said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is the intention of Government to bring in a Bill this or nest Session to give effect to the Recommendations agreed to by the right hon. Gentleman and a majority of the Select Committee on Poor Rate Assessment—namely, that so much of any Public or Local Act as permits composition for Rates in other than Parliamentary Boroughs should be repealed, and that all Local Rates should be merged into one (Consolidated) Rate, to be assessed and collected together, so as to make the future Parliamentary Franchise for Boroughs dependent upon the payment of all or any Local Rate other than the Poor Rate, as is now the statutory qualification by the Reform Act of 1867?

in reply, said, that he was scarcely in a position, so recently after the Committee had made their Report, to give any intimation as to what the intentions of the Government might be on that subject. For himself personally, however, as a Member of that Committee, he could state that he concurred in the recommendation that all those rates should be combined and should be collected by instalments as the best mode of procedure. But how the plan should be carried out must be a matter for future consideration.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Whether he will lay upon the Table of the House any Reports or Extracts from Reports made by our Military Attaches at Vienna and Berlin, relating to the quantity of ammunition used by the armies in Bohemia in the campaign of 1866, and especially of the number of rounds per gun' fired at the battle of Königrätz?

in reply, said, that he had made inquiries in the Department that morning with the view of answering the Question of the hon. and gallant Member, and he found that they had no statements of that nature which he could lay on the table with any confidence in their possessing official authority. The subject was, indeed, mentioned by the military correspondents in some of their letters, but he was told there were no documents in the Office which could be presented to the House as affording authoritative information which they could rely upon.

said, he would beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether the Government will undertake that the Report of the Select Committee on the House of Commons Arrangements shall be carefully considered during the Recess, so that provision according to the views of the Government may be made in the Estimates for next year?

said, that though the Question was addressed to the First Lord of the Treasury, it might be desirable, he apprehended, for him to give an answer. During the Recess Her Majesty's Government would give their most careful consideration, not only to the Report of the Committee over which the right hon. Gentleman presided, but also to the Report which he understood from the right hon. and gallant Member for Roscommon (Colonel French) was to be presented by the Kitchen Committee, with the view of proposing such alterations as might be deemed necessary in the next Session of Parliament.

said, that the Bill ought to apply to Ireland as well as to England, and for the purpose of raising the question he begged to move that the words "or Dublin" be inserted after the word "Westminster." It was perfectly obvious that there should be the same law on the subject for England and Ireland.

said, he was desirous that the Bill would be made to apply to Scotland also. Election Petitions were very rare in that country, but he thought it would be well to provide for the contingency.

observed that the adoption of the Amendment would necessitate an alteration of the whole framework of the Bill.

said, he took the same view. If the Amendment were carried, it would be almost impossible to pass the Bill in the present Session, for it would have to be sent back to the draftsman to be re-cast. A better mode of proceeding would be to have separate short Bills for Scotland and Ireland.

said, he had no objection to the principle of the Amendment, if Irish Members on both sides were satisfied that the fulfilment of those duties could be intrusted to Irish judges, who, he thought, would require no addition to their staff for the purpose. Supposing that they legislated for Ireland on this point, they must also legislate for Scotland, and he was of opinion that it would not be necessary to increase the number of the Scotch judges for the fulfilment of such duties. But he feared that in adopting the Amendment the Committee would be embarking on a sea of troubles, and would not be able to go on with the Bill as at present framed, and, therefore, if they legislated for Ireland and Scotland, they must do so, he apprehended, by separate measures. However, after the Bill as it stood was considered in Committee, it might be found possible to introduce a clause in respect to Ireland and Scotland, and the Government would consider that point.

said, he wished to know distinctly whether, if the present Bill passed, the Government would introduce similar measures for Ireland and Scotland? If they did not, the result would be that as regards those countries the trial of Election Petitions would still be conducted by a tribunal which the House declared to be incompetent in reference to England. And yet the right hon. Gentleman (the First Minister of the Crown) might, perhaps, say in the end that the function of trying Election Petitions could not be entrusted to a single Irish judge, who might have been, before his elevation to the Bench, noted for being of a different party complexion from the man whose seat he had to decide on.

said, that the Irish Bench was composed of men who in many instances had been Members of that House, and had discharged their duties on Election Committees with impartiality, and was it to be supposed that on being made Judges they become incapable of properly discharging the same functions? On the contrary, hon. Members, when transferred to the Bench, lost their politics. Mr. Whiteside was a strong partizan when in that House, but, by the consent of all men in Ireland, he was declared to be a conscientious and impartial Judge.

said, he thought the statement of the right hon. Gentleman (the First Lord of the Treasury) was perfectly fair and satisfactory.

said, the assumption was that this Bill would be a good measure as against corruption. Now, in some of the Irish boroughs corruption had prevailed to a very great extent. He desired the same legislation should extend to the whole kingdom. He did not want to impede the Bill. If the right hon. Gentleman would give a pledge that if this Bill passed for England he would introduce another Bill for Ireland and Scotland, he would be satisfied. He did not care how the thing was done; all he wanted was a distinct understanding that the same legislation should be applied to the three kingdoms.

said, he did not think this was dealing fairly and honourably by the right hon. Gentleman (the First Lord of the Treasury), who had distinctly stated what he should do. It was childish to go on as they were doing. The real object was to obstruct the Bill.

said, he did not wish to be misunderstood. He had not said he would proceed by separate legislation for Ireland and Scotland, but he did pledge himself to this—that when this Bill was carried through they might introduce some clause that might apply to Ireland and Scotland. So far he would pledge himself. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Bouverie) said first that it was impossible to apply this legislation to Ireland; and, second, that he would never consent to this legislation for England unless it should be applied to Ireland. What was the inevitable inference from the two propositions but that the attempt to apply it to Ireland was a side-wind attack on the Bill itself?

said, he objected to the whole scheme of the rota. The Government in this clause seemed to lose sight of the fact that the object of the Bill was to meet two entirely different classes of cases. The first embraced Election Petitions that would result from the General Election, and the second the more casual Election Petitions arising during the continuance of Parliament. There was no real resemblance between those two classes of cases. The Petitions arising out of the General Election would all be presented and brought into the Court of Common Pleas on the same day or within a week. Of these there might be forty; the casual Election Petitions did not exceed two in the course of a six months' Session. Now, I they were attempting to deal by the same machinery with both sets of Petitions. They proposed to select three Judges, and if they thought they were not sufficient to deal with the number of Petitions within a convenient time, to appoint new Judges to the Courts at Westminster, the reason of whose appointment would expire whenever these forty Election Petitions were disposed of. Was that a reasonable mode of treating the question? There was a defect in the clause which should at once be remedied. They left it to the Judges to say what time was reasonable—whether one or two months—within which the Petitions should be determined, whereas they ought to insist on a guarantee that the Petitions presented should be determined within a reasonable time. He would suggest an arrangement under which all difficulties would vanish. The Election would be about the beginning of the November term. Petitions would not be presented within forty days after the Election, or forty-five days when the recognizances were questioned. That would bring them to the middle of December, when the Judges were about to go all over the country to hold their winter criminal assize. Why, then, should they not avail themselves of this arrangement which Providence placed in their way, when the Judges and the Bar were in the country, to dispose of these Petitions? They were entitled to have an effort made at that time for the trial of the Petitions, and, if necessary, that other business should be postponed. The rota would interpose unnecessary difficulties in the way of the accomplishment of their object. But, to go further, it was extremely inconvenient that three particular Judges should be selected to discharge this duty. It would be much better for the whole of the Judges to meet together when the Election Petition list was complete and decide how they should all distribute themselves about the country for the purpose of trying these Petitions, Just in the same way as they distributed themselves at the spring, summer, and the winter assizes. Of course, if it were thought desirable, the Chief Justices of the three Common Law Courts could remain in London. It was absurd to appoint a rota of three Judges to try casual Petitions, of which only two or three might be presented in the course of a twelvemonth. Another objection to the rota was that the particular Judge whose turn it was to try an Election Petition might be particularly required to discharge some of the ordinary business of the Courts just at the time he was taken away to try the Petition. It would be far better to place in the hands of the Judges the power to determine which of their number should try any particular Election Petition. He, hoped that the Government would consent to the omission of the words relating to the rota. He begged to move to leave out the words "to be selected from a rota to be formed as hereinafter mentioned."

said, he; failed to see any practical objection in the speech of the hon. and learned Member to the proposal that the Judges should elect three of their number to try Election Petitions. The word "rota" was well known to the Judges, because they attended by "rota" to try prisoners at the Old Bailey. The ''rota" for Election Petitions was ordinarily to' consist of three Judges, but in case of a, General Election power was to be given to appoint other Judges. When the hon. and learned Member proposed that all the Judges should be liable to discharge this particular duly, did he mean that they were all to have an increase of £500 per annum in their incomes? The hon. and learned Member could not have attended the Bar very lately, or he would scarcely have stated that all the Judges went the winter circuit. The fact was that but few of them went the circuit. Did the hon. Member seriously propose that Judge should "turn to" and try first a prisoner and then an Election Petition alternately? The idea was perfectly preposterous. The hon. Member had further said that the Bar went the winter circuit, but he must have forgotten that only the junior portion of the Bar, who were just beginning to learn their profession, went that circuit. He hoped that the words the hon. Member proposed to omit would be retained.

said, he was greatly surprised by the flippancy of the observations of the Solicitor General upon the speech of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton). In his (Mr. Serjeant Gaselee's) opinion, the Judges to try these Petitions should be selected by ballot, and not by rota. As he understood, the selected Judges were to be on the rota for the whole year, or how would they get the extra £500? He had no objection to an increase in the salaries of the Judges generally, as he bought they were underpaid; but he objected to this £500 a year being paid hem as a sort of bribe to induce them to undertake the duty. He saw no reason why a Judge should not try a prisoner one lay and an Election Petition the next, n the same way as a Judge on Circuit tried a prisoner one day and a civil cause he next. He objected, in the first place, to the Judges being appointed to try Election Petitions by rota; secondly, to those Judges being appointed for a year; and, Thirdly, to its being known beforehand which of the Judges would have to try the case. He should support the Amendment on the ground that it would carry out more Fully the original plan, which unquestionably agreed with the opinion of the majority of the House—namely, that the Judges trying Election Petitions should occupy the position more of Jurors than of Judges.

said, he wished to point out an objection to the appointment by rota of the Judges to try the Election Petitions, which had apparently escaped the learned Solicitor General; which was that each of three Judges might have to try ten or twelve of these Petitions, instead of the whole of the Judges dividing the responsibility of deciding these crises among them. He thought they were running a risk of placing the Judges in a very invidious position. The greatest lawyer in the House had pointed out in a previous debate that one Judge might be more or less objected to than another, but here they were to have the same Judges over and over again. He wished to know why these three Judges should have £500 per annum more that the rest of the Judges for deciding a few of these cases once in every six years—because it was impossible to take the casual Petitions into consideration. Was the £500 intended as an equivalent for travelling expenses? He hoped that there would be some further explanation of the matter on the part of the Government.

said, it would be more satisfactory if instead of appointing a rota of three Judges the whole of the Judges were to take the trial of Election Petitions in turn. He wished to direct the attention of the Committee to the fact that the £500 a year which was to be paid to the Judges appointed for the purpose of trying Petitions was intended by way of extra salary and not in lieu of expenses, which, by another provision, were to be defrayed out of the Treasury. He certainly could not see any reason for paying an additional £500 a year to the three Judges to be appointed for the trial of these Petitions.

said, that the proposal to select Judges from a rota was in accordance with the plan adopted at the trial of criminals at the Old Bailey. In the course of three or four years all the Judges went through that work. They ought to trust the Judges and consult their convenience. He believed that the proposal made by the Government would be the most convenient for the Judges, for the Bar and also for the public.

said, he would beg to remind the Committee that they were not now discussing the question of an additional £500 a year being given to the Judges appointed for the trial of these Petitions. The question before the Committee was as to the selection from a rota, and it would be better perhaps if the Committee adhered to the plan usually followed, and to discuss only that portion of the measure which was immediately under consideration.

said, he thought it would be better to permit the appointment of as many Puisne Judges as the pressure of Election Petitions might require, instead of determining at once on the selection of a certain number for a rota.

said, he wished to remind the House that the Lord Chief Justice of England had written a letter to the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government upon this subject. That letter contained the following passages:—

"In conformity with your wishes, I have consulted the Judges, and I am charged by them, one and all, to convey to you their strong and unanimous feeling of insuperable repugnance to having these new and objectionable duties thrust upon them. We are unanimously of opinion that the inevitable consequence of putting Judges to try Election Petitions will be to lower and degrade the Judicial office, and to destroy, or, at all events, materially impair the confidence of the public in the thorough impartiality and inflexible integrity of the Judges when, in the course of their ordinary duties, political matters come incidentally before them.… I have only, in conclusion, to protest in the name of all the Judges and my own, most earnestly and emphatically, against the proposed scheme, as one which, besides being unconstitutional and unjust towards the Judges, is calculated to degrade the character of the Bench, to impair the confidence and esteem now happily entertained for the Judges, as well as their influence and utility, and most seriously to interfere with the administration of Justice."

He now desired to ask the right hon. Gentleman the First Minister of the Crown whether he had had any fresh communication with the Judges, and whether as the scheme now proposed to the Committee was practically the same as that of which the Lord Chief Justice had written so strongly, he had received any retraction of the opinions which he had just read, or whether, indeed, the fact was that the scheme, in its present form, had never been submitted to the Judges at all?

I will observe only that the opinion referred to was expressed a considerable time ago, and that it is now generally admitted that time influences even unanimous opinions. That opinion was, moreover, expressed at a harsh period of the year, when people are not sanguine in their temperament. I have, therefore, every hope that her Majesty's Judges will now take a larger and more expansive view of the circumstances of the case and of their duties; and if the House will but agree to the Bill we have introduced, Her Majesty's Judges will, I have little doubt, carry out its provisions to the. utmost of their ability.

I must remark that the right hon. Gentleman has not answered my Question.

pointed out that practically the House was saying to every one of its Members, including the Attorney General and all Members of the Bar among them, that they were incompetent to try an Election Petition as long as they were Members of the House, but that as soon as any learned Member was raised to the Bench he immediately became endowed with superior ability.

said, it must not be lost sight of that they were giving the Judges power to provide one of their number with an extra £500 a year. He presumed there would be some sort of canvassing among the Judges for the post, though he did not suppose they would issue election addresses. He could not, therefore, refrain from expressing a hope that the House would not hereafter hear of Election Petitions against the Judges themselves.

said, he thought the Committee ought to consider that the Government were placed in considerable difficulty in this matter, and that they deserved credit for touching this question at all. He looked upon the Bill ns an experiment, and, although he did not approve all its provisions, he would vote for it, because it would enable the House to escape from one of the very worst systems with which it had ever been hampered. But an unnecessary difficulty had been imported into the scheme in the shape of the £500 a year proposal. He recommended the Government to get rid of that proposal, and all would go smoothly. There was no necessity for it; the work of the Judges would be made much lighter by the Bill, and they could arrange for this extra work among themselves as they arranged for for the transaction of all other business; the Judges would, at the same time, be rid of the odium which might possibly attach to their voting £500 a year to one of their number. No doubt the increase of pay would induce the Bench to look with more favour on the Bill; but the House had but one duty before it, and that was to put an end to bribery. His own opinion was that a Judge going down to a borough would strike terror into the hearts of the corrupt, and do great things for enforcing purity of elections.

said, he thought that the question before the Committee should be decided before other matters were discussed.

said, the Amendment divided itself into two parts. First, the Judges were to meet on receipt of a Petition, and arrange who should try it; secondly, the trial was to terminate within two months. The first point was practically decided on the last section, when the House decided there should be a rota; and as to the second, he had to say only that a proposal to legislate that a trial should be completed within two months had never before been entertained in any civilized country.

said, he preferred the Amendment of the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton).

said, he understood the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets to intend, not that all the trials should be completed within two months, but that they should be commenced within that period.

said, his proposition was that they should fix a term for the commencement of the trial. If two months were too short they could alter the period, or insert the words—well known to the law—"within a reasonable time."

said, he wished to call attention to the way in which the section was framed. Its effect would be to put Election Petitions under the control of an Officer of the Crown. Any Secretary of State was to have power to regulate the trial of Election Petitions. In certain cases, if there was no interference by any such officer, the Petition could not be tried. If hon. Members accepted everything that was proposed to be put into the Bill because it was called a Bill for the Prevention of Corrupt Practices at Elections, they would deserve to be compared to those animals who swallow bait which, though smeared with something savoury, contains poison. In his opinion, the interposition of a Secretary of State was wholly unnecessary, and the natural course of proceedings would be to leave the matter in the hands of the Chief Justice, who could ask the members of his Court to make proper arrangements. He proposed as an Amendment to leave out the words "one of Her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State," in order to insert the words "Chief Justice of the Court."

said, he thought it would be better still that the matter should be left in the hands of the Judges on the rota, and suggested that the words "Chief Justice of the Court" should be struck out of the Amendment.

said, that the proviso in this section was a most unhappy one. It was proposed to enact that Judges should sit in the Superior Courts with the stigma of Parliament upon them, to the effect that they could not be trusted to do some of their duties. Anything more offensive to a Judge it was difficult to conceive. It seemed that they were to have two years of purification; but he (Mr. Ayrton) never before heard of any system of purification which extended over so long a period as two years. In converting a wretched Hindoo into a Brahmin it was only necessary that he should be steeped in jar of oil for nine days, and at the end of that period he came forth a Brahmin. Surely some shorter mode of purifying a Judge night be found; but, in his opinion, it would be better to leave out the latter part of the section altogether, and he therefore moved to omit the proviso.

said, he had no objection to omit the words objected to.

said, that the danger which it was intended to guard against was that of having partizans acting as Judges. A Gentleman who had taken part in the heated conflicts of that House might be transplanted to the Bench, and might, but for some such provision as this be at once engaged in trying Election Petitions. Whether he had to try the case of an opponent or that of a political friend the result was sure to be that there would be a charge of partiality brought against the Bench. The principle of the Bill was that such a man was to be distrusted as one of a Committee; but the moment he got upon the Bench he was to have full confidence placed in him.

suggested that the right hon. Gentleman had better move that no Member of Parliament should be made a Judge.

said, they had now arrived at that part of the Bill which provided that the Petition should be tried not before the Judge, but by the Judge without the assistance of a jury. It was proposed that he should not only without the intervention of a jury determine questions of fact, but also decide questions of law affecting the scat of a Member, his capacity to sit in Parliament for seven years, and the qualifications of electors. This was an enormous power to give to a single Judge. If an act of corruption was to be tried, involving a comparatively small punishment, the question of fact must be decided by a jury; but where the act of bribery was to affect the validity of the Election and deprive a Member of his seat, the Judge alone was to determine it. In fact, the person tried for bribery—it might be in the same Court, if not at the same sitting—might be acquitted by the jury, so that there would be an absolute reversal of the decision of the Judge by the verdict of the jury. That was a very unfortunate position in which to place a Judge. Would it be competent in such a case to sue out a pardon from the Crown against the decision of a Judge in these circumstances? Looking at the penal consequences of a conviction under these petitions, it was necessary that the case should be tried, as in other criminal cases, by a jury. The consciences of twelve men afforded a better guarantee for impartiality than that of a single Judge did. If the Committee assented to the proposition that all matters of fact were to be tried by a jury, it would be easy enough to adopt a course which would secure a jury whose minds were unbiassed with reference to the matter under inquiry. He begged to move as an Amendment, to leave out all the words in the clause after the word "tried" in line 15, for the purpose of inserting the words "by a jury to be selected as hereinafter provided." If that Amendment were adopted, all matters of law relating to these Election Petitions would be tried by a Judge, while all questions of fact would be decided by a jury of the people of this country.

pointed out a more convenient method by which the questions before the Committee could be put, and concluded by observing that in the multitude of words there was not much wisdom.

said, possibly the course proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) was a more convenient one than that which had been taken. Still the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets had a right to put his Amendment in the way he had done.

said, it was utterly impossible that the scheme proposed by the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) could be carried out practically. A jury might decide one or two issues of fact easily enough; but it was too much to expect them to come to a unanimous decision upon questions of the complicated character that were sure to arise at the trial of Election Petitions, where they would have to agree upon not one, but perhaps twenty issues of fact. The result would be that in every case the jury would have to be discharged without giving a verdict.

said, that these words would confine the trial on the spot to cases in which corrupt practices were charged; but he thought that in other cases—for instance, in the case of a scrutiny—there should be a local proceeding.

said, be would beg to move an Amendment binding the Judges in their procedure to respect the decisions and Judgments of the House. The inquiries of Election Committees were various in their character, and there was only one way by which proper relations between the House and the new tribunal could be preserved, and that was that the authority of the House should be fully recognized, and that the new tribunal should be guided in everything they did by the course followed by the House, whether that course were right or wrong. It was quite clear that I unless they did that there would at no very distant date be a continual conflict between the House and the Court they were now setting up.

objected to the Amendment, because he regarded it as unnecessary, and feared that it would be dangerous. Indeed, he looked upon it as the last effort on the part of the hon. I and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) to retain the jurisdiction in the House of Commons by making the House a kind of Court of Appeal to the tribunal they were now establishing. There was nothing in this Bill which gave the decision of the Judge any greater effect than the decision of an Election Committee; and, therefore, if any danger would exist after this Bill was passed, it had existed a long time. The Amendment served no good purpose, and could lead to nothing but ill.

said, that the House had had control over Committees, but the Judges might treat the Orders and Resolutions of the House as waste paper. There had been a struggle for centuries between the House and the Bench, and now the House with their eyes open were going to part with their privileges. They were about to rush with haste into what those who came after them would repent at leisure. He would support the Amendment as calculated to mitigate the evils the Bill would entail.

said, he had intended, before the clause was finally agreed to, to make some observations in vindication of a plan which was embodied in three pages of Amendments that stood on the Notice Paper in his name. As the Committee had, however, already virtually decided against his plan, he would not now press his Amendments.

said, he hoped the House, out of regard for its own dignity and character, would reject that clause, which was without parallel in the history of their legislation. Surely, when the law had been declared by a tribunal over which the House was to have no control, it was not to be supposed that the House would break the law. It should be left entirely to the House itself to say what it should or should not enter on its own Journals.

pointed out—as a precedent for that clause—that by the 86th section of the 11 & 12 Vict.c. 98 it was enacted that the decisions of Election Committees should be entered on the Journals of the House.

said, that the latter portion of the clause cut two ways, and would be likely to do more harm than good. If, in the case of corrupt practices, all the inhabitants of the locality were to be fined by paying the expenses of a Commission, the result would be that everyone of them would be interested in preventing corrupt practices being proved. The real danger of the Bill already was that it tended to prevent the discovery of corrupt practices, and this provision would add another motive to those which already prevailed to induce persons to refrain from giving evidence. He hoped the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Sandford) would leave out that portion of the clause which threw the expenses of Commissions on the locality.

said, it was the opinion of the Committee, which sat on the subject last year, that the object to be kept in view was rather the prevention of corrupt practices in the first instance than the disclosure of such practices when they had taken place. They thought that to throw the expenses of the inquiry upon the locality, where it was proved that corrupt practices had prevailed, would have the effect of preventing those corrupt practices being committed. It appeared, however, to him that the addition moved by the hon. Member would inflict injustice in certain cases.

said, he thought the most effectual way of preventing corrupt practices was by charging the expense of the inquiry upon the locality.

said, he objected to the expense being thrown upon the whole of the inhabitants of a locality, as it would be making the innocent suffer with the guilty. He feared that such a provision would render it the interest of the inhabitants of a borough where bribery had prevailed to have no petition presented.

said, he was happy to be able, on the present occasion, to vote with the Government.

said, that if the object was to prevent bribery, they had better not throw the expense of checking it on the offending locality, or they never would be able to discover the commission of corrupt practices, as people would band together in order to keep them from becoming known.

asked whether it was necessary to carry the delusion further, that the respectable inhabitants of a borough knew nothing about the corruption which took place in their midst? In some boroughs it was necessary to settle the "difficulty" which arose with regard to the voters who objected to bribery and those who were in favour of it before a candidate could be chosen. He believed that the imposition of a fine on a borough for corruption would tend to lessen the evil.

pointed out that the proposed Amendment would make the issue of a Commission imperative when a single case of bribery had been committed, although the Judge might be of opinion that bribery had not extensively prevailed. He thought it would be a hardship to the inhabitants of the county or borough to issue a Commission in cases where the Judge was of opinion there were only one or two cases of bribery.

observed that a Commission would issue under the clause as it stood only on the Address of both Houses of Parliament. He thought a Commission should issue unless the Judge should certify that no further acts of bribery had occurred beyond those he had already inquired into.

reminded his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) that the Judge was, under a previous clause, bound to report in writing to the Speaker whether there was reason to believe that corrupt practices had extensively prevailed.

contended that it should be imperative to issue a Commission where corrupt practices had extensively prevailed; and therefore it was necessary to consider by whom the proceedings were to be carried out after the Judge had decided that corrupt practices had prevailed. He remembered a case which had come before an Election Committee, of which the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter) was Chairman. The Committee reporte that corrupt practices had extensively prevailed; but, as the Chairman declined to move an Address, no inquiry had taken place from that day to this.

If that is the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman, he should say "No" to; the clause, and bring up a new clause himself.

said, he thought that the meaning of the words "extensive bribery" ought to be defined. Did they mean corruption to the extent of 5 or 10 per cent of the constituency?

maintained that on receipt of a Report from the Judge that bribery and corruption prevailed, a Commission should issue forthwith.

said, he was surprised at the mistake into which the right hon. I Gentleman (Mr. Russell Gurney) had fallen when he said it would be the duty of the Judge to inquire whether corruption had been prevalent. All that would devolve on the Judge would be to take such evidence as would decide the question of the seat.

observed that, in such a case at present, a Commission issued for the purpose of legislation, on the Address of the two Houses, to enable them to know whether the place should be disfranchised. A shorthand writer would attend the inquiry before the Judges, and his Report would be sent to the House, so that they would have the means of knowing everything that occurred.

By whom will the Address be moved?

said, he would answer the hon. and learned Member by asking who moved the Address in the House of Lords at present?

said, they were not legislating for the House of Lords; they were legislating for the House of Commons, and it was sufficient for him to have to do with the House of Commons. At present, the Chairman of the Election Committees who made the Report was a Member of the House, and could be brought to the table, but it surely was not intended that the Judge should be ordered to attend at the Bur, and explain what took place on the inquiry. After the Judge sent the certificate with regard to the prevalence of corrupt practices to Mr. Speaker, upon whom would devolve the duty of moving the Address? Unless they knew who was to move for the Commission in that House it would be better that the Commission should go as a matter of course.

said, that if the Amendment were carried a stop would be put to corrupt practices, as the inhabitants would exert themselves to prevent such practices being carried on.

said, that as he had an important Amendment to propose, and there was not time for the discussion, he would beg to move that the Committee report Progress.

said, he wished for some more explicit understanding as to the moving of these Addresses. He should otherwise feel it necessary to raise the question again. Was the duty to fall on the Government, or would it devolve upon any hon. Member who chose to wade through the short-hand notes? Unless he had a distinct understanding on that point he should move the rejection of the clause with the view to bringing up a fresh one.

If the right hon. Gentleman is desirous of preserving the privileges of this House, why does he grudge hon. Members the privilege of moving these Addresses?

objected to the performance of the duty being left to the inclination of any private Member.

rose to call attention to the deficiency of Workhouse dietaries in Ireland, and to move That, in the opinion of this House, the Poor Law Commissioners of Ireland should establish a minimum scale of dietary for the Paupers in the Union Workhouses not less than that now in existence in the Irish County Gaols, and which was recommended by the Commission appointed to report on the County Prison Dietaries, "as necessary for the preservation of the health of the prisoners." A year ago he brought under the notice of the noble Earl the Chief Secretary for Ireland the deficiency of the gaol dietaries in Ireland. The noble Earl gave an assurance that the subject would be inquired into, and soon after a Commission was issued for the purpose consisting of three gentlemen most eminent in their profession. They recommended that the dietary should be increased by a supper of six ounces of bread and half a pint of milk. The county prison dietary now consisted of 28 ounces of solid food n day, or 196 ounces per week. He would take the Woterford Union as an illustration of the workhouse dietary, as it was quite as good there as almost anywhere else. The able men had about 170 ounces of solid food in the week, or 26 ounces less than the prisoners confined for terms beyond a month, so that the latter got more in seven days than the paupers got in eight days. In Clonmel and other unions the condition of the pauper was even worse. Some unions gave a supper; but, although that was an improvement, still, with very few exceptions, there was no actual increase in the quantity of food, as the supper was usually made up of reductions from the breakfast and dinner. When three competent gentlemen had laid down a certain amount of food as essential to keep county prisoners in health, the same rule ought to be applied to the paupers. Except for the seclusion the condition of the prisoner was better than that of the workhouse pauper. He had a better bed, a nicer sleeping apartment, a pleasant temperature kept up, and not harder work to do, on the whole, than the pauper. As the Gaol Commissioners had recommended in the event of the same hard labour being introduced in the Irish county prisons as existed in England, that meat should be added to the dietary, it was as impolitic as it was unjust to place the person compelled, as was often the case, to enter a workhouse for no fault of his own, in a worse position as regarded the necessaries of life than the prisoner expiating a crime; indeed, it offered a direct incentive to the violation of the law. Besides, as a matter of economy, it was better for the ratepayers to maintain the able-bodied pauper in a state of health that would enable him to gain a livelihood outside. A Return, ordered at the instance of Mr. Cogan, showed some curious facts with regard to workhouse dietaries. There were 164 unions. In 91, there were only 2 meals; in 73, there were 3 meals given. Forty excluded the old and infirm from the third meal. Three unions excluded women only from the third meal, and three more refused a supper to infants. The exclusion of the old and infirm was most inhuman; far better instead of killing them by inches would it be to do as was done in India with old people—put them on a raft and send them off to sea. Humanity, independent of everything else, required that the State should see that those whom it undertook to protect should have their health and strength maintained at a fair standard. From the success which attended his appeal to the Chief Secretary on behalf of prisoners, he had every hope that with his characteristic humanity he would take measures to have the poor people obliged to resort to the sad alternative of entering a poorhouse placed in at least as good a position as those who did not merit the same sympathy.

seconded the Motion.

said, that the question raised by the hon. Member was one of considerable importance; but he thought the Motion was based on a misapprehension as to the scale of diet recommended by the Commissioners who inquired last year into the question of the dietary in county gaols. They recommended four classes of diet, proportioned to terms of imprisonment, for those who were respectively imprisoned one week, one month, three months, and more than three months; and the reason was that those undergoing the longer terms of imprisonment evidently required the more generous diet, particularly if their imprisonment was accompanied with hard labour. The scale for one-week prisoners was precisely the same as the minimum workhouse scale. The hon. Member did not say with what particular class of gaol diet he wished workhouse diet to be assimilated, but it was to be presumed he would say the one-month scale, which was somewhat more generous than workhouse diet and was accompanied by some advantages, three meals a day being allowed. In no single instance did the Commissioners, who inquired minutely into the diet of many workhouses, say that it was insufficient to maintain the health and strength of the paupers; but, in instituting a comparison between workhouse and gaol dietaries, they remark that whereas many of the paupers admitted into unions had been accustomed to a life of deprivation, many of the persons sent to prison had been used to liberal fare, and were, therefore, less capable of submitting to a very low diet; and they were inclined to the opinion that prisoners did require a higher scale of dietary than paupers. The average stay of the individual pauper in the Irish workhouse was seventy-one days, and that of the able-bodied pauper was much shorter, being a month or less, and on the principle of the Commissioners, the able-bodied paupers would have pretty nearly the same scale of diet as was recommended for the first-class prisoners who were confined for the shortest time. The question was a difficult one, and ought to be left to be decided very much by local circumstances and local knowledge, and it would not be wise in the Poor Law Commission to exercise their powers indiscriminately in forcing Guardians to increase the diet, particularly as it had been proved by the researches of Sir John Forbes in 1852, that the dietary in Irish workhouses, paradoxical as it might seem, was more nutritious and palatable than that in the English workhouses in consequence of the greater quantity of milk allowed. If an attempt was made to enforce a certain scale on the Guardians, the price and quality of the provisions would still be under their control. At present the greatest care was taken that everything should be of the best quality. The efforts of the Commissioners to induce Guardians in some cases to give a more liberal diet had generally been successful. The first point pressed upon the Guardians by the Commissioners was that they should allow three meals a day, instead of two. The next recommendation of the Commissioners, which had been adopted in a great many cases, was that a small portion of meat should be put into the vegetable soup for the purpose of rendering it more palatable. Another recommendation was that in the case of aged and infirm persons bread and tea should be substituted for "stirabout" and milk. It had been also recommended that a considerable addition should he made to the meat portion of the dietary: but, looking at the state of the country, he thought the reasons against adopting this recommendation were perfectly conclusive. In the first place the present dietary in Ireland was much more nutritious and wholesome, containing a greater quantity of animal food, than the English dietary. It should be remembered, moreover, that the great object of those who had the management of these institutions was to put the inmates in a position to obtain their livelihood by industry; but if in regard to young persons a scale of dietary were established superior to the ordinary diet of the country, no inducement would be offered to such persons to earn their livelihood by industry. There were good reasons, therefore, for the course which the Poor Law Commissioners had thought proper to adopt. It would be found from the Returns that the mortality in the Irish workhouses was very low; and under all the circumstances, although it might be desirable to make minor alterations in the scale of dietary, it would be unwise to make any considerable addition to the meat portion of the dietary.

said, he would withdraw his Motion.

Sir, if the subject to which I desire to draw the attention of the House were not one of very considerable importance, I should not have ventured to bring it forward at this late period of the Session. It is important because it concerns the interests of a large number of British subjects residing in the East, because it has a direct bearing upon the extensive commercial relations now existing between England and the Turkish Empire, and because it affects the character and reputation not only of this country, but of other European nations. The House may probably be aware that Nubar Pasha, the principal Minister of his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, has recently visited England, in order to obtain from Her Majesty's Government some mo- dification of the state of things which now exists in Egypt connected with the administration of justice under Consular jurisdiction, and the relations between British subjects and the subjects of the Viceroy. Nubar Pasha has also visited France for the same purpose. As the whole object of our treaty relations with Turkey, and of the rights and privileges claimed under them, has been greatly misunderstood and misrepresented both in this country and in the East, I will endeavour to explain to the House how the matter really stands. England entered into her first treaty with Turkey as early as the year 1578. This treaty was followed by others in 1606, 1648 and 1675. They were termed, in the diplomatic language of the time, "capitulations." All these treaties were confirmed by the general treaty of peace at the termination of the war with Turkey in 1809. The capitulations consist of a large number of articles; but there are only three or four of them which bear directly on the present question, and I will quote them. The 15th Article states—

"That in all litigations occurring between the English or subjects of England, and any other person, the Judge shall not proceed to hear the cause without the presence of an interpreter or one of his deputies."

The 16th Article—

"That if there happens any suit or difference or dispute among the English themselves, the decision thereof shall be left to their own Ambassador or Consul, according to their custom, without the Judge or other Governors, our slaves, intermeddling therein."

The 24th Article declares—

"That if an Englishman or other subject of that nation shall be involved in any lawsuit, or other affair connected with law, the Judge shall not hear or decide thereon until the Ambassador, Consul, or interpreter shall be present; and all suits exceeding the value of 4,000 aspers shall be heard at the Sublime Porte."

The 42nd Article that—

"In cases of manslaughter or other crime, the Governors shall not proceed in the cause until the Ambassador or Consul shall be present."

It must be borne in mind that there are articles in the capitulations entered into between Turkey and other nations giving still more extended privileges to the subjects of those nations; and that, as our capitulations contain what is called "the most favoured nation clause," we have a right to insist on the same privileges which have been accorded to other countries. When the capitulations were entered into our relations with Turkey were very dif- ferent from what they are at the present time. The commerce between the two countries was carried on by a privileged company, enjoying rights somewhat similar to those which were then possessed by the East India Company. This company, which was called the Levant Company, was abolished in the year 1825. The commerce of France with Turkey was carried on by a similar company, having a monopoly. The seat of that company was at Marseilles, and it was not abolished until 1835. Formerly, no British or French subject could trade with Turkey who was not a member of one of the privileged companies. Every member was compelled to deposit caution money, or to give security for his good behaviour, and was entirely under the control of the Consul, who was paid by the company itself, and who administered the law according to the articles of the various capitulations. The merchants resided in distinct establishments called "factories," which were usually surrounded by walls, enclosing shops, churches, chapels, and all the requirements for a small colony. The administration of justice by the Consuls being thus confined to these small communities was originally a very small and insignificant matter. The Sultans of Turkey made no difficulty in conceding the rights and privileges in this respect which the treaties had conferred, for two reasons. In the first place, it was admitted that owing to the exceptional position of foreigners in the midst of a, fanatical Mahommedan population they were entitled to exceptional protection from their own authorities; and secondly, because it has always been in accordance with the principles of the Turkish Government to allow non-Mahommedan sects to administer their own concerns without the intervention of the Turkish authorities, a principle which has been acted upon in the case of the Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and other sects inhabiting the Ottoman Empire. No one, however, can suppose for a moment that the great Sultans, the conquerors of a large portion of Europe and Africa, had any intention of renouncing the smallest portion of that authority over their own subjects which they must have considered the essential prerogative and right of a ruler. The House will observe that the articles which I have read apply solely to quarrels and lawsuits between foreigners resident in Turkey, and do not in any way affect Turkish subjects. The law appears to have been administered in a rude kind of way by our Consuls, and when complicated questions of commercial law arose, the principal merchants formed a body of assessors, who with the Consul, settled the matter in dispute. The Consuls themselves had very slight relations with the outer world, and knew little or nothing of the people in the midst of which they lived. Indeed, I remember one of them, who had been in the service of the Levant Company for fifty years, and who was a much respected and intelligent officer, shortly before his death boasting that he could not speak a word of the nasty languages of the country. After the end of the great war, and the abolition of the Levant Company, our relations with Turkey and other parts of the East underwent a great change. Owing to the improved means of communication with the East, to the development of the vast resources of the Ottoman Empire, and the reforms which were taking place in its internal administration, a large number of foreigners were attracted to Turkey as traders, merchants, and residents. A totally new state of affairs now arose, as this foreign population, no longer confined to the "factories," scattered itself over the country. It was very doubtful whether, after the abolition of the Levant Company, our Consuls, appointed and paid by the Foreign Office, still enjoyed the favours and could exercise the jurisdiction over British subjects which had been previously claimed by the officers of the Company. In order to remove all doubts upon the subject, the Act, 6 &c 7 Vict.c. 94, commonly called "the Foreign Jurisdiction Act," was passed in 1843. This Act conferred upon Her Majesty's Consuls in the East the powers formerly enjoyed by the officers of the Levant Company, and enabled them to exercise Jurisdiction over British subjects residing within the Turkish Empire, according to the terms of the capitulations. Since that time the foreign population has risen in Constantinople to 50,000, and in the Turkish provinces to about 100,000, and in Egypt from 9,000 (in 1848) to 200,000. A very large addition was made to British subjects by the lonians and Maltese, who swarmed to Turkey to obtain a livelihood. These formed probably the most dangerous part of the foreign population in the Turkish dominions. They defied both the Turkish and British authorities—committing murders, robberies, and every manner of crime with impunity. They claimed protection from the British Consuls, and exemption from the Turkish laws, under the capitulations, and our Consuls were quite unable to deal with them. In consequence, to a great extent, of the state of things which had arisen under British protection, life and property became very insecure in many parts of the East. At length, in order to place some check upon the evil, Consular Courts were established at Constantinople, Smyrna, and Alexandria, and were presided over by professional lawyers sent out from this country, instead of by the Consul. Now, in any observations I may make, I do not wish to cast any reflection on the persons who have presided over these Consular Courts. They have been, in most cases, men of high character, who have been brought up in England and have studied the law here; and I believe that, without exception, they have discharged their duties with satisfaction to the Foreign Office and to British subjects in the East. The remarks that I am about to make apply to the system, and not to either the Foreign Office or to the Courts. The example of England in establishing Consular Courts was followed by France. The first Judge sent by the Foreign Office to Constantinople was Sir E. Hornby, a gentleman of much experience and of high character. Regular Courts, such as are seen in Westminster Hall, were established, and all the horrors of the law were witnessed at Constantinople and Alexandria—even to barristers in wig and gown. In the other cities of Turkey and Egypt the Consul still remains the Judge, and administers the law to British subjects, assisted, in certain cases, by assessors taken from the principal British merchants. Not only do the Judges and Consuls deal with cases which come within the capitulations, but in consequence of various abuses which have sprung up in the course of time, they now take cognizance of matters and claim jurisdiction in cases which are not only not recognized by the treaties, but which are, in many instances, directly opposed to their spirit. This state of things has given rise to the most serious complaints on the part of the Turkish Government, which has seen foreigners gradually encroaching upon its rights, and exercising powers most dangerous to its authority, and to the peace and good order of the country. It has made urgent representations on the subject to the European Powers, pointing out not only the danger which must arise to Turkey, from the fact of there being Consular Courts and Consuls of some twenty different nations, exercising independent and conflicting jurisdiction within the Turkish Empire, but the serious inconvenience which such a state of things must entail upon foreigners themselves resident in Turkey. It has shown that murders, robberies, and other crimes are constantly committed with impunity, because, whilst the Turkish authorities have no power to deal with the offenders, these offenders, being subjects of foreign Powers, were cither not punished at all, or only removed for a time, returning to Turkey to commit again the same crimes. Especially in the case of British subjects it was shown that the power of the Consul to punish and remove them from Turkey was so limited that they virtually escaped with impunity. This state of things had become so serious that it was considered necessary to bring it before the Congress held at Paris at the end of the war in 1856. Lord Clarendon was, I believe, the first to introduce the subject. He was followed by other Plenipotentiaries, who admitted the evils that had arisen from the exercise of a foreign jurisdiction in the East, unwarranted by the capitulations. Ali Pasha, the Turkish Plenipotentiary, strongly urged the necessity of dealing with the matter, and the following declaration was solemnly recorded in a Protocol:—

"Ali Pasha attributes all the difficulties which fetter the commercial relations of Turkey and the action of the Ottoman Government to stipulations which are obsolete. He enters into details tending to establish that the privileges which Europeans have acquired by the capitulation are injurious to their own security and to the development of their transactions by limiting the interference of the local administration; that the jurisdiction by which foreign agents protect their countrymen constitutes a multiplicity of Governments within the Government, and, consequently, an insuperable obstacle to all improvements. Baron Bourqueney, and the other Plenipotentiaries with him, acknowledge that the capitulations apply to a situation to which the Treaty of Peace will necessarily tend to put an end, and that the privileges which they confer upon individuals circumscribe the authority of the Porte within limits to be regretted; that it is opportune to devise modifications calculated to bring all things into harmony… The Plenipotentiaries, then, unanimously recognize the necessity of revising the Capitulations, and decide upon recording in the Protocol their wish that a deliberation should be opened at Constantinople for the purpose after the conclusion of peace."

There were several reasons which induced the Plenipotentiaries at the Conference of Paris to consent to this declaration as to the revision of the capitulations; the prin- cipal one being, that at that time Foreign Powers were anxious to obtain for their subjects the right of holding land in Turkey; and the Turkish Government could not consent to grant any such privilege to foreigners so long as they refused to submit to its laws. Now, the question of the right of foreigners to possess land in Turkey has been very much misunderstood. It is often asserted that no Christian can hold land in Turkey. That is a mistake. A Christian can do so if he is a subject of the Porte. In fact, the laws relating to real property are the same in Turkey as in this country. An alien cannot hold it. In consequence of the declaration contained in the Protocol which I have quoted, the Turkish Government, relying upon the promise there made that the capitulations should be modified, proceeded to take measures for the alteration of the law regarding the possession of land by foreigners. In the so-called "Hatti-Humayoun," or "Charter of rights," issued by the Sultan in 1856, it was declared, that—

"It shall be lawful for foreigners to possess landed property in my dominions, conforming themselves to the laws and police regulations, and bearing the same charges as the Native in-habitants, and after arrangements have been come to with foreign Powers."

This declaration was made on the understanding that the promise entered into by the Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Paris would be carried out; but, unfortunately, it has not been. England and France have been continually calling on the Turkish Government to grant to foreigners the right to hold land in Turkey. They have made it a grievance that such a concession has not been granted to their subjects; but as they have not fulfilled their part of the agreement, they can scarcely, with justice, condemn the Porte. I believe that negotiations on this subject are still going on. I do not know in what state they now are; but perhaps the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will have the kindness to give the House some information on that point. I will now explain how justice is administered in Turkey when foreigners are concerned. When the crime, or the matter in dispute, is of a mixed character—that is to say, when a Turkish subject and a foreigner are parties to it—it must be tried in a Turkish Court; the capitulations merely giving jurisdiction to the foreign authorities when foreigners alone are concerned. Under the capitulations an interpreter, or some person connected with the Embassy, or Consulate, of the nation to which the foreigner in a suit belonged, has a right to attend to see that justice is properly administered. Of late years the Turkish I Government has established a special Court, called the "Tidjaret," for the decision of commercial cases, at which merchants, as well as Native Judges, preside, and which deal with cases in regard to evidence in other matters very much after the fashion of European Courts. Native Judges preside over the Criminal Courts; but when foreigners are concerned, an interpreter from the Embassy of the country to which the foreigner belongs takes his scat by the Native Judge, and is consulted by him as to the verdict. I have had an opportunity of speaking to Mr. Simmons, who for many years has acted as one of the interpreters to the British Embassy at Constantinople, and to whom has been confided the duty of attending these tribunals. That gentleman assures me that during his very long experience—and I believe that Mr. Simmons' experience has been as great as that of any other European in Turkey—he has scarcely ever known a case of injustice. On the whole, justice has been very fairly administered, and it is very seldom that any complaints have been addressed to the British Embassy. So much for cases between Natives and foreigners; but in cases between foreigners it sometimes happens that very considerable confusion and delay arise. According to the old legal maxim, Actio sequitur forum rei, the person against whom a charge is made is brought into the Court of his own Consul. When several foreigners of different nationalities have to be proceeded against each has to be brought into his own Court, and, in cases of appeal, the, appeals must be made to separate tribunals, one, perhaps, sitting at Trieste, another in London, another at Aix, in France, and another at New York. Under such a system it is evident that there I must be in many cases an entire miscarriage of justice. We formerly sent criminals to Malta and the Ionian Islands to be tried, and often it was impossible to get a verdict against them. The result was that they returned to Turkey to repeat their offences. In order to justify the protection thus afforded to foreign criminals, the Turkish police are said to be frequently cruel and arbitrary in dealing with strangers; but it is scarcely to be won- dered at that, exasperated at being constantly bearded in their own capital, and seeing crimes committed upon them with impunity, they should have been driven to deal somewhat severely with such criminals as they could lay their hands upon. At one time it was determined that after a British subject bad been twice convicted of crime British protection should be withdrawn from him; but that innovation caused so many complaints, and gave rise to so many scandals, that the British authorities were obliged to withdraw it. I will mention a case, showing the operation of these Consular Courts, and the nature of the independent jurisdiction which they claim. A very eminent British naval officer employed by the Turkish Government, Admiral Slade, was raised to the rank of a Turkish Pasha, and for a long time was in command of the port of Constantinople, rendering important services to the Turkish Government. Acting within his strict rights, he one day removed some Maltese from a ship which they had, it was believed, piratically seized in the harbour. They at once brought an action against the Pasha in the English Consular Court, and as he naturally refused to appear, not recognizing its jurisdiction over him for acts performed in the discharge of his duty as a Turkish Admiral, judgment went against him by default. They were actually going to arrest him under a warrant issued by the Court, when the Pasha threatened to take some very summary proceedings if they attempted to do so. The case was then referred to this country, and having been examined by the Law Officers of the Crown, was felt to be so monstrous in its character that it was immediately given up. Such was the state of things in the Turkish cities that a man who was seen to commit a murder and had entered a foreigner's house could not be arrested unless the officers of justice were accompanied by the Consul, or representative of the Consul, of the nation to which the offender and the person in whose house he had taken refuge belonged. Thus, if a Greek were seen to commit a murder, by merely walking into the next house he might defy the authorities to arrest him, unless accompanied by the Greek Consul, for whom it might be necessary to send a distance of twenty miles. If a violent outrage were committed by a band of brigands, it might become necessary that the Consuls of the nations to which they respectively belonged must be summoned before one of the number could be touched, It followed from this state of the law that the most atrocious crimes were often committed with impunity. Many other abuses have arisen under the capitulations, which, render attempts on the part of the Turkish, Government to improve and reform their local administration almost impossible. I will mention one or two of them. Complaints are constantly made of the state of the harbour of Constantinople. It is alleged, that, owing to the mismanagement and confusion that exist there, the interests of British merchants and of British commerce are seriously affected, and that British shipping is exposed to damage and loss, and the Turks are held responsible. Now, from what does this state of things arise: Is it solely on account of the misconduct or negligence of the Turkish authorities Allow me to quote from the very interesting work of Admiral Slade upon Turkey, published last year. No one has more experience of Turkey than that distinguished officer, and, having himself held command of the port of Constantinople, he can speak with authority. He writes—

"European vessels pay no port or anchorage dues in any provincial harbour of the Turkish Empire. At Constantinople, they pay, without reference to tonnage or length of sojourn, dues varying from one to two shillings per vessel, according to her flag. For example, the Great Eastern might he in the Golden Horn for a year, and her anchorage due would be twelve piastres, Twelve piastres, once representing as many dollars, now represent two shillings. In 1864 the Porte, at the instance of its Admiralty, proposed to improve the harbour accommodation on consideration of a graduated moderate scale of anchorage dues, and, in expectation of assent, suitable buoys with mooring chains were brought from England. The European Legations declined the proposition.… The English have made their harbour master out of a servant in search of a place, out of a shipchandler in difficulties, out of a hydropathic doctor in want of patients, but never out of a sailor."

There is no control by the Turkish authorities over the captains of British vessels. In time of war a British ship, or a ship belonging to an enemy and hoisting the British flag, might place herself alongside a Turkish ship of war. She might be laden with gunpowder, and might be intended as a fire-ship. The commander of the Turkish man-of-war would not dare to interfere with her. Such a state of things would seem incredible unless we had the statement from Admiral Slade. He says, in the work which I have quoted—

"The Turkish captains were restrained from exercising the right of keeping clear water around them—exercised by men-of-war in every part of the world, exercised afterwards freely by the allied fleets in Beikos Bay—by fear of misrepresentation. The naval reader will exclaim indignantly, 'Why did not Hassan Bey or Ali Bey weigh Captain Tomkins or Captain Lefevre's anchor, and let him drift to the devil, if he pleased?' I will tell him why. Captain Tomkins or Captain Lefevre would have made a report to his Consul, who would have forwarded it with elucidatory remarks to his Ambassador, who in his turn would have sent a dragoman to the Porte with a demand for pecuniary compensation to Captain Tomkins or to Captain Lefevre for the anxiety and ill-usage he had suffered by his own statement, and a request for the dismissal of Hassan Bey or Ali Bey from his ship for over-zeal."

With such a state of things existing in Constantinople, is it possible that the Turkish administration can be satisfactory? Foreign ships become the refuge of every villain; under the capitulations no Turkish officer has a right to board them; they claim complete immunity under a foreign flag. Admiral Slade wished to obtain some control over the harbour by making regulations affecting foreign boatmen. The British Government were quite willing that he should do so; but the French Government, rather than consent, issued an order prohibiting any French subjects from acting as boatmen in the Golden Horn. Again, under the capitulations, Consuls claim exemption from the payment of Custom House dues. The Consuls of this country are for the most part highly honourable men, and would not take advantage of this privilege. But I am afraid that there are Consuls of other nations who do not bear so high a character, and who are not so scrupulous. Moreover, most of the Consuls in the Levant are either merchants themselves or are closely connected with merchants. It may be easily conceived how such a privilege may be used to defraud the Turkish Customs to an enormous extent, and it is a well known fact that, in consequence of its existence, the Turkish revenue suffers most seriously. Under the capitulations foreigners again claim exemption from various taxes. A short time ago the Turkish Government placed a tax upon horses; but this was at once protested against by the Russian and French Embassies on the ground that it was a personal tax, from which they were exempted by the capitulations, and the Government were obliged to give it up, because they could not levy a tax upon their own subjects which foreigners had refused to pay. It was only after some years' discussion that foreigners were induced to pay the common house dues, and even now they object to pay the licence tax, to which a Turkish subject keeping a shop is liable. The evils arising from this state of things do not end here. The exceptional position of foreigners under the capitulations gives rise to constant claims, many of them of the most unjust and outrageous nature, upon the Turkish Government. When a foreigner conceives that he has been interfered with, or that he has not received the protection he considers himself entitled to under the capitulations, he appeals to his Embassy, and the affair is at once made a diplomatic question. A claim for indemnity is put forward, and urged with all the weight, I will not say the violence, of foreign diplomacy. The Turkish Government appeals in vain to the sense of justice of the Power concerned, and asks for a fair judicial investigation. The Embassy considers its reputation at strike unless it can summarily enforce the claim of its protected subject, and the Porte is compelled to give way rather than have a disagreeable quarrel. These demands for indemnities involve some shameful frauds, and the manner in which the Turkish Government has been frequently treated in regard to them is altogether disgraceful. When I was attached to the Embassy at Constantinople, I often felt a sense of shame when directed to support claims of this I nature, and blushed for the honour of my I countrymen. Enormous sums of money have thus been extorted from the Turkish Government, and the embarrassment in which the Turkish finances are now placed may be partly traced to this cause. In the case of the British Government, I am convinced that there is a desire to deal honestly and justly with the Porte; but I am not so sure that this is the case with some other countries. In speaking of! Egypt I shall have to return to this question of indemnities, and to point out a still greater abuse of the system. But, before leaving this part of the subject, let me ask how we can expect the Sultan to encourage the settlement of foreigners in his dominions, and the investment of; European capital in enterprizes which might prove beneficial to his country, when every stranger who settles in Turkey is an additional source of trouble and danger to the Turkish Government, renders all well-ordered administration impossible, and only looks to the means whereby he can plunder the Turkish Treasury? But bad as the condition of things arising out of the capitulations is in Turkey, it is infinitely worse in Egypt. In Turkey the European Powers have confined themselves generally to the privileges granted to them by the capitulations, and only cases between foreigners in which no Native is concerned have been dealt with by the Consuls and Consular Courts. But in Egypt, owing to gradual encroachments made of late years upon the undoubted rights of the Viceroy, the pretensions of the European Powers are carried far beyond these; and they insist that all cases in which a foreigner is defendant, whether the accuser or plaintiff be a foreigner or Native Egyptian, should be tried in the Court of the Consul of the nation to which the foreigner belongs; thus transferring the jurisdiction of the Viceroy over his own subjects to a foreign tribunal. Monstrous as this claim is, still it might be expected that, following the legal maxim and their own practice in other cases, foreigners would submit to the Native tribunals, where a Native was the defendant. But even in such cases means are found to evade the express stipulations of the capitulations, and to frustrate the ends of justice. This can be, and is, done in one of two ways. Either the case is taken away from the jurisdiction of the Native Courts altogether, and placed in the hands of the Consul, who makes a diplomatic question of it, and demands a direct and summary settlement, not according to the law, or the decision of a competent judge, but according to the view which he may himself take of it; or, availing himself of his right to have an interpreter from the Consulate present at the trial, the plaintiff takes care that that officer shall never be forthcoming; and the necessary formalities not having been complied with, he refuses to accept the decision of the Court if not favourable to him, or he prevents any decision from being given, and then addresses his complaint to his Consul. Thus almost every case in which a European and a Native are concerned is made a diplomatic question, and a claim not only for the amount which it is sure is put forward, but a large additional sum by way of indemnity is usually added. A short time ago some Italian claims, which had been increased to an enormous extent by demands for indemnities, were urged upon the Egyptian I Government. Instead of allowing these claims to be fairly investigated before a legal tribunal, the Italian Consul, after failing to induce the Egyptian Government to recognize them, referred the matter to the Italian Government. Upon the faith of his representations two armour-clad vessels of war were sent to Alexandria to enforce the claims. When the Consul announced the arrival of these vessels to the Viceroy find read a peremptory demand for the payment of the claims upon him, I am informed that the Viceroy asked him, "Whether the Italian Government wished him to become a tributary to Italy, or whether this was the method adopted in Italy to settle legal questions?" The Consul had no answer to give. However, the Viceroy deemed it more prudent to settle the matter by paying what was demanded of him than to expose himself to the consequences of a bombardment or blockade of Alexandria. And yet everyone acquainted with the matter is convinced that the greater part of these Italian claims were absolutely fraudulent. I do not venture to say that they were so; but this I will state, that the manner in which they were enforced naturally leads to the inference that they were so, and that those who put them forward did not dare to submit them to the investigation of a proper tribunal. But suppose the Viceroy had refused to pay these indemnities, a number of vessels would probably have been seized, or the port would have been blockaded, and in the end he would have had to pay in addition a bill of many millions of francs for losses inflicted upon merchants, shipowners, and others of different nations. Of course, under such circumstances, the Viceroy thought it prudent to pay at once. Such cases show that it is necessary to remove questions of this kind from the region of diplomacy; for, under the existing system, they can lead to nothing but misunderstandings, and must constantly endanger the peace of Europe. It is especially, I contend, the interest of this country to put an end to such a state of things, and to assist the Egyptian Government in introducing a better system under which claims of this nature can be settled in a just and judicial manner. No less than sixteen Consuls of as many different nations are at present resident in Alexandria and Cairo, with Consular Courts wherein casesbetween foreigners and subjects of the Viceroy are heard. Even the Persian Consul claims this right to an independent jurisdiction. The position of foreigners in Egypt and, the scandals to which it gives rise are so well summed up in an article in The Times that I cannot do better than read an extract from it—

"To illustrate the confusion fomented, it is pointed out that there is scarcely a single department of the national Administration free from interference. Even a murderer, if he be a foreigner, cannot be arrested by the police unless they be accompanied by a Consular delegate; while every minor police regulation—such as the control of drivers of public vehicles, &c.—is sot at naught; because, if a foreigner, the man knows he can appeal to his Consul, and if a Native he complains of the immunity allowed to his alien competitor. So with questions of ordinary taxation. Each Native trader is required to pay a licence duty; the foreigner refuses, and thus one is weighted against the other, and the worst animosities of race are created. In the same way all the most important industries of the country are impeded. For the welfare and development of commerce and agriculture a sound mortgage law is essential. No such law is possible in Egypt. If a fellah giants a mortgage to a European, he knows that in case of any question the decision will be made by the Consul of his creditor, and this not according to any uniform practice, but according to the mortgage law of the nation to which the creditor may happen to belong. Hence the agriculturist is driven to the Native moneylender, and usury becomes inevitable. Similar considerations influence the Viceroy in guarding against any steps that might tend to throw land into the hands of Europeans. …. The crowning evil still remains. In Egypt, as in all other Eastern countries, rulers and people are alike ignorant of the true principles of trade and finance. Hence the Viceroy becomes the prey of specious adventurers, and these adventurers, relying on their nationality, constantly lead him into the most injurious commitments, and then trust to the threats of their Consul either to enforce fulfilment or to obtain preposterous indemnities. Such cases can always be reserved as political weapons, and, of course, those Powers contrive to obtain the most whose representatives are the least scrupulous."

I could mention a number of cases to illustrate this statement to the House, but I will confine myself to one. Two foreigners of different nations come to Egypt with machinery for a watermill. They erect it upon a stream to which they have no right whatever, and which irrigates some neighbouring lands. The owners of the stream and lands appeal to the authorities. The owners of the mill can only be proceeded against in their own Consular Courts. After a long lawsuit it is decided that the foreigners had no right to erect the mill. They then put forward claims upon the Government for loss of money on account of having had to abandon their mill, the machinery of which they declare has been destroyed, and they succeed by diplomatic pressure in obtaining a large payment from the Viceroy by way of indemnity. I will read from an official Report to the Viceroy one or two cases in which names are mentioned, and which I should consequently not have ventured to bring before the House had they not been thus authenticated—

"A Consulate-General of Brazil exists, although there is no Brazilian settled in Egypt. The Consul General, an Italian, has been obliged, in order to constitute for himself a nation, to take all the members of his family under the protection of his flag. His nephew, Abd-Allah-el-Athem, an attaché to the Consulate, became bankrupt. The disputes arising out of this bankruptcy have been adjudicated against the will of the creditors by the uncle of the bankrupt, who has overruled all exceptions to the bankrupt's transactions. The refusals of justice on the part of the Consul General of Greece have been so flagrant that one day, in full session of the French tribunal, on appeal in action brought by a Greek against a Frenchman, the president, M. Tricou, sent for the plaintiff and addressed him, verbatim, in these words—' Your suit is struck off the list. Go and tell your Consul that when he shall render justice to Frenchmen, I will myself render justice to his countrymen.'"

Now, I would ask the House whether it be possible for a subject of the Viceroy or for the Viceroy himself to obtain justice when such a state of things exists? Nubar Pasha, in an official note, has stated that an Egyptian who has let his house to a foreigner would in most cases, in the event of the tenant refusing to pay the rent, rather abandon the house altogether than seek redress in a Consular Court. Let the House consider the position of an unfortunate Native who has to bring an action for a just debt against an association of three or more persons of different nations. He would have to pursue each one in a separate Consular Court. In one Court he might obtain a verdict in his favour, in the others he might fail to obtain justice. If he appealed from the Consular Courts in Egypt he might have to go, according to the nationality of each defendant, to Aix, to New York, and to Rio Janeiro. It would be absurd to imagine that the unfortunate Native could hope to get justice in such a case, even if he ventured upon, or could bear the cost of, such appeals. A still more absurd case might be imagined, and might, indeed, occur, and has indeed been instanced by Nubar Pasha. Suppose a band of marauders, including Englishmen, Spaniards, Frenchmen, Italians, and Greeks, were to attack an Egyptian village, to sack it, and to murder its inhabitants. The Egyptian authorities would be utterly powerless to punish—perhaps even to arrest—the criminals. They would have to prosecute each individual in his own Consular Court, and it may be easily imagined how much justice they would be likely to get in some of those Courts. I need scarcely point out the monstrous character of such a state of things, which would not be tolerated for one moment in any other country of the world. Supposing, again, that a man were wounded and robbed in the street, he might, by the intervention of the Consul, succeed in arresting the robber; but he could not compel a single witness to attend who did not belong to the same nation as the robber, and, consequently, he would probably fail to obtain justice. It must be remembered that this question of Consular jurisdiction and the abuses to which it has given rise, may very seriously affect the position of this country in Egypt, as well as the independence of that country. Thousands of French subjects are now employed on the Suez Canal, and may ultimately form a kind of permanent colony in Egypt. They would all claim to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of their own Consular Courts. No action could be brought against them, no redress obtained, except by appeal to the French Consul. Under such circumstances, the pretended neutralization of the Suez Canal would be simply an absurdity. The Company, or any of its officers, might close the canal any day against a British or other ship, and redress could only be obtained by an appeal to a French Consular Court. I need not dwell longer upon this subject—the danger will be evident to the House—nor need I point out the very serious source of uneasiness to the Egyptian Government which arises from the presence of a large population of foreigners in Egypt not amenable to the laws and authorities of the country. The question of indemnities is one worthy of the consideration of this country, on more than one account. The Viceroy has been compelled to pay within the space of four years no less a sum than 72,000,000 francs, or nearly £3,000,000 sterling, as indemnities to foreigners, without including the vast sums which have been shamelessly wrung from him by the projectors of the Suez Canal. How much of that sum was fraudulently obtained I will not venture to inquire. The result has been that the finances of Egypt have been seriously embarrassed, and that the Viceroy has had great difficulty in finding the means of pay- ing the annual interests upon the Egyptian loans, which are held for the most part in this country. The Viceroy is denounced for his cruelty towards the unhappy cultivators of the soil, from whom the last farthing is wrung, and who are borne down by the weight of taxes and imposts. I have no doubt that these unfortunate creatures are exposed to great hardships and distress; but it must not be forgotten that the European Powers, by supporting monstrous and fraudulent claims for indemnities, and by compelling the Viceroy to satisfy them without reference to their justice or injustice, are to a great extent responsible for the oppression which may exist, and which arises in a great measure from the necessity of finding the means of paying these claims. At one time Mehemet Ali Pasha was anxious to give encouragement to foreigners to settle in Egypt, and to give the country the advantage of European industry, intelligence, and capital. He could not then anticipate the result of his enlightened efforts. He had a right to expect fairer and juster treatment from the nations who boasted of their civilization. He gave foreigners the right to bold land in Egypt, but on the express condition that they should be subject to the Egyptian laws as regarded that land, and that they should pay the taxes and do all that Egyptian landholders would do. Conditions to that effect were inserted in the title-deeds of land sold to foreigners; but the foreign landowners now neither obeyed the laws nor paid the taxes, and in this they were uniformly supported by their Consuls. Nubar Pasha has laid all these facts before the French and English Governments, and the answer he has received from the noble Lord has been placed on the table of the House. All Nubar Pasha proposes as some remedy to this state of things is a return to the capitulations, and that instead of Consular Courts there should be established in Egypt Egyptian Courts, presided over partly by European and partly by Native Judges, to adjudicate on subjects in which Natives may be concerned. He does not wish to interfere in any way with the Consular Courts where foreigners alone are concerned; he only proposes one departure from the capitulations. It is this—According to the capitulations, an interpreter must always be present in Court in cases where foreigners are concerned, in order to see that justice is done. Nubar Pasha desires to do away with this condition, and, instead, he pro- poses to constitute the Egyptian Courts upon the most liberal principles. He proposes that they should be composed of three Native and three European judges; and in the event of this being objected to, he is even willing to agree that the Europeans should form the majority. All that he stipulates for is that the President of the Court should be a subject of the Viceroy. Instead of the presence of the dragoman or interpreter, he proposes that the utmost publicity should be given to the proceedings of the Court, that counsel should attend, and that a superior Court of Appeal should be instituted, composed, if insisted upon, of a majority of European judges, and that justice should be administered as it is in European countries. It must be remembered that at present the proceedings of the Turkish Courts are not public. Moreover, it is the intention of the Viceroy to train up a certain, number of young Egyptians to the profession of the law, and to educate them for the administration of justice. If this scheme were carried out, instead of there being, as now, sixteen different jurisdictions to which the subjects of the Viceroy; are liable, there would be but one, presided over by European and Native Judges. This seems to me to be a just, reasonable, and practical proposal; even the noble Lord admits that there is nothing whatever in it opposed to the spirit of the capitulations, or even to their letter. I might almost say that the Viceroy has not gone far enough; but even this very moderate and just proposal has excited a great outcry amongst the foreign residents in Egypt. The British and Maltese merchants, in an indignant memorial addressed to the noble Lord (Lord Stanley), which has been recently published in The Times, declare that—

"The Government of the Viceroy has submitted to Her Majesty's Government a proposition to abolish the jurisdiction of the British Consular Law Courts in Egypt."

But this statement is entirely opposed to the truth. All that the Viceroy asks is that the jurisdiction of those Courts should; be limited, according to the express terms of the capitulations, to cases in which foreigners alone are concerned, and that they be not permitted to interfere with his undoubted rights and prerogative of dealing with his own subjects. A letter, signed by a Mr. Bell, who appears to speak in the, name of the British community in Egypt, has appeared in The Times, together with the memorial. Amongst the reasons which it gives why Her Majesty's Government should decline to accept the Viceroy's proposal, there is one which will best show the pretensions of foreigners established in Egypt, and how ridiculous and utterly untenable they are. Mr. Bell states, in justification of the action of the British Consular Court over the Viceroy and his subjects, that in one case the payment of bills accepted by the manager of the Viceroy's private estate, and protested, could only be obtained—

"By a formal demand addressed to the British Consular Court, that the Viceroy, having failed to meet his engagements, should be immediately declared a bankrupt. A private intimation that this formal demand had been made for a declaration of bankruptcy was communicated to the Viceroy's agent, and he thereupon sent to the office of the holder of the bills the money to meet them."

Now, let the House imagine for one moment a foreign Court with independent jurisdiction established in this country declaring the Queen a bankrupt! Could such a state of things be conceived in any other country of the world but Egypt? Can it be a matter of surprise that the Viceroy should consider this foreign jurisdiction as injurious to his dignity and independence? It appears to me that the fact of such a proceeding as that described by Mr. Bell having taken place would alone justify the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) in accepting Nubar Pasha's proposal. I do not advocate the withdrawal of the protection of our Consuls altogether from British subjects in the East. I know that the time is not yet come for this step, although I trust that it is approaching; nor do I suggest that the noble Lord should consent to the proposal of the Egyptian Government without having first satisfied himself that justice shall be properly administered in the case of British subjects. Nubar Pasha, in his note to the Viceroy, which has been laid upon the table of the House, declares that the Egyptian Government is willing to give satisfactory security upon this point, and to meet foreign Governments more than half way. The noble Lord might even avail himself of this opportunity to obtain from the Turkish and Egyptian Governments a, reform of the law with regard to the admission of Christian evidence in criminal cases. Already, in civil and commercial suits, this has been done; and it is now virtually accepted, I believe, even in criminal cases: but the noble Lord would be quite justified if he were to call upon the Egyptian Government to abolish the law which still exists upon this subject before submitting British subjects to the control of Egyptian Courts. It has, I know, been suggested to the Egyptian Government that before calling upon the European Powers to accept the proposal made by Nubar Pasha, the best plan would be for the Viceroy to establish mixed Courts, and to allow the world to see how they worked. He has been told, "Institute your Courts, choose your European and Native Judges. Have justice well and impartially administered, and you will see that foreigners will then avail themselves of them, and you will obtain what you require from foreign Governments without any difficulty." But the objections to such a course appear to me to be very grave, if not altogether insurmountable. There are four that present themselves at once. First, English and French subjects might be induced to avail themselves of the Egyptian Courts, but others would not, and an additional element of confusion would consequently arise, and in mixed cases miscarriage of justice would ensue, some defendants appealing to the Local Courts, and others to the Consular Courts; secondly, the Egyptian Government could not venture upon a trial of this kind, unless they received the fullest assurance that the decrees of the Court should be carried out and its jurisdiction enforced—otherwise the authority of the Viceroy would further suffer; thirdly, the Viceroy could not call upon his Mahommedan subjects to submit to the jurisdiction of a Court presided over by European Judges, whose authority was not recognized by Europeans themselves; and lastly, the subjects of the Viceroy would be placed in this most unfair and disadvantageous position, that whilst foreigners would be able to appeal from the decision of the Egyptian Courts to a Court of Appeal established in Egypt, the Native of Egypt, when pursuing a foreigner in his Consular Court, would have to appeal to a Court established in some distant foreign country. The proposal made by the Viceroy, is, I think, a fair and reasonable one. He is willing that Commissioners named by the principal European Powers should be appointed to proceed to Egypt to inquire into the whole subject of Consular jurisdiction in that country, and to report to their respective Governments upon it, with a view to the adoption of the scheme which he has put forward. The French Government has already appointed a Commission of Inquiry, which has made a Report. Although I have not seen that Report, I understand that it is in many respects favourable to the proposal of the Viceroy. But whilst the Viceroy is prepared to agree to the appointment of an International Commission, he very justly insists that before it commences its labours a certain basis for its proceedings shall be agreed upon by the European Powers, and that that basis shall be the capitulations. Usages and abuses have sprung up in Egypt which, are entirely opposed to those treaties, and the Viceroy cannot admit their validity, and recognizes this as a point of departure in any future inquiry. It is, I believe, stated that the French Government have refused I to accept this condition. But I cannot believe that a great and just nation like France would insist upon supporting that which is a manifest abuse and a flagrant wrong when dealing with a weak Power. I have heard that the Emperor himself is fully alive to the great abuses which have sprung up under the capitulations, to the injustice to which the Natives of Egypt are exposed in consequence, and to the danger of the present state of things to the authority of the Viceroy. He cannot but feel that whilst the European Powers hold the Viceroy responsible for the safety of the lives and property of their subjects residing in Egypt, they are depriving the Viceroy of the only means that he has of securing that safety. The noble Lord (Lord Stanley), in his despatch of the 18th October last, which has been laid upon the table of the House, has fully admitted the evils to which the present system of Consular jurisdiction in Egypt has given rise, and has shown that that system is entirely opposed to the letter and spirit of our treaties. With the views expressed in that despatch I cordially agree. But I trust that the noble Lord will do more than write a despatch, and that he is prepared to act with energy in the matter, without being deterred from doing that which is just and right by any outcry which may be raised against him amongst the subjects of this country established in Egypt, who are, of course, determined to prevent, if possible, the reform of abuses of which they are partly the authors, and of which they have long profited. Let those gentlemen be reminded that after all they have no more right to the exceptional protection which they claim in Egypt, than British residents who chose to settle for the sake of gain in any other country. We do not have Consular Courts in South America—and the taxpayers of this country may with reason ask, why they should be compelled to support expensive establishments in Turkey and Egypt merely to promote the trade and speculations of persons who chose to go to those countries. Nor will the noble Lord, I hope, be deterred from doing that which is, right and just, by the unwillingness which other Powers, some of whom may have a direct interest in maintaining the present system, may show to go with him. I feel convinced that if England boldly adopts a just and liberal policy in this matter, and admits the undoubted rights of the Egyptian Government, other nations will be unable to take a different course. And if France, as I have reason to hope she is prepared to do, will unite with England in. putting an end to the present disgraceful state of things, and in supporting the just and legitimate demands of the Viceroy, I am certain that a new system will be introduced into Egypt, and, indeed, ere long into the whole of the Turkish Empire, which will be equally advantageous to the interests of Europeans and Natives. I will quote one or two extracts from the noble Lord's despatch, which will prove that he has taken what I conceive to be a proper view of this important question, and that there only now remains for him to carry out the policy which he has laid down—

"Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the system which now prevails in Egypt in regard to suits in which foreigners on the one hand and the Government and people of Egypt on the other, are concerned, is as injurious to the interests of all parties as it is certainly without warrant of any treaty engagement. Her Majesty's Government are perfectly willing, therefore, to lend their aid to the Egyptian Government in an attempt to establish a better system, and if the Egyptian Government succeed in obtaining the concurrence of other Powers for the same purpose, you may assure Nubar Pasha that the cordial co-operation of Great Britain will not be withheld from so salutary a work. They would hail with the utmost satisfaction such an improvement in the judicial system of the Ottoman Empire, and specifically of Egypt, which is so important a part of it, as would justify them in altogether renouncing any judicial action in that country, and leaving the disputes of their subjects, and the crimes which they may commit, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the local Government, as is the case in other countries. With such feelings, Her Majesty's Government are certainly not inclined to hold out for a jurisdiction to which they have no treaty right, which they submit to be an usurpation, though brought about by force of circumstances, and which is as injurious to British interests as it is derogatory to the character and well-being of the Egyptian Administration."

Fortunately, the principal commercial communities of this country are prepared to give their support to the noble Lord in this matter. I had hoped to have seen in their places this evening my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester (Mr. Bazley) and other Gentlemen connected with our commercial interests, who formed part of a deputation to the noble Lord a few days ago on this subject. They would have supported me, I know, on this occasion, They naturally perceive that the present system of Consular jurisdiction in the East, and the pretensions of foreigners residing in the Turkish Empire and in Egypt, are so outrageous and unjust that they must tend to interrupt the good feeling which ought to exist between the European Powers and the Turkish and Egyptian Governments, and to discourage and prevent the development of those commercial relations which exist between England and the East, and which are already becoming of such vast importance to this country. These views are entertained at the same time by almost every organ of public opinion of authority in this country, and have been advocated with great ability and power by The Times, and other leading newspapers. In conclusion, I would again quote from the work of a gentleman who has had more experience than most persons with regard to the working of the capitulations, Sir Adolphus Slade. He says—

"The necessity of framing capitulations is the 16th century for the protection of a few European trailers was a disgrace to Turkey; the strict enforcement of them in the 19th century is a reproach to Europe. They were framed on behalf of limited associations, self-restrained by bye-laws, and self-responsible for the conduct of their servants and employés; they are now enforced in favour of 50,000 Europeans of various nationalities and callings at Constantinople, and twice as many thousands or more domiciled in provincial cities, in pursuit, one and all, per fas et nefas, of one object—gain, and though divided by clashing interests, united by the common bond of rancour against the dominant race. Probed to their source, the occasional outbreaks in Turkey, called fanatical, would be seen to be the natural reaction against the overbearings and insolence of foreigners and protected natives. 'Would you abolish the capitulations?' asks the Levantine. Not altogether, so long as the separation of administrative and judicial functions in Turkey remains indistinct; but we would modify them in the interests of society by drawing a line between protection and impunity, between privilege and licence."

These are wise words, and I cannot do better than call the attention of the noble Lord earnestly to them. I trust that he will lose no time in taking some step which may put an end to the state of things they describe. The first thing, it appears to me to be done, is to come to an agreement with the French Government for the appointment of an International Commission, founded upon the basis suggested by the Egyptian Government, and empowered to inquire into the working of foreign Consular jurisdiction in the Turkish Empire and Egypt, and to ascertain what may be the rights and privileges which foreigners may have a right to claim under the capitulations. When the facts of the case are thus ascertained, it will be for England and France to act in a just and generous spirit towards Turkey and Egypt; to retain only those privileges which are absolutely necessary to the protection of their subjects in the East; to be prepared to remove that exceptional protection still further as those countries advance in the path of civilization and of reform; and to give assistance to the Turkish and Egyptian Governments in placing their internal administration, and especially that part of it which relates to law and justice, on a footing which may be equally beneficial to foreigners and to their own subjects.

said, he wished to point out that it was the weakness of the Egyptian Government, after the revolt of Ali Pasha, which led to the granting of the existing concessions to foreigners. He hoped the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would not treat this question as an Egyptian one merely, but would go to the root of the evil, and endeavour to carry out all the recommendations contained in the Protocol of Paris. At the time when the capitulations were entered into there was in Turkey a poll tax on Christians, and one object was to exempt foreign residents from this badge of servitude. Circumstances had wholly changed, and it was absurd that foreigners should be exempted from every impost except customs' clues. Foreign residents ought to be placed on an equal, but on no better footing, than Natives, and there was no reason whatever why they should not be required to pay their fair share of taxation. There could be no question that the Consular jurisdiction had given rise to great abuses on the part of the Consuls of third-rate Powers, and so reluctant were people to interfere that murder might be committed in Turkey by foreigners almost with impunity. Indeed he could mention one case in which a murder was witnessed by an English Consul and another Englishman. It was committed by an Italian, and the victim was a Greek; and though the English Consul interfered, and compelled the police to take the man up, the Italian Consul evidently thought he was going beyond his duty, and the end of the matter was that the man who committed the murder was allowed to get off to Genoa, and what became of him afterwards he could not tell. It was a wrong system that the Government of a country should not have jurisdiction over all its inhabitants, and there would be less inconvenience in the Egyptian Government having it now that Christian evidence was to all intents and purposes admitted. Mixed Courts having at our instance been established in Turkey, it was discrediting them in the eyes of the people if we did not allow our own subjects to be tried in them. He believed they were as impartial as the tribunals of Spain or Portugal. He trusted that there would be joint action by the European Powers as to these capitulations, with due regard to the right of the Turk in his own country.

Sir, I have no wish, and I see no reason, to prolong this discussion, since there is no dispute as to facts, and I am bound to say that in by far the greater part of what has been stated by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Southwark (Mr. Layard) I am inclined to agree. And first let me dispose of one or two questions which have been raised incidentally. As to the question of the right of foreigners to hold land in Turkey, and the conditions on which they should be allowed to hold it, I may remark that that is a matter which has been for some time under discussion, and I think we have practically settled the terms on which land may be held. I have always felt that in principle the Turkish Government were quite justified in the reservations and conditions they laid down; but Her Majesty's Government had to consider how those conditions would practically work in some parts of the Empire where Europeans are not numerous, and where Consular assistance is not at hand, I believe, however, that question has now been arranged between the two Governments. With regard to the abuse of Consular jurisdiction, I cordially sympathize in what has been said by the hon. Gentleman. It is an anomaly, even if it be a necessary one, that we should remove British subjects from the territorial jurisdiction of the country; but I quite agree that it is an intolerable abuse if that protection is extended to a large number of persons who have no claim upon us, as, for instance, in those cases in which Natives of the Ionian Islands have I claimed the privilege. Maltese, of course, have a right to protection as British subjects; but with regard to all those cases which used to be numerous in former years, when protection was extended to Natives who were dependants upon Europeans, I think the hon. Gentleman will bear me out in saying that this has been diminished of late years, and I do not think the abuse I now exists to any considerable extent. At any rate, if a case is brought before me in which it does exist, I shall be ready to do all in my power to remedy it. With regard to the claim of Europeans to exemption from local taxes, I am not aware that it has ever been made the subject of complaint on the part of the Porte. I am bound to admit that, like many other things bearing upon our connection with the Turkish Empire, it is somewhat anomalous, and I can quite understand that arrangements which were perfectly natural and harmless when but a very small number of foreigners were settled in Turkey, are quite inappropriate to the circumstances of the present time. The main question is the question whether or not we can get rid of Consular jurisdiction as regards Egypt. Now, upon that point I have stated what are in principle the views of the British Government in a despatch from which the hon. Gentleman has quoted, and I therefore need not repeat them at any length. Ever since the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris, not only the British Government, but I believe all the Great Powers of Europe have concurred in the feeling that the exercise of this Consular jurisdiction was an anomaly which it was desirable to remove. There is no doubt that jurisdiction extra territorial of that kind is in itself an evil. The only justification there can be for it is that it may be a necessity. But I if it ceases to be a necessity, it ceases to be justifiable. The real question is not whether you desire to give up these rights, but whether you can find an effective substitute for them. You cannot give up these exceptional rights unless you are satisfied that you can substitute for them the jurisdiction of an independent and impartial tribunal, and the difficulty is how to find in a country like Egypt sufficient security for the establishment of such a tribunal. Egypt, as we all know, is a country absolutely despotic, both in theory and in practice. I am not saying that judges would on that account be necessarily servile, but I am afraid that it would be difficult to find men who in any case where their own Government was concerned would not think it their duty to take the part of the Government of their own country, and we all know that the Egyptian Government is very often concerned in the questions that arise. There is no part of the hon. Gentleman's speech with which I more thoroughly concur than with respect to the great abuse and inconvenience of resorting to diplomatic agency for the determination of private matters; but it is because I hold that opinion that I think it essential to have Courts you can rely upon, because it is a lesser evil to have a Court which is anomalous in principle, but which works tolerably in practice, than a Court which may be constituted according to European notions of what is right, but which does not practically give justice, and the result of the working of which would be that its decisions would be continually appealed from, so that diplomatic questions would our way but I do not say that they cannot be overcome. With regard to an International Commission, I do not apprehend that there is at present between the leading Powers of Europe any considerable difference of opinion. I believe they are all of opinion that such a Commission should be established for the purpose of ascertaining how such Courts as we all desire in principle should be established. The only points of difference are upon questions which are comparatively matters of detail. With regard to the claim put foward by the Egyptian Government no longer to admit the capitulations and to ignore usages, that is a claim to which I should find it very difficult to give a positive answer either one way or the other, for there are usages and usages. A usage which has become an unwritten law must, I think, be practically regarded as part of the law of the country, but the same claim cannot be made for a custom that has sprung up within the last dozen years, and which has never been sanctioned or tolerated, but only submitted to through the weakness of the Government. I need say no more upon that, because there is very little in dispute between us. The one point upon which I should be inclined to question the view which the hon. Gentle- man takes is his wish that whatever we do should be done, not for Egypt only, but for every part of the Turkish Empire. Now, as to that, I am open to conviction, but as at present advised I doubt the policy of that course. Turkey is a very wide Empire, and it contains provinces in various stages of civilization. We have far greater interests in Egypt than anywhere else in that Empire, and there is a greater appeal there to European feeling and a greater influence of European ideas than can be found in the remoter provinces of Turkey. After all, too, if you are to establish a system of territorial jurisdiction which is to work well, the best chance of getting it to work is to establish it experimentally, and then, if you find it work well in one part, you can extend it to another. At the same time, we must be very much guided on this question partly by the views of the Porte, partly by the view which the other Powers may take, and partly by such light as may be thrown upon it in the course of the investigation which is to be held. The question of principle, as I understand, which the hon. Gentleman wishes to raise is, "Do you regard the for Consular authority as desirable?" Now, I agree with him that it is not desirable. The hon. Gentleman further asks, "Do you wish to see a better system of jurisdiction substituted?" I certainly do, but if you ask me how that is to be done it is a matter of great difficulty. We have to consult the Porte, the Egyptian Government, and the other great Powers, and many questions of detail will arise as to which we do not altogether see our way. All we say is that time and deliberation will be required, and I can only assure the House that the Government will not lose sight of the subject, and that their anxious desire is so to deal with it as to bring about a state of things more satisfactory than the present.

said, he wished to warn the noble Lord not to be led astray by the extraordinary statements which had proceeded from some of our countrymen in Egypt. He could readily understand that our countrymen there were so accustomed to special privileges that they were very unwilling to part with them. Egypt was now becoming so intimately bound to this country, and especially to Lancashire, by commercial relations, that he hoped the noble Lord would not allow that state of things with regard to our Consular Courts in Egypt which was so discreditable to us to remain in their present condition. It depended on the noble Lord very much whether the proposed new Courts would or would not be sanctioned by the other Governments.

said, that he was at the head of the firm which had signed the document of which the hon. Member for Southwark had so much complained. They knew very well that there was no tribunal in Egypt which could judge fairly between the buyer, being the Pasha, and the seller, the British merchant. He believed he was the oldest British merchant engaged in the Egyptian trade, and he had never heard of the decisions of the British Consular tribunal being called in question by any Native whatsoever. Any one who knew anything of the transactions between the British and the Pasha would gay that where justice was obtained it had been obtained by the Consular Courts, Though he would have no objection to see any system established which would do justice to other countries as well as our own, he would hesitate a long time before he would consent to have the transactions which passed between British merchants and the Pasha settled by an Egyptian tribunal,

said, that in a case where so many nationalities were concerned it was clear that nothing could be done without reference to them. The noble Lord had held out a hope that foreign nations would be willing to appoint a Commission to settle this question, but it would be more satisfactory to the mercantile community if they were assured that steps were being taken to have the matter immediately referred to this International Commission.

begged to enter his protest against Her Majesty's Government giving up British subjects to a Government which was utterly unconscious of purity of administration. [Mr. LAYARD: No!] The hon. Gentleman might say "No," but he maintained that the Government of Egypt was one into which corruption in every form entered. The idea of justice was foreign to such a Government, and to contemplate giving up British subjects in defiance of treaties to such a Power was most monstrous. If he could tell the House what was going on in Egypt, the hair of hon. Members would stand on end. [Mr. LAYARD: Oh!] Perhaps he had as authentic information and knew as much of what was going on in Egypt as the hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Layard), and he felt bound to say that nothing could exceed the corruption which prevailed there. This scheme had originated in the fact that there was one person connected with the Egyptian Administration who had had the advantage of an European education, who had a great deal of information and had made a fortune. That person had established himself in Western Europe and had created fin opinion purely fictitious as to the character of the Egyptian Government. [Mr. LAYARD: Oh!] The hon. Member might shake his head, but the fact was that those who took an interest in the affairs if the Levant became either very violent Turks or very violent Greeks—they were either desperate Philo-Turks or Philhellenes. Now, he was neither a Philo-Turk nor a Philhellene, because he had received great courtesy both from Turk and Greek; but he was speaking only of the Egyptian Government, which he believed to be so bad that it was utterly impossible to entrust it with any power over the destinies of British subjects. He hoped, therefore, the noble Lord would never consent to the establishment of an Egyptian tribunal such as that which was advocated by the hon. Gentleman. In any scheme that might be adopted, he hoped the noble Lord would make it a sine quâ non that to every decree pronounced by the Court affecting the rights of British subjects, the consent of the British Consul should be required.

in rising to move a Resolution on this subject, said, that he had to apologize to the House for bringing forward so important a subject at so late an hour; but when an independent Member had been counted out by the tactics of his own party, hon. Members would agree with him that the fault was not his. When he brought forward the Motion last year to place Catholics and Presbyterians on an equality with members of the Established Church with respect to education, it fell to the lot of Mr. Speaker to decide its fate, and in giving his decision the right hon. Gentleman said that the principle of the Motion was so important that the House ought to have another opportunity of expressing an opinion upon it. Since that time the subject had made unexpected progress. The question of religious equality in Ireland had made during the present Session a progress as sudden as it had been gratifying and extraordinary. The question had been simplified since last year, because the antagonistic scheme of the Government to grant a charter to a Roman Catholic University had been unanimously condemned by the House and the country. It had been shown that it was impossible to satisfy the Catholics by giving them a charter for a separate University; because the scheme was not more distinctly mischievous it was rejected with contempt by the Roman Catholic hierarchy. They demanded a University which should be exclusively managed by ecclesiastics, and in which Bishops should have a positive veto on the appointment of all officers, and the power of deciding what books should be read. Such demands the House never would concede; and the scheme which he proposed was the only one which would place Presbyterians and Roman Catholics in a position of equality. The country had decided not to grant State endowments to establish sectarian education. There was no chance of an endowment being granted for either a Presbyterian or a Roman Catholic College. If so, there was only one way in which Presbyterians and Roman Catholics could be placed in a position of equality with members of the Established Church, and that was by fairly and impartially throwing open to all the existing University endowments. The creation for either Roman Catholics or Presbyterians of an institution like Trinity College, on which £1,500,000 had been expended, was pecuniarily impossible; and, even if it were possible, money would not purchase associations like those connected with Trinity College. The Presbyterian or Roman Catholic who entered Trinity College might take the same honours and degrees as a Churchman, but he could not compete for a Fellowship with its distinction and income. As long as such a state of things remained the Presbyterian and Catholic inhabitants of Ireland would suffer under grave disability. Endowments were the outgrowth of historical circumstances which were not likely to recur, including the exercise of religious munificence and zeal and the confiscation of property by despotic monarchs. The irresistible conclusion was that the only way of producing equality was to admit people of all religions to existing endowments. An inde- pendent College for Roman Catholics and another for Presbyterians would result only in mischief, from the perpetuation of religious rancour and discord, which must, be removed before Ireland could prosper. It was a mistake to suppose the Roman, Catholic hierarchy represented the laity; and this was shown incidentally by an article in the Westminster Gazette, which, speaking of the increasing number of Catholics who were going to Oxford and Cambridge, said—

"This liberalism is as contagious as scarlet fever. If the Catholic laity continue to send their I sons to these places, where they receive a mixed '' education, in fifty years time where will be the friends of an exclusive system of Catholic education?"

It was remarkable that at present the number of Catholics receiving education at, the Queen's Colleges and Trinity College compared with the number of Protestants was nearly in the same proportion as the number of Catholics to Protestants in the lay professions in Ireland. Dr. Lloyd had propounded, with the most enlightened views, a scheme differing from his own. He proposed that Trinity College should be left exclusively in the hands of the Established Church, and that there should be denominational Colleges in connection with the Dublin University for the education of Catholics and Presbyterians. This scheme, said Dr. Lloyd, without destroying the denominational character of Trinity College, would secure many of the advantages of mixed education. But there were two main, and in his opinion insuperable, objections to such a scheme—first, the pecuniary difficulty of providing endowments for the proposed Roman Catholic and Presbyterian Colleges; and, secondly, because the great glory of Trinity College—the educational liberalism which had admitted Roman Catholics and Presbyterians to degrees long before degrees were given to Dissenters in the English Universities—would thereby be entirely destroyed. By establishing Roman Catholic and Presbyterian Colleges at the Dublin University you would put an end to the present mixed; education there. Now great advantages had resulted to Ireland by bringing together at Trinity College men of different faiths, who had learnt to respect each other's conscientious opinions. At Oxford and Cambridge men of different opinions held foundation scholarships; and among the Fellows High-Churchmen and Low-Churchmen lived in harmony, sinking their re- ligious differences in the prosecution of a common educational work. The same result would follow at Trinity College if his plan were adopted. But then it was said that if men of different religious bodies were admitted into the governing bodies that would introduce religious discord. He would only say that was not borne out by experience, It might be true that discord reigned among the members of the National Education Board, because they were sent there to represent three different religious denominations; but among those who were brought together by the bond of literary or scientific eminence religious discord was unknown. He was convinced that if his scheme were carried out in practice it would go far to remove religious prejudices. It was said that it would be impossible to promote the study of theology if they had mixed education. In reply to that, he would say why should there not be in the same College professors of different systems of theology as in Germany and, to some extent, in France? He had high Catholic authority for saying that in no European country was Catholic theology better taught than in Prussia, That the exclusive system had a depressing effect was pretty clear; from the fact that, while Trinity College had produced unrivalled mathematicians and more than one great philosopher, it had, in three centuries, scarcely produced a single illustrious theologian. A few years ago there were living in the College three of the greatest mathematicians in the world, but in the theological department the case was altogether different. You could not, in fact, expect theology to thrive if you bound it in narrow fetters. Sectarianism had a benumbing influence, and probably many a splendid intellect in Ireland was now wasting its powers in fanning the flames of religious discord. He believed he had shown that the scheme which he proposed was the only practical one by which Catholics and Presbyterians could be placed on an equality in regard to University education with members of the Established Church. He would be the last man in the House to say anything against the great principles of Liberalism. He wished his fellow-subjects to enjoy the same religious freedom which he enjoyed himself. He did not wish to force on others any system of religion to which they objected. What he wished was that the Roman Catholics of Dublin, Oxford, and Cambridge Universities should enjoy the same advantages which he, as a Churchman, enjoyed; and he felt that he enjoyed An unfair benefit when he, as a Churchman, had a share of great national endowments, while others, because they differed from him in religious opinion, were excluded. If the youth of Ireland were brought up together, they would inevitably learn a lesson which they would never forget—namely, that a man was not to be shunned because of his religious belief, but that honour and respect were due to all who displayed intellectual eminence or moral worth.

on rising to move the Amendment of which he had given Notice, said, he should not have taken exception to the question raised by the hon. Member, had it not appeared to him that the Motion, if accepted generally by Irish Catholic Members, was calculated to mislead the judgment of the House in respect to the real requirements of the Catholic people of Ireland in the matter of University education. He would state shortly what those requirements were. They might be all summed up in one proposition—namely, that there should be established in Ireland with the sanction and under the protection of the State an University as free from the interference; of the State as the University of Dublin now was, and with equally satisfactory protection for the religious faith of its Catholic students as that now enjoyed by Trinity College for the protection of its Protestant students. He maintained that nothing short of this proposition would or ought to satisfy the Catholics of Ireland, and he regarded it as important that the House should not be led to believe that the liberality of the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett) in opening up Trinity College and admitting Catholics to its honours and emoluments would or ought to satisfy the just claims of Irish Catholics. He took the present course, therefore, because he believed the opening of Trinity College, instead of being a solution of the difficulty or a removal of the obstacles to a satisfactory settlement, was simply adding another and a very serious impediment to those against which the Catholics of Ireland had already to contend. If justice were done to the Catholics of Ireland in, the matter of a Catholic University, he saw no reason why Trinity College should not continue to be, as it has been since its foundation, the chief educational establishment of the Protestant inhabitants of Ireland. At the same time, however, he claimed equal protection and equal sanction for the establishment of a Catholic, University; but he declined to mix up, that question, which was one of principle, with an assault on the constitution of Trinity College. The establishment of a Catholic University was a national requirement, but he regarded the attempt to make Trinity College a Catholic as well as a Protestant institution a very tempting, but at the same time a very dangerous, expedient. The proposition, although made, he was bound to admit, in a spirit, of justice and fair play was, nevertheless, in his opinion, one of those devices whereby modern Liberalism sought to eliminate all religion whatever, whether Catholic or Protestant, from the institutions of the State. And of all such devices he regarded the plan of "Godless Colleges" as the most dangerous. To him it appeared strange that in an assembly like the House of Commons there should exist any large section prepared to ignore the danger of educating the youth of Ireland in institutions where religion had no place. For his own part, holding steadfastly as he did for the rights of Catholics in respect to University education, he should regard it as less dangerous to faith and morals to send his children to Trinity College to be educated there, while it continued an avowed Protestant institution, than to send them to a College where Christianity was ignored. He was aware that such opinions as he held where characterized in certain quarters as retrograde and re-actionary; but he would not be deterred by phrases of this sort, nor ashamed of the principles he held, because they were opposed to those of the so-called party of progress. There is one question involved which is at the base of this controversy. Was Christianity essential to the welfare of the State, and of the individuals of whom the State is made up? He answered that question in the affirmative, and those who agreed in that answer must agree also in the corollary that it was the duty of the State to protect and foster the Christianity of its people. He could not doubt that the sense and conscience of the great majority on both sides the House would also affirm, this proposition, and he could scarcely believe that human pride had blinded the people of this country so that in any large proportion they would deny it. He admitted, indeed, that the abstract principles of morality, honour, and patriotism might exist independently of religion; art, literature, and science might exist irrespective of religion, but he denied that all these things could ever suffice without the chastening influences of religion to preserve society from corruption and decay. He should have been glad to move the Amendment of which he had given Notice if the rules of the House permitted him to do so, because for the reasons he had stated he could not concur in the Amendment of the hon. Member for Brighton.

said, he sincerely regretted that he could not support either the Motion of the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett) nor the Amendment of the hon. Member for Youghal (Sir Joseph M'Kenna). While he was willing to give both his hon. Friends full credit for the best intentions, he did not think that either of their propositions was a solution of the University question in Ireland. He differed from each of his hon. Friends, however, for very different and almost opposite reasons. He could not agree with the application of the endowments of Trinity College proposed by the hon. Member for Brighton; and he could not accept the proposition of the hon. Member for Youghal, that those endow, merits should be left as they are. After what had lately taken place in that House he did not think his hon. Friend could be so over sanguine or so deficient in political sagacity as to hope that Parliament would ever endow a separate University for Roman Catholics to the same extent as Trinity College, or to any extent at all. He therefore looked upon that proposition of his hon. Friend as an oratorical flourish at the eve of an election. To refuse, therefore, to deal with the enormous endowments of Trinity College for national University education in Ireland is to deprive the Roman Catholics of that country of all endowments for that purpose from public sources. There are three questions involved in the present Motion. First. The amount of the endowments of Trinity College. Second: Whether they are more than sufficient for the superior education of the Episcopalians of Ireland; and Third: What is to be the principle upon which they are to be applied? The Amendment states, or implies, that they are to be left as they are, and the Motion of the hon. Member for Brighton goes to have them applied in one College upon the mixed system. In other words, his hon. Friend wished to transform Trinity College into a gigantic Queen's College. He found by returns before him that the endowments of Trinity College amounted to £64,000 a year—namely, from rent and renewal fines, £34,000, and from fees, interest, &c., £30,000. But he also found by the Report of the Commission into that College that, if properly administered from the commencement, they would be now over £90,000 a year. Was that enormous endowment to be left for the University education of 690,000 Episcopalians, while four-fifths of the Irish people are left without any superior education? The number of students in Trinity College was 1,200, of which only 300 were resident; the number of Professors was 35—namely, 7 seniors and 28unior Fellows. Now, he asked, were 1,200 students and 35 Professors to have a present income of £64,000 a year and a future income of probably £90,000 a year? But in the University of Berlin the number of students was 2,500, of Professors 28, of extraordinary Professors 33, and of private Docentum 29—in all 90. The amount of endowments was £29,518, made up of a State grant of £28,842, and fees and real and funded property, £676. There were out of this a great many exhibitions for poor students varying from £12 to £60 a year, and the salaries of the principal Professors varied from £340 to £400, and with fees amounted in some cases to £1,000 to £1,500; so that this University out of less than half the income supported twice the number of students and three times the number of Professors that Trinity College did. But would this Motion of the hon. Member for Brighton effect the object of giving University education to the Roman Catholics of Ireland? In his opinion it was founded not only upon an ignorance of the opinions and feelings of the Irish people, but upon an ignorance of the actual facts recorded in the returns and records of that House. Out of the whole Roman Catholic population of Ireland the students in the Queen's Colleges and Trinity College belonging to the Catholic faith were a small minority; the Roman Catholics of Ireland protested against the separation of religion from education, and as a protest against the mixed system, they had established a Roman Catholic University at a cost of £120,000. Was it probable that the; Roman Catholics if Ireland would resort to a mixed College in Dublin when they refused to enter a mixed College in Cork and Galway at their doors? What were the grants for the Queen's University and Colleges? University; £2,462; Belfast College, £7,000; Cork College, £7,000; Galway, £7,000. In all £25,265, equal to the endowment of the University of Berlin. What had the Roman Catholics got under this large endowment? Belfast was an exclusively Presbyterian College. Cork, with almost an exclusively Roman Catholic population, had only 30 per cent of Roman Catholic students, and Galway the same proportion. What stronger evidence could they have that the Roman Catholics would not have the mixed system? Cui bono, therefore, establish a system that would not be accepted, and would be only a gigantic Queen's University? But his hon. Friend charged the Irish Bishops with rejecting the Government proposal of a separate University with scorn and contumely. Now, he had read the correspondence on that subject with care, and he thought if his hon. Friend did the same he would come to the conclusion that the Irish Bishops never said or did anything to warrant that charge. They simply were not brought up in the same school of diplomacy as Her Majesty's Ministers, and were consequently out-manœuvred.; They were the victims of political exigency and of mistaken confidence. Turning to the third part of the question, what ought to be the principle and scheme to be applied to these endowments of Trinity College? In the first place, what was the original idea in the minds of the founders of this University, and had Trinity College realized that idea? So far back as the reign of Henry VI. there was an idea of founding an Irish University in Dublin. The wars of the period prevented its execution. Then came the Reformation, and Elizabeth founded this College; but from the words of her charter, as well as those of James and Charles, it was intended that Trinity College should be only one of several Halls or Colleges. He admitted that the immediate idea of Elizabeth was to use this College as an instrument of Protestantizing the Irish people. Now, had it succeeded in its mission? Was it not admitted that it had failed in that mission as much as the Irish Established Church, of which it formed a part. But Trinity College was also in a great part an ecclesiastical College, and celibacy was enforced until the Royal Letter of 1850. So far, therefore, the cases of Trinity College and Maynooth were parallel. And as they had passed a Resolution to disendow Maynooth, was, Trinity College to be maintained as an ecclesiastical College? Was that the way to pacify and enlighten Ireland? There was only one way of dealing with this question, and that was to carry out the ideas of the founders and the objects of the charters, and to apply the endowments of Trinity College to form a National University with denominational Colleges, of which Trinity College should be one. The Queen's Colleges will represent the mixed system, and the Irish people could avail, themselves of University education according to their respective opinions, tastes, and sentiments. Two objections were, however, made to this plan—First, that the examining body would be independent of the teaching body, and would also be of separate religions; and the second, as to books to be read. Now, as to the first, instead of an objection it was a recommendation that the examining body should be independent of the teaching body. As to religion, there surely could be no objection to have Dr. Russell on the same examining board with the Provost of Trinity College, And as to books, the objection could only apply to moral philosophy; and as to that each student could use the books be was recommended in his own College. There was therefore no force in these objections. There were two courses open to them, First, a separate University with a separate charter, or one Irish University with several denominational Colleges. The former was the favourite plan of Her Majesty's Government, trumpeted all over Ireland by their supporters, but lately hastily abandoned in that House. It was the great "card "—considered by some the "trump card "—but played out very recently, or rather thrown away without any serious attempt to play it at all. The first plan being therefore abandoned by the Govern- ment, and opposed by this side of the House, the second was the only practical and rational course. It appeared to him the only solution of the Irish University question under present circumstances. He hoped that the friends of the mixed system would give up their exclusive and procrustean philosophy, and not stand in the way of this practicable and just solution. Did any Irish Member think, after what he had lately seen, that a Parliamentary endowment was possible for a separate Roman Catholic University? It had been abruptly abandoned by his own party, and had been met by what he might call a howl of disapprobation from that side of the House. Under these circumstances it appeared to him the duty of every Irish Member who wished for Roman Catholic University education to demand a University with denominational Colleges; and for that purpose the endowments of Trinity College were sufficient, and to that purpose they ought to be applied.

said, he wished to make an appeal to the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett) with regard to the peculiar position of the discussion which that hon. Gentleman had originated. The hon. Member had had an opportunity of placing his views on that subject before the House, and also of eliciting the views entertained by hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House in opposition to his own; and as it was understood that the hon. Member did not wish to go to a division, it did not seem as if they were likely to make much progress with the question in hand; while it should be remembered that they had a heavy Paper of Business still before them, and that the period of the Session was advanced. He would suggest, therefore, that, in order to facilitate the course of Public Business, the hon. Member for Brighton should withdraw his Motion, on the understanding that the hon. Member for Youghal (Sir Joseph M'Kenna) should also withdraw his Amendment.

expressed his readiness to accede to the request made to him by the Prime Minister.

said, he would be the last person to interfere with the convenience of the House; but he wished to express his regret that, after the statement of the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett), he and others on that side who held views contrary to those of that hon. Gentleman, and views, more- over, which might not be altogether in accordance with those of Her Majesty's Government, had had no opportunity of expressing their sentiments on that question.

said, he shared the feeling entertained by the last speaker.

said, he had on the Paper for that evening a Motion for a Committee to inquire into the truth of the, charges he had made on Monday night against the above establishment. He had put that Motion on the Paper in consequence of the remarks made by the Secretary of State for War in answer to his speech. Since then he had had a consultation with the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair, and found that his Motion was not strictly in Order. He was therefore obliged to withdraw it but he was anxious to have the truth of his statements investigated, and he would be happy to adopt any suggestion which the Secretary of State for War might make for that purpose.

wished to say that, in consequence of what passed the other evening, he had communicated with the officers of the War Office, and with Colonel Campbell, the head of the Royal Gun Factory, at Woolwich, who were affected by the statements of the hon. and gallant Member for Lichfield (Major Anson). Those officers were all gentlemen of as high station, honour, and character as that hon. and gallant Member himself, and they felt very much hurt by the statements which the hon. and gallant Member had made, casting serious imputations upon them; and they all desired that there should be some inquiry into the subject. The hon. and gallant Member would admit that it was due to those officers that his statements should be investigated or withdrawn; and under those circumstances the best course would, he thought, be that the hon. and gallant Member should draw up the charges which he was prepared to make against the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich, and then they would be in a position to refer them to a Select Committee of the House for investigation. He (Sir John Pakington) would suggest that the Committee of Inquiry should consist of only five Members, to be appointed by the Committee of Selection, and should sit de die in diem, to investigate the charges which the hon. and gallant Member might be prepared to specify.

Sir, after the discussion in this House, and considering the state of public feeling on this subject, it is unnecessary for me to expatiate on the services of Sir Robert Napier. Great and distinguished as those services in Abyssinia have been, they are only portions of a career in which for a long period of years he has proved his loyalty to his Sovereign and his devotion to his country. I have the satisfaction of informing the House that Her Majesty has been pleased to confer the high distinction of a peerage upon Sir Robert Napier, by the style and title of Lord Napier of Magdala; and it is with a view to sustain the honour of that great distinction that Her Majesty has now appealed to the House of Commons to assist her in the consummation she wishes. It is a part of the admirable combination of forces in our constitutional system that the Sovereign and the nation unite necessarily when there is a complete recognition of public services; and if the Committee will pass the Resolution which I am about to move, we shall prove that in this country those who render such services may depend upon a gracious Sovereign and a grateful people. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by proposing—

"That the annual sum of Two Thousand Pounds be granted to Her Majesty out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to be settled upon Lieutenant General Sir Robert Napier, G.C.B., and the next surviving Heir Male of his Body, for the term of their natural lives."

said that, in the present state of Public Business, and owing to the necessity of facilitating the registration for the purposes of the approaching General Election as much as possible, he should not, acting on the advice of a distinguished Member of his own side of the House, offer any opposition to the proposal.