properly which might be worth thousands of pounds? The question of discharge was a most difficult one, and he was by no means satisfied with the proposal in his own Bill for a dividend of 6s. 8d., and a limitation of six years. On the other hand, there were great difficulties in the view taken by his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Selwyn), that there should be no limitation at all to the claims of creditors as against after acquired property. In substance, this was a proposal that there should be no discharge. It was doubtful whether, if that was a sound system, it would not be well to abolish the law of bankruptcy altogether. In analogy to the provision contained in the Bill of last year were the Statutes of Limitation, whereby debts which in conscience were due became extinguished after a certain term if legal steps were not taken to keep them alive in the interval. The principle of discharge appeared to be in the nature of a compulsory composition. Trust deeds prescribing a voluntary composition were found to be a common and convenient mode of settling questions between debtor and creditor. They justified the Legislature in saying that there should be a compulsory composition upon certain terms, putting bankrupts in the same position as those who had voluntarily compounded. To keep this perpetual liability hanging over a man would diminish his chance of paying his former creditors. Under the Bill of last year it was proposed that a bankrupt who had committed no offence under the Act might receive his discharge if he paid a dividend of 6s. 8d. in the pound; if not, then at the end of six years. His hon. and learned Friend raised the amount to 10s., getting rid of the six years' limitation, and making the bankrupt's after-acquired estate always liable for the remaining sum. It was doubtful whether this provision would be of much value to creditors. In the case of after-acquired property the court was to have power to make an order for the payment of the balance due from the bankrupt. If the money were not paid there was to be a second bankruptcy, the new creditors being paid first and then the old ones. That would be a difficult remedy, and one that probably would not work. If so, the terms of the discharge, though apparently stricter than those proposed last year, would really be easier, and would also operate very unequally. The Bill of last year proposed not to give a discharge to bankrupts convicted of a misdemeanour under the Act. It was wrong not to make an exception in this case. With regard to the penal clauses, he would not at present inquire how far it was right to extend the amount to which, under the Small Debts Act, the power of imprisonment would apply in cases of contumacious non-payment on the part of persons able to pay. It would be always very difficult by satisfactory proof to get at the fact of ability to pay, and, looking to the arbitrary power already given to the courts, he felt unwilling to extend it. A distinction might, no doubt, consistently with sound principle, be drawn between those who contumaciously would not pay, and those who really could not. In certain cases—such, for instance, as that of persons earning weekly wages, and in general where there might be a difficulty in putting by money—some power of this kind must be relied on. It was desirable therefore to retain that power, provided it was not carried beyond due limits, which he did not menu to say his hon. and learned Friend intended to exceed. He could not, however, entirely approve some of the extensions which he found in the Bill. Last year he had endeavoured to impress upon the House that they should not avail themselves of the law of bankruptcy in order to treat things as criminal which, apart from bankruptcy, would be treated differently. There were things which were open to a certain amount of censure in se, which they did not think fit to treat as criminal by the general law. These things ought not to be so treated, merely because the person guilty of them had become bankrupt. If that principle were sound, certain exceptions which were made in the Bill ought not to be retained. His hon. and learned Friend proposed that imprisonment for debt should still remain where more than £20 had been recovered for damages in actions for slander, assault, battery, seduction, breach of promise, malicious trespass, and so forth. These things were either punishable under the law as it stood, or they were not. If they were, it was not necessary to make them the subject-matter of penal enactment under this Bill. If they were not, he objected that things which were not criminal under the general law should be made so under the law of bankruptcy. He did not see upon what sound principle a man should be imprisoned for debt resulting from a judgment upon a particular course of action, if he were not liable to imprisonment for the thing which was the cause of action itself. Take the instance of a libel. On what conceivable grounds should a man, not sentenced to imprisonment as a libeller, be imprisoned when he was declared a bankrupt? To make the law of bankruptcy an indirect method of punishing adultery, libel, or any such offences, should not be allowed. To say that the suspension of a man's discharge for three years might take place because he had had judgment against him for libel, slander, assault, adultery, and so forth, seemed to his mind as opposed to sound principle as anything could be. These things had nothing to do with bankruptcy. His hon. and learned Friend also proposed to suspend the discharge for three years for various other causes. The first was, if the bankrupt had committed any act of the nature of a misdemeanour, but had not been convicted thereof. If a man was convicted à fortiori they should punish him. To say that conviction gave a man a right to discharge, when he would not have that right if he had not been convicted, seemed unintelligible. With regard to the judicial arrangements, he had proposed last year to utilise the services of existing officers as far as he could, so as to avoid saddling the country with unnecessary compensations. It was reasonable that a period of fifteen years' service should entitle to full compensation, leaving other cases to a quantum meruit. But he did not see why the services of the existing bankruptcy officials should not be made available, so far as practicable, for County Courts, or otherwise, in the country districts. He was an advocate for making as much use of them as possible, and for paying nothing that he could help out of the public purse, without receiving a quid pro quo. He looked with a little alarm upon the reappearance of official assignees and messengers. He deprecated the harpies of the law seizing upon property as soon as the bankruptcy took place. Strong evidence was given before the Committee of 1864, that it was their too frequent practice to hurry on sales in a ruinous way. The proper principle was to leave the property, so far as possible, under the power of the creditors. As to an interim receiver, he should prefer not to make such an appointment an invariable rule, but confine it to cases where it was specially required. He was surprised to find it proposed that superannuations should be granted by the Lord Chancellor. That system was abolished by an Act of last Session, and it would be unwise to revert to it. In conclusion, he would only repeat that his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General deserved the thanks of the House and of the country for the contribution he had made towards the settlement of this question. He should be happy to render him any assistance in his power.

The laws of this country on the subject of debt have passed, not suddenly, but by a succession of steps, from one bad extreme to another. After having continued the old savage treatment of debtors far into an advanced state of civilization, we have now gradually lapsed into such a state that the debtor may be guilty of any kind of misconduct, short of actual fraud, and escape with practical impunity. Last year, for nearly the whole of the Session, I had a Notice on the Paper for an Instruction to the Committee, that it have power to remedy this evil by introducing provisions for the punishment of such debtors as might be shown on inquiry to have, with culpable temerity, risked and lost property which belonged to their creditors. The Bill of last year never reached such a stage that I could move that Instruction. The present Bill has passed the stage when a similar Instruction could be proposed. Under these circumstances I shall give my best support to the Amendments to be proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge (Mr. Selwyn), and I shall move other clauses going further in the same direction.

said, he agreed with the hon. Member for Westminster (Mr. Stuart Mill) that the commercial immorality practised during the last few years, and which had occasioned incalculable suffering, required legislation. What was wanted was to draw a line between the barbarity of the old law and the laxity of modern times. They had all had experience during the last few years of the enormous evils that had been occasioned by persons in commerce dealing unjustly with the property of others. Every one felt that some remedy was required. The hon. Gentleman had almost copied the words of Lord Coke, who said that—"we had taken the name as well as the wickedness of bankrupt from foreign countries." This Bill — subject to improvements in Committee—to some extent accomplished the difficult task of remedying these evils. With regard to after-acquired property, it would be better to provide, not that it should be all seized, but that a competent tribunal should investigate the matter. If there were no equities interfering with the primâ facie rule that a man who had the means should pay his debts, they should make that property liable. The old law was very stringent in regard to after-acquired property. The statute of Elizabeth somewhat relaxed that of the 34 & 35 Henry VIII., but it proceeded on the same footing, and made the debtor liable to the extent of his after-acquired property. It gave stringent powers to the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper to seize the bankrupt's person or property. The statute of Anne was more lenient, and freed the person after the cession of his property. A more lenient view was afterwards taken on this subject. The tendency of modern legislation had been perhaps too much in the opposite extreme. The problem for the House to solve was to reconcile two conflicting principles—that applied to traders and that applied to non-traders, on the one side not to be so harsh us to ruin a man who had been unfortunate, and on the other side not to allow a man to ruin others. The present Bill seemed to hit the medium between too great severity on the one hand and too much leniency on the other. He agreed with his hon. and learned Friend (Sir Roundell Palmer) that the principle of the present Bill was to place the administration of the law of bankruptcy as little as possible upon a curial footing. The best source of information on this subject was to be found in the Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider the Law of Bankruptcy in 1854. The Report of that Commission contained the soundest and most prudent views, and the present Bill would be found to be based on their recommendations. He could not conceive a Commission better calculated to represent the opinions of all classes on this subject. It contained the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Walpole), who had given much time to the study of bankruptcy, and also the hon. Member for Kendal (Mr. Glyn), whose name stood as high as that of any man in the commercial world. In proceedings for winding up companies, under the Act of 1862, the question had been long considered whether there should be compulsory liquidation, or whether there should be a winding up under the supervision of the Court. The present Lord Chancellor consulted the Judges on this subject last July, and the decision to which they came was that where it was possible it was advisable to hand over the assets to the creditors and let them administer their own estate. The main principle of the Bill was to let those who were above all interested in dealing with the estate take it into their own hands and deal with it as they preferred. He failed to discover any better remedy for the evils of which the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Moffatt) complained, than was provided by the present Bill. It seemed as if it were the want of more honesty on the part of the commercial world of which the hon. Gentleman complained, rather than the want of a better system. As to the objections of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer), who was a most able critic on this subject, they appeared to be objections of detail rather than of principle, and not likely to stop the progress of the measure. Many hon. Members must regard with apprehension so cumbrous and ponderous a Bill; but he was glad to find that at least four-fifths of the Bill of 105 printed sheets did not refer to any alteration in the law. It frequently embodied the clauses of existing Acts, often couched in improved language and taking advantage of the decisions of the Courts where the law had been clearly laid down. He did not know why because a man could not pay his debts they were to look back. The matters of principle involved in the Bill lay within a very narrow compass. In the points suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Richmond he (Mr. Karslake) did not think there was one likely to involve much discussion except that relating to after-acquired property. As to the observations which had been made relating to special cases that might have to be met, no system of law could avoid anomalies, nor could they expect to avoid overstepping now and then the laws of logic. The more the Bill was looked into the more satisfactory it would appear. He was able to say that without any indelicacy, because he had had nothing to do with its preparation. Viewing it fairly and impartially, it was a comprehensive measure, and one that effected a very considerable improvement in the law. At present lawyers did not know where they were in respect to the law of bankruptcy. The Act of 1861 repealed all former Acts as far as they were inconsistent with its provisions. That left the law very uncertain. Now they would have a clean sweep made, and anybody who wished to know what the existing law was would have a document to inform him, long, no doubt, but complete in itself, and easy of reference. If, in addition to the other achievements of that Session, they could pass a Bill of that importance, and one which would remove a serious blot on our commercial morality, it would be a source of great satisfaction both to the House and the country.

said, he hoped that as so few commercial men had as yet addressed the House, he might be allowed to say a few words upon it. No one could have listened to the debate without having become fully aware of the difficulties which surrounded the subject, and the almost hopeless task of arriving at a settlement that would be satisfactory to all classes. The hon. Member (Mr. Moffatt) believed that bankruptcy consisted above all in taking the estate of the bankrupt into the charge of the creditors, and in rapidly and equitably distributing the assets. On the other hand, the hon. Member for Westminster (Mr. Stuart Mill) intended to move clauses to render acts of commercial immorality penal. He would thus embody with the question of distributing assets, a code of commercial morality involving an investigation to see whether or not there had been acts of culpable temerity on the part of the bankrupt. Points of such a character were most difficult to determine. That which, when it was successful, might be regarded as a legitimate venture, might, when it failed, be called culpable temerity. The commercial classes were themselves the persons most interested in commercial morality, for they were the chief sufferers by any laxity in it, and they were therefore most interested in seeing fraudulent acts made penal, and treated as such by the criminal courts. But how could the Court of Bankruptcy, which had to collect and distribute a debtor's assets, deal satisfactorily with those penal offences? The hon. and learned Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Selwyn) had given cases where certain people were said to have committed fraud, but those people ought to have been punished quite irrespectively of whether they became bankrupt or not, their criminality being independent of their bankruptcy. The collection and distribution of assets was not so simple a process as was often assumed. Nothing was attended with more difficulty than a liquidation. The business was taken out of the hands of those who knew most of, and had most interest in it, and placed in the hands of those who had small interest, and sometimes conflicting interests, in the matter. The smallness of the assets of bankrupt estates as frequently occurred from the difficulty of realizing as from fraud. The House had to consider whether creditors could deal satisfactorily with an estate, without the intervention of a Court of Law and a system of checks and counter-checks. It would be found very difficult for creditors to manage the affairs of a bankrupt without some machinery provided to maintain supervision over them. There were many questions which required some impartial man to solve them, especially those in reference to preferential claims. The hon. Member for Southampton (Mr. Moffatt) rather underrated the necessity of legal supervision over the realization of the assets of insolvent estates. The needy creditors might wish to force a sale at a great sacrifice, while the wealthier creditors might prefer to wait till the markets improved. The creditors of a bankrupt estate were much in the same position as the shareholders of a limited liability company with no Articles of Association to regulate their relations. They were sure to get into difficulty unless some proper legal machinery existed for assisting them in the realization of the assets. If a trustee under a will had doubts how he was to act, he put the estate into Chancery. Something very analogous would take place in cases of bankruptcy if the creditors elected a trustee. The creditors were to be empowered to elect trustees and inspectors. But who would act as trustee if there was not some fixed rule as to how he was to deal with the various creditors. The advantages to the creditor under bankruptcy must be placed in juxtaposition with the disadvantages. The disadvantages were principally that the creditors lost their title to after-acquired property. But they had the advantage of the law stepping in to give them a speedier, cheaper, and safer realization of the debtor's estate than they would have under common law, or if left to take their own remedy. If the bankruptcy, law failed to give this, it failed in what was its chief object. Sometimes the question was asked whether the bankruptcy law should not be abolished altogether, and the creditors retain their right to after-acquired property, but lose their right of dividing the debtor's property at once. He thought that the difficulty and expense of each man proceeding for himself would be so great that a bankruptcy law was preferable to that. If, as the hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir Roundell Palmer) suggested, no man should be able to make himself bankrupt, then the creditors would be able to determine whether there should or not be bankruptcy. A question was raised whether the Bill was right in providing that after-acquired property should not be responsible to the full extent. The hon. and learned Member (Mr. Selwyn) argued as though the present and natural idea was that such property ought to be liable. But for a long time it had been almost universally held that it was for the public good that such property should not be liable. There would be great difficulty in carrying out the suggestion of the Committee of 1865 as to the dividend of 6s. 8d. As to the proposal to render after-acquired property responsible to the extent of 10s. in the pound, it was desirable if practicable. But there would be great difficulty in carrying it out. A bankrupt would feel as though he was always liable to be made bankrupt over again by means of the provisional trustee pouncing down upon him and taking his after-acquired property. He did not know but that it would be better that a bankrupt should be liable to the whole 20s., with a proviso that a certain portion only of his after-acquired property should be taken at any one time. Such a system would not deprive a man of all inducement to work on to acquire property. The question, however, was surrounded with difficulties, and perhaps the compromise suggested in the Bill might be the right thing to try. If a creditor were able at any time to demand his debt of the bankrupt it would be impossible for the bankrupt to acquire property under such circumstances, because the creditors would not allow him time to do so. No doubt the proposal in the Bill was a most important change. If it were carried out, it would go far to get rid of fraudulent bankruptcies. He could not view with satisfaction that part of the Bill which introduced again into the Bankruptcy Court inquiries into the conduct of the bankrupt, and mixed this question up with that of the administration of the estate. The hon. and learned Gentleman who had spoken last had alluded to those as time-honoured provisions. But the question was whether they had been successful. Had they led to the punishment of fraudulent bankrupts? The Commissioners had been allowed a discretion in every case, and they had exercised it by letting everybody off. If it were not possible to make those clauses efficient, it would be better to strike them out and look to other means for doing what they had been intended to effect, but had not effected. He was glad the Government had followed the recommendation of the Committee of 1865, that prosecutions for misdemeanours should take place not at the expense of the creditors, but should be paid for as prosecutions for felony were paid for. The creditors of a particular bankrupt were no more interested in punishing him for misdemeanour than were the commercial public generally. The Bill before the House did something for the debtor and something for the creditor. It improved the position of the debtor by the abolition of imprisonment for debt. Imprisonment for debt having been ineffectual to prevent fraud, public opinion generally was against it. At the same time, he had received a good many communications in which the writers protested against such abolition, unless the greatest precautions were taken, so that fraud should still be punished. But it must be remembered that there was a great difference between a debt and a fraud. Imprisonment for fraudulent debt was a very different thing from imprisoning a man because he could not pay. On the other hand, the creditors would obtain several advantages by the Bill. The subject-matter of the bankruptcy would be more in their hands. He approved of some official machinery being still proposed to be retained. Some official machinery was necessary to which the creditors might appeal in case of need; but the less necessity there was for such appeal the better. He did not think it could be said that the Bill went too far in the direction of officialism. Some sort of official machinery was necessary to prevent the abuses of creditors among themselves and to assist in the speedy and effectual realization of the assets. He was glad that legal Gentlemen took such an interest in this subject. A satisfactory settlement would only be obtained by a free interchange of opinion between those who were practically engaged in commercial matters and those who, knowing the desires and the wants of the commercial classes, could put them in such a legal shape that they would carry out their views without giving rise to new evils in the place of those which it was intended to remedy.

said, that after the exhaustive criticism the Bill had undergone, it would be wrong if he were to occupy the time of the House for more than a few minutes. He agreed with many of the observations of the hon. and learned Member for Richmond (Sir Rouudell Palmer), and with none more than his last, in which he expressed his sense of the obligations the House was under to the hon. and learned Attorney General for the time, attention, and labour he had bestowed upon the subject. He might add, what the hon. and learned Member for Richmond could not, that that hon. and learned Member himself had also rendered most important services to the cause of bankruptcy reform. He had listened to the speech the hon. and learned Gentleman made on this subject last year, which was one of the most profound and lucid that he had ever heard, even from him. But the Bill to which that speech was the preface was scarcely worthy of its author. It was modelled upon the Scotch Bankruptcy Law, and seemed to have been drawn by some one who was unable to adapt its principles to the modes of English law. The measure betrayed the defects which might thus have been anticipated. The Bill of the hon. and learned Attorney General had not these defects. It was an able measure, and ably drawn. The Bill of last year proposed to reduce the number of Commissioners from three to two. It also had a provision that the bankrupt should not be discharged from further responsibility except on condition of his paying 6s. 8d. in the pound. There was no principle in that stipulation. The Bill of the present Session proceeded on the proper principle of a consolidation of the Bankruptcy Law. It also abolished that last remnant of barbarism, the imprisonment for debt on final process. It continued the three Commissioners, and it gave them the title of Judges. He trusted, notwithstanding what had been said by the hon. Member for Southampton (Mr. Moffatt), that it was the intention of the Government with their new name to increase their salaries. They were fairly entitled to it. No one had rendered more important services to the Bankruptcy Law than the senior Commissioner Mr. Holroyd. The arrangements for settling estates out of the Bankruptcy Court were most useful. He agreed with the suggestion of the hon. and learned Member for Richmond that some official connection with the Court ought to be associated with these arrangements. The deed of arrangement ought to be final. But it ought to be brought in the first instance under the cognizance of the Court. It would be well that such an officer as the official assignee should be appointed to superintend these arrangements. They all knew how often it happened in those private arrangements that liberty amounted to license. The great desire was to spare the feelings of the bankrupt. The solicitor of the creditors was his solicitor; the inspectors were his friends, and thus there was great laxity in the inquiry. If one of the official assignees were appointed, who would not be actuated by these feelings, and who would be careful to inquire into such matters as post-nuptial arrangements and preferential payments, much good might be effected for the creditors. The hon. Member for Southampton need not be afraid that this would lead to any outrageous expense, for the official assignee was already paid, and by a salary. It would lead to a more proper administration and a fairer division of the assets than often took place under the present system. There was another provision which he thought well entitled to a trial. That was that the after-property of a bankrupt should be liable for his debts to the extent of 10s. in the pound. It might be said that this was a retrogressive step; to a certain extent it was so. Parliament had entertained the hope that, though a bankrupt was legally free from his debts, his own sense of morality would step in and induce him to pay them when he had the power. But as it was now proved that private morality was lax in this respect, it was right that Parliament should step in and enfore the claim. The particular object he had in rising was this. The Attorney General proposed to constitute a central court of the three Commissioners, who were to be called Judges. The Bill gave them power to sit together. It gave an appeal from their decisions, as now, to the Lords Justices. It constituted fifty or sixty independent and separate Courts—the County Courts were all of them to have original jurisdiction in bankruptcy. The danger of this arrangement was that there would not be uniformity in the practice or in the legal views of these independent courts. Each Judge would take his own view, and the danger would be that there would arise a conflict of authority and practice. It was true that an appeal would lie from each of these Courts to the Lords Justices. But a Court of Appeal was not the place to settle small questions of practice or of law. It appeared to him that all the County Court Judges should be placed in close and immediate communication with the Central Court in London, and that all appeals in matters of practice and law should be made to the Central Court in London. The Judges would have ample time to deal with these questions. He hoped the Attorney General would accept this suggestion, as he thought it would be a great improvement in the Bill.

said, he regretted that his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General had not been a member of the Committtee from which the idea of this Bill had come; if he had been he never would have fallen into such a misapprehension of the views of the Committee. The most glaring misapprehension of the views of the Committee was shown in this, that the Bill related to bankruptcy rather than to imprisonment for debt. The Committee considered that before taking any step with reference to bankruptcy they ought to determine what they would do with reference to imprisonment for debt. His hon. and learned Friend had not grappled with that fundamental question. Instead of abolishing the punishment of imprisonment for debt he had re-produced all the old abuses. One of the worst of them was making a distinction between the pretended rich bankrupt and the unfortunate poor. He said pretended rich, for no bankrupt could be really rich; but he was presumed solvent till the discovery was made that he was deluding mankind. If a man by his family connections or by making pretences in trade became bankrupt for a larger debt than £50, he would be free from obligation. But if his debt was less than £50 he must go before the County Court, must appear there from time to time, would be liable to be ordered to pay by instalments, and if he did not he might be sent to gaol from time to time. This might be done at the instance of creditors, however humble, while the pretended rich were exempted from these proceedings. So unjust was the law, that if a man owed a number of debts to the amount of £10 or £15 each, if he could induce a friend to lend him a sum of money in order to contract a larger debt, he might then go before the Court and wipe out all the small debts, so that he would not be liable to the County Court process. On what principle did the Attorney General defend these proceedings? The Committee to which he referred had better appreciated their duty, and they declared emphatically that imprisonment for debt should cease altogether. The Committee would allow of no exemption for the poor, or any benefit for those who were in a higher position. Now the poor were placed in the same category with those a little above them it was possible the poor might be saved by this association.

said, he rose to move for a Select Committee to inquire into the causes of, and perhaps to suggest a remedy for, the unequal way in which the laws relating to Juries pressed upon citizens. The present course of proceeding in London and Middlesex in respect of juries, particularly of special juries, caused great inconvenience to jurors, was disadvantageous to suitors, and was not satisfactory either in the conduct of litigation: or the administration of justice. He therefore desired the appointment of a Select Committee to see whether the law could not be made in London and Middlesex similar to what it was in other parts of the country as regards the striking of panels, the more careful revision of the lists, and the adoption of means by which the labour of serving might fall more equally upon those liable. In the country special jury panel were summoned under the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act, passed in 1852. But London and Middlesex were not under its operation. In the country one general panel of special jurors was summoned. They tried all the causes referred to them. They were used according to the discretion of the Court, and they were usually informed of the number of days they had to serve. In London and Middlesex the case was totally different. Assuming that in one of the Superior Courts four causes were set down for trial, it would perhaps happen that there were twenty-four jurors on each panel. So that ninety-six would be brought to the Court every morning. With one general panel, such as was called in the country, probably eighteen jurors would be enough. But this was not the full extent of the grievance under which London and Middlesex jurymen laboured. When they attended the Court they were left in the greatest uncertainty as to when they would be required to consider a case. They might be summoned on a Monday and kept in suspense until the following Wednesday week. They might then find the causes they had come to try were either compromised, or had been withdrawn. The same man might find himself summoned to three of the Superior Common Law Courts, the Chancery Courts, Divorce Court, and other courts at the same time. The highest legal authorities had condemned the inequalities and injustice of the system. He found in the Report of the proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas, on the 16th of February, at Guildhall, before Lord Chief Justice Bovill, a record of the following incident:—

"A special juryman this morning complained to his Lordship of the unjust selection of jurymen. For himself he believed that he had been called upon to serve every sitting since he had been in business: his partner was frequently summoned at the same time as himself, and at that moment they both had summonses to attend in this very court. At the same time it was well known that hundreds, and even thousands, of their brother merchants were exempted from service altogether, either by the operation of the law or by the way in which the law was administered. The Lord Chief Justice said that the attention of those whose duty it was to alter the law had been for some time called to the matter. While he himself was a Member of Parliament he had taken the matter up at the suggestion of the late Lord Chief Justice Erle. What was complained of could not altogether be remedied under the present law. By it the juries were drawn by ballot, and it frequently happened that the same jurymen were drawn over and over again, while others were not called on for long together. A practice had also grown up that when a jury had been struck in one case the parties in other cases accepted the same jury. These things led to injustice to jurymen, and at that moment he had twelve summonses sent to one gentleman for one sitting. The subject was now under the consideration of the Solicitor General, and it had received great consideration for some years past from Mr. Erle, who had published a paper calling attention to the matter. In the country a general panel of special jurors was summoned instead of having a special panel for each case, and it was well worthy of attention whether the country system could not be applied to London. Business had also very largely increased in London. There were six Courts sitting now, while there used formerly only to be three, and in addition there were a great many compensation cases. If any committee of jurymen or any individual juryman would make any practical suggestion to Mr. Erle, he (the Lord Chief Justice) would take care to forward it to the proper authorities."

On the 21st of February in the Divorce Court he read that—

"At the sitting of the court a gentleman made a complaint of the number of times that a person who claimed exemption as a barrister, and who was unable to attend to-day, had been summoned upon special juries. His Lordship said he quite agreed in the remarks which had been made in other courts, that the summoning of juries was at present conducted upon a most mischievous system, but he had no power to alter it."

The Lord Chief Justice of England, when sitting at Westminster, had his attention drawn to a most extraordinary case—

"One of the gentlemen on the special jury panel for Middlesex complained to his Lordship that he had received eight summonses in eight different cases in the course of the present week (June 23, 1866). The Lord Chief Justice, after expressing his regret that the complainant should be inconvenienced, said there really ought to be some notice taken of the matter in Parliament. He believed that the present very unsatisfactory state of things arose from the defective lists sent to the sheriffs by the parochial officers, the result of which was that there was not a sufficient number of special jurors from which to strike the panels. Seeing Mr. Bovill present, who was one of the leading members of the liar, and also a Member of the Legislature, he had thought this a proper occasion to express his opinion on the subject. Mr. Bovill said he had intended to bring the matter before the House of Commons, because it did seem remarkable that any gentleman should receive eight summonses in one week. Would his Lordship give him permission to repeat what he had said to-day? The Lord Chief Justice said certainly Mr. Bovill might use his name, and add that he requested him to take such steps as would, it might be hoped, tend to facilitate the administration of justice."

Again, before Lord Chief Justice Erle on the 30th of June, 1866, he read that—

"A special juryman addressed his Lordship, and said that he wished to protest against the system of summoning special jurors. He said that he had been summoned every session for upwards of twenty years, and this frequency of service he submitted could hardly be accidental, considering the long period over which it had extended. He received from one to three summonses every sitting; his brother and partner was as frequently summoned; and, in addition, he himself had to do duty at Westminster as a special juryman for Middlesex. He was perfectly willing to perform his share of the public duty, but he must say that he did so under a feeling of wrong, in consequence of the impression that the summonses were not fairly distributed. The Lord Chief Justice assured the gentleman that everything was done by the officers of the court in accordance with the spirit of the observations which had been made, and added that but for the pressure of public business a Bill would have been brought in to put the system upon a wholesome footing. That Bill would have provided for the summonses being impartially distribute; for the jury having occupation while they were in attendance; and for making the pressure upon them about one-tenth of what it was now. The evils which were complained of existed only in the metropolis, and it was very desirable that gentlemen who felt the inconvenience of the present system should represent the matter to their Members of Parliament, so that it might be brought before the Legislature."

He believed it was possible to introduce a measure which would at once put an end to the state of things described in these reports; but he thought it more becoming his position as a layman if he moved for a Select Committee, in the hope that official support would be given to the reform be desired to initiate. Another subject of complaint in connection with this matter was the system of favouritism which was believed to prevail by the manner in which the sheriffs' officers performed their duty. It was suspected from the way in which some were continually being called upon, and others continued to escape from the obligation, to serve, that some such practical remonstrance as an occasional present was made to those whose duty it was to summon jurors, lumbers of persons secured to themselves a total exemption from being summoned, and thus threw the whole burden upon a comparatively small body of men. This evil loudly called for reform. Another just ground of complaint consisted in the fact that, although a special juror would be entitled to a guinea if actually sworn, he might wait for many days and yet receive nothing, because it had happened that he was not wanted. It was open for consideration as to whether jurors summoned to attend should not be compensated whether employed or not. The evil pressed upon the suitors with scarcely less severity. Taking the number of causes in each of the Superior Courts at a London sitting at 100, he found that, although in connection with only three-fourths of them, panels were struck, suitors had to pay for 1,800 summonses. In addition to this, it should be remembered that many causes were ordered to stand over and fresh summonses had to be issued. It constantly happened that there were difficulties in getting the proper number of special jurymen for the trial of causes. The deficiency had to be made up by calling upon talesmen, or, in other words, common jurymen to serve. This was any-thing but satisfactory. By the Jury Acts it was intended that higher qualifications should be required of special jurymen than of those who were only bound to serve on the common jury. When, therefore, the special jury had to be supplemented by talesmen it was a hardship upon the suitor who had expected that his cause would be tried by men whose intelligence was presumed to be greater, and whose position was certainly superior. It was imperative that there should be a constant revision of the jury lists. In Middlesex the lists were filled with the names of people who had died, changed their residence, gone abroad, or who lived in the country and never came to town. Serjeant Pulling, in his proposal for amending the law affecting juries and jurymen, had suggested an easy and effectual remedy for this state of things. The learned serjeant said—

"The short remedy for the present defective state of the jurors' list is to assimilate the procedure with respect to their revision, &c., to that prescribed in the case of the voters' lists. The overseers should every year be required to make out a list of all persons residing in the parish whom they believed duly qualified as jurymen, describing in separate columns the nature of their qualification, and whether objected to, or exempt from serving, and any one on the list should be entitled to object to its incompleteness or inaccuracy. The revising barrister should be invested with power to summon all necessary parties before him and to enforce penalties for giving false information, or, in the case of officials, for any neglect of duty. In the revision of the lists he should strike out the names of all persons not appearing to be properly qualified, or who were found to be disqualified on the ground of age, or conviction of crime or fraud, or who were exempt, generally, or for a limited period by reason of having already served."

In the language of a high legal authority he (Viscount Enfield) would say—

"Jurors are our judges; they are judges in cases of life and death, in cases which concern property, liberty, character, and life itself. Can any care be too great to preserve the purity and efficiency of a system on which so much depends?"

He felt sure, therefore, that any care and pains taken to render the present system more satisfactory would be well bestowed. He had brought this subject forward in the interest and at the request of the constituency which he represented, and he believed that it was well deserving of the investigation which he solicited. He moved for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire and take evidence as to the law and practice relating to the summoning, attendance and remuneration of special and common juries, and to report to the House as to any alterations which ought to be made therein.

said, that no one who looked at the manner in which trials had recently been conducted, or who had seen what had appeared in the public journals with regard to them, could doubt that the subject was one well deserving of the consideration of the House. On the part of the Government, he had no opposition to offer to the Motion. The noble Lord had done good service in bringing the question before the House. It was high time that the attendance of special jurors should be enforced when their services were required. It frequently happened that special jurors who were summoned did not attend. The result was that cases were tried by a jury who had not been summoned for the special purpose occasioning dissatisfaction to the suitors. The subject was one which might be fairly considered by a Committee. Whatever might be the result of its labours, it must lead to a better state of things than that which now existed.

said, he quite agreed that a Committee should be appointed. Great inconvenience was caused by the exemptions allowed under the present system. It was singular that persons living in monasteries and convents were exempted. He knew of a town of 24,000 inhabitants in which all the residents were so exempted.

moved for leave to introduce a Bill for the better regulation of the accounts of joint-stock companies, including railway companies, and placing them under the supervision of the Board of Trade. He said, that his object was to bring into practical effect some important provisions of the Acts under which these bodies were incorporated, and to secure to shareholders and the public periodically a true balance-sheet of the financial affairs of companies, and a true statement of their assets and liabilities. No one could have read the Act of 1854 for the consolidation of these companies, or the Companies' Act of 1862, without being struck by the grave and imperative language in which the Acts directed that no dividend should be paid by any company unless their accounts showed that the dividend had been really earned, and could be paid out of the net profits of the company. It might be thought that the ordinary maxims of prudence and good faith, combined with the uniform practice of persons privately engaged in the transaction of commercial affairs, would have been sufficient to secure the observance of such a regulation, without the authoritative interposition of the law. Unhappily the fact was far otherwise. Directors of companies were too often tempted, in order to make things pleasant to their proprietors, and to make their shares look well in the market, to disregard all these moral and legal obligations, Railway companies uniformly produced what they called a balance-sheet, but it was frequently such as no merchants or bankers would be satisfied with. With respect to companies formed under the Limited Liability Act, the greater part of them were not in the habit of producing any balance-sheets at all, but were content with a report, whose chief purpose was that of mystifying their proprietors and the public. It was not surprising, therefore, that great concerns, often of a very complicated character, conducted, with such recklessness and irregularity, should have ended disastrously and disgracefully. He proposed that no company should pay any dividend until it had deposited with the Board of Trade a statement of its liabilities and assets in a form prescribed by that Department; that it should be signed by the officers of the company and two Directors; that it should be registered and open to inspection under certain restrictions; that the Board of Trade should be empowered on the requisition of two Directors of a company to inspect the account-book of the bankers of the company and report thereon. He also proposed to adopt the penal provisions of the Railway Securities Act, in order to carry out the objects of the Bill. The Bill introduced no new principle or machinery, but was merely an application of the Railway Securities Act and the Companies' Consolidated Act.

said, this was not the first time that this important subject had been brought before the House. In the year 1847, after disasters in the railway world, more general perhaps in proportion than those which had recently occurred, similar proposals were made. These attempts were not successful. They were resisted by both the Directors and shareholders of the great companies, and four Bills were fruitlessly discussed in the House of Commons in three years. In 1848 a Bill was sent down from the House of Lords. It proposed to enact that on the requisition of a certain number of shareholders, who were ready to deposit £200 to meet expenses, Government should appoint impartial persons as auditors. The object of the Bill was, it was said, to protect the minority, because the Directors being elected by the majority, if the majority elected the auditor too, the check would be imperfect. It was objected that there was no cry for it in the country; that there was no demand for it amongst the shareholders that the interference was sought not on behalf of the public but on behalf of private partners in private concerns; that they might just as well have an audit of the accounts of the Bank of England or any joint-stock company. In 1851 the railway companies themselves brought in an audit Bill, proposing to appoint a board of auditors elected by shareholders, having the qualification of Directors. Mr. Labouchere, who was then President of the Board of Trade, objected to the proposal, because it made people judges in their own cases, and because such tribunal would want both independence and continuity. He said that the directors in the House prevented his bringing in a better measure. On that occasion Mr. Hume among others argued that it would be better to allow the railway companies to have more power to manage their own affairs, and expressed his approval of the system of five auditors, which prevailed in Marylebone, and in the parishes under Sir John Hobhouse's Act. The last proposal made to the House was that the railway companies should elect a body of 300 persons, out of which five auditors should be chosen to hold their places during good behaviour. It was proposed that the debenture-holders should also take part in this election. No legislation sprang from these Bills. A most important question arose at the outset of this discussion—namely, what should be the scope of the audit itself. It was now generally conceded that an ordinary audit, the mere comparison of payments and vouchers, was an operation which did not give that protection which shareholders sometimes fancied it did. Were they prepared, then, to determine that auditors should report specially on the policy of Directors? Were the auditors to examine facts as well as figures? Was the House prepared for an audit of policy as well as of accounts? That was one extreme. The other extreme, perhaps, was the mere opportunity given to shareholders by the Companies Clauses Act, of inspecting the books for a fortnight before the balance, and a month afterwards. But those shareholders who most required protection were those who would find it impossible to take advantage of such a privilege as that. Several proposals had been sent in to the Board of Trade during the last few months. Though they varied much in detail the common recommendation was that an auditor should be appointed by the Board of Trade, or that there should be constituted under Government a separate railway department to register securities, and to have the general control of the finance of railway companies and to remedy—what was a common complaint and a very reasonable one—the want of uniformity in accounts. If one general scheme could be devised, then by placing the accounts of different companies side by side, it would be possible almost at a glance to compare one with another, and to see how one railway was carrying on its concerns in comparison with another. But against that it was objected, with more plausibility perhaps than force, that it was impossible to have a uniform scheme of accounts for all companies, because the circumstances of different companies were so dissimilar. They could not have an accurate comparison unless they knew what were the gradients of each line of railway, and the price of coal and coke in each instance, and other details which varied in a greater or less degree in every case. A uniform system of accounts would, however, be a very great improvement. The hon. Member for the City (Mr. Crawford) had already spoken to him on that point. In India the returns were made in a much better form and in a much more uniform shape than they were in this country. The strongest objection he had to a Government audit was the very thing which made many who were interested in railways desire it—namely, that it would have a tendency to what was called restoring public confidence. Nothing of course was better than the restoration of public confidence, provided it was done in a fair and legitimate manner. But he was afraid this would be overdone, and that the public might place too great faith in that system of Government audit. It might be represented to the public, and they might believe, that the soundness of the company's proceedings and finance was certified and even guaranteed by the Government. If that was the effect, as he feared it might be, it would cause a greater delusion and a greater amount of mischief than had already been produced. He had sometimes thought that the railways themselves might constitute a central board of audit, and that they might for that purpose make use of the existing machinery of the Railway Clearing-house, which had already added, with an excellent result, administrative functions of an important kind to those of a merely mechanical character. Such a board, under the control of the railways themselves, would be less likely to give false security than an audit under Government. He would not presume to offer any criticisms on the right hon. Gentleman's proposal till he had carefully examined it. The right hon. Gentleman would, he thought, find a far less hostile feeling among companies themselves than they manifested at the former epoch to which he had alluded. In assenting to the introduction of the Bill he could assure the right hon. Gentleman that it should have his most careful and respectful consideration.

had not intended to say anything on the present occasion but for the reference which had been made to him by his right hon. Friend. He agreed with the Vice President of the Board of Trade (Mr. S. Cave), that there was great objection to the Government undertaking the audit of railway accounts. His right hon. Friend appeared to think that the accounts of railway companies ought to be filed and laid before the Board of Trade with their vouchers before they were permitted to declare a dividend. [" No!"] He might have misunderstood his right hon. Friend, but such was the impression left upon his mind. The Government audit would affix a kind of imprimatur on the accounts, but it would be very difficult to give satisfaction to the public. In the first place, they must clearly determine what were working expenses, and what revenue, and unless they could define that by statute there would be constant differences of opinion on the point. The public wholly misunderstood the nature of a Government audit. He agreed with the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Cave) as to what an audit should be. It ought not to be an audit of the policy of a company, for the Directors must be responsible to the shareholders and to the public as to their policy. The audit should be nothing more than an accountant's audit, showing that the accounts were duly sustained by the vouchers and the requisite proofs and authorities. The right hon. Gentleman had suggested that an uniformity of audit might be obtained by means of the clearing system which obtained among the railway companies, but he did not think that any proposal of that kind could be found practically useful, owing to the want of uniformity of interest. There were many objections to the plan of Government audit. It would be impracticable. It would lead the public to form erroneous ideas as to the responsibility of the Government in the matter. His right hon. Friend had rather misrepresented what he had stated on a former occasion. The proposal he then made, as he had expressly stated, was not made out of regard to the interests of railways themselves. It proceeded on a totally different principle—that the Government might avail themselves of the then position of affairs for the purpose of securing the eventual ownership of the railways for the benefit of the State. It was the interest of the public he had in view. He certainly would not for a moment have thought of asking the State to help railways in any eleemosynary spirit. He should be glad to see the Bill of his right hon. Friend when it was introduced.

said, that the speeches of his right hon. and hon. Friends had been addressed to the official audit of the accounts of railway companies. But what the right hon. Baronet proposed was not an official audit. He proposed to introduce a Bill for the better regulation and supervision, by the Board of Trade, of the accounts of railway and other—he supposed all other—joint-stock companies, regulating the accounts, and therefore fixing the dividends of millions of property. That was a very sweeping proposal. It was right that they should know whether the Board of Trade was prepared to take that responsibility in all its length and breadth. The country had grown great by the enforcement of a policy enlarging and deepening yearly—that of leaving private parties to manage their own affairs in their own way. Individual care of individual interests could not be supplied by the action of any Government department. The right hon. Baronet (Sir William Hutt) had, no doubt, great experience at the Board of Trade. He had endeavoured to explain his proposal in language, perhaps, not peculiarly fortunate. When he compared that language with what had fallen from the Vice President of the Board of Trade (Mr. S. Cave), and the hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. Crawford), he should like to ask one question. Did the right hon. Baronet mean to propose to the House to give him leave to introduce a Bill the effect of which would be to place under the control of the Board of Trade the regulation and supervision—totally different things—of all the accounts of all the companies constituted by Charter, established by Act of Parliament, or set on foot by the Limited Liability Act of 1862—not railways only, but every banking company, insurance company, every gas and water company, every partnership in the country consisting of more than seven partners. If that was the meaning of the right hon. Baronet he should like further to know if the Board of Trade was prepared to accept and recommend so sweeping a proposal.

said, that he certainly did not contemplate anything so extensive. The object he had in view was much more contracted. Already there were provisions in existence which had reference to this subject, but from some defect in their character they were inoperative. His purpose merely was to give them practical operation.

said, he moved an Address to Her Majesty for Copies of all Letters addressed to the Lord Chancellor in 1853–4, containing proposals for a plan to consolidate the statutes, which were not contained in the printed copy of Mr. Bellenden Ker's Reports. The subject of a digest of the law had recently been referred to in an able article in The Times. That journal stated that it would be worth while for Parliament to vote £30,000 a year even for so long a period as ten years—though, probably, five years would be sufficient for the purpose—in order to secure so important an object as the digest of the law. He had a strong feeling that the House of Commons had been trifled with by the delay in carrying out this work, and that the interests of the country had been materially injured. In 1854, when the subject was pressed strongly on the attention of the Government, a Commission was appointed, upon which were placed individuals of high legal authority. It would have been utterly impossible to get men better qualified for the work, if they had chosen to do it. But it was vain to expect legal reform to spring from legal men. The result of the appointment of that Commission had been really nothing. Certain gentlemen were directed by Lord Cranworth, one of the members of the Commission, to set to work and furnish specimens of their ability in consolidating the statutes. Mr. Bellenden Ker was appointed, with a salary of £1,000 a year. Four other gentlemen were associated with him, at salaries of £600 a year, to submit proposals for the consolidation of the statute law into one code or digest. These gentlemen were only appointed for one year. They succeeded in preparing a digest from the time of Henry III. to the 17 & 18 Vict., in sending in a draft! Bill for the consolidation of 963 Acts relating to the National Debt, and in arranging a plan for the future amendment of the law so as to secure uniformity. But the rapid way in which the business was done seemed to astonish the Commissioners, and these gentlemen were got rid of. The Notice which he had placed on the paper referred particularly to a letter from Mr. Chisholm Anstey and Mr. Rogers, two of the gentlemen who had been employed in the work, in which they stated that they would undertake in four years to complete everything that was intrusted to the Commissioners, or, if they had two others associated with them, to do all that was required by Parliament in two years, which would be about 1856–7. The reason that nothing had yet been done was that the consolidation had been intrusted entirely to legal men. If they appointed one or two barristers and as many laymen for the work, and placed Lord Westbury at the head, the revision would be finished in a very short time. He fancied there would be no objection on the part of the Government to the production of the letters. He trusted that the result of attention being directed to this matter would be that an impetus would be given to a work the completion of which must be conducive to the interests of the country.

said, it was impossible that the present Government could be acquainted with a letter, which it appeared was addressed to the Lord Chancellor so long ago as 1853–4. He did not believe that the document in question was now to be found in any office connected with the Lord Chancellor. The importance of the consolidation of the statutes would be admitted by every one. That work had been proceeding under the direction of the Government, and very considerable progress had been made. He trusted the Motion would not be pressed.

said, that if the Government had not the letters, they could not, of course, produce them. Would the Government be prepared to produce the document in case they should find that it was in existence?

said, in that case they should of course be ready to produce it, unless there was some special reason for not adopting that course.

I rise for the purpose of calling the attention of the House to a petition presented by me on the 30th of last month from the inhabitants of the Cape of Good Hope, praying that Her Majesty's forces might not be withdrawn from that colony. That petition, signed by upwards of 1,100 of the most influential inhabitants of Cape Town, was transmitted to me by the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce; and in order that its prayer might be brought directly under the notice of Parliament, I have deemed it desirable to make it the subject of a special Motion. I will not discuss the wisdom of the policy now generally adopted by the successive Governments of this country with respect to colonial defences, nor will I detain the House with any lengthened statement of the arguments that might be adduced in support of a change in that policy so far as the Cape of Good Hope is concerned; but briefly I will explain the reasons set forth by the petitioners themselves, and leave the House to form its own opinion. The annexation of British Kaffraria to the Cape Colony has taken place at a very recent date, and although I will not go so far as to say that annexation was contrary to the wishes of the colonists, I believe that if they had had notice of it they would have expressed their disapproval of it to Her Majesty's Government. The large tract of country thus added to their colony give them a much greater territory to defend, and is a serious source of weakness in itself, even if it had not been the means of vastly increasing the proportion of natives to the colonists. I believe I may say that there are three times as many blacks as white within the boundaries of the colony, and there is this additional disadvantage, that in the event of a war between the white and the natives, the latter could reinforce themselves from the tribes beyond the frontiers to an unlimited extent. Of late the presence of Her Majesty's troops has been sufficient to check, or at all events to repress, the incursions of these tribes; but if those troops be now withdrawn, and the colony left to its own defences, there is no saying what steps the natives may take against the colonists, and thus create a war which can only be of the most bloody nature. Stupid and debased as these savages may be, they have sense enough to know that if the colonists are left to protect themselves that will be the most fitting time and opportunity to make a descent upon them. And if the colonists find themselves strong enough to withstand any such attack, which is very much to be doubted, it will be no matter of wonder if they, in their turn, become the assailants, and what was originally a war of defence end in becoming a war of extermination. But a second reason to be found for the support of the petition is the fact that the colony at this time is suffering from financial embarrassments to such an extent that it is not, and cannot be for some time, in a position to pay the contribution of £40 per head which is asked by Her Majesty's Government for all troops henceforth to remain in the colony. A succession of droughts, and a terrible cattle disease have lately fallen to their unfortunate lot, and the population being almost exclusively devoted to agricultural and pastoral pursuits the effect of these visitations has been to well nigh impoverish them. They have a heavy sum to provide for annually for their border defence—from £60,000 to £70,000 in fact—and so great is the prevalent distress, that this payment, and the other ordinary expenses of the colony could only be met by means of loans, the bare interest on which presses severely upon the colonists. Under these circumstances, it would be out of the question to attempt to raise more money to pay for English troops, and if the condition of those troops remaining in the colony is to be the payment of the sum demanded by the Home Government, they must go, and the colony be left to itself. But apart from these (which I may term colonial reasons in favour of the petition) there is the important one that the Cape of Good Hope is not only suitable, from its climate, for a training ground for troops destined to serve in India, China, and Japan; but from its geographical position is a valuable depôt for troops in case of any war breaking out in either of those countries. I urge this upon the attention of the Government and the House not merely as an opinion of my own, but as the opinion of men more capable of judging of its importance from a military point of view; and I hope due consideration may be given to it before it is decided to withdraw such troops as may now be at the Cape. Upon Imperial, therefore, as well as colonial grounds, I think the prayer of the colonists is one that the House ought to listen to, and if it cannot be acceded to in its entirety, I hope the alternative prayer—namely, that the troops may remain until the present financial difficulties are tided over, may be granted. I may here add that the late Duke of Newcastle, in one of his despatches, admitted that certain exceptional cases might arise in which it might be expedient that colonists should have the protection of British troops; and I cannot help thinking that the case of the present petitioners, who are so utterly unable to protect themselves, and are in constant fear of the incursions of innumerable tribes of savages, come strongly within the scope of that admission. Taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, I hope the House will assent to the proposition I am now about to make.

said, that the very fact relied upon by the hon. Gentleman in support of his Motion, that there was a large number of native tribes in the colony, induced him to think that the Government would act wisely in withdrawing from it British troops as proposed. For the proper management of those tribes it was essential that they should be controlled by a strong and enlightened Government. It was impossible with a divided authority, partly colonial and partly Imperial, that our rule should be of that resolute, firm, energetic, and, at the same time, merciful character which tended to impress the barbarian mind. In the parallel case of New Zealand, the unhappy scenes that had occurred had been mainly due to divided authority, exercised partly by the Governor and partly by the Colonial Minister. This had failed to command the fear or the respect of the natives. Divided authority could hardly fail to produce at the Cape the same result it had produced in New Zealand. If a case could be made out for special assistance to the Cape in consideration of its being exposed to the inroads of native tribes, that assistance would be best rendered in the shape of a subsidy. This would be more effectual than a body of troops not altogether under the control of the Colonial Governor. As divided authority produced confusion, he supported the Government in withdrawing British troops. He hoped the day was not far off when not one Imperial soldier would be left in the colonies.

said, he knew the Cape Colony well. He believed the presence of Imperial troops was mainly the cause of the Kaffir war. It was got up chiefly by the colonists for the sake of the commissariat expenses. Nothing would tend so much to the pacification of the colony as the withdrawal of the British troops.

said, that the prayer of the petitions which had been presented from Port Elizabeth and Cape Town was that this country should continue to protect the South African colonies at the exclusive cost of English taxpayers. Not a word had been said to show, and he could not conceive, why the Cape should be treated specially and differently in this respect from any other colony. The financial embarrassments of the Cape were only such as all countries, including this country, were exposed to. The petitioners spoke of their poverty, bad harvests, and cattle plagues, unconscious of the fact that English taxpayers had to meet similar emergencies. Nor was the Cape singular in being exposed to the incursions of aboriginal tribes. New Zealand was equally exposed, and had nobly confronted the danger, and they were only anxious that the British troops should stand out of their way. The early English colonists of North America not only contended with most formidable tribes, but with the organized armies of France and Spain. But they maintained their own, and themselves added colonies to the British Empire. It could hardly have occurred to the petitioners that, so far from having any special claim, they had not done as much as others in meeting the dangers to which they were exposed from native tribes on their frontiers. He was one of those who had believed it to have been a mistaken policy on the part of this country to establish a foreign Power on the Cape frontier, and so to expose the colonists to danger from the Dutch boors. He had opposed the abandonment of the Orange territory, and recognition of the Sovereignty. But that did not constitute a special ground for maintaining so large a force as had been maintained by the British Government. There might be some force in the view that South African territory should be treated as a depôt for troops for service in India, and there were certainly distinctive Imperial interests in holding Cape Town. But there was a limit to that Imperial argument, which had been considered in the adoption of the policy now under discussion. Not many years ago, thirteen English regiments were accumulated under Sir George Grey's command in the South African colonies. Since that time considerable reductions had been made. Now the question was whether 4,000 British troops were not more than this country could be fairly called upon to maintain, at the expense of the British taxpayer, merely to secure Cape Town, and provide a depôt for India. The petition had really been produced by a despatch of the Earl of Carnarvon's. That despatch expressed the opinion that the number of troops now in the South African colonies was a great deal too large to be maintained solely at the expense of this country, that we were indefensibly treating the Cape in a manner different from other colonies, and that the number of troops in South Africa ought to be gradually diminished, or else partly paid for. Warning had been given to the colonies generally, and to the Cape in particular, the Earl of Carnarvon considered that there should be still more ample warning. Therefore he proposed that reductions should be made year by year, and increasing contribution should be made by the colony to the cost of those troops which remained. During the current year no reduction was to be made. In 1868 one of the four regiments was to be paid for at the same rate as other colonies were paying or to be withdrawn. In 1869 two regiments were to be paid for or withdrawn, and so on. It would not be until 1872 that all the troops were to be either paid for or withdrawn. One regiment, on the ground of Imperial policy, would continue to be maintained at the cost of the English taxpayer, the maintenance of which it was considered would be a sufficient contribution on the part of this country to the defence of the colony, and enough to hold Cape Town secure from sudden attack. The petitioners were quite mistaken in supposing that the Earl of Carnarvon's policy was influenced by the recent annexation of British Kaffraria. That annexation was rendered quite necessary by the circumstances of the case. A frontier or neutral territory had been established between the Cape and the native tribes, as a barrier against incursion. But the will of the House of Commons had been so asserted, that it became necessary to place British Kaffraria and the Cape under the same government, by common representation in the Parliament of the Cape. The real basis, therefore, of Lord Carnarvon's despatch, was a distinct decision of the House of Commons, in accepting the Report of the Colonial Military Expenditure Committee of 1861, which said—

"With respect to dependencies properly called colonies, the responsibility and cost of the military defence of such dependencies ought mainly to devolve on themselves. The mode of proceeding adopted by Lord Grey in 1851, in announcing to the Australian colonies the terms on which alone Imperial troops could be sent there, may be gradually applied to other dependencies. With respect to the South African colonies, their security against warlike tribes or domestic disturbances should be provided for as far as possible by means of local efforts and local organization, and the main object of any system adopted by this country should be to encourage such efforts, not merely to diminish Imperial expenditure, but for the far more important purpose of stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in colonial communities. The settlers of South Africa should be called on to contribute a larger sum than they do at present towards the military expenditure of these colonies."

The last paragraph of the Commissioners' Report was as follows:—

"In conclusion, the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile Power; and it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops required for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible; and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of the Empire."

This was the ground of Lord Carnarvon's despatch. It was the deliberate decision of the House of Commons upon which his policy rested—for, after debate, the Report of the Committee of 1861 was endorsed by the House of Commons. The principles contained in the Report had already been applied to Ceylon, the Mauritius, Hong Kong, British Columbia, Australia, and New Zealand. What did the Cape pay for military? Not £10,000 a year. Their defences altogether cost them £70,000, and that included the cost of the Cape Mounted Rifles and the police. What did England contribute? — £300,000; but was that consistent with our treatment of other colonies, while the Cape Parliament expended out of their revenue only £70,000 a year. The real cause of this petition was the irritation which now existed at the Cape about the annexation of British Kaffraria. The colonists said that they had not been consulted on this subject. But there was no doubt that the policy of annexation was absolutely necessary. This country could no more be expected to keep up a barrier territory against Cape enemies at the cost of home taxpayers, than to maintain their forces for them. Sir Philip Wodehouse had acted most honourably in maintaining the necessity for this annexation, though he thereby drew upon himself personally great odium. [Mr. CARDWELI: Hear, hear!] He fully believed that this irritation was temporary only, that it would rapidly pass away, and that the Cape would soon see that the course which had been taken was as much for its own interest, as it was in justice towards British taxpayers. No doubt such a change might be more or less galling at the moment. The Cape had recently suffered from our free trade policy. But their wine trade had already found new developments, and, thrown on its own merits, had greatly improved. He hoped the Cape colonists would see that if they were to maintain themselves as a great colony of the British Empire, they must take part, in common with other British subjects, in maintaining their own defence.

said, he hoped that the hon. Member (Mr. Vanderbyl) would think he had done his duty by his friends in the colony, and would not deem it necessary to press a Motion in which the House would not concur. A judicious and moderate adherence to the Report of the Committee of 1861, and the steady endeavour to throw more and more upon the colonies the obligation of defending themselves, was a policy which the House would support. It would be well to lay before the House the Correspondence, so that they might see how the policy had been carried out at the Cape. To the general purport of that policy he cordially subscribed. It had been his duty to give effect to it in New Zealand. He had also intimated to Sir Philip Wodehouse that the time would not be long delayed when that policy would be applied to the Cape. The annexation of British Kaffraria was really an argument in favour of that policy. That annexation had taken place not for a purely Imperial object, but in order to give the Cape a better frontier and a better means of defence. There was a very excellent mounted police in Kaffraria. He had no doubt that proper attention would be paid to develop and increase that force. If it were found, when the papers were produced, that the course adopted were a judicious and temperate mode of carrying into effect the policy of the Committee of 1861, he was sure that the House would give it their support.

I am unwilling to prolong this discussion; but I must remark, in reply to the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge (Mr. Gorst), that New Zealand cannot fairly be compared to the Cape, the number of natives being very small in proportion to the white population. With regard to the statement of the hon. Member for Bute (Mr. Lamont) that the colonists did not object to the war, being delighted to obtain the commissariat expenditure, I have only to say that no amount of commissariat money would compensate the inhabitants for the destruction of property and enormous loss of life caused by a repetition of Kaffir wars. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Adderley) has confounded Dutch boers with the native blacks. The colonists have never dreaded the Dutch boers. I will not attempt to press my Motion; but, out of deference to the feelings manifested on both sides of the House, will beg to withdraw it.

said, he regretted the noble Lord (Lord Elcho) had moved the second reading of the Bill without stating grounds for proceeding with it this Session, instead of waiting until after the Royal Commission now sitting on Trades Unions had made their Report. Having served upon the Committee over which the noble Lord had so courteously and ably presided, he felt bound to oppose the second reading. He admitted the present state of the law was very unsatisfactory, and he took credit to himself as an employer of labour having never put the law in force against any of his workmen. The evidence taken before the Committee showed the oppressive action of the law in very few instances. Nearly the whole of the evidence was strongly against contracts of all kinds. Out of twenty-two witnesses examined before the Committee nine were representatives of trades unions. Scarcely any witness spoke of hardships under the present law from his own experience, though they had all heard of instances of hardship in the case of others. He was struck by the fact that all the complaints came from the mineral districts. There were none from the districts where textile fabrics were produced. He did not care personally if the Bill of the noble Lord came into operation to-morrow. But he had the strongest opinion of the impolicy of agitating this question until the Commission which was now sitting should have reported on the general question. The working classes themselves would be of opinion that it would be much fairer to leave the matter to a Reformed Parliament, in which the working class element would be much better represented. They would be much better satisfied with a measure obtained from such a body than by precipitate legislation in the present Session. He moved that the Bill be read a second time that day six months.

said, that having served on the Committee he must express his dissent from the view of the evidence which had been given by the hon. Gentleman. Both parties gave their evidence with great candour. The masters admitted that the present law was unjust, and that employer and employed should, except in particular cases, be on the same footing. They approved the Bill of his noble Friend. He would refer to some of the evidence before the Committee on the present system of contracts. One witness, a large employer of labour in Scotland, had stated that the system pursued among his workpeople was that of the day or minute contract. Mr. Dickenson, the chief inspector of mines, gave similar evidence. It was a little hard then to represent these complaints as emanating entirely from the men. Until the present time he was really not aware there was any opposition to the Bill. He was most surprised that opposition to it should proceed from an hon. Member who acknowledged the injustice of the present law. Objections on points of detail might be considered in Committee.

said, he fully admitted the injustice of the present law, but the House should also remember that the law of master and servant had been much before I might not be presented for a considerable the public, and involved an amount of interest which it was almost impossible to describe. Though he had a strong objection to the power of imprisonment, there were some cases in which it would be advisable to preserve that power. There was the case of protecting workmen from the strikes of their fellow workmen, which was provided for by the dread of imprisonment. A colliery employing large numbers of men and a great deal of shipping might be stopped by the strike of an engineman. A thousand men might thus be thrown out of work. If this Bill passed, such a man could only be punished by means of a fine, and that fine would probably be paid by the trades union to which he belonged. He strongly objected, moreover, to the proposal that two justices should have power to annul a contract, this being a power which, except in case of fraud, no court in the kingdom possessed. The length of time which would elapse before complaints of breach of contract could be adjudicated was another ground of objection. While desirous that a measure on this subject should be passed without delay, so as to promote a better understanding between employers and employed, he thought the present Bill contained such faults as could not be remedied in Committee of the Whole House. He should therefore, when the opportunity arrived, propose that it be referred to a Select Committee.

said, he supported the Bill. Its defects, whatever they might be, could be remedied in Committee. The fact that the present law was not enforced in the districts where textile manufactures were carried on was an argument for its abolition. It was said to be necessary in the mining districts, on the ground of there not being in many cases a cordial understanding between masters and workmen; but the present law was one cause of that misunderstanding, for we could not expect trades unions to change their policy as long as this ground of complaint existed. As an employer, he should not feel himself justified in putting the Act in force, and he had therefore no available remedy against a workman who committed a breach of contract. The operation of the law in agricultural districts must likewise be considered, for many cases of extreme hardship occurred in those localities. As to awaiting the Report of the Royal Commission, that Commission was engaged on a very intricate question, and their Report might not be presented for a considerable time. He could not see why a source of irritation like this should not be removed at once. As long as the present law existed no workman who respected himself would enter into a long contract. Whatever trades unions might think or say to the contrary, it was desirable that contracts between masters and men should be of considerable duration. Believing that the law as it at present stood was both unjust and impolitic, he cordially supported the second reading of the Bill.

said, he agreed that it would be better to alter the existing law to a certain extent; but he could not agree that the House would do well to adopt the whole principle of the present Bill. That principle was the abandonment of the punitive process against the workman, and the doing away with the deterrent effect of the present law. The noble Lord (Lord Elcho) moved for, and presided over, the Select Committee on this subject. He drew up their Report. Yet he had brought in a Bill which was not based on that Report. The Committee was composed of fifteen Members. That Report was passed without a division, and was finally adopted by five Members, one being the noble Lord himself. That was a Report which, affecting the relations of employer and employed throughout the country as it did, was second to none in importance, yet it could not be expected to carry very great weight. He wished to ask the noble Lord whether the other nine Members of the Committee were assenting parties to the Report? One important feature of the Report was, that in aggravated cases of breach of contract the magistrates ought to have the power of awarding punishment by imprisonment, and not by fine. If the noble Lord would agree that in aggravated cases, where, as in collieries and manufactories, a great number of workmen were employed, and where a breach of contract might involve loss of life, the magistrate should have the option recommended in the Report, the opposition which the noble Lord would otherwise encounter would disappear. It was unjust, as by the present law, to compel the magistrate to inflict the punishment of imprisonment instead of a fine; but, if the circumstances appeared to require it, he ought still to retain the power to imprison without fine. It would be very dangerous to the interests of the workmen themselves to deprive magistrates of the power of dealing summarily with delinquents, and he implored the House not hastily to deprive magistrates of all discretion of punishing breaches of contract by imprisonment without any previous summons. It was all very well to talk of equalizing the law between master and servant. The amount of compensation which a servant could claim from his master was measured by the amount of his wages. But the amount of compensation which a master might claim from his servant could not be measured by any criterion whatever; and, moreover, the responsibility of maintaining discipline rested with the master alone, so that in no sense could their respective positions and obligations be considered equal.

said, that having had the honour of being a Member of the Select Committee he must express his approval of the Bill. It was founded on reciprocity of principle between master and servant. By the present law, the master was responsible civilly—the servant criminally. In all cases where, by the Act of the servant, any injury was inflicted upon the master which could not be compensated by fine, an option of imprisonment or fine ought still to be left. County Members must allow that the present law bore very hardly upon agricultural servants. When the spring of the year came and labour bore a higher price, they sometimes attempted to break their contracts with their masters. A great number of agricultural labourers found themselves in consequence the inmates of a gaol because they could not release themselves from their contracts, and the magistrates had no alternative. It would be very desirable that these hirings should be regulated by the common law which applied to domestic servants, so that master and servant could both be free by a month's notice on either side.

said, he thought they owed the noble Lord a good deal for the trouble he had taken in bringing that subject, which was one of great importance, before them. The main principle of the Bill was that contracts of service generally should be put on the footing of a civil bargain, the breach of which should render the party liable to pecuniary remedies, but not to penal punishment. In that proposition he agreed. He agreed that in that respect the master and the man should stand on the same ground. But some of the details of the measure required careful consideration. In the first place, it might be worth the noble Lord's attention whether some limit should not be put to the quantum of damages which the magistrates might assess. As the Bill stood the amount appeared to be unlimited. The parties were to claim damages for serious injury to persons or property. But a master might sustain a heavy loss by the absence of a servant, and yet might not be able to prove that it was an injury to his person or even to his property. When they came to the case of a heavy loss, unless they laid down some limit it was possible that the damages given might be carried to a vindictive extent, which would be very unfortunate for both parties. Juries were sometimes accused of running riot in the matter of damages. Again, where the injury to the person or property of the party complaining had been wilfully or maliciously inflicted, so as to amount to a criminal act, the case was to be sent to the quarter sessions. He did not exactly understand that provision. If a man inflicted a wilful or malicious injury now, and the act was one which was recognised by statute as an offence, he could be indicted at quarter sessions without that clause. If it was a fanciful offence, and not now recognised by statute, the clause as it stood would not, he thought, give a jurisdiction to try it at quarter sessions, and therefore the provision would be waste paper. It was worth the noble Lord's while to consider whether those cases were not sufficiently provided for already by the Acts of Parliament which had been very carefully revised within the past few years. Another point was this—The Bill applied to all kinds of service—service in the country included. Suppose a waggoner who went out with his master's team got drunk and drove the horses in a very improper way home, or that he had not fed them in the morning. Many such acts of misbehaviour could not be easily brought within the category of breaches of contract, yet they could hardly be called criminal acts, and the man could scarcely be indicted at quarter sessions. It was also worth consideration whether servants living in their masters' houses ought to be included in that Bill, because there were many miscarriages among servants, which could be met without much difficulty either by a slight abatement of their wages or in some similar manner. That remark applied to male as well as female servants, and he invited the noble Lord's attention to that point.

said, he agreed with the principle of the Bill, but thought that, after the many suggestions which had been thrown out, it would be advisable to refer it to a Select Committee. Under ordinary circumstances, a breach of contract between workman and employer might be easily dealt with as a merely civil offence. But there were cases in which the act of a servant in breaking his contract involved much more than an offence to his master. It involved a loss of employment to a vast number of his fellow workmen, the interruption of work, the payment of heavy damages to third parties, and the infliction of an amount of evil altogether disproportionate to any possible remedy which could be exacted from servants. An illustration of that occurred in his own neighbourhood a few years ago. A haulier, employed in hauling coal out of a colliery, was dismissed for improper conduct. The case was so flagrant that it never occurred to the man to appeal to the stipendiary magistrate of the place, whose justice and impartiality were well known. Without any notice the remaining hauliers, about eight in number, in that colliery struck work, and the consequence was that a large colliery, employing between 200 and 300 colliers, was stopped, every workman lost his wages, the coal owners were unable to deliver the coal at the port, and had to pay for demurrage and delay; and all that arose through the summary and peremptory act of those hauliers. Under the Bill, how would they have been dealt with? A summons would have been taken out against them, and they might have been compelled to fulfil their contract, that was, to return to their work. But what remedy was that? The evil had already been done, and an interruption of work for a week had taken place. The legal definition of cases of this kind was not very easy, but it was capable of being done better by a Committee sitting upstairs than by the House. The immediate issue of a warrant might seem a harsh proceeding, but in certain cases it was perfectly justifiable and even necessary. When men were led away by emissaries and by the promise of higher wages, to a distance, perhaps, of 300 or 400 miles, the proceeding by summons would be nugatory. They would either not attend or shift their quarters—perhaps cross the border into Scotland. Where positive proof existed that the men had absconded, and removed to a distance of some miles, power should be given to the magistrate to proceed, in the first instance, by warrant. The House had agreed to the principle of the Bill; if therefore the noble Lord consented to refer it to a Select Committee, he should be happy to aid him in rendering the details satisfactory alike to employers and employed.

said, this Bill very fairly represented the evidence given before the Select Committee last year. Many of the points referred to in the debate had been already considered by the noble Lord and the other members of the Committee, who were sincerely anxious to overcome the difficulties, but could not clearly see their way to do so. The men, he believed, would not object to aggravated breaches of contract on their part being treated as criminal offences, if aggravated breaches of contract on the part of the masters were similarly dealt with. It seemed to him a fallacy to urge that a heavier scale of penalties should attach to offences committed by the men, on the ground that more serious losses were thereby entailed. No doubt the pecuniary loss was great; but consequences as severe frequently devolved upon the men through the acts of the masters. Men who were brought from distant parts of the country, say from the North to the South, on a promise of twelve months' regular work and at the end of three months were discarded, owing to fluctuations in the trade, suffered hardships as great as any capable of being entailed upon the master. As to the suggestion that progress with the Bill should be postponed till the Trades Unions Commission reported, he was entirely opposed to it. There was no connection between the two subjects, and nothing could be more unfortunate than to mix up the question of trades unions with a grievance which all admitted and which would continue to be felt, if trades unions ceased to exist tomorrow. The noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) had studied this subject his only object was to get an undoubted grievance remedied as quickly as possible. Whatever decision, therefore, the noble Lord arrived at with regard to the reference of the measure to a Select Committee, he should be prepared to support it.

said, he was opposed to the Bill, which was not in accordance with the Resolution of the Committee, of which he had been a member. Its provisions were not fair between servant and servant. Was a man, having charge of an engine at a pit's mouth, who got drunk and ran away, to be dealt with merely as a debtor, though he might leave 400 or 500 fellow workmen below in enforced idleness and in cruel uncertainty for six or seven hours? It was the knowledge that under the existing law he would be dealt with very differently, which kept such a man from getting drunk and running away. He did not know any masters who objected to the principle of this Bill, but its provisions they would stoutly resist.

said, that he and hon. Members, whose names had been placed on the back of the Bill, had every reason to be satisfied with the reception it had met with from the House. Every speaker had admitted that some change was necessary. His own position with regard to the measure was peculiar. As it involved, with the exception of domestic servants, the whole relations of employers to employed, he had been most anxious that the question should be taken up by the Government. But the late Home Secretary (Mr. Walpole), with whom he communicated on the point, though prepared to give all the assistance in his power in promoting the object in view, saw difficulties in the way of initiating legislation, and therefore the task had devolved upon himself, a private Member. Though no lawyer, he contended that the principle of the Bill was sound. The present state of the law was shortly this—For an alleged breach of contract, a man might be taken out of bed at night, brought by a policeman before a magistrate, and sentenced on the evidence of his employer to three months' imprisonment, with hard labour, without time being afforded him to bring forward evidence for his defence. The hard labour was a necessary part of the sentence, for sentences which did not include it had been quashed. This harsh law was really a remnant of serfdom, and dated from a time when it was not a harshness but a relaxation, since it enabled men to enter into contracts respecting their labour, which before they had been unable to do. But what in the 18th century formed relaxation might constitute a galling and grievous restriction in the present day: it was an unjust, harsh, unequal, and unnecessary law. It was most desirable that the breach of contract should be made the subject of a civil action. In Scotland there were 35,000 miners, and 25,000 did not serve under this law. The Committee was a fairly constituted one, and went into the case very carefully; and the House was in possession of the conclusion that Committee came to. He had hoped that his Bill would have been agreed to by all parties; those who represented the men had agreed to it; but the Mining Association representing the masters had offered objections and made new proposals, which had to be considered by the men. Under those circumstances, he suggested a compromise which was accepted by the men, but the Mining Association raised objections to that mode of settlement, and he had at length proposed to Parliament what he believed was just to masters and men, and unfavourable to neither. As to the course which should be adopted for the future consideration of his measure, he would prefer not to send it before a Select Committee, but to have it read a second time unconditionally; he would then endeavour to come to some arrangement with those specially informed upon the subject as to what Amendments should be made in the Bill, and he would ask the House to pass it through Committee pro formâ, in order that it might be printed in the amended form. If upon this he found it impossible to do what he regarded as justice between one side and the other, he would be the first to move that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee. He therefore hoped his hon. Friend would withdraw his Amendment, and he might rest assured that the House, as at present constituted, was as ready to do justice between one class and another as it was to listen to any grievances that might be brought before it.

said, he quite agreed that some such Bill as that under discussion was necessary.

said, he thought the House must be quite satisfied of the necessity for mitigating the rigour of the present law. The difficulties in the way of amending it which had been suggested, however, were such as could not be well settled in a full House; the proposal of the noble Lord was therefore a wise one; he believed it would be assented to, and that the noble Lord would have the satisfaction of going into Committee without having an opponent to the principle of his measure.