said, he would beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether, having regard to the fact that in a Despatch from the Governor of Sierra Leone, bearing date the 22nd of March, 1867, His Excellency acknowledges the commission of a series of assaults upon Natives of the Colony by certain servants of the Crown, it is the intention of the Colonial Office to deny the protection of Trial by Jury in Civil Actions to the Native Population; and whether the attention of the Government has been called to certain judgments recently delivered in the Criminal Courts of that Settlement, in which the punishment awarded is said to have been in excess of and contrary to Law, and which are set forth in a Petition said to have been addressed to the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs?

, in reply, said, in the first place, it was untrue that a series of assaults had been committed by servants of the Crown in Sierra Leone upon Natives; and, in the second place, the assaults that had been committed had been effectually dealt with by the authorities on the spot. In some cases actions were brought, in which the aggrieved parties had received money by way of compromise. Assaults were, unfortunately, too common of whites against the negroes wherever the two races came in contact; but they had not been specially committed by public servants of the Crown. In one case, certainly, an assault was committed against a negro, under great provocation, by a person who happened to be a public servant, but the offence was fully punished. The Question of the hon. Gentleman conveyed the inference that, in consequence of those assaults, the Government had been led to give effect to the recommendation of the local authorities in respect to the abolition of Trial by Jury in Civil Actions. The Crown had, in fact, confirmed the local ordinance, which it was intended should be as serviceable to the negroes as to the whites. There was ample evidence to prove that this system of Trial by Jury in such cases had worked extremely ill towards all who were brought under its operation. With regard to the second part of the hon. Gentleman's Question, the Petition referred to was signed by fifteen persons, of whom the only known one was an editor of a newspaper. In no single instance had sentences been complained of by the prisoners, or any persons on their behalf. Nevertheless, the circumstances alluded to were certainly such as to demand the most serious investigation, which was now being carried on. He quite admitted that if Juries were done away with in Civil Actions, it was essential that the Judges should be men without spot as to their integrity and of undoubted capacity for office. The statement set forth in this Petition, so far as the facts had been investigated, contained many inaccuracies.

said, he would beg to ask the Under Secretary for the Colonies, Whether the Government have any further information as to the ravages of the yellow fever in the Mauritius, and whether they propose to allow Parliament to separate without providing means to alleviate the severe distress reported to be existing there?

said, in reply, that the last information at the Colonial Office relative to the ravages of the yellow fever in the Mauritius was dated on the 20th of May, and was received on the 20th of July. The statement was that the health of the population had been improving since the 7th of May, but that there had died in Port Louis and other districts up to that date 7,000 persons. Governor Sir Henry Barkly had already instituted certain inquiries as to the causes of the epidemic, and the local Board of Health was still considering the question. The Colonial Office also intended to send out other persons to assist in that inquiry. With regard to any relief which Parliament might render, he could only say that the circumstances of the distress were not sufficiently known to justify the Government in asking Parliament for a Vote of Public Money on the subject. Such Votes for the relief of the population in distant Colonies were very rare, almost the only cases being for relief of distress caused by hurricanes in the West Indies. A private subscription was now being collected in the City on behalf of the sufferers in the Mauritius, and a large amount had already been collected, and any gentleman sympathizing with the object of that fund could, of course, contribute to it.

rose to move that the measure should be read a third time upon that day three months, and expressed his regret that it should have come before the House at so late a period of the Session, when it was almost impossible to induce hon. Members to direct their attention to the great importance of the questions it involved. The Bill had not, up to the present time, been properly discussed, and its character was very imperfectly understood, and therefore he objected to its being read a third time without comment, lest the other House of Parliament should be led to believe that it had met with the general sanction of the House of Commons and of the public, and thus be induced to give it a consideration to which it was not entitled. On this ground, therefore, he had felt it to be his duty to enter this protest against the principle of the measure, which, in his opinion, was open to three or four grave, if not fatal, objections. In the first place, the provisions contained in the Bill, while they would be injurious to those who spoke at public meetings, would be no less injurious to those who were spoken against; they would tend to frustrate the due administration of justice as regarded the offender; and, in the end would, he believed, tend to destroy the liberty of the press itself by leading to the imposition of those restrictions which were imposed upon it in other countries, and which would become necessary if we were once to allow the press to have the advantage of exceptional laws which would deprive the public at large of that protection which the law of the land now gave them. This Bill endeavoured to place the law of slander and the law of libel upon the same footing; whereas heretofore, upon what he believed to be solid grounds, a great distinction had been recognized between words spoken and words written. And from the nature of society it was important that distinction should not be lost sight of, because it was impossible for men to exercise the same care in the selection of their words in speaking as they could do in writing. It was unnecessary for him to enter into any long argument to convince hon. Members of the necessity of maintaining this distinction; for any one who had sat in that House for a month must have perceived how exceedingly difficult it was for speakers to restrain themselves when taking part in an exciting debate, to the choice of words which expressed their meaning with perfect accuracy, and how frequently when carried away by their feelings they made use of observations which they would most certainly not have used in writing, and which, when challenged, they withdrew on the ground that they had not expressed themselves as they had intended. This difficulty experienced by speakers was so obvious that the law took notice of it, and declared that a person should not be responsible for what he said unless he so far transgressed the bounds of propriety as to inflict injury upon another person by charging him with having committed a crime, or by inflicting pecuniary loss upon him, and that he should not be responsible for uttering that general language of excitement, and it might be of abuse, for which he would be amenable were he to put his language into writing. The definition of slander was totally different from that of libel, and the question raised by this Bill was—whether under circumstances most likely to excite the speaker, and to lead him into the commission of an error, he was to be made responsible for what he said to a greater degree than he was by the law as it stood at present. There might be grounds for abolishing that distinction in cases where a man spoke with great calmness, deliberation, and thought; but the cases selected was exactly the reverse—namely, that a person who published for his own profit what another man said was not to be made liable for what he so published. Each ought to be held responsible for his own act, as by the present law. It was said that the speaker would be exempted from the consequences of this Bill if he could show that he had been misreported, but hon. Members must see at what a great disadvantage a speaker would be placed in maintaining that he did not say exactly what was ascribed to him, because the reporter would declare that he had taken down what was said; and the unhappy speaker, having nothing to refer to but his own memory, would be unable to adduce any evidence in his defence. If, however, he admitted that the report was accurate, but did not publish an apology, he would be held responsible for publishing a libel, although he had no concern whatever in the publication of it. It might be that a speaker might not know that a reporter was present when he made use of certain expressions; yet, on their being published, without his knowlege or consent, he would be held responsible for them in an action for libel, and a notable example of such a circumstance occurred very recently. A select assembly took place in a part of this House, where certain statements were made, and, after the meeting, if it could be called so, had come to an end, it was stated that reporters had been present. Thereupon the persons who had spoken appeared very much astonished when they heard that fact, but still the reporters had intruded themselves, and had actually prepared a report of what had occurred. The parties calling the meeting had, it appeared, invited reporters to be present. In some cases even where a speaker had expressly desired that his observations might not be reported his request had not been attended to, and his speech was published. There was, therefore, no protection to speakers. The other day, on an occasion when he knew that reporters were present, he desired that some remarks he made affecting the conduct of others should not be reported, nevertheless, the reporters, in the exercise of their discretion, took down his words and published them. Under such circumstances as these it would be most unjust to render the speaker liable for the publication of expressions which he had specially requested might not be reported. If such a course were to be adopted they would be imposing a tyranny over speakers at public meetings which was uncalled for, injurious, and unnecessary, and the result would be to repress free discussion in this country. The House must recollect that under the law of libel a person was responsible for holding another up to ridicule and contempt in writing; but that no such responsibility was incurred where the words were merely spoken. In most discussions, even those that took place in that House, half the speakers held up those who did not take their view of a subject to ridicule and contempt; but, if the; language they used were to be published, the speakers would be liable, although for the mere utterance of it they were not responsible. He wished to know why persons should not be free to discuss any subject at a public meeting without being rendered responsible for the language they might use in consequence of a reporter being present and publishing their speeches. That was the unfortunate position in which the speaker would be placed by the Bill; but what would be the position of the person libelled? Under the provisions of the Bill the person libelled would be practically deprived of all protection, because the newspaper proprietor would be exempted from all responsibility if he could show that the report was accurate. A person at a public meeting might make malicious statements respecting another person, and the newspaper reporting them would be free from any liability if it could show that the report was a faithful account of what had taken place. It was said that the person attacked might write a defence of himself in the newspaper in which the report appeared, provided, in the opinion of the editor of that journal, it was not too long for insertion, and provided it did not attack the reputation of any other person; but in nine cases out of ten the question was, whether the person attacked or some one else was guilty of the impropriety alleged; but by this provision he would be deprived of all opportunity of vindicating his own conduct. Then what remedy would he have under the Bill? He was to be at liberty to sue the person who had uttered the speech containing the accusation; but how was he to know who had made the speech? The report might state that a man, calling himself John Smith, got upon the platform and delivered this tirade or invective; but the reporter was not bound by the provisions of this Bill to ascertain that the speaker's name really was John Smith, or whether it was a feigned name, or anything about him. All he had to do was to put down the name which the speaker might give. He was not sure that, under the provisions of the Bill, the reporter was bound to give any name at all, as it might be that it would be quite sufficient for the reporter to say "that a person got upon the platform and made the following speech." In such a case it would be impossible for the person injured to ascertain who had brought the charge against him. The effect conveyed by speech as delivered at a meeting, and when published in a newspaper, was totally different, because those present could judge from the character, conduct, and tone of the speaker what weight should be attached to his statements; but where was the protection in the report that that impression should be conveyed to those who read it in a newspaper, because the reporter would not be called upon to give a dramatic account of the wild mode of delivering the speech, or of the violent conduct of the speaker? A speech, therefore, which might not have compromised the character of the accused in the slightest degree in the minds of those who were present might go forth in the newspaper as a wise, well-considered, and effective one, of the most damaging description to the person attacked. There was, however, another class of cases to which he would refer, which strongly exhibited the unjust manner in which this Bill would work. By Clause 3 a person speaking was to have the same privilege when charged with libel as he would have had if the action had been one of slander; but the effect of that clause had not yet been explained, although it would be of the gravest and most unjust character. The principle which regulated the law of privileged communications was, that a man was at liberty to make a communication for the purpose of business which he was prohibited from making on any other occasion, and therefore it was not there protected. The Bill proposed that if a newspaper published a privileged communication, that then the utterer of it should have all the protection that belonged to that class of communications, and that the newspaper should be exempted from any consequences in consequence of its being a bonâ fide privileged communication. The result of that proposition being agreed to by the House would be that both parties would be relieved from all responsibility in the matter. The provision would, of course, apply to the meetings of the shareholders of all railway and other companies; and when the House remembered the large number of these meetings at which reporters were present, because it was disagreeable to order them out of the room, they might imagine the evil that was likely to result if they permitted the publication of these privileged communications. The provision would also apply to the meetings of vestries and of local boards. It might be necessary for the conduct of the business of these various bodies that statements should be made which might be unpleasant to some persons, and it might be most inconvenient for those statements to be published in a newspaper, where they would be read by persons who were not in any way concerned with that business. The present law was a most wholesome one, because the reporters present at these meetings, knowing that they were responsible if they chose to publish that which was a libel, kept within bounds, and excluded from their reports all objectionable statements; and in his opinion, were that restraint to be removed, a great wrong would be done to society. He then came to the remedy which the Bill gave the aggrieved person against newspaper proprietors. The Bill proposed to exempt one class of persons from the general law of the land, to an extent never but once before proposed, and then it was deliberately rejected by that House—namely, in the case of the Vexatious Indictments Bill. The Bill proposed if a magistrate dismissed an indictment for libel, the person aggrieved should have no further redress not even giving him the power to indict before a grand jury in the event of the magistrate declining to commit the accused, or to compel him to enter into recognizances. In his opinion this would amount to a denial of justice, and he trusted that it would not be assented to from a desire on the part of some persons to curry favour with newspaper proprietors, who were anxious to pass this Bill. But the matter did not stop there; the Bill went on to say that in the event of the committal of the accused the aggrieved person must give two sureties for the payment of the costs of the prosecution, a provision which inflicted a most grievous wrong upon the prosecutor in a case of libel. He asked whether such a grievous injustice was to be done in behalf of a class of persons whose solicitations some people were unable to resist? It would almost appear that the Bill had been drawn up by newspaper proprietors for their own protection, utterly regardless of the interests of society, and he was sure that the House would not tolerate such provisions as it contained for a moment. He further objected to the provision in the Bill which rendered the aggrieved person liable for costs in the event of his withdrawing from the prosecution he had instituted, although he might have had reasonable grounds for preferring the indictment, and good reasons for withdrawing from the presecution. He protested against newspaper proprietors being exempted from the ordinary rule of law that applied to all other classes of the community, merely because they happened to be able to exercise an influence over Members of the House, and he asked hon. Members to consider whether in gratifying the owners of newspapers, they were not doing themselves and society at large a great injury? Having thus pointed out what appeared to him to be the chief objections to the Bill he asked the House to go a little further, and to see whether in attempting to gratify the newspaper proprietors they would not in reality be doing them a great injury? If they once commenced this exceptional legislation they must proceed further, and it would be well for them to consider whether it might not lead to the fettering rather than to an extension of the freedom of the press, because persons who are injured by the press would raise such an outcry against its injustice as might lead to the imposition of restrictions which newspaper proprietors should be the last to invite. It was a remarkable fact that demagogues, or those who considered themselves the leaders of the people, were those who most resented the attacks of the press, and by passing this Bill the House would be strengthening their views and the result might eventually be to lead to the adoption in this country of the system that was in force in France with regard to the press—namely, that the writer in a newspaper should be personally identified with his production, so that he might be held morally, if not legally responsible for what he wrote. Such a result would, of course, greatly interfere with the liberty of the press enjoyed under the existing law. The great security for the freedom of the press in this country was that newspaper proprietors should be subjected to the law of the land in the same manner as any other class of society; but if they placed newspapers under a separate law of restraint and under a separate law of responsibility it would prove most injurious to them, because it would put those which were badly conducted on a footing with those which were well and honourably conducted for the benefit of society. By continuing the present responsibility of newspapers they would continue to have the reports written by men who were, or ought to be, able and competent to discriminate between what was right and what was wrong to be printed and published, but if they passed this Bill, any newspaper which employed the most ignorant and incompetent reporters, would be put on a level with those who employed gentlemen of intelligence, ability, and discretion, and they would also by it give protection to the worst conducted papers in the country. The object of this Bill was to weaken the present excellent footing on which the press of this country was placed, and he would illustrate it by an observation which a gentleman of great experience in public affairs once made to him. He said—

"The most effectual way to put an end to the influence of the press in this country would be to abolish the law of libel."

Thinking this was a somewhat paradoxical statement, he asked for further explanation, when the gentleman said—

"As long as the newspapers are responsible for what they print their contents will carry a certain character and weight with them, because it is felt that the proprietors will not recklessly give publicity to statements while they are liable to heavy damages in case such statements should be libellous. If, however, the law of libel were to be abolished nobody would be responsible for any statement, and the result would be that people would not care a straw for anything which appeared in the newspapers."

There was in his opinion great truth in that remark, and as he (Mr. Ayrton) hoped that such a calamity would not overtake the newspaper press of this country, he entirely objected to the present measure and begged to move that it be read a third time on that day three months.

said, that considering the late period of the Session and the stage at which this Bill had arrived, it was not his intention to go into any argument in support of the measure. He objected to the mode in which this Bill had been opposed by the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets, whose speech was wholly directed against the principle of the Bill, which was discussed on the second reading. He did not consider it altogether legitimate for an hon. Member who had not opposed the second reading, nor ventured to divide on the clauses in Committee, to give notice at the last moment of his intention to move the rejection of the Bill on the third reading. The Bill passed through Committee on the 28th of June, and would have been read a third time shortly afterwards, had not his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets, knowing what was the state of public business, gave notice of the Motion he now moved, with the view of preventing the Bill from passing during the present Session, and when his Motion did come on in the ordinary course, a few weeks ago, an opponent of the Bill, perhaps a Friend of the hon. and learned Member, got the House counted out, while the hon. and learned Member was speaking in support of his Motion. Now, he did not think that was a legitimate mode of opposing a Bill, and he therefore would not now discuss the principle of the measure. The Bill, he might remark, was introduced on the 8th of February, and, consequently, it was absurd for his hon. and learned Friend to say that there was no opportunity for its full consideration and discussion. On Wednesday, the 13th of March, it passed the second reading without a division, and on that occasion no fewer than twelve hon. Members took part in the debate on the Bill. At the suggestion of the Home Secretary the Bill was then referred to a Select Committee, who had held several meetings and fully considered the Bill, and ultimately the Bill, with considerable Amendments, was reported to the House on the 8th of April. The Committee was fixed for the 13th of April, but owing to various circumstances the House did not go into Committee on the Bill till the 25th of June, when its provisions were discussed for upwards of two hours. The hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets spoke in that discussion, but did not then venture to divide the House, and it was unfair for the hon. and learned Gentleman now to oppose the Bill on the third reading. The Bill as amended was reported on the 28th of June, and would have been sent very shortly afterwards to the House of Lords had not his hon. and learned Friend placed his Motion on the Paper. Having given this short history of the Bill, he would not now discuss the various questions which had just been raised by his hon. and learned Friend; but there was one point on which he had a remark to make. This Bill did not, as had been so frequently stated, relate to newspapers alone. The first three clauses had special reference to newspapers, but the remainder of the clauses related to the law of libel generally. He might mention that the Bill had received the sanction of the Provincial Newspaper Press Association, which was composed of 160 or 170 newspaper proprietors in this kingdom, and that from eighty to ninety Petitions had been presented in favour of the Bill, while only one had been presented against it, and that proceeded from a gentleman who had commenced fourteen actions against newspapers for reporting a speech delivered in the House of Lords. The object of the clause which provided that security should be given for costs by persons proceeding by way of indictment for a libel was to place them in the same position as they would occupy at the present time if they applied to the Court of Queen's Bench for a criminal information. In conclusion, he would remark that although his hon. and learned Friend might succeed in preventing the Bill from becoming law during the present Session, he was still most anxious that it should be read a third time, and therefore he should certainly divide the House.

said, this was a very peculiar Session, for the House having been pre-occupied by another and a great question the present Bill has been passed through the House with a rapidity which in ordinary Sessions would not have been permitted. He opposed the Bill on the second reading; and therefore the hon. and learned Member for Clare could not complain of him for deferring his opposition to the last stage of the Bill. The Secretary of State for the Home Department expressed an opinion on the second reading that there were portions of the Bill that might be advantageous to the public, and that the best plan would be to refer the Bill to a Select Committee; it would have been idle for him (Mr. Newdegate) to dispute that opinion. Still he had felt that it was almost out of the province of a Committee to strike out the principle of the Bill, however vicious. The Select Committee seemed to have felt this, and the Bill had come back to the House modified and qualified; but, still containing that vicious principle: he felt that, if passed into law, the Bill would have a mischievous operation. The principle of the Bill was to exempt the proprietor of a newspaper which published slanderous or libellous words, reported as having been spoken at a public meeting, from all responsibility for publishing such slanderous matter, and to transfer the responsibility to the person who was supposed, judging from the report, to have spoken the words at the meeting. This he held to be a vicious principle. If a man spoke slanderous matter at a public meeting there was an opportunity of correction, because anyone could rise and demand an explanation or retractation of the slander; but where the slander was reported, it travelled beyond the sphere of the meeting, the slander became stereotyped, there was no power of refutation sufficiently prompt to correct the evil entailed on individuals by the wide dissemination of the libel or slander. It was evident, indeed, that the Select Committee and those who drew up the Bill were conscious of this difficulty, for there was a clause almost ordering a newspaper to insert a retractation of the libel or slander—the retractation, be it observed, not of what had been spoken, but of the impression of the reporter as to what was spoken, which impression, whether correct or incorrect, had been stereotyped by the newspaper and disseminated among the general public, who were not present at the meeting when the speech was delivered. It should be remembered that to speak slander was an offence; but to repeat it, to retail it in writing or in print, a second and a greater, because a more deliberate, offence. He wished to bear his tribute of praise to the care and intelligence, and the usefulness of the press in this country, and to the manner in which, under circumstances of great difficulty, the conductors of newspapers had avoided the dissemination of mischievous libels and mischievous slanders; but he was convinced that if the press were relieved of this responsibility there would immediately spring up a tendency to deteriorate the character of the press; that there would spring up papers of a low character, as had been properly observed by the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets, papers of a low character and unrestricted competition—a competition he meant not restricted by the character of the newspapers, which had been so useful to the country; that character largely depended upon the solvency of the proprietors, and had contributed to raise the character of the press in Great Britain to a height that the press had never attained in any other part of the world. The hon. and learned Member for Clare had complained that the course taken by the opponents of the Bill was unfair. He said that he would not enter into a discussion on the principles of the Bill, because the stage was the third reading. [Sir COLMAN O'LOGHLEN: Hear, hear!] He had himself undertaken the responsibility of counting the House when the hon. Baronet's Bill came on, not on the second but on the third reading. The circumstances were these:—on entering the House he was told that Bills were passing rapidly without discussion. He saw that there was not a quorum, and as an independent Member he claimed that the House should be counted, and the count proved that there was not a quorum in the House. The hon. Baronet, then, had no right to complain of his preventing the final stage of this Bill being passed on the occasion he had adverted to, when there was not a quorum of the House present. For himself, he could see nothing factious in such a proceeding. As the Select Committee was not competent to alter the principle of the Bill, it would, in his judgment, be an abuse if the House were not to avail itself of the present opportunity of again discussing that principle. He trusted that the House would reject the Bill because it was in direct opposition to the present law of libel, and to the principle on which the press of this country had been hitherto so advantageously regulated by law and conducted. The existing law of libel was framed on those principles which were most likely to secure the real and permanent freedom of the press—it was framed by the late Lord Campbell. Was he, or was he not, a person competent to deal with the subject? In early life Lord Campbell had been in straitened means, and he reported for the press, but by his own talent he rose to the eminent position of being Lord Chancellor and the possessor of a peerage, first by right of his wife, mid then in his own right—a peerage now inherited by his son. That noble Lord framed the present law of libel. He would read a short extract from the writings of Lord Campbell for the purpose of showing how completely he was actuated by a sincere attachment to the principles of freedom—the freedom of the individual, the freedom of the press. Lord Campbell was not chimerical enough to suppose that by allowing the law of libel to remain in the hands of the Judges alone freedom would be secured. The old law of libel had stood in that position previous to Lord Campbell's Act; it enjoined on the Judge to state to the Jury whether the matter complained of was libellous or not. Could there be a more complete departure from the Constitutional law of the country than this—that the Judge, without the previous intervention of the Court or of the Jury, should prejudge the very matter which was about to be submitted to the Court? And yet, this was the law that had once existed in this country; and he would show the House that if they passed the present Bill, they were in danger of reverting to that state of the law. Lord Campbell said—

"I am afraid that the law, as far as it concerns the nature of the writings which may be treated as libellous, must always remain indefinite, and that the effectual protection against publications injurious to private character, or dangerous to the community, and against vexatious and oppressive proceedings, dangerous to the freedom of the press, can only be found in the discrimination and firmness of juries, who may acquit or convict as they think that the intention of the accused was innocent or malicious."

In all cases, if they secured freedom, they must allow the public and the Jury, ever their legitimate representative, to judge what was consistent or inconsistent with their freedom and the freedom of their fellow-subjects. That system had been the Palladium of the freedom of this country; for centuries it had been found effectual, and in this matter, which touched the private character of individuals, the interests of the State, and the freedom of the press, he trusted that the House would pass no Act that would interfere with the main principles of the law of libel and the law of publication. There was great truth in the statement of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets, that if we excepted the press from the general principle of the common law of the country there would arise other exceptional legislation, and we might hear of principles such as existed in the Legislature and laws of France and of other countries carried out until the press was deprived of the freedom which, thank God, in England it possessed, and did not abuse. But he wished to point out how this Bill had escaped from the pressure of its vicious principle. The Bill proposed to enact that a report in any newspaper, which was bonâ fide, and without actual malice, and printed in the ordinary course of business, should not be liable to action for libel, "without actual malice." But the plea of "not guilty" already denied malice, so that this clause would not change the existing law, but would merely offer as a boon that which was merely an affirmation of an existing right. And what did the second clause contain? A command that the newspaper which published the libel or slander should publish the retractation but with a condition. And what was the condition? It was that newspaper proprietors should be bound to publish the explanation or retractation of the speaker, if the explanation or retractation was not libellous. Therefore, with respect to the retractation or explanation, the Bill was obliged to claim the discretion of the press, of the newspaper proprietors, under penalty not to publish any retractation that was slanderous or libellous, though as to the report it exempted him from the necessity of using any discretion. How did this operate on the individual who was reported to have spoken a libel or slander? It might be very difficult for an individual who had not spoken a libel or slander to prove that he did not speak the libel or the slander attributed to him. This was a danger to which the individual would be exposed, and the restriction upon the publication of his explanation, which was to be at the discretion of the newspaper proprietor, would aggravate the danger to the individual who had spoken. But, after all, were they to incur this danger in order to exempt the newspaper proprietor, in the first place, from all responsibility? He appealed to the Members of the House, as guardians of the freedom of the people of this country, to reject the Bill. If it went to "another place" at this late period of the Session he did not believe that the House of Lords, which contained within its walls several Members who had risen to their present eminence by the same course as Lord Campbell, would endanger the freedom of their fellow-countrymen by sanctioning the vicious principle embodied in this measure. He admitted that some of the subordinate provisions which the hon. Member for Clare had explained were disconnected from the first part of the Bill, relating to the press, and there were among these latter provisions, some which might be advantageous. Yet there was the provision which enabled the Judge, independently of the Jury, to exercise a jurisdiction as to costs, which he thought trenched upon the principle by which the Judges were, under Lord Campbell's Act, forbidden to exercise a personal jurisdiction, independently of the Court, in matters touching libel and slander. There were objectionable provisions, even in the latter part of the Bill, but the one glaring vice of the Bill was contained in the first clause, and he did say this, that it was unfair, that it was unjust, that it was an attempt to take an undue advantage of the press itself, to tender to them the prospect of an exemption, and that an exemption at the expense of the freedom of the subject. It would be easy to frame provisions which would render persons bringing vexatious actions against newspapers liable to the punishment they deserved; but in order to attain that object it was not necessary to adopt a principle so vicious as that contained in the present measure. For these reasons, he, for one, should most cordially support the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets in his just and legitimate opposition to this Bill.

called attention to the first clause of the Bill, which stated that no proprietor of a newspaper should be liable to a prosecution for reporting proceedings if there was no malice. But a libel might be of serious consequence to an individual, and the mischief of the libel might be accomplished before a retractation could be resorted to. He agreed with the hon. Member for Clare that it was too late now to enter into details with regard to this measure, but he complained of the Government for allowing a question of constitutional law, which agitated the Courts of Law, and affected the liberty of the subject more than anything in the present day, to remain in the hands of an individual Member. There could be no necessity for pressing on the Bill in this Session. There had been no complaints of the existing state of the law on this subject, except from a few members of the press; and the House had no grounds to induce them to take on themselves the duties of a Court of Appeal on this branch of the constitutional law of the country affecting the liberty of the subject, and to overrule the decisions of the Courts of Law—a subject which only a fraction of the House pretended to understand.

said, he did not think he should have said a word on the subject had it not been for the course which the discussion had taken; but having been a member of the Committee he could not avoid saying a few words. His hon. Friend said it was not in the power of the Committee to strike out the vicious principle of the Bill. That was a great mistake. It was open to the Committee to pass the first, or the second, or the third clause of the Bill; and the third clause of the Bill was altered as much as it could possibly lie* altered, or rather a new clause drawn by the Attorney General was substituted for the third clause. The whole principle of making the speaker liable rather than the reporter was fully discussed, and the Committee decided the point unanimously. It would be idle to endeavour to conceal the fact that in a question of this sort there were conveniences and inconveniences on both sides, and the Committee had to decide on which side the balance lay. In this country public meetings, or rather meetings at which reporters were present, were of everyday occurrence on all sorts of things. Was it or was it not of great advantage, to the public to know what took place at these meetings? Take the case stated by the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets, the case of the railway meetings. Was it or was it not of advantage that the thousands of railway shareholders who were not and could not be present at those meetings should know what took place there? Again, look to the meetings under Local Government Acts. Should the ratepayers not have a fair and just report of what passed between their representatives when engaged in transacting parish business and voting the money of the ratepayers? In all these cases he answered in the affirmative, and proceeded to inquire whether it was just or not that the reporters of such meetings and the proprietor of the newspaper publishing the report should be liable, on account of some remarks which had fallen from a public speaker, to be mulcted not only in damages, but in the costs also, which was of much more importance, considering that the proceedings were in most cases instituted by some professional man solely for the purpose of getting costs on account of a matter which had resulted in damage to no one? Was it just that the man who spoke the libel should be liable to an action rather than the newspaper which reported him? Of course the report should be fair and full in the matter of explanation and denial, and if so the newspaper should be held blameless in his opinion. The speaker who uttered the libel was fully protected by the clause drawn by the Attorney General and adopted by the Committee. If a man in the heat of the moment made assertions which on reflection he would not have made, he was held harmless if he retracted the scandal. Was that a hardship on him? If he had not the honesty and manliness to retract, was it not right that he should be punished? He was aware that in former times spoken and written words were placed in different categories. Now-a-days meetings were taking place every day. Formerly the scandal which Tom uttered to Jack at the corner of the street was not libellous. At present a man going to a meeting to make a speech knew that his words would be taken down and recorded, and he ought to be careful what he said, and ought not to complain if he were afterwards called over the coals by persons supposed to be injured by his remarks. On a balance of conveniences and inconveniences he thought the Bill was on the side of the conveniences, and he would support the measure.

On the Motion for the second reading of this Bill, I expressed the opinion which I adhere to now, that the hon. and learned Baronet's proposed alteration of the law was entitled to great consideration. I therefore took an active part in the Committee which considered it, and I am bound to say that the Bill is entitled to be read a third time, although I agree with the hon. and learned Baronet in the opinion that in all probability it will not be passed into law this Session. The hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Whalley) said it was the duty of the Government, if it approved the hon. and learned Baronet's Bill, to have taken it out of his hands; but how can the Government take in hand all the numerous Bills of the hon. and learned Baronet? It seemed to me that he was perfectly entitled to bring in such a Bill, and I thought it but just to accord him a fair hearing. I formed a favourable opinion of the measure, and did as much as possible to amend it in the Select Committee. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) says it is a most objectionable thing to put the press under exceptional legislation; but surely he is aware that the press is under exceptional legislation already. Has he forgotten the Bill which he, in all probability, assisted in passing in 1843 for the purpose of enabling newspaper publishers to plead in answer to an action for libel that the passage complained of was inserted without malice and without neglect, and this plea should be accompanied by the payment of a sum of money into Court, and by the offer to insert an apology either in the journal which contained the libel, or in another, as the plaintiff might select? [Mr. NEWDEGATE: Is that an apology of the proprietor?] I was only on the point that exceptional legislation on the subject of newspapers exists at present; and the question raised by the Bill under discussion has been mooted before. Lord Campbell introduced a Bill in the House of Lords very much indeed in the form in which this Bill was brought in by the hon. and learned Baronet; and it was discussed to a very considerable extent.

That Bill kept the newspaper proprietor within the general provisions of the law of libel; this excepts him from them.

I think I am right in saying that the two Bills are very similar in principle. Lord Campbell tried to define more at length than is attempted in this Bill what meetings should be regarded as public, and which of those a newspaper might report; but he failed, because, as Lord Lyndhurst pointed out, it would be impossible to confine the enactment to those meetings or to do justice if it were so confined. The Select Committee considering this Bill thought a bonâ fide report of a meeting called for a lawful purpose, published without malice in the ordinary course of business should be allowed; but I thought that too great a privilege to extend to the press, unless the persons who spoke at the meeting were made answerable for the matter they uttered. Therefore it seemed to me that when any person at a public meeting expresses defamatory matter he should be liable to an action in the event of his refusing to publish an apology when his attention had been called to the libel he had uttered. There is nothing unfair in that. And with reference to the distinction which is set up between slander and libel, that the one is often spoken in heat, but that the other is written intentionally, I apprehend that where a person goes to a meeting which he knows to be of a public character, for the purpose of making a speech which he knows will be reported in the newspapers, it is hardly fair to allow him to say, "I knew all this; I used words reflecting on the character of another person; I decline to make any apology for what I have done, and I say you shant have a right to bring an action against me, although it was circulated throughout the country by the newspapers." It seems to me but fair that he should be made answerable. The principle agreed on by the House when this Bill was read a second time was this, that the person who deliberately utters words reflecting on the character of another should be liable for an action on account of those words, and should be free from such liability only when he had apologized. The hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) says that privilege is taken away by this Bill. I believe that it does nothing of the sort. [Mr. AYRTON: I said exactly the reverse—that the privilege of the speaker was fully maintained.] Every privilege which a person has is preserved by this Bill. The hon. and learned Member has assumed that it applies to ordinary newspapers only, but it applies to other publications. I confess I thought, and I think still, that a larger measure of justice ought to be meted out to the Press, in respect of cases where the publisher of a newspaper accidentally reports something which turns out to be defamatory, especially because there are too many persons ready to pounce down upon a publisher for the purpose of getting damages and costs from him on account of a matter for which he was not in the least to blame. I do not think it fair in discussing a Bill of this sort to say that those who brought it forward did so because the newspapers were urging them to press it through Parliament.

said, he thought the Bill good in respect of those of its provisions which increased the responsibility of speakers; but in getting this good by the Bill they were in danger of losing what might turn out to be of much more value—namely, the responsibility of the newspaper. The law worked very well at present; a great many foolish things were said at public meetings which the better class of papers did not publish, and those who spoke those foolish things were no doubt very glad when they found next morning that they had not been reported; and, as a great many mischievous as well as nonsensical remarks were made at meetings, he thought it unwise to diminish the responsibility of those who made it their business to circulate reports of public proceedings.

, who had given notice of his intention to move the following Instruction:—

"That it be an Instruction to the Committee that no new Bishopric be founded under the provisions of this Bill until a sum shall be raised by voluntary subscriptions, which shall provide not only for the stipend of the new Bishop, but shall also be sufficient to provide for all the other expenses of a cathedral establishment"—

inquired of the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair, whether he should be in Order in proposing it?

said, the course the hon. Member had intended to pursue was not in order, because the Committee had power already to make the alteration in the Bill to which the Instruction pointed. Where a thing could be done voluntarily it should not be done in a mandatory form.

said, he wished to explain that, although when this Bill was under discussion on a former occasion he had used words which had been so interpreted as to cause pain to the Bishop of Adelaide, nothing could have been further from his thoughts than a desire to cause that pain; and he was glad to be able to bear testimony to the admirable manner in which the Bishop of Adelaide discharged the duties of his office.

proposed to insert the following words:—

"Provided that no such scheme shall be submitted for confirmation to Her Majesty in Council until there shall have been paid or transferred to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners by voluntary gift or bequest, monies, securities, or estates, of which the annual interest, rents, or profits shall be sufficient to pay the annual income of the Bishop and of all other persons to be appointed to any office under such scheme according to the stipulations thereof, and all other charges and expenses of carrying the same into effect."

offered no objection to the Amendment: but the wording he thought might be improved if it were made to read—income of the Bishop and of all other persons, "if any."

, in proposing to omit this clause, said, that in the case of persons called upon to fulfil the double duties of Bishop and Peer of the realm, there was a necessity for maintaining a certain appearance in London; but a Bishop proposing to confine himself entirely to the local duties of his office had no need of an equally large income. Accordingly, he moved the omission of the clause, rendering it indispensable that the income of the new see should be equal to that of any existing see.

said, that this clause was not contained in the Bill as originally introduced by Lord Lyttelton, but was inserted upon a division by a majority of 1, at the instance of Earl Grey, and afterwards affirmed upon Report by a larger majority. The Peers who voted for that clause were induced to do so by a fear lest inequality of incomes among the different episcopal sees might revive the old objectionable practice of translation from one see to the other. He believed, however, that the moral feeling of the country, very different now from what it was in former times, would prevent translations taking place except in cases where these could be plainly justified upon public grounds. Even as matters stood, there were grave inequalities between the incomes of the different Bishops. Yet the present Bishop of Sodor and Man, who had less by £3,000 annually than the majority of English Bishops, had continued in the same see for a great number of years. He allowed full weight to the motives influencing noble Lords in the other House; but he certainly thought it would be an advantage if the Bill were, in this respect, restored to its original shape.

said, the clause was incomplete, as it only provided conditionally for the appointment of "a capitular body, minor canons, honorary canons, archdeacons, and other officers for the said diocese." The scheme, whatever its nature, ought to be complete in itself; this was a matter of principle, and therefore he proposed to leave out the words "if need be."

felt bound to object to the somewhat extravagant Conservatism of the hon. Member. He could not admit that the existence of deans and chapters was matter of principle in the Church of England. If a dean and chapter were insisted upon in the case of every bishop, they could hardly avoid a somewhat expensive cathedral; and these charges all thrown upon public subscription would tend to prevent or delay the Church of England obtaining those officers who were absolutely requisite for her proper spiritual administration.

said, it was in the highest degree undesirable to make necessary the payment of sinecure deans and chapters, and he intended to move an Amendment to Clause 7, which he thought would meet the views of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets, and the noble Lord the Member for Stamford. The principle of gratuitous canons and deans, so far as this new arrangement was concerned, was recognized by the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets in another Amendment of which he had given notice, referring to the salaries or emoluments, "if any," which they were to receive, and he (Sir Roundell Palmer) intended to move an Amendment to Clause 7, enabling the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to make provision for the residence, if any, and for the salaries or emoluments, if any, of the deans and chapters. The effect of that Amendment would be to recognize the principle which the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets had in view.

trusted his noble Friend the Member for Stamford would agree to that proposal. It would be simply strangling the Bill, and making it a nullity if private subscriptions were to endow opulent deans and canons. He believed it was essential to keep up the old ecclesiastical framework, but the offices should be allowed to be honorary; and he therefore hoped that the Amendment suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Richmond would be agreed to.

explained that his object was to determine at the outset whether the deans and other officers were to be endowed or not; so that after their appointment they would have no ground for coming forward and contending that revenues ought to be attached to their official positions unless this were distinctly expressed.

held that the dean and chapter as now existing constituted an innovation upon the ancient system under which the bishop was master of the diocese. He knew cases in which the bishop had been turned out of his own cathedral by the dean and chapter.

proposed to add at the end of the clause words to the effect that in any provision for the appointment of a capitular body the status and duties of such body should be regulated according to the mode prescribed by the 4th and 5th sections of the 13 and 14 Vict., so far as the same might be applicable to the circumstances of the case. He said that on the formation of the diocese of Manchester, a complete scheme was elaborated, the Act was most carefully considered, and it was desirable that any new dioceses to be formed in this country should be formed on the mode thus provided.

said, it was not fair, at a moment's notice, to ask them to adopt the provisions of that Act.

said, it was not necessary they should do so. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners had the precedent before them, and if they thought fit to follow it they could do so.

said, that the Amendment of the clause had rendered it unnecessary, and he therefore proposed its omission.

proposed to omit the words—

"Until the dean and canons of any new diocese shall have been completely endowed, according to a scale to be fixed in the said schemes, they shall not be bound to reside at the cathedral,"

and to insert words to the effect that it should be lawful for the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, in settling any scheme, to make such provision as to them should seem fit concerning the residence to be required from the dean and canons of any new diocese, having regard to the amount of the endowments, if any, leaving it optional to them to provide (in the concluding words of the clause) that the dean should hold an ecclesiastical benefice within the limits of the diocese. This Amendment, he said, would simply declare more effectually the object of the clause as it stood.

objected to an Amendment of this nature, which opened up so very large a question, being agreed to now. The hon. and learned Gentleman ought to have given notice of the change which he proposed. It would be much better if he would bring up this Amendment on the Report.

, who had given notice of an Amendment for striking out the clause, said, his reason for doing so was that it seemed to contemplate that at some future period the deans and canons were to be endowed, and it left the House hereafter to find the endowment as it could. In any Amendment care should be taken that any funds intended for the benefit of the people should not, by any contrivance, be appropriated for the endowment of dignified clergy. If his hon. and learned Friend would take care that the words introduced would not open the door to that abuse, but would secure to the inhabitants of a parish the funds that ought to be applied to their benefit, he should not see any objection to the clause.

said, the best plan would be to omit the clause altogether. The present position of the capitular bodies was a great scandal. He could understand a collegiate body living together for the common pursuit of a common object; but nothing could be more inefficient for its purpose than the present mode of regulating the residence of deans and chapters. What could be the common feelings of persons who never met together, and simply resided in a place for a set time? The hon. and learned Member for Richmond dropped a word which, to his mind, was a very fatal word for a Member of the Church of England—he spoke of "sinecure canons." The existing state of things as to sinecures was a scandal, and he did not wish to see any more sinecure canons created. If the canons had nothing to do why did they exist? It seemed to him that, under the 5th Clause there was abundant power to regulate generally the performance of Divine service, and the conditions of the existence of the titular authorities. It would be a bad thing to pass a clause which said that the present regulation of residence was the sort of thing that was satisfactory, and which implied that the term of residence was to be proportionate to the amount of stipend paid, and he thought it would be better on general grounds to omit the 7th Clause altogether.

said, that the purpose of the clause was to obviate and prevent just that which was apprehended by the hon. and learned Member for Exeter; it was to provide against deans and canons falling into the present stereotyped condition of the law with respect to residence, and to enable the Commissioners to do that which was obviously desirable — namely, to vary and depart from the present condition of things. He therefore hoped the hon. and learned Member for Exeter would take a different view of it.

said, the dean and chapter were to elect the Bishop, but who were to elect the dean and chapter? It would be desirable for the hon. and learned Member for Richmond to consider this matter, and bring up an amended clause on the Report which would provide for it. He suggested, further, that the dean, in the first instance should be appointed by the Crown, and the canons by the Bishop of the diocese out of which the new diocese was to be carved. Subsequently the future deans and canons should be appointed by the new Bishop of the new diocese. There was ample precedent for that course. Many of the English cathedrals had canons appointed by the Bishops, and in the four Welsh bishoprics the deans were also in the patronage of their respective Bishops.

said, rural deans would make good capitular bodies without the necessity for residence.

said, the dean and chapter would be appointed in the manner proscribed by the scheme, and would proceed to elect their Bishop.

said, the 5th clause enabled the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to provide for the appointment of the titular officers in the first instance, so that there would be no difficulty on that point. With regard to what had been said by the hon. and learned Member for Exeter, his objections were sound and solid objections to the present law, and applicable to the present capitular bodies, but they did not touch the present Bill in any way.

said, the hon. and learned Member for Richmond had given way too much, and the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets had made confusion worse confounded. The best plan was to let a Bishop be appointed if there were the money, and to strike out all the nonsense about the dean and chapter.

said, that when the hon. and learned Member for Richmond regarded a clause as clear and satisfactory, it might be taken for granted that it was so. He quite agreed with the hon. and learned Member for Exeter that recent legislation had greatly impaired the utility of their old cathedral institutions, but he did not believe that the existing canons were all sinecurists.

said, he only remarked that the hon. and learned Member for Richmond dropped the word "sinecure."

said, he only used the word in its legal sense, sinecure benefices being those without the cure of souls.

thought it would be better that the deans should hold benefices within the limits of particular cities.

moved to insert after the word "see," the words—

"Except any capital monies or securities of which the interest may be payable to the Bishop, and which shall be held in trust for him and his successors by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, subject to the directions, if any, of the donors thereof."

moved the omission of this clause. He thought it extremely undesirable that these new Bishops should have the right under any circumstances of sitting in the House of Lords. By giving them that privilege they would be placed in a false position—a position which, with the endowments they would probably possess, would be found irksome and burdensome, while their dioceses would be deprived to a great extent of their care and attention.

supported the clause. The Bishops had now ceased to sit by tenure, their property being subjected to the control of the same Commission under whose management that of the new Bishops was to be placed.

wished to join in the appeal made by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets. To assent to the clause would render the position of the Bishops having seats in the House of Lords very anomalous. We had assented in principle to the creation of great ecclesiastical officers, whose temporal circumstances would in all probability be such that to impose upon them the duty of sitting in the House of Lords would be to impose upon them the burden of sitting in the House of Lords. It would be to call upon them to assume a rank, and to discharge the social duties connected with that rank, to which their temporal means would be quite inadequate. It was to the fact of poor bishoprics such as those of Exeter and Oxford, which in former times did not exceed £1,500 a year, being connected with seats in the House of Lords, that the objectionable system of translation had grown up.

said, that when the Bishop of Sodor and Man had no seat in the House of Lords it could not be contended that the proposal introduced a novelty. If we established new Bishops for ecclesiastical purposes alone, without connecting them with Parliamentary duties, we should get rid of the objections to any future increase of bishoprics, which would inevitably recur, if every such measure must involve a re-consideration and re-settlement of the title of the Spiritual Peers to their seats in Parliament. Having charge of the Bill, he should have felt bound to support the retention of the clause had there been any material differences of opinion in the Committee. As, however, it appeared to be the general feeling that the clause should be omitted he should not raise his voice in its support.

said, the effect of this Bill, in connection with the existing law, would be to exclude four Bishops at a time from seats in the House of Lords, thus making an approach to the system of rotation adopted in the case of the Irish Church. He therefore did not see his way so clearly as his right hon. Friend the Member for South Lancashire; but, with the precedent of Sodor and Man before them, he saw no reason to apprehend evil consequences.

said, he would have been inclined to support the retention of the clause if his hon. and learned Friend had insisted upon its being retained. Still, he was desirous that the unanimity with which the Bill was received should be undisturbed, and he should not oppose the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets. He might, perhaps, hope from the unanimity which had marked the progress of the Bill that the same absence of political considerations would attend the appointment of these new Bishops, and that they would be selected solely on account of their fitness for the duties.

anticipated great benefit to the Church from the Bill.

moved the insertion of the following clause:—

"No Bishop hereby authorized shall, as such Bishop, be liable or entitled to be summoned to attend in Parliament, or to sit therein."

moved the following clause:—

"And whereas it is expedient that assistance should be provided for Bishops who may be disabled by old age or other infirmity, and that for this purpose facilities should be given for the more ready and convenient application of an Act passed in the twenty-sixth year of the reign of King Henry the Eighth, chapter fourteen, intituled 'An Act for nomination of Suffragans and Consecration of them,' which Act is still in force: Be it Enacted, That so much of that Act be and is hereby repealed, as relates to territorial titles to be taken from certain towns in England, as episcopal sees for such suffragans, and that any suffragan who may be henceforth nominated and consecrated under that Act, be called and styled Suffragan Bishop, or Coadjutor, without any such territorial title; and that in case of mental decay and failure, duly certified, of a Bishop of a diocese: Be it Enacted, That the Archbishop of the province in which the diocese is situate, be and hereby is empowered to act on his behalf, and to provide a Suffragan or Coadjutor for the said Bishop according to the terms of the said Act, as modified in the manner hereinbefore mentioned."

The law on the subject was in a most disgraceful state, and the Report of the Committee of the Upper House of Convocation was a sufficient justification for his endeavouring to amend the present Bill by such a clause as he proposed.

objected to the clause on the ground that there was already a remedy existing, and which had been applied hitherto without difficulty—namely, by passing a short Act of Parliament. If the Bishop died, and the Suffragan succeeded as a matter of course, this clause would give a great increase of power to the episcopate, and if the Suffragan was not necessarily to succeed to the see, the clause would be open to the objection that it would largely increase the number of Bishops in the anomalous position of being without dioceses.

asked how these suffragan Bishops were to be remunerated under this clause. It would be necessary on adopting this clause to pass another directing what portion of the income of the Bishop should be given to the person appointed as Suffragan to discharge the Bishop's duties. He considered that legislation was necessary with regard to the mode of paying Archbishops, Bishops, and clergymen. When they could not do their duties it was not right that they should, as at present, receive the full emoluments of their offices. The clause opened a very wide question which he thought had better be dealt with next Session in a measure dealing with the whole question of superanuation in the Church.

admitted that the right hon. Gentleman had raised a question of considerable interest and importance, but thought they were hardly in a position at present to come to a decision on the clause. Means should be afforded to remunerate the Suffragan; but it was not easy at a moment to decide how the provision should be made. He advised his right hon. Friend not to press the clause, because, although there was no objection to make provision for the payment of the suffragan Bishops in the case referred to, they were not at once prepared to adopt the proposal submitted to them.

said, that the Act of Henry VIII. provided that the Archbishop should submit the names of the ecclesiastics of the Crown, and that the Crown should nominate one of them. No arbitrary power of appointing suffragans would therefore be given by the clause.

admitted, that the present state of superannuation in the Church was a scandal, and he should like to see a remedy applied. What they wanted was to have a person to discharge the episcopal duties in the diocese of an incapacitated Bishop. No person suggested that there was any evil in the proposed remedy, and if they agreed to the clause there was nothing to prevent them from making a better arrangement in a future year.

remarked, that the adoption of the clause would increase the power of the Bishops, and he was not surprised that the Upper House of Convocation was in favour of it.

urged his right hon. Friend not to press the clause, because it was not germane to the present measure. The question was raised in the House of Lords, but the proposition met with considerable opposition, and was rejected.

moved, in consequence of the rejection of the 9th Clause, the addition of a clause to the effect that the number of Bishops in the House of Lords should not be increased by virtue of the operation of this Act.