said, he felt some hesitation in prolonging the debates on this Bill by stating his objections to the clause of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lowe), but those objections were of such a nature, that much as he wished the Bill to be carried, he should pause before accepting it if encumbered with this clause. He quite allowed that when we were about to make an advance towards democracy far beyond what any Member thought possible last year, it was worth while to consider whether by adopting any such plan as this we could remedy some of the supposed defects of democracy. Let us not, however, through fear of the unknown, adopt a principle which he believed to be a vicious one, and opposed to the well-working of representative Government. Now, the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman must not be discussed only with reference to the limited application which it would have under this Bill. If the principle were a sound one, by all means let the Committee adopt it, but let them adopt it universally; because if the minorities in Manchester and Birmingham ought to be protected and represented, minorities ought also to be protected elsewhere in the 300 other constituencies to which this clause would not apply. If, on the other hand, the principle when considered with reference to the whole country was unsound, let them not introduce the thin end of the wedge, and, at a time when they were chiefly engaged in getting rid of anomalies, introduce a new one. Now, the right hon. Gentleman disclaimed, as he understood, the protection of minorities, and placed his argument on the ground of abstract justice. He seemed to forget all that he told the House last year about the danger of arguing such questions on abstract rights and à priori considerations. For his part, he preferred to look at results, and if the scheme were adopted universally in the two-Membered constituencies, she result would be that, almost with certainty, the minority would be placed on an equal footing with the majority, and we should have a House returned giving an equality of Members to the two parties. He could not see the abstract justice of this or its expediency, and the short answer which he would give to the abstract justice argument of the right hon. Gentleman was, that if a voter found only one candidate to whom he could give his vote, it was because the convenience of the party suggested to them that the best mode of returning one Member was by starting one candidate only. It by no means followed that the voter's other two votes were lost; he would probably endeavour to split them, and to get other votes in return for his favourite. The real question remained, whether it was desirable by artificial means of this kind to secure a representation of minorities? Now, the main arguments on which this was contended for were two—first, the necessity of protecting a minority from the tyranny of the majority; and secondly, the expediency of securing the representation of intelligence and wealth in those cases where the upper classes were likely to be in a minority. Now, as regarded the first point, he believed that it was neither possible nor necessary to protect a minority. It was not possible, because, if the majority were really desirous of tyrannizing over a minority, no artificial scheme of this kind would prevent it. It would always find the means of securing its end, and it would probably turn any scheme that might be proposed to its own advantage. Party organization would avail itself of these arrangements, and with a certain majority of two-thirds, unfettered by considerations towards the other third, argument would be unavailing. In whatever way they might shuffle the pack the cards would remain the same. The game depended on that side which had the greatest number of trumps. Moreover, the scheme was not necessary. Experience, he ventured to say, of representative institutions worked out to their fullest extent did not show the necessity. It did not present cases where the majority tyrannized over the minority, or where the minority had not influence. If the minority were a considerable one, even if it was not successful in the election, its influence was by no means lost. Electors were not divided into two distinct parties by a sharp line, but there was every grade of opinion, from one extreme to the other, and experience showed, that if the Representative went too far in one direction, the moderate men in his constituency at once joined the other side and jeopardized his seat. It was the knowledge of this which insured moderation in many a Member; it was the certainty of this which made any great advance to a party impossible. He could quote numerous examples of the working of this in our own Constitution, and in the present Parliament there really seemed to be something of irony in advocating the claims of a minority. He could also quote instances from the working of the American Constitution. The right hon. Gentleman stated in his speech last night that in that country the minority of thousands might as well not exist, it being entirely ignored; I but this he ventured to deny. There was no country where the position and numbers of a minority were so closely studied, and where, even when unrepresented in Congress, it carried more weight in proportion to its numbers. There was never an election without a contest, and politicians watched with the greatest care the growth or decadence of a minority. When he was in that country last autumn the most violent political contest was being fought. The action of the President had excited great indignation in the Republican party, and in the elections for Congress the utmost exertions were made by both parties. The Republican party carried all before them; they returned seven-eighths of the representatives, although, when the aggregate vote was counted, it proved that the Democratic party had obtained two-thirds of the whole number of votes. What was the result? The Republican party, elated by their success, endeavoured to carry out extreme measures in Congress; they threatened impeachment of the President, and they brought in an almost prohibitive tariff. In doing so, however, they frightened the moderate men of their party both in and out of Congress, and they failed in both objects; but the strength of their party enabled them to carry a moderate scheme for the temporary government of the South which had met with the approval of the country, and there had resulted a political lull. Now, in the American Constitution there were, as he thought, defects which made it much less likely that a minority would be represented in proportion to its numbers than in our House of Commons. The number of members for Congress was so small that the chances of variety and of the minority being there were much reduced, whereas here the number of our representatives was so great that it was almost a certainty that the minority would be represented in proportion to its real Strength; and our system of double representatives increased those chances, while, at the same time, it left each Member responsible to his own constituency. For instance, there were 8 counties returning 3 Members each, and of these the minority succeeded in returning 5 Members—the numbers being 19 to 5. Again, there were 58 counties returning 2 Members each; in 16 of them 1 Member of each party was returned; in 32, 2 Conservatives were returned; and in 10, 2 Liberals; making a proportion of 80 to 36 — as nearly as possible that which would result from the adoption of three-Membered constituencies and cumulative voting. So, again, in the boroughs. There were 91 boroughs, with a population exceeding 10,000, returning 2 Members each; 34 of these returned 1 Member of each party, 44 returned 2 Liberals, and 13, 2 Conservatives, making a total of 124 Liberals to 60 Conservatives — the same proportion as if the constituencies had 3 Members, and the voters cumulative votes, On the other hand, if we looked at the Scotch boroughs, each of which returned 1 Member only, we found them all of the same hue. He contended, therefore, that our present system favoured the representation of minorities, while it retained the responsibility of each Member to the whole of his constituency; and he saw no reason why there should be any difference under the new franchise, though, of course, the two parties might be somewhat differently constituted, and their dividing line somewhat lower down. But then it was said, "By securing the minority its representation we shall get more moderate and more highly educated men. The upper classes, the property and intelligence of a constituency, will combine and return their own Member, and thus make head against democracy." Why, however, should the upper classes be the only minority thus to band together for its special purposes? Should we not have other minorities doing the same, and returning Members, not for the general good, but for their own special advantage? It had been our boast hitherto that Members represented their whole constituencies — that, when elected, they were to look to the benefit of all; but, if this clause were passed, they would look to the views and interests of sections only, and we should have far more decided partisans returned on both sides. The majority, relieved from fear or influence of the minority, would return more decided men; the minority, secure in returning one Member, would demand that that one should be more devoted to their views. Take the case of the three-Membered counties now existing, and suppose this clause adopted, would the minority of Liberals be satisfied with the Liberal county Members they now returned; would they not insist upon having a more decided Radical than the third Liberal county Member at present in general was? So also would it be in the great cities. If the upper classes combined to return a Member, it would be a man thinking only of class interests, a man bigoted and selfish, and probably hateful to the other classes in the town. These, on their part, relieved from the influence of the wealthy and the intellectual, would themselves return more violent partisans, persons having in view only class interests. He objected to this scheme, because it was based upon a theory of classes which was as yet unknown to our Constitution. It appeared to him to be of great importance that the wealthy and the intellectual should be compelled to descend from their eminence and to mix with the common people, and to maintain their influence by active interference of a legitimate kind. By adopting this clause we should prevent that circulation of interests and classes which was the very life of representative government, and withdraw the influence of the wealthy and the wise from directing, advising, and moderating the masses—by which process alone could we hope for the state so well described by the poet—

"Where jarring interests themselves create

The according music of a well-mixed State."

said, he agreed with the right hon. Gentleman who proposed this clause, that no very striking results were to be expected from its adoption. He did not suppose it would materially increase or diminish the Conservative majority which the Chancellor of the Exchequer expected to secure in a Reformed Parliament, and to this fact he attributed the indifference of the two great party leaders to it. Those right hon. Gentlemen, indeed, had not much interest in the remote future effects of this Bill. They would not lose their seats; but would continue to occupy their present distinguished positions, and this consideration, it seemed to him, had seriously interfered with the proper discussion of this great revolutionary measure. The matter, however, presented a very different aspect to the younger Members of the House. The younger men were interested, not in what might happen in Parliament after a Dissolution, but in what would be the state of this country twenty or forty years hence. It was for this reason that he ventured to intrude himself upon the Committee, and state why he supported the clause. The young men were vitally interested in this Reform question. Many of them would lose their seats altogether, and would thus be cut off from that public career in life upon which they were just entering. The worst effect of the Government measure would be its demoralizing effect upon men who would be compelled to make themselves popular. He did not suppose that the opinions of a constituency would weigh unduly with men like the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the right hon. Member for South Lancashire, because their political opinions had long been formed, and settled; but he dreaded their influence upon young men whose political character was not formed, and who would have to stoop to make themselves popular. If he had no other reason to offer but that alone, he would feel himself justified in supporting the clause, because it would give them some hope, and point out a way in which hereafter it might be possible for people who were unable to make themselves popular with the masses to find their way into Parliament. He did not believe the re-distribution scheme of the Government would stop where it was. [Mr. BERESFORD HOPE: "Hear, hear!"] He, for one, did not doubt that in a very few years they would have a scheme of distribution somewhat commensurate with the extensive reduction of the franchise which had been made. More three-corned constituencies would be created; and if the proposition contained in the clause were affirmed, they would have a principle established that would prove very beneficial, and there would be a chance for the representation of minorities. The hon. Member for Reading said that it was not desirable to represent minorities. That might, perhaps, be the case just now; but the time would come when it would not only be desirable, but necessary. It was the boast of that House that it at present represented all classes, and could not afford to be indifferent to the opinions of any class of their constituents, but after this Bill passed they would represent only one class, and that, generally, the lowest; so that the opinions of richer voters would be of no value when weighed in the same scale with a more numerous section. Looking to the future of this country, it seemed to him eminently desirable that there should be a chance hereafter of representing minorities He had not intruded himself upon the House during these Reform discussions, yet, night after night, he had been much distressed and grieved at the expressions made use of against the Conservative party. There was considerable justice in the remarks made towards them. It seemed to him they were in great danger of getting rid of the best part of their Conservative principles — to act contrary to all their previous opinions, and yet retaining the worst part of Conservatism. They were giving the country an extreme democratic measure, and at the same time they shrank from all those checks and precautions that hon. Members opposite had themselves suggested.

said, he was glad the Committee had at length the opportunity of considering the principle involved in the Amendment. He feared that the advocates of this principle were in a minority in that House, and in the country. Yet in time they might hope to convert the minority into a majority, and especially to obtain converts among the younger men. The principle sought to be established by the right hon. Member for Calne was by no means new, nor was it without able and eminent advocates from the days of Burke to those of Guizot, Mill, Hare, &c. It was in the speech of a Conservative statesman, Mr. Praed, that the first notice of this proposal was to be found. Mr. Praed, during the debate on the Reform Bill in 1831, proposed that in the unicorn counties enfranchised by the Bill each elector should only have two votes. Mr. Praed said:—

"If we desire that the representatives of a numerous constituency should come hither merely as witnesses of the fact that certain opinions are entertained by the majority of that constituency, our present system of election is certainly rational; and Members are right in their reprobation of a compromise, because it would diminish the strength of the evidence to a fact we wish to ascertain. But if we intend, as surely we do intend, that not the majority only, but the aggregate mass of every numerous constituency, should, so far as it is possible, be seen in the persons, and heard in the voices, of their representatives—should be, in short, in the obvious literal sense of the words, 'represented' in this House—then, Sir, our present rule of election is in theory wrong and absurd, and in practice is but partially corrected by the admission of that compromise on which so much virtuous indignation has been wasted."—[S Hansard, v. 1362.]

Lord Althorp replied, and made a prophecy as to the future, which, if the subsequent elections for unicorn counties were examined, would be found to be completely verified. The present Earl Grey made a proposal of a somewhat similar kind in the debate on the English Municipal Bill; and on the Irish Municipal Bill he proposed that when there were eight candidates to be elected, the elector should only have five votes. The noble Earl also proposed that the same principle should be introduced into the constitution of the Cape of Good Hope. Earl Russell likewise, in introducing his Reform Bill of 1854, proposed that each elector of a unicorn constituency should only vote for two candidates. The noble Earl said:—

"Now, it appears to us that many advantages would attend the enabling the minority to have a part in these returns. In the first place, there is apt to be a feeling of great soreness when a very considerable number of electors, such as I have mentioned, are completely shut out from a share in the representation of one place. …. But in the next place, I think that the more you have your representation confined to large populations, the more ought you to take care that there should be some kind of balance, and that the large places sending Members to this House should send those who represent the community at large. But when there is a very large body excluded it cannot be said that the community at large is fairly represented."—[3 Hansard, cxxx. 498.]

In bringing forward his next Reform Bill in 1860, Earl Russell again gave his adhesion to the principle. He said:—

"The House may remember that, upon a former occasion, I made a proposition which was not very palatable to the House, and which was certainly not popular in the country—namely, that there should be a division of votes; in other words, that where there were three Members each elector should have only two votes. As that proposition was not very popular, although I think it was a fair and just one, I shall not attempt to renew it upon the present occasion."—[3 Hansard, clvi. 2062.]

In 1865, in re-publishing his Essay on the English Constitution, Earl Russell wrote as follows:—

"If there were to be any deviation from our customary habits and rooted ideas on the subject of representation, I should like to see such a change as I once proposed in order to obtain representatives of the minority in large and populous counties and towns. If when three Members are to be elected each elector were allowed to give two votes, we might have a Liberal country gentleman sitting for Buckinghamshire, and a Conservative manufacturer for Manchester. The local majority would have two to one in the House of Commons, and the minority would not feel itself disfranchised and degraded."

He held it to be a fixed axiom in modern politics that the opinion of the majority must rule; but it was most important for the well-being of the State that the minority should have a hearing; and that was necessary even in the interest of the majority themselves, who seldom knew what was most for their own real benefit and the benefit of the country, and could only arrive at that knowledge by means of a wholesome collision of arguments and opinions. Too much could not be done to inculcate on the community that this was an united nation, and that the interest of every one was bound up with the interest of all. That was a fundamental law in political economy; and yet how rarely was it accepted as a vital principle even by educated minds! The present proposal would secure to a minority in every place, forming one-fourth of the electors the certainty of having one representative. The minority would generally be better disciplined and actuated by higher motives than the majority, for a large number of persons always went with the winning side; whereas the greatest reforms ever achieved were always initiated by a small but noble band, who were at first in conflict with the majority. The minority, under that proposal, would have the greatest possible motive for selecting as their candidate the best and ablest man they could find, partly with a view of having their opinions well ex-pressed, and partly also in order to win to their side the new voters who would come from time to time upon the register. Anotber result of the plan would be to get rid of a large part of the expenditure at elections, and it would likewise in many cases, put an end to bribery. Of course, he did not bring any special charge against the four or five cities and boroughs, or the seven or eight counties, which would be affected by that proposal; as, if it were adopted by the Committee, he looked forward to the time when after a trial of the experiment on so limited a scale, the House would see reason to enlarge the sphere of its operations. He concurred with the hon. Member for Lambeth in thinking that such a plan would have the effect of interesting an increased number of persons in polities. A large part of the population in many constituencies was now practically disfranchised. They took no interest in the elections, which was a grave evil; and there he joined issue with the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Lefevre), who objected to the proposal because under it the wealthier and upper classes would no longer take an interest in politics. Its effect, he thought, would be directly the reverse of that. One serious objection that had been raised was that it would put the candidates of the majority in a disadvantageous position towards each other as regarded the splitting of votes between the popular candidates; and that was with him a reason for preferring the plan of Lord Russell to the clause of his right hon. Friend. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had said the result of such a proposal would be to weaken the Executive. They all knew the weakness of the Executive now, and all deplored it; but he thought the result would be exactly the contrary, inasmuch as the Executive would no longer have to fear sudden and capricious changes of opinion. The changes of opinion in that House would then be more gradual and more in accordance with the real public opinion of the time, which would enable the Executive to assume a bolder attitude, as it would not then, as was the case at present, so much fear to run counter to the feeling of any small body of persons. As a mere party question he believed that the effects of the proposal would be absolutely null and void. For himself he should scorn to allow his opinion on it to be influenced by such considerations; but as to the three cornered constituencies contemplated by the Bill, while it was true that the Liberal party might obtain a seat in Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, and Oxfordshire, on the other hand, the Conservatives would gain a seat in Birmingham, Manchester, and the City of London. In conclusion, he was very glad to be able to stand there and give his adhesion to the principle contained in the clause, because he knew it was unpopular at present among the constituencies, and, although he was aware that the knowledge of the circumstances deterred many hon. Gentlemen from giving the proposal their support, he was yet convinced that the surest way to gain strength for it in the mind of the country was to show that a large number of Members of the House of Commons of every shade of political opinion had seriously considered it and had given it their adhesion.

said, he was glad that so important a proposal as the present was likely to receive a full and fair discussion. The extreme difficulty, however, of carrying it out was exemplified by the fact that two of its chief advocates in that House sought to effect their object by different methods. The plan of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lowe) seemed open to this objection, that it would place a rather insignificant minority in a superior position to that of the majority in a constituency. The proposition of the hon. Member for Plymouth was for a direct representation of minorities. If that principle were to be adopted at all it ought to be carried further. They could not adopt it simply where the electors returned three Members, but must also do so in constituencies which returned two; because an elector living in a constituency with three Members, and who had one candidate in whom he was especially interested, would have the power under that proposition of giving him three votes, whereas another elector, living perhaps in a neighbouring constituency, would be able to give the candidate in whom he might be especially interested one vote only. It was said that the representatives should be the reflection of the represented, and it was clear that the more electors were induced to take a direct interest in the affairs of the legislature the more would they take in the affairs of the country. An additional reason for the adoption of some plan of this kind was to be found in the present tendency to give increased representation to large and populous places. If in those places there were no cumulative vote or no representation of the minority the majority would have the power of returning a certain number of representatives in direct accordance with their own peculiar political views, and those Members, from representing the majority continually, would become rather delegates, compelled to carry out the popular will, than representatives as they should be, of the whole country. He would at once admit that no representative should be dead to the influence of public opinion, which at the present day exercised so much power; but he was at the same time of opinion that a representative should, on the great questions of the day, be left free to exercise his own independent judgment. His hon Friend the Member for Reading had in the course of his speech entered into some details with respect to the state of things which prevailed in America, and he, too, had had as well as his hon. Friend the pleasure of travelling in that country. He there learnt from several person whom he met that several of the most influential citizens of the United States shrank from taking part in public affairs because they were so greatly outnumbered by the lower order of the community. Now that was not a desirable state of things and it would, he hoped, be long before a similar state of things came to exist in England. It seemed also most probable that, if our representatives should become the mere delegates of the popular will, we should very soon have to resort to the payment of the Members returned to the House of Commons. Of the results which such a system led to in America he might be allowed to give a single instance. He once saw it stated in a paper that in one of the Western States of that country the people had a great objection to make any payment which was not absolutely necessary. Their taxes were not very great, and there was only one pauper in the whole place. Having to pay a representative, they hit on the expedient of sending the pauper as their Member to the Legislative Assembly, and thus made the one expense suffice. He had simply, in conclusion, to express a hope that the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne, or some proposal similar to it, would be adopted. If that were done, there would be a good chance that all classes of the English people would be fully and fairly represented in the future House of Commons.

said, it appeared to him that the hon. Member for Cambridge had put the question under discussion on the right footing when he very frankly stated that there was at present no necessity for the proposed change; but that he was favourable to it in consequence of the alteration which the Bill would make in the future constituency of the country. His right hon. Friend the Member for Calne had expressed a similar opinion, for he had a profound distrust of the new constituencies. In that view his right hon. Friend had been perfectly consistent, and amid all the changes of opinion which had taken place on the question of Reform he alone remained unchanged,—

"Nec civium ardor prava jubentium,

"Nec vultus instantis tyranni,

"Mente quatit solidâ."

But what, he would ask, was the foundation of the argument on which the proposal of his right hon. Friend was based? It proceeded on the belief that the minority in the new constituency was more likely to be right than the majority, or that the majority were not in the future so likely to be right as they were at present. Now, that might be a very good argument against the third reading of the Bill or any extension of the franchise at all; but it seemed to him to be of very little force as addressed to those who were of opinion that the franchise was being properly extended, and that the new class of voters would be as good as, if not better than, the old. His hon. Friend who had just spoken had pointed out very clearly that which was the logical conclusion to which the arguments in favour of cumulative voting led—namely, to the establishmnet of the system in constituencies which returned only two Members. And what, he would ask, would be the effect of the adoption of such a system in those constituencies? Why, that in every one of them a minority of one-third plus one would be equal to the majority. In almost every such case two Members opposed in political opinion would be returned, and, inasmuch as their votes would neutralize one another, the practical result would be that all the great questions of the day would be decided by the constituencies which returned only one Member. He was quite ready to admit that, in the case of constituencies returning three Members, the arguments against the proposal before the Committee were by no means so strong; they were, he at the same time thought, of great weight. What, for instance, was the theory of our representative system? One Member was given to a comparatively small community, while two were given to a larger, in order that they might be more effectually represented, not merely in debate, but by votes recorded in the lobby; a constituency with two Members having twice the power on a division than that by which only one was returned. Applying the same rule to constituencies returning three Members, was it not intended that they should have still more power in that respect than those the number of whose representatives was smaller? If the present Motion were agreed to, the consequences would be that a great Liberal or Conservative constituency—it mattered not which, because the question was not one of a party character—would in reality be represented in the lobby on all important occasions by only one vote. In the case of Manchester, for example, and all the other great towns having three Members, the Member of the minority would neutralize one of the votes of the two Members for the majority, so that those great towns would practically not have a greater number of votes than a small borough like Totnes. His hon. Friend who spoke last had dwelt on two incidental advantages which, he said, would be likely to attend the adoption of cumulative voting—the prevention of bribery and of contested elections. He could not, however, help thinking that if it did operate to prevent contests it would do so only at the expense of something more valuable than their absence. A minority of one-fourth would, under the operation of the clause proposed by his right hon. Friend the Member for Calne, and still more if the Amendment of his hon. Colleague were adopted, be sure of returning their Member. The majority, too, would be sure of returning theirs. Indifference as to the candidates returned would be the result, and a political stagnation which might prove to be worse even than political excitement. But there was an inevitable difficulty attending the working of this principle. Let them suppose that the Member of the minority of one-fourth was named to a Government office, would it not be idle to expect that he would be reelected by the majority? If that were so the Member of the minority would be rendered practically ineligible for the holding of office, and would thus be placed in a position of inferiority as compared with other Members. Besides, he could not help thinking that the novelty of having Members whose opinions were diametrically opposed to those of the majority of their constituency was calculated to place those Members in a false position in that House. He was not one of these who attached any great reliance on the argument of prescription. He was not opposed to all change, simply because it was change, nor did he adhere to an existing system merely because it happened to be established. Those who followed the right hon. Member for Calne, however, in the present instance, were advocating a system of voting which was wholly unknown to the Constitution of this country. The burden of proof, therefore, as to its expediency, he maintained rested with them, and in his opinion they had failed to make out any such case as should induce the Committee to assent to a proposition, which, as far as he could see, was due solely to a distrust of the new constituencies, and he should, therefore, certainly feel bound to oppose the Motion.

said, he was unable to concur in the view that the cumulative vote was an essential part of the new system of representation which they were about to adopt. He considered that the representation of communities was the principle of representation in that House; and hitherto he had always understood that the object of the process of election was to ascertain what were the prevalent wish and feeling of a community which chose men to represent them in that House, not merely in reference to one single question on which the election might have turned, but to think, consult, and deliberate for them as to what might be best for Imperial interests in general. They were told that the influx of democracy would be so great that they must abandon the old plan of ascertaining what was the prevalent wish of every community, and must arrive at some plan for enabling every individual, or, at least, every class of the constituency, to have a direct voice in that assembly. That was an entirely new principle. Hon. Gentlemen opposite told them that they had adopted so democratic a suffrage, they must endeavour to cure the evil by facilitating a process of combination against it. The principle of this new scheme of representation had been enunciated in the hon. Member for Westminster's work by the words "that the whole people should be represented by the whole people;" but the question was whether that principle would be better carried out by the majority and minority of different places sending antagonists to Parliament to represent them on opposite views, or by the collective community electing Members who on all questions could think and act for the integral constituencies by which they are returned. The present mode of ascertaining by the voice of the majority the prevalent will of a constituency was, according to the proposed plan, no longer to be the rule; and the locality returning a Member was no longer to be considered as an organized community, but every individual in it was to be severally or in groups represented. Every community in order to be represented in that House had hitherto acted as an unit, and, just as an individual arrived at a conclusion, after balancing conflicting reasons, so a community, after balancing one set of opinions against the other, expressed its decision in a contested election through the majority, and the Members elected were intended to represent freely, and in their own Judgment, the aggregate will of the place. There were some Gentlemen there who might see only one side of a question, who did not trouble themselves to balance reasons; they were analogous to rotten boroughs, or places never contested: but, happily, they were vastly outnumbered by those who brought the effect of balanced judgment to bear upon their decisions, and such alone are worthy members of a deliberative assembly. It seemed to him that a representative was not to be taken to indicate the opinion of every individual he represented, but to exercise a judgment which was in general accordance with the opinion of his constituents. Was it to be supposed that hon. Members represented the stereotyped opinion of their constituencies on one point merely? Did any hon. Member suppose that he merely represented in that House his constituents in some one particular view, or on one question, such as Free Trade or Reform? If he did, he was not fit to represent any constituency in that House. The hon. Member for Lambeth has said that he had never felt comfortable in that House because he knew that he did not represent the minority in his constituency. It was, however, the hon. Member's business to represent the minority, and the minority would consider the hon. Member wanting in his duty if he did not represent them on every question which came before Parliament. Not only ought he to do so, but he could not help doing so; and the hon. Member acknowledged the influence of that minority in his arguments and in his conduct in that House. It was taken for granted in all these arguments that the minority and the majority were two bodies which must be in stereotyped antagonism on all subjects, and that the one had no sympathy with the other. The minority were supposed to represent the intelligence of a constituency, and the majority were taken to represent numbers or brute force. Was that so in every case? It was not, because the intelligence of a place, if it were worth anything, always divided the numbers. If the educated class chose to withdraw from political contests on acount of fear, sloth, or luxury, it did not deserve to possess political influence, and he would make no alteration in the old principle of election in order to meet such a case. He could not help thinking that in all these arguments each man had his mind fixed on a particular case, and that they were losing sight of the great principle which had always guided the representation of conflicting opinions in that House. The hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. Hughes) had said that if the principle he advocated were adopted, the interest of the different classes of the people would all be enlisted in the conduct of the affairs of the Empire, and that thereby men of leisure and fortune would be withdrawn from the pursuits of the turf, men of the middle class from the pursuit of money-making, and the poorer class from their addiction to gin. Now, to induce the rich to take a part in politics as a class of themselves, separate from the poor, was not a good mode of proceeding; and it would be better to make the rich feel a common cause with the poorer classes. As for the poor, they formed no opinions on most political questions, but generally followed leaders; and those were the very men whom it was proposed to separate as a minority distinctly by themselves, and who ought to be the very persons to influence the poorer classes to give them their votes. The right hon. Member for Calne had stated that he did not want to give minorities protection, but equality; and when the right hon. Gentleman was able to square the circle he would be able to give equal value to majorities and minorities at elections in a free country.

said, that those who intended to support the proposition of the right hon. Member for Calne might feel somewhat inspirited by the speech they had just heard; for if they judged from past events, they might fairly conclude that the opposition of the right hon. Gentleman simply indicated that at the conclusion of the debate the Chancellor of the Exchequer would give the proposition his warm and cordial support. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Adderley) seemed greatly distressed because the proposition was new. Of course, the supporters of the clause felt sorry to trouble those who were harrassed by the cares of political life with new propositions; but they could not help feeling that many things which were very new were very true, important, and well worthy of consideration. The right hon. Gentleman said it had been a constitutional principle that communities should be represented, and he (Mr. Fawcett) supported the proposition of the Member for Calne, because he wished to see communities as far as possible represented, and he could not see how it could be maintained that they were represented at present. Take the case of a large constituency of 20,000 electors, returning three Members; and because there happened to be 11,000 Liberals and 9,000 Conservatives, or, vice versâ, the majority was represented by three Members, while the rest of the constituency had no voice or power whatever. Then it was said by the hon. and learned Member for Plymouth that those who supported the proposition assumed that the minorities to whom they sought to give some power were superior in intelligence to the majorities. The hon. and learned Member had no right to say that they had made such a proposition. He would admit that every elector had exactly the same amount of intelligence, and gave an equal vote; and if they started with that supposition it strengthened their proposition that the majority should not overwhelm the minority. Those who were endeavouring to improve the representative system must base their efforts upon the principle that a representative body ought as far as possible to represent all sections and all classes in the country by the ablest and most independent men. It was because he cherished that principle that he had supported and should continue to support every proposition which was calculated to reduce election expenses; for unless something was done to reduce those expenses they could not have communities so represented, but they must have another qualification; they must have men who were also rich, as no poor man would then be able to obtain a seat in that House. It was sometimes very erroneously supposed that it was their wish to give a minority as much power as a majority. That he altogether denied. He would never support a proposition which by any dodge or artifice should seek either openly or covertly to give the minority as much power as the majority. He had never concealed that he was a friend of democracy; but when he said that he favoured democracy, what did he mean? He looked upon a pure democracy as one in which everyone had an equal opportunity of exercising political influence and political power, and he did not look upon a society as being a true democracy, but, on the other hand, as an unfortunate oligarchy, if the majority had the power of exercising its will by trampling upon the minority, and of exercising its power unchecked, unrestrained, and unchallenged by the opinions or votes of the minority. It was sometimes said that if the minority was stifled in one constituency it was represented in another; that if, for instance, the Conservatives were outnumbered in Marylebone, that was compensated for by the Radicals being outnumbered in Suffolk. But that was no compensation whatever. What those who had advocated an extension of the franchise wished was to interest the greatest number possible in the political life of the nation. The State was harmed, and individuals were injured, if, from any circumstance whatever, persons were forced out from active interest in political life; and it was a great misfortune that from Conservatives being outnumbered in one constituency, ane Radicals in another, those minorities should think it was of no use to exert themselves in political contests, and therefore gave up political life as altogether hopeless. It was said that they ought to extend this principle to constituencies returning two Members; but that conclusion would not be logical, because by so applying the principle of cumulative voting they would give to the minority in those constituencies as much power as the majority. When, however, they confined the proposition to constituencies which returned three Members, they by no means gave the minority as much power as the majority. The proposition did not represent minorities so far as he should like to see them represented; but a man was not a practical politician, but a visionary and enthusiast, if he refused something which he looked upon as very good because it did not do all that he would like to see accomplished. The proposition of the right hon. Member for Calne, so far as it went, would operate entirely for good, and therefore it met with his cordial support. In a practical nation like this they could only get a new and great idea accepted gradually, and after, by very careful experiment, its advantages had been proved. When the principle of representing minorities had been tried upon the small scale now advocated, the nation would gradually learn a valuable lesson, would step by step get hold of the advantages of this great principle, and would be prepared at last, perhaps twenty or fifty years hence, to give its sanction to some great philosophic scheme which would enable a pure democracy—and they were coming to a democracy—to work with all its advantages and counteract all its disadvantages. No one could doubt that some Liberals in that House were beginning to tremble at the extension of the suffrage which had been sanctioned, because, for what reasons he knew not, they were beginning to get into their heads that at the first General Election the Conservative party might be somewhat strengthened. Such considerations did not trouble him in the least. He could honestly say that whenever any proposition had been brought forward during these Reform discussions he had never been in the slightest degree influenced by the immediate effect it might have upon party prospects. He knew that those effects were temporary and evanescent. He knew that the suffrage would act as a great agency of education; and that if they could educate the people more they would be much more likely to support those political principles which were true. He believed that his principles were true, and that therefore they would ultimately get more and more support, but if on the contrary they proved to be false, he was confident that the improved education of the people would detect their errors. He longed to see that House, as far as possible, the mirror and image of the political opinions of the country. He was certain that if they had a fair representation of minorities they might then have with safety a much wider extension of the suffrage, because if minorities were represented every opinion would then be fairly discussed, every side of a question would be advocated by able men, truth would then be victorious, and the will of the majority would predominate, not by trampling upon and despising the minority, but by giving to every class of opinion its fair, its just, and its proportionate interest.

said, that both he and the hon. Member for Birmingham in one sense represented the same constituency, though entertaining widely different opinions on several subjects; and, although as a Member for the county in which Birmingham is situate, he did not claim to represent Birmingham as fully as the hon. Gentleman, his partly doing so might be taken as an example of the manner in which the Constitution had carefully provided for the representation of minorities already. The circumstance which gave extra importance to this motion was the fact that they were preparing to diminish not only the number but the representation of small boroughs. He voted for the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Portsmouth (Mr. Serjeant Gaselee), and he joined in the opinion that they would see the representation of small constituencies gradually extinguished or very much diminished. It was, then, in consequence of the decision to which the House had come, of extreme importance that they should secure an equipoise in the constitution they had framed for the majority of the constituencies of England and Wales. Upon the bearings of democracy no man had written more intelligently than M. de Tocqueville. He would show how clearly de Tocqueville saw danger from the want of some such counterpoise in the Constitution of the United States which he so much admired, and how he foresaw, also, the danger which England would have to guard against. He hoped the Committee would forgive him for quoting the following passages from the Memoirs, Letters, and Remains of Alexis de Tocqueville. In one of his letters upon the Government of the United States, de Tocqueville said—

"Democracy, in short, seems to me to be a fact which the Government may hope in future to regulate, but not to reverse. I assure you that it was not without difficulty that I resigned myself to this idea. My view of this country does not prove to me that, even under the most favourable circumstances, and they exist here, the Government of the people is a desirable event. All are pretty well agreed that in the early days of the Republic the statesmen and members of Congress were much more distinguished men than they now are. They nearly all belonged to the class of country gentlemen—a race which diminishes every day. The country no longer selects so well. It chooses in general those who flatter its passions and descend to its level. This effect of democracy, joined to the extreme instability, the entire absence of coherence or permanence that one sees here, convinces me every day more and more that the best government is not that in which all have a share, but that which is directed by the class of the highest moral principle and intellectual cultivation."

Then what did he say about England? He would read an extract from Mr. Senior's Journal, and under the date Feb. 24, 1854, M. de Tocqueville said—

"I am alarmed by your Reform Bill. Your new £6 franchise must, I suppose, double the constituencies. It is a further step to universal suffrage—the least remediable of institutions. While you preserve your aristocracy you will preserve your freedom. If that goes, you are in danger of falling into the worst of tyrannies—that of a despot appointed and controlled, if controlled at all, by a mob."

He had read those two passages to show that, in giving the vote he had done, his eyes had been open to the possible consequences. He was, however, induced to hope that the Committtee would entertain and accept the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne, because, if they adopted it, the experiment of cumulative voting might be tried on a limited scale in the same manner that three-cornered constituencies were tried by the Act of 1832. The hon Member for Plymouth said, that the principle of representation in this country always had been that communities should be represented, and based his argument upon that principle, contending that, no matter how large the constituency nor how many the representatives, the majority—that was to say, a section only—of the community should be heard in that House. In his opinion that was not a sufficient representation of a large community, but only of a section of the community; and in proof of that he reminded the Committee that, it was only by means of notorious corruption, or by their Members being frequently returned, avowedly as the nominees of great landowners, that the minorities had up to this time preserved some share of representation in the country. Now, however, in consequence of the progress of events, the change of circumstances, and the spread of education, the country revolted from the coarse means of bribery, corruption, and nomination to which the minorities had been driven in order to obtain a share in the representation by means of these small boroughs. These small constituencies were gradually vanishing, and with them was vanishing one of the elements of the representation of minorities. Seeing that such a result was inevitable, and adopting the opinion of de Tocqueville that democracy might be regulated, but not reversed, he tendered his thanks to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne, who, having defended the small boroughs with an ability which all had acknowledged and with a courage which all had admired, now tendered this scheme for the preservation of their action upon the representation of the country, which had formerly been beneficial. It had been objected that, applying the principle of cumulative voting to the three-cornered constituency of Birmingham, the vote of one of the two Members returned by the majority would be neutralized by the vote of the one Member returned by the minority. He thought that the majority in Birmingham should be satisfied by being represented by two to one. He believed that the argument of the hon. Member for Lambeth was well founded, and that the minorities in the large constituencies were too important to be overlooked. Seeing that so many hon. Gentlemen were anxious to address the Committee he would say no more than that he would accept the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman, which seemed an improvement upon that which was made by the Government of Lord Aberdeen, and which had the sanction of Earl Russell, Lord Palmerston, and Sir James Graham; and he hoped that the Committee would adopt it as a further experiment in the direction of that which created the three-cornered constituencies by the Act of 1832.

I think it is an unfortunate thing for the right hon. Gentleman who brings this proposition forward that all those who are in its favour do not appear to exactly approve it. Neither the hon. Member for Plymouth who spoke from the seat below me, nor the hon. Member for Brighton appear to regard the question in the same light as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne does; and they utterly repudiate his frank admission that the principle of his proposition is applicable to a further and a wider field than the few constituencies which will return three Members to this House. It is also a thing to be observed and noticed particularly that this proposition is introduced to the House by a Member whose course during the last and the present Session on the question of the extention of the suffrage has been very marked and very consistent. He has, in language of a most agonizing entreaty, urged the House to avoid the abyss of ruin into which Lord Derby and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have been inviting their supporters to follow them. The right hon. Gentleman is quite consistent, he has the greatest right to hold the opinions he does, and I am not saying a word to depreciate him in this matter. I think the course he has taken is the one which he might have been expected to take. I think it might also have been expected that hon. Members opposite, who are supposed to coincide in opinion with the noble Lord the Member for Stamford, should follow the lead and support the proposition of the right hon. Member for Calne. I am, however, very much surprised that any Gentleman on this side of the House—more especially the hon. Member for Brighton, who utters declarations in favour of democracy from which I should shrink—should get up in his place to support a proposition which I will venture to say is the most violent attack upon the principle of representation in this country that has ever been made in this House. I find that there is a great disposition in favour of new-fangled propositions in some minds. For my own part I have no sympathy with them, and I never had. I have always invited the House, in dealing with this Question, to march along the ancient paths of the Constitution, and I believe that in the proposition to which this House has now mainly agreed, as far as the suffrage is concerned, the Government and the House have hitherto marched along those paths. Let us recollect what the right hon. Gentleman said last night, and I beg hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House to bear it in mind. The right hon. Gentleman told us what a terrific state of things we were approaching, and he begged the House, as its last and only chance—he spoke of this proposition as being the last arrow in the quiver—to avoid the ruin towards which we were rushing, and then what does he do? He proposes a scheme which will only apply to eight or ten constituencies, in the majority of which the hon. Member for Plymouth says the desired result is already attained. He hopes that the House will accept this mode of arresting the danger; first of all assuming that the danger is so great, and then assuming that his remedy will avail. Why, if a man abstracted a snowball from an avalanche, would that prevent the danger or destruction that was impending? Bearing in mind the probable effects of this Bill, assuming, if you like to assume it, that the fears of the right hon. Gentleman as to the Bill have any real foundation—the proposition itself, I say, is one of the most puerile and insignificant, and utterly worthless for the object in view. If the House is mistaken in the step which it has taken with regard to the borough franchise or to the county franchise, for this proposal, I take it, is to affect counties as well as boroughs, let the House review its course and amend it. For my part, I believe the longer the House of Commons is in existence the more will it be confirmed in its opinion that the course it has taken with regard to the franchise has been a wise one; and probably, under the circumstances in which we were placed, it was a course which could not be avoided. Hon. Gentlemen speak as if, hitherto and in future, minorities had and will have no chance. Now, let every Member of the House ask himself whether it is not the fact that hitherto the minority in this country has had far more than its fair share of representation? Is it not true, also, that under this Bill, taking your whole system together, large boroughs, small boroughs, and counties, the minority in the country, even after this Bill passes, will have its full share of representation? It has been one of the general complaints of the country that the minority has ruled, through an unfair and improper representation in Parliament. I will undertake to say that there is no country where a representative system exists, that is free in its action—I mean free from the control of the Government—in which the minority is not sufficiently represented. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire, who claims to be in part a representative of Birmingham—and he is, of those Conservative electors of Birmingham who vote in the county which he represents—being, in fact, the representative of the very minority for for which he now seeks another representative—has quoted an opinion from a very eminent, writer on the subject of the United States; but there is not a point more conclusive against his argument that the present condition of the United States. There never has been a time in the history of that country when the minority in the House of Representatives has not been equally proportioned at least to the minority out of doors. And as to what the hon. Member for Plymouth, who ought to know something about America, has said of this mode of election giving strength to the Executive Government, I venture to say that if the system of representing minorities according to the proposition now before the House had been established, and had been in existence during the late war, the United States Government never could have been borne up, as they were, by the entire people, and never would have possessed power sufficient to suppress the desperate rebellion in the Southern States. Every American knows that well, and every Englishman ought to know that anything which enfeebles the representative power, and lessens the vitality of the electoral system—which puts in the nominees of little cliques here representing a majority, and there a minority, but having no real influence among the people—every system like that weakens and must ultimately destroy the power and the force of your Executive Government. I do not deny that this proposal may be worth discussing; but as I heard the right hon. Member for Calne last night, I thought it exactly that sort of subject that one would hear discussed at University College Debating Society, or which would probably be discussed in the debating clubs of Oxford and Cambridge, but which has not sufficient claim to much consideration in Parliament. Now, what is it that the gentleman who propose this system admit? They admit that in all large boroughs to which you give three Members it would make the return absolutely certain before you went to the election at all. The hon. Member says it would be no grievance to the constituency of Birmingham that it should have two Members on one side of the House and one upon the other. [Mr. NEWDEGATE: I said there was a possibility of it.] Well, I will not speak of Birmingham but of other towns; and in which, as I collect from the statements of hon. Members favourable to this system, the result I have contemplated is inevitable. It is said that it will be no great grievance, because there will be two Members on one side and one on the other; but they will not be returned by fair election. If they were no one would complain. Nobody complains that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Lancashire was elected to sit on this side of the House, and that the two gentlemen who are his Colleagues sit opposite to him. But suppose that, without a contest, he were returned, and continued to be returned on all occasions by a minority, to neutralize by his vote one of the other representatives, leaving that great division of the county to be represented practically and insufficiently in the lobby by one of its Members. I think that would be one of the most ridiculous propositions that ever was offered to Parliament. If that system be established, it is quite plain that contests will be at an end. In South Lancashire, at the last election, the Conservatives proposed three candidates; and on our side we proposed three. There was a very active canvass, great debate and discussion of all public questions, and the discussion did much to teach all parties something of the state of the country. The result was that two gentlemen came to your side of the House and one to this. But suppose the system now proposed had then been in operation. Everything would have been known beforehand; we should have known perfectly well that we could not have returned more than one Member; your friends would have known that they could not carry more than two, and the result would have been that the two committees would have met and decided upon their respective candidates; these would have been proposed at Newton-on-the-Willows and elected, and the population of the county would have known almost nothing about it. I must say that a principle can hardly be devised more calculated to destroy the vitality of our elective system, and to produce stagnation, not only of the most complete, but of the most fatal character, affecting our public affairs. The right hon. Member for Calne, whom we cannot but admire, because he is not afraid of his position or principles, says that the system would act equally well in places where there are only two Members. It has been admitted by the Members for Plymouth and for Brighton that the system would end in one Member being returned by the majority and one by the minority. Why not put a clause into our Acts of Parliament, enacting that the Liberals shall return one Member and the Tories another? Then the Tories could meet and return their Member, and the Liberals could meet and return their Member. Then this House would meet with an equal proportion of Members on either side, and I suppose we should always appeal to Mr. Speaker to decide what the House intended to do. There is only one mode of excluding the minority from its rightful power, assuming that you give the suffrage pretty widely through the country, and that would be if your whole constituency was one constituency. If in this country, for instance, all the electors of the kingdom were upon one list of electors, and all the 658 Members were to be elected by them, then you would have one great ticket as they have in America, only fifty times as long; a list proposed upon one side, and a list proposed upon the other, and the majority would of course sweep away the 658 put forward by their opponents. In that event clearly the minority would be altogether unrepresented. But that is not the case here, it is not the case in the United States, it is not the case in Switzerland, nor anywhere else where the representative system exists. At present the minority of one set of politics in a particular borough are generally represented by the Members returned by the majority in an adjacent borough. I will take Liverpool and Manchester. The Members for Liverpool are Conservatives; the representatives of Manchester have been Liberals generally; though at this moment the return is rather equivocal. But the minority in Manchester has always had its case fairly stated by the representatives of the majority in Liverpool. If you look over the list of all our constituencies from the time of the Reform Bill, with the exception of those dead boroughs to which the hon. Member for Warwickshire objects—it would seem equally with myself—and of counties which are not free, I think it will be found that constant changes have taken place, of a healthy character, and tending to the instruction of our people in all our national affairs. The right hon. Member for Calne, I think, should have given us more figures, and shown us how his plan would work. I will take the case of the City of London. It returns four Members, and I will assume that it has 20,000 electors; I do not know the proportions; but assume that it has 12,000 Liberal and 8,000 Tory electors, and that all these voted in straight lines for their own candidates; it is not usual, I know, but I will assume it for the sake of argument. These 12,000 Liberal votes would enable that party to give 48,000 votes, divided among their four candidates. The Tory party, on the other hand, knowing their numerical inferiority, would probably put up but one candidate, and for this one representative they would be able to poll 32,000 votes, and the man who represented the minority would be a very long way a-head on the poll. Some time ago, I was illustrating this matter for my constituents in Birmingham, and I said the plan looked to me like that species of entertainment, a donkey race, where the last is destined to win. But suppose the Liberals in the City of London only brought forward three candidates, and the Tories ventured on putting up two; each side would then have 16,000 votes, if they were all equally divided according to the respective parties, and if only one more vote were lost to the Liberal side through splitting than was lost to their opponents, the Tory minority would be enabled to return two Members. For a man like the right hon. Member for Calne, who has a natural, and acquired, and confirmed horror of anything revolutionary, to make a proposition like this does appear to me extraordinary and somewhat inconsistent. He thinks probably that his scheme would protect constituencies from the sudden changes of opinion of which he is apprehensive. But looking to the past, can anything be more gradual than the changes which have taken place? How long did it take the Tory party to win over the majority in South Lancashire which we obtained in the Free Trade struggle? How long will it take us—or how long would it have taken us but for this Bill—to recover the ground we have lost? Why, all these changes take place commonly in the most gradual manner, and nobody can ever see that there is any great and sudden change in this House arising from a great and sudden change in the constituencies. Great changes no doubt happen from other causes, and indeed we are witnesses of one this Session. There is the right hon. Member for Calne, who with his jealousy for the Constitution offered the most obstinate opposition to the proposals of last Session, and who nevertheless has been, as we all know, one of the most potent influences in producing this great change. But great as that change is, and much as he may deplore it, in all probability we may find it has been of very great advantage to the country, and of singular advantage to hon. Gentlemen opposite, as they will, I am sure, if they live, have reason to know. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has already stated in very distinct terms his views of these new-fangled propositions. They are the propositions of men who either, like the right hon. Member for Calne, feel great alarm as to the Bill to which we have agreed, or who propose to go to some unknown length with the hon. Member for Brighton. Now I object to offer my children or grandchildren, be they electors or Members of the House, inducements to go into schemes of that kind. I think we had better do what is the duty of our day with regard to the matter before us, and leave those great changes to which the hon. Gentleman has pointed to be made—if they are necessary—by those who may come after us, and who may have seen the failure—if it be a failure—of the measures which we are now engaged in passing. I believe that as regards the object of the right hon. Member for Calne this proposition is not worth a straw—it is not worth considering in that light, and I hope no Member will so consider it; but it would have the effect of destroying all that is living and energetic in the constituencies wherever it was applied, and it would, I believe from that cause be fatal to your principle of representation. Now if there be one thing in this country which, more than another, has been of service to our ancestors and of service to us, notwithstanding sometimes the brutality, often the venality, occasionally I am afraid too generally, the compulsion which is exercised upon electors—surely it is the freedom of our elections. Let us have laid down, as in a chart, everything that is bad concerning elections in this country, and still, after all that, I say there is an enormous balance of good to the people in the freedom and the life of our Parliamentary elections. Starting with that opinion, let us in a new Bill, establishing a broader system, at least find out that that system has these evils which are pointed to before we adopt a principle, which if you adopt it clearly cannot correct those evils, from the very small extent to which it is applied, but which may do much to destroy the life of our representation to which I have adverted; and which is of a thousand times more value than any of those peculiar crotchets and dreamy propositions which the right hon. Gentleman on my right, and the hon. and learned Gentleman on my left, have so strongly urged upon the Committee.

The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has appeared in a character which he has recently affected as a defender of the old ways, and a reverencer of our ancient Constitution. From his point of view I have no donbt he is right; but I believe no more dangerous error can be entertained by the House of Commons than to believe that you can withdraw one-half, and more than one-half, of the elements which contituted our ancient Constitution, and that then you can, on the plea of Conservatism, adhere to the rest and believe that they will bear the fruit which they bore in old times. Our Constitution was monarchical; it was aristocratic; it had, also, a large tinge of democracy; but speaking practically, the monarchical principle has died. The aristocratic principle you are now sentencing to death; the democratic principle you propose to leave alone, unchecked by the elements which existed before; and then, in urging us to retain it unchanged, you claim for it the sanction which descends from the experience and wisdom of our ancestors. You must make up your minds, if you will have one thing new, to have many things new—new things to correct the innovations you have introduced. We want a new principle which shall be strong enough to counteract the overwhelming weight you have given in contradiction to all the old traditions of the community to one particular class in it. I claim the hon. Gentleman's own testimony to this point. The experiment on which we have been invited to enter, with very little deliberation and preparation, but apparently on the simple principle that it is the business of those who are in office to outbid what they resisted in Opposition—the change proposed is absolutely new. Do not appeal to the United States or to Switzerland. The hon. Member for Birmingham, in more genial moments, in another place, admitted that the United States furnished no precedent whatever for the gigantic change which you are now proposing to introduce. Deeply as the views of the hon. Member impressed me, I cannot quote him accurately from memory; but I believe that I am right in saying that the franchise in England, which this Bill proposes to introduce, is, by the admission of the hon. Gentleman, for all practical purposes, lower than the franchise which exists in the United States. The experiment, then, is absolutely new. Where will you look for its like? Do you look to the States of antiquity? The existence of slavery made the difference absolutely vital, because it withdrew from the rights of citizenship a large mass of the labouring class. There is no State in Europe, in the present or in the past, which has tried the experiment on which you are entering now. It may be all prosperity before you; it may be that you are opening a new road to power; it may be that it is a mine of wealth, and honour, and strength, which you have suddenly discovered; but do not deceive yourselves as to its being new. There is nothing in old time or in the present that is in the least degree like to it; and you will be acting the part of madmen if you refuse merely on the ground of novelty to entertain propositions that are calculated to neutralize some of the evils that may be apprehended from the experiment on which you have entered. The hon. Member for Birmingham found it convenient for the purposes of his argument to refute what it is not proposed to adopt. He went mainly upon the question of what would happen in two-Membered constituencies. Mr. Bright said this was only part of his argument. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman does not remember the effect his eloquence has produced, but he went upon the question what would happen if you applied this principle to double constituencies. I do not look at it in the least in that light. I acknowledge that the immediate effect of the adoption of the principle would be comparatively trifling; but now that you are engrafting upon the Constitution what is, to all intents and purposes, anew principle in the democratic sense, I wish you to engraft a new and protecting principle in a sense Conservative of your old Institutions. It is perfectly true that its immediate operation would be small, but remember that you are in the presence of two great changes of different characters. We have passed this Session—to all appearance it is likely we shall adhere to it—an enormous reduction of the suffrage. At the same time, by a sort of compromise between certain hon. Gentlemen opposite and the Gentlemen on these benches, we are adhering to a system of distribution of electoral power, which is as much out of harmony with the suffrage you have introduced as it is possible for anything to be. Well, I do not for a moment believe that the keen and prescient mind of the Chancellor of the Exchequer thinks that that compromise will last; but it does very well for that purpose which so many of his propositions have served—it serves for a time to draw into the lobby the somewhat—credulous shall I say?—Members who have hitherto supported him. They believe that for the excess, as they think and as I think, of the alteration in the suffrage they are receiving a compensation in the limitations imposed upon the change of seats. Now, I utterly disbelieve in that security. I know that when you have once introduced household suffrage, when you have once applied to these small boroughs, a qualification which will admit to the franchise the very least cultivated and most dependent of the community, no future Parliament can sustain the small seats which you are now sedulously preserving. I ask you to look to the future. Let not the House be deceived by the glamour which the Chancellor of the Exchequer throws over his own party. We know that these things will be changed, and I want to look forward and ask what is to happen then? We shall be asked, as we have been asked with justice, to increase the number of Members given to large constituencies; and the point you have now to decide by your votes upon this proposal is, whether these seats shall go to increase the already overgrown and exaggerated strength of the numerical majority, or whether they shall serve as instruments to ensure that which all representative systems should aim at—a perfect representation of all classes of the community? The wealth, the intelligence, the energy of the community, all that has given you that power which makes you so proud of your nation, and which makes the deliberations of this House so important, will be numerically, under this new constituency, absolutely overmatched. It may not be at first that that result will be felt. Time will be wanted to enable the new electors to organize themselves; but sooner or later you may depend upon it, there will arise questions upon which the interests of employers and employed are in hostility and will clash. There are questions which cannot be decided by arbitration, which cannot be adjusted by any appeals to equity or to any argumentative principles. There are questions which must be decided by nothing else but political force; and in that conflict of political force you are pitting an overwhelming number of employed against a hopeless minority of employers. That is the future which you are preparing for your country. I entreat you not to look to your immediate interest, not to think of a Dissolution which may be imminent, not to ask yourselves what this or that election agent may say, but, taking a wide view of the position of this community, ask yourselves what is the attitude in which the social facts, as they exist, are likely to place the opposing parties in the State? I ask you to decide now whether you think such a state of things, in which the employed shall be in such a superiority that the employers shall not even have a hearing, will in your opinion be to the interest of the community? It seems to me that if we are accused of asking for the undue representation of minorities, the nature of our demand is entirely misunderstood. We are merely asking you to efface that unreasonable disadvantage of minorities which your peculiar institutions impose upon us. You divide the whole minorities of the country, but if you put them together they are numerous enough to demand at least a very considerable representation in this House, if representation is to be the true image of the represented. But taking these minorities one by one, pitting 500 here against 600 there, and 5,000 here against 6,000 there, you obtain a result, in which the House of Commons, so far from representing truly the community at large, will only represent the overwhelming power of those who may be in the majority. It is said sometimes that it is the natural right of the majority to rule. It is the natural right of an overwhelming majority to rule; but you must remember that every minority has resources and natural rights of its own—it has immunities of position, and circumstances of opportunity, and leadership, which give it advantages in the struggle of which it is utterly deprived when you take it to the polling booth. It is to prevent that great evil—that those who form a considerable part of the constituency should yet, by reason of being a minority in each, be unable to obtain an adequate hearing in the House of Commons—that we entreat you to entertain the principle which the right hon. Member for Calne proposes—a principle which, although small in its immediate effect, is great in its ultimate results. We are accused on this side of struggling for privilege and prerogative. The time for that is long gone by, and the asssertion is a mockery. We are pleading for simple freedom, and are only asking that, in the unknown future to which you are hurrying, this absolute subjection to a class never yet intrusted with political powers, this entire absorption of the destinies of the country in the will of those who have been little instructed and directed—of those who have little of that political practice which should induce them to direct it upon right motives—we ask you that we should not be utterly effaced, that we should still have, at least, the power of pleading our own cause in the face of those who will be our masters; and that you should not, because you have chosen to introduce this large and excessive measure of enfranchisement of the lowest class of the community, absolutely disfranchise and reduce to political insignificance and extinction the classes who have hitherto contributed so much to the greatness and prosperity of their country.

I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham will forgive me if the highly Conservative speech which he has delivered, almost the first which I ever heard him deliver with which I could not sympathize, has not converted me from the eminently democratic opinions which I have held for a great number of years. I am very glad that my hon. Friend stated so candidly the extremely Conservative vein of thought and tone of feeling which is the foundation of his political feelings. It is true that it is almost as opposite a frame of mind from my own as it is possible to conceive; but, fortunately, in the case of most of the practical questions that we have to decide we draw nearly the same conclusions from our so different premises. Nevertheless, I am extremely glad that my hon. Friend has shown that it is upon the principle of standing by old things, and resisting newfangled notions, that his antipathy to the proposal of my right hon. Friend the Member for Calne, which I most strongly support, has been derived. It is the less necessary that I should address the House at any length upon this question, because on a previous occasion I expressed myself strongly in favour of the principles upon some of which this Motion rests, and expressed my strong sense of the necessity for a change in our mode of election, directed in some degree to the same ends as those pointed out by this almost insignificant makeshift—a makeshift not, however, without considerable real efficacy, and resting in part upon the same principles upon which Mr. Hare's system of personal representation is founded. There are two principles which we must mainly regard. In the first place, it appears to me that any body of persons who are united by any ties, either of interest or of opinion, should have, or should be able to have, if they desire it, influence and power in this House proportionate to that which they exercise out of it. This, of course, excludes the idea of applying such a system as this to constituencies having only two Members, because in that case its application would render a minority of one-third equal to a majority. The other principle upon which I support the representation of minorities is because I wish—although this may surprise some hon. Members—that the majority should govern. We heard a great deal formerly about the tyranny of the majority, but it appears to me that many hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House are now reconciled to that tyranny, and are disposed to defend and maintain it against us democrats. My own opinion is, that any plan for the representation of minorities must operate in a very great degree to diminish and counteract the tyranny of majorities. I wish to maintain the just ascendancy of majorities, but this cannot be done unless minorities are represented. The majority in this House is got at by the elimination of two minorities. You first eliminate at the election the minority out of the House, and then upon a division you eliminate the minority in the House. Now, it may very well happen that those combined minorities would greatly out-number the majority which prevails in this House, and consequently that the majority does not now govern. The true majority can only be maintained if all minorities are counted; if they are counted there is only one process of elimination, and only one minority left out. Perhaps I may be allowed to answer one or two objections which have been made to the proposal of my right hon. Friend, The right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies urged that, according to our constitution, representation should be by communities, and upon that subject he said several things with which it is impossible not to agree. But it seems to me that this is one of many remarkable proofs now offering themselves, that hon. Gentlemen opposite, not content with coming to our opinions, are now adopting our arguments. For instance, the right hon. Gentleman insisted upon the greatness of the mistake of supposing that the country was divided into a majority and a minority, instead of into majorities and minorities. I have said that myself I should think at least 500 times. The right hon. Gentleman said one thing that perfectly amazed me. He said, as we all admit, that it was wrong that the representative of any community should represent it only in a single aspect, should represent only one interest—only its Tory or its Liberal opinions; and he added that, at present, this was not the case, but that such a state of things would be produced by the adoption of this proposal. I apprehend that then, even more than now, each party would desire to be represented, and would feel the importance of getting itself represented by those men who would be most acceptable to the general body of the constituency; and therefore on all other points, except that of being Liberals or Tories, those Members would represent the constituencies fully as much, if not more, than they do now. The right hon. Gentleman thinks that the local communities ought to be represented as units, but that is not my opinion. For example, the right hon. Gentleman would contend that if a Member were elected by two-thirds of a constituency he ought to sit in that House as representing the whole. If that were the case they would evidently pass for what they are not. I have no idea of Members sitting in this House as the representatives of mere names of places, or bricks and mortar, or some particular part of the terrestrial globe, in different localities. What we want is the representation of the inhabitants of those places. If there should be a place in which two-thirds of the constituency are Conservative, and one-third Liberal, it is a falsehood to contend that the Conservative Member represents the Liberals of that place. On the other hand, if there were three Members for such a place, two of whom represented the majority, and the third the minority, there would be a full representation of the constituency, and certainly a far more accurate representation than if a man returned by a simple majority assumed to represent the whole constituency. Another objection made and insisted upon by my hon. Friend below me, in one of the most eloquent parts of his speech, and in the spirit of which I quite agree, is that the effect of this system will be to put an end to contests at elections, and to all the instruction they afford, and all the public spirit and interest in public affairs which they excite. This appears to me to be an opinion, which only the extreme dislike that my hon. Friend professes for everything new in politics prevents him from seeing to be an entire mistake. The fault which my hon. Friend and others find with the proposed mode of election is one that is in an eminent degree attributable to the existing system; because under that system wherever it is known from the state of the registration that one side is able to return all the Members, the other side now take little or no interest in the election, and therefore it will be evident that if those persons who cannot be represented in their own locality cannot obtain a representation elsewhere, representation, so far as they are concerned, will be a perfectly effete institution. What is it that induces people when they are once beaten at an election to try again? Is it not the belief that possibly a change has taken place in the opinions of at least some of the electors, or that, at all events, there has been such a change in the general feeling of the constituency that there is some chance of their being returned, and therefore there is a sufficient motive to induce them to try again? But that motive never can exist under the present system where there is so great a discrepancy between the parties as two-thirds and one-third, because in no case can one-third of the constituency ever hope to convert itself into a majority. What motive, then, is there for trying? But under the new system, suppose the minority obtains one Member out of three, the minority can always try for the second seat, and precisely the same motive will exist if the parties should be nearly equal. Indeed, in such a case, the motive would be all the stronger, because then the majority will try to get all the members. What will be the case where there are three Members to be returned? The majority of two-thirds will only have two of the Members, and if any change in opinion takes place favourable to the minority they will always be in a position to bid for the third seat; so that I apprehend the healthy excitement of contest in an election, which follows from the existence of the motives which will induce persons to embark in the struggle, will be more certainly guaranteed by the more perfect represention of the constituency. It has been argued by my hon. Friend below me, and it has been several times insisted on by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the Executive will be rendered very weak by the adoption of this principle, and I must own that there is some truth and justice in that argument. But the House cannot fail to perceive that so long as you give to the minority the same power as is possessed by the majority, it is perfectly clear that there may be a large majority of the constituency in favour of the Government, while there may be no majority in the House. At the present moment we do not care what majority the Government may have in the country; all that we want is to prevent it having a large majority in the House. No one is more opposed to such a state of things than I am; but the practical application is, that we wish to prevent the Government having a large majority in the House, with a small majority in the country. That is the case in Australia, as was very strongly exemplified on the question of Free Trade and protection, and also in the United States, where there is a moderate difference in the constituencies between one party, and the other, but a very much greater difference in the House of Representatives. When the right hon. Gentleman says that this system will make a weak Government, my answer is that it is not desirable that a Government should be a strong one, if it rests on a small majority of the constituencies; nor is it desirable that a Government should be lured on and deceived by a great majority in the House; because a very small change in the constituencies would be sufficient to deprive them of that majority, and it is not desirable that the policy of the Government should be tumbled about from one extreme to the other when the opinion of the constituency is almost equally divided between the two parties. I quite agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, that in revolutionary times it is necessary that a party should be as strong as possible while the fight lasts, since the sooner the fighting is over the better. But although in such a case there should be a decisive predominance, such times are exceptional, and circumstances do not apply which apply in ordinary and peaceful times. They are times for which we cannot legislate or adapt our ordinary institutions. Under such circumstances men may be obliged to dispense with all law, and, if necessary, to have a dictatorship in the hands of one man, but that is altogether an exceptional case, I am extremely anxious that the feeling should not get abroad, from the circumstance of the right hon. Member for Calne having brought forward this proposal, and from its being so largely supported by Gentlemen on the other side of the House, that this is essentially a Conservative "move," and is intended solely for the purpose of doing away, as far as possible with the effect of the Reform Bill now before us. I have always entertained these opinions, long before the introduction of this Reform Bill, and although I never supposed that I should see such a Reform as this adopted in my life, I have protested and reprobated oppression of this kind, on whichever side it has been practised. The only reason why it can be said that it is brought forward as a Conservative measure, and in aid of Conservatives, is that it really operates in favour of those who are likely to be weakest; it is those who are in danger of being outnumbered and subjected to the tyranny of a majority who are protected. I have always been afraid that the Conservative party would not see the necessity of these things until they actually saw that it is their interest, and that they would not see it until the power has passed away to the other side. Had they taken up the question four or five years ago they might by this time have made it the general opinion of the country, and have lead the masses of the people to be more just when their time came than they have been to them. Their eyes are not so soon opened to those things which appear to be against them as they are to those that are in their favour; but there are minds on the other side of the House quite capable of seeing the value and importance of the principle, and of representing it with such effect that ultimately the principle of the representation of minorities will be generally adopted.

said, that having represented what was called a unicorn county for many years, and having been actively engaged in election matters connected with it, his attention had been directed not a little to the subject under discussion. He hoped therefore that the Committee would excuse him if he made a few remarks on the proposal of the right hon. Member for Calne. That right hon. Gentleman asked the Committee to support the proposal—first, on account of its justice; next, to consider it generally in point of political expediency; and thirdly, specially as regarded the present aspect of affairs; and that, he admitted, was not an unfair way of putting the case. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to have laid down very curious grounds of justice. He said that a man who had three candidates to vote for should have three votes, and the man who had one candidate should have only one vote. That appeared to be the oddest way possible of arriving at the justice or the injustice of the case; because the minority had only to put up two or three candidates, when the injustice would be immediately repaired, and he would have his three votes as well as the former who had three candidates to vote for. If there were better grounds for basing it on justice or injustice the right hon. Gentleman would not have failed to have stated them. It was said that if the new principle was worth anything, it ought logically to be established universally; but the learned Professor the hon. Member for Brighton had very clearly pointed out that it was impossible it could work in constituencies which returned only two representatives. If that were so, to what narrow ground was not the proposal reduced. The right hon. Member for Calne, indeed, and his noble Friend below him, had argued in favour of it, because, in their opinion, it would tend to redress the evils—the right hon. Gentleman spoke-even of ruin—which they apprehended as likely to arise from the vast influx of democratic power by acting somewhat as a balance; but let the Committee examine for a moment what it was that was going to produce such a marvellous result. Why, the proposal would not apply, he believed, to above a dozen constituencies in the whole country, and how would it operate even with regard to them? Four or five of them were boroughs which did not at present return Members who were all of one way of thinking; and in the counties, to which the proposal would, for the most part, apply, and which, in the majority of instances, now returned Conservative Members, the probability was that the minority would be strengthened by the influx of Liberal voters under the new state of things. That, therefore, which might be gained in the boroughs would be lost in the counties, and he could not see how practically the proposal could have any appreciable effect on the result of elections. He was, consequently, unable to realize the great effects which the right hon. Gentleman and the noble Lord (Viscount Cranborne) appeared to anticipate. As to the matter of justice, assuming there was a difference of opinion in the constituencies so great as that one-fourth were in the minority, the effect of it would be that that minority would command a Member. In a constituency consisting of 20,000 electors, in which the majority might be 11,000 and the minority 9,000, it was not an improbable thing to happen that the majority might be unwise enough to put up three candidates and the minority only two, and then the result would be, under the system of cumulative voting, the minority wonld return two out of the three Members. Now, he asked, was it just that one-fourth of a constituency should possess one-third of the representation? He did not object to the proposed system because it was new, but those who proposed ought to show it would be beneficial some way or other. He did not believe that it would have the slightest beneficial effect in checking that influx of democratic principles which it was proposed to remedy; and that being so, why should he sanction a principle which those who had introduced it said could nut be generally applied? He thought it would be unwise in them to adopt hastily a system of which they had no experience, for he believed there was no place in the world where it had been tried. On these grounds he should vote against the proposition.

said, he had no want of confidence in the future constituencies, such as had been stated on all occasions by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne. He considered, however, that although the principle of cumulative voting might mate no difference in the balance of parties in the House, it would, on the other hand, effect a considerable difference, and a beneficial one, in the composition of parties out of the Mouse.

I am surprised that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge should complain that I have not taken part in the debate. Considering that my hon. Friend rose at the commencement of the sitting to-day, and that the debate only commenced late last night, I think my hon. Friend was rather unjust in his comments. It is not usual that those who occupy the position which I at present hold should rise immediately after the commencement of a debate; but it is in fact, one of our duties to await the expression of opinion, and though this is a subject on which I was anxious to hear the opinions of hon. Members, my own has been already declared. It was therefore in every way unnecessary that I should offer to address the House early in the debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge seems to think that I ought to take a line on this subject which would be favourable to his retaining his seat in the next Parliament. Now, my opinion of him is so high that I have no doubt, whatever line I may take on this question, and whatever may be the result of this debate, my hon. Friend will find his way into this House again. I must, however, protest against the doctrine that for the reason he has brought forward, and on account of his alleged extreme youth, of which he seems extremely proud, I am to shape the remainder of my career, whatever it may be, in order to insure to him a brilliant future. The Motion of the right hon. Member for Calne, if we look to its application, is really of no great importance. Nothing could offer a greater contrast than the largeness of its principles and the smallness of its application, but I will state at once that I am not favourable to the adoption of a principle which involves so vast a change in our electoral system, though it is applied in a manner which may produce such slight consequences. Why run the risk of great changes if slight consequences only are to be produced? Why incur great danger for small results? There is no doubt, however, that the natural inference of every one would be, that if the principle, described to be so advantageous, is adopted, it must be applied in a greater degree than the right hon. Member for Calne proposes to our representative system, and, of course, to constituencies represented by two Members,—that is to say, not only to the majority, but to the vast majority of cases in our representative system. What argument have we heard against such a just and necessary application of the principle? One hon. Gentleman tells us that it would not be convenient; but the question is whether, if you adopt the principle, the argument in favour of its application in that way would not be irresistible. The hon. Member for Brighton is not favourable to the application of the principle to places represented by two Members, because he does not think that the minority in those cases ought to be represented. [Mr. FAWCETT: I said it ought not to be represented so much as the majority.] The object of the Amendment is that the minority should be represented; but if we are to be called on to decide how much of the minority is to be represented, the question becomes more complicated and difficult. If you adopt the principle of the cumulative vote—that is that a man should do what he likes with all his votes—you cannot confine the application of that principle to places represented by three Members. It is a good principle or a bad principle. If good, you must apply it to all constituencies; if bad, why apply it to any? That appears to me to be an argument unanswerable. And what would be the consequences of applying this principle generally as you would hive to do either immediately or eventually? The result must be that you would effectually neutralize the great bulk of the representative system. By far the greater number of places in the country are represented by two Members; and, if you, adopt this principle, the consequence is that opinion is neutralized in all those places. But what would be the further consequence? If all the constituencies represented by two Members are thus neutralized, it appears to me that the Government of the country would be thrown into the hands of those constituencies which are represented by only one Member each. In fact, the United Kingdom would be governed by Scotland. I am anxious to do justice to Scotland, and have brought in a measure founded on sound principles increasing the representation of that country; but if the clause of the right hon. Member for Calne should be adopted, I must beg to recall the engagement I have made with respect to the second reading of the Scotch Reform Bill this Session, because the House would have to consider the whole Scotch electoral system, in case the absolute control of the destinies of the United Kingdom is to be exercised by Scotland, with, perhaps, some assistance from Wales. In fact, the whole power of the Kingdom must, under the proposed scheme, devolve on constituencies each having only one Member and represented by Members with distinct opinions. All the other towns and counties of the country which have hitherto exercised some influence on public affairs would be perfectly neutralized and emasculated, and the sovereign Power of Parliament would be exercised by constituencies electing one Member, and would consequently devolve on Scotland and Wales. It may be said that if the principle be good, you must submit to all inconveniences and be prepared to act accordingly—that is to say, you must reconstruct the whole of your representative system. Now, I am not prepared on the 5th of July to ask the House of Commons to enter upon a campaign to carry out a system which is, as far as I understand it, alien to the customs, manners, and traditions of the people of this country. The proposal is opposed to every sound principle, and its direct effect would be, I believe, to create a stagnant representation, and a stagnant representation would bring about a feeble Executive. If the scheme should be applied to the vast majority of constituencies, almost all the representatives for the United Kingdom would be reduced to the position of nominees. They would not be elected by a free people in the light of Heaven, but would be nominated as much as were the Members for all those boroughs extinguished in 1832; and at a General Election you would be able to calculate with exact precision and painful accuracy on the return of Members elected by thousands of persons, just the same as you could formerly calculate on the return of the Members for Old Sarum and other similar boroughs. I think that this is not a course of policy which this House or the country will adopt. I cannot bring myself to believe that the country will adopt it; for it appears to me to be adverse to all the principal sentiments which animate a country like England. I have always been of opinion with respect to this cumulative voting and other schemes having for their object to represent minorities, that they are admirable schemes for bringing crotchetty men into this House—an inconvenience which we have hitherto avoided, though it appears that we have now some few exceptions to the general state of things; but I do not think that we ought to legislate to increase the number of specimens. The scheme of the right hon. Member for Calne is in harmony with all the opinions he has expressed for the last two or three years with much variety and vehemence. I can easily understand that he wishes to introduce a principle which, in his opinion, would bring about consequences different from those he deprecates. But let the Committee fairly understand the question which is before them. If they agree in the general opinions of the right hon. Gentleman on the subject of the representation of this country, then they may join in the campaign with him. If on the other hand hon. Members believe that the extension of the franchise which has been proposed is a wise and safe measure, they cannot, I think, support a proposition which, if followed out, will neutralize its good effects, and land this House in inextricable difficulties, and which I am sure will give no satisfaction to the public. These, Sir, are the schemes of coteries, not the politics of nations, and if adopted they will only end in discomfiture and confusion. My noble Friend the Member for Stamford (Viscount Cranborne) commenced his speech by drawing a very terrific picture of our present political position. He said, "Monarchy is dead, aristocracy is doomed, and democracy is triumphant." Sir, I doubt the accuracy of these statements. I do not think that "monarchy is dead." The noble Lord has been a Minister of the Crown—a most able Minister of the Crown. He has been, from his high position, in very near relations with his Sovereign. I think his experience must certainly have differed from that of all his Colleagues if he found that during the time he was in office that "monarchy was dead." On the contrary, the Sovereign power has exercised that constitutional criticism in all departments of the State which I believe to be most salutary; and I am sure the noble Lord must have felt in all the questions submitted to him and his Colleagues there was no reason to believe that "monarchy was dead." Then, again, I do not think that "the aristocracy is doomed;" and so long as it produces men like my noble Friend it will be difficult for aristocracy to be doomed. And if it does not produce such men as my noble Friend, it will fall from no external assault, but from internal decrepitude. But, in my opinion, there never was a period in England when monarchy was more powerful, when the aristocracy possessed more considerable influence, and were in a position where they might more certainly increase that influence if they fulfilled their public duties. Then, is "democracy triumphant?" Democracy is not triumphant until this Bill is passed, even according to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Calne. He has described our present political state as one of infinite beatitude. We all remember the description he gave of it. Therefore, democracy is not at present triumphant. But democracy is to be triumphant—and why? In what way is democracy to be triumphant, even if the measure before us passes? I wish, Sir, that some of these great lights would condescend to tell us what they mean by this terrible word democracy which they now introduce with such facility into our debates. Is it household suffrage? I suppose it is household suffrage. That is democracy. Well, there are 4,500,000 inhabited houses in England. I do not pretend to speak with severe statistical accuracy, but I think I do not make much of a mistake. Not more than a moiety of these, even if this Bill passes, will be inhabited by persons qualified to exercise the franchise. Then, if household suffrage be democracy, what is this all about? Why, in one portion of your constituency, in the boroughs of England, which altogether are represented by 334 Members, in the unjust manner I have often called attention to, there are altogether only 1,500,000 houses; and you are, in fact, extending that household suffrage, which has existed in this country since 1832, to a class which will probably increase your constituency by about 300,000 persons. ["No, no!"] No, no! I must express my opinion; I do not ask any one to adopt it if they do not believe it. It is my opinion that the increase of the constituency by the measure which has been brought forward and which being founded on this general principle, will give satisfaction, because every man will feel that if he deserves it he may obtain a vote, I say, practically, the increase will not be more than 350,000. [Mr. BRIGHT: In the boroughs]. Well, but last year, and the year before that, and five years before that, and three years before those five years—for fifteen or sixteen years, you have been blundering about this business, and making propositions in no one of which I believe you ever proposed less than the addition to the borough constituency of 200,000; yet, when you praised, if you did not vote for those propositions, you never believed that democracy was going to be triumphant in this country; but, now, because a measure is brought forward which is founded on some principle which does not say that a man shall not be a voter because he pays a few shillings more or less in the year, but founds the franchise on a principle in which there is certainty and safety; because it may probably increase that contemplated number by 100,000 or 150,000, we are told that "democracy is triumphant," and we are about to change the Constitution of England and all those principles on which our predecessors have exercised the noble franchises which have been bestowed by Parliament. I think that a most extraordinary statement to be made with reference to the present situation of affairs. And who are these people to whom you are offering the franchise — this limited number which is confined only to the boroughs of England; this principle not being applied to the greater portion of the country? They are Englishmen, who have been born and bred under the influence of the laws, the manners and customs and traditions of the country. [A cry of "Our own flesh and blood."] Far beyond "flesh and blood," Laws, customs, and traditions are far more effective. How then are we to believe these separate stories which are told about democracy being triumphant? I do not grudge the noble Lord, the right hon. Gentleman, or anybody else entertaining these sentiments, as I think it is not disadvantageous that they should be discussed, and in some instances no doubt their promulgation gratifies private self-complacency. When these monstrous and unfounded propositions are brought forward in debate we can controvert them, and when they are circulated in private society we can enlighten the irritated feelings they are meant to provoke. But what I now wish to impress on the Committee is the great importance of not permitting such bugbears to be the foundation of new legislation which is to change the character and the constitution of the country.

I wish to say a few words bearing directly on the subject submitted to our decision. We have before us two propositions, both seeking to attain the same object, but by very different means. We have the proposition of my right hon. Friend the Member for Calne, and that is the only proposal which has been seriously discussed during the whole of this long debate. On the other hand, we have the Amendment proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, which is essentially different in character, though both have the same object—namely, the representation of minorities. I think there is great objection to the proposal of my right hon. Friend the Member for Calne. I think if you allow electors to cumulate all their votes on one candidate, you would give too great power to the minority; and there is great force in the objection that, if you apply this rule to places returning three Members, it would be extremely difficult not to apply it to places returning two. But the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth is free from this objection—it avoids the difficulties that would arise from the adoption of my right hon. Friend's clause. His scheme is, that where three Members are returned by a constituency an elector should give only two votes—not accumulating them on one candidate, but voting for only two out of the candidates, which gives no undue power to a minority. I am prepared to agree to the proposal of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, and with regard to the division which is about to take place, I wish to call the attention of the Committee to the position in which we stand. If this was a Resolution proposed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Calne, and an Amendment had been proposed to it, the Amendment would be disposed of before we came to vote on the main question; but we are in this position — if we are in favour of the proposal of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, as distinct from that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Calne, we must vote for the second reading of the clause, because, until it is read a second time, we cannot propose the Amendment. I therefore, in voting for the second reading of my right hon. Friend's clause, do so only to enable me afterwards to support the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth.

The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has truly observed that by reading the clause a second time the Committe would not fetter themselves as to the way in which its principle is to be applied. I will not now proceed to argue the merits of the three propositions which have been laid before the Committee, but I may be allowed to reply to observations which have been made by hon. Gentlemen during the course of the lengthened discussion that has ensued upon this subject. It is excessively kind of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer to lay before the Committee for their instruction a great many arguments, which, however, I am sure, can have no possible weight with himself. He has been so kind as to attempt to prove to us in a most elaborate manner that this measure has no democratic tendency whatever. It is very good of him to do that, because we know from an exposition of his own political faith which he recently gave elsewhere that these things are to him matters of perfect indifference. In that speech he was more candid than he has been to us, and he made an exposition of his political creed which did not in the least surprise me or any one else who has watched his career. I can only describe it as political nihilism; as meaning, in other words, "that everything is just as good as everything else, and nothing matters in particular." The right hon. Gentleman said it was nonsense to talk about democracy in England; that you might talk of reforms in the Government and political changes, but democracy was impossible in England; that the elements of democracy did not exist in this country; that England is an aristocratic and monarchical country, and must remain an aristocratic and monarchical country, make what changes you will. That was the language held by the right hon. Gentleman, and which was greeted with applause by a Conservative audience. But if this be the true doctrine, of what use is the Conservative party? If you are just as safe under a democracy as under an aristocracy, why is it worth while to conserve anything? The right hon. Gentleman has found fault with the principle of the proposal for being so large while its application is so small. Nominally, the right hon. Gentleman is still the Leader of the Conservative party, and would he and those who follow him have thought the better of this proposal, if, being a very large principle, I had proposed at once without trial to give it a large application? Is not a proposal one of wisdom and moderation, if when a Member sees a principle which may be of benefit to the public, he submits it to them, giving them his reasons for it, and asking them to give it a small and limited application—a principle which, if it works well, is capable of great expansion—instead of asking them at once to expand it? We cannot help the principle being a large one, but we can help the principle being largely applied until we have tested its effects. The wise and the right way to act until we are in the necessity of the case driven to a large application is to give a principle a moderate application, with a view to ascertain what may be its results. It has also been said that this measure would produce political stagnation. This argument comes with good grace from the hon. Member for Birmiugham, because we know that the hon. Member does not object to a little conflict; but this is the first time I ever heard that the avoiding of a contested election was in itself an evil. A contested election in the opinion of the Leader of the Conservative party and the hon. Member for Birmingham is in itself a great good. Nothing can be stronger than the way in which the hon. Member for Birmingham has put the case. He said that South Lancashire returned two Members of one way of thinking, and one of another way of thinking, and this was done after a contest which effected an enormous amount of good. But, supposing you had adopted the new-fangled idea, and there had been no row, no public house expenditure, and no broken heads, what would have been the result? Probably, Gentlemen would not have worked themselves up to that pitch of frenzy and excitement as to induce them to go about the country propagating doctrines which, when brought home to them, they shrink from in dismay. I protest against any arguments being drawn from the existing state of things to be applied to the state of things which is to be. Hon. Gentlemen have pressed on me very strongly that we have not those see-saws and changes I have alluded to—that our past history does not show them. No, Sir, it does not; but is this any argument that our future history will not show them? Because we have been able to avoid these things by the moderation of our institutions, by the manner in which we have provided for the representation of all classes of the community in respect of the exercise of political power, shall we, therefore, go on less moderately and safely now that we are going to entrust supreme power to almost the lowest class of all? Hon. Gentlemen say that in America it would have been a great evil if the system which I advocate had been introduced at the time of the civil war—that it would probably have prevented that energy which was put forth in the suppression of the revolt on the part of the South. But hon. Gentlemen forget what was the state of things in America. They forget that there were two great parties in America; the Republican party and the Democratic party. The Democratic party mainly belonged to the Southern States, and when the latter were withdrawn by their own act from the Confederacy, the small Democratic minority was left face to face with the Republican majority, and, consequently, they were quite at its mercy. My hon. Friend the Member for Reading has said that a majority in America has never been known to abuse its power. I will take one instance which is as good as a thousand. Certain things became necessary for the Republican party, which could not be carried without a majority of two-thirds of the Congress. Everybody knows that Members who were innocent men were expelled from the Legislature in order to obtain the necessary Republican majority. Then it is said that we are separating the upper classes from the rest of the community, giving them a sort of isolated existence and breaking them up into sections. I reply to that argument that the thing has been done already. We know from experience it is a law of the human mind that when we lower the franchise beyond a certain limit, the upper classes cannot be brought to take a part in elections. The choice presented to you now is this. Will you have your upper classes absolutely withdrawn from politics, or will you cut out of your constituencies a field on which they may yet feel they can with advantage take an interest in politics, and become re-attached to the Constitution from which the violent measures of the Government is about completely and utterly to sever them? Whatever the merits of this Bill may be it is certainly most inimical to persons in moderate circumstances. It will be hardly possible for any person without an enormous command of money to obtain a seat in this House in future; but if you pass this clause you will enable a certain number of persons to form a constituency which will be certain of returning a Member, and if they please without the slightest expense to themselves. You will be able by that means to have what you must have if this House is to continue to carry on the business of the country—namely—persons of moderate means who will devote themselves to it as a sort of profession. But if you do not pass this clause, or something similar to it, you will have nothing to look forward to but the almost absolute and immediate separation of the Executive Government from the House of Commons. You will have a House of Commons consisting of rich men returned by a mob; and you will find that a House so constituted will not be able to carry on the Executive Government in the manner in which it has hitherto been done. The result will be that you must do that which has been done under similar circumstances in other countries. You must have an Executive appointed by some other persons, who will be in their turn selected by the people and so be independent of this House. The hon. and learned Member for Plymouth spoke of an anomaly that would occur if my proposition were adopted by which he was shocked. He put it that one-third of the constituency of a borough plus one would equal one half of the representation. He is not however shocked by the anomaly that now exists—that one half of the constituency plus one is equal to the whole. The hon. Member for Birmingham is also horrified. He says that 12,000 votes may be given for one Member and 8,000 for another, and that thus under this system, a constituency returning four Members may be represented by two and two. That is exactly the same thing. The hon. Member is horrified at thinking that one-third could ever be equal to one half, but he is not the least horrified at thinking that one half plus one should equal the whole. The right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies, being in search of an illustration, looked about for one, and could find no other than himself. He said, "If you want to understand how a majority works just look at an individual." I thought an individual meant something which could not be divided, but he has for the benefit of the House been good enough to cut himself into several pieces and to make himself a composite party for the purpose of illustrating his argument. Now, I suppose he is a majority. I wonder how his conscience voted on both sides last year and this, in voting then for a lateral extension of the franchise, and now for a vertical descent, and how the majority is arranged between them. Well, Sir, I am taunted with the little good I can hope to achieve by this clause; I think I have been a little misrepresented on that point, for I said distinctly that it was quite ridiculous to suppose that a mere change like this could counteract the enormous revolution into which we are plunging. The hon. Member for Birmingham says it is only taking a handful of snow out of an avalanche. That is quite true, and no one feels more than I do, or chafes more at my impotence to arrest the fearful change which is about to take place. I never attempted to represent to the Committee that a measure like this or a measure of ten times its influence would prevent the change we are about to undergo. You cannot do wrong and undo it in the same degree in this tremendous and irremediable measure. But is that any reason why we should not do what we can? The Chancellor of the Exchequer says we want to introduce crochetty men into the House. I do not exactly know what he means, but I suppose that he means men who are of the same opinions this year and last. If so, I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon not being a crotchetty man, and on never being likely to require the aid of one of these constituencies.

said, that in rising to move a Resolution on this subject, he wished to explain to the House that at the time of the Union it was determined to follow, with respect to the Irish Peerage, the precedent set in the case of the Scotch Peerage at the time of the union of Scotland with England—namely, to have an Irish Representative Peerage; and accordingly the Act of Union provided that the Peers of Ireland should have twenty-eight representatives in the Imperial Parliament. There were, however, several points of difference between the Scotch Peerage and the Irish Peerage. The Scotch Peers were elected at the beginning of every Parliament, and without re-election could only sit for one Parliament. The Irish Representative Peers, on the other hand, were elected for life, and any person who was elected as a Representative Peer of Ireland had no power of resigning. He must serve. It had been said, he knew not on what authority, that a late noble Lord, so long the Leader of that House (Lord Palmerston), had refused to make out his right to vote for the Irish Representative Peerage, because he was afraid that, at some time or other, he might be elected and sent to the House of Lords against his will. The consequence of the system of election for life was that men in decrepit age, and even a lunatic confined in an asylum—as had been the case not long ago—might be found on the roll of the twenty eight Irish Representative Peers. If a Peer of Scotland was made a Peer of the Realm, he ceased to be a Representative Scotch Peer; but if an Irish Representative Peer was promoted to be a Peer of the Realm, he still remained a Representative Peer of Ireland for the whole term of his life; and there was a still more substantial difference between the Irish Peerage and the Scotch, since the Union of Scotland with this country no Scotch Peerage can be created; but under the Irish Act of Union an Irish Peerage may be created whenever three Irish Peerages become extinct, and even that limitation does not exist whenever the number of Irish Peers falls below one hundred. A Scotch Peer cannot be elected a Member of the House of Commons; but an Irish Peer can be elected for any constituency on this side of the Channel. It was perfectly competent to Her Majesty, if she so thought fit, to decline to create a further number of Irish Peers, and the only question was, was there any advantage in keeping up the Irish Peerage? He maintained that there was not. The fact of a man being an Irish Peer deprived him of the power of acting in many capacities which he might act in if he had no Peerage. An Irish Peer could not sit in that House for an Irish constituency; he could take no part in the management of the affairs of his county because he could not sit upon the grand jury; he was in fact a political eunuch. He believed that no English or Scotch gentleman would accept an Irish Peerage. It was not in substance or reality a Peerage; the coronet which it brought with it was a mere pasteboard one. If an Irishman was worthy of a Peerage at all, he ought to be made a British Peer. The Motion of which he had given notice was one for an Address to Her Majesty, praying Her not to exercise Her Royal Prerogative in creating Irish Peers; but the ultimate object he had in view was the amalgamation of the British, Scotch, and Irish Peerage. The present system worked very badly. He did not wish to say anything offensive to anyone; but it was notorious that, unless an Irish Peer professed very strong political opinions, he had no chance of a seat in the House of Lords. It was generally believed the noble Earl at the head of the Government exercised such an influence in the nomination of the Irish Representative Peers that, unless an Irish Peer coincided in the political views of that noble Earl, he had no chance of being elected to a seat in the House of Lords. That compelled the young Irish Peers to become Conservatives at once. The noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland would inherit an Irish Peerage; but if he sat for an Irish borough, the moment he became an Irish Peer he would have to quit the House, unless he could get in for a place in England or Scotland. It might be asked how he would provide room in the House of Lords for all the Irish and Scotch Peers? It was not for him to do that; he would leave it to the wisdom of Parliament and the bounty of Her Majesty. The thing, however, was not so very difficult. The Irish Peerage ought to be put on the same footing as the Scotch, and no more Irish Peers ought to be created. He would thus allow the Irish Peerage to become gradually extinct from non-creation of fresh Peerages, until the number was reduced so low that those remaining might become absorbed into the House of Lords as British Peers. To show how such a system would work he would mention that at the time of the Scotch Union there were 154 Scotch Peers, there were now only 78, the rest having become extinct. Of those 78, 41 had been created, since the Scotch Union, British Peers. That only left 37 Scotch Peers, of whom 16 were Representative Peers, so that there only remained 21 Scotch Peers who had not seats in that House. No doubt that number would be reduced by the process of extinction adopted until there would be no difficulty in adding them to the House of Lords. At the time of the Union with Ireland there were 238 Irish Peers, 60 had become extinct; but, unfortunately, that extinction had not the same effect as in Scotland, for some new Irish Peerages had been since created. There were, however, 189 Irish Peers at present, of whom 80 held English Peerages. Of those, 80 were English and 28 Representative Peerages, making the total number of Irish Peers without seats in Parliament, 81. At the time of the Union there were 228, which showed the rapidity of the process of extinction, the Union having taken place only 67 years ago. Last year, no less than six Peers of Ireland got English Peerages. It might be objected that such an addition as was proposed would render the House of Lords unmanageable, and interfere with the proper despatch of business. But if all the Scotch and Irish Peers at present existing were added, that would not be the case. At the present moment there were 463 Peers on the Roll of Parliament, but the House of Commons consisted of 658 Members, and might, if the proposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was accepted, be raised to the magical number of 666. But if they excluded the Irish and Scotch Peers and the Bishops, the number of Peers having seats in the House of Lords was 385, of whom 97 only claimed their Peerage anterior to the accession of George III. There were only two Dukes whose creation dated so early as the reign of Charles II., and only one Marquess whose creation dated before the reign of George III. He stated these facts to show how rapidly hereditary dignities became extinct; and that would be rendered still more plain to the House when he informed them that whereas at the accession of George III. there were 388 Peers, and that monarch created 215, there only now remained 385. There was no reason, then, to fear that the House of Lords would be rendered unmanageable by the addition of the Scotch and Irish Peers. Meantime he thought they should have a reform of the Irish Peerage, with, among other things, the cumulative vote. He would have them also elected each Parliament, the same as the Scotch Peers, and in other respects assimilated to them. His main object now in bringing this subject under the consideration of the House was to put an end to anomalies unsuited to the present age, and he trusted the present discussion would not be useless.

said, that, in seconding the Motion, he begged to be allowed to express a hope that the Government would not turn a deaf ear to the suggestion of his hon. and learned Friend, and relieve the Irish Peerage from the undeserved sneer that was often levelled against them. Since 1832 the Irish Peers stood at a much greater disadvantage than before. Until the great measure which extinguished the rotten boroughs was passed it was easy for Irish Peers to obtain seats in that House; and Lord Wellesley, Lord Londonderry, and other Irish Peers had been among the leading men of the House of Commons. But since 1832 all that was changed, and to make any one an Irish Peer now was to put an extinguisher upon him as a public man. It might be said that this was a sentimental grievance; but half the grievances in the world were sentimental, and created as much irritation as material grievances.

characterized the Motion as most extraordinary. The hon. and learned Member asked the House to endorse a proposal to violate the Articles of Union, and strike at the Prerogative of the Crown. Did he desire to secure the extinction of the Irish Peerage? Seventy-four Irish Peerages had become extinct since the Union, and that, one would think, should be sufficient to satisfy the craving of the hon. and learned Member. He surely could not expect any Minister to advise Her Majesty to add 110 Members to the House of Lords. The proposition was not original; the Duke of Somerset in 1716 proposed to limit the Prerogative of the Crown in the matter of creating Peerages to the extent of eight beyond the number then existing. Sir Robert Walpole told him that it would be perfectly impossible to get such a measure passed by the House of Commons, as many of its Members were living in expectation of having the honour of a Peerage conferred upon them, and the measure was afterwards, on the Motion of Lord Stanhope, abandoned; and well it was so, or the Peerage, as an oligarchy, would long since have ceased to exist. At the death of Queen Elizabeth there were in England but 59 Peers; James I. made 62; Charles I., 59; Charles II., 64; James II., 8; William III., 30; Anne, 30; George I., 20; making, altogether, 273; but 119 of those had become extinct, so that the Duke of Somerset's limit would have been 223. Peerages of the United Kingdom did not appear to last a very long time. In Ireland it was different. No country in Europe can boast a higher or more ancient aristocracy than Ireland—the De Burgos, from whom the Royal family derived their Earldom of Ulster; the De Berminghams, Lords Athenry, the Premier Peer of Ireland, the Geraldines, Kildare and Desmonde; the De Courcys, whose chief representative enjoyed the peculiar privilege of standing covered in the presence of his Sovereign, granted to one of his ancestors by King John; the D'Anjulos, Lords Nangle, the De la Poers, Du Barrys, De Excestres, De Barry, FitzWalters, called from their hereditary offices; Butlers, the Talbots, the Danish Plunketts, the Barnwells, and Prestons of the Pale. The newest of these Peerages has been 400 years in existence; the majority six or seven centuries. The great Celtic Peerages, Tyrowen, Tirconnell, M'Carthy More, O'Dempsy or Clanmalina, O'Brien of Thomond, have, with the exception of the last (Inchiquin) disappeared, as well as the soldier Peers of William III., the Schombergs and De Ginkles. At the commencement of the last century the creation of the Peers of Ireland may be said to have been vested in the hands of the undertakers—a number of families who undertook to carry all the Government measures on the patronage of the Crown being left in their hands. The chief of these families were the Gores, Beresfords, Speaker Boyle, and Primates Stone and Boulter. Government took the matter into their own bands, openly sold the Peerages for £5,000 each, and purchased boroughs with the money, creating what George Nugent Reynolds, in a letter to Lord Clare, denominated the Pinchbeck aristocracy, and called by others "the titled mushrooms." Curran, in his description of the Government of the day, says—

"They begun with the sale of the honour of the Peerage; the open and avowed sale to whomsoever was rich and shameless enough to become the purchaser. It depraved the Commons; it profaned the sanctity of the Lords; it poisoned the sources of legislation and fountains of justice; it annihilated the very idea of public honour or public integrity."

According to rumour, £100,000 was obtained in this way. Mr. Ponsonby offered proof of six of these sales to the House of Commons; and, to this day, forty-two names are on the roll of Irish Peers who have not a residence or an acre of land in that country amongst them. In twenty years previous to the Union, thirty Peerages were made; and at the Union, in promotion and creation forty-two were made. They do not stand in high favour in Ireland, as to this day there is no more unpopular an epithet than that of a Union Peer. Since 1800 thirty-four have been created or promoted, So that Ireland had no cause to think herself neglected; and in one respect she had an advantage over Scotland, as her Peers could get themselves returned to the House of Commons. Since the Union many Irish Peers have sat in the House of Commons; the Marquess of Londonderry, Lord Palmerston, Lord Hotham, Lord Annesley, Lord Henniker, Lord Rendlesham, Lord Galway, Lord Fermoy, Lord Henley, and others. He could not see any reason why the descendants of the purchaser of an Irish Peerage should have a claim to an English one, or why those who come after any of the Union Peers should have an opportunity afforded them of doing in their new country what their fathers did in the old. The 4th Article of the Union provided for keeping up the Irish Peerage; that for every three becoming extinct, and one year elapsing afterwards, Her Majesty should have the power to create one, and when the number was reduced to 100, she could create one for every vacancy that might occur. His hon. Friend the Member for Clare does not approve of this arrangement, and seeks to deprive Ireland of the trifling gilding that is left to her. He complains that the Irish Representative Peers differ from him in politics; but he does not propose to put a stop to English Peers voting at their election, which would do away with Ministerial dictation, and give its due weight to residence and devotion to Irish interests. There had been no claim made by any of the Irish Peers to have this supposed grievance redressed, nor had any desire been evinced on the part of the Irish people to see their representatives in the House of Lords. Why, then, was this Motion brought forward? Men — Irishmen — of ancient lineage may yet like to rank themselves amongst the nobles of the country where their properties are situated; or those persons who hereafter may raise themselves to distinction by their advocacy of Ireland's interests, may wish to identify their names with that of their country by being enrolled amongst its Peers. It appeared to him, therefore, that, under these circumstances, the Motion made by his hon. and learned Friend was not only uncalled for, but absolutely mischievous, and he trusted that Her Majesty's Government would give no encouragement to hon. Members who might desire to take up the time of the House with Motions of this kind.

said, he was certainly puzzled to find a Motion of this nature brought forward as an Irish grievance. He, however, supposed that, seeing there was to be no Irish Reform Bill during the present Session, and thinking they had time to spare, his hon. Friend had thought he might occupy the time of the House with an attempt to reform the House of Peers. He certainly thought it would be well if we had only one Peerage for the two countries. Still, however, the existence of a separate Peerage was provided for by one of the Articles of the Union, and if any improvement was to be effected in that Treaty the whole subject ought to be brought under consideration, and not to be dealt with piecemeal. He, therefore, suggested that the House should proceed to the other business on the Paper, and lay aside a Motion which could produce no beneficial result.

said, that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just sat down had mistaken the nature of the Motion made by his hon. Friend. That Motion did not contemplate the elevation of the whole of the Irish Peerage to the House of Lords, but was simply to ask the Queen not to increase the number of Irish Peers—trusting to time to reduce them to such a number that they might be absorbed in the English Peerage. He could not imagine that the existing Peers would be dissatisfied because their number was not increased, while it could not, he thought, be agreeable to the Irish people generally that the Peerage of their country should remain one of an inferior rank.

said, he was not disposed to take up the time of the House in discussing a Motion which could in his opinion lead to no practical result. He was sorry to hear that there was any grievance affecting the Irish Peers; but he could not think that the grievance to which the hon. Gentleman had referred was one that sat very heavily on that body. He must confess that he could not regard as a grievance the complaint made by an hon. Gentleman opposite, that since the rotten boroughs had been abolished, Irish Peers had no longer an opportunity of becoming Members of that House. It was certainly not complimentary to that body; but he begged to remind the House that there had been lately an illustrious example to the contrary in the person of the late Prime Minister. There was not a constituency in England which would not, during the last twenty-five years, have been proud to have had him as their representative. Irish Peers with a capacity for public business such as the noble Lord possessed would find no difficulty in obtaining a seat in that House, and in getting important constituencies to recognize their business qualities. With regard to the Motion itself, he wished to point out that it would be impossible for the House to agree to it. Not only was it levelled directly against an important Prerogative of the Crown, but that Prerogative was confirmed in a solemn compact through the medium of an Act of Parliament. If, therefore, any interference was at all contemplated in this direction, that interference ought not to take the form of a Resolution, but should be solemnly embodied by the House in an Act of Parliament—an Act that would have the effect of repealing one of the Articles of the Union. He did not think that this would be a desirable course. He admitted that in some respects an Irish Peer was placed in an anomalous position; but his position in his own country was more anomalous than it was with regard to his Parliamentary privileges. It was felt as an inconvenience that an Irish Peer could not take that part in the business of the country that was taken by an ordinary gentleman. He, however, certainly thought that the House ought to be very slow to adopt a Resolution of this kind, and to interfere in the manner proposed with one of the most solemn acts ever entered into by the Parliament of this country.

said, the object of the Motion was not so much to get rid of the Act of Parliament as to elicit the opinion of the Government upon the question; and he believed that object had been fully attained in the discussion that had taken place that evening. It was most desirable that the English and Irish Peerages should be fused into one, the same as was done with the Scotch and English Peerages. If that plan had been adopted at the time of the Union there would only now be twenty-three Irish peers without seats in the House of Lords, and the fusion of the two would have been on the point of taking place. Everybody must admit that it was rather an unfortunate circumstance that, by the present system of election, Irish peers belonging to one party only could by possibility find a seat in the House of Lords. It was a somewhat remarkable circumstance that the other night, when Lord Russell brought forward a Motion on the question of the Irish Established Church—a matter which must really be settled if they were to give satisfaction to the Irish people—not a single Representative Irish Peer voted with that noble Lord.

said, in rising to call attention to the recent persecution of the Jews in Roumania, he wished to observe that the Jews in Moldavia were a very numerous body, being estimated at about 200,000. The great majority of them were supposed to be descended from ancestors who settled there many centuries ago. They had lived, on the whole, upon terms of amity with the bulk of the population of that Principality, and had little in the shape of persecution to complain of until about a year ago, when, on the occasion of the endeavour to obtain an express recognition of political rights for them under the new Constitution of the country, a party of agitators sought to make political capital out of a prejudice which was supposed to prevail against them among the nation. M. Bratiano, the present Minister of the Interior, one of the party which then attempted to assert the political rights of the Jews, had since taken the lead in subjecting them to the most cruel persecution. On the 22nd of last May, the hon. Member for the City (Baron de Rothschild), Sir Moses Montefiore, and himself received a telegram, which was to be found in the Papers then before the House. It was stated in that telegram that the Minister, M. Bratiano, putting a false interpretation on laws and regulations which had been long in disuse, and which were abrogated by the new Civil Code, had ordered the immediate ejectment of all Jews from the farms, inns, and village cabarets occupied by them; that a razzia was also directed to be made against the Jews in the streets of Jassy, under the pretext of vagabondage; and that the police had been engaged for some days previously in arresting the Jews in the streets, and transporting them with great brutality in troops across the Danube. The course which the Minister had taken was not only barbarous but illegal; and that was the case not only with regard to the ejectment of the Jews from their houses, but also with regard to the arrests for vagabondage; for it was provided by one of the Articles of the Constitution, that no one should be arrested as a vagabond until he had had a month's notice given to him, in order that he might within that time provide himself with a domicile, and in this case no such warning had been given. The telegram to which he (Sir Francis Goldsmid) had referred implored him to do what he could in aid of the sufferers, and he had forwarded it to the noble Lord opposite (the Foreign Secretary), who immediately sent instructions to our Consul General at Bucharest to remonstrate against these proceedings, and to direct the Consul at Jassy also to remonstrate with the local officers. M. Crémieux, the eminent French advocate, obtained an interview with the Emperor of the French, who took up the matter in a like spirit, and his Government despatched similar instructions to its agents, while he himself sent a telegram of remonstrance to Prince Charles. On the 26th May, Mr. Green, the British Consul General, had an interview with the Prince on the subject, but the Prince, doubtless acting on the information of his Minister, M. Bratiano, intimated to Mr. Green that no persecutions against the Jews had been intended, and that certain hygienic and police measures only had been adopted; the Prince also manifested astonishment at the petition of the Boyards, because they had previously expressed to him opinions unfavourable to the Jewish community. He ought rather to have inferred that M. Bratiano's measures must have been most unjustifiable, since they shocked even those who were prejudiced against the Jews. The petition drew a striking picture of the anarchy produced in Jassy by the arbitrary proceedings of the Minister, and correctly remarked, that a course so lawless was a threat against the rights of the Roumans generally, to whom no security would remain if such a violation of all law were tolerated. Before the receipt of instructions from this country, our Consul at Jassy had made unofficial representations to M. Bratiano, who was then in that city, and similar representations were likewise made by the Russian and Austrian agents, when M. Bratiano promised that instructions should be immediately issued to reform these abuses; but it was found next day that the Minister had left Jassy without such instructions being issued, while the arrests were continued. The total number of Jews arrested in Jassy was eighty. Fifty of them remained in prison on the 7th of June; thirty were tried for vagabondage, fifteen were acquitted, and fifteen were condemned—who had to appeal to a higher Court. On the 14th of June the noble Lord sent a despatch to Mr. Green, instructing him to continue his friendly and earnest remonstrances. At the end of the Papers Consul General Green expressed an opinion that the persecution had ceased; but, unfortunately, that was too sanguine a conclusion. This was clear from a telegram of June the 16th, which stated the continued arrests of Jewish travellers furnished with regular passports (munis de passeports), not, as stated by a misprint in the Papers before the House, minus passports. Then, too, it appeared from a letter from Jassy, dated June the 18th, that in the town, persecution had ceased; but that Jews who were travelling were still seized and sent from one district to another; that the servants of Jewish farmers were turned out of the villages under the pretence that the farmers alone had the right to remain; and that in the whole country the tribunals refused to confirm the purchase of houses by Jews, so that it was impossible for them either to buy or to sell house property. The only favourable piece of information was the last which he (Sir Francis Goldsmid) had received. This was the intelligence that the Court of Appeal at Jassy had reversed the decisions of the tribunals of First Instance, and had declared that three of the Jews taken up for vagabondage had been wrongfully arrested. A pamphlet had been published on the subject in Paris, which was attributed to M. Bratiano, and in which it was stated that the Jews had suffered because of their partiality to Russia; but that was most unlikely, inasmuch as the Russian Government was almost the only Government of a civilized State which had of late years exhibited any wish to persecute its Jewish subjects. In the pamphlet to which he referred, it was also set forth that the measures which were taken had reference to all vagabonds, whether Christians or not; but the fact was that they might be more correctly described as steps taken against the Jews, whether vagabonds or otherwise. If anything could aggravate the cruelty that had been shown towards the Jews, it was that that cruelty had been instigated by a gentleman who was the professed advocate of the most enlightened principles of liberty and the fullest rights of man. Those persecutions had excited in this country so much interest that his (Sir Francis Goldsmid's) venerable friend, Sir Moses Montefiore, although upwards of eighty years of age, had determined to make a journey to the spot with the view of seeing whether something could not be done towards their mitigation. He (Sir Francis Goldsmid) knew so well the hatred of the House of Commons for all oppression, that he would feel sure of their sympathy, even if the rights of the Jews only were invaded or menaced. But this was not so. If the habit of persecution were allowed to gain ground, it would affect all Christians who were not of the dominant sect, as well as the Jews. In Lord Lyons' despatch of the 6th of May, in which he reported on the condition of the Christians in Turkey, he said—

"In short, very little progress has been made towards enabling the Christians to feel that the Ottoman Government is, as regards them, a national Government. They submit to it as a less evil than anarchy and confusion; and each Christian race seems to value it chiefly against what appears to be to each the great object of dread—the domination of any of the other Christian races in the empire."

This paragraph well deserved the attention of those who fancied that the overthrow of the Turkish Government would be a panacea for the evils affecting its Christian subjects. The hon. Baronet concluded by asking the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he had received any intelligence on the subject of the persecution of the Jews of Roumania since the presentation to Parliament of the Papers relating to it, and by moving for any subsequent Correspondence that might have taken place?

said, that doubtless the young Prince who ruled over the district in question was well disposed to prevent anything like the persecution to which the hon. Baronet had called attention. It must at the same time be admitted that, reigning, as he did, over a country which scarcely came within the limits of civilization, and which was troubled by domestic dissensions, it was extremely difficult for him to realize his wishes in that respect. He was happy to find that the period over which the alleged outrages extended did not appear of very long duration, and was inclined to think that Mr. Green would not have sent so satisfactory a report on the subject if their severity had not been considerably mitigated. The persecution of the Jews should not be tolerated in the present day, and there was no reason why the existence of that creed should be considered hostile to Christianity. On the contrary its existence had been of benefit to Christianity. They were indebted to the Jews for the preservation of the language in connection with which the Christian religion was founded. No part of the literary efforts of a right hon. Gentleman who held a prominent position in that House was more interesting or more to his credit than the defence he had opened for that race. He thought it was necessary that means should be devised for giving the House an opportunity to express its opinion upon engagements made by the Crown of a diplomatic nature previous to ratification.

said, he desired to express his grateful thanks to the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office for the course he had taken in reference to these persecutions. There was no doubt that the interference of England and France had saved these people from much heavy persecution, and that many persons had been released from imprisonment owing to the exertions of the Governments of the two countries. He believed that not only Jews but Christians in all parts of the world would bless the noble Lord for the course he had taken.

said, he had no objection whatever to place the Papers asked for by the hon. Baronet on the table of the House. They, however, contained very few details beyond those which had already been published. The latest intelligence on the subject had been received that morning. Mr. Green, the Consul, writing from Bucharest, stated that Mr. St. Clair, the Consul at Jassy, had had an interview with Prince Charles, and had received an assurance from him that these persecutions would be put a stop to. Whether the promise would be kept he (Lord Stanley) could not undertake to say, but as far as the matter rested with the Prince, he believed that he was perfectly sincere in what he said, for he had acted very fairly in all these matters. With respect to the persons by whom the administration of the country was carried out, it was impossible to say how far they originated and traded on, for purposes of their own, the popular agitation, or how far it had its root in popular feeling. No doubt the country, taken as a whole, was superstitious, and under ecclesiastical influence; and, probably, a good deal of that feeling existed there which prevailed in Europe three or four centuries ago, when men thought that a little persecution of others atoned for much immorality on their own part. Then again, they must consider that the population had only been recently emancipated; only the other day they were in a position of inferiority, and he was afraid that the first impulse of persons so circumstanced, was to assert, in an unpleasant manner, their superiority over persons of another race who might be in their power. He did not think the persecutions had been directed against the Jewish community solely on account of their wealth. It was a matter of popular prejudice. If that prejudice was really strong and general, he could not hold out a hope that it would be entirely removed by diplomatic action, and in that case they must trust to time and the moral pressure of the civilized communities of Europe. At any rate, the English Government would do all that was reasonable and possible; and the French Government were acting cordially with them in the matter, He need not say that in a case of this kind, the more discussion there was and the more publicity was given to the subject the better.

said, he rose to call the attention of the House to the Report of the 10th of August, 1866, of the Committee appointed to inquire into the Rank, Pay and Position of the Medical Officers of the Army. On this subject he could not help recalling to mind the period of the Russian War, at the commencement of which the Crimea was the veritable Aceldama of the British Army—and reminding the House of the noble exertions of Lord Herbert and Miss Nightingale to remedy the then existing evils. With respect to the proceedings of the Select Committee of 1866, it appeared from the evidence of Professor Longmore, Dr. Rees, and Dr. George Johnson, that the chance of promotion for medical officers in the army was so small that only inferior candidates could be expected to enter the service. In 1865 the candidates were almost all of the third class. During the present year the highest number of marks obtained was 1,079, the maximum being 3,400; and the lowest number was 146, the minimum being 1,034. The conclusion which the Committee of 1866 came to upon the evidence was that there was a considerable deficiency of candidates of that high class of professional attainment who it was hoped would present themselves as competitors, and they recommended that a better system should be adopted, and that the Warrant of 1858 should be carried out. The evidence also showed that the candidates were not well-educated professional men, and therefore a greater number were rejected in 1865 than in 1863. He thought all the facts proved clearly that the non-execution of the Warrant of 1858 had had a progressively injurious effect upon the qualifications of the candidates for the Army Medical Service, and therefore the Committee of 1866 were perfectly right in issuing the recommendations for the Government to act upon. Those recommendations were—first, that at all boards except courts martial and inquiries into military offences, medical officers should sit according to their medical rank, as ordered by the Warrant of 1858, and not attend merely as witnesses (the present system was that they were summoned merely as witnesses, and were not allowed to sit on the bench upon ordinary inquiries); secondly, that the senior military officers should preside, but that the medical officer should have the same relative position according to the rank which he held as the military officer; thirdly, that in the monthly Army List the names of the medical officers should be published in the ordinary course; fourthly, that medical officers ranking with field officers should be allowed to hold the same position as military officers of the same rank; and, fifthly, that an increase of pay should be granted according to the scale fixed by the Government. The Warrant carrying out this last recommendation was dated the 1st of April last, and made no reference whatever to the other recommendations of the Committee or the Warrant of 1858. The medical officers, therefore, did not know whether the Warrant of 1858 was in existence, or whether it was intended to carry out the other recommendations of the Committee. The medical officers were satisfied with the rate of service pay as settled by the Circular of 1866, but not with the retiring pay allowed by the Warrant of 1st April. After a certain period of service a surgeon-major was entitled to retire upon a rate of pay which should not exceed one half of his full pay. Thus, a surgeon-major of twenty years' standing would be entitled to a retiring pension of 12s. a day, while an assistant surgeon who might have served thirty or forty years would only be entitled to a retiring pension of 8s. 9d. a day. The half-pay ought to be regulated by length of service, and not by the name given to the officer. At a recent meeting in Dublin a Resolution was passed on the subject, and condemnatory of the Government for not declaring whether the Warrant of 1858 was or was not to be carried out. With reference to the period of five years mentioned in the proviso in the Warrant of April he would allude to Returns which had been laid on the table in 1861, and which showed the number of assistant-surgeons and surgeons in the Service to be 738, while the average vacancies were only eighteen, so that by seniority an assistant surgeon would have to serve forty years before he could attain the rank of surgeon, and after that time he would be entitled to only 8s. a day. The Returns on the same subject, which applied to Her Majesty's troops in India as well as at home, embracing the last ten years showed that it would take an assistant-surgeon thirty-one years to become a full surgeon, and even then he would only be entitled to a retiring pension of 8s. 9d. a day. The remedy for that, in the opinion of the medical officers, was for the Secretary at War to fix a time within which assistant-surgeons would be entitled to rank as surgeons. It was also suggested that instead of assistant-surgeon the title of junior surgeon should be given them. He did not see why there should not be in a regiment two surgeons as well as two captains and two majors. Their real grievance was that by the seniority principle of advancement they might serve thirty-one years as assistant-surgeon, with a retiring pay of only 8s. a day. The promotion was fixed at ten years in the naval service, and at twelve years in India, and the medical officers saw no reason why similar rules should not prevail in the ordinary service of Her Majesty. That was a matter which the Secretary for War ought to take into consideration. There was also a difference between the cavalry and the infantry service with respect to medical officers. In the cavalry, although the pay of other officers might be increased, there was no increase in that of the medical officers. In the cavalry, the medical officer had to keep a horse, for which he had to pay 8d. a day for forage, while in the infantry the medical officer received 1s. 10d. a day for his horse's forage. He thought that medical officers in both these branches of the service should be put on the same footing. He was persuaded that such a reform would be not only fair and reasonable, but would be the very best economy. It would not be disputed that a good regimental doctor was worth a hundred times the pay he received, whilst a bad regimental doctor would be a positive loss. The Emperor Napoleon declared that his Surgeon General O'Leira was worth six generals, and he (Mr. Synan) considered that a good regimental doctor was at least worth one general. Sir James Outram, also, on his death-bed said—

"It pains me to think that the services of medical officers are so ill requited, and that my efforts to obtain justice for them have been attended with so little effect; but the time is coming when they must be properly recognized—the next war will settle this long controversy terribly in their favour."

The hon. Gentleman, in conclusion, moved the Resolution of which he had given notice.

said, that if the hon. Member was of opinion that the medical officers of the army had not been treated in a satisfactory and deserving manner, he was quite right in bringing the subject under the notice of the House. He entirely agreed with the hon. Member that the army ought to have competent and well-qualified surgeons, and it was no less essential that they should be treated, both by the army and by the Government, in a most kind and liberal spirit. No class of persons, indeed, were more entitled to consideration, honour, and credit, than the medical officers of the army and navy. Wherever there was danger they were always ready to share it; they were always willing to do even more than their duty, and from considerations both of good feeling and good policy they were entitled to the most generous treatment. The question, therefore, really was, whether or not, looking to what had taken place of late years with respect to both services, the medical officers had at the present time any ground of complaint? The Member for Limerick seemed to think they had, and in support of this view had adverted to the Warrant issued in 1858. That Warrant was issued at a time when his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire was Secretary for War, and he thought it would be admitted that it was conceived in a spirit of the greatest kindness and generosity towards the medical officers of the army. But the hon. Gentleman complained that that Warrant had been subsequently allowed to fall into neglect. Now, he believed the Warrant was not carried out to its full extent, and the result was that evils and inconveniences arose, so that a further inquiry became necessary. Accordingly in 1866, a Committee was appointed, presided over by Sir Alexander Milne, who was now one of the Lords of the Admiralty. The hon. Gentleman now complained that the recommendations of that Committee had also been neglected. He must say, however, that, in his opinion, the hon. Member had somewhat overstated this part of his case. The hon. Member had referred to a point on which the medical officers were very sensitive—namely, their relative rank in regard to the other officers of the army, and particularly to the position which the medical officers occupied when called upon to assist in mixed Boards of Inquiry. The fact, however, was that the Committee recommended that when medical officers were engaged on such boards they should be entitled to occupy the position which their relative rank entitled them to; but at the same time it was recommended that mixed boards should not be continued. Now, whatever might be the merits or demerits of these mixed boards, he, being an unprofessional man, was unable to say; but it was at all events clear that that recommendation absolutely confirmed the rule that if medical officers did sit on mixed boards they should have the benefit of their full rank. Then as to the position of medical officers at the mess, the recommendation was that if they did not enjoy their full relative rank they should be allowed to hold the second place. That recommendation also had been acted upon, and in his judgment met the difficulty of the case. Again, there were recommendations respecting the position which medical officers were to occupy in the army, and the greater part of these recommendations were acquiesced in. It was true that a recommendation that they should be restored to the classification which they formerly held had been disapproved at the Horse Guards and at the War Office; but this was, he believed, a point of minor importance. The hon. Gentleman had thought that the medical officers should be allowed to have chargers, and to appear mounted on parade; but the fact was that the recommendation was to the effect that it should be compulsory on them to do so. It appeared, however, that whether in consequence of medical officers of infantry regiments not being skilful, or from other causes, that this was regarded by the medical officers not as a boon but quite the reverse, and therefore the recommendation had not been enforced. He was surprised that the hon. Gentleman should have touched so lightly on the rate of pay which the medical officers received, and in this respect he challenged the hon. Member to say that they were not most generously and liberally treated? [Mr. SYNAN: I said so.] Surely, then, when the hon. Gentleman made a complaint that these officers were not well treated, he must admit that that was a most important exception. He did not believe that any Gentleman would remain thirty years an assistant-surgeon if he were worth promoting. With few exceptions he believed that the recommendations of the Committee had been literally and in spirit carried out, and that the army surgeons, so far as these recommendations were concerned, had no ground to complain. That there was a deficiency of candidates both for the army and the navy was unfortunately the fact; and he should be glad to make any arrangements which he consistently could make in order to render the military service more attractive.

said, he thought the officers both of the army and of the navy had been very handsomely rated as to pay by the right hon. Baronet. As the right hon. Baronet said the whole cause of the dissatisfaction existing among the medical officers of the army had arisen from the alteration in the Warrant of October 1, 1858. Had that Warrant been carried out Parliament would not have heard a word of these complaints, and the present dearth of first-class medical men in the army would not have been as lamentable as it now is.

said, that after the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman he should not press his Motion.

said, he rose to call attention to the conviction of two men, Henry Fulford and Mark Wellstead, for poaching, by the Salisbury bench of county magistrates, in March last, and to move an address for a copy of the depositions on which such conviction was based. He was not without hope that his Motion would be acceded to, as he would have no difficulty in proving his case to the House. If his case was an erroneous one, it was due to the magistrates whose conduct was impugned, to the administration of justice in this country, to the public feeling of the people in the neighbourhood where the alleged outrage on justice was committed, that its error should be fairly and fully established. On the contrary, if the case he brought forward could not be gainsaid or contradicted, it was due to those who had been aggrieved that they should not be left without the sympathy of the House. The gentleman upon whose authority he made his statement was the Rev. Richard Payne, vicar in the immediate neighbourhood where this affair took place. He had not the honour of Mr. Payne's acquaintance, he had never seen him, but knew something of him by report, and he could assert that as regarded education, social position, and what was at least as valuable—prudence and discretion—he could not possibly call into court a more creditable or satisfactory witness. It was due to this gentleman to say that he (Mr. P. A. Taylor) brought him forward on his own responsibility and from a sense of public duty. That gentleman had made no request to be brought forward in connection with this matter, and when communicated with he said it would be more agreeable to him to allow the matter to drop; but that if he (Mr. P. A. Taylor) thought it a matter of public duty to bring the case forward, he could say that he was unable to give him a single circumstance in mitigation of the facts. Now, the facts were these:—On the 26th of March last, George Pilgrim, a gamekeeper, took out summonses for poaching against George Fulford, Henry Fulford, and Mark Wellstead. About the first-named of these three men no question arose that he was guilty, and he absconded. Henry Fulford and Mark Wellstead, however, appeared and protested that they had been in bed the whole night. The gamekeeper swore that in the early spring morning, an hour before sunrise, he saw three men running away, and that defendants were two of them. This was all the testimony against them. On the other hand, it was sworn by the father of one that his son was sleeping in the same room with him at the time; and the father and mother of the other deposed that he was sleeping in the same room with them. The woman who appeared to be a remarkably conscientious witness deposed that she slept as usual that night, but she could positively testify that the prisoner was in bed at nine o'clock at night, and at five o'clock in the morning. Stephen Deer swore that he saw two men running away, and that the two men taken up were not those he saw running away. They had, therefore, the assertion of the gamekeeper on the one side; while on the other hand, they had in the one case two witnesses, and in the other three witnesses swearing in direct contradiction. One would have supposed that if the balance of evidence was not in favour of the prisoner, yet if there was a doubt the prisoner would have had the benefit of it. But—

"Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill."

Things were indeed bad begun for these poor men when country gentlemen entered that court and took their seats on the bench against men who in point of fact were offenders against them. And the thing that was bad begun made strong itself by ill, because it predisposed the magistrates to weigh in a false scale the evidence produced before them, and to violate the first principle of English law, that a man was to be held innocent till he was found guilty. In this case the magistrates, in spite of the testimony which had been adduced in favour of the prisoners, found them guilty. Fulford was lightly treated, and only sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment, because his character had been hitherto irreproachable; while Wellstead received three months, because he had before been convicted of poaching. Now, the first thing which struck one in this case was, not merely the fact that the magistrates accepted as gospel truth the testimony of the gamekeeper, but they seemed to think him such an unquestionable witness that they did not think it was worth their while to cross-examine him. They refused even to cross-examine him, and although they did not go so far as to charge the woman by implication with perjury, they intimated that she possibly might have been mistaken, and that although she saw her son in the bed-room at nine and at five, yet, in the interval, he might have gone out when she was asleep and done his little bit of poaching. If they had taken the trouble to cross-examine Pilgrim the gamekeeper, they would have found that he deposed to seeing the men at a quarter to five, one mile away from his home. Either, then, the men were innocent and the gamekeeper had made a mistake, or the father and mother had perjured themselves. But Pilgrim the gamekeeper was not altogether an irreproachable witness; for on a previous occasion there had been a conviction on his evidence, in which he had been proved to be wrong; and singularly enough the clerk of the magistrates urged that in his favour, because he said that having made such a mistake once before, he would be likely to be more careful on a future occasion. If that was the idea of justice these persons entertained one could not but be filled with admiration at the entire harmony and homogeneity which characterized all the surroundings of this case, both with respect to the magistrates and their clerk. As was the magistrate so was the clerk, and as was the clerk so was the only witness. Pilgrim, indeed, said that he had another witness, but when asked why he did not bring him forward, he said, "Oh, the magistrates would be satisfied with his word;" and so the clerk said to Mr. Payne—

"If you are dissatisfied with the conviction, appeal to the Home Secretary; he will refer to the magistrates, and the magistrates will report;"

implying that their Report would end the whole matter, and the inference being that the clerk would put the reply into his pocket, and they would hear no more of it. But while the magistrates and the clerk affected to believe the men guilty, all the neighbourhood knew they were innocent; and they knew it for the reason that they were perfectly cognizant of who had committed the offence. Mr. Payne says—

"I did not willingly interfere in this matter; but it was too much for any man with any sense of justice, or self-respect, to put up with."

He then goes on to say—

"For some time I heard unpleasant rumours; but, in what I now think a misplaced confidence in the administration of justice, I made no inquiry; at last I was forced to do so, and was put into communication with one of the real culprits, Charles Moody, who told me the whole truth of the matter."

He was thoroughly convinced that George and Mary Wellstead were thoroughly trustworthy witnesses; and, moreover, the men in question had confessed that they were the real offenders. The House would perhaps be of opinion that upon this fact coming to the knowledge of the magistrates, they would at once hasten to undo the wrong of which they had been guilty, and that the post and the telegraph would alike be set in motion to secure the men's release. Mr. Payne took the man who had made the confession before Mr. Hinxman, one of the committing magistrates; he confessed himself to be the real offender, and showed his knowledge of the other. This offender was Stephen Deer, who swore that the prisoners were not the men; but also swore falsely, being unwilling to commit himself, that he did not know who the real offenders were. Mr. Payne naturally thought that the magistrates would have done the men justice, and have applied to the Home Office to release them from prison; but, to his surprise, on the 20th of Maybe received a letter from Mr. Hinxman that he had heard from Lord Folkestone, and that after a careful consideration of the evidence and otherwise, they must decline taking any further steps in the matter. The House would observe that those magistrates who sit on the Bench to administer justice supplement the evidence by the words "and otherwise." Did that "otherwise," which apparently weighed so strongly in the consideration they gave to this case, mean vague rumour, or evidence that might have been called? He believed that it would be found to mean that a man named Sherwood saw the men running away, attempting to disguise themselves; that he recognized one of them as George Fulford, but could not recognize the other two; and he it was who told Pilgrim, the gamekeeper, that he thought he was not far wrong. It turned out afterwards that these men were Stephen Deer and Charles Moody; and Moody being a remarkably little man, when that description was given to the gamekeeper, he rushed at once to the conclusion that it must be Wellstead, because he also was a little man. Well, notwithstanding that all this evidence was procured and forwarded to the Home Secretary, the right hon. Gentleman declined to interfere in the matter. It would be impertinent on his part to attempt to guess why the right hon. Gentleman declined to interfere; but he conceived that he must have been animated by one of two reasons. He had either looked into the evidence upon which the magistrates had decided the case, and come to the conclusion that those magistrates were right, or he declined to look into the evidence at all. If the former was the case, he could only say that the Home Secretary's mode of weighing evidence was as peculiar as that of the magistrates themselves; and if the right hon. Gentleman never looked into the evidence at all, then the result was that the public were bound hand and foot, and were absolutely in the power, and at the mercy, of these county magistrates, and they might do as they liked without an appeal to the Home Secretary. It was somewhere before the 29th of May that Mr. Payne wrote to the magistrates, and afterwards sent the information to the Home Secretary, stating that this unhappy case never stood upon more than one leg; and now that the evidence of the gamekeeper had broken down, it had no leg left at all. The people of the neighbourhood were quite of that opinion; for a petition signed by great numbers, from the vicar, churchwardens, and inhabitants of Downton, was prepared, praying for a reversion of the sentence. How much this may have influenced the Minister I know not, but on Tuesday, June 17th, orders were sent down that Wellstead should be released. Now, this man was released because he was not guilty; and Mr. Payne thought that, at least, the justice would be done of releasing his bail from reponsibility; and, accordingly, on the 18th of June, he wrote to the Home Secretary stating that it was hard enough upon the poor man to have suffered an unjust imprisonment; but it would be still harder on him if his bail were not released; but it was almost incredible that no answer whatever had been received to that application. This was the case which he had to present to the House. They sometimes heard it charged against Reformers that in their speeches they endeavoured to set class against class; but was there ever a case more likely to set the peasantry against the squirearchy than the one which he now brought forward? Let hon. Members try to bridge over the abyss that separated them from that class—put themselves in their position, and imagine what would be their feelings if subjected to the gross wrong and injustice to which these men had been subjected. He was quite sure that hon. Gentlemen would feel most indignant if, under such laws as the Game Laws, they were wrongfully accused, and sent to prison upon the oath of a single gamekeeper, counter-proved by evidence upon evidence. Indeed, he was not quite sure that the feelings of what had been called by a high authority the "wild justice of revenge" would not enter their minds. What must be the feeling of hopeless insecurity among the people of this neighbourhood, not one of whom was sure that they might not be made the victim of some serviceable rascal anxious to procure a conviction which he knew would be pleasant to his master, and whose oath would be held to weigh more than any number of witnesses that they could bring, especially when the charge was knocking over a hare which happened to be nibbling his cabbages, crossing the road, or nibbling on his master's pasture. He did not hesitate to say, that, even if there had been no evidence brought forward to rebut the evidence of the gamekeeper, the evidence of the latter was not sufficient to have convicted these men. He would ask the House seriously to consider for one moment how such a state of things affected these poor people? He would say that in this case and in all similar cases—he said in all similar cases—because they all knew that this was a sample of scores and hundreds occurring through the length and breadth of the land. He said that in this and similar cases a terrible wrong was done, a reckless denial of justice was perpetrated—a wrong which, were not the peasants the mildest and kindliest people on the face of the earth, did they not carry forbearance and meekness almost, if it be possible, to a fault, no class, however powerful, would dare to inflict on any portion of their fellow-countrymen, however humble. He begged to conclude by moving an Address for a Copy of the Depositions on which this conviction had been based.

said, that, as one of the Salisbury Bench, he wished to say a few words on the subject. With reference to the last observation of the hon. Gentleman, he could not help remarking that, if hundreds of such cases were occurring, it was strange the House of Commons did not hear of them when there were so many hon. Gentlemen who would be willing to take them up. As to the particular case itself, he had very little to say, because he was not present on the occasion of the conviction. But he was intimately acquainted with the two magistrates who presided at the hearing of the case, and he knew that no more honourable men could be found. With reference to the sneer of the hon. Member for Leicester as to one of them being a game preserver, he might observe that the gentleman referred to was no game preserver at all. The other (Lord Folkestone) was the son of a most able magistrate, and such was the reputation of the noble Lord himself, that it was likely he would be the Chairman of the next Quarter Sessions. He thought that no suspicion rested on the magistrates. The evidence which the House had heard that night was all on one side—the evidence of mothers, fathers, and other relatives of the accused; while, on the other hand, there was, no doubt, considerable inconsistency in the evidence given before the magistrates, who would, he felt assured, have never wilfully injured any persons, however humble.

said, that the hon. Member for Leicester had taken a course on this occasion which he hoped he should never see followed in that House. No doubt, honour, virtue, and integrity would die with the hon. Member, and not be found elsewhere. He had presumed in a tone as unjustifiable as any which had ever been heard in that House to speak of the magistrate who had acted in the case. Those gentlemen were no acquaintances of his; but he must protest against the hon. Member for Leicester speaking of them as men who had the baseness to convict two persons on evidence which they knew to be false, simply because the witness against them was a gamekeeper. If the hon. Member knew anything about what passed in Criminal Courts, he must know that mistakes as to identity occurred in other cases as well as those in which the accused were charged with breaches of the Game Laws. He disdained to answer the charge which the hon. Member had brought against himself. From the first he had been perfectly disinterested in the matter; and, when the circumstances were brought before him, he took the course which appeared to him to be the correct one. It appeared to him, on a careful review of the facts, that there was so much doubt in the case that it was his duty to release the men. One of the men, Henry Fulford, had completed the term of his imprisonment six weeks before the case was laid before him, and during the six weeks no remonstrance had been made by, or on behalf of—that man as far as he was aware of no remonstrance had been sent in to the Home Office. It must be remembered, too, that those persons had an opportunity of appealing to the Quarter Sessions if they thought that they had been wrongly convicted. Henry Fulford remained in prison for the full period of his sentence, and when the case was brought under the notice of the Home Department a number of statements were made, and he received several letters on the subject of the conviction. He knew from his experience at the bar how difficult it was to arrive at a proper conclusion as to evidence without having the witnesses before you face to face. Without affecting, therefore, to come a strict conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the parties—because he knew how difficult it was to come to a sound conclusion in cases of alibi—yet, believing there was much doubt in the case he thought it was better to let the man who was still in prison be discharged. At the same time he gave directions that the men should be set free from their bail. If that had not been done, it was not his fault. In the first instance this case had been taken up in a very different spirit. It had been brought forward by the hon. and learned Member for Richmond. How had it fallen into the hands of the hon. Member for Leicester? He did not handle it in the same spirit as that displayed by the hon. and learned Member for Richmond. The hon. and learned Member for Richmond had spoken of the magistrates in the eulogistic terms which had been applied to those gentlemen by the hon. Member for Salisbury. He did not say that a mistake had not been made. He should not have allowed the man to be released if he had not thought that there was great doubt in the case; but game prosecutions were not the only ones in which persons were convicted on the evidence of one witness. The cases in which there were convictions on the evidence of one witness were numerous. There had been a prosecution in which seven persons were convicted on the testimony of one witness, though several alibis had been set up. Afterwards the prisoners indicted for perjury the person who had sworn against them; but they failed to prove that the case which had been made against them was not perfectly right. In spite of all these alibis a jury which saw these men face to face, and saw them examined and tested in a proper way, came to the conclusion that they would believe the one man against all the witnesses who supported the alibis. If evidence were to be estimated by the number of witnesses rather than by its own weight, as the hon. Member for Leicester seemed to think it should, we should come to most unjust decisions. The hon. Member remarked that one of the magistrates had said something about "evidence and otherwise." The new evidence adduced in support of the alibi on the part of one of the defendants, except that of his father and mother, was all "otherwise;" it was not given on oath before the magistrates, but sent subsequently to the Home Office. Therefore, what the magistrate referred to was the result of inquiries he had made, which he supposed confirmed his decision. Without discussing whether it was right or wrong, he believed it was fairly, honestly, and justly given, because the magistrates believed the evidence adduced. There was no cross-examination, nor was it the duty of the magistrates to make such a cross-examination as the hon. Member supposed. The hon. Member's idea of cross-examination was an extraordinary one. He had said the witness Pilgrim was not cross-examined as to what Stephen Doer had said about seeing some man running away a mile off. It would have been a most extraordinary thing to have asked Pilgrim about what Stephen Deer had seen a mile off.

said, what he had stated was that Pilgrim ought to have been cross-examined as to when and where he saw the three men running away.

said, the mother had sworn that her son was in bed about five o'clock, and the keeper had said he saw the man between four and five o'clock between one and two miles from the cottage in which he lived. The magistrates knowing how indefinite evidence as to time frequently was, believed from the evidence before them that there was time for the man to have got from where the gamekeeper saw him to the house where he lived, at the hour stated, without imputing perjury to the father or mother. It was clear that there was a case of poaching, and Stephen Deer said that George Fulford, who had absconded, was one of the men, and he did not know who the others were. This man Deer had been convicted several times for poaching, and the magistrates did not rely much on his testimony. He had subsequently said that he himself was one of those who were running away, and that a man named Moody was the other; but when he appeared before Mr. Hinxman, the magistrate, he was believed by that gentleman to be drunk, and the magistrate's mind was not much affected by what he said. He must say that nothing could have convinced him more than the manner in which this case had been brought before the House of the impropriety of bringing up in the House, as a Court of Appeal, such cases. After the tone and spirit of the speech that had been made by the hon. Member for Leicester, he must say that he never heard any one attempt to enter upon a judicial investigation in so unjudicial a manner. The hon. Gentleman had treated the magistrates in this case worse than the magistrates would have treated any witness who had been known to have perjured himself on a former occasion, and had assumed, that because the case was one of poaching, the magistrates had dealt with it in a different manner to that in which they would have treated any other case. He might just as well have said that in any ordinary case of robbery magistrates had so deep an interest in protecting their neighbours' property that they would believe any charge that was brought before them. One of the magistrates, it appeared, was not a game preserver, and he ought at least to be regarded as a disinterested person. However, it was not for him (Mr. Hardy) to defend the magistrates. He believed most firmly that the bench acted upon their sense of what was right, that they weighed the evidence, and further, he believed that the gamekeeper himself committed no wilful error. He (Mr. Hardy), however, thinking that great doubt had been thrown upon the case, ordered the man to be set at liberty; but he repeated that he did not think that the magistrates had done anything to subject them to censure.

said, that since he had the honour of being a Member of that House he had never heard so unjustifiable an attack made upon any Member of it, as that which had been made on his hon. Friend by so high a functionary as the right hon. Gentleman. That right hon. Gentleman had not shaken a single word of the statement which had been made. The right hon. Gentleman had only misstated what his hon. Friend had said, being too angry to attend to him. The right hon. Gentleman said the magistrates believed the evidence given before them to be true; but the whole strength of the case was that the tendency of magistrates was always to believe the evidence of gamekeepers. Whether that was so or not, it was the general opinion, and this was an extraordinary and emphatic corroboration of that opinion. It was not denied that Pilgrim had made an unfortunate mistake as to identity before, and that on his evidence this person was found guilty, notwithstanding the other evidence and that the error was not corrected until evidence had been produced in addition—namely, the self-crimination of other persons. One would think it was the imperative duty of the magistrates to sift the matter to the very bottom, and to take care that the whole should be perfectly understood, so that they might be sure that they were not continuing to perpetrate a great injustice. As to appealing to Quarter Sessions, persons in the labouring class in the rural districts were not likely to appeal from magistrates to magistrates; they were too much afraid, and too much cowed to do that; and, besides, they had not the pecuniary means. The only other thing they had heard, was that one of these magistrates was likely to be appointed chairman of Quarter Sessions, in which office he would have to perform some of the most important judicial functions that could devolve on any person in these dominions, with the least amount of responsibility. They might be honourable men; but honourable men were sometimes singularly prejudiced, singularly un-judicial, and singularly disposed to believe in the sufficiency of evidence in a particular kind of charge.

said, he thought that the hon. Member for Leicester in bringing forward what he believed to be a gross case of magisterial misdeeds, had been rebuked by the Home Secretary in a tone which ought not properly to be adopted.

said, he could bear his testimony to the character and position of the two magistrates whose conduct had been attacked. There were no more honourable men to be found, or men more capable of discharging judicial functions. The subject had been brought forward in a style and tone which reflected infinitely greater discredit on the hon. Member than any remarks he had made could do on these magistrates. He hoped the House would not allow the Motion to be withdrawn, but express their sense of it by rejecting it by a large majority.

asked the Home Secretary if he intended to produce the depositions? [Mr. GATHORNE HARDY said there were none.] He had rather supposed that was the case. He regretted the magistrates were unable to give the grounds upon which they made the conviction. He would, therefore, move to add to the Motion that the right hon. Gentleman should give the Correspondence that had taken place between him and the magistrates. The right hon. Gentleman shook his head; but he (Mr. Forster) could not understand why he should refuse to produce the Correspondence. If no notes were taken he was at a loss to know where the right hon. Gentleman got the information on which he acted. The right hon. Gentleman had expressed his surprise that notice had been taken of this matter. It was not a case that could escape being noticed. The right hon. Gentleman released the man that was convicted, and thereby he admitted that injustice had been done to the man. His own speech showed that it was necessary to take notice of the case.

said, that, as a Wiltshire magistrate, he was surprised to hear what had fallen from the Home Secretary with reference to the depositions. He had never known a case where notes were not taken, which were called depositions. If none had been taken by the clerk to the magistrates, all he could say was that the practice was most reprehensible. He was intimately acquainted with the two magistrates referred to in this case, and it would be useless for him to add anything to what had been said in their favour on both sides of the House, as men of honour and men who would not have convicted any man unless they thoroughly believed at the time that the men were guilty.

said, depositions were distinct things, and well known to the law. They were taken down, read over, and signed by the witnesses, and they became formal documents that could be produced when required. In summary convictions it was only usual to take short notes.

said, that these men had suffered punishment at the hands of the magistrates who were evidently interested parties. There could be no doubt the gentry and magistrates in this county were game preservers, but they held in Scotland that it was inexpedient that game preservers should adjudicate in cases of this kind, and they were endeavouring to substitute the sheriffs of the county for such interested judges. The right hon. Gentleman had spoken of the hereditary judicial mind of one of the magistrates connected with this case. They might have a hereditary Legislature, but a hereditary judicial mind was something remarkable. As this matter had attracted a great deal of public attention, he thanked the hon. Member for having brought it forward. When we obtained a reformed House of Commons, cases of this nature would obtain larger proportions in the Legislature than hon. Members imagined.

said, the hon. Member for Perth had given the sanction of his high approbation of the moderate course pursued by the hon. Member for Leicester, that moderation being that, without one title of proof, he had asserted there were hundreds of cases like this. The hon. Member for Bradford was not justified in saying that the Home Secretary had admitted that wrong had been done by these magistrates. The Home Secretary most carefully avoided making any such admission. He said there was a conflict of evidence, and he determined to give the convicted man the benefit of the doubt. All men were liable to mistakes, but they were not all open to the charge of having done so wilfully. They had been told by the Home Secretary that he entertained some doubts about this case, and that being so he had given the prisoners the benefit of them and discharged them. He never heard a case which showed more than this how unfit a tribunal this House was to have such cases brought before them. The hon. Member for Westminster, wishing to approach the case in a judicial spirit, had been seeking information on which to form an opinion, and he had been going all over the town whooping and making inflammatory speeches to large masses of his countrymen on this case, and now he came there, and sought to treat the question like a Judge. He (Mr. Henley) held that the men could and ought to have appealed if they felt themselves unjustly treated; but it was impossible that the magistrates could discharge them, as the hon. Member had demanded. The hon. Gentleman must have known, or ought to have known, that the magistrates had no power to discharge. It had been properly stated that in cases of summary conviction there were no regular depositions; short notes were taken by the clerks, and it was his opinion that more mischief than good was done by the practice. The magistrates might convict on points not written down by the clerk; notes were not read over, and he would venture to say that not one magistrate in fifty knew what his clerk took down. Both parties were convicted by an imperfect record; and it should not be forgotten that Courts of Petty Sessions were not Courts of Record. He thought this case afforded a striking proof how unfit the House was for a tribunal of appeal.

said, he was not present when the hon. Member for Leicester made his statement; but he gathered from what he had heard in the course of the debate that both sides of the House found fault with him, not for bringing it forward, but for the style, and tone, and manner in which he had done it. He contended that any man who had much experience in such cases must be satisfied that, on the whole, substantial justice was done by the magistracy both in England and Scotland, and if they were dissatisfied with the system, the only remedy would be to abolish the unpaid magistracy altogether.

said, he had been rather surprised at the excitement which had been displayed in the course of the debate, as it seemed to him that the case was a very plain and simple one. Two men appeared to have been convicted for poaching by two magistrates, against whom personally nothing had been objected; although some very irrelevant remarks had been made as to the father of one having a judicial mind. The evidence was the unsupported statement of a gamekeeper, who had been mistaken in a previous instance, and that evidence had been deemed insufficient by the Secretary of State.

said, he had not made this statement. The evidence taken before the magistrates might have been perfectly sufficient.

said, he was anxious to keep within perfectly fair limits; but it was at least evidence which required to be supplemented, and which, according to the right hon. Gentleman's ultimate decision, left the matter in doubt. The case had been taken up by a neighbouring clergyman, and after some delay, for which the right hon. Gentleman did not appear responsible, the men were discharged. If the matter had had no reference to the Game Laws the House would have heard nothing of it; but considering the excitement in the country which it had occasioned, it would be only reasonable that any Papers on the subject should be produced. In Yorkshire the notes taken at a magistrate's court were held to be public property, as undoubtedly they were. He thought it would be very unfortunate, after the debate that had occurred, if the Government refused to produce the Correspondence between the magistrates and the Home Office, and he would suggest to the hon. Member for Leicester to alter the terms of his Motion to that effect—merely asking for copies of the Correspondence.

said, that one would suppose from the tone of the debate that the Home Secretary had in some tyrannical manner imprisoned one of Her Majesty's subjects; the fact being that the prerogative of mercy had been exercised on behalf of the imprisoned men by the advice of his right hon. Friend. His right hon. Friend had been subjected to a great many reproaches for having performed in the discharge of his office an act of a most generous character. The Motion of the hon. Member for Leicester was virtually to ask the House to form itself into a Committee to inquire under what circumstances he had exercised the prerogative of mercy. That was a most unusual proceeding. They ought to be satisfied that they had the happiness of living in a country where there was such a prerogative, and where there were Ministers who would recommend their Sovereign to exercise it. It was surprising that such conduct should be criticized. The hon. Gentleman had also moved for documents which did not exist, and it was notorious that in cases of summary jurisdiction, and in Courts which were not Courts of Record, depositions were not taken, but only notes, and the form of taking those notes varied in different districts. The Motion for the Correspondence was unprecedented. The Home Secretary was constantly corresponding with magistrates, and it was utterly impossible to assent to the production of Correspondence in the present case. If it is the opinion of the hon. Member for Leicester that there has been any miscarriage of justice or any oppression, there are means by which redress can be obtained; but it is not by bringing such a Motion as this before the House of Commons that redress can be had.

thanked the hon. Member for Perth for his expression of the opinions entertained by Scotchmen on the subject of game. The noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire, with his usual easy assurance had endeavoured to put those opinions aside. But there was another opinion which Scotchmen entertained with equal tenacity, and that was that the Bill introduced by the noble Lord on the subject of game was an imposture and a sham. He hoped the hon. Member for Leicester would divide.