said, he wished to ask the Secretary to the Poor Law Board, Whether the Poor Law Board intend, on or before the 29th of September next, to put into operation the 73rd Section of the Metropolitan Poor Law Act, by issuing their order to every Union or Parish, in the Metropolis which is governed by a Local Act, so that from and after a day to be stated in such order the relief of the poor shall, in every such Union or Parish be administered by a Board of Guardians elected according to the provision of the Poor Law Acts; and, if any such Parishes or Unions are not brought under the operation of the 73rd Clause on or before the date mentioned, will they be entitled to share in the benefits of the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund?

said, in reply, that he had to state that the Poor Law Board had already issued orders constituting five of the principal unions or parishes in the metropolis governed by a Local Act Unions or parishes to be administered by a Board of Guardians elected according to the provisions of the 73rd section of the Poor Law Act. The Poor Law Board were about to issue a sixth order, and a seventh case was under consideration, and it was expected that the arrangement respecting it would be completed by the 29th of September nest; but in the event of any cause, now unforeseen, interfering to prevent the completion of the arrangement, the delay would in no case affect the claim of the parish or union to participate in the benefits of the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund.

said, he wished to ask the First Commissioner of Works, If it is intended to move the statue of Canning from its present site and to reinstate it in its former position?

Sir, in answer to my hon. Friend, I have to say that the present position of the question affecting Mr. Canning's statue is as follows:—When the railway works were being made through Parliament Square they necessarily destroyed the trees and shrubs which heretofore had formed the background to the Canning statue; and it became necessary to re-consider the whole arrangement with regard to Parliament Square, and my right hon. predecessor at the Office of Works, in conjunction with Mr. Barry, gave his best attention to the subject, and arrived at the conclusion that it would be proper to remove the statue from the site it formerly occupied to the situation in which it is now placed. It appears to me that the conclusion at which they thus arrived was formed on very good grounds, and I have adhered to it; consequently the statue was removed to where it now is. But it appears that a very strong feeling exists in many quarters, more especially among those related to, or who were acquainted with, Mr. Canning, that the statue to his memory having once occupied a position in immediate contiguity to the Houses of Parliament ought not to have been removed from that site. I apprehend that if you view this question merely on the ground of artistic considerations the removal of Mr. Canning's statue to the site it now occupies is perfectly justifiable. If artistic considerations are put out of the question, and the subject is looked at merely with reference to the feelings of private connections, I admit there may be a good deal in what was said on the subject in "another place." On that occasion there was a very strong expression of opinion in favour of restoring the statue to the site it formerly occupied, or one immediately contiguous to the Houses of Parliament. In this conflict of opinion I consulted some of my Colleagues, and in concert with Mr. Barry carefully reviewed the whole question. No final decision has been come to, but I think I may say that if it is thought advisable on the considerations to which I have referred to move Mr. Canning's statue again, we should think it right not to place it precisely on the site it originally occupied, which under the changed circumstances would be very objectionable, but in the centre of Parliament Square. I should think the decision must be arrived at on one or other of the grounds I have indicated. Those who have seen the statue from the rear will be of opinion that nothing could be more objectionable than that it should be approached by the public in that direction. Any one who did not know the effect produced by viewing a large statue at the rear, when it was never intended that the eye should see it in that way, had only to walk down Regent Street, and he would be satisfied of the truth of that opinion. Great objection, he was afraid, would be taken to the replacing of Mr. Canning's statue in its former position by those approaching the Houses of Parliament from Victoria Street. On the other hand, those approaching the Houses of Parliament by Whitehall or by Westminster Bridge would no doubt entertain a different opinion; but, whatever decision is come to, either those who regard the question from the artistic, or those who regard it from what he might venture to call the sentimental point of view, mnst necessarily be disappointed.

said, he wished to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, If it is intended to confine the Tenders for Conveyance of Her Majesty's Mails from the United Kingdom to New York to ships sailing under the British flag; and, if not, whether vessels tendering under a Foreign flag will be subject to the surveys and conditions imposed on British ships carrying Her Majesty's Mails?

said, in reply, that the tenders the hon. Member alluded to, were asked for in pursuance of the Postal Convention concluded this year between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States. The object of that Convention was to carry out an arrangement which had been acceded to by the late Government, and under which the Postmaster General of this country was to provide for the conveyance of mails on stated days from certain ports in England to certain ports in the United States, and the United States were to provide for the conveyance of mails the reverse way. There was no restriction on either side with regard to the flag; but he believed that, other things being equal, the English Postmaster General would give the preference to vessels sailing under the British flag. The vessels under foreign flags would, by the tender, be subject to the same conditions as those imposed upon British ships, but such conditions did not include the surveys to which the hon. Member had alluded.

Mr. Speaker,—Sir, Before you leave the Chair I wish to redeem the pledge I gave at the close of last Session to call the attention of the House to the unsatisfactory state of our Extradition Treaties with foreign Powers. A few days before the prorogation last year a Bill was brought down from the House of Lords, to which our assent was asked, changing the rule of judicial procedure in the case of foreigners accused of crime. Time out of mind the rule of English law has been that no man should be committed for trial, either here or abroad, without parôle testimony as to his identity, and primâ facie as to his guilt. The accused, by himself or his counsel, have always thus had the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses against him. But, save in the case of depositions made by a dying man, documentary proof was never, up to last year, held sufficient by itself to justify a magistrate in sending anyone to stand his trial as a felon, or in sending him out of the country to be tried by a foreign tribunal, or to be kept in prison for the rest of his life awaiting that trial. Our Judges and our magistrates applied the rule indifferently to the stranger and to him that was born in the land. We are a people loving justice. We have inherited its maxims and traditions from our fathers; and the reverence in which we hold them has done more than anything else in our customs and institutions to make us what we are—the freest people in the world, and the fittest people to be free. This rule of criminal law, however, we were last year called upon to change as regards French citizens or denizens resident here. This humane and wise and time-honoured system was an offence unto the French Govern- ment. Oral proof is not required in France for the arrest and imprisonment of any man, however exalted, virtuous, or above suspicion. Neither is it necessary to show him the whole of the depositions which constitute the charge against him; he is liable to be incarcerated without being confronted with his accusers. The Ministers of the Queen told us that, unless they could get Parliament to abrogate English law, and substitute French law, in dealing with Frenchmen, his Imperial Majesty would put an end to the Convention subsisting between the two countries for the mutual rendition of criminals. This was not, indeed, what the French Ambassador had asked. It appears by the Papers laid upon your table that he asked a great deal more. He demanded that a French writ should run in every part of Her Majesty's dominions as it does in every department of France; and he demanded that we should in every case, without discussion or discretion, surrender French refugees, tried and condemned in their absence, against whom the record of such condemnation should be produced before a magistrate. When I asked Lord Cairns, then Attorney General, whether he was prepared to entertain these two last demands, he replied, with a spirit that became him, that he would cut off his right band before it should sign any assent to such submissions; but he sought to persuade us that the Government Bill, substituting documentary for parôle proof, would satisfy the French Government, and yet do no harm. My hon. Friends around me were not persuaded. We demurred to waiving, at the bidding of a foreign Court, a venerated and sacred principle of justice between man and man. We said it cannot be right to maintain that principle for ourselves and to renounce it where foreigners are concerned. You do not ask us to take it away altogether. You dare not venture to clip the coin of justice, as for centuries it has been current amongst us; but from the friendless and the helpless fugitives from absolute power, you ask us to take away a protection which we keep for ourselves. The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) and his Law Advisers argued that no harm would really be done; and when we pointed out the possibility of men being demanded for one crime and, when surrendered, tried upon another, we were told our misgivings were unfounded, our fears chimerical, our suspicions vain. No foreign Government, it was said, would think of playing a trick upon another, or seek to kidnap an ob- noxious fugitive by charging him with a crime named in the Treaty, and then detaining him, or indicting him, for some other crime; or if, by any unforeseen contingency, the fugitive were wrongfully obtained, regard for our offended dignity would be sure to cause an immediate amende and the restoration of the mistaken prisoner to freedom. We were not convinced; but our objections were overruled, and our votes overborne. The Bill became law; and then what happened? The French police, who until then declared they could not, compatibly with the honour of their master, attempt to capture fugitives sheltering in the dominions of the Queen, became active and enterprizing. You told us they would be so if we passed this Act, and they redeemed your word with a vengeance. The Convention of 1843, you told us, would not work without this Bill, and that was the only reason assigned in its favour. Well, the Bill passed; and before six weeks had elapsed the agents of the French police had captured two individuals—the one in Canada, the other in London—both of which cases serve to exemplify in a manner not to be mistaken the force of all that we had urged. The case of M. Lamirande is probably familiar to most of those who hear me. It stands out in the history of this question so prominently that I hardly suppose any one will be found, whatever may be his opinions, to attempt its palliation. From first to last, it is about the most flagrant and immitigable tissue of fraud and violence with which we have ever had to deal. Nothing that we said last Session as hypothetically agreeable can compare with the bare narration of undisputed facts recorded in the despatch of Lord Carnarvon of the 20th of November to Lord Monck, recounting what was done in Canada, and the despatch of the noble Lord opposite to Lord Cowley, stating what subsequently occurred. We may put aside altogether the speeches of advocates and the comments of journalists. From the official admissions of the Foreign Secretary and his late Colleague, the Secretary for the Colonies, the whole infamous story may be clearly gathered, and every inference we desired to impress upon the mind of the House may be conclusively drawn. Lamirande, on a charge of forgery committed in France, was arrested at Montreal. Agents of the French police, who had followed him thither, applied for an extradition warrant, which by contrivance they induced the Governor General to sign, pending an application for an habeas corpus. Lord Monck promised that time should be afforded for the hearing of that application; but the night before the decision was given by the Judge of the Queen's Bench the prisoner was delivered up under the Governor's warrant, and, after midnight, placed in a railway train which had been specially detained three hours, for the purpose of avoiding observation, prevented from having any communication with his law adviser, who tried to speak to him at the station, conveyed by steamer to England, and thence to France. The morning after his surreptitious removal, Mr. Justice Drummond granted the writ of habeas corpus, and declared his capture illegal on various grounds. With some of these I need not trouble the House; but two of them deserve attention. The warrant issued in France was not produced; but a copy, certified by no one who had read the depositions. So much for the evidence. Now for the crime itself. Lamirande was a robber; but he had no more committed forgery than he had committed murder or arson. He had committed theft—he had stolen thousands of gold pieces out of the cellar of the Bank at Poictiers, of which he was cashier. He forged no document for the purpose; he forged no document at all; he did not tamper with the Bank accounts; they remained unchanged. The books were right, but the bags were wrong. If a man steals your cheque-book and imitates your name, he is a forger; but if he picks your pocket of your purse, or picks the lock of your strong box, you might as well call him a sheep stealer as a forger. Why, then, did the French police have him arrested for forgery, not theft? I will tell you why: because theft is not one of the crimes named in the Anglo-French Treaty, and forgery is; and as they wanted to bring down their prey, not having a bullet, they used a slug. They brought the man to France, and tried him there for the offence of which he had been guilty; and, the case being clear as to the facts, he was condemned to ten years' penal servitude; but they had no more right to take him and to try him than they would have to take or try me. In the French Penal Code there are five classes of offences against property called "faux"—false witness, false coin, false weights, false seals or tokens, and false writings of a public or a private kind. What we call forgery may be classed under the denomination "false writings;" and because in a logical category forger is classed as "faux" the French kidnappers had the impudence to set up the barefaced cheat that "faux" is synonymous with forgery. Lamirande may have committed some of the offences denominated "faux;" but it was not even pretended at the trial that he had committed anything which we call forgery. Lord Monck—of whom I wish to speak with every consideration and forbearance — suffered himself to be puzzled to some extent by those about him who used this incredible imposture; but the moment the case was referred to, the Law Officers of the Crown in England flung it aside with contempt, as any upright and enlightened jurist would do. This part of the case needs only to be stated to be made plain. You named four crimes in your Treaty with France, and forgery is one of them. What you mean by forgery may not always be the same as that which is meant in France. But what is to be the rule of interpretation? Manifestly the rule of the law whose assistance is invoked—the rule of the country whose magistrates are to act: our Judges, and magistrates know our law, but they do not know the French law; and the French magistrates know their law, and they do not know our law. Every Court must administer its own law, which it is bound to know; not a foreign law which it cannot be supposed to know. But this is not all. Suppose any magistrate in England and the Colonies had copies of the Côde Napoleon and the records of the Cour de Cassation, and reports of all the trials and arguments which guide the decisions of French judges, spread out before him, and suppose the practitioners in his Court were equally capable of raising and discussing points of Foreign law—Would that do? Not at all. You signed a treaty in 1843 enumerating four offences. Ever though you affected to believe that the criminal codes of the two countries were in 1843 absolutely identical, so that every step of prosecution would be equal and identical, what is to prevent either country from altering its laws under each head of offence after your Treaty was signed, inserting crimes that did not formerly belong to that category? Now apply this to offences against the person. You make loud professions of your care not to be entrapped into surrendering political offenders. But if you allow any French spy or bailiff to tell your magistrates what is constructively an attempt to commit homicide, and if the French writ, which he produces unsupported by oral testimony, compels the extradition of the accused, what need is there of a magistrate at all? You could get the thing done better and cheaper by machinery. The whole thing is a farce. Mr. Justice Drummond states distinctly in his written and published judgment that Lamirande appeared to have committed no offence named in the Treaty. He had not committed forgery, and he was accused of nothing else. He might have committed faux—one species of faux, and if that species of faux had been what we call forgery he would have been legally given up. But not having committed that crime, and the Treaty containing nothing about stealing money out of bags in the cellar of a bank, the habeas corpus must issue, and the man be set free. When the writ issued the man was gone. And why? Because Lord Monck had been misadvised that forty-eight hours was time enough to allow him for making the application. Now this brings me to one of the practical issues I desire to raise. I would have a fixed and inflexible law; not a miserable dependent enactment limping after the terms of a special Convention, concluded between two Governments when they happen to be mutually in good humour, but a permanent and imperative law which would prescribe that three months should elapse after the signing of the warrant of extradition by the magistrate during which the prisoner might sue for a writ of habeas corpus, and have the merits of his case duly heard. I have great faith in the consistency, impartiality, and independence of our supreme tribunals. Their judgments are not liable to be disturbed by diplomatic or political influences; our Judges are appointed for life, and their decisions are matters of record. I have great faith in their decisions; but I own I have not the same faith in despatches written off-hand by a Secretary of State no matter who he may be. At present the appeal, and the only appeal is to him, from the decision of the magistrate. But is he always capable, or in a condition to act judicially? Is it to be expected that on an ex parte statement not made on oath he can or ought to be expected to overrule the judgment of the magistrate? If he does he subjects his Government to just reproach on the score of caprice from the foreign Power whose fugitive subject is not surrendered. If he does not the prisoner has really no benefit of appeal. Either way the system is faulty and works ill. In the case of Lamirande the appeal had there been time, would have been effectual; but no time being specified by law the man was cheated of the privilege, and to all intents and purposes he was as much stolen out of the custody of the British Crown as the gold was stolen out of the cellar at Poictiers. The noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs felt keenly the humiliation and indignity that had been placed upon his country; and he tried every art of remonstrance with M. Moustier to induce him to give Lamirande back. He very wisely and properly abstained from claiming him as a matter of right, because by the unfortunate mistake made in Canada we had lost our claim under strict International Law and could only urge international equity; but the French Foreign Office turned a deaf ear to his expostulations. The Correspondence is upon the table; let whoso readeth understand. It went on throughout the greater part of the winter, and on the 9th of January the noble Lord grew very urgent in his entreaties for the rendition of Lamirande. Parliament was about to meet; and he tells our Charge d'Affaires at Paris if something is not done in time the subject is certain to be discussed, and the result will probably be fatal to the renewal of the Extradition Bill of last Session, if not to the existence of any convention on the subject with France. The noble Lord appreciated justly the susceptibility of Parliament on a question so nearly touching the national honour; and we are here today not to blame the noble Lord or to taunt the French Government with having got out of the scrape by the poor device of getting the wretched man to withdraw his claim to our interposition, impelled by what motives I leave you to judge; but we are here to-day to call upon the Government to provide official means without delay against similar abuses occurring again. Our purpose is not to make mischief out of the past; but to draw good out of evil for the future. But was the case of Lamirande the only one which justified our misgivings with regard to the consequences of the Act of last Session which you now ask us to renew? We foresaw and forewarned you that the effect of passing that Act would be not merely to speed the work of the police by sweeping technical hindrances out of their way, but that it would be taken as a signal by all engaged in the administration of criminal justice, that Parliament in future wished them to be less punctilious and less particular in matters of extradition; and that they had better in doubtful circumstances give the benefit of the doubt to the foreign catchpole, not to the foreign refugee. Of course, this apprehension, like every other we expressed, when set in the balance against the courtly assurances of diplomacy was treated as of little weight. There is a freemasonry among those practising the art and mystery of Government at home and abroad, which not only makes their intercourse more smooth and agreeable, but which involuntarily—perhaps unconsciously—indisposes them to listen to words of warning from unofficial lips. But will anyone acquainted with the incidents of the past twelve months venture to treat lightly the fears we then expressed? I will not stop to criticize the tone of Lord Monck's despatches, wherein he seeks to vindicate the course taken by him regarding Lamirande. Nor shall I seek to strain the meaning of the noble Lord's words addressed to Mr. Fane on the 9th January, iu which he clearly indicates his apprehension that unless Lamirande were restored by the French authorities Parliament would not easily be induced to renew the Act of last year. There is something much more serious and important to be adduced on this score. On the 7th of September last a Frenchman, named Dubois, was brought before one of the metropolitan magistrates (Mr. Vaughan) on a charge of forgery, committed at Villeneuve, three years before. Had the copies of the depositions against him been produced before the passing of the late Act they would not have been legal proof, and he would have gone free; for the only parôle evidence brought forward was that of a person, who stated that he knew Dubois had been tried in his absence and condemned par contumace. The question is not whether the prisoner was or was not guilty. The sole question for us to consider is, whether or not he was dealt with in such a way as to form a precedent for the surrender of other men of very different character, and accused of a very different kind of crime. Now mark—Had he been arrested six weeks earlier he could not have been detained for the reasons I have stated. Two sorts of evidence were adduced against him—the one documentary, which would not have been legal or sufficient had you not passed the Bill of last year; the other oral, which would not have been admissible; because, in the case of Frenchmen, you have not yet consented to treat men as criminals who have been tried and condemned in their absence. But, remember, you have been asked to do so by the Government of Napoleon III; and, remember, that Lord Malmesbury, when Foreign Secretary of State, actually signed a Convention in 1852 agreeing to give up Frenchmen who had been sentenced par contumace, and that it was only by the opposition of Lord Aberdeen and Lord Campbell that the sanction of Parliament was refused. Remember, further, that since then you have actually made that, concession to Denmark; and, remember finally, that only eighteen months ago the present French Ambassador in England demanded on behalf of his Court this very concession to France. Are we then mistrustful without cause? Or can we be expected to read without the criticism of suspicion every case which seems to point towards a consummation, we look upon with such loathing? Objections were made on various technical grounds to the retention of Dubois. But all of them were overruled. I do not question the legality of that decision; but I do question the course pursued by the magistrate who, when asked for time to apply for a habeas corpus, refused to suspend the writ of extradition, or to give any opportunity for appeal. If this be right in one case, who is to say that it is wrong in another? Dubois was probably a thief whom it was well to be rid of, and for whom no honest man could feel any sympathy; but if next day a refugee, obnoxious on political grounds to his Government, were impleaded before the same magistrate on an identical charge, what security would be have had against a similar rule of summary adjudication? What happened? Had Dubois been without professional aid—as many a poor exile must often be—or had he been inertly or inaptly defended—as all men sometimes are—the warrant of extradition would have been executed forthwith, and we should have heard no more of the matter; or if the magistrate had been sitting in Edinburgh, in Dublin, or in York, it might have made all the difference; but Bow Street happens to be within half-a-mile of Whitehall, and the solicitor for Dubois happened to be a man of energy and perseverance. It was late in the day when the order of the magistrate was made, and in the month of September the best of administrators are not given to linger late in the public departments. The solicitor hastened to the Home Office, Mr. Walpole was in attendance on the Queen at Balmoral; but access was obtained to the Under Secretary, who undertook that the prisoner should not be given up until Mr. Walpole had had an opportunity of fully considering the whole circumstances of the case. Upon such consideration the Secretary of State wisely and humanely decided that time should be given to sue out a writ of habeas corpus. No injustice was or could be thus done to anyone; and the Lord Chancellor, having heard the arguments in favour of the Motion for the writ, refused the application on grounds which seemed to him just. It is not necessary to question the justice of the Chaneellor's decision in point of law, or the guilt of Dubois in point of fact; but the case is important as illustrating this fact—that a foreigner may be delivered up on a charge made by foreign police without a particle of such proof of primâ facie guilt as would send an Englishman for trial; and that he is liable to be sent out of the realm without time to ask the benefit of an habeas corpus if his attorney does not win a cab race from Bow Street to Whitehall. Is this the condition in which a great principle and practice of international law ought to be suffered to remain? Suppose the case had occurred in Glasgow, Liverpool or Newcastle, and that any of the score of accidents that beset all communications by letter had interposed? It is all very well to talk of Lamirande's case as exceptional because colonial, but here is the very same contingency waiting at your very door. In every case there ought to be a time, specifically defined by statute after the decision of the magistrate, within which the accused may move the Court of Queen's Bench for an habeas corpus. To leave all to the temper or caprice of a single subordinate official, acting irresponsibly, is a thing without precedent or parallel in our law, without sense or decency in point of policy. And now it will be asked, "What do we propose?" Would the refusal of Parliament to renew the Act of last Session satisfy us or close the question you have opened? Not so. When we debated the subject last year our talk was of techni-nalities; but you have driven us to reconsider principles; and to-day I trust that our discussion will not be limited to forms of procedure in a police court, but will embrace the consideration of a national policy. At all times there has been a conflict of authorities as to which way the presumption should be held to lie regarding the rendition of fugitives. In the Civil Law—that crystalization of overruling authority—no place was too remote for recapture, no integrity or purity of thought furnished any excuse why an individual ought not to be surrendered who had incurred the suspicion or the enmity of power. The dominion of Rome rested on the theory of resistless domination; and when that Power was at its zenith, international liberty lay in stirless sleep; but on the break-up of the hard frost of Cæsarism, every country that aspired to be free, in one shape or other, resumed the inherent right to give shelter to fugitives. It is, indeed, an essential part and parcel of international freedom. England, France, Switzerland, the commonwealths of Italy, the Hanse Towns, the German Principalities, the Swedes and the Dutch, nil asserted, early and earnestly, the right of asylum. But I think history makes this clear that, just in proportion as the element of personal or imperious will prevailed in Government, the evil disposition showed itself again and again to over-reach and overbear, in this matter, the justice and self-respect of neighbours who were weak enough to be bullied, or frail enough to be cajoled. I will venture to say this, after carefully investigating the subject, that hardly an instance can be pointed out of a State, where the Executive became practically irresponsible to the opinion of its subjects, in which we do not find this claim of extradition exaggerated, and put much higher than before; and, on the other hand, I think it can be clearly shown that, in proportion as communities worked out their domestic freedom, and came to be constitutionally governed, they not only dissuaded their rulers from straining this pretension, but steadily resisted the attempt to exercise it on the part of foreign Powers. It is remarked by Mr. Froude, in his last volume of the History of England, that nothing so emboldened the enemies of the Regent Murray as his fatal compliance with the demands of Elizabeth to surrender the Northern Earls, who had risen in rebellion against her, and fled across the Border. On other points Scottish factions differed; but all united in a sense of shame at the truckling of their Executive to a Foreign Sovereign; and, but for this, the historian thinks that Murray might not have fallen. In the growth of law and liberty under the Stuarts, international right was comparatively little thought of; but the greatest English jurist of his time saw clearly, and laid down plainly, the truth of extradition—

"It hath over been holden," says Coke, "that in separate kingdoms the subject of one fleeing to another for safety ought not to be delivered up."

One of the first, and one of the worst, excesses of Royalist reaction at the Restoration was the instructions sent by Clarendon to Sir George Downing, our Envoy in Holland, to obtain the surrender of Colonel Okey, Barkstead, and Corbet, who had sat on the trial of the King. Mr. Pepys, in his Diary, calls Sir George Downing "a perfidious rogue;" and William Penn marvelled how the man, who had been originally a chaplain in Okey's regiment, could lend himself to such a service. Downing persuaded Do Witt to let him seize the unsuspecting English refugees at Delph. They were sent home in an English frigate, and executed at Tyburn. It is a memorable fact that, ere many years elapsed, the great and good statesman, who had suffered himself to be thus betrayed into an act unworthy of his country in the vain hope of conciliating the despotic Stuart, should have fallen at the hand of assassins pensioned by one of that family. Some strong things have since then been done by English Administrations; but, upon the whole, since the Revolution, the gradual course of our dealings with foreign States has been more lenient, more liberal, and more enlightened. During that dark season, when we went to war with France to humour George III, and to stem the tide of democracy, a shameful act of violence and wrong was perpetrated in England's dishonoured name. Parliamentary Reform and religious liberty were denied at home, and the right of public meeting was suspended. Ireland, goaded to madness, broke forth in rebellion; and, when the revolt was crushed with inhuman slaughter, three of the survivors escaped to Hamburgh, and there, in a free and neutral city, believed themselves secure. Our Resident, Sir James Crawford, was instructed to demand that they should be delivered up, and the magistrates yielded so far as to give him a party of police, who in the night surrounded the inn where the exiles slept, and in the morning conducted them to gaol. The English Minister claimed his prey; the Senate, warned by the French Envoy, hesitated long. By every principle of honour, humanity, and law, they were deterred from making the surrender—by all their sense of weakness and dependence for commercial life on the safety of their ships at sea they were tempted to yield. They stood out manfully against the threats of Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt for eleven months, and they only then succumbed because the Czar Paul of Russia had, by our Government, been persuaded to lay an embargo on their vessels in his ports. Their city would be ruined if they persevered, and General Tandy with his companions were given up. Lord Cornwallis, a wise and just man, then Viceroy of Ireland, wrote confidentially to dissuade the Government from a proceeding which he foresaw could only entail reproach and humiliation; but his opinion being disregarded, he was obliged to order the fugitives for trial. Tandy was indicted for treason, condemned, and left for execution. Lord Cornwallis wrote to the Duke of Portland the reasons why he had respited him; but when his successor, Lord Hardwicke, commuted the sentence to transportation for life, Tandy refused. Napoleon had, upon his surrender, written to the Senate at Hamburg a letter full of scathing reproach—

"It was not by cowardice and truckling that small States were preserved, but by courage and virtue. You have violated the laws of hospitality as the hordes of the desert would not have done; and if the blood of those brave men be shed on the scaffold it will do their captors more harm than a legion of armed men."

These were not idle protestations. While Tandy lay in Lifford gaol the negotiations for peace drew near a close at Amiens. Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph on no account to sign the preliminaries until General Tandy was restored to France; and after having waded knee-deep in violence and illegality our Government thought it prudent not only to liberate the condemned traitor, but to place him on board a neutral ship by which he was conveyed to France. It is noted in a valuable work by my hon. Friend the Member for Elgin (Mr. Grant Duff) how M. Tourguéneff, the friend of Stein, and author of one of the first enlightened books on the social and political condition of Russia, was travelling abroad when, in 1825, an unsuccessful attempt at revolution broke out. The evil eye of autocratic suspicion fell upon him, and he was summoned peremptorily to return to his own land. He understood too well what the mandate meant and sat him down for shelter on the hearth of England. His extradition was demanded by the Russian Ambassador and was met by Mr. Canning with a scornful stare. Had he been surrendered he would have been sent to Siberia, if not to the scaffold. The admonitory shade of Canning's statue no longer falls upon our path as we approach this House; but although bad taste has put back his effigy I hope his noble-hearted policy in foreign affairs will not be cast into oblivion. When Hungary was crushed in 1849 for asserting principles which within the last few months have been recognized by the Emperor of Austria, Kossuth and his companions claimed the protection of the Porte as political refugees. Both Russia and Austria insisted on their being delivered up, and when Lord Stratford advised the Sultan to resist, the pretext was resorted to of charging Kossuth with fraud and larceny of the Crown jewels. We all know now that the charge was utterly false. But if you hold the doctrine that a Government ought to give up every fugitive against whom a charge of ordinary crime is made, leaving him then to the mercy of his political enemies, you must be of opinion that the Porte had no right to refuse the surrender, and that we ought not to have counselled the refusal. But Lord Palmerston did not think so, for he wrote a despatch on the 6th of October, 1849, to our Ministers at the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg, in which he said—

"If there is one rule more than another that has been observed in modern times by independent States, both great and small, of the civilized world, it is the rule not to deliver up political refugees. The law of hospitality, the dictates of humanity, the general feelings of mankind forbid such surrenders; and any independent Government which, by its own free will was to make any such surrender would be universally and deservedly stigmatized as dishonoured — unless a State is bound to extradition by the positive obligations of a Treaty; but such treaty engagements are few, if indeed any such exist."

That they do exist is unfortunately too certain. The network of treaties between despotic States is gradually spreading more and more. If we allow our policy to remain undefined much longer, it will be taken for granted that England too means to be a subscriber and shareholder in the system of joint-stock police which all absolute governments favour. But there would be no mutuality in the obligation, for we have long since repudiated all thought of following political offenders beyond sea, while with despotisms it is the primary object. In 1830, the Neapolitan Government demanded from France the surrender of M. Pita Terra, a political refugee domiciled at Ajaccio, on a fictitious charge of murder; and he was surrendered on a warrant signed by Duc Pasquier. After the Revolution of July representations were made to the new Government that a fraud had been practised, and the Minister, then Garde des Sceaux, defended himself, on the ground that he could not believe it possible that false representations had been made for the purposes of extradition; but the Liberal party pressed the case so strongly that Casimir Perrier insisted upon restitution of the prisoner, and had him brought back to Corsica; but the French Government itself since the restoration of the Empire has not disdained to press that of Switzerland, with whom it has a stringent treaty of extradition to compel obnoxious politicians to quit their confines. The same course has been pursued towards Belgium; and they insisted upon Victor Hugo quitting the country and taking refuge in the Channel Islands. How-long he will be safe there no man in this House can tell, if you leave your law and practice in its present state. There is nothing to prevent a charge of forgery or attempt to commit homicide being trumped up against him, and nothing to prevent a magistrate, on mere documentary proof—the unreality of which the wretches who are sent to produce it may not even know—from being given up as Lamirande was and tried for a totally different offence, or what is more probable, and more formidable, kept in durance without trial. You may say there is time for habeas corpus, and time for the suspension veto of the Secretary of State; but I have shown you both in the case of Lamirande and that of Dubois, how frail is that reliance. I say there ought to be a fixed and known law of England—a real English law, not a French Act of Parliament like that we are asked to-day to renew, which would prevent any man, under any circumstances, or on any pretence, being taken out of the realm within the space of three months after the magistrate's warrant of extradition had been signed. I say further that when brought before the Queen's Bench on habeas corpus it should be the prisoner's right to call upon that high tribunal to try the bonâ fide of the whole proceeding, and specially to inquire, if the prisoner desire it, whether he has ever made himself obnoxious to the Government that claims him by acts of a political nature. I did not believe last year, and I do not believe now, that it is in the power of Parliament to say beforehand what are political and what are not political crimes. I frankly own that there are offences against the person of the Sovereign or chief magistrate, or against those holding public offices in the State, which, though their motive be political, plainly fall within the category of murder. The acts of Booth and of Orsini were such crimes; but does anyone believe that the Court of Queen's Bench would have refused to confirm warrants for their extradition? On the other hand, I do not believe that that upright and learned tribunal would have given up Kossuth, or Victor Hugo, or Prince Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, late of King Street, St. James's; but now of the Tuileries, Paris. I do not care to raise again the subordinate question as to the precise scope and mischief of this Bill. Ministers feel it to be insufficient and unsatisfactory, and they only ask its renewal therefore for another year. I had hoped that the whole subject might have been brought under the consideration of Parliament this Session with a view to the adoption of some more easily intelligible, more permanent, more comprehensive, and, I will add, more worthy, enactment. Our time and attention have been so absorbed by topics more pressing that I felt it to be my duty to abstain from bringing forward the Motion of which I had given Notice on an earlier day; but I trust that the noble Lord will meet the forbearance we have shown by entering frankly into a disclosure of his policy, if he has one regarding extradition; and, if not, that he will at least give us a specific assurance that early next Session the whole subject will be submitted to a Royal Commission or to a Select Committee of this House; for certain I am that our inconsistent and anomalous treaties cannot be left as they are with safety to the honour, the dignity, or the peace of the nation.

said, it was true, as stated by his hon. Friend, that the Treaty with France was prepared by the Government of which he was a Member. But his own opinion had always been opposed to that treaty, and he believed it to be wrong on two distinct points. In the first place, he objected to it because it was an exceptional treaty made with a single Power; and next, because it afforded facilities for demanding offenders ostensibly on account of criminal acts, but really on account of political offences. He did not mean to say that France would be guilty of demanding prisoners for political offences, but there could be no doubt that the treaty conferred the power. A person of the highest authority, a native of France, told him at the time that Treaty was passed that under it he might at any time be delivered up to the authorities for the time being in that country. It was most dangerous for such a power to be given to any State. Nothing could be more objectionable than the way in which extradition treaties were concluded. The last treaties with America, France, and Denmark, were all founded on different principles three or four years ago. He had the honour of proposing an extradition treaty with Prussia, but his hon. Friend the Member for Brighton opposed that treaty, and it was withdrawn. He did not say that his hon. Friend was wrong, but that Treaty had in its favour precedent. It was word for word the same treaty which had been agreed to in the case of Denmark; and there seemed to be no reason why a treaty sanctioned in the case of one Power should be refused in the case of another. The great error lay in the fact that all these treaties were matters of negotiation and barter between the two countries. Each side gave up something, and when the treaty was ultimately agreed upon it was submitted to Parliament, which might either accept or reject it. That was a false position for the Government to be placed in. A treaty solemnly negotiated should be conclusive. We had no interest in detaining foreign criminals in this country, or in keeping up a system under which our own criminals in other countries were enabled to escape. We ought not to allow this question to remain one of bargain and sale. We ought to lay down for ourselves the principle upon which we were prepared to give up persons accused of crime to the State to which they belonged, without reference to any concessions we might obtain from them in return. His hon. Friend had fallen into error when he said that in the case of one of our treaties we were bound to give up a man who had previously been tried and condemned in his absence. That was not so. We gave up a man to be tried, and if guilty, to be condemned in the Courts of his own country, on certain evidence which was considered sufficient to warrant his extradition having first been adduced before tribunals properly constitated. It must be remembered that the laws of foreign countries were in many respects diametrically opposed to our own. Here we assumed a man to be innocent till he was found guilty. In France, anyone accused was treated as guilty till he was discovered to be innocent. What made the question still more difficult was that the evidence was taken without the knowledge of the person accused, and with closed doors. Copies of the evidence so taken were not even given to the State called upon to deliver the person that was claimed. This country accordingly was placed in a very awkward position; for it was called upon to do that which was in direct violation of English law. When the question was under discussion last year at the Foreign Office, he felt that the right course would be to appoint a Committee chosen from Gentlemen on both sides of the House, men of the highest diplomatic and legal experience, who should investigate the question thoroughly, and decide for what crimes, and upon what evidence, persons, claimed by foreign Governments, should be given up. When once these conditions had been laid down, any Power seeking for an Extradition Treaty with us should be apprised that such and such terms only would be granted, and would not be departed from. When these terms were acceded to, the treaty should be made by the Executive, and no reference to Parliament should be necessary. In the case of certain foreign countries the power of the Crown sufficed for the regulation of certain particular purposes. In the cases of China and Turkey, the Crown was empowered by Order in Council to pass certain laws concerning British subjects, and a similar mode of proceeding might usefully be adopted in this case. This question, he thought, ought hardly to have been raised upon a mere Continuance Bill. It was not the fault, probably, of the noble Lord, but last year a pledge was given that opportunity should be afforded for a full discussion of the question. That pledge ought to be redeemed. The noble Lord, in renewing this Treaty, should only do so for a period of one year that the question might be fully discussed next Session.

said, he wished it to be understood that the views of the hon. Member (Mr. Torrens) did not meet with general assent on that (the Opposition) side of the House. If any importance should be attached to his speech out of doors—and he did not suppose there would be much—he should say that a more mischievous one had never been made in Par- liament. The principles it contained would, if accepted, place us outside the pale of civilized nations. They would so far place us outside the pale of civilized nations that they would render it impossible for us to maintain with them such relations as would enable us to demand the surrender of criminals that had fled from our shores. He entirely agreed with his hon. Friend (Mr. Layard) that it was not desirable to make this matter the subject of reciprocal treaties with other Powers, and that it would be far better to lay down the general rules on which this country would act, whatever foreign countries might do. At the same time it would be very difficult to pass such an Act of Parliament, because it would involve the definition of crimes punishable by the laws of other nations. Therefore, it was impossible to frame any Act on this subject dealing with foreign nations without consultation with those nations. He repudiated the principle that we ought to try foreign criminals by the rules of foreign law, and also the assertion that the principle of the French procedure was to assume that every person accused was guilty until his innocence was proved. If they looked merely to the principles of justice, the foreign procedure was not inferior to our own, and we had no right to give the law to foreign nations, though, no doubt, justice was administered in this country in a spirit of independence and purity unknown in other countries. All a foreign country was bound to show, or we to show to a foreign country, when demanding the extradition of a subject, was a primâ facie case such as that which was laid before a grand jury to justify the trial of a prisoner. Nor was there any injustice in the person whose extradition was demanded not being heard in his defence more than there was in the case of an accusation before a grand jury. Though, as compared with our proceedings, a spirit of unfairness towards the accused characterized the action of foreign tribunals, the principles of their jurisprudence were equitable, and they were entitled to repudiate any pretensions on our part to set ourselves up as authorities. We had no right to impose upon foreign nations our rules of procedure, or to say that they ought not to bring a man to justice unless viva voce evidence had been taken against him. The real thing, and the only thing, that required to be guarded against was lest civil crimes should be made the pretext for demanding the surrender of political offenders. We must trust to the honour of foreign nations that this was not done. If not, if they were to refuse to conclude extradition treaties because they felt suspicious that they would be converted to wrong purposes by other nations, it would follow that other nations would say, "If you treat us in this manner, as if we were rogues and liars, and not to be trusted, let us cease at once all diplomatic relations, withdraw your ambassadors, and have only commercial agents." He agreed, with the hon. Member (Mr. Torrens) that a greater space of time should be allowed to a man to obtain relief by habeas corpus, and that it should not be left entirely in the hands of the police magistrate. Without extradition treaties the ordinary ends of justice would constantly be defeated. A man might commit a murder, a cashier might rob the tills of his bank, and, within a few hours, and before discovery was in any way possible, he might laugh at those whom he had wronged, secure in the asylum of the French soil. Unless, then, we dealt with foreign nations in such a manner as to have mutual extradition in proper cases, the most inconvenient restrictions might be placed in the way of our obtaining possesion of the persons of criminals who had fled to other countries. He hoped that the noble Lord, in considering the subject would give due weight to that consideration.

said, that it was with great reluctance that he ventured to criticize the action, or even the inaction, of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, as he felt much admiration for his policy generally. With respect to this particular subject, however, he certainly thought that the noble Lord had not done all that might have been expected of him. He (Sir Francis Goldsmid), in the course of the debate on this subject last Session, proposed an Amendment to the effect that political offenders should be exempt from the operation of the Extradition Treaty; and the debate ended in the limitation of the Treaty to one year, the noble Lord stating that in the course of next Session the House would have an opportunity of carefully and deliberately considering the question. It might be said that the Reform Bill had stood in the way; but if this was true so far as regarded the House, it was not true with reference to the Foreign Secretary, who for some months past had not taken any such part in the debates on Reform as would have precluded him from devoting his powerful mind to the subject of extra- dition. The noble Lord during the discussion of last year said—

"International courtesy demanded that the Treaty should not be materially altered without communication with the other party to it."—[3 Hansard, clxxxiv. 2114.]

So also Lord Derby said in "another place" a few days afterwards—

"Moreover, during the year an opportunity would be afforded of communicating with the Government of France, and arranging the terms of the renewal of the former Treaty, or of any new treaty which might be thought expedient."—[3 Hansard, clxxxiv. 2154.]

Surely statements such as these justified the expectation that Ministers would seek an opportunity of communicating with the French Government and arranging a new treaty. But no such communication had taken place, and the House was now informed that the matter was in precisely the same position as it then stood. Before the debate of last year the general belief was that none of the extradition treaties applied to political offences; and when it appeared that this was an error, he (Sir Francis Goldsmid) had brought forward his Amendment limiting the operation of the treaties to non-political offences. This proposal was deemed too wide, and the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) pointed out that if it should happen that any one should shoot him in the Lobby and get away to France, the criminal would be secure of a refuge because the crime would be considered a political offence. Notwithstanding the persistent opposition of the hon. Member to the privileges of the City of London, he (Sir Francis Goldsmid) did not think it very likely that an indignant Lord Mayor or infuriated Common Councilman would come down to the House and shoot the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets. It was, however, true that if the treaties exempted all political offenders, the exemption would apply to those who had committed, or attempted to commit, political assassination, and that such persons as Orsini and Booth might thus be able to claim the benefit of the exception. Now, almost all were agreed that political assassins should not, and that other political offenders should, be entitled to protection. He (Sir Francis Goldsmid) was, however, afraid that the treaties as they were at present framed were not subject to any such limitation, and that a person engaged in civil conflict against any Power with whom we had such a treaty would, if he took refuge in England, have to be rendered up by us if any blood had been shed in the course of the contest. The attempt which had been made to show that the word assassinat in the French Code only applied to cases of assassination, altogether failed, and he believed that it also applied to deaths resulting from civil disturbances arising out of political agitations. The 297th Article of the French Penal Code showed that meurtre is synonymous with culpable homicide, and that assassinat is equivalent, not to assassination, but to murder; the premeditation required not being premeditated malice against a particular individual, but only an intention to fight anyone who opposes you. In the same way in England, killing anyone when the killer is intentionally doing an unlawful act, though without malice against the person killed, is murder. So also, the remark of the hon. and learned Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer), that taking life in a civil conflict in France is not murder, because resistance to the existing authority in France is not a crime in England, ignores the circumstance that under the extradition treaties the magistrate is to consider whether the act done would have been murder or attempt to murder if it had been done in this country, and that if the resistance had been made in this country, it would have been resistance to the Queen's soldiers or police. There was really, therefore, no reason to doubt that, under the existing Acts, we might be called on to deliver up anyone who had fought in a rebellion against the greatest tyranny. Then, again, it was said that the language of the Act was merely permissive, and that the Secretary of State might deliver up an accused person if he thought right. But the language of the treaty was obligatory, and if a proper case were made out the Secretary of State would be bound to give up the offender. If such a case occurred with reference to an individual who had only taken part in a civil conflict, a great shock would be caused to public opinion in England, and the right of asylum, as it had been hitherto considered, would be materially invaded. He trusted that, at all events, the noble Lord would not extend the Act further than one year, so that the subject might be duly considered next Session.

said, he did not think that the hon. Member for Finsbury should have made any allusion to national subserviency. It was not necessary to give a lesson upon that subject to the House of Com- mons, as he believed no body was less inclined to give way to national subserviency than that House. The hon. Gentleman should have said that it was for the benefit of society all over the world that malefactors should get the punishment they deserved. Lamirande was cashier in one of the branches of the Bank of France; and was in the habit of extracting coin from the vaults and safes of the bank, making false entries, and falsifying the books. At last, on an occasion when it became necessary to send a large quantity of specie away, Lamirande disappeared, taking with him 700,000f. Everyone who knew the great importance of preserving the integrity of those engaged in banking operations must be aware that the crime of Lamirande was as atrocious as any crime except that of murder. He was, however, arrested in New York under a French warrant, and, having employed counsel, he escaped to Canada, and the counsel did what he trusted no English counsel would do for his client, stole the warrant. Evidence of his identity however was produced before the magistrate in Canada and he was handed over to the French police and sent to England. In the interval, however, a writ of habeas corpus was issued by Chief Justice Drummond, and immediately that the Governor General heard of that he telegraphed to the Colonial Office stating the facts of the case. So that every precaution had been taken in the case by the colonial authorities, and if any injustice was done to Lamirande, it happened in England. It was very much more important for society that murderers, robbers, and those who embezzled monies, should, under an extradition treaty, receive their punishment than that some few persons suspected as political offenders should unfortunately be given up on the pretence of their being criminals.

said, that the argument of his hon. Friend (Mr. Watkin) carried out to its logical conclusion would carry him much farther than to giving up mere criminals; it would induce the House to connive at the most tyrannical exercise of power on the part of a Government. It was very important, no doubt, that malefactors should be given up, and that peaceably disposed persons should be able to walk about in security; but he did not think that anybody in that House would be found to agree in such an argument as that made use of by the hon. Member for Stockport, which was an argument that had always been made use of in defence of tyranny. If they restrained tyranny, if they restricted the abuse of power, if they did anything which had a tendency to weaken the hands of those who conducted the administration of the country, it did not follow that they were disposed to throw aside all the advantages which society derived from the existence of law and government. That argument, therefore, might be put out of the question. No doubt it was very important that malefactors should not be able to fly from one country to another. Other countries as well as this felt the importance of delivering up ordinary malefactors. But every country did not think it right to surrender persons who were only charged as criminals, because they were deemed to be political offenders; and to make such a concession would stamp any free country with disgrace. Was the House prepared to entertain the doctrine that we ought to have such unbounded confidence in every Government with which we had diplomatic relations that we ought to rely upon the honour of that Government that it would not demand the extradition of political offenders, instead of taking proper precautions against the abuse of the treaty by foreign Governments? The hon. Member had referred to the circumstances of the Lamirande case. Everyone was aware that the extradition of that person had been obtained by a fraudulent proceeding, but at the same time everyone was aware that Lamirande was a scoundrel, and probably the consciousness of that fact went far to prevent any prolonged discussion upon the subject of the treaty, such as would have taken place had it been the case of the extradition of a political offender. The hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Layard) had alluded to the difference between the French and English procedure in criminal cases, stating that here we always presumed a man to be innocent till he was proved guilty, whereas in France a man was presumed to be guilty till he had proved himself to be innocent. No doubt this did not necessarily imply a failure of justice in foreign countries; because the tribunals were bound to act precisely on the same abstract principles of truth and justice as were presumed to be acted upon by our Courts of Justice. It was true, however, that in this country the tri- bunals considered themselves simply bound to hear the case, and if justice was defeated the fault was with the parties, the Judge being impartial; while abroad—in France for instance—the Judge acted to a certain extent as an officer of police as well as of justice; he thought it his business to hold an inquisition—not, of course, of the nature of the Spanish Inquisition—into the case, and felt bound to discover by whom the offence had been committed. He was as little disposed as any Member of the House to flatter his countrymen at the expense of other nations; but in this respect the feelings and opinions of our Courts were much better than those of most foreign countries, and in his opinion we ought not to give up any portion of the advantage which we derived from that difference. With their feelings in this respect, it was exceedingly natural that the French tribunals, and still more the subordinates of the French tribunals, should take very much the same view as the hon. Member for Stockport, and should think that everything was fair by means of which a person accused of a crime could be brought before a tribunal. This it was that was so strikingly illustrated by the case of Lamirande, which placed in a very strong light indeed the impolicy and injustice of that confidence which his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford was willing to place in the Governments and officers of foreign countries. It showed that it would not do for us to abandon the right that we had always exercised, of examining, before we delivered up an alleged criminal, whether there was such evidence as appeared to our tribunals to be sufficient to justify his being placed upon his trial. When, last year, the noble Lord (Lord Stanley), yielding to their arguments and not to their numbers, consented to limit the duration of this measure till the 1st of September, the general expectation was that the interval would be employed in placing the matter upon a more satisfactory footing, either by means of negotiation, or, as he (Mr. Mill) should prefer, by laying down some principle which should apply to all extradition treaties. They left the matter willingly in the hands of the noble Lord. He hoped that the noble Lord would be able to say that something of the sort had been done. Unless the noble Lord could make out some very strong case as to the extreme difficulty of dealing with this subject, he did not see how he could ask for a longer prolongation of the statute than that which was granted last year. The demand indeed reminded him of the story of Hiero and Simonides. Hiero asked Simondes to define the Godhead. Simonides asked for a day; at the expiration of that time he asked for two, and at the expiration of the two he asked for four, explaining that the more he considered the subject the more difficult he found it. The Government first asked them for a year and now, having had it, for what amounted to two years. An hon. and learned Friend of his, who was not in his place, contemplated proposing that, instead of prolonging the Act until the end of the Session of 1869, the endurance of the measure should be limited till the 15th July next, in order that the question might be thoroughly discussed in a full House. If the noble Lord was not prepared to assent to that Amendment he hoped that the noble Lord, when he rose to reply, would be able to assure the House that the time that had elapsed had been usefully employed, and that some plan had been drawn up, or that negotiations had been entered into with foreign Governments that would lead to a satisfactory result being arrived at with reference to this important question.

In answer to the appeal which has been made to me by the hon. Member for Westminster and by the hon. Baronet who preceded him, I have to state that it never was my intention to ask the House to continue this Bill for more than one year. Both the hon. Member for Westminster and the hon. Baronet appear to imagine that during the discussion upon this matter last year I undertook that some general inquiry should be made into the whole subject of extradition. Upon that point, however, the hon. Members are labouring under a misapprehension; for all I then said was, that I thought it desirable inquiry should be made into the question, and that if some hon. Gentleman were to move for the appointment of a Committee to conduct such an investigation, I should offer no opposition to such a Motion. It is not my fault that the attention of the House has been occupied by matters of a different character, and that, therefore, no one has thought fit to move for the appointment of a Committee for that purpose. The fact is, that no one has even mentioned the subject. On consideration of the whole matter, I agree with the hon. Member for Southwark, that to appoint a Committee to investigate the whole matter would be the most satisfactory mode of proceeding. It may be asked, "Why delay the settlement of the question by going to the trouble of investigating the subject, when you have only to enter into negotiations with foreign countries?" The reply to such a question is that it would add enormously to our labour, without producing any adequate result, were we to enter into negotiations with each foreign Power separately; whereas if we can once lay down some general principle with regard to the subject of extradition, it will be but a small matter to apply that principle to all extradition treaties we may enter into with foreign countries. At the same time, I must say that, although the adoption of such a uniform system is much to be desired, I think that if the hon. Member for Westminster were to serve upon this Committee next year he would find the story to which he has referred even more applicable than he supposes, because the more the matter is looked into in detail the greater the difficulties become. Let me revert for a moment to the speech of the hon. Member for Finsbury, who, no doubt, has studied and understands the subject, though I was certainly rather surprised at some part of his argument—that is, if I am to regard it as an argument bearing upon the Bill under consideration. The hon. Gentleman said that we were going to give up men without inquiring into the offences which they were alleged to have committed. Let me remind the House that the Act, the continuance of which is now under discussion, merely provides that copies of certain legal documents duly authenticated shall be admitted as proofs in English Courts without the Judge who signed them being called upon personally to prove them before some witness to be afterwards brought over to this country to verify the signature. The case of Lamirande was an unsatisfactory transaction, but it has no more to do with the Bill, the continuance of which I am now proposing, than with the Reform Bill. There is no doubt that Lamirande was unduly captured, that there was over zeal on the part of the French police, and laxity or mistake on the part of the colonial authorities. If that mistake had not been made, Lamirande would not have been captured and sentenced; but the difficulty which we felt and which prevented us from demanding his release as a matter of right was, that the error had been committed by our own authorities; and that, therefore, we and not the French Government were responsible for what had taken place; but supposing the Bill had not existed, the case of Lamirande would have stood upon precisely the same footing. The only difference would have been that, in order to obtain his arrest, instead of merely producing certain documents, the French police would have been compelled to take to Canada witnesses who would have proved the authenticity. That might have increased the expense but would not have added to the proof, nor prevented the arrest. The hon. Member said that the French police abused the Act of Extradition by putting it to a use which was never intended, and arrested Lamirande for an offence which he had not committed. That is a question as to the construction of a French law term; but, admitting that they strained the law for their own purposes, there is nothing in this Bill which bears upon that subject. It was as much open to the French police to do that under the Act of 1843 as under the amended Act of last year. The hon. Gentleman suggested a case in which some foreign Government might bring a pretended charge against a prisoner in order to get him into their power, and then proceed against him upon another charge and sentence him for an offence to which the extradition treaty did not apply. My answer to that is, that if anything of the kind were attempted, which seems to me very improbable indeed, it would be for us to demand back the man, and to insist that he should only be tried and punished for the crime for which the extradition was granted. I hold that that would be the proper course to take. Apart from going to war, or breaking off diplomatic relations, we should in such a case have a complete remedy, because if a treaty was abused in that way by any Power, it would immediately be allowed to drop, and the right of extradition, as far as that country was concerned, would cease. I shall not enter into a great many of the arguments which I have heard this afternoon, because they seem to have been chiefly directed, not against the Bill which we are now discussing, but against the whole principle, or rather practice, of extradition. No doubt, that is a fair subject for discussion, and I do not find fault with anyone for saying that the principle of extradition is a bad principle; but that will raise the whole question as to the policy of the Act of 1843; and I think I am justified in assuming that, unless this House expresses in some decided way a contrary opinion, the country is not prepared to depart from that principle which was adopted after the fullest consideration, which has been in force for twenty-five years, and with reference to which very few and slight cases of abuse had ever been alleged. With regard to the manner in which that principle is to be applied, I think that is a very fair subject for an inquiry; and, if a Committee is moved for to investigate the subject next year, I shall not then object—as I should not this year have objected — to its appointment.

said, he must express his surprise at the extreme jealousy shown in that House with regard to the principle of extradition, which, in his opinion, was an essential part of civilization, and a benefit to human society generally. Hugo Grotius, the greatest of all writers on International Law, laid down the maxim that it was disgraceful for a country to give an asylum to criminals. The arguments adduced against the principle of extradition appeared to be based on a notion that it might lead to the extradition and punishment of political offenders. He admitted that Grotius also asserted what was termed the right of asylum, stating that it was sacred, and he (Sir George Bowyer) would never deny the right of an asylum to those who, in the course of political events, were compelled to leave their own country and seek refuge in another. At the same time he was of opinion that the right of an asylum should be confined to strictly political offences. A political offence might be defined as that which was an offence against the Government of a particular country; but not an act condemed as criminal by the laws of other countries, and by the opinion of civilized men. In the course of the debate on this question last year, it was stated that although persons might be guilty of murder or assassination—which was a peculiar species of murder—yet they ought not to be delivered up if the offence were of a political character. He denied, however, that murder or assassination, or attempts, or conspiracies to murder or assassinate could be properly termed political offences, because they were regarded as offences according to the laws of all countries, whether civilized or uncivilized. The taking, or attempting to take life, was condemned by the laws, not only of all civilized, but also of partially civilized countries. It was an offence against natural law. Therefore any person who had for a political motive taken the life, or conspired, or attempted to take the life of another ought to be given up to justice in the same manner as if he had committed the offence for the sake of gain, or from any other motive. These were the doctrines of jurists, and the principles which would stand the test of public discussion. If they once removed this political element there was no difficulty in the matter of extradition. The offences ought to be clearly defined as well as the evidence on which the magistrates might safely act in delivering up the criminal. The Bill now under discussion related merely to a question of evidence, and did not touch the principle on which extradition rested, but he had taken this opportunity to state to the House what in his opinion were sound principles in regard to the general subject.

said, that the turn the discussion had taken made it clear that the whole question of extradition would have to be considered during the next Session of Parliament, as there was nothing in the four corners of the Treaty in question which warranted the discussion. With reference to the inquiry that was likely to take place as to the principles upon which extradition treaties should be based, every one must admit the importance of considering the means by which the laws of foreign countries as well as of our own were administered. It would be very inconvenient if "a hard and fast line" were drawn by those making the inquiry, to which foreign countries were unable or did not choose to assent. The hon. Member for Reading (Sir Francis Goldsmid), and the hon. Member for Westminster (Mr. Stuart Mill), had unfairly blamed the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) for not having attended to this matter earlier. They should have remembered that he had been engaged in the difficult task of preventing people cutting one another's throats. In that he had been successful, and was more beneficially employed than in attending to the matter under discussion. As it was the general wish of the House that an inquiry should be made he supposed it would be well to have it; but he believed the end of such inquiries would be the abolition of extradition treaties altogether. After all, the results from them were not large, and it did not very much matter whether the per- sons of questionable character exchanged remained on one side of the water or the other.

said, he wished to correct a misapprehension as to the way in which this discussion had arisen. Very early in the Session, seeing the difficulties in which private Members were placed by the pressure of public business, he communicated with the noble Lord opposite, stating that Members on that (the Opposition) side were willing to wait until a Bill came before the House, on the understanding that the general question should then be discussed, either on the second reading or on going into Committee.

said, he thought that the mistake had arisen from its having been understood that the noble Lord would bring forward the question.

said, he had never intended to say that the noble Lord had broken any pledge. If the noble Lord had given any pledge, donbtless he would have kept it. He had only said that there had been an expectation and a hope in the House that the question would be discussed.

said, what he stated was that if the matter could be inquired into by a Committee, the Government would offer no objection to such a course.

said, that most of the Acts relating to the cattle plague would terminate at the end of the present month, and it was, therefore, necessary to pass a Continuance Act with those Amendments, which experience has shown to be necessary. The object of the present Bill was to relax, as far as possible, the restrictions now imposed on the movement of cattle within Great Britain. At present, if the local authorities were lax, the cattle plague might again spread over the country. To prevent that it was necessary to impose general restrictions on the movement of cattle in the place of local restrictions. The restrictions under the Bill would however be local and self-acting, so that a general freedom would then be granted. All restrictions were a burden and tended to raise prices. They should therefore be as partial as possible. But, under the altered circumstances of the country, they must be permanent. The demand for meat had steadily increased for the last twenty years in consequence of the improved condition of the labouring classes. Yet the supply in Great Britain had reached its limit. The various agricultural improvements which had been introduced had tended to diminish the amount of grass land in the country. Even the grass lands which were maintained were not so much devoted to the grazing of cattle as they were formerly. There were better returns from sheep; sheep were ready for the market in one-third the time, and there was always a regular demand for wool. This led to a great increase in the breeding of sheep in preference to cattle. It was now absolutely necessary, therefore, that cattle should be imported from abroad. Before 1842 the importation of cattle was absolutely prohibited. The prohibition was then removed and a heavy duty imposed. This restrictive duty was taken off by Sir Robert Peel in 1846. It was argued at the time that this measure of freedom would prove entirely nugatory and without any result. The wealth and wants of the country however augmented, with the growth of our trade and manufactures. The price of meat rose; and it became worth while to import it from greater distances. Every year the cattle trade increased. And in the year 1865 we drew our meat supplies from Spain and Portugal, from France, Belgium, and Holland, from Sweden, Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, the Baltic, Poland, Galicia, Hungary, and Styria. In 1843, 1,114 head of cattle were imported; in 1844, 3,682 head of cattle; in 1845, 9,734; in 1846, 17,191; in 1847, 27,831; in 1857, 53,277; in 1865, 188,326. Into London alone the importation of cattle, sheep, pigs, &c., had vastly increased. In the week ending May 6, 1858, 1,840 head of cattle, sheep, pigs, &c., were imported into the metropolis; in the corresponding week of 1866, 8,572; in the same week of 1867, 12,099. On one side therefore we had a great and increasing demand; and on the other, a daily more easy supply. But these very facilities and the rapidity of railway transit rendered us for ever liable to the introduction of the cattle plague. How was this danger met in other countries? In France, prompt vigour, Imperial decrees, and military cordons, were sufficient to shut out the cattle plague. Holland was too trading to be vigorous; they feared to keep out the ugly customer, and were not free from it to that day. In this country the first impulse was a fear, on the part of the Liberal Government, to interfere with trade. But at last they found out that isolation and stamping out were the only effective resources. This was attended with marked success. Just before the restrictions were imposed with the intention of stamping out the cattle plague, the number of attacks in one week in Cheshire amounted to 4,378, and in Yorkshire to 2,028 cases. The Act passed on the 20th of February. In the week ending the 3rd of March the attacks of cattle plague in Cheshire had decreased to 1,273, and on the 31st of March to 765. It was a curious circumstance that the sanitary restrictions imposed seem to have had no effect upon the price of meat either during recent attacks or during those which took place in the last century: For the average of five years, from 1739 to 1744, immediately preceding the distemper, the price of meat was 2¼d. per lb. During the twelve years of the distemper from 1745 to 1756 the price was also 2¼d. During the five worst years of the distemper the price was only 2d. 2–5ths. During the twelve years after the distemper, from 1756 to 1768, the price was 2½d. a lb. The same features were observable in modern times. In 1864 the price of meat ranged from 6½ to 7¼d.; in the beginning of 1865 from 6⅛d. to 7⅛d.; in 1866, during the time that the cattle plague was very bad, from 5¾d. to 7d. In April this year the price was from 6d. to 6½d. The quantity of cattle slaughtered during the prevalence of the distemper had the effect of keeping down the price; while the demand was satisfied as the meat was bought locally; it had the effect of changing the venue of the market, the cattle, instead of being sold in London, being sold throughout the country; but the trade adapted itself to the altered circumstances. Another consequence of the restrictions imposed on account of the cattle plague was that other diseases which had been prevalent among cattle were almost extinguished. The foot and month disease was imported from Holland in 1839, and pleuro-pneumonia was imported from Holland in 1842. In the latter year, and before the disease was imported, the average mortality among cattle in England was from 1½ to 2½ per cent. From that time the percentage rose steadily till it appeared from the Reports of the Cattle Insurance Company, in 1848, that three-fourths of all their losses were due to pleuro-pneumonia. In 1860, 374,048 horned cattle died of disease in the United Kingdom, of which more than one-half was due to pleuro-pneumonia. From 1854 to 1860 the average loss annually from that cause amounted to 160,000 head of cattle. But after the restrictions were imposed what occurred? On the 12th of March, 1867, Professors Simmons and Brown reported that pleuro-pneumonia and the foot and mouth disease existed only to a very limited extent. This, they stated, was due to the restrictions on the movement of cattle, by which they estimated that we saved annually £1,000,000 worth of food. The Agricultural Society of Cornwall was unanimously of opinion that these diseases had been nearly eradicated by the cattle plague restrictions. Various agricultural societies accordingly desired that the same restrictive powers which had been applied to the cattle plague should be extended to other diseases. With that recommendation he could not concur, as the proposal was surrounded with many difficulties. Most persons, looking at a Continental Bradshaw, and seeing that the railways came straight from Hungary and Poland to Bremen and Rotterdam, jumped to the conclusion that all importation of foreign cattle should be stopped. But we might as well attempt to sweep back the tide with a broom as to keep the foreign meat trade out of the country. The object of all men was to make food cheap; but it may be raised in price by stopping the foreign supply as well as by the destruction of British cattle. Some persons maintained that the grass lands in the East of Europe, populated by millions of cattle, were the home of the cattle plague, and that as long as cattle were allowed to be brought from thence we should always run the risk of introducing it here. They then argued that if cattle were allowed to be imported they should be killed at the port of landing. Under the present regulations cattle were killed at all the ports, with the exception of Harwich and Southampton, which were permitted to send foreign cattle to the metropolitan market. But the metropolis was isolated from the rest of the country. The imports for London were so enormous that the attempt to deal with the matter otherwise would occasion a violent disturbance of trade, and an amount of incon- venience that would be almost intolerable. The question was narrowed to the metropolis. In 1866 no less than 164,557 head of cattle were imported into London. The next largest importation was into Hull, where, in the same year, only 26,009 cattle were imported. Newcastle imported 8,418, Southampton 5,045, Harwich 4,322, Leith 4,261. All the other ports in that year were considerably below 5,000. It was contended that dead meat might be sent into the metropolis in the same way that it now came from Aberdeen and the North of Scotland. But that was from a climate favourable for cooling, at a time of year favourable to keeping, and in quantities so small that loss would be trifling. Besides it must be borne in mind that, in that case, each lot was consigned at a named price, so that the consignee was the loser in case anything went wrong. But when meat was sent in large quantities, the loss cannot be fixed on any consignee; with foreign meat the risk was that of the foreign owner. And if the law were that cattle must be killed within a certain number of days buyers had only to hold back for a time, knowing that eventually the meat must come down to their price, and then the foreign farmer would send over no more cattle. Hence, even if the meat could always arrive perfectly good and sound, the foreign farmers who sent it must be losers, because the buyers knew that dead meat must be sold, and they would only have to wait a little in order to get it at their own prices. These were some of the difficulties in the way of dealing with the subject, but the greatest of all was the feeding of the poor. Two-thirds of the meat which came into London was consumed by the working classes at the East End. If the beasts were killed at Harwich or Southampton, only the best joints would be sent up, for it would not pay to send the rest. But the working classes fed not on beef steaks, but on shins of beef; not on South Downs, but on Merino sheep. It was not upon joints, but upon offal, that the poorest fed; and the offal would never be brought to London if the animals were killed at the place of landing. The head and pluck of a sheep were sold for 2s.; the head of a bullock cost 3s.; the heart 2s.; the tail 1s. 6d.; the liver and tripes 7s. 6d.; the tongue 3s. 6d.; the feet 1s.; the value of the whole offal of a bullock amounted to only 18s. 6d. If foreign bullocks were killed at Harwich and Southampton, they would rob the poor of the food to which they were accustomed. Again the sheepskins, and hides of bullocks, the hoofs, and horns, and even the blood, were used in trades. The factories of London would be deprived of these, and the poor of their work. With respect to the suggestion that quarantine should be established at the ports, he must remind the House that store cattle were never imported into this country, and fat cattle in quarantine sometimes lost as much as £5 in value in ten days, while their keep in the time of quarantine would amount to £2. The proof of the inutility of quarantine was that it had never been used. Besides, if one infected beast got in, the quarantine ground would become a pest-house, and perpetual focus of disease. The hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets wished to have a separate market in London for foreign cattle. But that would be a most expensive measure, as it would be necessary to purchase land and to erect buildings for the accommodation of not less than 5,000 cattle a week, as well as for slaughterhouses for all these beasts. Besides, if they were to have two markets, one for English and the other for foreign cattle, they would divide the buyers and destroy competition. The proposal was therefore "a gigantic system of protection." Another objection to the scheme was that in the Metropolis Market Act there was a clause forbidding the erection of a new market within seven miles of St. Paul's; and, therefore, if the suggestion were to be carried into effect, the buyer would have to go much more than seven miles for his meat, and the price would thereby be greatly enhanced. It was true that in other ports they had established Port-market Licences. But here there could be no competition as the one market was for foreign fat stock, and the other for English store stock. No doubt every restriction on the movement of home cattle was a tax; and every limitation on the importation of foreign cattle was a tax, and tended to an increase of price. They were placed between two difficulties. The English farmers desired that all restrictions upon the inland trade should be removed, while they desired to have the restrictions upon the foreign trade maintained or augmented. But the inhabitants of Liverpool, Manchester, and our other great towns had no objection to the maintenance of restrictions upon the inland trade, while they contended that restrictions upon the importation of foreign cattle led to a great disturbance of trade and an increase in the price of meat. The only means they had found of meeting the difficulty was to make the restrictions locally self-acting, instead of general. This they were attempting to do by that Bill, and they proposed to do so still more through the consolidated Orders which were shortly to be issued. They would endeavour to throw the foreign trade open as much as possible, taking care to preserve intact the principle of preventing contact between home and foreign cattle. That had been already done in the case of the metropolis, which was perfectly isolated, and treated as a foreign country, inasmuch as cattle that once got into it could not get out again. Nor could foreign cattle come in contact with English cattle at Harwich and Southampton, while at every other port they were killed within four days of their landing. He moved that the Speaker leave the Chair.

said, it appeared to him that all the restrictions of which the noble Lord had spoken would be absolutely useless unless something more were done in the matter. About six weeks ago a statement had appeared in the newspapers to the effect that twenty-one animals purchased at Doune in Scotland, and sent by railway to Hampshire, had been from four and a half to five days in the transit, during which they had received neither food nor water, and that out of the number two had died, while the remaining nineteen had arrived in a state of great suffering. It appeared to him that unless something were done to prevent such cases they must always expect to find cattle disease prevailing in this country. Having read that statement in the newspapers he had taken all the means in his power to ascertain whether it was well-founded, and he had received from the persons who had purchased the animals the most positive assurance as to its accuracy. He had then applied to the noble Lord for the purpose of seeing whether he could interfere in any way in the matter, but was told that the Privy Council had nothing to do with a case of that kind, and that he had better refer to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. He had afterwards addressed similar applications to the Home Secretary and the Vice President of the Board of Trade; but with them he had been equally unsuccessful. This was a case which could not be a solitary or isolated one, and it clearly had some connec- tion with the progress and communication of the cattle plague. Under these circumstances he had thought it right to bring the matter under the notice of the House.

said, that in this discussion the Reports of the Cattle Plague Commissioners ought not to be forgotten. He wished to make some remarks in favour of slaughtering foreign cattle at the ports. There was a strong feeling in its favour in the country, as had been evinced by the Petitions which had been presented, and it was borne out by the Reports of the Commissioners. In inquiring into the origin of the disease, they came to the conclusion that it did not rise spontaneously in this country; that it was brought direct from Holland, and indirectly from Revel, from Russian Poland, and from the Russian steppes, in which it found its constant home. They therefore recommended an inspection of foreign animals in this country more minute than any that would probably be applied to them abroad. They stated that during several months in the year this country imported from 5,000 to 10,000 animals a week, which were landed at some few ports, and thence dispersed all over the country. Upwards of six-sevenths of these were landed at the three ports of London, Harwich, and Hull. They recommended that the foreign trade in cattle, which had grown to such enormous dimensions of late years, should be subjected to proper regulations; that the cattle should be slaughtered at the ports, and that good landing-places, lairs, and sheds should be provided there, by which much of the cruelty of the land transport would be avoided. He made these remarks with a view of directing attention to the subject. He believed that if the Government carried out the recommendations of the Commissioners, they might dispense with many of the restrictions now imposed inland, and give general satisfaction to the country. Those whom he represented, as practical men, had no objection to free trade in cattle as far as it was requisite to supply the necessities of the country, but they had a great objection to free trade in cattle plague brought from abroad, and to the unlimited importation of disease.

said, it was extremely important that the House should be put in possession of the Report of the International Congress at Vienna on the subject of Cattle Plague, for which a sum of £148 8s. 9d. had been voted. Was it intended to distribute it, and when? The Bill was an extraordinary mode of facilitating the introduction of cattle into this country. Many of the cases of so-called cattle disease were the result of hard usage and over-driving.

said, he found it very difficult to understand the clause, and feared that its ambiguity would lead to litigation.

said, that the clause had been inserted in the House of Lords.

said, that the Orders issued by the Privy Council were tantamount to Acts of Parliament, and it was therefore essential that security should be given that somebody should attend the meetings of the Council, where the Orders were framed, who was thoroughly cognizant of the subject, and would be able to declare what was necessary to be done. If the restrictions were to be continued for three years, words should be added to the clause enacting that the President or Vice President of the Council, or a Secretary of State who would be cognizant of the policy of the Government with respect to the subject dealt with by the Bill should attend the meetings of the Council and sign, the Orders.

said, that it might be very difficult to get the President or Vice President to attend at periods of the year when they would be out of town.

said, he moved that the words should be struck out which gave power to the Privy Council to remove inspectors. If the Council were to be allowed, without giving a reason, to remove any inspector they liked, and to call upon the local authorities to appoint another, they would weaken the responsibility of those authorities, and prevent them taking a proper amount of trouble in the selection of the inspectors.

said, he thought the Privy Council should have the power of removing incompetent inspectors, because that would make the local authorities more careful in their appointments.

said, he would suggest that a Proviso should be inserted in the Bill, enacting that when a local inspector made an error the Privy Council should have authority to rectify it by reversing the decision of the local inspector.

said, he thought the difficulty would be met by carrying out the suggestion of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire, and he would accordingly introduce at a future stage of the Bill words authorizing the Privy Council to reverse the decisions of the local inspectors.

said, he believed that the Privy Coucil exercised that power at the present time.

said, he objected to placing the power of removal of inspectors in the hands of the Government, which were the worst it could be placed in.

said, he believed the local authorities would be better able to judge of a competent inspector than the noble Lord and the Privy Council.

said, that the power of dismissing incompetent inspectors should be left in the hands of the local authorities. The Committee ought to reject the words at the end of the clause, as tending to destroy local self-government.

said, he objected to the clause as most arbitrary, and calculated to remove local authorities by a mere stroke of the pen. It would be better to leave the local authorities and the Government to consider the matter. If the absolute power were given to the Government no such consideration could take place.

said, he would propose that they should omit the words "Privy Council," and insert the words, "Court of Quarter Sessions," thereby giving the power to remove the inspectors to the Court of Quarter Sessions instead of to the Privy Council.

There is an Amendment already before the Committee.

moved an Amendment—

"Provided such Inspector shall, after inquiry, have been reported to be Incompetent for the performance of his duty, and to have been guilty of misconduct."

said, he hoped the hon. Member would not put the Committee to the trouble of dividing again upon a question which had already been decided.

said, the power should not be exercised by the Privy Council until they could show, after inquiry, that the person was unfit for the office of inspector.

said, that it was to be presumed that the inspector would not be removed unless the Privy Council had good reason for removing him. Nothing would be done until after a Report by the local authorities.

said, that he had good reason for desiring to have the words introduced.

said, that if the hon. Member would withdraw his Amendment he would undertake on the Report to introduce words to meet his objection.

said, he considered it a very serious thing to place power in the hands of an inspector to declare a place infected on his own mere fiat. It would have been well, he thought, to have made some provision as to the proof of the inspectors' competency before their appointment.

said, that from the nature of the rinderpest it was absolutely necessary to act promptly. There were three modes of declaring a place infected—first, by the statutory declaration of the inspector; next, by the action of the local authorities; and thirdly, by that of the Privy Council. The great object was at once to isolate the particular place infected.

said, it was no doubt a large power to place in the hands of an inspector, but it seemed to be unavoidable to make such a provision.

said, that provision should be made for declaring a place disinfected when it was so, and that without loss of time. Was there power to reverse the declaration of the inspector in case of his being mistaken?

said, that power was given to the Privy Council for that purpose.

said, he would suggest that the power of the inspector to declare a place infected should be provisional merely till the local authorities had time to examine the place.

said, he was afraid that would not be sufficient, as the local authorities were often unwilling to act.

said, he objected to the cumbrous machinery of the measure. He feared that the making of a statutory declaration might occasion mischievous delay.

said, that the object of the declaration was to insure that the inspector should not act rashly.

said, he would suggest that notice of the making of the declaration should be published, not by the local authorities, but by the inspector, in order that delay might be avoided.

said, that the local authorities were bound to publish the declaration immediately on its being made.

read the title of the Bill.

Sir, I move that the Amendments of the Lords be printed and taken into consideration on Thursday.

said, that he rose to move an Address to Her Majesty on the subject of the Simla Court-Martial. Three objections might be taken to the course he was about to pursue. It might be said that the case was one of individual and personal grievance which ought not to be brought before the House; that he was inviting the House to enter upon a discussion as to the administration and discipline of the army; and, lastly, that the facts he was about to bring forward constituted a personal attack upon an officer of the highest eminence — the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India. With regard to the last point, the facts he should have to state, and the mode in which he should have to state them, would bear that appearance, but he had no vindictive feeling against Sir William Mansfield. He did not desire to bring this forward as a question between the retirement of Sir William Mansfield and the reinstatement of Captain Jervis in the service. It would give him no pleasure that the services of Sir William Mansfield should be lost to the country. He had but one object, and that was to persuade the Minister of War that Captain Jervis ought to be restored to the service. As to the second point, he had taken as much care as possible in framing his Motion to avoid any interference with the Prerogative of the Crown. He did not ask the House either to revise or control the sentence that had been pronounced, or the decision that had been come to. He only asked the House to lend its paramount influence to persuade the Sovereign to revise the decision, which was an unjust one. As to the first point, he would admit that a case of individual grievance ought only to be brought before the House under exceptional circumstances; but, in this case, he felt satisfied that a great injustice had been done. It could not be just that the faults which this young man had committed should be visited by a sentence of degradation and ruin for life. And this decision was the decision of an authority so high that there was no constituted authority in the country to revise or criticize that decision. In such cases it had always been one of the highest privileges of that House to express its opinion, to draw the attention of the Crown to the grievance, and to humbly ask of the Crown to devise redress. He would now refer to the facts. Captain Jervis was tried at Simla, in 1866, upon charges of having fraudulently misappropriated the property of Sir William Mansfield, his Commander, to whom he acted as aide-de-camp. He was further charged with insubordination arising out of the other charge against him. The court-martial acquitted him on the charges of fraud, but found him guilty on the charges of insubordination. It sentenced him to be dismissed from the service, but accompanied the dismissal with a recommendation to mercy on the ground of the extenuating circumstances which appeared in the case. The only meaning of such a finding could be that the charges of fraud being false did extenuate the insubordination. Sir William Mansfield, who was more than the prosecutor, being also a witness and warm party in the cause, taking the sentence into his hands, specifically disregarded the sentence of the court-martial that these charges of fraud were not true. In a General Order to the army, he stated that these charges were true, and disregarding also the recommendation to mercy of the court-martial, he sentenced Captain Jervis to dismissal from the service. He passed upon him the exact sentence which would have been passed upon Captain Jervis if he had been found guilty of the charges of fraud. When that decision was laid before the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of War, they confirmed the sentence; but, by way of gratuity, ordered Captain Jervis to receive the sum of £1,800. So that the next time his right hon. Friend the Minister of State for India read out that remarkable list—which he had read on one occasion that Session—there would be added to it, the case of Captain Jervis, tried on charge of fraud, dismissed the service, and thereupon ordered to receive the gratuity of £1,800. He proposed to show that the court-martial were perfectly justified in recommending Captain Jervis to mercy on the ground of extenuating circumstances; that Sir William Mansfield, for some reason or other, had taken a personal dislike to Captain Jervis before any of these charges were made; that he made these charges one after the other, in the most vindictive spirit, with every circumstance of provocation and insult; that these charges being all false, thereby drove this young man to acts which were clearly wrong, and which he could not attempt to justify. If, however, Captain Jervis was driven to these acts of insubordination by false charges made under circumstances of the greatest provocation, his dismissal from the service, so that his prospects in life were entirely ruined, could not be a just sentence. More than that, even supposing it were a sentence just in itself, it could not stand, having been passed by one who was a warm party to the cause. It would outrage public feeling if a judgment passed by a person who was really the prosecutor were confirmed. He had said that the charge of fraud was false. He was justified in saying so, because the court-martial had found that it was false. He declined to go into the facts themselves. He should not have the least fear of the result, for he would pledge his reputation that, upon the facts, as they were produced before the court, not a tribunal in England could have found the accused guilty. But this was an acquittal by court-martial. There could not be a more sensitive tribunal imagined for the investigation of a charge of fraud against an officer in the army. If there were the smallest taint of fraud a more dangerous tribunal could not be imagined; and after having been tried on such a charge by such a court, a person might say that he had gone through the ordeal of fire. He wished to show to the House the circumstances of provocation, and the mode in which the charges were brought forward, and to do that he should marshal the facts as they really happened, and not as they appeared in the blue book, where they necessarily appeared in the order in which the evidence was taken. He could not be said to be strictly impartial in these proceedings, as this young man was the son of his father's sister; but he could assure the House that he had never from his childhood up to the time of this trial heard the slightest reflection on his honour or integrity. [The hon. and learned Member then read at very great length the series of letters, documents, and evidence, as they appear in the blue book, and then proceeded to say:] He assumed that many hon. Gentlemen in the House had read the evidence taken before the court-martial, and he would ask anyone who had read the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, whether in the annals of any court with which hon. Members had had experience, they had ever known questions to be answered upon a criminal charge in the manner that the questions put to the prosecutor were answered on this occasion. One would have imagined that in a criminal charge preferred against a member of his own household, the prosecutor would have answered the questions put to him with pain, with an appearance of distress, with reticence; or that he would, at all events, have done what he could to shield or excuse the faults committed. But, on the contrary, not a single answer was given without the introduction of extraneous matter—matter evidently introduced for the sole purpose of aggravating the offence and accompanied with every expression of contumely and insult. The defence was, of course, written by the advocate for Captain Jervis, and what was the case with the prosecutor's reply? The nominal prosecutor in this case was an officer in the army, and he would ask anybody who had read that reply, whether it was written by a gentleman in that position. It was evidently written by an astute and practised lawyer; by one of those learned men who were frequently to be found in our colonies but who were but little accustomed to the rough wear and tear of life, and had but imperfect acquaintance with the rules of criminal procedure. This gentleman endeavoured to make out the charge of fraud upon what he called legal presumption, and to his surprise he found that the counsel of Captain Jervis followed the lead. But any man of experience would have scouted such an idea, and he could not understand how any man in his senses could have listened to such absolute nonsense. Besides what tribunal could there be that ought to be more sensitive on matters connected with such a charge than a court-martial engaged in trying a brother officer? This was not a simple prosecution in which the prosecutor was preferring a charge for the purpose of vindicating justice. It was a case in which the prosecutor was endeavouring to make out the strongest case he possibly could against the prisoner. Sir William Mansfield evidently took every possible means in his power, and by the greatest skill at his command to obtain a verdict. What was that verdict? The first charge was with having behaved in a scandalous manner, unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman, while employed as aide-decamp in charge of the household expenditure of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in four respects. First, in having at Mahasoo, during the months of September, October, and November, 1865, dishonestly misappropriated to his own use, and for the entertainment of his own guests, the following wines, beer, and other stores, the property of the Commander-in-Chief, intrusted to him, Captain Jervis, for expenditure on his Excellency's account only; and in having then, or subsequently, with intent to defraud the Commander-in-Chief, entered, or caused to be entered, part of the said articles in the account books of the household in his, Captain Jervis's, charge, as having been expended on his Excellency's account. The charge set forth the misappropriation of so many dozen of wine, and so on, and went into the minutest particulars, stating, among other things, that Captain Jervis had misappropriated one bottle of brandy, one bottle of maraschino, one bottle of curaçoa, six bottles of lemonade, one tin of ham, one tin of bacon, one tin of tongue, three tins of oysters, two tins of sardines, one tin of giblet soup, one bottle of mixed pickles, two bottles of Harvey's sauce, one bottle of Worcestershire sauce, one jar of plum jam, one jar of raspberry jam, one ponnd of tea, two pounds of coffee, and one loaf of sugar. The whole of these articles were said to amount in money value to £92, though when the defence had been made, the value dwindled down to £23. The second portion of the charge was as follows:—

"In having at Calcutta, in or about the month of February, 1866, with intent to defraud the Commander-in-Chief, charged or caused to be charged to his Excellency's debit, in the account books of the household, in his, Captain Jervis's, charge, the sum of 700 rupees, or thereabouts, the same being the cost of his, Captain Jervis's, own private table espouses at Mahasoo during the months of September, October, and November, 1865."

That was, in fact, the same charge in another form. The third and fourth articles were—

"In having, at Calcutta, or Simla, or both these places, between the 16th of December, 1865, and the 25th of April, 1866, dishonestly misappropriated to his own use the following articles of stable necessaries and horse furniture, of the aggregate value of 275 rupees or thereabouts. In having at Simla, in or about the month of April, 1866, with intent to defraud the Commander-in-Chief, charged under the head of bazaar expenses to his Excellency's debit in the 'bazaar expenses' account book of the household, in his, Captain Jervis's, charge, the sum of 47 rs. 14, the same being the cost of his, Captain Jervis's, private expenses from the 25th to the 29th of March, 1866, inclusive, while en route from Calcutta to Simla, and not in attendance as aide-de-camp."

These four items went to make up the first charge. The second charge was—

"With having at Simla, on the 14th of May, 1866, neglected to obey the order of his Excel- lency the Commander-in-Chief to produce before a military Court of Inquiry certain books, accounts, and vouchers, the property of the Commander-in-Chief, in his (Captain Jervis's) possession."

The third charge was—

"With having at Simla, on the 22nd of May, 1866, neglected to obey the order of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to attend a Committee of audit, which had been assembled by order of his Excellency."

The fourth charge was for having disobeyed the lawful command of his superior officer in refusing to give up his sword. The fifth with having written a disrespectful letter to the court-martial. The verdict was delivered in the following terms:—

"The Court are of opinion that the prisoner, Captain Ernest Scott Jervis, of Her Majesty's 106th Regiment (Bombay Light Infantry) is not guilty of the first and second charges preferred against him, and do accordingly acquit him of the same, and that he is guilty of the third, fourth, and fifth charges preferred against him. The Court sentence the prisoner, Captain Ernest Scott Jervis, of Her Majesty's 106th Regiment (Bombay Light Infantry) to be dismissed the service. The Court having awarded a sentence of dismissal, and marked their sense of the prisoner's military misconduct, do now beg to recommend him to mercy in consideration of the extenuating circumstances disclosed in the proceedings."

That was, that the court-martial acquitted Captain Jervis of the first charge in which the four particulars of fraud were set forth, and upon, the second, in which he was charged with having neglected to give up the books, vouchers, and accounts, found him guilty of the three remaining charges, involving military misconduct. What was the meaning of that? It could not mean that the Court desired he should be dismissed the service. What were the extenuating circumstances to which the Court referred? That he had been falsely accused of fraud; for if he had not been falsely accused of fraud what extenuating circumstances could possibly be found in the case? Sir William Mansfield had brought certain charges of fraud against his own aide-de-camp, and had pressed them with the greatest subtlety before a court-martial which he himself had nominated, and, after doing all he possibly could to procure a conviction, that court-martial decided that the charges were incorrect and false. What would have been the feelings of an ordinary English gentleman under such circumstances? What might reasonably have been expected from any person holding the high position filled by Sir William Mans- field? It would naturally have been expected that he would have written to Captain Jervis, have expressed his sorrow that the charges should have been made, his happiness that they had been disproved, and would have acknowledged that it was impossible for him, under the circumstances, to confirm the sentence of dismissal. But what did Sir William Mansfield do? He drew out as artful and as subtle a description of the evidence as possible, bringing into prominence every point that could be urged against Captain Jervis, and he sent that statement, with the authority of his own name, to the court-martial, desiring them to re-consider their finding on the first and second charges, informing them, at the same time, that he had no fault to find with their verdict, as far as it referred to the three latter charges on which Captain Jervis was found guilty. What was the reply given?—

"The court, having attentively re-considered the whole of the evidence, and also the communication from the revising officer, do now respectfully adhere to their original finding."

One would have thought that after such an answer hatred itself would have been satisfied, and that Sir William Mansfield would, at all events, have withdrawn any charge, but what did he do? He wrote a General Order. He supposed, though he was not sufficiently acquainted with military matters to be certain upon the point, that such an Order was published throughout the army, and he would venture to say that, coming from a man who had occupied the position of prosecutor, such a thing had long been entirely unknown in England. That Order was—

"1st Charge.—It is to be regretted that, in accordance with precedent and the advice of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, the Court did not find a special verdict, with regard to the facts admitted by the prisoner and the intention denied by him."

The meaning of that was that Sir William Mansfield's counsel had agreed that, the facts having been admitted, the necessary conclusion of the law was that the intention should have been inferred—

"Putting aside the question of form, it is now the duty of the Commander-in-Chief to say that his Excellency is advised that the proof for the prosecution is complete in the several instances of the first charge, with the exception of variances as to certain items. This was shown in the careful analysis of the evidence and the law regarding it, which was submitted to the Court on revision. The Court, in its discretion, having, nevertheless, recorded an acquittal, his Excellency may express his personal gratification that the character of one he has long befriended will have the advantage of this verdict in time to come. His Excellency can only regret that serious military misconduct on the part of the prisoner should have deprived him, before the trial, of the benefit of the doubts on which the Court has apparently acted."

The House would observe that General Mansfield there spoke of the doubt entertained by the court-martial. But the court had not expressed any doubt. The General, however, took it upon himself to say that the fraud had been committed, and that doubt had prevented the Court from finding him guilty of it. In the judgment of Sir William Mansfield it was further stated—

"2nd Charge.—His Excellency is further advised that the verdict on the second charge is contrary to clear and sufficient proof. In this instance, the prisoner disobeyed orders which were reasonable, in accordance with the custom and regulation of the army, and without obedience to which he could not possibly clear his character of the most serious imputations. According to the principles of military discipline, and the dictates of the English Judges, all officers and soldiers are bound to obey orders which are reasonable and not contrary to the law of the land. The Commander-in-Chief might, perhaps, earn a cheap reputation for clemency and liberality by attending to this recommendation. His Excellency is compelled to show how such action on his part would amount to a betrayal of his duty. The Court, if it considered the prisoner a fit and proper officer to retain the commission of a Captain in Her Majesty's service, could have awarded punishment other than dismissal. With respect to the alleged extenuating circumstances as being the ground of the recommendation, his Excellency is under the necessity of showing to the Court that they have no existence."

Sir William Mansfield goes on to say—

"In the course of this long and unduly protracted trial, there was much requiring unfavourable comment in the matter of procedure. The Commander-in-Chief trusts that the faults of procedure to which he alludes, involving great lose of time, the abuse of the right of cross-examination, and the making use of a court-martial to propagate attacks on witnesses not in presence of the Court, will not be drawn into precedents hereafter. This matter will be more particularly dealt with in detail by the Judge Advocate General of the Army, for the guidance of General officers and courts-martial."

In this case, Sir William Mansfield gave judgment in his own favour. Even if his judgment had been right, this would have been contrary to our notions of what was correct, because in this country it was never allowed that a judgment by a party in the cause should be allowed to stand. But, in point of fact, the judgment was clearly wrong. If the court-martial had considered Captain Jervis guilty of the frnud there could not have been any extenuating circumstances. The Court, however, found that there were extenuating circumstances. This General Mansfield took upon himself to deny, and ordered Captain Jervis to be dismissed the service. That judgment was referred home to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief. He trusted the Members of that House had read the despatch of the Commander-in-Chief. It was a document which maintained the character that had won for his Royal Highness the respect and esteem of every one in the country. Nothing could be more satisfactory than this despatch. Though it was in guarded and dignified language, it did substantially use against the judgment of Sir William Mansfield the arguments which he was now endeavouring to bring under the notice of the House. He pointed out that Sir William was a party to the cause, that he had not carried out the sentence as the court-martial wished it to be carried out, that he had disregarded the extenuating circumstances, that he had reiterated the charges of fraud, and that therefore his Royal Highness entirely disapproved of the course he had taken. In pages three and four of the despatch there was this statement—

"Entertaining these views, therefore, the Duke of Cambridge is unable to concur in the propriety of the Instructions contained in your Excellency's Memoranda, dated 30th March and 14th of April last, drawn up for the guidance of the officers of your personal Staff, similar documents to which have never before come to his Royal Highness's notice.…. But, granting even that your Excellency's views as to the position and duties of an Aide-de-camp were correct, the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief greatly deplores that the first steps taken by you in reference to Captain Jervis should have been of a nature so calculated to lead to opposition to your authority, and eventually to the necessity for bringing him to trial. His Royal Highness cannot help thinking that had you in the earliest stage of these proceedings acted in a more concilatory manner towards him — and, considering the long and personal intimacy of your relations with that officer, his Royal Highness is impressed with the conviction that your Aide-de-camp had a claim to such consideration at your hands—much of what afterwards occurred might have been prevented, and a great and deplorable scandal averted. His Royal Highness conceives that the course to have adopted on its becoming known to you that the management of your household and farm was not in accordance with your belief and intention was for your Excellency to have recalled Captain Jervis from his temporary leave of absence, and to have invited him to explain personally to you any matter in which it appeared to you that his conduct was questionable; a private invitation on your part to enter into a full and unreserved explanation was far more calculated to lead to a satisfactory result than the semi-official demand conveyed to Captain Jervis through your military secretary. The Duke of Cambridge makes every allowance for your feelings of surprise and mortification at believing yourself to have been deceived by an officer of your personal Staff, in whom for years you had placed such entire reliance, and his Royal Highness understands how distasteful it would have been to you to have had to avow personally to that officer that your confidence in him was shaken. Notwithstanding, however disagreeable to your feelings the adoption of such a course, his Royal Highness is convinced that it was the proper and judicious one, and deeply regrets that you did not follow it. Still more does he regret your having entered into a personal examination of your servant on matters so materially affecting Captain Jervis's character without inviting that officer to be present personally to explain or refute the accusations made against him. It appears to his Royal Highness that it was only due to Captain Jervis to give him this opportunity of entering into a personal explanation; and that this apparent want of consideration for his feelings as an officer and a gentleman was eminently calculated to lead to continued misunderstanding, and to rash and ill-considered action on the part of your Aide-de-camp."

The despatch went on to refer to the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, which even in his right hon. and learned Friend's presence he would say was an admirable one. The Judge Advocate General observed—

"No point which could possibly be urged in favour of a conviction was omitted in the very able reply for the prosecution, and all the arguments which could tell against the prisoner were accumulated with remarkahle subtlety and ingenuity in the minute and accurate analysis of the whole case drawn up by the Judge Advocate General of Bengal, when the Court was ordered to re-assemble for the purpose of revision; and this last document was submitted to the Court with the further sanction and authority of the Commander-in-Chief. The Court deliberately found in favour of the prisoner, and I do not feel myself justified in saying that such finding was wrong."

The despatch referring to that opinion stated—

"In this opinion his Royal Highness entirely concurs, feeling sure, from a perusal of the proceedings, that the Court had every opportunity of arriving at a just judgment, and only formed it alter a most anxious consideration of every fact and argument brought before them. In rejecting the recommendation of the Court in the prisoner's favour his Royal Highness considers your Excellency to have allowed yourself to enter into observations which he extremely regrets with reference to their probable effect on the army at large."

He now desired to speak with the greatest possible delicacy. If that despatch had been consistently acted on he would have nothing to desire in this case. It seemed to him the real meaning of the despatch was that General Mansfield's decision had been wrong in both points. It had been wrong because it was a decision pronounced by General Mansfield in his own case. It was one which he ought never to have given, because he ought to have sent the matter home in order that the judgment might be pronounced in this country. Then it was wrong in fact. General Mansfield neglected to give effect to the extenuating circumstances. The court-martial acquitted Captain Jervis of fraud, and therefore it must be taken that he had been falsely accused of that offence. He repeated that if the despatch of the Commander-in-Chief had been consistently acted on in its reasonable sense he should have been satisfied. But, though he had not the least doubt of the desire of his Royal Highness that justice should be done in the case, he regretted to say that full effect had not been given to the despatch by the Commander-in-Chief, and by his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War. In a subsequent letter Captain Jervis was told that, after a full consideration of the case, his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief had decided that the sentence of the General court-martial should have effect from the date on which it was confirmed. The letter further stated that, with reference to the recommendation to mercy recorded by the Court, the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary for War had consented to Captain Jervis receiving a sum of money equivalent to the full value of a captain's commission, and that the sum of £1,800 would therefore be paid to him. What he (Mr. Brett) asked, was £1,800, or £40 a year to a young man dismissed from the service? A General Order had been promulgated throughout the Army of India in which the charge of fraud was reiterated. Who would now understand that the charge of fraud was not confirmed by the military authorities? Would it be understood in the army that the £1,800 was to be paid to Captain Jervis because he had been acquitted of fraud? The note of the Commander-in-Chief gave no more effect to the extenuating circumstances than the action taken by Sir William Mansfield. The £1,800 to be received by Captain Jervis was a thing of no value whatever, when considered as a solatium for wounded honour, and Captain Jervis was right in declining without hesitation to accept it. On these considerations, then, he asked the House to assent to his declaration, that although Captain Jervis had been guilty of grave military insubordination, which he did not for one moment wish to justify, yet his guilt was pardonable because it was induced by provocation rarely given, and that, therefore, the sentence upon him was unjust. Estimated in accordance with the principle of justice in its highest sense, the sentence was most harsh, simply because the whole circumstances of the case were not taken into consideration. He accordingly asked the House to join with him in praying Her Majesty to re-consider the sentence of the court-martial held at Simla on Captain Jervis, with a view to reinstate that officer in his rank in the army and in his regiment.

said, he could not but regret that the hon. and learned Gentleman had brought forward this Motion, and he still more regretted that the despatch of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief had been moved for, and that the Government had consented to lay it on the table of the House. He thought that no one who read that despatch would disapprove the view taken by the Commander-in-Chief of Sir William Mansfield's conduct. That despatch was submitted to him (General Peel), and approved by him; and by that approval he had taken upon himself the responsibility it involved as the Secretary of State for War must always do in the case of actions of the Commander-in-Chief approved by him. In ordinary cases of discipline it would be very unwise for a Secretary of State to interfere with a Commander-in-Chief; but this was no ordinary case. The question of the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and the authority he exercised, was of such importance that his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army thought proper to consult both the Secretary for War and the Secretary for India before acting in the matter. The first question submitted was, whether or not Sir William Mansfield should be removed from his command? His Royal Highness expressed a very strong opinion on the subject. Although he disapproved of the conduct of General Mansfield in reference to the Simla Court-Martial, his Royal Highness said there was nothing illegal in it, and nothing to justify the ex- treme measure of removing so high and distinguished an officer as Sir William Mansfield from his command. But his Royal Highness said he should not hesitate to express to General Mansfield in the most unreserved terms his opinion upon the whole case. That opinion was expressed in the despatch which had been read, and which he (General Peel) had approved. But that despatch expressed the private opinion of the Commander-in-Chief in England to the Commander-in-Chief in India as a guide for his future conduct. Had he (General Peel) known that the despatch would have been made public, he should not have given so unhesitating an approval of it. He should have pointed out to his Royal Highness that he would have thought it better at once to have removed General Mansfield from his command than to have subjected him to a public censure, which must have the effect of weakening his authority in India, and to a certain extent destroying the prestige and influence which a Commander-in-Chief ought always to possess. His Royal Highness would be the last person to do anything to weaken the authority of the Commander-in-Chief in India. Had he (General Peel) known that the despatch would be made public, he would have pointed out that it was too long and argumentative, and that, by quoting the opinions of the Judge Advocate, it almost invited an answer from General Mansfield. Had it been intended as a public censure, it ought to have been couched in terms which would admit of no answer. He objected to the production of the despatch as much on the part of the Commander-in-Chief as on that of Sir William Mansfield. He should doubtless be told that it was not a private or confidential communication; but he considered that to be a private document which was not intended by the writer to be made public. Had his Royal Highness intended to administer a public censure to Sir William Mansfield, he would have taken some method of making that censure known to the Indian Army, and not have left it to a chance Motion in that House. It often happened that the Government refused to lay upon the table communications that took place, not only with regard to such cases as these, but between the different public offices. The publication of such communications would tend to stop confidential expression of opinion between officers of State. His (General Peel's) only object was to request that the House would not assent to the Motion, unless it was prepared to approve of it on the only ground upon which it had a right to interfere. He presumed that they had not yet arrived at that point at which any hon. Member would deny the undoubted Prerogative of the Crown to dispense with the services of any officer without giving a reason for so doing. That Prerogative was exercised by a Minister who was responsible to the House for the manner in which he acted, and if the intention of the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Brett) was, as might be inferred from the conclusion of his speech, to censure the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief or of the Secretary for War, he had a perfect right to press his Motion to a division. He (General Peel) defied the House to pass that Resolution without, at the same time, passing a Vote of Censure on his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War and his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief. One point which weakened his regret that the despatch should have been laid upon the table was, that it proved how admirably his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief conducted the business of his office, it would prove to those who were always professing to believe that there was a constant antagonism between the Secretary for War and the Commander-in-Chief that nothing of the kind existed, but that the most intimate relations subisted between them. There was another point. If the House was ready to accord praise to the Commander-in-Chief in regard to General Mansfield's conduct, why not put equal confidence in what he had done with respect to the conduct of Captain Jervis? If General Mansfield were wrong, that did not make Captain Jervis right. He (General Peel) was not responsible for any decision that had been come to with regard to Captain Jervis, inasmuch as he had left office before that decision was arrived at, but he believed that the same justice had been done to Captain Jervis that had been done to General Mansfield. Why should it be supposed that the Commander-in-Chief should censure General Mansfield, and not be prepared to mete out justice to Captain Jervis? Of all tribunals that could be called upon to give a decision in a case of this kind the House of Commons was the very worst. If that House was prepared to make itself a Court of Appeal in such matters, it could not confine its deliberations to cases in which officers who had the good or bad fortune to have connections in that House were concerned. There was not a corporal who had the stripes taken off his arm, or a private who had stripes put upon his back at the instance of a court-martial whose case might not be brought before that House. That was the precedent they were about to establish if they passed the Motion of the hon. and learned Member. The case had been decided. Captain Jervis was dissatisfied, and called upon the House to reverse the decision. Supposing the House consented to reverse that decision, what would happen? In every similar case there would be a similar appeal. The Commander-in-Chief would no longer be regarded as the final appeal in military cases. He was afraid that he was about to make a very bad return for all the kindness which he had received from the House of Commons, but he had no hesitation in saying they were every day assuming a power which the Constitution of this country never intended that they should exercise. They were endeavouring to take upon themselves the Executive Government of the country, and in no case could that be more detrimental than when they interfered with the command and with the discipline of the army. What was the Motion? It asked them to agree to an Address praying that Her Majesty would re-consider the sentence of the court-martial held at Simla on Captain Jervis for the purpose of reinstating that officer in his rank in the army and in his regiment. He was not prepared to assent to that Motion. The case of Captain Jervis had been already considered by Her Majesty's Advisers, and he saw no reason for finding fault with their decision.

said, that the hon. and learned Gentleman who had brought forward that subject had stated very candidly that he was a near relative of Captain Jervis. He must say, with equal candour, that he stood in near relationship to Sir William Mansfield. He spoke in all sincerity when he said he believed that Sir William Mansfield had acted from no personal dislike or ill-feeling towards Captain Jervis. Great stress had been laid on certain of the duties which Captain Jervis had to perform as aide-de-camp to Sir William Mansfield, and which tended, perhaps, to give that matter a somewhat ridiculous aspect. It might appear strange to some hon. Members that these duties should be performed by an officer in Captain Jervis's position. But he believed it was customary for aides-de-camp to fulfil such duties, and, at any rate, Captain Jervis himself knew what he was undertaking. It would be very distasteful to him to go through the evidence with a view to criminate Captain Jervis; but he felt bound to notice two or three points. It appeared that that officer became aide-de-camp to Sir William Mansfield in 1865, and subsequently, at his request, undertook the management of his household accounts and those of his farm. While Captain Jervis was away, owing to certain accounts that were sent into quarters, some suspicion attached to that officer. So far from Sir William Mansfield having summoned two servants in Captain Jervis's absence to criminate him, his butler, named Abbey, came forward voluntarily and gave some information which induced Sir William Mansfield to ask for an inspection of the books. Captain Jervis, who, he believed, was a remarkably good accountant, declined to give up the books, but asked for a committee of inquiry. He (Mr. Dutton) did not think it was the partial one that the hon. and learned Gentleman sought to prove, and every opportunity was given to Captain Jervis to free himself from suspicion. A fair course of conduct was pursued towards him, and it was natural to suppose that Captain Jervis should wish to prove that his conduct was above suspicion. It was charged against Captain Jervis that in managing the farm of Sir William Mansfield he traded on his own account, making use of his Excellency's name and of his Excellency's servants. By his refusal, if he were innocent, which he trusted he was, he did himself great injustice. The charge against Captain Jervis he did not wish to follow up too closely. A gentleman's farm very seldom did pay, and he believed that in this instance the thing did not answer. Another point was that Captain Jervis's travelling expenses were mixed up in an irregular manner. That fact was, he believed, put in evidence, and he had not seen it at all denied. Another case related to an outlay in building, where a very considerable sum of money was expended by Captain Jervis in excess of the amount which Sir William Mansfield authorized. The principal charge against Captain Jervis was that when Sir William Mansfield had agreed to pay 2,000 rupees for raising the aide-de-camp's house a storey Captain Jervis had spent on it 5,765 rupees additional, which he had drawn from other funds of Sir William's. He did not wish to say that an answer to all that could not be put in; but he did say that there was sufficient reason why Captain Jervis should be made accountable for his conduct. Sir William Mansfield, as he had said, had no desire to bring the matter before a court-martial, but wished that it might be dealt with by a civil proceeding. That, however, could not be done, owing to the provisions of the Mutiny Act and the distant situation of Simla; and his Excellency was advised by his legal advisors that the case should be dealt with by a court-martial. Sir William Mansfield, accordingly, brought the matter before a court-martial, and there he appeared in the position of prosecutor as well as Commander-in-Chief. This was a most unpleasant position for him to occupy, though caused by no fault of his, but one which was due to the unfortunate contingency which had arisen. Sir William Mansfield had endeavoured to act with impartiality. The court-martial acquitted Captain Jervis on the two principal charges, and they strongly recommended him to mercy, thereby putting his Excellency in a great difficulty. He said, with great pain, that the finding of the court-martial merely amounted to "not guilty," and was not a full and honourable acquittal. Had it been so, Sir William Mansfield's course would have been an easier one. His Excellency, however, thought it was not for the good of the service that he should overlook the finding of the court-martial on the other charges. The court-martial had the power of awarding any sentence, from a severe reprimand to a far heavier punishment. If they had done the former Sir William Mansfield would have been relieved from all reproach on the score of not having acted on that recommendation to mercy. His Excellency had consulted the Judge Advocate General, and had throughout acted upon the best legal advice which he could have taken. He thought it impossible to condone the matter. All he (Mr. Dutton) wished to do was to protest, which he did with all sincerity, that Sir William Mansfield had been actuated by no personal feeling in the matter; that he had deemed it his duty—and it was a very painful one—to carry out the finding of the court-martial; that he had done so very much against his own feeling and inclination; and that he had acted entirely throughout his long and distinguished career for the good of the army at large.

said, he knew Sir William Mansfield to be a man who had served his country well, but he must confess that in this particular case he thought the conduct of that distinguished man had been most reprehensible. He concurred with every word of the despatch which had been alluded to by the late Secretary of State for War (General Peel). The question really at issue was not the conduct of Sir William Mansfield, but whether Captain Jervis should be restored to the army. He would only refer to one charge, or rather, one part of the charge against Captain Jervis. There was a difference between a simple acquittal on such a charge and a full and honourable acquittal. A simple acquittal was equivalent to the Scotch verdict of "Not proven." Captain Jervis was fully aware of the difference. He told the Court he must be regarded either as an innocent man or a felon, and an acquittal would be of little value to him unless it was a full and honourable one. That acquittal was not a full and honourable one, and therefore it would be, by his own confession, of little value to Captain Jervis. The first charge was that at Mahasoo, where Captain Jervis lived in part of the month of September, October, and November, 1865, he appropriated certain stores, including several bottles of sherry, champagne, and claret, and other stores. Mahasoo was six miles from Simla, of which place it was as it were the Fulham, and when Captain Jervis had charge of Sir William Mansfield's establishment at Simla he took a house for himself at Mahasoo. He lived in that house during the months of October and November, entertained his friends, and gave parties and pic-nics. And how did he entertain those friends? With the Commander-in-Chief's wines and stores. It was not disputed that no account was rendered of those stores. It was not denied that twenty-four dozen of wine and a variety of stores were consumed there by Captain Jervis, and no one asserted that the value was credited to Sir William Mansfield. Another aide-de-camp who took part in one of those entertainments, paid his share of the expenses amounting to 230 rupees, but neither that nor any other sum was credited to Sir William Mansfield for these stores. Something had been said about these stores consisting of "tins." In India everything except beef and mutton was kept in tins, and therefore the stores in these tins represented so much money's worth. Some 222 of these tins and several dozen of wine were appro- priated by Captain Jervis, and next year when the Commander-in-Chief went back to Simla, no account of them was rendered, nor had they been accounted for to this day. He did not mean to say that Captain Jervis meant fraudulently and dishonestly to appropriate these stores, but his conduct was calculated to excite suspicion. He had no intention to express a full conviction of Captain Jervis's guilt, but if his conduct in the other cases entered into by the court-martial were as suspicious and as discreditable as this case, he was not surprised that the Commander-in-Chief had not restored him to the army.

said that the right view of this question had been taken by the right hon. Gentleman (General Peel)—namely, that it was not the province of that House to review the decision of a lawfully constituted tribunal, either in this country or elsewhere. If the House should declare its readiness to re-open the decisions of the tribunals of the Empire, he or any other member of the legal profession, having a client who might be dissatisfied with the judgment of a Court of Law or Equity, might come before the House and ask the House to agree to a humble Address to Her Majesty very much in the terms of the present Motion with a view to reverse the decision of a Judge of one of the Superior Courts. He had read with surprise some of the items of duty imposed by the Indian Commander-in-Chief on his aides-de-camp, who seemed in that part of the world to be placed pretty much on the level of footmen. It was not the province of that House to entertain the question.

said, he would remind the noble Lord (Lord William Hay) that the court-martial had before them the witnesses in the cause, and after due consideration they not only found Captain Jervis innocent of the charges against him, but after Sir William Mansfield, using the influence of his position, had called upon the officers of the court-martial to review their decision, they deliberately re-affirmed it. The noble Lord could not be as well qualified to pronounce a decision as the court-martial. He had the highest possible respect for the right hon. Gentleman (General Peel); but it was a strange principle to lay down that such a despatch as that of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief of the Army ought not to have been made public. That despatch had a much wider application than to the officer to whom it was ad- dressed. It conveyed to every officer in the army that, although he was liable to military law, and must be amenable to military discipline, yet there was at the head of the army a Commander-in-Chief who might be looked to as a Court of Appeal, and who would see that justice was done to the humblest officer in the service. It was said that this was a private despath; but despatches marked "confidential" in diplomatic negotiations on matters of European importance were constantly laid before the House. He understood that a document issued by any department which was meant to be purely confidential was always styled a letter as distinguished from a despatch; the use of the latter word implying that it might under conceivable circumstances be produced. The 27th paragraph of his Royal Highness's despatch, which had not been read by the hon. and learned Gentleman, but which contained the gist of the whole question, was as follows:—

"It becomes the duty of the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, under these circumstances, to inform your Excellency that he cannot approve the remarks which you have thought fit to publish in your General Orders, for his Royal Highness cannot ignore the fact that those remarks have a practical tendency to weaken the independence of courts-martial, to bring contempt on military tribunals in the eyes of the public, and to affect the discipline of the army in a very material degree."

That paragraph implied that the public must be made acquainted with the opinion entertained in high quarters. His belief, after reading the Papers, was that Captain Jervis became unpopular in Sir William Mansfield's social circle by not satisfactorily discharging his social functions, and that on this account he was sacrificed. To remove him from the Staff was a very different thing, however, to removing him from his profession altogether. He could now understand why many of the Staff officers were not appointed from the Staff College, for there were probably no Professors there to teach the particular regulations presented in Sir William Mansfield's Memorandum. The treatment of Captain Jervis had been oppressive and unjust. Even, however, if Captain Jervis could not be retained in the army, he protested against the people of India being saddled with the £1,800 requisite for settling the dispute between him and Sir William Mansfield. The Indian Department, the War Office, and the Horse Guards being in a difficulty, they appa- rently determined to solve it at the expense of the impoverished people of India.

said, that justice had not been done to the high tone of feeling manifested by Sir William Mansfield throughout these proceedings. At his examination at the court-martial, Sir William Mansfield said—

"There is one thing which, in the exercise of my office, I cannot cast aside or condone, and that is the allegation of scandalous conduct against an officer bearing Her Majesty's commission. When such an allegation has been made it is the imperative duty of the superior officer, according to Act of Parliament, to compel the accused to clear his character, or to see justice done in the sense of the Mutiny Act and Articles of War. The superior officer, even if he would, is himself responsible in this matter that there shall be no condonation. I would hold any officer commanding a regiment in this army responsible for such condonation, if it came to my knowledge, and I would attack his commission for it. That which I exact from others in the execution of my office I cannot flinch from myself, however odious and disgusting the duty, as in the case of the present prosecution."

He believed that was the explanation of Sir William Mansfield's course, which was taken under the advice of the Law Officers of India. He regretted that his hon. and learned Friend, in bringing forward the Motion, had allowed himself to use expressions with reference to Sir William Mansfield hardly worthy of him. His hon. and learned Friend had spoken of the charges of Sir William Mansfield as false, incorrect, insulting, vindictive, and he even used the expression "hatred." As one connected with Sir William Mansfield, he knew he was incapable of the feelings attributed to him by his hon. and learned Friend, and that he was animated by a strong desire for justice and for the discipline of the army.

Accepting the entire responsibility of the decision arrived at in this case, I wish in the first place to remind the House that I have no relationship with either party; that I have never, as far as I am aware, seen either Sir William Mansfield or Captain Jervis, and that I formed my opinion upon an impartial consideration of the merits of the case. With regard to the production of the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, my right hon. Friend (General Peel) has stated that he was responsible for it, and that it would never have been written had he thought it would be made public. I was fully aware of the importance of that letter, and it was produced with the concurrence of my Colleagues, and on my de- liberate conviction that its production was essential to a proper understanding of the case. It was in no respect a private document. It was not marked "private" or "confidential," nor was it signed by the Commander-in-Chief. It was written as a public State paper, it was signed by his Royal Highness's Military Secretary, and it conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief in India the deliberate judgment of the highest authority in England. It was written, moreover, after reference to the Judge Advocate General, and it contains several extracts from his Report upon the evidence. Being, therefore, an important part of the proceedings in this matter, I felt bound to produce it, and, in my opinion, if it had not been produced justice would not have been done. The answer which I am prepared to make to the Motion is two-fold. First, I rest it on what I consider the grave impropriety of making the House of Commons a Court of Appeal from a grave and serious decision of a military tribunal. Secondly, and irrespective of that question, I say that full justice has been done in the matter. I confess it would have been difficult to have contended that full justice has been done if the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief had not been produced on the merits of the case. No one can wonder that my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Brett) should desire to vindicate the conduct of his relative, and make the best possible answer on the merits of the case; but I confess I feel surprised that any Gentleman of the great professional standing and long professional experience of my hon. and learned Friend should have thought it right to invite the House of Commons to act as a Court of Appeal, to revise the proceedings of a court-martial, and enter into the whole merits of an elaborate trial which occupied, I think, twenty-seven days before one of the established tribunals of the country. Sir, I submit to this House that we are not competent to these duties, and that if we were to attempt to discharge them we should take a course fatal to the discipline of the army and to the administration of justice in this country. There are two elements indispensable to any Court of Appeal—one is a complete knowledge of the case, and the other is that such a review should be entered into in a calm, judicial, and impartial spirit. Now, Jet me ask how many Gentlemen are there at present in this House who are prepared to rise in their places and say that they have made themselves masters of the evidence which occupied twenty-seven days in the hearing, and of the various arguments which have been brought forward in the elaborate statements by which that evidence has been supported or rebutted? I think that very few will venture to say that they are at this moment in a position to enter into this question with impartiality. What is the position of my hon. and learned Friend who brought the case before us to-night? His position is this—he appears before us in a three-fold capacity as advocate, juryman, and judge. I venture to caution the House, before they decide on supporting the Motion of my hon. and learned Friend, to take warning from the proceedings of this House a few years ago with respect to the last court-martial to which the public attention of this country was directed—I refer to the case of Colonel Crawley. The House must remember that in 1863 the public mind was agitated about the proceedings of a court-martial which was held in India. The House must remember how strong was the public prejudice, how loud the public clamour, how the press of this country condemned Colonel Crawley and accused him of the murder of Sergeant Lilley. We must all remember the speech delivered by the hon. Member for Andover (Mr. D. Fortescue) when in 1863 he brought the case before the House and paved the way for the proceedings that followed when Colonel Crawley was brought to trial at Aldershot. And now let me remind the House how the case ended, and read the terms of the finding of the court-martial. They were these—

"The Court is of opinion, with regard to the first charge, that the prisoner is not guilty. With regard to the second charge, the Court is of opinion that he is not guilty."

And then the Court went on to use these words—

"The Court does therefore fully and honourably acquit Lieutenant Colonel Crawley of all the charges preferred against him."

That case of Colonel Crawley led to debates in this House, and I cannot help quoting some words which fell from the noble Lord the Member for North Lancashire (the Marquess of Hartington) who then represented the War Department in this House, and who used on that occasion language peculiarly applicable to the question before the House. The noble Lord said that—

"The conduct of the Government in ordering the court-martial at Aldershot has been the subject of criticism, and the Government are perfectly prepared to afford the House all the materials that could be possibly desired to form a judgment upon the merits of their conduct. But the Government did not expect, and I think the House will hardly hold it to be right, that, when a full and ample investigation has been gone into before the only tribunal, to form and pronounce a decision upon the case, it is hardly fair, or honourable, or consistent with our notions of fair play, that the evidence should be again gone over in this House, and that the country should be invited to arrive at a different conclusion from that already formed."—[3 Hansard, clxxiii. 1656.]

But the House will see that that is the very course which is now being taken. My hon. and learned Friend has gone over all the evidence again and has asked the House of Commons to re-try the case. He has has gone into all the arguments and the painful correspondence which took place between Sir William Mansfield and Captain Jervis. He has asked us not only to form a judgment of our own, but to reverse the decision deliberately arrived at, not only by the court-martial, but by the military authorities in this country, and to address the Crown to set aside the solemn decision of a court-martial, whose independence, impartiality, and justice, have been distinctly recognized by the Judge Advocate General and the Commander-in-Chief. I have never heard the impartiality or justice of that court-martial impugned, and yet my hon. and learned Friend has asked me to review their decision, to reverse their judgment, and, as the noble Lord opposite had said, "to arrive at a different conclusion from that which had been already formed" after a patient trial of twenty-seven days. I have here a similar passage delivered at the same time by a right hon. and learned Gentleman, whom I am sorry not to see in his place to-night, because there are few in this House who could give us better counsel—I mean the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Newcastle (Mr. Headlam). That right hon. and learned Gentleman said upon the occasion to which I have before referred—

"I can assure the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) that every one who has had anything to do with the administration of the affairs of the Army join with me in deprecating the discussion of the proceedings of courts-martial in this House."—[3 Hansard, clxxiv. 67–8.]

Such was the language of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I cannot imagine anything more inconsistent with our ideas of justice than for a popular assembly to re-try this case, and give a verdict upon evidence which occupied the Court for such a length of time, and a decison upon which was arrived at after the most solemn and deliberate inquiry. If there were anything which would justify a Motion of this kind it would be that there had occurred a grave violation of justice. But justice has been fully done, and the object of the authorities in this country has been to carry out the decision of the court-martial in India. I am a party to the decision, and I know that the anxious desire of the authorities in this country has been to act as fairly as they could upon the judgment of the court-martial. When I accepted the office I now hold this case was under consideration at the Horse Guards. My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) has stated very justly that as regards Sir William Mansfield the case had been decided before he left office in conjunction with the noble Lord the Member for Stamford (Viscount Cranborne) then Secretary for India. The Commander-in-Chief, with the assistance of both the noble Lord and right hon. and gallant Gentleman, had arrived at the decision to send out the despatch which has been the subject of discussion this evening. With respect to that despatch, no one will dispute that the Commander-in-Chief approached the judgment that was delivered, with regard to Sir William Mansfield, in a way of which every one must approve. Of all the men I have ever known I have never met one less likely than his Royal Highness to be guilty of anything like undue severity, or to take any course which might be open to the charge of harshness or unfairness towards any person upon whose case he had to decide. When I entered upon my present office his Royal Highness did me the honour of consulting me upon this question. There were two questions to be decided with respect to Captain Jervis—first, did the circumstances of the case require that in strict justice he should be reinstated; and, secondly, if he could not be reinstated, by what course could the Commander-in-Chief give effect to the recommendation to mercy of the court-martial? It was the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief—an opinion in which, after full consideration, I concurred, and in which every military authority of high rank whom I consulted agreed, that, looking at the whole of the case, and with every endeavour to do justice, Captain Jervis could not with propriety be reinstated in the army. I have no wish to speak with any undue harshness of Captain Jervis, but I protest against the competency of this House to re-consider the case. I say, first, that the case was disposed of by court-martial, upon a principle of justice that no one can impeach; and, secondly, that it has been disposed of with due regard to the same principle by the military authorities at home. We would not be carried away by popular clamour on the one hand, or on the other by the feelings which may influence relations or Gentlemen in this House respecting the conduct of Sir William Mansfield. I am not standing here as the champion or the advocate of Sir William Mansfield. I admit entirely the grave indiscretion which has marked his conduct throughout. I do not for a moment defend the conduct of Sir William Mansfield. I think it is open to much censure. It has received—I beg the House to remember—great censure. It has received a grave rebuke from the highest authority in the army. At the same time I beg the House to bear in mind that it does not follow because Sir William Mansfield is wrong that, therefore, Captain Jervis is right. I accept the responsibility for what has been done. Although this is the act of the Commander-in-Chief, as the head of the army, his Royal Highness has not taken this step without consulting the responsible Minister of the Crown. The Commander-in-Chief was most anxious to fulfil his duty with perfect impartiality and justice. But we had to consider what was the real position of the case as regarded Captain Jervis. I am sorry that this question has been raised, and that I am compelled, in the discharge of my duty, to hold any language which may now appear harsh towards Captain Jervis. But it was impossible to disregard the fact—which I ask the House of Commons to consider and not be carried away by prejudice or clamour—what is the usual practice of courts-martial in drawing up their decisions. I challenge any man who is the advocate of Captain Jervis to deny that the usual practice of courts-martial, especially in charges which at all affect the honour or character of the accused party, is, where they believe him to be wholly innocent of the charge, to declare him fully and honourably acquitted. I have read the terms of the finding in the case of Colonel Crawley. There was never a case in which a man had been subjected to more obloquy and clamour. Time passed, a deliberate trial took place, and the finding was a full and honourable acquittal. If Captain Jervis had been fully and honourably acquitted the decision at home must have been different. But in taking a fair, judicial view of this question, it is impossible to disregard the fact that a full and honourable acquittal was not contained in the finding. The omission was a remarkable one. Was it accidental, or was it deliberate? At any rate, in deciding the question, whether Captain Jervis ought to be reinstated we could not disregard that omission. Then, a fair element of consideration was the view taken of this case by a perfectly impartial person, the Judge-Advocate General. My right hon. and learned Friend had to report to the Commander-in-Chief upon the merits of this case. He is open to no suspicion of partiality or prejudice; but, after deliberately reviewing the evidence, he said he thought the evidence would have justified either an acquittal or a conviction; and that the court-martial having given a deliberate verdict in favour of the accused he was not prepared to say that that finding was wrong. This was not the language of a judicial officer who thought that Captain Jervis had been the victim of a most unjust and unfair charge. I think the noble Lord opposite (Lord William Hay) made a fair and just observation, free from harshness or prejudice, when he stated that the substance of this finding was what we are familiar with in Scotch law as a verdict of "Not Proven." Then, the House will remember that the subsequent conduct of Captain Jervis was not such as to give him any particular claim to the favourable consideration of the authorities, or to inspire them with any desire to reverse the judgment of an impartial tribunal. Thinking he had reason to complain of portions of the examination of the counsel of Sir William Mansfield, he proceeded to commit a violent assault upon that gentleman at the door of the Court, and assaulted three other witnesses on the trial, for which violent conduct he was brought before the Court, made a public apology, and was bound over to keep the peace. These facts did not bear on the material points at issue in the trial, but they did bear upon the question how far the authorities at home were called upon by the whole circumstances of the case to reverse the finding of the court-martial and restore Captain Jervis to his rank. The question was what force was to be given to the recommendation to mercy? It was the anxious desire of the Commander-in-Chief, and it was my own desire, that this recommendation should not be disregarded, There were only two ways of attending to it. One was by reinstating Captain Jervis; the other was to remove the stigma of his conviction by allowing him to sell his commission, as though in a purchase regiment. That appeared to the Commander-in-Chief and to myself the most effectual way of giving effect to the recommendation of the Court. This is the view taken by the military authorities in this country, and I earnestly hope that this House will not, by supporting the Motion, take a course which, in my opinion, will be inconsistent with justice, dangerous as a precedent, and inconsistent alike with the discipline and character of the service.

It is with great unwillingness that I trouble the House with a few words on this subject. I am unwilling to do so, because this is a most complicated and difficult question, and because I feel that I have not studied the voluminous Papers in this case so completely as to enable me to give an authoratitive opinion upon many of the points raised. Indeed, I would not have troubled the House at all, if it had not been for one or two observations made by speakers who have preceded me. I do not, like the right hon. and gallant Gentleman (General Peel), go the length of deprecating the interference of the House of Commons altogether in discussions of this nature. The right hon. Gentleman has, on many occasions, expressed his opinion that the interference of the House in almost all military subjects is a source of unmitigated evil. I believe there are many points of military administration in which this House may most usefully and beneficially interfere. But I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that this House ought to be extremely careful as to the occasions and the manner in which it interferes with military questions of a personal character. Still there are occasions even of a personal character in which it may property interfere. If there is a suspicion that personal favour has been shown to an officer, or that justice has not been done to his merits, the publicity given to such cases cannot but be beneficial. But we ought to be very careful when we undertake, in questions affecting military discipline, to review the decisions either of legally constituted tribunals or of officers who have the power to revise such decisions. There is one point to which I wish to refer. It may be said that the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Helston is an invitation to us to revise the decision of a court-martial. To a certain extent that is true, as a court-martial did sentence Captain Jervis to be dismissed from the army. But the hon. and learned Member will probably reply that he is not so much inviting the House to revise the decision, as to attend to the recommendation to mercy given by the Court. Although, therefore, this Motion can hardly be taken as an invitation to revise the sentence of the court-martial, it is an invitation to an act which is almost if not equally delicate and dangerous—namely, to undertake the revision of judicial decisions come to by persons legally qualified to give them—the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Commander-in-Chief at home, backed up by the authority of the Secretary of State for War. No one can deny that the Commander-in-Chief in India legally had the power to confirm or revise the decision of the court-martial at Simla; no one can deny that he legally had the power either to act upon or to set aside the recommendation to mercy. Although I concur in many of the strictures passed this evening upon the want of judgment displayed by Sir William Mansfield, I must avow my firm opinion, so far as I have been able to form a judgment from reading the Papers, that Sir William Mansfield, was not actuated by personal motives of dislike to Captain Jervis, and that, although he may have been mistaken in his view, he did act upon the view he took of his public duty. I believe that the real state of the case as regards Sir William Mansfield is correctly stated in two paragraphs of his despatch, which are as follows:—

"It can hardly be said that the accident of grave offences of insubordination having been committed against the Commander-in-Chief in person is a reason for the latter to forget his duty of maintaining the discipline of the army according to law and usage, when the conduct of the accused person has compelled the Commander-in-Chief to the last resource of a public trial My view has been, on the contrary, that it was for the Commander-in-Chief to elevate himself above the whole matter, as if he were not a party concerned, and to treat it as it would have been treated in the case of any other superior officer who had been insulted and met with the grossest insubordination by one under his immediate command, it being recollected that the protection of his office on the part of the Commander-in-Chief is a positive obligation on him."

No one can deny that the Commander-in-Chief was legally entitled to act or not to act upon the recommendation or the proceedings the court-martial. They were forwarded to England. They were revised by the right hon. Gentleman the Deputy Judge Advocate General, who, having perused the proceedings with as much care as any Gentleman in this House, did not think it necessary to recommend to Her Majesty that these proceedings should be reversed. The Duke of Cambridge, as admitted by all who have spoken, also studied them with care; and he did not think it necessary to act upon the recommendation to mercy. Although he did not shrink from the responsibility of severely censuring Sir William Mansfield for his conduct, he did not think that the sentence of the Court should be reversed, or that the recommendation to mercy should be attended to. Both these officers—Sir William Mansfield and the Duke of Cambridge—were the legally constituted officers on whom the duty devolved of considering whether the sentence of the court-martial should be acted on in its integrity or not. The House will take upon itself a very grave and serious responsibility if it undertakes to revise, not the sentence of the court-martial, but that of the legally constituted authorities whose duty it was to revise it. After what has been said on both sides of the House, I think it is tolerably clear no injustice has been done by removing Captain Jervis from the army. I cannot forget the fact, referred to by the Secretary of State for War, which I think is a material point in the case, that the Court arrived at a verdict of mere acquittal, and not, as the accused requested, at one of full and honourable acquittal. With that I couple the conclusion at which the Court arrived on the charges of insubordination, including that of refusal to appear before the Court for the purpose of clearing his own character. When I look at these circumstances I cannot bring myself to believe that any substantial injustice has been done by the removal of Captain Jervis from the army. Unless the House is fully convinced that an act of substantial and gross injustice has been done, it will be setting a bad example and establishing a mischievous precedent, if it undertakes to revise the decision not so much of the Simla court-martial, as of all those authorities whose duty it has been to revise and to act upon them.

said, he wished to ask those who deprecated the discussion in that House of the proceedings of the court-martial, why they had been laid on the table if they were not to be discussed. On the other hand, he admitted that the House of Commons was hardly a good tribunal to try again cases of this kind. Therefore, in suggesting an Amendment to the hon. and learned Member for Helston (Mr. Brett) he took what was the safe course of abiding by the decision of the court-martial? He was the more satisfied that this was a right and wise course, because that decision had been upheld by the Commander-in-Chief in a despatch which did him the greatest honour. Therefore he would suggest as an Amendment, that an Address should be presented to Her Majesty, praying that—

"She will be graciously pleased to give effect to the recommendation to mercy contained in the sentence of the court-martial held at Simla on Captain Jervis."

That court-martial was one of the most impartial and painstaking of military tribunals that ever assembled. The omission of the words "full and honourable" before the word "acquittal" in the finding of the Court was capable of explanation. If he were well informed, it was so. There were many tribunals in which differences of opinion arose, and in considering such a difference of opinion, account must be taken of the circumstances under which it arose. Here the Commander-in-Chief had summoned officers, all subordinate to himself. It was quite possible, without for a moment imagining that they would act with the slightest partiality, that they might have been unable to come to an unanimous decision on some questions, and that they therefore agreed to a compromise. These matters were no longer secret. Indeed, the Commander-in-Chief in India referred to the opinions of individual officers. He had been told by the gentleman who was charged with the defence of Captain Jervis that the reason the words "full and honourable" were omitted, was that the Court determined they would give a recommendation to mercy. They decided on an acquittal accompanied by a recommendation to mercy, the effect of which they reasonably imagined would be the restoration of Captain Jervis to his place in the army. He had no hesitation in saying, on the authority of the same gentleman, that if this expectation had not been entertained, the words "full and honourable acquittal" would in all probability have been used. When the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) said that substantial justice had been done, how did he measure the professional honour of an officer? At a sum of £1,800. This was not a question of degree of guilt. Captain Jervis must be innocent or not. If he took a pot of jam or a jar of pickles with intent to defraud, he was a thief, and no longer fit for the army. But if his doing so was merely part of a loose debtor and creditor account he was entitled to an acquittal. Captain Jervis was either innocent or guilty. He could not be partly both. The insubordination was induced by these disgraceful charges of which he had been acquitted. Captain Jervis had been dismissed from the army and disgraced. Was it probable for instance that he could be a member of any Club in London? Yet, being innocent, it was said that full and substantial justice was done by awarding him the sum of £1,800. And from what source? From the revenues of India! If a Sultan were to be entertained, or if an injustice to an officer of the army were to be redressed, the revenues of India were equally available. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India (Sir Stafford Northcote) seemed to lend himself to these negotiations with a facility that was perfectly surprising. The right hon. Baronet received on the 7th of June from the Secretary of State for War a letter written in a very easy and pleasant style, enclosing the following communication from the Horse Guards "for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India in Council:"—

"I am directed by the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State, that his Royal Highness proposes to give effect to the sentence of dismissal passed on that officer by the general court-martial which sat on his trial at Simla last year. But with reference to the recommendation of the court in Captain Jervis's favour, and to the peculiar circumstances of the case, his Royal Highness desires me to suggest that a sum equivalent to the full value of his commission—namely, £1,800, may be granted him. On receiving your reply to this communication measures will be immediately taken for succeeding Captain Jervis in the 106th Regiment."

In the same easy and pleasant style the Secretary of State for India returned an answer on the following day, the 8th of June. The right hon. Baronet was evidently in too great a hurry to consult his Council, as his reply was singularly short—

"In reply, I am directed to acquaint you that Sir Stafford Northcote concurs in the course proposed, and I am to request that Captain Jervis may be informed that the sum of £1,800 will be paid to him on application at this office."

He was treated as if he were an officer who had purchased into a regiment of the British Army, whereas he was an officer in the Indian Army, in which purchase had never been permitted. This was the easy manner in which the India Office was always ready to give out of the revenues of India the hush-money recessary to keep unpleasant subjects quiet. But if Captain Jervis was, as Sir William Mansfield had once declared, a man of "scrupulous honour," no grant of money could compensate the injury he had sustained. He did not agree with the opinion of the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) that the despatch of the Commander-in-Chief—which did His Royal Highness infinite credit—ought not to have been produced. A curious illustration of the harmony which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman assured the House existed between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for War was furnished by the right hon. and gallant Gentlemen, when he accused the Secretary of State for War of having improperly published a dispatch of the Commander-in-Chief. There was no want of precedents to justify the House in coming to a decision respecting the sentence of a court-martial, and it was not for the first time that it was called upon to remedy an act of injustice that would otherwise pass unrevoked. He begged to move his Amendment.

said, that he rose to answer the most unfair and extraordinary quotation of documents he had ever heard in the House. He referred to that part of the subject in which he had a share. The hon. Gentleman who spoke last had said that the grant of £1,800 upon the revenues of India had been settled in a couple of short and agreeable letters between the Secretary for India and the Secretary for War—one written on the 7th and the other on the 8th of June; and that, consequently, it was quite impossible that the Council for India could have been consulted. This was the statement. What were the facts, as shown by the Correspondence to which the hon. Gentleman had referred? The Correspondence on the subject began, not on the 7th of June, but on the 13th of May, in a letter addressed by the Under Secretary of State for War to the Under Secretary for India. The gentleman by whom it was written, said:—

"I am directed by Secretary Sir John Pakington to transmit to you for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India in Council the accompanying copy of a letter which has been received by the Military Secretary to the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief from Captain S. Jervis, 106th Regiment. Sir John Pakington having been in communication with his Royal Highness on the subject of this application has arrived at the conclusion that, with a view to meet the case of Captain Jervis, it is desirable to make such arrangements in mitigation of the sentence on that officer, and in deference to the recommendation to mercy by the court-martial, as may be equivalent to permitting him to sell his commission as if he were an officer in one of the purchase regiments in the British Army. His Royal Highness has expressed his concurrence in this proposition, and I am to request that should Sir Stafford Northcote see no reason to dissent from it you will move him to cause the necessary arrangements to be made accordingly."

On the 24th of May, eleven days after, having had ample time to bring the subject before the Council by whom it had been considered, he (Sir Stafford Northcote) sent, or rather General Pears sent, the following reply:—

"I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, forwarding a letter from Captain Jervis of the 106th Regiment, and suiting that Sir John Pakington having been in communication with His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief on the subject of that officer's application has arrived at the conclusion that, with a view to meet his case, it is desirable to make such arrangements in mitigation of his sentence, and in deference to the recommendation to mercy by the court-martial, as may be equivalent to permitting him to sell his commission, as if he were an officer in one of the purchase regiments in the British Army, and requesting that in the event of Sir Stafford Northcote concurring in this view, he will cause the necessary arrangements to be made accordingly. 2. In reply, I am desired to state that, as far as Sir Stafford Northcote has been made acquainted with the present position of Captain Jervis, that officer has been sentenced by court-martial in India to be dismissed the service, but with a recommendation to mercy, and that the sentence has been confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief in India, but that effect has not yet been given to the sentence in this country, either by its publication in the Gazette, or by the removal of Captain Jervis's name from the regiment in the official Army List. 3. Captain Jervis, although he retained, on transfer to the 106th Foot, a prospective claim to pension under India rules, is not yet entitled under those rules to any pension, having entered the army as recently as 1856, but I am desired to state that should the sentence of the court-martial be carried out, and this officer be removed from the service, the Secretary of State in Council will be prepared, on the recommendation of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for War, to grant him from Indian revenues a sum equivalent to the selling value of his commission."

The letter he received on tho 7th of June referred to by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Otway), simply acquainted him with the final decision which had been arrived at, and all that was then necessary to be done was to notify the fact that arrangements had been made to carry out what had been determined upon. The hon. Gentleman apparently felt himself justified in entirely ignoring the important communications of the 13th and the 24th of May, in which the question was dealt with at length, and in referring to the last two letters which had passed, as if those two letters comprised the whole of the correspondence, and this he did in addressing hon. Gentlemen who had not the Papers in their hands. If the hon. Gentleman regarded such conduct as fair and candid, all he could say was that his views on the subject of fairness and candour, and those entertained by the hon. Gentleman, differed very widely. The matter was duly brought under the consideration of the Council. In regard to the merits of the case, the Council for India looked at it in this light: if Captain Jervis had remained in the service he would upon the time arriving for his retirement have been entitled to a pension upon the revenues of India, and under the circumstances he was entitled to compensation. The amount of it might be a question for discussion. With regard to the mode in which the matter had been determined, as far as related to the Correspondence on the subject, he hoped the House saw that it was entirely different from that represented by the hon. Gentleman.

said, that every officer had a right to appeal to the Crown against the decisions of a court-martial. That right was not in any way affected in consequence of the court-martial having been, held in India instead of in this country. The conduct of the Commander-in-Chief in India had been blamed by the Commander-in-Chief in. England, and the former, in replying to the remarks made upon the course he had pursued, said—

"In your 33rd and 34th paragraphs you indicate that, as I was unable to concur with the Court and to act on their recommendation, I should have altogether refrained from dealing with the case, and that I should have forwarded the proceedings to England for submission to the Queen to be disposed of according to Her Ma- jesty's pleasure. It is further said that this course would have relieved me from all responsibility, and would have extricated me from a most anomalous and exceptional position. In answer, I have to submit, with great deference, that this course did not escape my consideration, but that I did not feel myself justified in evading my due responsibility according to my warrant and the position I hold as Commander-in-Chief in India."

In this case, owing to the course adopted by the Commander-in-Chief in India, an opportunity was not afforded to the Crown to carry out the recommendation of the court-martial. And yet the officer by whom that letter was written had expressly declined to act upon the recommendation to mercy that was made by the court-martial, on the ground that such mercy belonged only to the Prerogative of the Queen. His conduct, therefore, plainly showed that he designedly confirmed the sentence of the court-martial, rather than he would submit it to a quarter where a clemency to which he was averse might have been exhibited. Hitherto, the case had not been submitted to the Crown, and all that was now asked of the House was that the privilege to which every British officer was entitled might be made available to Captain Jervis, and that the case should be submitted to the Crown for the exercise of clemency.

said, the House would readily believe that his predilections were in favour of upholding the properly constituted military authorities. There were, however, exceptional cases where injustice had been committed, and where interferences consequently was called for. For such interference they had a precedent in the case of Colonel Crawley. There was an appeal from the Judges of Assize to the Courts, and ultimately to the House of Lords. It was not unreasonable that in cases like that of Captain Jervis there should be an appeal to the House of Commons. The case was this—Captain Jervis was tried for fraud. The charge was preferred by the Commander-in-Chief. Captain Jervis was also charged with insubordination. The court-martial, consisting of officers equal to Sir William Mansfield in experience and judgment, acquitted Captain Jervis of fraud, and with respect to the other charge, recommended him to mercy in consequence of extenuating circumstances. What was now asked was that the recommendation should be carried into effect.

said, he would withdraw his Motion in order that the Amendment of the hon. Member (Mr. Otway) might be put in its stead.

said, he moved for leave to introduce a Bill for the better Municipal Government of the Metropolis. The Bill embodied the remainder of the plan, part of which he had introduced in another Bill at an earlier period of the Session. It could not be expected that the Bill could pass into law this Session, and his object was simply to have it printed so that it might be laid before the public with a view to its being considered next Session. It provided for a central municipal government, as the other Bill provided local district municipalities. The Bill borrowed from a variety of sources; from the recommendations of a Royal Commission some years ago; from those of the Committee recently presided over by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton); and from the views which had been brought before the House on various occasions by the hon. and learned Member for Southwark (Mr. Locke). The Bill did not make a tabula rasa of the old system, but made use of the existing materials. The Bill proposed that the present corporation of the City of London should be enlarged by absorbing the Board of Works. The object of the Bill was to enlarge the corporation into a municipality for the whole of London, leaving behind in the City as much power as was necessary for purely local administration, which under the other Bill all the other districts of the municipality would also have. The Lord Mayor, under this Bill, would grow into a Lord Mayor for all London, and the Common Council would be converted into a Common Council for all London. That Common Council would consist of the Lord Mayor, aldermen, and common councilmen, but the aldermen, would not be a separate body, but, with the Common Council, would be elected by the ratepayers. It was proposed by the Bill that the present aldermen of the City should retain their offices for life, but that no vacancy amongst them should be filled up until their number was reduced to six, which would be double the number of aldermen for other districts of the Metropolis. There would be two aldermen in the Common Council for each district, they being those among the successful candidates for the district councillorships who had obtained the greatest number of votes. The corporation property would pass into the possession of this larger municipality. The City, it was right to say, had not given its assent to this transfer, but from what was known of the state of opinion in the City, there was ground to hope that there would be no corporate opposition to it. In consideration of the surrender of the corporation property, it was proposed to make certain concessions to the City in return, which he thought would not be considered more than a fair equivalent. It was proposed that the City should have twice the number of representatives in the Common Council that its population would justify. It was further proposed that the Deputy Mayor, who would represent the Lord Mayor in his absence or fill his place in case of his dying in office, should always be one of the aldermen of the City. There were a few other arrangements which would be sufficiently shown by the Bill itself. The county of the City of London would become the county of all London, and would have one Commission of Peace, of which all the aldermen would be members. As a temporary measure it was proposed that the Board of Works and all the present aldermen should be added to the Council, Sir John Thwaites being appointed Chairman of the standing Committees at his present salary, provided that he was willing to accept the office.

said, he did not propose to enter into any discussion of the measure. Though he approved of the Bill now introduced, he thought there were considerable difficulties in its way. He did not at present see how it could be worked in connection with another Bill which the hon. Member for Westminster had introduced on the subject of the municipal government of the metropolis. He hoped, however that the introduction of the Bill would assist in reforming the municipal government of London, which stood very much in need of reformation.

said, he would not oppose the introduction of the Bill.

said, the proposal of the hon. Member for Westminster was one of great importance. The corporation of London had not yet had an opportu- nity of expressing an opinion on it. The subject no doubt would be brought before the House next Session. The corporation of London would be most ready to consider all the plans proposed, and were only anxious that the extension of the municipality should not take place at the expense of any of those valuable privileges they had so long held, and still continued to hold, for the benefit of the metropolis.