said, he would beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, What is the present political state of affairs at the Red River Settlement?

In answer to the Question of my hon. Friend I need hardly go back to the commencement of the rising. He is well aware that the armed rising in the Red River Settlement resulted in the refusal to admit the designated Lieutenant Governor, who has returned to Canada. We have every reason to believe that this armed rising was principally caused by misapprehension as to the intentions of the Canadian Government; and a Special Commissioner and two Envoys have been sent by the Canadian Government to remove the se misapprehensions, and to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants, thus placing the matter in the course of settlement. The Commissioner has been re- ceived by the insurgent party, and is now in communication with them. So far as matters have gone—although it would be premature to express any decided opinion—there appears to be good reason for hoping that the difficulties will be adjusted without recourse to any other measures than the se of mutual explanation.

said, he would beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If the Government have succeeded in obtaining an amendment in the se stipulations in the Treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar, which permit-Slave Trading in his dominions?

, in reply, said, that Her Majesty's Government had succeeded in obtaining an amendment in the se stipulations in the treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar which permitted slave trading in his dominions. By the treaty to which his hon. Friend had alluded, the export of slaves from the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar was entirely prohibited. Subsequently, in 1863, an agreement was come to that the transport of slaves within the dominions of the Sultan should be prohibited entirely during the months of January, February, March, and April, as it was during the se months that the Northern Arabs repaired to Zanzibar for the purpose of procuring slaves for sale in the Persian Gulf. The agreement also authorized Her Majesty's cruizers to seize all vessels carrying slaves in the territorial waters of the Sultan during the se months. During the Recess a Committee appointed by Lord Clarendon had met at the Foreign Office to inquire into the whole subject of slavery on the East Coast of Africa. The India Office, the Colonial Office, the Treasury, and the Admiralty were represented on the Committee as well as the Foreign Office, and they had also the advantage of the presence of Mr. Churchill, Her Majesty's Consul at Zanzibar. That Committee had made its Report, containing valuable suggestions for the ultimate entire suppression of slavery. He hoped shortly to lay the Report on the table of the House.

said, he would beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, as the General Convention of the Church, of Ireland, summoned in pursuance of a legislative enactment promoted by the Government last Session, will meet in Dublin for the first time on Tuesday next, the 15th instant, he will so arrange the Business of the House, that important measures, and especially important measures affecting Ireland, promoted by the Government this Session, may not be discussed in the absence of the Members of Parliament—including several English, and nearly all the Irish Conservative Members—whose duty it will be to attend the first Meeting of the General Convention of the Church of Ireland?

With regard to the Question which the hon. Member has put to me, I observe that in the latter clause of it he has laid down the rather stringent rule of obligation, that it is the duty of all the Conservative Members for Ireland not to attend the General Convention merely, but to attend the first meeting of the Convention. Now, even in the meetings of this House, we do not always succeed in procuring the attendance of all Members on the first day. But, seriously, I think there will be a disposition on the part of the Government to prevent any practical inconvenience. It will not be possible that we should decline to introduce the Irish Land Bill until after that time But if the Irish Bill can be introduced on Tuesday next, I shall hope to be able to fix the day for the second reading of that Bill, with the assent of the House, at such a period as will allow the interval necessary to enable Members of the House to discharge any duties they may have in connection with the Convention of the Church of Ireland.

said, he would beg to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, When he will introduce the Bill he promised last Session for affording facilities for the acquisition of glebes and glebe houses by the different religious denominations in Ireland?

, in reply, said, he did intend to bring in a Bill with this object, and he would ask leave to do so in due time, but he could not at present say on what day.

said, he would beg to ask the Postmaster-General, If he is aware that the despatch of public intelligence by Telegraph (including the Debates on Her Majesty's Speech in both Houses) failed on Tuesday in every part of the Country; if he can state the cause; and if means will be taken to prevent a recurrence of this serious inconvenience to the public?

Sir, in replying to the Question of my hon. Friend, I regret to have to acknowledge that the despatch of public intelligence was seriously delayed on Tuesday evening. The reason for that delay did not commence on Tuesday, but originated in several causes which came into operation when the telegraphs were first transferred to the Department. In the first place, there was a very large accession of business, in consequence, I suppose, of the reduction in the rates. In the next place, many of the wires were seriously out of order, in consequence of the very unfavourable state of the weather. Hon. Members may also have seen that on Monday night an accident occurred which had the effect of cutting off entirely communication for a time with the whole of the West of England. During one of the busiest portions of the day nearly all the wires were on Tuesday occupied with the transmission of the Queen's Speech. The ordinary commercial telegrams were, consequently, delayed, and they could not be worked off in time to admit of the transmission of the usual intelligence for the Press. These causes, combined with a certain amount of inexperience on the part of many of the officers in the working of a system to which they are as yet somewhat new, have led to the delay. Every exertion has been made yesterday and to-day, and, so far as I am aware, with perfect success, to remedy both defects; and I have no reason to fear, under ordinary circumstances, that any such, breakdown will recur. I am sure that I shall not in vain ask my hon. Friend and the House to make some allowance for the very difficult circumstances in which the Department is now and will for a few days be placed. The officers and operators who have to work this system are mainly the se who were employed under the old companies; but they have to work the now system under circumstances different in many ways from the se under which they previously performed their duties. It is impossible such a transfer could have taken place without causing temporary inconvenience; but I can assure the House that to my own knowledge every one connected with the Department is working with every possible zeal and energy, and I hope that no such complaints will again have to be made.

asked, Whether in the case of a Borough where the Corporation has declined to grant permission to extend the wires of the telegraph to the present Post Office, the Postmaster General is entitled to cut off telegraphic communication with such Borough?

The Telegraph Act of 1868 does not compel the Postmaster General to open telegraph offices at any place; it merely permits him to open telegraph offices at such places as he may think fit. The Act also clearly contemplates that the telegraph office shall be opened at a Post office, and I have an authoritative opinion that it is perfectly within the power of the Department to decline to open telegraph offices anywhere except where they think the circumstances will justify them in so doing.

I have now, Sir, in conformity with the Motion which has been placed on the Paper, to move—

"That Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa, returned as Knight of the Shire for the County of Tipperary, having been adjudged guilty of felony, and sentenced to penal servitude for life, and being now imprisoned under such sentence, has become and continues incapable of being elected or returned as a Member of this House."

Of course, I am naturally led, in conjunction with the proposition that I submit to the House, to consider the counter proposal which is to be submitted to it as an Amendment—the proposal, I mean, to refer this question to the care of a Select Committee.

That is not the exact Motion which I intended to make. It has been altered in the Papers of the House. What I propose is that the matter should be left to the consideration of a Committee; and the kind of Committee to whose consideration I wish to leave it is a Committee to be appointed to examine into the precedents in the case and to report to the House what steps ought to be taken in the matter.

However that may be—without any reference to the hon. Gentleman or his proposition—I will now state in a very few words the view we take of the matter. If this were a case in which, after the best investigation we can make, we thought that any just, fair, or reasonable doubt attached to the facts or the arguments of the case, or as to the course which the House ought to pursue, then I admit it might be a subject for reference to a Committee; especially if the question were one which involved the examination of a long and complicated series of precedents, such as it would be difficult to bring under the view of the House in debate. But, Sir, in our view it is neither the one nor the other. The facts of the case are the fewest as possible, and the principles applicable as clear as can be brought to bear on any question of Parliamentary discussion. And I would submit that, if that be the case, a proposal to inquire instead of a proposal to act would not be becoming the dignity of this House. In a matter of a character so remarkable as this, where a person unhappily adjudged guilty of acts that fall within the legal designation of treason-felony has been returned as a Member of this House by the officer whose duty it is to make such return, it appears to me that unless there appear to be the strongest grounds for hesitating as to the answer we should make, that answer ought to be given without a moment's delay. The question then, Sir, really is whether the case, in every substantial consideration that affects it, is a clear case or not. Sir, the writ which calls upon the electors of any county to return a Knight of the Shire will, I apprehend, be admitted to speak with paramount authority; and in the language of that writ the electors are desired to choose a given number of persons, be it one or two or more, under the description of magis idoneos et discretos; and these words, the general meaning of which is sufficiently clear, have received an authoritative sense from a long course of practice as absolutely excluding various classes of persons. If, for example, we look either to the se who are below the ordinary standard, I presume there is no doubt that the return of a person labouring under the grievous disability of idiotcy, or the return of a child, would be no answer to a writ for the election of a Knight of the Shire to serve in Parliament. And if, on the other hand, I go higher, I believe I should be correct in saying that the return of a Peer sitting in the House of Lords, or the return—for the sake of illustration—of the Sovereign on the Throne, would be no answer to the writ. Therefore, our assertion is that the return of a person adjudged guilty of felony is no return to the writ—that the writ has not been obeyed, has not been answered, that the order for the return remains unfulfilled, and that we have no alternative except to declare the fact, and to call upon the electors in due course, by the issue of a new writ, to discharge that duty which from—be it inadvertence or be it ignorance of the law, or from whatever other cause—they have failed on the present occasion to do. With regard to precedents, there is but one to which it is necessary to advert, and that is one in which the procedure was of such a character as will, I think, leave no doubt on the mind of the House as to the nature of the rule which is laid down—I mean the precedent of Mr. Smith O'Brien. It is recent; and the procedure in that case—not the mere speeches which were made, which would necessarily be of inferior authority, but the original Motion made—the Amendment moved upon it, and the Motion which in its final form was carried by the House—indicate in the clearest manner the basis of the proceedings which then were taken. On the 18th of May, 1849, Lord Russell, made this Motion—

"That it appears by the Record communicated from the House of Lords that William Smith O'Brien has been convicted of high treason."—[3 Hansard, cv. 669.]

Sir Frederick Thesiger took an objection to the use of the word "convicted," and pointed out—I believe with perfect justice—that the legal incapacity consequent on the commission of certain acts did not follow upon conviction, which is the act of the jury, but upon the judgment, which is the act of the Court; and, consequently, Sir Frederick Thesiger suggested that the word "attainted" ought to be substituted for the word "convicted" of high treason. But the House declined to adopt the word "attainted," and the Attorney General (Sir John Jervis) in lieu of the word "attainted," suggested that "adjudged guilty" should be substituted for "convicted." Well, it is plain from the proceeding itself that the Attorney General of that day—who was as competent to the performance of his duty, aud to afford guidance to the House, in these matters as perhaps any Law Officer of our time—the Attorney General well knew that in certain cases of felony which imposed disability from sitting in this Mouse, attainder, notwithstanding, did not follow. The process had then commenced, which has since been extended, and to which, I believe, it is owing that the person whoso case we are now considering has not, like Mr. Smith O'Brien, been found guilty of high treason, and attainted accordingly. The act of which O'Donovan Rossa has been convicted and adjudged guilty is an act of treason-felony, and that act is not followed by attainder; and the House will perceive that the use of the word "attainted" would have set up a false light for its guidance in future cases, because it would have seemed to imply that the disabilities of felony were limited to cases in which it was followed by attainder; and therefore, the House declined to use the word "attainted," but made use advisedly of the words "adjudged guilty" of high treason, substituting that for the word proposed by Sir Frederick Thesiger. Well, Sir, the facts as they stand in legal phraseology are not precisely parallel in both cases; because the category of the crime has been altered since the time of Mr. Smith O'Brien. But if we are to look to the reason of the case I own I cannot conceive anything more irrational than the proposition that the Legislature of this country, because it chose in the case of one grave class of crime to commute capital punishment into the punishment next less severe to capital, intended to accompany that change with the removal of the undoubted disability which would otherwise have followed, and to confer on the person so brought down from the highest to the second class of punishment a capacity to receive one of the highest honours that can be conferred on any individual. Sir, it is not for me to pretend to speak with any authority on this matter. I prefer rather to direct the attention of the House to the undoubted fact that, whether it be by the judgment of this House and by the law of Parliamentary privilege, or whether it be by the known and admitted sentiment of the highest text-writers upon the law of this country, the disability attaching to felony is matter of undoubted principle. If so, I think, Sir, I am justified in the statement that I make of a matter which is strictly one of argument, and from which everything but argument should be carefully excluded—the function we have to discharge is strictly a judicial function; and my statement is this—that the law and the precedent applicable to this case are on every point of substance perfectly clear. And therefore it is I shall propose to the House the two Motions of which I have given notice—the first of which declares that Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa has become and continues incapable of being elected or returned as a Member of this House. I need only in conclusion point out to the House that the negative of that proposition involves this affirmative doctrine—that a person convicted of felony, and suffering sentence within the walls of a prison in consequence of that felony, is, nevertheless, a fit and proper person—one of the magis idoneos et discretos milites—whom the writ requires the electors to return for the purpose of representing their interests in this House, and of dealing with the highest questions that can be submitted to the judgment of Parliament. Sir, I now move the first resolution which stands in my name.

said, that in rising to propose the Amendment of which he had given notice, he had no expectation of inducing the House to abandon its apparently foregone conclusion of setting aside the election of the hon. Member for Tipperary. [Laughter.] Hon. Gentlemen were pleased to laugh at his styling Mr. O'Donovan Rossa "the honourable Member for Tipperary;" but he was the Member for Tipperary, and would remain so until his election had been reversed by that House; and he was the honourable Member for Tipperary at all events by one title to which, perhaps, some Members of the House could not lay claim—by obtaining his seat without having recourse to any corrupt or dishonourable practices. He would assure hon. Gentlemen who had thus early interrupted him that he did not intend to discuss the question; but he did hope to persuade the House to proceed in their intention with care and caution, and with a due sense of its own responsibility in the course it might take. That was not a party question, or even a political question—it was a simple question of Parliamentary law, precedent, and practice. He hoped it would be discussed entirely in that sense—and not only in the form but in the spirit of a judicial inquiry. The first point they were bound to ascertain was—what were the powers and privileges of the House of Commons in this matter, and what was their jurisdiction in a case of this kind? On that point the published words of Sir Erskine May left no room for any doubt or ambiguity whatever. In his Law and Practice of Parliament he distinctly laid down that—

"Not withstanding their extensive jurisdiction in regard to election, the Commons hare no control over the eligibility of candidates, except in the administration of the laws that define their qualifications."

And, after citing the cases of Mr. Arthur Hall, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Trelawny, and Mr. Robert Walpole—to say nothing of Mr. Wilkes—in which that rule appeared to have been more or less disregarded, Sir Erskine May told them that—

"All these cases can only be cited as examples of excess of its jurisdiction by the Commons; for one House of Parliament cannot create a disability unknown to the law."

As he (Mr. Moore) trusted and believed it was not the intention of the House of Commons on that occasion to add one more to these "cases of excess of jurisdiction," they must assume, therefore, that they had "no control over the eligibility" of the Member for Tipperary, "except to administer the laws that define his qualification." But, if that were so, the first and most obvious question that presented itself to an inquiring mind was wiry and how the House of Commons was then called upon to pronounce upon that question of qualification at all. By the Election Act of 1868 the whole power and jurisdiction of the House in these cases was transferred to the Judges of Election Petitions. the se Judges, therefore, possessed—he did not say exclusively, but, at all events, they possessed—all the powers possessed by that House in the determination of the qualification of Members. Now, if the legal positions that the right hon. Gentleman opposite had just laid down were correct, it necessarily followed that if Mr. Heron had only presented a petition against the return of his opponent, and praying for the seat on the ground of disqualification, he would now be the sitting Member for the county of Tipperary. Now, be it remembered that at the Tipperary election Mr. Heron made no secret of his intention to adopt that course. He took all the legal steps and served all the legal notices that were necessary to make that course effectual. How, then, did it come to pass that immediately after his return to Dublin "a change came o'er the spirit of his dream," and that he suddenly abandoned the easy and certain course by which, according to the legal doctrines of the First Minister of the Crown, he could have at once obtained his seat by an election petition at the hands of the presiding Judge? However "permeated" with the national colour, according to the opinion of the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, Mr. Heron might have been on the hustings of Tipperary, he was by no means "green" in the Four Courts of Dublin; and it was out of all reason to suppose that he, a lawyer, shrewd, vigilant, and sly, would have preferred running the gauntlet of another Tipperary election to the acquisition of an easy and certain seat, at the hands of Mr. Justice Keogh or Baron Hughes. Although the First Minister, owing to the judicious character of his Irish appointments, was at present without an Irish law adviser in the House, he might have ascertained through less direct out easily accessible channels that Mr. Heron satisfied himself—and it certainly was the opinion of the Irish Bar—that he had no chance whatever of obtaining from an Irish Judge that legal decision on the subject of qualification which the right hon. Gentleman opposite now called on the House irregularly and without inquiry to affirm. It was generally understood that Mr. Heron had satisfied himself, after due inquiry and consultation, that a conviction of judgment for felony did not constitute an absolute disqualification, unless that conviction or judgment was followed by attainder; Mr. O'Donovan Rossa in this case not being attainted, consequently no presiding Judge on an election petition would decide that he was legally disqualified. The only precedent which was really a precedent in point in modern times made it perfectly clear, in his opinion, that lawyers in England had always held the opinion which Mr. Heron in Ireland found to be the law. This precedent had not been quite correctly stated by the right hon. Gentleman. In 1849, Lord John Russell proposed two Resolutions to that House with regard to the conviction of Mr. Smith O'Brien, the first of which ran as follows:—

"That it appears by the record, communicated from the House of Lords, that William Smith O'Brien has been convicted of high treason."—[3 Hansard, cv. 669.]

On this Sir Frederick Thesiger, as reported in Hansard, wished to state a single objection with regard to the wording of the Resolution. The words were—

"That William Smith O'Brien has been convicted of high treason." "Now, the noble Lord" (continued Sir Frederick Thesiger) "might be aware that attainder did not follow on conviction, but on the judgment which followed; and he would therefore beg to suggest that the words of the Resolution should be altered into 'attainted of high treason.' He thought the noble Lord could not proceed with the second Resolution, which implied that William Smith O'Brien was civilly dead, unless the word 'attainted' were introduced into the first Resolution."—[Ibid.]

The Attorney-General (Sir John Jervis) said that possibly a middle course might be the best to take, and he would therefore suggest that the words "adjudged guilty" should be substituted for "convicted." Lord John Russell then moved—

"That Mr. Speaker do issue his warrant to the clerk of the Crown to issue a new writ for the county of Limerick, in the room of William Smith O'Brien."—[Ibid.]

It was scarcely necessary to remark that in the case of Mr. Smith O'Brien sentence of death had been passed, attainder had followed, and therefore, beyond doubt, disqualification had ensued. But even in this case, so anxious were the legal authorities of the House not to overstep the jurisdiction of Parliament that an alteration in the form of the Resolution was agreed to in order to show that attainder had followed in this particular case—so evident did it appear that by the law and practice of Parliament disqualification on the ground of felony could only be sustained on the fact of attainder. The right hon. Gentleman did not see and could not conceive why, because the Legislature had thought it expedient to substitute a milder punishment for the old one, the disqualification in the case of treason should be removed. But, as a matter of fact, almost all of them had been removed; and it was for the right hon. Gentleman to show why, when other disqualifications had been removed, one disqualification should be preserved. He would leave to the legally-educated Members of the House the easy task of following the right hon. Gentleman through his arguments, and of showing that the Member for Tipperary had not been attainted, and therefore not disqualified by the existing law of Parliament. Now, although he was not a lawyer, he sometimes looked into Blackstone and such simple authorities for simple men, and he there found the whole essence and consequences of attainder very distinctly and lucidly defined. Blackstone showed that—

"After sentence of death, the most terrible and highest judgment of the laws of England, is pronounced, the immediate inseparable consequence of the law of England is attainder. For, when it is now clear beyond dispute that the criminal is no longer fit to live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as a monster aud as a bane to human society, the law sets a note of infamy upon him, puts him out of its protection, and takes no further care of him than barely to see him executed."

"This forfeiture for felony," he further remarked, "arises only on attainder." There were lawyers in that House who believed, and who he had no doubt would tell them, that, by the Election Act of 1868, that House had delegated to the Judge appointed to try election petitions the whole right and prerogative of that House to decide as to the qualification of candidates. Not being a lawyer, he would not undertake to advance any such opinion; but he would put it as an argument ad verecundiam to Members of tins House as ignorant of the law as himself, that they ought not, without previous inquiry and examination, to give a decision on a difficult question of law, which might possibly be opposed to legal opinions of the Judges. Mr. Heron, with remarkable foresight and good sense, preferred to trust to the chance of a deus ex machinâ, in the person of a rash Minister and a raw House of Commons to rescue him in a cloud of words and by a random Resolution from the electoral difficulty out of which he knew he had no chance of escaping through the recognized tribunals. It was, he believed, perfectly well-known that Mr. Heron had satisfied himself, after taking competent advice and counsel, that a conviction for felony did not constitute a legal disqualification unless followed by attainder, and that as Mr. O'Donovan Rossa was not attainted he could not be declared by an Election Judge to be legally disqualified. That was his (Mr. Moore's) opinion; but that opinion was not involved in the proposition which he had made to the House, and which he thought every consideration of justice and prudence would seem to recommend. He had endeavoured to argue this question on its merits, and the proposition which he made was one by which the merits of the case might be tested. He hoped, therefore, for the favourable consideration of considerate men on both sides of the House. From the Conservative party he hoped for support, because it was their special function and prerogative not to allow any of the ancient landmarks of the Constitution to be moved without care and caution; to the Liberal party he looked for co-operation, because it was their duty to protect the electoral rights and privileges of the people; and from the members of the new party of progress he expected assistance, because they had yet to show that they cared for any class but one class, or any rights but their own. The hon. Member concluded by moving his Amendment.

said, he would endeavour to avoid entering at undue length into the consideration of the legal question they were called upon to decide. If the matter were free from doubt, whatever might be their sympathies, the House should act at once; but the question was so surrounded by difficulties, that he should second the Amendment. The speech of the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. Moore) raised two points well worthy of consideration. As he understood it, the Act of 1868, regulating the course to be taken with regard to election petitions, was intended not only to relieve the House of Commons from inquiries of that kind, but to shut it out from them altogether. But if the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) were agreed to, he did not see why any other question of a disputed election should not be brought under the notice of the House of Commons, and submitted to its judgment. The 50th section of the Act of 1868 provided, in express terms, that—

"After the next dissolution of Parliament no election or return shall be questioned except in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

In the case of Sir Sydney Waterlow, last year, a Committee was appointed, the hon. Gentleman was declared disqualified, and a new Writ was ordered to be issued. That seemed, no doubt, to assume that the jurisdiction of the House over elections still continued. But as the Committee was appointed at the request of the hon. Gentleman himself, for the purpose of protecting himself against penalties, and the new Writ was issued sub silentio, he did not think that case could be regarded as a precedent. The House had to ask themselves the plain constitutional question—whether, after the passing of an Act of Parliament providing a new form of jurisdiction in election matters, such matters ought still to be tried by the House of Commons? But, assuming that the House would not be disposed to accede to this view of the matter, he was anxious to direct their attention to another point which appeared to him to be one of great gravity. Had it not been for the language of the right hon. Gentleman, he (Mr. Matthews) should have submitted, with great confidence, that Mr. O'Donovan Rossa, the Member-elect for Tipperary—and he presumed he might be allowed to give him that title, at all events—was not subject to any disqualification known to the law. No constitutional lawyer would contend that the House, by any Resolution of its own, could create any fresh incapacity to be elected. It was the exclusive constitutional privilege of the electors to judge for themselves of the fitness of the representatives they elected, subject to any disqualification that might exist under the actual law of the land. With that single limitation the electors were at liberty to elect, as their representative in that House, any person whom they might think fit. The House, therefore must ascertain what were the disqualifications that existed under the actual law of the land. Upon this point, having searched through the authorities, he must state his belief that the only legal disqualification for election was attainder for treason or felony. Lord Coke, from whom the right hon. Gentleman had taken the words he had used, stated in direct terms that a man attainted for treason or felony was disqualified from being elected; and throughout the whole current of authorities disqualification was stated in the same terms. He had himself searched with some industry, and he had found only one authority—Roe on Elections—in which the case now in hand, of a felony which did no carry the consequence of attainder, was dealt with: the author, after first stating that a man attainted for treason or felony was disqualified for election, proceeded to observe that it did not appear that any crime of less enormity carried with it a similar disqualification, so as to bind the electors that they should not elect the guilty person. The universal current of opinion of all esteemed writers was that attainder, and attainder alone, carried disqualification with it. Addressing, as he was, an Assembly, many of the members of which were learned in the law, it was unnecessary for him to remind them that at the time of Lord Coke the great bulk of felonies were punished capitally, and therefore carried attainder with them—although they were not all capital, the greater number of them were—but still attainder only followed upon sentence of death being pronounced, and in no other case was it produced or brought about by the judgment. No disqualification that he was aware of by the laws of England followed upon the conviction or sentence of a man for felony not capital, except that he was rendered incapable of giving evidence as a witness, and that he forfeited his goods and chattels—no other disqualification attached unless the felony was a capital one. But the moment a man was sentenced to capital punishment for a felony he became attainted, was looked upon as dead, lost his property, and was rendered incapable of holding any office or trust. It would greatly surprise him if any lawyer in that House were to assert that any judgment except that of death was followed by attainder, or should produce any authority to show that disqualification to sit in Parliament had been held to arise from anything but attainder. The case of Smith O'Brien had been already dealt with by his hon. Friend (Mr. Moore), who had shown that that individual had been sentenced to death, and had therefore been attainted. Lord Chelmsford laid stress upon that very fact; and therefore the term "adjudged guilty" in the Resolution of the House could only refer to the judgment of death, which in his case had been pronounced, and had been followed by all its consequences. The case of Smith O'Brien, therefore, afforded no precedent that would assist the House in arriving at a decision in the present instance. And what was the answer of the right hon. Gentleman to this view of the case? The right hon. Gentleman said that it was an absurd and irrational thing, where the guilt of the man was the same as would have been punished capitally in former days, to suppose because by the indulgence of the Legislature a lesser punishment had been inflicted, that therefore the disqualification to be elected to sit in Parliament, one of the usual consequences of attainder, should not follow. He begged the House to pause before they accepted that doctrine. The old consequences of attainder arose from the fact that the punishment was death. But if disqualification to be elected to sit in Parliament was to follow where the judgment was not capital, why should not the other consequences of attainder, the forfeiture of lands, and the inability to give evidence, also follow? If once the strict and well-defined bounds of the law were to be overstepped, he did not see where the line was to be drawn. Then, the right hon. Gentleman, had asked whether this man was among the magis idoneos et discretos? The right hon. Gentleman's argument proved too much, because he presumed that even the right hon. Gentleman would scarcely contend that a conviction for misdemeanour would disqualify a man from sitting in that House; yet, a person who had been convicted of an offence coming under that head could not be said to be idoneus et discretus, any more than a man who had been convicted of a non-capital felony. Sir Robert Walpole, for instance, had been sent to the Tower for having sold contracts for money while Minister for War—an act certainly not denoting discretion and fitness—yet he had not been held disqualified from sitting in that House; and gross and shocking and revolting to all moral sense as that act was, he did not think that there was a lawyer now living who would suggest that it would have the effect of disqualifying the offender from sitting in Parliament. If they once went beyond the limits the law had traced, and embarked upon objections to the moral fitness of men, he did not know where the line could be drawn, and they would, probably, establish a number of disabilities that were unknown to the law. That it was absurd and irrational to permit a convicted felon to sit in that House he did not deny; but his short answer to that objection was, that such a person was not disqualified by law from being elected and from taking his seat. If the law was absurd and irrational, let them alter the law; but, as long as it remained in force, they were bound to abide by it. In dealing with an Irish question of this nature, above all others, the House was bound to act with the greatest caution, and to keep strictly within the letter of the law; because, if there was one lesson more than another which it was incumbent upon them to teach the people of Ireland, it was to act with strict respect to the law. With regard to the election of Mr. O'Donovan Rossa, he looked upon it as being no more than an expression of the passionate sympathy felt in Ireland for the Fenian and the political prisoners—a sympathy which had arisen in part from a sincere notion that they were patriots, and partly from the impression that they had endured great sufferings. As long as that sympathy was shown in a legal manner, the House should not stretch the law in order to show their disapproval of it. He would not point to any consequences likely to occur at future elections which might render it necessary, on the part of that House, to take further action; but he warned hon. Members against overstepping the bounds of the law, lest their Resolution should be treated, not as an act of justice, but one of vengeance, and should thereby lead the Irish people to believe that impartial justice could not be expected by them from the Imperial Parliament. He did not second the Amendment with the view that the matter of the election should be shifted from that House to a Committee—because he thought that such a proceeding would be equally opposed to the law with the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman—but with the view that if the House should think that the suggestions that had been made were deserving of consideration, they should be inquired into by a Committee who might search into precedents; when the House could with more satisfaction, and perhaps he might say with a clearer conscience, adopt or reject the Resolution proposed by the right hon. Gentleman. He begged to second the Amendment.

I entirety agree with the proposition of the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. Moore) that this is a question which should be debated in a calm and judicial manner, and, as far as possible, should be kept free from all party or purely political considerations. I further entirely agree that if any fair and candid mind could see that inquiry was needed the House should grant such inquiry. It certainly would be a very disastrous state of things, and a state of things which would leave us exposed to very just reproach, if it were really the law of the country that a man convicted of treason-felony, and now undergoing sentence of penal servitude in one of the prisons of the Queen, should be eligible and should be deputed to represent a county in Parliament. This would be a great reproach to the law—still, if it were so, the law would have to be administered as it stood in a judicial spirit. Of course, too, I agree—as every lawyer and every man must agree—that laws affecting whole classes of Her Majesty's subjects cannot be created by Resolutions of the House of Commons. Resolutions can be of no effect except when they declare that which is either the statute law, or that which has been by a long course of judicial procedure decided to be the common law of the country. I now proceed to describe to the House my view of the question at issue. I begin, in the first instance, for the purpose of putting it out of the way, with the point which the hon. Members for Mayo and Dungarvan last referred to—I mean the argument they have derived from the words of the Election Petitions Act, and the supposed taking away thereby of the jurisdiction of this House in matters of this description, and transferring it to the Judges. No doubt that Act has been correctly stated. The 50th section of that Act, the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125, enacts that—

"From and after the next Dissolution of Parliament no Election or Return to Parliament shall be questioned except in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

But, in order correctly to gather the meaning of these words, it is necessary to consider what the Act was dealing with, to what state of facts it was to be applied, and what jurisdiction it was transferring. That statute was transferring to the Judges the jurisdiction which up to that time had been exercised by this House exclusively under the 11 & 12 Vict., commonly called Sir Robert Peel's Act. The later statute begins by calling itself "An Act for amending the Laws relating to Election Petitions," and it is known as the Election Petitions Act. It sets out the form in which election petitions are to be made out, it deals at considerable length with the whole course of procedure applicable to the courts it constitutes; and then, after certain miscellaneous provisions, in the 50th section it enacts that—

"From and after the next dissolution of Parliament no election or return to Parliament shall be questioned, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act; but, until such dissolution, elections and returns to Parliament may be questioned in manner heretofore in use."

What does that mean? It means, of course, "questioned" by election petitions—"questioned" by persons having an interest in raising the question, by persons wishing to vindicate their own rights, by persons who under the state of the law existing before would have been referred to an Election Committee of the House, which exercised jurisdiction in a manner familiar to us all. If that were not the case, and if the Act of Parliament were not to be considered by that rule of common sense, what would happen? In the case of no elector choosing to question the return of a Member, the House of Commons would be bound by law, according to the argument of the hon. Gentleman opposite, to receive among its Members persons who by law were ineligible; because the hon. Member knows there are no means of questioning elections except before the Judges, that the Judges alone inquire into election petitions, and unless the Judges were petitioned in such a case a person confessedly ineligible could take his seat in the House unquestioned. Can that be the fair and sensible meaning of the Act? I venture to think that any one who considers the matter candidly as a man of sense will see that I am giving the reasonable interpretation I of the Act. Now, lot us consider some of the technical questions raised. As I understand the argument of the hon. Gentlemen opposite, it is somewhat in this form. The old authorities, they tell us, show that the disqualification of a felon wholly rests upon his attainder; this felon is not attainted, therefore, this felon is not disqualified. That is the argument of the hon. Member for Mayo; and, in considering it, I will begin by making admissions that I am bound to make, and which I make in the fairest and fullest sense. I admit that the old authorities—not all of them, but most of them—enough to speak of them generally as "the old authorities"—lay down that persons attainted of treason or felony are disqualified from sitting in Parliament. But the course we propose is perfectly consistent with that admission. It is also perfectly correct to say that at the date these authorities wrote almost all felonies, and the exceptions are few, were capital offences, and as capital felonies were followed by attainder; so that when the old authorities speak of a person "attainted of treason or felony" they speak of ordinary felons, because there were no felons in those days except attainted felons; and this being so, it is laid down in the text books with sufficient authority that attainted felons were incapable of sitting in Parliament. But it is not correct—and nobody knows that bettor than the hon. and learned? Member (Mr. Matthews)—to say that attainder and the punishment of death, although for the most part inseparably connected, were by any means the same thing or were convertible terms; because the hon. and learned Member knows full well that a man might have been put to death for heresy without being attainted, and he knows very well that a man might be attainted by being outlawed without being put to death. The hon. and learned Member therefore misleads the House if he wishes it to understand that of necessity death and attainder, although often inseparable, were by no means convertible terms or necessarily connected in idea. Now, what follows from this? As the law altered in course of time, and as that which had been an inseparable accident of the judgment of felony ceased to be so connected with it—as persons who had been convicted of felony and adjudged guilty of felony, were not put to death, and, therefore, were not attainted—it rests with those who agree with the hon. Member for Mayo to show that thereupon, as a necessary consequence, the disqualification which followed upon the general and complex idea of an attainted felon was so connected with that part of the idea which was contained in the word "attainder," that when the word attainder ceased to be applicable to a felon the felon at once became capable of sitting in Parliament. Nothing could be a more unreasonable view of the old authorities. I therefore answer the hon. and learned Member's argument in two ways. I say, first, assuming that the technical consequences of the conviction for felony have now been altered in point of fact, the principles upon which you find these old authorities proceeded still remain; and if the principle upon which the old authorities were founded remains, although the technical consequences of the law in some respects may have been altered, it is proper to maintain the principle of the law untouched. I admit that this view is capable of wide application, and that it should be cautiously applied; but the principle is a sound principle; and when the circumstances of a case bring that case within its application, as the circumstances of the matter before us do, then it is a principle upon which this House may safely act. Now, I answer the hon. Member in a second way—I say it is for him to show that the technical consequences of the law have been in any manner altered. You have to deal with the incidents of conviction, of judgment, and of attainder in the case of a felon. There is no doubt that at the time when all felonies were capital conviction by the jury, followed by the judgment of the Court, made a man what was called attainted. He must be a much wiser and better lawyer than I am to inform the House what "attainder" really means; some refer it to attinctus—that is, so deeply dyed with black that he cannot be worthy of any civil rights. "Well, Sir, the felony remains, the conviction remains, the judgment on conviction remains the same; and the felony, the conviction, and judgment on conviction remaining the same, what is there—what fragment of authority has either hon. Gentleman who has addressed the House given it for showing that the consequence I admit to have resulted from the whole various matters taken together—the felony, conviction, judgment, and attainder—is to be limited to the attainder alone? I find no authority for such a position. It is said that attainted felons were incapable at a time when there were no felons who were not attainted; but there is no earthly reason for supposing that it was the technical consequence of guilt—the attainder—that constituted the disqualification rather than the guilt itself. Have we any authority upon this subject? I say there is the highest authority; and I beg the attention of the House to the case of Mr. Smith O'Brien, which is directly in point. I am sure that everyone who looks at that case will say that it has the weight I attribute to it. Mr. Smith O'Brien was convicted of treason—if you please, attainted of treason. What does Lord John Russell do in that state of things? He moves that Mr. Smith O'Brien being convicted of treason, a now writ do issue for the city or county—I forget which— he represented. Sir Frederick Thesiger, with all the consequences no doubt before him that were present to the mind of the hon. and learned Gentleman, and with that notion of the law which, he set forth with considerable ingenuity, distinctly moved that the word "convicted" should be left out of the Resolution and the word "attainted" put in. What was done on that? The Attorney General of that day was Sir John Jervis, one of the acutest and ablest men in Westminster Hall—a great authority on criminal matters. What did he do? He said, "Don't put in 'attainted;' there are many felonies on which attainder at this time of day does not follow; if you put in 'attainted' you will be yielding to the argument of Sir Frederick Thesiger, that it is upon attainder, and technical attainder alone, that a man becomes ineligible. I would do nothing of the sort. I recommend the House of Commons to say that what really makes a man ineligible is the conviction and the judgment on conviction." And what did he substitute for "convicted"?"—not "attainted," but the term "adjudged guilty," which includes conviction and judgment. Upon the conviction of the jury and the judgment of the Court, in his opinion, as in mine, the disqualification follows. To that Sir Frederick Thesiger, who had filled the responsible position of Attorney General, and who at no time of his life shrunk from maintaining what he considered to be his duty either to the public or his profession, assented. The words "adjudged guilty," as suggested by the Attorney General, were substituted, and the Resolution was adopted by the House without a division. It is vain to deny that this is a direct authority on the part of the House of Commons for the proposition which at too great length I have endeavoured to expound—that the disability follows not in consequence of the attainder, but in consequence of the conviction of the jury and the judgment of the Court. I must say, with all respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman who has argued with so much ingenuity, that it is possible for legal minds to raise an argument out of anything, and I cannot help thinking that the sense of the whole matter is in favour of the view I have endeavoured to present to the House, and that there is abundance of legal authority to sustain the course which the Government recommend.

said, he was prepared to support the Amendment of the hon. Member for Mayo, and hoped he might be allowed very briefly to travel beyond the legal bounds of the question which had been submitted to the House. In taking this course, he trusted they would acquit him of any sympathy with O'Donovan Rossa or with Fenianism in general. It was impossible for loyal Englishmen or Irishmen to support a society which had for its object, not only a dissolution of the Union, but a dismemberment of the Empire, and would carry out its projects not by reform but by revolution. Yet, while he viewed the objects of Fenianism, not only with dislike but with abhorrence, he must say he could not but sympathize to a very great degree with those men, who misguided as they were, were many of them honest in their patriotic desire for the promotion of what they believed to be the good of their country; and he trusted an honest love of country would receive consideration, fair play, and even generous treatment at the hands of a British Parliament. Fenianism was of composite origin. It was partly owing to long standing wrongs in Ireland, and partly to the spread of those republican ideas which were undoubtedly making progress, not only in America, but in Europe. Another source of Fenianism was the education which the Irish people had been for centuries receiving at the hands of the priesthood. He, for one, did not regret the Irish Church Act passed last Session. He thought that the Protestants of Ireland should have done with doleful lamentations about the downfall of the Irish Church. He believed the Church, formerly the Established Church, of Ireland, would in freedom and independence be more than compensated for her disestablishment by the State. He was glad that the Government were going to bring in a Land Bill, which he trusted would be a large and liberal measure. They had heard a good deal of the loyalty of the priesthood, but what had they done? ["Question, question!"] The priests had denounced Fenianism; but had they not, also, denounced Freemasonry? Did any one believe they denounced Fenianism because they loved England? ["Question"]

rose to Order. He wished to know whether, in the discussion of a dry, legal, constitu- tional question, the House was to be insisted by having to listen to a defence of Fenianism within its walls? ["Chair, chair!"]

I did not understand the hon. Member to argue in the manner described; but I hope the hon. Member will see the propriety, as the House is now discussing a legal question, of not diverging unnecessarily from the argument before it.

said, he had already expressed his abhorrence of Fenianism, and therefore thought he had guarded himself from such an imputation as that conveyed by the hon. Baronet. He would now sit down, trusting that the House would not be led away by any panic from doing justice to the subject before them. For himself, he would prefer Liberty, even in her hour of license, to the tyranny of Ultramontane rule.

I quite agree with the hon. Member who moved this Amendment that in a question of this importance the House should be very cautious as to the course which it adopts, and that no step should be taken which does not rest on the soundest foundation. If I thought that the course proposed by the Government was not guaranteed by the strongest precedents and authorities, I should not hesitate in giving my support to the Amendment. But, as I understand the question, it is one that does not admit of any argument or doubt. There is no dispute that O'Donovan Rossa was convicted of treason-felony. The precedents have been accurately followed. A copy of the record—the indictment, the conviction, and the judgment, is on the table of the House—there is no point into which a Committee could inquire which is not already known to the House—and, sitting on this (the Opposition) side of the House, I feel it right not to leave my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General unsupported by any expression of opinion proceeding from these benches. With regard to the word "attainted," I look upon that as a descriptive expression; and this view is corroborated by the terms of the passage read by the hon. and learned Member for Dungarvan, which showed that the crime and not merely its consequence was the ground for expulsion. This House has expelled men for forgery and per- jury where there could be no attainder, acting on precedent throughout, and considering the crime and the nature of the crime, and not the technical consequences following it. It seems, then, to me that we should be neglecting our duty, and throwing doubt upon a question where no doubt can arise, if we refrained in this case from exercising a power in conformity with what has been done by our predecessors. With respect to the particular offence itself, it is one of so heinous a character that no person can say it does not come within the class to which this House has always attached disability for sitting in the House. Surely, no one can believe that any gentleman sitting in this House could be guilty of it without being visited by immediate expulsion? Can it be seriously maintained that, because no election petition has been presented in the present case, no proceedings can be taken in the matter? Suppose an infant twelve or fourteen years old were returned to this House, is it to be said that because there might happen to be no petition the House could not by its own authority prevent such a person taking his scat? It was never intended by the Election Petitions' Act to take from this House its proper authority; and in the present case, where there is nothing to inquire about, where the judgment is admitted by those who move the Amendment, and where the matter stands on the same footing as when the word "attainted" was used, I think the House may safely adopt the course proposed by Her Majesty's Government.

I do not wish to detain the House long, because I agree with my right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Hardy), and in the general tenour of the able argument of the hon. and learned Solicitor General. I do not suppose my right hon. Friend proposed to take as his precedent a case of expulsion of a Member from the House, because that is a very different step from the one now proposed, for a man may be expelled from the House for certain offences, though not legally disqualified. The Motion now before the House is founded upon the assumption, that Mr. O'Donovan Rossa is legally disqualified: at the same time I do not think it wholly irrelevant to refer to instances of expulsion, as they afford strong evidence that the House has always considered that the infamy which attaches to a gross crime renders the criminal incapable of properly discharging his duty in this House. This shows that the principle of disqualification also, in those cases in which convicts are disqualified, ought to be looked for in the adjudication of guilt, followed by its appropriate sentence, and not in the technical consequence, "attainder." The hon. and learned Solicitor General hardly did full justice to his own case when he said the authorities laid it down that "an attainted felon" cannot sit in the House. The expression is, a man "attaint of treason or felony" cannot sit, the reason given being drawn from the terms of the writ, which requires the return of "discreet and fit persons." Now, it is impossible that a man convicted of treason or felony, and suffering punishment for that offence, could be a fit person, on account of the infamy attaching to the crime; and the mere use of the term "attaint," which was the technical equivalent of the word "convicted" in all such cases under the former state of the law, cannot alter the fact that it is the crime which causes the disqualification and not a technicality of law. If it were otherwise, the reason given would have been, because he is civilly dead; not because he is (necessarily) wanting in fitness and discretion. Very strong indirect evidence to the same effect is to be found in the course of recent legislation, which has mitigated the punishment for felony; for till lately the sentence of death was pronounced or recorded in all serious cases of felony. It is not now proposed that a man should be disqualified to sit in Parliament for any other felonies than those which before constituted a disqualification, and for which modern legislation has substituted a milder punishment than that which our ancestors imposed. It could not be doubted that those who instituted and carried that beneficent reform of the sanguinary laws formerly in force would, have expressly provided that the effect of great crime should continue to be a disqualification for public office or great franchises, if they had not taken the same view of the law as the Government. The law, in fact, was already so, and no new provision was necessary to declare that a sentence of transportation for life or of penal servitude for life—which, indeed, makes it necessarily impossible for a man to be present for a single moment in this House—disqualified the person subject to it from being a Member of Parliament. I therefore think that the House is bound to take the course recommended by the Government.

After listening to the argument of the hon. and learned Solicitor General, I should not have had the slightest doubt on the question, if the matter had been discussed three years ago, that a person convicted of a great crime could be declared by this House "ineligible and incapable of being returned to Parliament;" but the hon. and learned Gentleman passed over with great skill the clause in the Act of Parliament of 1868. The words of the statute are to my mind very clear—"that no election or return should be questioned except in accordance with the provisions of that Act." I think more weight should be attributed to that clause than was attributed to it by the hon and learned Gentleman. The question is whether it has not the effect of taking all trials of these questions of returns out of the House. The proposal of the Government is, that O'Donovan Rossa, having been adjudged guilty of treason-felony, has become, and continues, incapable of being "returned" as a Member of this House. I put it to the common sense of the House, whether it can be contended that the adoption of such a Resolution is not questioning the return. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxford University (Mr. Gathorne Hardy) said it would be absurd, if an infant or alien were returned, that we should have no means of questioning the return. I must admit that it would be absurd; and that was one of the objections to handing over the trial of these questions to a tribunal which could not deal with them in the manner in which the House had been in the habit of treating them. The precedent of Smith O'Brien, in my opinion, does not apply at all, because he was already a Member of the House when we declared him incapable of sitting in it; and there was no question as to his return, which was indisputably good. We are now asked, in the very teeth of an Act solemnly and deliberately considered and discussed to question a return which that same Act says shall not be ques- tioned, except in a particular way pointed out by such Act. When we passed that Act we parted with our jurisdiction in the matter. If we now proceed in the way proposed by the Government, we shall be establishing a precedent under which many cases of alleged bad returns may be brought before the House, although no petitions may have been presented against them. The Solicitor General has argued that when there is no election petition, and the Judge under the statute has not been called into action, the House is at liberty to decide whether there has been a bad return or not. In that case we may have discussions in this House such as were raised before the passing of the Grenville Act, and all the mischiefs which it has been a constant struggle on the part of Parliament to get rid of would be renewed. Suppose there should be a petition in such a case as the present, and the Election Judge were to decide that the person objected to was eligible, and had a right to a seat in this House, while we, on the inherent authority claimed by the Solicitor General and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxford University, decided that he was ineligible—it is possible that a conflict might arise between this House and the courts of law; and if, on the other hand, you resolve that a person has been improperly returned, and was not eligible for election to Parliament, and a Judge decides the other way, how can you refuse to reconsider the question, and perhaps come to an opposite conclusion? I confess that the argument used this evening upon this point has not satisfied my mind. It is possible that the prejudices which exists against the person concerned in this case naturally and necessarily influence the House here, and may induce the House to assent to the Motion; but I own that I do not feel satisfied; and as I was one of those who objected to part with this jurisdiction, foreseeing that we should probably be landed in some of these difficulties, I hope the House will forgive me for having mentioned my doubts on this occasion.

said, that the text writers, speaking of the effect of attainder in cases of high treason, one of which was the corruption of blood, so that no descent could be traced from a person so convicted, laid down the doc- trine that such a person had violated his contract with the State, and had become an enemy of the State, and the new Act did not propose other than to proceed by the principle of the old law. Heading 11 & 12 Vict. by this light, there was no difficulty in construing it. No one could have supposed that in mitigating the penalties of treason it was intended to abrogate the incidents attached to it by the old law. The arguments of the Government on the question were irresistible; perhaps, however, the words of the Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman had been framed a little too much upon precedents which hardly applied to the particular case, and he suggested that it might be expedient to face the difficulty, and say—"Whereas 0'Donovan Rossa has boon convicted of felony under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 12, and is thereby incapable of sitting in this House"—so as to place on record the decision of the House that a person convicted under that Act was subjected to this one of the incidents of treason.

said, it was very desirable that O'Donovan Rossa, or any other person in the same position, should not be allowed to take his seat in the House, but as statutes had been passed preventing minors, bankrupts, judges, bankruptcy commissioners, clergy of the Churches of England, Scotland, and Rome, and persons guilty of bribery and corruption, and other classes of persons from sitting in the House, he thought it would be better to deal with this case in the same way, and to pass a general declaratory Act that no person under such circumstances should sit in the House. Suppose that, after they had passed this Resolution, O'Donovan Rossa, or some other Fenian convict, should be again returned for Tipperary, and on an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in Dublin, that Court did not take exactly the same view as this House took of his ineligibility, in what an awkward position the House would be placed. They would do violence to the law by exercising their power, and turning out a man whom the Court of Common Pleas had declared to be eligible. The proposal of the Government was based upon the statement of Lord Coke, that a man attainted of treason or felony could not sit in Parliament. But Lord Coke could not have meant felony of every kind. For instance, manslaughter committed by chance medley, or in self-defence, would not have rendered a man ineligible. The only kind of felony contemplated by Lord Coke was a capital felony in which a sentence of death might be passed. Now, in this case, treason-felony was a new offence unknown to the common law, and the statute of Edward III. did not apply to it; it was never capital, and the incidents of a capital crime never attached to it. Nothing whatever was to be gained by carrying this Resolution without inquiry; the only result would be continual disturbances, and the matter would never be satisfactorily settled. Let a Committee inquire into the whole question, and an Act be founded upon their Report, and all the objects of the Government would be effected. He would, moreover, remind the House—for attention had not been drawn to it—of the manner in which the Resolution was worded. As the Resolution was framed, it read as though O'Donovan Rossa had, since his return, been found guilty of this offence, and not, as the fact was, previous to his return. It should be altered in accordance with the facts, for otherwise hereafter it save an erroneous impression.

said, it had been assumed by Members who supported the Government in this matter, that there was really no serious doubt as to the propriety of the course now proposed. But having listened with the greatest anxiety to the arguments used on the part of the Government, and to the address of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bouverie), he must say that he, with other hon. Members, entertained doubts as to the propriety of the course proposed; and that being so, the people of Ireland would feel that the better course to have pursued would have been to adopt the suggestion of the hon. Member for Mayo. If the matter were sent to a Committee, the House would have the result of a great and solemn inquiry into which no element of passion would have entered to guide them in any subsequent action they might think proper to adopt. He had come to the conclusion that, by the late Act, they had, to a very large extent, abandoned their jurisdiction, and that they had not the power to decide on these returns. This was not a question of party, politics, or individuals, but one of grave Parliamentary law, which the House should not decide on by balancing one legal speech with another; but, after due inquiry, the matter should be referred to a Committee to inquire into the authorities.

said, if it had been competent for him to do so, he would have simply moved that Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa be expelled from this House, and if that had been the original Motion it would have got rid of a great constitutional difficulty. He was afraid the Resolutions would be misunderstood in Ireland. They had been told that a great many things had lately been misunderstood in Ireland; that the policy of the Government had been misunderstood; and that language had been used by a Cabinet Minister with reference to the landlords and the land of Ireland that had been also misunderstood; and he was afraid it might be misunderstood in Ireland if it were supposed that the House of Commons entertained the slightest doubt about O'Donovan Rossa remaining a Member of that House. As he could not propose the expulsion of O' Donovan Rossa, he should support the Resolutions, and which every loyal and honest citizen in the country ought to adopt.

said, he should not have risen but for what had been said by the hon. Member for Cork (Mr. Maguire), as to the doubts entertained upon the subject. He, however, had never any doubts about the matter. Having been consulted as to the course to be adopted by the returning officer, he advised that O'Donovan Rossa should be put in nomination. It might have been that O'Donovan Rossa was not the O'Donovan Rossa, or that, if he was, he might have received a free pardon. He had no doubt about the question of eligibility, for he was of opinion that it was the felony, and not the attainder for felony, which caused the disqualification; and he utterly denied the eligibility of a felon to sit in the House. But he thought that the Act of 1868 had entirely divested this House of any jurisdiction in these matters.

said, he was surprised that any doubt should have been expressed as to the jurisdiction of the House in matters of this kind. The Act of 1868 was passed for the purpose of more effectually preventing corrupt practices at Parliamentary elections, and the inquiry conducted by the Election Judges was confined to that. It did not, therefore, deprive that House of the power it had before of dealing with cases like that under discussion—namely, with all matters relating to its Members, and which it exercised in the case of Sir Sydney Waterlow only last year. It was an absurdity to suppose that that power did not exist, as without it, lunatics, idiots, minors, and—he had no wish to class them with those he had named—females might be returned as Members of Parliament, and the House according to the argument of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bouverie) would have no power to deal with the return. The House had only parted with so much of its judicial powers as related to inquiry into corrupt practices at elections, and such questions of disputed returns as were previously dealt with by the Election Committees. All they had to inquire was whether the person who had been returned for Tipperary was eligible. He concurred in the opinion expressed by the Solicitor General and the hon. and learned Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer) that it was not the attainder of felony, but the judgment which constituted the ineligibility. Attainder was the consequence of the judgment and not the occasion of the inability. Indeed, persons had been expelled the House who could not in any sense be said to have been attainted of felony. A Committee could find no other precedents than those that had been quoted by the Government, or such as would go to this, that persons, such as monopolists for instance, not attainted had been declared unfit to sit in the House, and therefore he thought it would be useless to appoint one.

, in moving for leave to bring in a "Bill to consolidate and amend the Acts relating to the Regulation and Inspection of Mines," said, that the subject had been brought under the notice of the House towards the close of last Session, so that it would be needless for him to make any lengthened remarks on the present occasion. He hoped to press forward the Bill with all reasonable speed. The second reading would be taken on the 21st instant, when, of course, an opportunity would be given to hon. Members of discussing the measure and the various Amendments to it. He had carefully considered the very numerous Amendments which had been proposed, as well as the representations made to him by deputations from what might be called both sides of the question; and the consequence was that he had introduced into the measure several Amendments which he would describe when the Bill came on for a second reading. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving for leave to bring in the Bill.

said, the Bill and Amendments would be printed on Tuesday next.

, in moving for leave to bring in a "Bill to consolidate and amend the law relating to the Coinage and Her Majesty's Mint," said: The Bill which I am about to ask leave to introduce is concerned with the laws relating to the coinage and the Mint; but it has no relation whatever to the question which I raised at the end of last Session with regard to the position of the mintage on our coinage. That question is in such a state that I do not think it could with any profit be at present brought before the House. We cannot, indeed, properly discuss the question of mintage without reference to the subject of international coinage; and the present state of affairs in France in regard to that subject is such as to make it desirable that we should not take any step just now even if the House were otherwise disposed to do so. The adoption of a single gold standard was recommended by the International Conference which mot in Paris in 1867, at the instance of the the French Government. The French Government subsequently appointed a Commission which also recommended a single gold standard, but it has now thought fit to nominate another Commission to investigate the same subject. Consequently, as a single gold standard is indispensable for the advancement of a scheme of international coinage, the matter must stand over until the French Government shall have arrived at a conclusion on that all-important subject. The subject I now wish to bring before the House has been brought into prominent notice in our Department. The recent death of Professor Graham, the late Master of the Mint, whose scientific attainments shed lustre not only on his own name, but upon the country, occasioned us to take a survey of the whole subject of the Mint. The House is no doubt aware that the Masters of the Mint in the old time—in the time of Sir Isaac Newton, for instance—were not Government servants or employés as they are now. Sir Isaac Newton was a contractor with the Government for the coinage, and I believe he realized in that capacity a handsome fortune. At the end of the last century, however, the Master of the Mint became a political officer who came in and went out with the Government. The last person appointed under this system was Mr. Sheil, on whose retirement, in 1850, the plan was adopted of appointing eminent men of science, the first of whom was Sir John Herschel, on whose resignation, in 1855, the late Processor Graham was appointed to the office. Well, the result of our recent inquiries is this. We found there were two principal officers in the Mint—namely, the Master and the Deputy Master—and we soon became satisfied that there really was not sufficient work for two officers, and that it was not just or fair to the public that two persons should be retained to do duties which would mode-rately occupy the energies of one. The question then arose—with which of these two officers ought we to dispense? We accordingly considered the duties which had to be discharged, and came to the conclusion that the mintage is, after all, a very ordinary and routine kind of manufacture, requiring, no doubt, care and attention, but rarely raising any difficult points which demand the attention of a man of science. Moreover, when such points do arise they can be stated in the form of a problem, which may be easily solved by some of the scientific gentlemen who are so numerous in this country. The daily duties of the Mint require the attention of a man of business, versed in the affairs of public offices, and able to manage and thoroughly well direct the routine of a public establishment. Having arrived at these conclusions, it appeared to us that it was not our duty to recommend that the office of Master of the Mint should in its present shape be filled up. At the same time it was considered desirable not to destroy that ancient office, but rather to hold it in reserve, so that if any new emergency should arise, or if the plan we propose should not succeed, we may be able to revive it. We propose, therefore, to unite it with the office which I have the honour to hold, taking away from it its salary; and to leave the daily executive work of the Mint in the hands of the present efficient Deputy Master, Mr. Fremantle. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will perform all those duties which by Act of Parliament or otherwise require the action of the Master of the Mint, while the executive duties will be carried on by Mr. Fremantle in conference with the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the time being. By that operation, together with certain other reforms which Mr. Fremantle and other officers of the Treasury associated with him have been able to carry out reduction will be effected in the Estimates of the next financial year of £3,500; and I hope before long to be able to effect a still further reduction. Some reports on the subject have been made to the Treasury, and I will lay them upon the table, as they will inform hon. Gentlemen more minutely of the steps which have been taken. Hon. Members will sec that the first object of this Bill is to amalgamate the office of Master of the Mint with that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the time being, and to take away its salary. The second object of the Bill is to consolidate the rules and regulations of the Mint, for at present nothing can be more difficult than to arrive at a complete knowledge of them. They are contained partly in Acts of Parliament, partly in Orders of Council, partly in Royal proclamations, and partly in the Mint Indentures, which were made part of the law of the land by the Act of 1816. The present Bill will compress all the information on this head into a single statute, so that everyone will hereafter be in a position to ascertain without difficulty what are the rules and regulations of the Mint. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving for leave to bring in the Bill.

said, the statement of the right hon. Gentleman had relieved his mind of a great weight, and he was sure many other persons would be gratified to learn that it was not his intention to carry out his proposals brought forward last year with regard to the weight and fineness of the sovereign. He believed that the measure indicated by the right hon. Gentleman would be satisfactory to the community.

regretted that the office of Master of the Mint should be retained at all, because it might enable some future Government to revive it during the Recess and unknown to the House. Would it not be better to abolish the office altogether?

said, that the Bill would annex the office of Master of the Mint to that of Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, therefore, nothing could be done to fix the salary of the former office upon the country without the consent of Parliament.

, in moving for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the Law relating to Friendly Societies, said: I am sorry to say that it is for a similar reason I have to introduce a Bill on the subject of Friendly Societies. The public have lost a most excellent and hard-working; servant in Mr. Tidd Pratt, who filled the office of Registrar of Friendly Societies and Savings Banks. The death of Mr. Tidd Pratt has, like that of Mr. Graham, induced me to consider what is the proper course to be taken in regard to the duties that he performed. The great merits of Mr. Tidd Pratt and the confidence he gained with the public threw a lustre over his office which possibly it did not of itself altogether deserve. The duty of the Registrar of Friendly Societies and Savings Banks is, in the first place, ministerial. It is his duty to register the rules of friendly societies, and, having done so, he had, in the next place, not exactly a judicial, but what may be termed a prophylactic duty, and to certify that those rules were in accordance with the law. When old rules were changed, and new ones were made, it was also his duty to certify them. With the exception of some of small judicial duties, a large portion of his time was taken up in transferring stock when no trustees were living, in assisting in winding up companies, and discharging duties which were rather matrimonial than anything else—assisting companies to change their names. The Government have carefully looked at the matter, and we have arrived at the opinion that we may altogether dispense with one of these duties, and that the principal one—namely, the certifying of these rules by the Registrar, which is attended in the Act with certain results. The societies whose rules have been registered have become as it were the favourites of the law, and are entitled to certain privileges and facilities, such as those of suing fraudulent employés and trustees which are denied to others that have not obtained certification. Now that is a thoroughly bad principle of the law. The law ought to have no favourites. It ought to treat all alike, and if societies are allowed to exist they ought to be treated with per- feet impartiality. If a society is legal it ought to have all the benefits and facilities which the law gives. If it is not legal it ought not to be allowed to exist at all. I do not know of any middle state of things, such as societies being allowed to exist, and yet being snubbed and looked down upon by the law. More than that; the certificate of the Registrar of Friendly Societies went no further than to show that the rules of the society did not transgress the law. It did not show in the least that the society was well organized, or was effectual for the purpose. It did not show that the rides were good, or that the actuarial calculations were sound. Nor did it give the societies the slightest protection, because it has been held that if the Registrar certified that to be law which was not law, his certificate did not make it law. It was not merely negative in its effects. It did very little good to societies, and it did a great deal of evil. By obtaining a certificate of a man of the known ability and eminence and the judicial impartiality of Mr. Tidd Pratt, certain societies obtained an amount of credit which they did not deserve. Poor and ignorant people who principally supported these societies believed that the certificate meant that the society had received the approbation of the Government, that it was founded on sound principles, and they might safely invest their money in it without the risk that attached to other societies not so certificated. So that founded with the best intentions and administered in the best manner, this paternal interference on the part of the Government with these societies has been most mischievous. Instead of pretending to give them this assistance and security we think it would be better to withdraw the pretence of doing it, and to leave these societies to stand or fall on their own merits. Their stability depends on the character, honesty, and good conduct of their managers, upon the soundness of their actuarial calculations, and the goodness of their constitution and rules, and not whether they do or do not transgress a long and technical statute. Therefore, I do not believe we can do a greater service to these friendly societies than to withdraw from them the certification of their rules, which is a more illusion I propose that whatever benefit these societies derived from having their rules certified they should continue to receive from merely registering them, and putting the public in the position of being able to inspect them, and thus to form their own opinion upon them. There can, then, be no pretence for saying that the Government have looked into the matter and have satisfied themselves that the society was sound and might be relied upon. Every society would stand on its own merits, and we may then hope to prevent the increase of societies so unsound and so calamitous as many of these have been. There are many things to suggest for the amendment of societies of this kind; but this is the first step. The result of the Bill will be that the greater part of the duty of the Registrar will be at an end, and we do not, therefore, propose to fill up the office of Registrar of Friendly Societies and Savings Banks. The ministerial duty of registering these societies will be performed by the Board of Trade, which is willing to perform it. There are other small duties which we shall discharge without additional expense to the public. The main point is to do away with a very injurious piece of Government interference; but, of course, it will not be altogether disagreeable to know that the result of the Bill will be a saving of £1,500 a-year—£1,000 to the Registrar, and £500 to his chief clerk. The fore-going is the only piece of patronage which the Chancellor of the Exchequer possesses, and I may, therefore, claim to be disinterested in the matter. The effect of our interference has been to do what was never intended, and to give a spurious credit to certain societies. It has done but little good, and a great deal of mischief, and we cannot do more wisely than to withdraw from it.

confessed that he felt satisfied with the tone of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's first observations. The right hon. Gentleman had pointed out with great justice that the Registrar's certificate seemed to him to convey a sort of fictitious value. But when the right hon. Gentleman told them that he proposed to do away entirely with the office he (Mr. Corrance) did not fool the like degree of accord. He thought the office of Registrar was invested with most important functions, for it had given the public much information relative to these societies which was extremely valuable, and which could not have otherwise been obtained. Lord Lichfield drew up a Bill relative to these societies, but he did not succeed in passing it through the House of Peers; and he (Mr. Corrance) had served on a Committee, the result of whose labours was an opinion that a Royal Commission ought to be issued to inquire into the subject at large. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that he was opposed to Government interference with these societies; but there were some of them which could not work out their rules, and they required the protection of such an officer as they had just lost. In the Bill about to be presented to the House he trusted that some substituted machinery would be found to make good the loss which the public had sustained in the death of that officer whose name they were now about to erase.

said, he felt some surprise that a Bill abolishing the connection of Government with the friendly societies was introduced at such a moment. In what the right hon. Gentleman had had said on Mr. Pratt's assiduity, knowledge of law, and able fulfilment of the duties which devolved upon him, he had merely done justice to that officer; but the right hon. Gentleman, he feared, greatly underrated the benefits which the working classes of the country had derived from the operation of those rules which, in fact, formed the code of the friendly societies throughout the country. He agreed that it was desirable to minimize, as far as possible, the paternal system of Government; but it should be remembered that in connection with these societies there were those who early in life had entered into contracts which affected the whole of their lives, and to whom, in their state of comparative ignorance, it would be difficult to explain an entire change of system. It was, therefore, desirable that some indication should be given as to the proposals of the Bill upon this head. The way in which friendly societies had developed and spread was, he thought, very creditable to the country, and the Government interference which had taken place had not boon found altogether useless. It would certainly be a startling thing to immense numbers of persons to find that prop suddenly taken away.

said, he thought they ought to be obliged to the Govern- ment for bringing in this Bill. Over and over again he had known cases in which persons who had lost what to them were large sums by payments to those societies accounted for their having so invested by saying—"It was a Government society; it was according to the Government rules, and we thought it was all right."

asked the right hon. Gentleman to state the sources of information upon which he was acting in bringing forward so unexpected a measure. Undoubtedly, cases like those mentioned by the hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. Alderman Lusk) were only too familiar; but the amount of good which the societies had accomplished under the superintendence of Mr. Tidd Pratt was very great indeed, and nothing ought hastily to be done which would weaken the confidence of the public in existing societies.

The facts which I have stated are tolerably notorious. I am not able to go into the list of authorities; but there are the Reports of the Registrar from year to year giving a most dismal picture of numerous and notorious failures of these societies. I think these are facts that ought to lead any Government that respects itself and is anxious to do what is good for the people carefully to consider whether it is altogether free from blame, and whether a continuance of the connection is likely to lead to good or otherwise. In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Bonham-Carter), I would state that the Bill is strictly limited to the office of Registrar of these societies, and that we do not meddle with any of the wider subjects to which he has alluded. It is not within my Department to deal with these societies, though there are some that I might not have been sorry to have tried my hand upon, and I think there is a good deal which might be done for them by legislation, such as preventing persons subscribing for benefits which it is utterly impossible they can ever receive. This, however, is a tiling which we have never attempted to do. I do not think I am fairly chargeable with doing injury to existing societies when I only withdraw a prop which is very much like the reed that pierced the hand of him who trusted to it.

, in moving that the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Burial Laws, said, the Bill was in its nature and in most of its clauses identical with that which had been introduced in the last Session by the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Hadfield), giving leave for the performance of burials in church-yards, with or without religious services. A clause, however, had been added, providing that the cost of repairing and maintaining the churchyards should be charged upon the poor rates, as it was felt that if Dissenters were admitted to the right of burial in churchyards, they ought also to share the cost of maintaining them.

said, that he could not accept the suggestion of his hon. and learned Friend that the placing the churchyards on the poor rate was any benefit to the Church. On the contrary, he looked on the proposal with apprehension, as tending to weaken the freehold right which the Church had in its churchyards; unless they gave this up he would forego any help from rates. Besides the new rate was simply a return in one incident to the principle of a compulsory church rate, and he foresaw difficulties in the imposition of this church-yawl rate, now that church rates had just been got rid of. The grievance to be remedied really seemed a very small one, for it was simply the right to perform certain services in the churchyards, the Dissenters having already the right to bury in them, and already the right to perform what services they liked over the dead bodies, either at home or in their own places of worship. For the sake of attaining this one privilege more he doubted whether it was worth while to throw the existing machinery into confusion.

remarked, that some very painful and distressing scenes had been witnessed in different parts of the country, in consequence of the exist- ing state of the law with respect to burials in churchyards, and he conceived that it was therefore most desirable that some change, such as that proposed by the Bill of the hon. Gentleman, should be made.

, in moving for leave to bring in a Bill to facilitate the purchase and taking of Sites for Places of Worship and Schools, said, his Bill would afford to parties desirous of obtaining sites for places of worship and schools not self-supporting the same powers as were given to incorporated companies, of acquiring land for commercial purposes. There was the greatest possible necessity for powers of this sort to obtain sites in districts of England and Wales, where the land was in the hands of one or two owners, who always could, and sometimes actually did, refuse to sell a single rood of their land for religious or educational purposes where the land was sought to be obtained by religious bodies of the principles of which they did not approve. Such a grievance ought not to be tolerated in any civilized country. The Bill proposed to deal with the grievance in two ways. First of all it proposed to give the same power of purchasing by voluntary agreement from persons entitled to limited estates—e. g., tenants for life, sites for places of worship and schools which was now enjoyed by companies under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. In Scotland a similar power existed, and he had never heard that it had been abused. The other portion of the Bill enacted that fifty persons, residing within a radius of four miles, might present a memorial to the In-closure Commissioners, stating that within that radius no land convenient for a site for a school or place of worship could be obtained, and praying the Commissioners to put in force the compulsory provisions of the Lauds Clauses Consolidation Act. The Commissioners would be empowered, upon receiving such a memorial, to cause a public inquiry to take place, and they might, if the result of that inquiry was favourable, comply with the prayer of the petitioners.