said, that as the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury had been the Chairman of the Private Bill Committee, to which his Question referred, and as it was upon his strong recommendation that the House passed the Bill, he wished to ask, If he can give, or will endeavour to obtain, for the information of the House, any account of what has been done by "The Farmer's Estate Society," incorporated by an Act passed in 1848, to purchase land in Ireland and resell it on credit, if desired, in small quantities? He had not been able to find in the records of Parliament anything about this society further than that in a year or two afterwards they came to Parliament to borrow some money.

Sir, it is quite true, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, that I was Chairman of the Private Bill Committee with respect to the Farmer's Estate Society, and I am sorry to add that I have quite lost sight of the body on whose proposals we were then employed. But I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman, and I feel obliged to his good memory and discriminating judgment for directing our attention once more to the subject. We will cause particular inquiry to be made in Ireland with respect to the society, and all the information that we can obtain will be laid on the table as soon as we can get it.

said, he would beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If he could cause a Return to be made of the exact amount of loss—if any—sustained by the Exchequer from the sale and purchase of Securities in connection with the Savings Banks since the reduction of the rate of interest to three pounds five shillings per centum?

There is no objection, Sir, to the production of the Return moved for by my hon. Friend.

said, he Mould beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he has any objection to state his intentions with respect to the Income Tax on Trades, Professions, and Employments under Schedule D; and, if not, whether he is prepared to make any; and what, reduction in the assessment of such Tax, and supplying the deficiency by an increase of the Property Tax, in accordance with the numerous Petitions presented to this House to that effect?

said, he was sorry he must de dine to answer that Question. It was part of a subject connected with the general finance of the year, and he would be happy to state his intention when the proper time came. At present it would be quite premature to do so.

said, he had an appeal to make to the hon. Member for Falmouth (Mr. R. N. Fowler) who had given notice that on going into Committee of Supply he would put a Question to him respecting the disturbances in this settlement. As negotiations were now going on between the contending parties, which he hoped would soon be brought to a close, he thought it would be injurious to the public interest if there were any discussion at present on the subject. He therefore trusted the hon. Gentleman would postpone his Notice.

said, after the appeal that had been made to him by the right hon. Gentleman he thought it would be wrong on his part to press the Question. He was very glad to hear that negotiations were going on in a satisfactory manner, and he hoped that when the Government saw no objection to the discussion of that question they would afford due facilities for its being brought fully before the House.

, in rising according to Notice, to call the attention of the House to the present position of Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Services said, that, considering the manner in which the hon. Member for Warrington (Mr. Rylands) had dealt last year with the Diplomatic branch of that subject, his observations would now be mainly directed to the Consular Department. Appreciating very fully the evidence the Government had given of their determination to lay a reforming hand where maladministration or extravagance was found to exist, he trusted that the Committee proposed by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would have a far more important result than any that had followed the appointment of previous Committees of Inquiry into that subject. A discussion on the question at present would, he believed, not only lessen the labours of that Committee, but enhance their value. Successive Committees had been appointed, but it was remarkable that there had been no debate on that important Department of the State for more than a quarter of a century, and in point of fact no encouragement had been given to the discussion of the subject. Any remarks which he might make he desired to apply, not to individuals, but to the system. The Consular system as it at present existed was regulated by the action taken by Mr. Canning in 1825. At that period the monopoly of trade in the East so long enjoyed by the Levant Company was transferred from that company to the Government, and at the same time the various Consuls in the Levant were also transferred to the Crown, in whose hands their control and their remuneration had since then remained. At that time Mr. Canning laid down the rule that our Consuls abroad should all be paid direct from the Home Government, and should be non-trading. After a few years' experience it was found that system tended greatly to increase the cost of our Consular Department, and representations were made to the Government to that effect, but it was not till 1833 that any relaxation was made in the rule. The Reformed Parliament then reduced the expense of the Consular Service by from £30,000 to £40,000. The cost of the Service in the year 1834 was £83,300. In 1835 a Committee was appointed to inquire into the state of the Consular Service, and especially into the mode of remunerating Consuls abroad, and that Committee unhesitatingly condemned the principle laid down by Mr. Canning, and declared that our Consuls should be permitted, at the discretion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to trade or not to trade. In 1838 the expenditure on this Department remained much as it was in 1834; but the attention of the country from 1838 to 1848 being1 engrossed by the great question of Free Trade and withdrawn from financial economy, the result was an enormous increase in our Miscellaneous Estimates. A Committee was then appointed to inquire into those Estimates, and its attention was naturally drawn to the great increase in the charge for the Consular Service, which in 1848 amounted to £123,000, in addition to which £24,000 was required for the services in China and Japan, making the total cost in that year £147,000. The Committee protested against the increase of £4,200 over the Estimate of the preceding year, and that amount was struck off. They also recommended that when the exigencies of trade called for the establishment of new Consulates, investigation should be made into the existing Consulates, to see whether they did not admit of reduction. In 1850, the Committee appointed upon Official Salaries were able to inquire only into the condition of the Diplomatic Service; but they recommended that in the following year an inquiry should be prosecuted into the Consular Service; and if their recommendation had been attended to by the Foreign Office in regard to the Diplomatic Service a saving to the nation up to this time would have been effected of at least £500,000. In 1857–8 another Committee was appointed to inquire into the Consular Service. He must say that that Committee seemed to have been far more moved by the interest of the Consuls abroad than by that of the taxpayers at home. They, however, made several suggestions, which again received little or no attention. In 1859, another Committee was appointed, which also made some most valuable recommendations, but these, in turn, were treated with very little respect by the Foreign Office. The officials of the Foreign Office showed considerable skill in warding off attacks on the present system of diplomacy, from whatever side they came; and there was not much inclination on their part to carry out the improvements recommended by the Committees. The House had acquired abundant information on the subject, and what was now wanted was action. The Committee of 1858 recommended that in future all the fees received by the Consuls should be paid into the Treasury, and that they should instead receive salaries and allowances. In 1858 we paid £15,840 to Consuls in Turkey, and the fees amounted to £8,000 or £10,000 more; but last year there was voted £25,700 by way of salaries, and there was returned to the Treasury on account of fees only £968. In the ease of Bucharest, the Earl of Malmesbury, writing before the salary of the Consul at that place was increased, said that for several years the fees had been £220 a-year. Upon this the salary was raised from £900 to £1,000 a year, and there was besides £300 a-year of allowances; last year, however, there was only 40s. returned to the Treasury for fees, whilst the allowances voted were £800. In Alexandria the fees had been £1,220, but last year there reached the Treasury only £587; and at Cairo the fees had been £300, whilst the sum paid to the Treasury was but £38. The Consular accounts from many other places indicated a similar extravagance. The Committee, after hearing witness after witness in favour of the plan, recommended that a system of stamps should be adopted, and that the Foreign Office, in conjunction with the Treasury and the Board of Inland Revenue, should devise such a scheme. The scheme, however, never had been devised. It had been found that the present system, as far as the Foreign Office was concerned, was most delusive and unbusinesslike. He would now endeavour to show that the natural and proper position for the Consular Service to occupy was that it should be in close connection with the Board of Trade. If the arrangements of the Consular Service were looked at they would be found to be most unsatisfactory. One set of Consuls corresponded with the Superintendent of Trade, or nearest local authority; another set direct with the Foreign Office; others with the nearest Consul General, Chargé d'affaires, or resident Minister; a fourth set corresponded with the Board of Trade; and he believed that there was a fifth class who did not correspond at all. Ever since the passing of the Mercantile Marine Act of 1854 the Board of Trade had to communicate with the Consuls about shipping, but the Board had to send through the Foreign Office, instead of writing direct to the Consuls themselves. Now this circumlocution must cause great waste of time and money, and must necessitate the existence of two staffs of officials, one at Downing Street, and another at the Board of Trade. Before the Committee of 1858 Mr. Hammond stated that the correspondence with the Consuls was chiefly of a commercial character, and that such correspondence was always sent to the Board of Trade, and unless there was some important matter it was sent without his seeing it—what he called important matter related chiefly to shipwrecks. Mr. Ward, who followed him as a witness, said that the proportion of communications that even favoured of a political character was small. From this it seemed clear that the correspondence which went to the Foreign Office should go to the Board of Trade—and, indeed, since the Mercantile Marine Act, certain Consuls, as he had said, must write direct to the Board of Trade. If the exigencies of trade demanded new Consulates, the opinion of the Board of Trade was taken; or if any Consul exceeded his duty, or charged improper fees, recourse was had to the Board of Trade; and, indeed, this Board did everything in reference to Consuls after they were once appointed. It seemed to him that the Board of Trade did all the work, while the Foreign Office had all the patronage of the appointments. While this system remained it would be impossible to have efficient control or proper economy. No doubt the Consuls had political duties; but communications in reference to them could be sent to the Foreign Office, whilst commercial correspondence could go to the Board of Trade. A similar system was already in operation in France, the Netherlands, and the United States. Mr. Ward was of opinion that such a system could be easily carried out here. It would, no doubt, be of great advantage to commerce if Consuls were led to understand that their work should be as little as possible of a political nature. This was the view taken by the Committee of 1857–58, which reported that from the earliest period Consuls had been con- nected with trade, and though under particular circumstances some Governments might have found it convenient to invest them with diplomatic functions, the commercial interests of the country required that Consuls should be commercial officers occupied in commercial duties alone. It should be remembered that this country was not now in the same relative position to other countries that it was twenty or thirty years ago. Formerly we were far ahead in respect of trade and commerce, but now other nations were nearly abreast of us. To place Consuls in direct communication with the Board of Trade, and to confine their functions to commerce as much as possible, would be quite in accordance with the principles of unity of administration that the Government were carrying out at the Admiralty and the War Office. The cost of the Consular Service in particular countries bore but little relation to the amount of trade done with those countries. In 1868 the total import and export trade of Great Britain amounted to £402,500,000, and last year there was voted for the Consular Service £243,563. That was after deducting £17,888 for fees returned. Of this amount of trade £247,000,000 was done with seven countries, in which the cost of the Consular Service was £32,500, or two-thirds of the entire trade was done at one-seventh of the entire cost. While in 1854 our trade with China amounted to a little more than £10,000,000, at a cost for our Consular Service of £26,400; in 1807, for a trade of only a little over £19,000,000, we paid nearly £136,000 for Consular Service. Lot those figures be contrasted with our Consular expenditure in the Netherlands, where, for a trade amounting to £10,000,000 more than that with China, we only paid £1,500. The cost of the United States Consular Service in China, with a trade only second to our own, was only about £12,000 per annum. But if the case of China was bad, the case of Siam was far worse. Our trade with Siam had averaged for the last five years £10,500 exports and £12,000 imports—excepting one year, when the amount was greater by £115,000, the value of rice exported in consequence of the famine in India—and the expense of the Consular Service was from £4,000 to £5,000 per annum. But last year, with a trade of £3,072 with that place, we expended no less than £3,450, being more than the whole value of our trade with that country. The Service in Tripoli, again, cost us £1,766 last year, although for five years we had not traded with that place to the value of a penny, except in 1867, when we dealt with it to the extent of about £8,000; and it would be found that our Consulates in Morocco stood in a similar position. The Committee of 1859 had recommended that the Consulates in Morocco should be closely watched, and that before any vacancy was filled up inquiries should be made as to whether the expected advantage had been derived from these particular Consulates. But since 1859 all these Consulates had been vacant, and all the vacancies, with the exception of one very insignificant one, had been filled up, although our trade with that country had in no degree increased. The expenses were now nearly £500 more than they amounted to when the Committee made that very proper suggestion. He would next take the case of Greece. We expended upon our Diplomatic and Consular Services in that country about £10,000 per annum, being nearly the one-fourth part of the whole cost of the Civil Service of that kingdom, our Ambassador receiving ten times and one of our Consuls three times the salary of the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, in America, with a trade, in 1868, of £66,000,000—nearly double that with any other nation—we only expended £6,500 upon our Consular Service, and this result was chiefly owing to the fact that the American nation conducted its Consular affairs in a practical, business-like, and economical manner. He had it upon authority that the Consular Service in America cost that country nothing at all—that was to say, it paid its own expenses entirely. The number of paid Consuls employed by that nation was 120, but they paid more fees into the Exchequer than sufficed to pay the whole of their salaries. If we were to follow the American example, and pay only 120, as was recommended by the Committee of 1859, we could save at least £100,000 per annum in our Consular Department, while its efficiency would be materially increased, the American Government having 600 representatives throughout the world, whereas we had only 430. Having investigated the subject carefully, and without any preconceived notions, he had arrived at the conclusion that the Service would be conducted far more economically and more efficiently if it was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Board of Trade. He had said nothing if the Diplomatic Service, and for this reason—if the control of the Consular Department was removed from the Foreign Office to the Board of Trade the breezes of public opinion would pass through the Foreign Office, and a reform in the Diplomatic Department would become inevitable. He was no advocate for a mean and parsimonious economy, on the contrary, he advocated the liberal payment of our public servants wherever there was work for them; but he was strongly opposed to the maintenance of a whole regiment of paid Consuls, some of whom were entirely useless; and he believed that in many places merchants of high standing would be willing to discharge the light duties attaching to Consulships in consideration merely of the honour of serving Her Majesty. He was afraid that some useless and expensive Consulates were maintained chiefly for the patronage afforded by their existence; no Ministry had yet been proof against the temptation which vacancies presented of offering appointments to their supporters. But surely the time was drawing to an end when an Administration required that sort of support, and the time coming when Governments would feel that they might rest their popularity upon a wider foundation. Not a reform of an abuse was effected without the fact reaching the ears of the people and calling forth their gratitude; and in this way strength and honour would be conferred upon the Minister who effected it. The hon. Member concluded by moving his Resolution.

rose to second the Motion. In doing so, however, he must be allowed to say that he restricted his support of the Resolutions to the second, and even as to that he must make a limitation. He would limit the transfer to Consulates at ports either on the seacoast or on great navigable rivers. Consulates in the interior of countries were comparatively very few in number, and the officers employed there had, most of them, more or less of political duties to attend to, and on that account, and for other reasons which he should mention presently, he thought they ought to be retained under the Foreign Office. He supported the transfer of the other Consulates—that was of the Consular Service properly so called—to the Board of Trade, first, on the grounds of general public convenience and utility, and secondly, because he believed this measure would be advantageous both to the Diplomatic and to the Consular Service, and would render the members of those Services more contented and efficient. It was, of course, supposable that the transfer of a Department from one great office of the State to another, though desirable on public grounds, might be prejudicial to the private interests of the officers of that Department. In making the change now advocated, he imagined there was nothing of that sort to be apprehended, but quite the reverse. He presumed it was for the advantage of the public that a Department should be placed where its work could be done as directly and with as little reference to other offices as possible, because references implied correspondence, and correspondence implied delay. That being so, there was primâ facie evidence, from the nature of their duties, that Consuls ought to be under the Board of Trade. Those duties had been classed in the Report of 1858, on Mr. Murray's plan for the revision of Consular fees, under three heads—the notarial, shipping, and State duties. Now, no one could contend that the Foreign Office had any direct connection with notaries and shipping; but the Board of Trade had. There remained the State duties, and what were they? A long list was given of them, but the words trade, commerce, or shipping, occur in almost every line. The only one of those duties which could possibly be twisted into direct connection with the Foreign Office was thus described—

"Jealously to guard against any infringement being made in our existing treaties by the authorities of the place to which the Consul is appointed to the prejudice of our trade and navigation."

But Mr. Hammond stated that the Consul could not make any communication on these matters, or, indeed, on any other matter, to a foreign Government, and could address the local authorities only, and oven with them must avoid all political discussion; and if he could not settle the matter with them à l'amiable he must content himself with reporting what had occurred. His report, then, in such exceptional cases might be a duplicate one, and might be made to the British diplomatic officer at the capital of the foreign Government, and through the Board of Trade to the Foreign Office. But from Lord Clarendon's circular, of the 24th of February, 1857, it would seem to be the duty rather of the Secretary of Legation than of the Consul to report such matters as infringements of treaties. After referring to the Consular Reports as of a local character, the circular went on to say—

"Her Majesty's diplomatic servants residing at the capital have opportunities of ascertaining the grounds on which legislative interference with the course of trade is resorted to, and the effect which such interference is calculated to have, not only on local or general interests in the countries themselves, but also on the commercial relations of those countries with foreign nations."

He maintained, then, that nothing in the duties of Consuls made it advisable to continue them under the Foreign Office, but that there was evidence from the nature of those duties that they should be under the Board of Trade. He believed the whole of their work, at least of Consuls at ports, had reference to commercial matters; but, admitting only three-fourths of it to be of such a character, it was quite clear many delays and references would be saved if they were under the Board. But there were other and stronger grounds for the transfer. It appeared from the statements of Mr. Hammond himself, in his evidence before the Committee of 1858, that there was a distinct line of demarcation between the Consular and Diplomatic Services. Mr. Hammond said—

"The Consul cannot communicate directly with the Government of the country in which he resides, unless he is Chargé d'affaires and Consul General (that is, unless he is a diplomatic officer). If a foreign Consul were to address the Secretary of State we should not answer him, but we should answer his Minister. If it happened frequently we should give him a hint that it was not a Consul's business to communicate with us."

Here, then, the line was distinctly drawn between the two Services, and the reason of this was most judiciously stated by Mr. Hammond, when he said—

"My opinion is this, that if the Consular Body were to look to diplomatic employment, the tendency would be to make them think political business of morn importance than Consular, and that they would be induced to seek to set a reputation for adroitly managing political questions—and we may guess what that would lead to—instead of confining themselves strictly to Consular duties."

Unfortunately, since those words were uttered events had happened which rendered it no longer matter of conjecture, but of certainty, what results accrued from a Consular officer, with the best possible intentions no doubt, going out of his province, and proceeding into the interior of the country to which he was accredited, for the purpose of discharging diplomatic functions. The Abyssinian difficulty had cost us a sum which would have defrayed the whole expenditure on the Diplomatic and Consular Services for many years, and was an example of the danger of not keeping the Services separate. This was a case in which the danger had clothed itself with such reality that no one could close his eyes to it. But how often had it happened that the political aspirations of Consuls had brought us to the very verge of war. To use the words of Sir Henry Rawlinson before the Committee of 1858, "the interference of Consuls has become a byword." He (Mr. Eastwick) contended, therefore, that the only way of effectually shutting out those dangers was to relegate the Consuls to those peaceful occupations which were their proper sphere, and make them subordinate to the Board of Trade, which was by its very nature opposed to war. This was the sole means of securing their undivided attention to their proper duties, for if they were placed under the same roof with diplomacy, and if their proceedings were shrouded from publicity by holding over them the impenetrable ægis of the Foreign Office, we should assuredly at no very distant period be suddenly called upon to deal with a fresh brood of troubles hatched in China or Japan, or some other unlooked-for quarter by the warmth of Consular zeal. But supposing the transfer to be made, how would it affect the Diplomatic and Consular Services? He believed the separation would be beneficial to both. Each would become a distinct and independent Service, and would, therefore, be less exposed to invasion by gentlemen brought from other professions. The Diplomatic Service would be especially the gainer by being kept distinct from the Consular, for it was very much owing to the intrusions of Consular officers into the higher ranks of the Diplomatic Service that this latter Service was in its present overcrowded state. It appeared that from 1858 to 1868 there had been only twenty vacancies in the rank of Minister or Chargé d'affaires, and seven of those vacancies had been filled up by Consuls. The result was that the senior diplomatic officer in each of the lower grades had been about ten years in his present rank. Consequently, any diplomatic officer entering the service now would, in the ordinary course of things, have to wait more than thirty years before he could be a Minister. Now, when it was considered how far more rapid promotion used to be—that Sir Henry Bulwer and Sir James Hudson were Ministers in twelve years, Sir Hamilton Seymour in seven, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in less than five—it was no wonder that there should be some dissatisfaction felt at the difference. Now, by means of this transfer, the plethora in the Diplomatic Service might, it appeared to him, be removed. The Consuls General in South America, who were really diplomatic officers and Ministers in all but name, might, without any additional expense to the public, except for their pensions on retirement, be raised at once to the rank of Minister. In case of their absence, instead of sending up a Consul from a distant port to act for them, it would be a very beneficial step to provide them with a chancelier or archiviste, who might be an attaché, and in some cases succeed, if his length of service entitled him, to the post upon a vacancy occurring. Consulates in the interior of countries might be held in future by junior officers of the Diplomatic Service, and their direct subordination to the Minister or Ambassador would be a salutary check upon over-zeal. At the same time, in such posts they would discharge duties which would fit them for promotion, and which would be a great deal more interesting than copying despatches at head-quarters. In point of fact, junior diplomatic officers did, as he knew from experience, now often act for Consuls, and he was not aware of any objection to the expransion of such a system. The transfer, therefore, might be made extremely beneficial to the Diplomatic Service, and he thought it would be also beneficial to the Consular Service, particularly if the appointments were thrown open to competition. The standard of examination might be raised very considerably, and at the same time a class of men would join the Service who would be content with the certainly very moderate salaries given to Consular officers. There would be a few prizes in the Service, such as the Consul Generalship at Odessa; and if it were found necessary to make the Service more attractive, that could be done, and done, he thought, very properly, by shortening the term of service for pension. It was with these views that he had risen to support the Motion of the hon. Member (Mr. Holms). He looked more to the efficiency of the Services than to economical advantages, and he thought the extreme importance of the duties which both Services had to perform justified this mode of regarding the matter.

said, he was of opinion that the best course to pursue would be to refer the whole question to the consideration of a Select Committee, as Her Majesty's Government had proposed to do the other night. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms), however, asserted that the House already possessed sufficient information on the subject, and asked it to pass a Resolution—

"That it is expedient for the promotion of efficiency and economy to transfer the control of the Consular Department from the Foreign Office to the Board of Trade."

Now, it appeared to him that there were two objections to the course proposed by the hon. Gentleman. If the House adopted the Motion they would be acting most unfairly to Her Majesty's Government, who had evinced, both in the last and the present Session, a disposition to aid the House in obtaining a thorough and complete investigation of the subject, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs having moved on Monday last for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the constitution of the Diplomatic and Consular Departments. A still more serious objection might be urged against the Motion, which he could not help thinking asked the House to do too much. It asked them to pass, after a very short debate, and when there was but a small attendance of Members, an abstract Resolution transferring the Consular Department from the Foreign Office to the Board of Trade. Now, if the only question respecting the Consular Department were the mere question of transfer he should unhesitatingly say that the House was as competent to deal with it as a Committee upstairs; but there were other matters affecting the Department which also required discussion and investigation. For instance, there was the question as to whether our Consuls should be paid by fees or salaries, or partly by fees and partly by salaries. Again, there was the question whether the present fees as regulated by Act of Parliament were adequate for the services rendered, and whether we ought to adopt to a greater extent the American system, which was self-supporting. There was also the question whether we should allow our Consuls to receive the fees in coin, or substitute the use of stamps. At present we had not the slightest check on the Consular establishments, and it was a remarkable fact that the whole of the Consulate foes returned into the Exchequer were less than £20,000. He was strongly of opinion that the wisest course would be to refer the whole subject to a Committee.

said, he must admit the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) had with great care collected the materials for his speech, but he could not agree with all the statements it contained. He would remind the House of the course taken by the Government on that question. Towards the close of last Session on the discussion of the Civil Service Estimates, the hon. Member for Warrington (Mr. Rylands) made a very effective speech, and after a short debate, a division was taken on a Motion made by him for the reduction of the diplomatic expenditure to the amount of £10,000. The opinion of the House was so equally balanced that if it had not been for the judgment of the Chairman, those on whom the responsibility of the expenditure lay would have found themselves in a minority. In consequence of that proceeding the attention of the Foreign Department was directed, as indeed it ought to be, to the opinion manifested by the House of Commons; and on that occasion, as representing the Department, he informed the hon. Member for Warrington that the allegations he had made should receive a complete investigation by a Committee to be appointed, for that purpose. The Government, having decided upon that step, thought the best course to pursue was to propose a Committee on their own responsibility. Accordingly, on Monday evening last, a Committee, having power to inquire into all the circumstances just touched upon by hon. Members, was appointed by the House without anyone dissenting from the proposal. He must say, therefore, that if the present Motion required to be made at all, it ought to have been brought forward on that occasion, and not by way of an Amendment to the Motion that the Speaker do leave the Chair. He trusted the hon. Member would not go to a division, but if he should do so those who thought the cost of the Diplomatic Service ought to be reduced, might, without sacrifice of principle, vote against the hon. Member's proposal. When they negatived the Motion of the hon. Member they would not be affirming the negativing of his proposition, but simply that the Speaker should leave the Chair. These were just the very questions that it would be the duty of the Committee to inquire into, and, as he believed that its Members were fully competent to deal with the matter, he would not on this occasion say whether he agreed or whether he disagreed with the hon. Member on the question of expenditure. Upon that branch of the subject he would, however, remark that, whatever opinion the hon. Member might have formed of the extravagant action or intentions of the Foreign Office, it was incontrovertible that the sum expended for Diplomatic salaries and pensions had not increased since the time it was originally fixed—as he believed some thirty or forty years ago. With regard to the Consular expenditure, there had, no doubt, been an increase; but the hon. Member had himself assigned sufficient cause for the increase when he alluded to the vast increase which there had been of late years in the trade of this country. In China and Japan, too, we formerly had no Consuls, and he could not help stating that his hon. Friend had upon this matter made use of an argument which was calculated to mislead the House, because his hon. Friend instituted a comparison between our Consular expenditure in China and that of the United States; the United States, as he said, ranking second only to ourselves in the amount of their trade with that country. It was perfectly true that the United States did come next to ourselves, but his hon. Friend ought to have shown the great distance which existed between the respective trades of the two countries with China, and unless he did so his statement was calculated to lead to misconception. An idea that there was a complete difference between Consular and Diplomatic functions appeared to underlie all the arguments used by both his hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Falmouth (Mr. Eastwick) who had followed him; but he would be a clever man who could tell where in the conduct of Consular functions a matter ceased to belong to the province of commerce and to enter that of diplomacy. There was hardly a single question a Consul had to treat that might not become a question of diplomacy. The functions of a Consul in any seaport town were not confined to trade, but extended to many other matters, such, for instance, as the intestacy of British subjects, and if we had our Consuls acting under the Board of Trade, but receiving their instructions from the British Minister, who acted under the Foreign Department alone, the result would inevitably be complications and conflicts of authority, leading frequently to other and considerable evils. And he must say when an hon. Member proposed by an abstract Resolution to make a change of this magnitude he ought to adduce some strong reasons in support of the change. If there had been any complaint of the hindrance to trade from the action of the Foreign Office, the hon. Gentleman might be able to assign some cause for the adoption of the course he suggested; but none had been cited, and, so far as he was aware, none existed. The delay to which his hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Eastwick) had alluded had no existence, except in his hon. Friend's imagination. Communications between the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade were constant, and were always personal where the subject required it. He believed that, under these circumstances, it would be very unwise and very unusual if the House were, by acceding to his hon. Friend's Motion, to interfere with, the province of a Committee who were appointed to investigate into this and other matters, and respecting whose competence to deal with the question there could be no doubt. He would suggest that the better course would be for his hon. Friend to withdraw his Motion.

said, he was disposed to agree with the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms), that this was not a subject for a Committee. He had given a good deal of attention to the subject, and he believed that ample materials for legislation on this subject had been collected by former Committees. They had the evidence of that great authority, Mr. Hammond. He could not, however, help feeling that the House, or rather a portion of the House and the country were not always very fair towards the Diplomatic Service, for it was to that Service that the Liberals looked whenever they were in want of a grievance. Our Diplomatic Service was in this position—that it was asked to perform duties which did not require to be performed. He believed, for instance, that if the whole system of diplomacy, as far as Western Europe was concerned, were done away with, and we had no permanent representative at the Courts of Western Europe, our peaceable relations with Continental States would suffer no interruption, and our commercial interests would be as well looked after as they now were. It was not exactly fair to institute comparisons between the Service of this country and that of the United States, because the English Service was a profession while that of the United States was not. In America men were appointed on account of their eminence, generally with every change of Presidents, and not because they had been so long in the Service. If there was any complaint to be made with regard to Diplomacy it was not with reference to our Consular servants abroad, but it arose from a certain helplessness on the part of the Foreign Office to readjust the Diplomatic Service in the country to our changing wants. We kept, for instance, Consuls at many places were they were not required, and appointed none in others where their services would be useful. For instance, we had no Consul at Pesth. He believed, however, in opposition to what had been observed in the course of the debate, that the duties of our Consuls were in many instances more of a political than of a commercial character; and that was so especially in the case of Bucharest, Warsaw, and China. He could not agree with the hon. Member that sufficient reason had been given for putting the Consuls under the Board of Trade rather than the Foreign Office. Under all the circumstances of the case he hoped the hon. Gentleman would not press the Motion to a division, as the discussion which he had raised would be more likely than the appointment of a Committee to lead to practical results.

said, he hoped his hon. Friend (Mr. Holms) would not be discouraged by the reception which his Motion had met with. His speech was an able one, and no Member could regret that he had ventilated the question. He was not surprised, watching the course of public events, that his hon. Friend had no confidence in Committees, which were too often only made the means of shelving a question. An experience of some years in the House had led him to that conclusion. What really might be of use would be that the question should be thoroughly investigated by responsible officers of the Government. So that while recommending the withdrawal of the Motion, he would urge the Government to give full attention to the subject. His hon. Friend (Mr. Otway) had said that this question would come before a Committee. It had been before a Committee, and he quite admitted that it was not so easy of solution as to be settled by a short debate in that House. For instance, whether Consuls should be paid by fees or by salary had occupied the attention of a Committee for a long time, and he did not think that the Foreign Office had come to any definite conclusion as to which would be most conducive to the interests of the country. Certainly the China and Japan trade had made such advances that it ought to be able to pay the Consular Service out of fees. But, on the other hand, in such a country as Franco, no fees were paid at all. And, again, the payment of fees was a heavy tax, and evidence had been brought before the Committee showing the high fees which our merchant service paid, when no fees were paid by the subjects of other countries. He would urge his hon. Friend not to lose sight of this question, but to bring it periodically before the House till a change was made for the better.

said, that the Bill which he was going to ask the House to read a second time was in its main features an old friend, for it made considerable progress both under the late and the present Government, and it was only stopped by want of time, both in the Session of 1868 and last year. It appeared now in a somewhat modified form, because the Government wished, as far as possible, to meet the views of various hon. Members interested in India, who had communicated with his noble Friend the Secretary of State and with himself about it; and the Government were now extremely anxious that if it were the will of Parliament, it might become law as quickly as possible, because they were being very much pressed from India to have it passed as soon as they could. Its principal objects were four in number—First, to effect a better distribution of business between the Legislative and the Executive Councils of the Governor General; secondly, to raise in an important particular the position of the high officers known as Chief Commissioners; thirdly, to give Parliamentary sanction to a procedure in the Executive Council which had long been customary, but had never been actually prescribed; fourthly, to afford facilities for the admission of native Indian subjects of Her Majesty to posts in their own country which had hitherto been closed to them. The first of these objects was carried out by Clauses 1 and 2, and in order to make their drift intelligible but few words of explanation were necessary. The Governor General was ex officio President of two bodies—first, the Supreme Council, which consisted of himself and six other members, all chosen, like himself, for the express purpose of governing, or assisting to govern, the Indian Empire; and, secondly, a body consisting of this same supreme governing or executive Council, plus not fewer than six nor more than twelve additional members, nominated by the Governor General, for the purpose of constituting his Council for the making of laws and regulations, and commonly known as the Legislative Council of India. This last body was called into existence by Parliament in the year 1861. Its primary object was to enact laws of a general character for the whole of India, and its members were chosen, and are chosen, chiefly for the purpose of bringing as many cross lights of experience as possible to bear upon the great general questions of legislation which affect the whole of India; to take care, for example, that when a Bill is being considered relating to one of the great heads of law, there might be some persons to say, "Such and such provisions which are proposed will not precisely suit the case of this or that great province, or this or that great interest." This, he said, was the primary object of adding to the Executive Council when sitting for the purpose of making laws and regulations from six to twelve nominees of the Governor General, and this primary object had been, on the whole, extremely well fulfilled. They had every reason to be satisfied with the success of this part of the experiment of 1861. Parliament, however, while providing for the general legislation of India, was not unmindful that a great deal of local legislation would be wanted for the various provinces of India; and so it established in Madras and Bombay local Legislative Councils for those Presidencies, formed after the model of the Governor General's Legislative Council, and it enabled the Governor General to call into existence local Legislative Councils for the great provinces of Bengal, of the North-West, and of the Punjaub. The Governor General acted on this authority, and did call into existence a local Legislative Council for Bengal, but no Governor General had yet seen his way to call into existence local Legislative Councils for the North-West Provinces or for the Punjaub. The materials, in fact, for such Councils did not yet exist, and Parliament never gave him power to create local Legislative Councils for Oudh, for the Central Provinces, or for Burmah. One of the consequences of the non-existence of local Legislative Councils for any one of the eight provinces, except Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, was that the unhappy Legislative Council of the Governor General had thrown upon its shoulders, in addition to its own proper work, the whole of the local legislation of five out of the eight provinces of India. Perhaps he could make the state of affairs most intelligible by an illustration taken from Europe. The position of the Legislative Council of the Governor General was very much this—Imagine a largo Select Committee of this House sitting-half the year at Dantzic and the other half of the year at the Baths of Lucca, and charged in addition to all its other work—that work being, so far as its principal members were concerned about as hard as the ordinary work of Cabinet Ministers in this country—primarily with the duty of making general laws for the whole of Europe except Russia, and secondarily with the duty of doing the whole of the local legislation required for the following countries:—First, for Great Britain, which is about equal in size to the North-West Provinces; secondly, for the kingdom of Italy, which is about the size of the Punjaub; thirdly, for Belgium and Holland, which might stand for Oudh; fourthly, for Prussia, as she was before the events of 1866, which might be taken very roughly to represent the Central Provinces, though these were considerably larger; and lastly, for Norway, which, also roughly, might stand for Burmah, which huge country, be it remembered, was only accidentally connected with India at all, inhabited as it was by a people differing from the natives of India in race, in manners, in religion—in short in almost every way in which men can differ. The mere mention of such a mass of duties would, he was sure, excite compassion in the minds of hon. Members, already disposed to sympathy by the terrible prospects which were before them for this Session; and they would, he was inclined to think, blame him, not for proposing too much, but for proposing too little, when he told them that all he asked them to do was to relieve the Legislative Council of the Governor General of a mere fraction of this local, legislative business. It would, no doubt, have been very desirable to relieve it of more, but for the present the thing was out of the question. It must continue to bear most of its burden till local Legislative Councils could be created in other provinces. The portion of its work, of which it was wished to relieve the Legislative Council, was a kind of work which was not, properly speaking, legislative at all. It was the making of regulations for certain districts of India, which were scattered up and down chiefly in our newly-acquired provinces, and which were not nearly up in point of civilization to the ordinary level of Indian society, to which, in fact, the legislation that was beneficent, say, for example, in Lower Bengal, was just about as applicable as the legislation which was good for Surrey, as Surrey is in the year 1870, would have been to Lochaber or Strathspey in the year 1570. He would continue his illustration from Europe. Suppose there were no Parliamentary institutions in this quarter of the globe, and that all Europe outside Russia was legislated for by a large Select Committee of that House, sitting half the year at Dantzic and half the year at the Baths of Lucca. What it was proposed to enact was that some of the wilder parts of European Turkey, and some of the most brigand-haunted corners of Greece, and some of the more dangerous bits of the Abruzzi, and certain portions of the island of Corsica should not have applied to them precisely the same slow and refined processes of legislation that were thought desirable for Kent, for Normandy, and for the Mark of Brandenburg. The Government proposal was simply this, that the Secretary of State in Council should have power to name certain districts in India to which he thought the ordinary processes of legislation not wholly applicable, and that when he had done so the great officers in India who had the charge of the provinces in which these districts lie should have the power of proposing to the Governor General drafts of regulations for those districts, and that the Governor General should in his turn have the power of enacting, subject to the revision of the Home authorities, those regulations by and with the advice of his Executive or Governing Council, and without calling in the assistance of the nominees whom he had appointed to help him and his Executive Council in a totally different class of business. The chief advantages which the Government expected to gain, if the House agreed to their view, were these—First, they Mould relieve the Legislative Council of that portion of its work for which it was least fitted, and so give it more time for that portion of its work for which it was most fitted; secondly, they would avoid the appearance of making everlasting changes in Indian legislation—changes which had a very bad effect upon the native and even upon the European mind, for did they not continually hear it said that we had a great deal too much legislation on our Indian statute book, the fact being that we had very little legislation, properly so called, on our statute book, but that, from the awkwardness of the present machinery, we were obliged to do a thousand things, by a sort of quasi-legislation in the Legislative Council of India, which ought to be done by local Legislative Councils, if only we had the materials for them, or in default of these materials, by the Executive Government; thirdly, under the process which the Government proposed, they looked for increased expedition, which was often very important in dealing with wild and lawless districts; and fourthly, they looked for greater secresy, which, in dealing with such districts, was, he need not say, often quite as important. Some persons had praised the Government and some had blamed them for tending by these clauses towards a more despotic ideal of government in India; but they deserved neither the praise nor the blame, for they were doing nothing of the kind. They were simply altering a clumsy expedient for a more convenient one, and when the day came that something better could be substituted for the present convenient expedient they heartily hoped that it might be substituted. They accepted the phrase that Asiatics should be governed Asiatically, considered as a truism, but they did not accept it considered as a pregnant political maxim; nor did they believe that it was possible to comprise in one formula the systems of government which were best adapted at a given moment of time for the Rajpoot and the Chinaman, for the Arab and the Japanese. Government of the people by the people was the ideal to be aimed at in all countries, but of course it was one thing to keep before them an ideal and another to see any prospect of realizing that ideal in any time to which politicians could look forward. The second principal object of the Bill was to give to all Chief Commissioners and to all new Lieutenant Governors, and to confirm to existing Lieutenant Governors, the right of sitting in the Legislative Council of the Governor General as ex officio members when the Legislative Council of the Governor General happened to sit within the territories over which they presided. To this arrangement there could be no conceivable objection. The third principal object of the Bill was, as he had said, to give Parliamentary sanction to a certain procedure in the Governor General's Executive Council. This object was carried out by Clauses 4 and 5, which simply repealed the cumbrous and obsolete provisions of the Act of 1833 with regard to the procedure in cases of difference of opinion between the Governor General and his advisers, and enacted that what had long been the practice should be law. No one would, he thought, object to these clauses, and so he need say no more about them. Now, then, he came to the fourth object, which was carried out by Clause 6, and which was, as he had said, to afford facilities for the admission of native Indian subjects of Her Majesty to posts in the Civil Service of their own country which were not at present open to them. The 6th clause gave power to the authorities in India, who now assigned their various appointments to members of the Covenanted Civil Service, to appoint natives of India to positions heretofore held by members of the Covenanted Civil Service without their having necessarily undergone any examination whatever. Now, the very last thing the Government wished to be understood to say was, that the great experiment that was made at the last renewal of the Company's Charter with regard to throwing open the Civil Service to competition had in any way failed. True it was, that the best men of the English Universities had not rushed in crowds to India, but then, no one who really knew the state of our Universities ever dreamt that they would do so. All reasonable expectations had boon amply fulfilled, and there left our shores almost every year to take part in the work of Indian administration some half-dozen men who had already proved themselves possessed of much more than average application and ability; some thirty or forty men who had proved themselves quite competent for the ordinary duties of an Indian civilian, and among whom the necessities and responsibilities of an Indian career would assuredly bring out far greater powers than as yet appeared in them, and, he feared he must add in the interests of truth, a small sprinkling of men who were not, perhaps, all that could be desired, but who could not be put on a level with the hard bargains, as they were called, of the nomination period. Considering that every system of selection which could be devised was terrestrial and not celestial, the result was eminently satisfactory, because the Indian Civil Service attained a considerably higher average of merit than in former days. It had, however, been gradually borne in upon the minds of the authorities in India that the present system of competition required to be supplemented by some provisions for the benefit of the natives. Young natives who had a little means could come to England and compete with the English for appointments, and were doing so. Then, again, if clever young natives had not means they would be helped by the Gilchrist and Government scholarships, assuming these last to be continued—a point, however, not yet settled. All that was good—nay, excellent for the young, but it was quite inadequate, even for them, and it did not moot the case of the old at all. It was absurd that in a country like India, in which our rule was one vast political experiment, incomparably the most vast and most interesting political experiment now being carried on on the face of the earth, we should not arm our responsible officers with full powers to try any reasonable experiment in the employment of natives. There was no want of civil ability among the natives of India. He remembered having been often told by one who had lived in the closest intimacy with all the leading men of that great Indian generation in which Munro and Elphinstone were the most conspicuous names, that the ablest politician he had ever known in life was a Mahratta Brahmin, and he believed his experience was by no means unique. Of course the services of native administrators could only be used at present in quite exceptional cases, but there were probably a very considerable number of natives who might be employed with great advantage to the State in a judicial capacity. This clause left very considerable latitude to authorities in India, and by no means excluded the power of appointing natives to civil offices after a competitive examination. It would be perfectly competent under it, say, for the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to refuse to admit any young native to the Civil Service unless he had passed so high an examination as to make it certain that he would have been selected by the Civil Service Commission; but as the object of the clause was merely to make possible a series of experiments with a view to find out how natives could be most usefully employed in situations which had been hitherto closed to them, and as those experiments would be most narrowly watched, it would be a pity to fetter the discretion of those who were to make the experiment. He concluded by moving the Second Reading- of the Bill.

said, the Bill came before the House this year in a form which disposed of many of his objections. Last year he moved to refer the Bill to a Select Committee, because it seemed to him to aim at an entire reversal of the Act of 1861, called the Indian Councils Act. The principle of that Act was that the legislative and administrative functions should be separated, and reside in separate bodies though the personnel might be partly the same; and another principle of the Bill was that the Government should cease to exercise the power of legislating for the later acquisitions of our Indian Empire, known as the non-Regulation Provinces on the sole plea that within the area of these provinces there are some rude and uncivilized races, who require to be governed by a rougher and simpler system than that in force in the rest of the Empire. But these rude races were a mere handful as compared with the rest of the population, and it was not well that 30,000,000 of cultivated people should be deprived of the safeguards of enlightened laws, and placed at the mercy of a discretionary power which might err. He was aware authorities could be cited in support of a provision even as sweeping as that. The party in India known as the patriarchal or autocratic school, preferred administering a rough justice, with no other light than that of reason; but having had some opportunities of forming a judgment upon the subject, his conviction was that personal administration was very useful in newly-acquired provinces when warlike populations had to be broken in to British rule, but when habits of peace and industry had succeeded to turbulence, and when wealth had accumulated and complicated interests had arisen, then the reign of good laws should begin. That being his advice last year, he confessed he should have preferred it if the Bill before them had been simply a declaratory Act, enabling the Legislative Council in India to except certain territory, on cause being shown, from the sphere of their own jurisdiction, and to give the Governor General authority to make laws for such territories. There was no reason why the Legislative Council should not be the only source of legislation, nor would such a course weaken the hands of the Governor General, for the Act of 1861 gave the Governor General power, in cases of emergency requiring vigorous treatment, to issue rules and ordinances having the force of law for the period of six months. Since, however, the powers of legislation sought to be conferred on the Executive Governments by the present Bill are so much restricted, and depend on the special sanction of the Secretary of State in each ease, he acknowledged that no sufficient ground was left him to ask for a Select Committee on this part of the Bill. The last section of the Bill referred to a totally different matter; it proposed to offer new facilities for the utilization of native ability, and so far received his entire approbation, for he had long felt it was our duty to offer to the natives of India an honourable career in the public service, on the principle that a Government which excluded natives from high offices of State would soon become odious throughout the land. There were many natives capable of filling the highest posts, and he could not understand why the Governor General had refrained from exercising the power he already had in this respect. He feared, however, that the selection of the native candidates for appointment and promotion would hardly fail to create dissatisfaction—that if the appointments were not made exclusively by competition nomination would degenerate into favouritism, and invite jealousy between those who had entered the service by competition and those who had gained appointments by interest. Beside this, the disposition among young natives to come to England and enter into competion would receive a check, and this was the more serious when it was considered that no training was so excellent for a young man destined to administer the laws in India as a study of the workings of English law and life in this country. Last year four natives of India obtained Civil Service certificates. Natives of India were, however, placed under a disadvantage, as compared with Englishmen, in being obliged to reside here, at a distance from their friends and at great expense, while preparing for their examination; and it was desirable to find out, if possible, a means of relieving them from that disadvantage, and placing them on a more equal footing with Europeans. That difficulty was in part met by a scheme which had been devised by the right hon. Baronet the late Secretary of State for India (Sir Stafford Northcote), under which scholarships were established for the support of natives of that country while residing in England pursuing their studies. There were nine of these scholarships, but it was urged against the scheme that it was inadequate. That, however, was an objection on the ground of degree, not of principle, and he, for one, regretted to see it announced in the Gazette of Indiathat the scholarships were to be discontinued. From conversations with native gentlemen prosecuting their studies in England, and from articles in the native Indian Press, he gathered that the native educated opinion was by no means in favour of a nomination system. They asked for no favour. They were prepared to compete with the youth of England. But they would prefer that the first competitive examination should be held in India—a certain number of appointments being allotted to India, and that the selected candidates should be required to reside in England until they passed the final examination, dur- ing which time they would receive £100 a-year. This proposition, although he did not mean to say he gave in his adhesion to it, appeared to him to be at all events worthy of consideration. Perhaps in practice it would not be very different from the scholarship scheme. He was not satisfied with the definition of natives of India contained in the Bill, because it might include some Europeans permanently settled in India; but that was a matter for Committee. The question, he might add, of the employment of the natives of India presented many very difficult problems; and he thought it should be referred to a Select Committee. When the right hon. Baronet the late Secretary of State withdrew his Bill containing this clause in 1868, he promised that it should during the next Session be referred to a Select Committee. He could not see the urgency for the passing of this clause. He desired to see the natives of India appointed to fill the highest offices, but a sufficiently wide field could be found at present in the non-Regulation Provinces, containing sixty districts, where the Governor General had power to appoint them to any office. He feared, that although it might be in a small way, the principle of competition was affected by the clause, and he should be sorry to see the principle imperilled. His experience of the working of the competitive system in India was, that it had raised the average of ability and attainments in the Civil Service in a great degree. He did not say that it would produce men more eminent than some whom the nomination system had given us, but it had raised the average of efficiency, while the instances of glaring inefficiency, which under the nomination system were not infrequent, were now entirely unknown.

said, he concurred in the views of the hon. Member for Gravesend (Sir Charles Wingfield), and would join in entreating the Under Secretary of State for India to adopt the suggestion to submit this important question, affecting the natives of India, to a Select Committee. It was ten years since any Committee had been appointed on Indian affairs by that House, and this was a question requiring great consideration. He regretted what had happened last year, when four natives of India came over to this country for the purpose of a competitive examination, in which they were successful, and carried away the first places; and yet, because of some technical flaw about the date of their birth, an objection was taken to them, and they were held to be disqualified. Such an occurrence must spread in India the idea that unfairness was shown to natives. But, if the matter was remitted to a Committee, it would be manifest to them that measures affecting their interests were not resolved on without duo consideration.

said, it was true that in the case to which his hon. Friend referred, two young natives had been held disqualified who had succeeded in obtaining places in the examination. The ground of disqualification, however, was not merely technical but vital. A great deal of correspondence had taken place on the subject between the Civil Service Commissioners and the authorities in India; and he was happy to say that within the last two or three days the Civil Service Commissioners had found that it was possible to give to the two young men in question the benefit of the doubt. They would, therefore, be placed in the position in which they would have been had that doubt never arisen.

In asking leave, Sir, to introduce a Bill to provide for the equal distribution over the Metropolis of a further portion of the charge for Poor Relief, it will be convenient that I should state what progress has been already made towards equalization, and what thus far have been its effects, both financially and as regards the administration of Poor Law relief. I am not sure that the results of the equalization have been fully appreciated—partly, no doubt, because, though it is now two or three years since the Act of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gathorne Hardy) passed, only three half-years have come under its operation. The audit always occupies a certain number of months, so that the parishes do not get immediate payment. At present they have received only two payments under the Bill of the right hon. Gentleman; but in the course of a few days they will receive a third payment. As regards the general financial statement of poor relief in the metropolis, the situation is about as follows:—The aggregate expenditure for poor relief in London amounts in round numbers for the year ending Lady-day, 1868, to £1,300,000, and for the year ending Lady-day, 1869, it amounts to £1,400,000. But I ought to add, especially at the present time, when, very naturally, great attention is drawn to the expenditure in the metropolis, that, although the year ending Lady-day, 1869, shows an increase of £100,000 over the preceding year, yet the half-year ending Lady-day, 1869, shows only a very slight increase over the corresponding portion of the preceding year. I may also mention that the half-year ending at Michaelmas, 1869, shows a reduction in regard to in-maintenance and out-relief as compared with the corresponding half-year in 1868. Therefore, up to last Michaelmas, there was no increase at all in the items for in-maintenance and out-relief in the metropolis. I attribute this to the circumstance that, although the number of paupers has been slightly greater, corn was cheaper, and a certain economy was effected in that respect. However, irrespective of the question of increase or diminution, these figures represent what I hope we need not consider the normal state of expenditure in the metropolis—because I hope we shall not always be burdened with the present number of paupers—although they fairly represent the average expenditure for the last two or throe years. Now, it is well known to all who are engaged in the administration of poor relief, but not, perhaps, to the public in general, that this large sum which is spent in poor relief is usually divided into five or six heads. First, there is a heavy item for in-maintenance, representing about three-tenths of the whole; another for out-relief, also representing three-tenths; a third for lunatics in asylums or licensed houses, representing one-tenth; salaries of officers about one-tenth; workhouse loans and other expenses about two-tenths. It will, therefore, be seen that it is not only the in-maintenance and the out-relief which form so great a part of the total charge for relief, but a number of expenses which are more or less con- nected with poor relief, and in part administrative expenses. As regards equalization, very considerable progress has been made—much more, indeed, as I remarked just now, than is generally supposed. I ought, however, to add that the increase in the expenditure in 1869, as compared with 1808, represented 1d. in the pound, the average rate being 1s. 6¾d. in 1868, and 1s. 7¾d. in 1869. The increase would have been slightly greater, but for some addition to the rateable value. And now to return to the question of equalization. The following items were put on the common fund by the Bill of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford:—the cost of lunatics, of children, of fever hospitals, and of medicines and drugs, and a very large sum for the salaries of officers. These are already upon the common fund. When the Act first came into operation, there was some little difficulty in bringing all these items on to the common fund, because the clerks to the Boards of Guardians found themselves in arrear; but the system is now in full operation, and I may say that £400,000 a-year is already charged on the common fund, out of £1,400,000, the aggregate sum paid for poor relief. For the half-year, of which the audit has just been concluded, the sum charged on the common fund is £200,000; in the previous half-year, £170,000 was so charged; and in the half-year before that £130,000. There has been a progressive increase under the head of cost of maintenance of lunatics in proportion to the number of lunatics whom the Guardians have been able to remove to asylums, for hon. Members may remember that it is only when this class of paupers are removed from the workhouses that the Unions enjoy the benefit of coming on the common poor fund in respect of them. The same rule applies when children are removed from the workhouses and placed in separate schools or district schools. So, in proportion to the removal from the workhouses of lunatics and children, the charge on the common fund has been increased, and the charge on the Unions themselves decreased. It may be interesting to some hon. Members, or at all events to the parties concerned, to know what kind of benefit is given to the poor parishes in the metropolis by the equalization up to this time. I will quote a few figures relating to the half-year ending on Lady Day, 1869. Bethnal Green is entitled to a surplus of £6,300, Shore-ditch to £4,700, Whitechapel to £3,900, and Stepney to £3,000. Thus the poorest parishes are receiving the most money. Twenty-four parishes receive money from the fund, and about fifteen contribute to the fund. As regards the latter, I may remark that the City of London is called upon to pay nearly £15,000; St. George's, Hanover Square, has to draw a check for £6,500; Paddington has to contribute £5,600, and Kensington about £4,000, so that the Act is by no means inoperative, as some people suppose, but has already conferred a very considerable benefit on the poorer parishes. During the last three half-years, including the one of which the audit is now-being settled, Bethnal Green has received £16,000, Whitechapel £11,500, Greenwich nearly £11,000, and Shore-ditch nearly £9,000; while during the same period the richer parishes have of course paid sums equal to the amount received by the poorer ones. I will now briefly state the items with regard to which these payments will arise in respect of the year ended Lady Day, 1869. The maintenance of lunatics in asylums and licensed houses amounts to £160,000—that item, I am sorry to say, is constantly increasing all over the country—medicines and surgical appliances to about £9,000, salaries of officers to £103,000, maintenance of children in separate or district schools to £91,000, expenses under the Houseless Poor Act to £12,000, and registration and vaccination fees to £15,000. The heavily-rated parishes have not yet reaped all the benefit of the change, but when the system is in full action, and the schools are all ready for the reception of the children, and the asylums for the imbeciles are completed, I hope that they will do so. To a certain extent it must be borne in mind that the tendency of equalizing the poor rates is to increase expense. The salaries of officers, for instance, have increased materially since 1866. In the first year there was an increase of £10,000 under this head, a similar increase occurred in the year following, and last year there was an increase of £15,000. This is a most instructive item as regards the administration of relief. At first sight it points to the conclusion that there has been increased extravagance; but I think the House will desire to look into the matter somewhat closely. How has this increase arisen? I have examined carefully the circumstances as to three classes of officials—the doctors, relieving officers, and nurses. I find that the doctors have been increased in number by eighteen; that the relieving officers, formerly 110 in number, are now 150; and that the paid nurses have been increased by 173, being formerly 213 and now 386. These additions represent very fairly the advantages and disadvantages resulting from placing charges of this description on the common fund. Very few persons to whom the circumstances are known would grudge the increase either in doctors, relieving officers, or paid nurses. But what happened was this. Before the equalization of rates parishes which were overburdened with rates frankly confessed the necessity for an increased number of relieving officers and paid nurses, but were unable to support further expenditure for the purpose; but as soon as the burden of taxation became more evenly distributed, they then recognized the necessity of increasing their staff, and not without good results. I hail the increase in the number of relieving officers as one of the very greatest advantages which has resulted from the introduction of the new system. There ran be no stronger instance than that of Poplar, which has greatly increased its staff of relieving officers, and the consequence has been that while other districts in the neighbourhood have seen their pauperism increase, that of Poplar has been stationary, having been kept down by an improved system of administration. Throughout the metropolis generally each relieving officer, on an average, has to take care of 386 adult paupers, while in Poplar, every such officer has only 176 under his charge, the result being that he has infinitely more time at his disposal to investigate cases properly, to trace out distress, and to deal with any attempted imposition, than he can have in neighbourhoods where he is overburdened with work. There are many districts where the proportion is infinitely higher than 386, and I feel confident there is no better way in which growing pauperism can be dealt with than by increasing the staff of officers and giving them the means of properly inves- tigating cases of distress. The want of a proper staff of nurses was one of the evils which was dwelt upon very much a few years ago, and it is not yet entirely removed; but the appointment of an additional number of paid nurses in the infirmaries and workhouses must be regarded as a decided progress. Putting, then, these salaries upon the common fund has not been unattended with good results. But there is another and less inviting aspect of the question. Boards of Guardians have no longer the same direct interest which they formerly had in keeping down the salaries of their officers. This may and does happen; some Union with a good relieving officer at a salary, say of £120 a-year, comes to the Poor Law Board and ask to have his salary raised to £150. Why? "Because if we do not another Union will bid higher for his services, and take him away from us." The Unions find their account in keeping down the general expenses of relief by the activity of the relieving officer, regarding the amount of the salary to be paid to him as a matter of comparative indifference, as it is borne by the common fund. There is only one way of meeting such applications, and that is the way the Poor Law Board have adopted—of refusing their sanction to any such proposal, unless a clear case be made out, either on the ground of length of service, or additional work, or some exceptional circumstances warranting the increase of salary. And this brings me to a point of great importance. Every step in the direction of further equalization of rates must be taken in such a manner that the poorer parishes, or indeed any parish, may not be able to utilize the common fund without the control of those who represent the common interests. That seems to be an axiom from which we cannot depart. It is absolutely necessary that when we equalize the burden we should also equalize the control, and insist upon a certain uniformity. One main cause of the trouble into which the Poor Law Board has got with various Boards of Guardians has boon because these insisted upon increasing the salaries of their officers. "Surely," they argued, "we may be allowed to manage our own affairs, and we must know better what our officers are worth than the Poor Law Board can do." But the answer seems conclusive; they really are not managing their own affairs—at least they are not spending their own money. When they propose to increase salaries, they are proposing to dip their hands into the pockets of all who contribute towards the common fund. The next point is as to lunatics and children. By the removal of the charge for them on to the common fund the Poor Law Board has been able to carry out the declared wishes of Parliament in a way that it never otherwise could have done. The Guardians steadfastly refused for years to provide distinct buildings and separate schools, or to part with the control of a single pauper. But the temptation of transferring to the common fund the charge for the maintenance of the lunatics and children proved too much for them, and the result is that 8,000 out of the 10,000 children in metropolitan workhouses are now in separate or distinct schools, and not in the workhouse itself. Very great advantages to the children themselves, I am convinced, have resulted from this change. With respect to dispensaries, since the clause in the Act of last year was passed, giving powers to the Poor Law Board to stop the charge of the salaries of the medical officers to the common fund if dispensaries were not built, there has been every disposition to meet the Poor Law Board, and I trust dispensaries will soon be established in almost every Union in the metropolis. If there be harmony between the central authority and the Boards of Guardians, and if arrangements are carried out in conformity with the intentions of the Legislature, they will be entitled to payment from the common fund; but if there be resistance to the central authority and to the intentions of the Legislature, they must bear the burden themselves. Where the power is retained of spending common money without central control there is great difficulty in procuring economy; and it is necessary, if the relief of the poor of any class is put on the common fund, to take the necessary precautions to strengthen the hands of those who to a certain extent have control over the whole. That being the case as regards equalization in the past, I think there are few who will not concur with me that if we can take a further stop towards equalization it ought to be done. The burden of paupers in the metropolis is so great, and the changes which occur in the places which are chiefly burdened by increase in the number of paupers are so decided, that few object to the principle of equalization up to a certain extent. There was a time when the usual argument against equalization was this, that all the advantage gained by equalization resulted to the benefit of the owners of property in various places, and that they would increase their rents if poor rates were increased. That may be true to a certain extent, but it is certainly not true entirely. The proportions of pauperism change very rapidly in the present day. There are certain portions of the metropolis where there used to be a large number which have ceased to have this distinction; and what with the demolition of houses, the introduction of railways into the metropolis, and the general advance in the number of paupers who come up from the country to the capital, there are parts of London burdened with paupers now which used to be comparatively free from them; so that the argument as to the owners of property breaks down in these cases. The Government are anxious that some further alleviation should be given, it being justly required by the poorer portions of the metropolis, which are not responsible for the pauperism that congregates in those particular localities. We have been anxious to see what further step could be taken in the direction of equalization, without running the risk to which I have alluded of affording the opportunity to certain parishes of being exceeding liberal at other people's expense. I must freely confess that, without a total change in the administration of relief in the metropolis—without superseding local agency altogether—I do not see how out-door relief could be placed on the common fund. Nor have I yet seen any plan that gives sufficient control to the central authority to prevent abuses. Under these circumstances, it has appeared to the Government that they could not place out-door relief on the common fund; we must rather look to the other claim—namely, the in-door relief; and what we propose is to place the whole maintenance in workhouses upon the common fund, less a necessary margin which shall leave a stimulus to Guardians administering the funds of Unions to be economical. We propose that a certain sum per head—a large proportion, but not the whole cost of the maintenance of each inmate—should be charged on the common fund. We propose that 3s. 6d. per week, or 6d. per night per head, should be paid in that way. This would be a very large relief to the poorest parishes in the metropolis, and I think it can be shown that no danger is likely to arise from it. I can fancy, at first sight, that objections may be urged. It may be said this will tempt the Guardians of every Union to crowd their workhouses. That is perfectly true; we must therefore enact, it may be in a Bill containing very few clauses, that, once for all, the numbers which any single workhouse may hold shall be settled, so as to prevent that overcrowding which has thrown so much discredit on the administration of relief in the metropolis. While relief is given, it is necessary that an end should be put to overcrowding, and I feel confident that no one can object to this, that the maximum number should be fixed, and that beyond that amount no payment should be given to the Guardians. Then, again, I think we should infringe on the principle of the separation of children from workhouses, if we permitted the Guardians to claim payment in respect of children kept in the workhouses. Children, as heretofore will have to be sent to district schools. Of course, it is necessary that precautions should be taken that if Unions receive the sum of 3s. 6d. per head of adults in the workhouse, they should comply with the general regulations and requirements of the law, and that the relief afforded should be adequate and should fairly represent the average form of relief in the metropolis. At present the salaries of officers are on the common fund, whereas their rations are not. Hence it arises that one Union officer has a salary only, while another has a smaller salary with rations; and the parish which gives the rations loses that amount. But the rations of officers will, on a certain scale, be also placed on the common fund. The House is entitled to know what will be the financial effect of this change. The effect will be this—that when the asylums now building are completed, and when the remaining district schools, which are making rapid progress, are completed, including the effect of the measure we now propose, nearly one-half of the total relief of the poor in the metropolis will be paid out of the metropolitan common poor fund, and the sum which will be distributed will be between £620,000 and £650,000. If the present enormous scale of out-door relief should be reduced, the relief afforded will be to the local burden, and not to the burden thrown on the common fund. If there is any margin the local funds will have the advantage of it. The workhouse accommodation in the metropolis is insufficient, and it is difficult to say how far out-door relief has increased in consequence of the impossibility of properly applying the workhouse test. In the great pressure we have just gone through, if the application of the workhouse test has occasionally appeared harsh, yet, as a general rule, the great increase of pauperism has been chiefly in those localities where it was impossible properly to apply that test. It may be objected that by the system we recommend we hold out a premium to Guardians to fill the workhouses, and apply the workhouse test most strenously. The possibility of a more frequent application of the test would not be a disadvantage; but hon. Members must not assume that there is, or will be, a very great margin which the Guardians, however stringently inclined, could fill up. Additional accommodation will be secured, but of that the first result will be that the same scandalous and dangerous overcrowding will not exist which occurred last year, when some 20 to 30 per cent of paupers more than the workhouses could properly hold were taken in. It may be asked—Why not relieve them out of doors? To that we answer, Because it is impossible, even if it were desirable to do so; and I am sure that such a relaxation of the law would not recommend itself to the feelings of the House generally. There is no danger that the workhouse test will be applied too strenuously, for though we do a great deal to increase the accommodation, yet we do not go much beyond the extent which will provide decent room and space for those within the workhouse. The general result of our proposal will be this, that when the Act comes in force the half of the whole charge for relief will be imposed on the common fund. If we are able, as we hope to be, to reduce the amount of outdoor pauperism, to effect some diminu- tion in the 50,000 additional paupers now in the metropolis, as compared with the number four years ago, it will be from the local and not from the common fund, so that the equalization will amount to more than a half of the whole charge. I do not know that to those who wish entire equalization this will commend itself. But, at least, it is a step that cannot lead to any increased laxity of administration or extravagance; sufficient interest will be left to the Guardians as representing their own ratepayers; the provisions against overcrowding will be valuable, and the ratepayers will see that their burdens are being partially removed in a way that is not objectionable, while the scheme will not increase the aggregate pauperism of the whole metropolis. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving for leave to bring in the Bill.

said, he was not disposed to quarrel with the net result of the scheme as stated by the right hon. Gentleman—namely, that one-half of the sum necessary for the support of the metropolitan poor was to be levied on a common fund; and he should have been glad if his right lion. Friend the President of the Poor Law Board in the last Administration (Mr. Gathorne Hardy) had been in the House to hear the good account which had boon given of the partial measure of equalization which he had brought in two years ago. At that time the Government did not expect that would be a final measure, but that something like the present Bill would be necessary. He thought the illustration given by the President of the Poor Law Board of the consequences of placing the salaries of officers on the common fund should induce the House to look narrowly into the details of the Bill, which would put so large a portion of the in-door maintenance on the common fund. This required consideration, and he would suggest that, instead of the sum so placed being a fixed one of 6d. per day per pauper, it should be a certain relative proportion of the whole, because otherwise, in consequence of variation in the price of provisions, the margin which was now considered sufficient to give the Guardians an interest in keeping down expenditure might become altogether insufficient. The way in which the common fund was to be disbursed was very important. The right hon. Gentleman had said that the issue out of the common fund should be watched by persons who had an interest in it, and in preventing its increase. It was to be supposed that in this he referred to the Poor Law Board, because there was no representative body which stood in the position to do this work. The ratepayers generally would, however, feel some difficulty in assenting to the proposition that the Poor Law Board had an interest in keeping down the amount of the common fund. The right hon. Gentleman had not said what he considered would be a sufficient margin to keep Guardians within due bounds in the administration of in-door relief, though probably he thought that a trifling amount would be enough. He (Mr. Sclater-Booth) repeated that he should have preferred the amount placed on the common fund being three-fourths or four-fifths of the whole, instead of the fixed amount of 6d. a-day.

said, he conceived that the measure was another step towards transferring power over the relief system from the local bodies to a central and perfectly irresponsible authority. He was not opposed to the principle of equalization, if it were joined with the principle of representation; but he understood that the present proposal was one to take from the elected bodies that control over the inmates of workhouses which they had hitherto enjoyed, and to vest the control of the expenditure for metropolitan poor relief in an irresponsible body. He understood that each workhouse was now to be limited in its accommodation by the Poor Law Board, and they knew by experience what that meant, for there were theories at the Board with regard to cubic space, and of the mischievous effects of whose application they had already had too much experience. They knew that extended accommodation for in-door relief implied gigantic expenditure and debt, and, as in the case of lunatics, idiots, sick persons, and children in district schools, it meant the borrowing of vast sums of money to be expended in Government masonry and to be charged upon the rates. The right hon. Gentleman had been represented as having stated elsewhere that the great object of the Government was to find the minimum of poor relief, and his fixing now 6d. a day for in-door maintenance was a practical illustration of the principle which he was supposed to have espoused. When they took away local control over the relief afforded to the sick and insane it opened the door to mismanagement, extravagance, and inhumanity; and he regretted that the President of the Poor Law Board had quoted that as a precedent to be followed in this matter. The right hon. Gentleman had also spoken hopefully of probable fluctuations in the numbers of the poor, but he (Mr. W. M. Torrens) feared that the "fluctuations" would only be from bad to worse. He did not know what number of coroners' inquests would satisfy the right hon. Gentleman, but the fact was that the coroners were almost broken down in the discharge of their painful duty. If the House desired to treat the metropolis as it treated the rest of the country, let the same principles be adopted in legislating for the metropolis which were applied to all England, and let there be in London, as elsewhere, local control coincident with local taxation. As he understood the proposal of the President of the Poor Law Board, the control of the ratepayers over one-half of the total expenditure on poor relief in the metropolis was to be taken away, in order to try a further experiment in centralization—a course which was not desirable for the paupers, the ratepayers, or the nation at large. The tendency, and, he presumed, the purpose of this further step in local disfranchisement was plain. The number in each workhouse being arbitrarily limited; as soon as each was full, an order would be issued to build a new one or a large addition to the old one; and in this way the building speculators of Gwydyr House would proceed flourishingly and unlimitedly: for power of interposition ratepayers and Guardians would have none. The scale of charge for in-door maintenance might then be raised by the same despotic authority whenever it thought fit; and the poorer parishes would be bribed into acquiescence by being told that in this way they might put their hands into the pockets of those that were comparatively well to do. But neither the one nor the other would have any voice in regulating the outlay; for the whole of the in-door maintenance would henceforth come out of the common fund. It was, in fact, a revival of the vicious system of a rate in aid in the worst possible form. The right hon. Gentleman apologized for not applying the same rule to out-door relief by saying that such a change would involve the absolute sweeping away of whatever still remained of local government. To that, however, they would assuredly come if they took the present step in the direction so significantly indicated. The provisions of the Bill seemed to be framed with subtlety to put the metropolis out of harmony with the rest of the country, and with what object he could not divine, unless, indeed, wider projects were cherished for the gradual withdrawal of out-door relief; and it was thought prudent to experimentalize on the capital before proceeding to sequestrate the heritage of poverty and to destroy the local rights of industry and thrift throughout the kingdom.

said, he thought the Bill would bestow increased comforts on the poor, and he would admit that something like equalization could not be avoided; but his opinion was that the public had looked upon the extension of the common fund, without provision for the due representation of the ratepayers, as something quite new to this country, and as a most dangerous innovation; and they would hardly be prepared for the proposal that so large a proportion as one-half of the poor rates of the metropolis should be administered by a body that was not directly responsible to the taxpayers. The common fund, as he said last year, was a means whereby parish A could tax parish B without its exercising any control in the matter, or having the power to tax parish A. The Bill would be a valuable one if the ratepayers could have control over the expenditure of the common fund.

said, he had been a strong advocate for the equalization of the poor rates, and he was pleased that this Bill proposed an extension of the principle so far that 3s. 6d. a head for every in-door pauper was to be levied upon the general rate throughout the whole metropolis. This was a step in the right direction, much more so than was the division of the metropolis into districts and parishes for the provision of asylums. He did not believe there was anything in the objection that equalization would lead to extravagance, because each parish or district would al- ways have to pay its share of the rate. Twelve or thirteen years ago he had his name on the back of a Bill, along with that of the right lion. Gentleman the Chief Commissioner of Works, the object of which was to equalize poor rates; that Bill proposed to establish committees of magistrates and others to review the expenditure of each particular parish; but that mode of proceeding was deemed a clumsy one, and the Bill was not looked upon with favour by the House. At that time equalization was not so popular at the Poor Law Board as it is now, and there was no one at the Poor Law Board to support it. Now that the Poor Law Board had adopted it, there must be some one intrusted with the revision of the expenditure. The Poor Law Board were not perfect. On the contrary, great objections were from time to time made to them; but somebody must exercise a controlling power, and he should be unwilling, on this account, to throw any difficulties in the way of passing a Bill which would confer great benefits on the metropolis by the further approach to equalization which it contemplated. He should be glad, therefore, to give his right hon. Friend every support in his power in passing the measure.

said, he wished for an explanation from the right hon. Gentleman. He was afraid that the Guardians of parishes would have little control over the district schools.

, in reply, said he could assure his hon. Friend (Mr. Whalley) that the Guardians would exercise considerable power over these schools, for the Boards of management would be formed exclusively from the Guardians of the district, and they would be able to watch over the schools and to protect them from any sinister influences. With regard to the remarks of the hon. Member for North Hampshire (Mr. Sclater-Booth), the Bill would provide that as regards the future the Poor Law Board might by order increase the sum of 3s. 6d., subject, however, to the condition that the Board should lay such Order on the table of the House, and that it should not come into effect until six weeks afterwards. This would guard against the the danger which the hon. Member anticipated—namely, that by a rise or fall in the price of provisions the 3s. 6d. might be either too high or too low. The hon. Member said it would be better to take a proportionate amount. But if that plan were adopted the stimulus to economy on the part of the Guardians would not be so great as under the Bill. The proposal was that 3d. 6d. per head a-week should be paid, and therefore any economy would be entirely for the benefit of the Guardians, whereas if four fifths were paid from the common fund and one filth by the Guardians, they would only be interested in any economy which might be effected to the extent of that one fifth. The point had been carefully considered, and the advantage that would accrue to the Guardians under the Bill had been anticipated. The hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. W. M. Torrens), was mistaken in supposing that 3s. 6d. was the exact sum to be spent. The 3s. 6d. was to be paid out of the common fund; but at present, and for some time to come, every pauper was likely to cost considerably more than that sum. As to the margin which would be left, it was calculated that £90,000 would still be borne by the local authorities, irrespective of the common poor fund, and that they would therefore still be interested to the extent of £90,000 in economy. The hon. Member said that pauperism in the metropolis was increasing, and asked how many more inquests he (Mr. Goschen) would require to convince him of the fact. No one could be blind to the existence of pauperism in the metropolis, and no one was more impressed with it than he was; but he hoped that better times were in store, and as to the inquests, he would remind the hon. Member that some of them arose from the overcrowding of workhouses—the very point with which he proposed to deal by the provisions of this Bill. The hon. Member was entirely wrong in supposing that the whole control would be taken out of the hands of the Guardians. That would be the case if the Poor Law Board said they would be responsible for the whole administration of these workhouses; but there would be the payment of a fixed sum, and the general arrangements would be no more taken out of the hands of the Guardians than at present. Certainly, there would be this important difference—that, whereas as present, if any Board of Guardians dealt with their poor in such a manner as to call for the interference of the Poor Law Board, an application to the Court of Queen's Bench for a mandamus was the only mode of compelling them to do their duty, the Bill would supply a more simple means of effecting this result and of strengthening the hands of the Poor Law Board in this respect.