asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he will postpone the Vote which includes the Martini-Henry Rifle till the House has decided whether a Committee shall be appointed?

Sir, my predecessor appointed a most competent Committee to examine the question what rifle should be adopted. About the time of my accession to office that Committee reported in favour of the Martini-Henry. I referred the Report to the Ordnance Council, and, under their advice, the weapon has been tried by the troops in hot and cold climates, at home and abroad. The Reports from the different regiments have been laid upon the Table of the House, and are eminently satisfactory. I have re-appointed the Committee, under the same Chairman—Colonel Fletcher—with some new members, to consider those Reports, and the final Report of that Committee has been laid upon the Table also. Sufficient inquiry in a matter of so much importance is an excellent thing; but there is a point at which, if the Army is to be armed at all with the improved weapon, inquiry must terminate and action must commence. The present case is, in my opinion, one for decision, and not for further and probable indefinite inquiry.

asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, now that the Army Regulation Bill has passed its Second Reading, he will take steps to stop exchanges from full to half pay, by private arrangements between officers, for money considerations, or at least to carry out the Queen's Regulation now in force on that head; and, whether, when promotion above the rank of Captain is made by selection, the selection will be confined to officers on full pay, or will extend to those on half pay, especially those whe have been compulsorily placed on half pay?

It is not intended to alter the practice which has hitherto prevailed until the new regulations consequent upon the passing of the Bill shall be issued. Promotions by selection will not be limited to officers on full-pay, but will include officers on half-pay.

asked the Secretary to the Treasury, What determination has been arrived at as to granting annual leave of absence and sick leave to Writers in Her Majesty's Customs?

It has been resolved. Sir, to give leave of absence without loss of pay for 14 days per annum to writers in the Customs who have served satisfactorily for one year.

asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Why payment of the dividend due on March 1st on the portion of the Greek Loan of 1832–3 guaranteed by England has been refused payment by the London agents of the contractors?

The bill for payment of that portion of the Greek Loan guaranteed by Great Britain was only presented at the Pay Office on Saturday, and orders have been given to honour it. The delay referred to by the hon. Gentleman arose from the state of affairs in Paris, whence the London agents receive the usual instructions for paying the dividends. They are now, however, in course of payment.

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether the Irish Board of National Education has agreed to recommend to Her Majesty's Government that the capitation allowance to Monastic and Conventual Schools shall continue to be made without reference to results, but shall be at once doubled in amount; and, if so, whether he would object to lay upon the Table of this House a Copy of the document in which that recommendation is made?

said, in reply, that no such recommendation had been made by the Irish Commissioners for Education. The recommendations which had been made were now under the consideration of the Government, and as soon as they should be finally decided on there would be no objection to lay them on the Table of the House.

appealed to those hon. Members who had placed on the Paper Notices of Motions on the Motion for going into Supply, to postpone their respective Motions until Committee.

said, he regretted that he was unable to respond to the appeal of the right hon. Gentleman. He should not be doing his duty to his constituents if he did not take advantage of this opportunity of bringing forward his Motion on the subject of gunboats, which ought to be discussed before the right hon. Gentleman reached the Estimates.

agreed to postpone his Motion on condition that the Government would give some assurance that the purchase of Deptford Dockyard should not be completed until the question had been discussed by the House. He was told that the purchase was to be completed to-morrow, and if that statement were true it would materially prejudice the discussion that might arise.

said, he wished to explain with reference to Deptford Dockyard that the Government could not undertake any such obligation as that suggested by the hon. Baronet (Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson). In fact, there was a legal obligation to carry out the conveyance. The Government had no power to stay proceedings at this stage, besides the delay would materially interfere with the building of the cattle market.

, in moving, according to the Notice he had given, a Resolution that it was expedient to make additional provision for the defence of the commercial harbours of this country, said, that although this country, happily, had not been involved in the Continental entanglements of the last few months, yet the public were impressed with the necessity of placing our defences upon a more permanent and reliable basis than at present. Last week the Prime Minister had delivered a most impressive forecast of the future, and no one could have listened to his words without feeling the cloud had not entirely passed away; but, whether the danger had passed away or not, it was incumbent upon Parliament, in time of peace, and in the absence of panic, to consider whether we could not utilize our magnificent and unrivalled maritime resources, by devising some scheme which might be maintained at small cost through years of peace, ready to meet any emergency that might unhappily arise. War was now reduced to a question of weeks instead of years, and the nation that was found unprepared, in the event of being involved in war, would find, when too late, the cost of neglect. He was ready to admit that we had a powerful seagoing fleet—probably superior to that of any other nation; but considering our insular position, our dependence on foreign supplies, the vast interests we had to protect at home and abroad, and the necessity of keeping free and uninterrupted communication with India and our Colonial Empire in every part of the globe, he was not willing to admit that we possessed a fleet sufficient to meet all those requirements, and at the same time capable of resisting any attack which might be directed against us by a coalition of maritime Powers. They could not shut their eyes to the very great improvements which had been made in modern warfare. The use of steam had revolutionized all our previous experience; it equalized to a large extent the powers of nations; and gave to an attacking, or invading Power, the great advantage of being able to concentrate at one point, and at a specific time, a very large and powerful force. Nor must it be forgotten that the pre- cision and power of modern artillery, the use of submarine weapons of destruction, and the application of rams in naval warfare rendered such effective service, that even victorious fleets coming out of future actions would be so crippled that they would find it not only hard to maintain their position at sea, but the vessels would have difficulty in reaching a port, where they would have to remain for weeks, perhaps months, for repairs, owing to their peculiar construction. It was said we had the command of the Channel, but what did that mean? If it meant that we had a fleet capable of preventing the fleet of any other nation from entering the Channel, he believed we had such a fleet; but if it was meant that the fleet would prevent invading operations being undertaken in swift steamers passing through fleets, perhaps hundreds of miles apart, under cover of night, we had not, in his opinion, such a command of the Channel as we ought to aim at. In order to obtain security of the reliable character which the country required, it would be necessary to provide an inshore flotilla of small and powerfully armed light-draught steam vessels. Such vessels, distributed throughout the commercial ports of this country, would, in his opinion, create a defensive force sufficient not only for the protection of the harbours themselves, but for the protection of our coasts, and capable of supporting our fleets in operations of a more extended character. The utterly defenceless state of our commercial harbours had long been a subject of great anxiety to the country, and such a protection as he suggested would effectually stop those periodical panics, which embarrassed so seriously the commercial operations of the country, causing a great stoppage of our industry, and serious loss to all engaged in peaceful trade. The attack of an enemy would not be directed against armed places, and, surely, if defences were necessary, they were essentially necessary to our commercial ports, which were the great emporiums of trade, and which, by their wealth and their weakness, would absolutely invite attack. The hon. Member for Leith (Mr. Macfie) had, on more than one occasion, endeavoured to bring this question before the House. The hon. Member had reason for anxiety in the matter, for the shores of the Firth and the capital of the North were with- out the slightest protection. Coming down to Tynemouth and Sunderland, those ports had docks usually filled with ships lying parallel with the coast, and absolutely at the mercy of any passing vessel that desired to shell the shipping of the town. Again, the Humber was not protected, and from the peculiarity of the channel leading to the important port of Hull, could only be defended by floating batteries—forts or land defences were practically useless. No doubt, attempts would always be made to defend the Thames, for many good reasons. The hon. Member for Falmouth (Mr. Eastwick) had sought to draw attention to the state of that harbour; and the Chambers of Commerce at Bristol and Cardiff had recently petitioned the House, asking for defences in the shape of floating batteries. With regard to the port of Liverpool, efforts had been made during the last 16 years to get something done for its protection. Hon. Members were doubtless acquainted with the position of the port and the character of its enormous trade. The exports passing through it probably amounted to one-half of the entire exports of the country; and there were few days in the year when property of the value of from £30,000,000 to £40,000,000 was not lying within rifle shot from the river. Although they might withdraw their pilots, and remove their buoys and light-ships, it would be perfectly easy for any dashing officer to bring his ship up the river on the flood tide, and after throwing red-hot shot and shell into the shipping in the harbour, and the warehouses along the docks, filled with combustible materials, make his retreat in safety on the next ebb. There was not a fort or a ship there capable of resisting such an expedition. That was a state of things which ought not to continue. In a moment of alarm in 1855, the Government of the day wrote to the authorities to say that it had been decided to build a fort upon the northern extremity of the docks, and batteries on five pierheads; but nothing had yet been done. Within the last few days a communication had been received, asking whether the fort could be proceeded with. This, however, was another spasmodic movement; but, whether it was or not, he, for one, did not wish the matter to sleep again. It might be satisfactory for the time to be told, as they had been by the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, that in the event of war the ports would be protected; but those who understood the subject would know that Her Majesty's Government would not have the power to do so on the outbreak of war, for in such an emergency every nerve would be strained to send every ship we possessed against the enemy, and thus it would be impossible for the Government to entertain applications from particular ports. He would not presume to offer an opinion on the relative merits of shore and floating batteries; but he might be permitted to point out that while the former involved enormous expenditure and considerable loss of time, the latter could be built at once at a comparatively moderate cost. It was notorious that we were deficient in the smaller class of vessels to which his proposition referred; and it was because the Navy Estimates—which had been in the hands of hon. Members for two or three weeks—only provided for some half-dozen of those vessels that he had felt it his duty to bring this question before the House. If further increase in the number were now contemplated, Supplemental Estimates ought to have been laid on the Table. With regard to maintaining these vessels, he had to state that, besides the Coastguard and Naval Reserve, which we had in all large seaports, there were also in such places classes of maritime population who were not utilized as they might be for purposes of defence. There were pilots, riggers, and boatmen—men who had spent their lives upon vessels of the very class required, who would take as much pride in them as Volunteers did in their corps. The local knowledge which these men had of tides, banks, and currents, would be of the greatest value in manning defensive vessels; and in time of peace it would be only necessary to keep up a small permanent staff—namely, a warrant officer and gunner, and one or two seamen-gunners. Some objection would probably be raised with respect to the cost of this scheme; but 40 or 50 vessels of the Staunch or Plucky class, carrying an 18-ton, or even heavier gun, would not cost more than £7,500 each, so that the whole inshore flotilla would only require an expenditure of from £300,000 to £400,000, spread over a couple of years. Such a flotilla would, he be- lieved, be most useful in shallow estuaries, being able to cope with superior forces; because, by moving rapidly, they would concentrate their fire upon a special object, while each would offer a very small target to the enemy. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer was unable to allow an addition on this account to the sum provided in the Estimates, he should not hesitate to suggest that the building of other vessels should cease for the moment, in order that the money intended to be spent on the larger class of vessels might be applied to the building of those smaller vessels, which were a primary necessity. There were few ships composing the iron-clad Navy of England which drew less than 26 feet of water, and still fewer harbours, north of Brest, which they could enter. Coast operations would be simply impossible; and if ever we found ourselves engaged in a European quarrel our fleets would return to our ports, as the French fleet did from the Baltic—without firing a shot. He could not avoid alluding, in passing, to the scheme of the Government for re-organizing the Army at a cost of many millions, with the prospect, in the opinion of competent authorities, of very doubtful results. If it were possible to divert any portion of the expenditure to providing a fleet of small vessels, he believed that we should then have such protection as would enable us in a short time to diminish our Army instead of increasing it. The Secretary for War told us that the Army organization scheme would require seven years. [An hon. MEMBER: 12 years.] Well, in these times seven years were a political generation; great changes might occur within the next seven years, and what was wanted by the country was something that would render us prepared at the moment, and enable us to gain time for that organization of the Army that might be carried on afterwards. It appeared to him that we had begun at the wrong end—that in a homely phrase, we had "put the cart before the horse." We had, in fact, commenced to furnish our house before we had seen that the doors were capable of being properly secured. If he had power to divert a portion of the expenditure from the re-construction of the Army, as it was called, and which, if passed to-morrow, would not give any further protection to the defences of the country than existed at this moment, he certainly should feel it his duty to do so. He believed that if we only substituted for the Coastguard ships vessels of the Cyclops class, powerful vessels with slight draught of water, and attached to them gunboats, and if we utilized the Reserve, and the maritime population of the adjacent districts, we should then have a line of defence which would not only make England invulnerable, but would leave our fleets free to do that which they had always done before—block up the mouth of every suspected harbour of the enemy, and attack the enemy's fleet wherever it could be found. It was too much our habit to talk of our fleets as lines of defence. That was not the language of 50 years since, when the Navy of our country won for itself imperishable renown, not by defensive, but offensive, operations. He believed that this question was one which involved a high policy, and that the House ought to express an opinion upon it. He asked for the question he had brought forward a fair and unbiassed consideration; and if the House should support him in the proposal that he made, he believed that we should have a protection round our shores which would meet every requirement of the country, and would be obtained at a very moderate cost. The hon. Member concluded by moving his Resolution.

said, that, in seconding the motion, he was animated by the strongest sense of public duty. His hon. Friend had alluded to the failure of the operations of the French fleet, owing to the deficiency of vessels of light draught adapted to coast defence. Our own experience in the Baltic campaign, when a powerful fleet of line-of-battle ships and frigates was condemned to inaction for want of gunboats, and the successes, on the other hand, of the American naval operations, owing to the United States possessing vessels of light draught, were matters of history. The most eminent professional authorities strongly recommended the construction of a flotilla of vessels of moderate draught for the defence of our coasts and harbours. The Defenee Commissioners, in their Report of 1860, advised that £1,000,000 sterling should be spent in aid of the land fortifications which they suggested, and they laid it down as a rule that the extreme draught of a vessel adapted for coast defence should be 16 feet. Subsequently, however, a Committee was appointed, with Lord Landerdale as president, to examine into the merits of Captain Cowper Cole's system of turret armament, who strongly recommended that the turret system should be adopted for vessels designed for coast defence. But he believed that at the present time there was not in the British fleet a single turret-ship which drew less than 16 feet of water. The vessels we had afloat largely exceeded the draught laid down as essential for vessels for coast purposes. On comparing the resources of the British Navy with the navies of other Powers, in respect to this class of vessels, he found that our deficiencies were of a very serious character. In the Russian Navy there were 24 iron-clads, of which 22 were vessels of light draught powerfully armed, 13 being of the Monitor type. The American fleet contained 52 iron-clads, 45 of which were of light draught and adapted for coast defence. Now, compared with these two statements, the British Navy was alarmingly deficient in vessels adapted for coast operations. He should be sorry to advocate increased expenditure, and he would suggest that we ought to substitute for the costly vessels of deep draught now in contemplation vessels of more moderate cost and lesser size, and better adapted for the defence of our coasts. With regard to line-of-battle ships, we were undoubtedly superior to any other maritime Power, and perhaps superior, to all the other maritime Powers taken together, and, therefore, it was unnecessary at present to expend more money in constructing vessels of this class. When they considered that the Sultan, which cost £394,000, could be destroyed by a single successful torpedo, it was enough to make us pause before we constructed more of this class of ships, especially as in 10 years' time this class of ships might be found to be obsolete. Further, he would suggest that we might suspend the construction of a number of vessels of the Inconstant type until a sufficient number of vessels were supplied adapted for coast defence. Our mercantile navy, especially the powerful ships which performed a regular service between Liverpool and New York in the most tempestuous winter weather, and under favourable conditions, attain- ing a speed of 14 knots an hour for several days consecutively, would, in the event of war breaking out, be admirable substitutes for vessels like the Inconstant. He submitted that we might without danger postpone the construction of more Inconstants at the present time, and that we could spend our money to greater advantage by building vessels of the Staunch class, which his hon. Friend (Mr. Graves) had referred to as being essential to the defence of our harbours and shores. The programme of the Admiralty of last year contemplated the construction of 12,000 tons of armourplated shipping per annum. The Secretary of the United States Government in his last Report suggested that the United States establishment in time of peace should include 40 armoured vessels for coast defence of a tonnage not exceeding 800 tons. Assuming that we adopted that tonnage as sufficient for our Monitors, or in order to secure a more thoroughly efficient type of vessels, increased the size of our Monitors to 1,000 tons, we could, by suspending the construction of vessels of the Devastation type provide by the end of three years, without any addition to the present Vote for ship-building, 36 vessels of a type admirably adapted for coast defence. Again, we could build 33 vessels of the Staunch class for the same money which it would take to construct an Inconstant. Thus we might have in three years 100 gunboats of the Staunch class, which, taken together with 36 Monitors, would form a substantial and reliable defence for the great arsenals and commercial harbours of the country. There was one more suggestion which he wished to offer with respect to the utilization of our mercantile marine for purposes of naval defence. He had often contemplated the possibility of making arrangements with the owners of the tug and coasting steamers which were to be found in "numbers numberless" around our shores, by which those vessels might be made a very valuable defence of the harbours to which they belonged. He believed that a sum equal to a third or fourth of the original cost of such vessels would be gladly accepted by their owners upon condition that they should be constructed with such modifications of scantling and fitment as would adapt them to carry a gun, mounted on Captain Scott's plan, so successfully applied in the Staunch. For a sum not exceeding what we should spend in maintaining a like number of the steam gunboats in reserve the owners of those vessels would probably be glad to keep them in a state of repair satisfactory to an inspector and sufficient to enable us to rely with confidence on them in case their services should be required. He would conclude by expressing a sincere hope that the Government would find it consistent with those economical principles which they had adopted to increase our defence flotilla, so as to render impossible in the future the recurrence of those periodical panics which did so little credit to this country.

was very glad that the hon. Member for Liverpool had brought forward this question, for it was impossible to overrate its importance. It was not to be wondered that attention was called to this matter, when it was considered what an enormous amount of property was really in a defenceless condition. He must, however, confess that he should be sorry to see adopted the plan of dispensing with building the larger class of vessels in order to construct small ones for home defence. His hon. Friend had given a very good reason against his own recommendation—namely, the enormous time required to repair a fleet of iron-clads after an action, and we could not look upon our Channel defence as complete unless we had a reserve of iron-clads fit to go to sea when the others returned in a damaged condition. He quite agreed that ships of lighter draught were the only vessels for harbour defence. He would ask the House to bear in mind the history of the last 18 or 20 years, and to consider whether the history of that time did not furnish the strongest reason for constructing small vessels such as those which had been recommended. At the commencement of the Crimean War we were entirely unprovided with gunboats. A noble Earl (the Earl of Hardwicke), who was a distinguished naval officer, made a recommendation in 1853 that the First Lord should immediately lay down 100 gunboats; but that recommendation was not attended to. Well, on the outbreak of the war, we set about building 150 gunboats, but in such a hurry that in 12 months they were all rotten; and we contrived to have the boats finished just as the war was over. If we had had 100 gunboats earlier we should have taken Cronstadt without difficulty, and probably should have entered Sebastopol, and the whole character of the war would have been changed. We had also had more recent experience on the subject. There was the report of the commanders of the French squadron in the late war; and they said that the French iron-clads in the Baltic were perfectly useless for all purposes of offensive warfare, whereas if they had had 100 boats of light draught the fleet would then have been most useful as an aggressive force. We had heard a good deal lately of our treaty obligations; but let us imagine that we were called upon under treaty obligations to prevent an attack upon Antwerp, which was the point most looked to when any question of European concern was at issue. What could we possibly do? What use would our large iron-clads be with their draught of water? We had really not a single ship of war that we could send up the river to defend the place. Looking at the history of the past, and the necessities of the present, he did not think that we could do better than build small vessels such as those which had been referred to.

said, that, as he had himself given notice to call attention to vessels of the Staunch class, he would say a few words in support of the Motion that was now before the House. He had come to the conclusion that there could not be any more effective mode of defending the harbours of this country than by building gunboats carrying one gun. He had a letter from Sir William Armstrong to the effect that the cost of two iron-clads would construct 100 of these vessels, and that these vessels would be of much more importance to the harbours of this country than a fleet of iron-clads. These small vessels were ubiquitous; they could move from one place to another, and they could not be all destroyed at once. It was not competent for hon. Members to move any increase of the Estimates, therefore he would not press the subject further than by saying that he believed there would be in the Estimates provision for six of these vessels, and he would be inclined to press upon Government to proceed further in this direction.

desired, with the permission of the House, to say a few words on the subject. He entirely agreed with what had fallen from the hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. G. Bentinck) that there should be no delay in completing the larger iron-clads, with the view of devoting the money to smaller gunboats, if it were not that the iron-clads we were constructing were not of that type which it was desirable to provide; so that he thought the proposition of his hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool was entitled to some weight, because they knew the value and exceeding cheapness of that class of gunboats, and that the seven iron-clads which were now being constructed were the subject of consideration by an important Committee. Although they had not reported yet, something was known with regard to the Fury, Thunderer, and Devastation. The Fury had been entirely suspended, though it was held up in the autumn to be a vessel of great importance; but he was glad to learn that the money expended had not resulted in a great loss to the public, as he believed only 1/56th had been completed. He was quite sure he was right in saying that no Committee would say it was the type of vessel that should be adopted. They desired to see the experiment tried by dealing with the Thunderer and the Devastation; but one would probably be constructed in the original manner, and the other according to an altered design. With regard to the other four vessels of the Cyclops class, there was no doubt they had the advantage of drawing not too much water, and in that respect they would be a very serviceable vessel. But as he understood, the Committee had reported that in such seas as would be met with on the north-west and south coasts of Ireland, and on the west coast of Scotland, they would be in great danger, and they would roll over and go down as the Captain went down. He thought vessels of the Staunch class did not carry large enough guns, as they ought to carry an 18-ton gun, rather than a 12-ton gun, and ought to be constructed so as to be able to lay with their heads to the sea and fire abeam. He believed a sum of £8,000 would produce a gunboat of a class which would be able to take care of itself in almost all weathers, navigate in shallow seas, and fire with great precision. The Defence Committee of 1860 had advised the expenditure of £1,000,000 for this purpose, and he would be glad to hear from the First Lord of the Admiralty what course Government was pursuing in this matter. A considerable number of these vessels should be constructed in each year, and he urged upon the representatives of the commercial ports to consider how these vessels should be manned and preserved in their ports. They should cost the country nothing but ammunition for the training of the men. One gunner, a warrant officer, should be in charge of each of the various gunboats in the various ports, and in that way the country would have a force which the mercantile body itself would be interested in keeping efficient. By this means they would not be subject to those panics which occasionally arose, as they would have their vessels at hand, armed with guns of the heaviest calibre, and ready to be manned for the defence of the port.

said, he should have preferred to explain the policy of the Government with respect to this matter in the statement which he had to make later in the evening. It was impossible to deal with one class of these vessels alone; and no better proof could be given of this than the speeches which had just been made by the hon. Members. He was astonished beyond measure to hear the hon. and gallant Admiral opposite (Sir John Hay) mention to the House the substance of a confidential Report which had only been placed upon his (Mr. Goschen's) table two days ago. A very important Committee had been sitting, and every document which he had seen in connection with it was marked "confidential," and most properly so, because it could not be to the advantage of the country that, before the Committee had completed its final Report, the substance of the Re- port they were about to make should be published piecemeal in the speeches of hon. Members—thereby producing a wrong impression throughout the country. Was it right that the gallant Admiral should have mentioned one point of a confidential Report regarding the Cyclops and Devastation, and alarm the country at the progress made with these vessels, before the public had the other points, or were in possession of full materials to enable them to judge? It had been a great question with him whether, in the interest of the public service, he should lay these Reports before the House. They touched on the whole question of the shipbuilding of the country; they were prepared by most eminent men, and went into the most minute questions of shipbuilding. It was a great matter of doubt with him whether he should publish these or not for the benefit of the world. It might be right to publish them, but he thought that it should be left to the Government to decide the question, and it was not right for the hon. and gallant Member to force the premature production of these Reports by quoting from them so much as was unfavourable to the vessels that were under construction. With regard to the question generally, it would be his duty presently to state to the House the policy of the Government with regard to the building of these ships. Hon. Members had assumed, and the hon. Member for Hastings (Mr. Brassey) seemed to indicate that the Government was in favour of proceeding with ironclads at the expense of these small gun vessels; but that was not the policy of the Government. The policy of the Government was to proceed with these gunboats, as many hon. Members had proposed; but they were not prepared to do so, at present, on the scale urged by the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Graves). Progress must, at the same time, be made with other ships which also constituted a portion of the coast defences, beause it was not assumed that these ships which were to remain in the harbours were to be our chief defences. We must have fighting ships also; we must have large ships drawing 26 feet of water, superior in power to the ships of other countries; and therefore Government could not consent to stop the progress of such ships as the Devastation; nor could they stop the progress of the four ships of the Cyclops class, drawing 15 feet or 16 feet of water, even for those which were most useful for coast defences. There would be a considerable flotilla of the very gunboats recommended by the hon. Member for Hastings (Mr. Brassey) of the Staunch class, but he did not need to pursue the subject further at the present moment; he would only state that of that class 12 were practically completed, and, further, boats of the same class would be completed during the present financial year. It would be un-advisable to suspend the completion of the Blonde, which was at present in progress of construction. That was a most important and useful class of vessels; but as to the amount spent on them in any one year, and the relative amount spent on the larger class of vessels, that question would be best dealt with when he came to speak on the general policy of the Government.

said, that if he was rightly informed, instructions had been issued to the Committee on Naval Construction which had been referred to, prohibiting them from considering any class of vessels below 2,000 tons. It was of the highest importance that some opinion should go forth from that House that that Committee should have power to inquire into the class of vessels of smaller tonnage and light draught, which he concurred with previous speakers in believing to be most suited for the defence of our shores. He hoped, therefore, that in the course of the evening he should receive some assurance from Government on the subject. He hoped his hon. Friend would not put the House to the trouble of dividing until they had heard the statement of the Government; but it was of such importance that he would be justified in asking the opinion of the House on the question, should the explanation of the Government not be satisfactory.

said, that the ports on the north-east coast were totally unprotected. The only defence which we had at present was vessels of the iron-clad type, but the experience of the French and German War showed that iron-clads were utterly useless for certain purposes. Vessels of small draught of the Monitor class, similar to the Minotauk turret which ran the gauntlet of the Land Forts during the American Civil War were, in his opinion, the best ships for the defence of the coast, and the country would be put to no great additional expense, as the men composing the Naval Reserve could be utilized to great advantage if that suggestion were adopted.

said, the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Graves) was quite justified in bringing forward this Motion. He did not hesitate to say that one or two small Monitors, such as the Admiralty were now building, would destroy the very fine armour-clad ship called the Resistance, now stationed in the Mersey, which was not at all fitted for getting into or out of ports. His view was that the various harbours of this country could be made safe by vessels of the Staunch class and Monitor class. He was aware that Government were building six small vessels for coast defence. It was better for the country to build vessels of this small class for the harbours, even as a matter of economy, because by their means the rest of the Navy would be set free for foreign service without exposing ourselves to the risk of invasion. The vessels now in commission would suffice for all the requirements of foreign service, and we should have no need to build large-class vessels for a long time to come.

protested against the slowness of the present and preceding Governments in providing for the defence of the ports of the country. A vessel of war running into the Firth of Forth would be nearer to Edinburgh than Hyde Park Corner was to the House in which they were now sitting. What a shame it would be if a cruiser were to come from the Baltic and bring the renowned and ancient capital of Scotland to ruins. No considerations of economy, no advantage gained by delay, ought to postpone the expenditure which everyone was convinced must, sooner or later, be incurred on the defence of the coast, and in the removal of those panics which were well founded, so far as the unprotected position of our harbours was concerned. What would be the state of Lancashire and the manufacturing districts if a gunboat were to go up the Mersey and burn up the stock of cotton in the port of Liverpool?

Sir, I am glad the hon. Member for Liverpool has called attention to this subject. One would have thought that the defences of commercial ports would have been the first thought of a commercial nation. But, perhaps, it has not been attended to just because it was so very obviously necessary. Sir, I regret that I did not hear the beginning of this debate, but I am sure that my hon. Friend has explained the wants of Liverpool with his usual clearness and ability, so that I need add nothing on that head; but I should like to say a word respecting Falmouth—a port at which there is often an immense fleet of ships, and which ought, therefore, to be made perfectly secure. Now, I am far from saying that Falmouth is so defenceless as Liverpool, but what I complain of is that it is imperfectly defended, when a very little additional outlay would make it quite secure. There are two castles of Henry VIII's time—Pendennis, on the west of the harbour, and St. Mawe's on the east. Pendennis is an irregular heptagon with seven very small bastions, in each of which is a 56-pounder gun en barbette. Below are land batteries of 32-pounders, which are quite useless against armour-plated vessels. The top battery is also useless, because there are no bomb-proofs and no expense battery inside the fort, and the three old magazines are exposed to fire, as they can be seen above the parapets. For want of a small outlay this defence, then, is indefensible. St. Mawe's Castle is well placed, but its 12 guns—being shell guns—are of no use against armour-plated vessels. These guns ought to be replaced by 9-inch guns. But two more batteries are wanted—a 3-gun battery of heavy guns on St. Anthony, at the eastern point of the harbour, and a battery at Trefusis Point inside the harbour; for, as matters at present stand, if a vessel could run between the two castles, not a gun could be brought to bear on her, and she might burn the town and sink all the shipping in the port. Having spoken of Falmouth, I wish to say a word on the defences of the Clyde, and then on the general question. At Greenock there is the Black Prince, and no doubt she is a very formidable defence. But I think there ought to be defences on shore as well, and I believe there are no rifled guns. Near Greenock there are two smoothbore guns, but no rifled guns. There are companies of Volunteer artillery in Argyllshire, Renfrew, Ayr, and Dum- barton, and a body of Militia Artillery in Argyllshire; but not a man of them has ever been taught to handle a breech-loading rifled gun. I think that such guns should be sent down, and the artillerymen instructed in their use. Now as to the general question. I believe I am right in saying that harbour defences consist of batteries on shore, armour-plated vessels, and torpedoes. It has been rightly observed that we want a number of small armour-plated ships, of light draught, which could prevent an enemy's vessel or boats from raking out our torpedoes. It appears to me that these latter weapons are the best we can use. In fact, I think the next naval war will be a war of torpedoes. That being so, I am really surprised that the Admiralty has been so utterly supine regarding these most formidable engines. I speak more particularly of Harvey's sea-torpedo, or "otter" torpedo. There was Correspondence about these torpedoes as long back as July 8th, 1868, and most successful trials were made with it against the Royal Sovereign on the 17th and 18th February, 1870; yet it was not till the 29th of December that the Government ordered 20, and on the 22nd of this month, 60 more. But while our Government has been fast asleep over torpedoes—and they are not exactly the things that a reasonable person would choose to slumber over—Russia has been arming to the teeth with them. Sir, it requires a couple of months' practice to manage these weapons successfully; but if it should come to a torpedo war we should be at a great disadvantage as compared with Russia, for it would be the most skilful manipulator—and skill is got only by practice—who would be certain to win. Sir, there can be no doubt that a flotilla of torpedo ships would blow up any fleet of iron-clads in the world. Why, Sir, in 10 trials against the Royal Sovereign, that ship three times got only one shot, and five times only two shots, at the torpedo vessel, and that even in the day; but there can be no doubt that in dark tempestuous nights there would be many chances to one against the torpedo vessel being struck. I hope, therefore, that immediate attention will be given to this subject, and that the crews, not only of the Excellent and Cambridge, but of every man-of-war in the Navy, will be exercised in the use of the "otter" torpedo, and that the services of Captain Harvey will be retained especially and solely for this country, at a fair and even liberal remuneration.

said, he was satisfied with the discussion which had taken place, as it had shown that the opinion of the House was unanimous in favour of the policy of additional defence for commercial harbours. As he did not wish to occupy the time unnecessarily, or to embarrass the Government by dividing the House, he would ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

said, that as he understood the transfer of Deptford Dockyard was to be made To-morrow, he felt bound to bring forward the Motion of which he had given Notice on the subject. The Dockyard had been valued at £400,000. It was sold to two different individuals, but a portion remained which he was told was worth £134,000. This property was sold to Mr. Austin, brother-in-law of the Solicitor to the Admiralty, who, it was stated, sold his bargain to the Corporation of London for a premium of £21,000; no proper advertisements of these transactions having been inserted in the newspapers, so far as he (Sir James Elphinstone) could find. Mr. Evelyn, of Wotton, in Surrey, had written a letter declaring that the sale to Mr. Austin, and the transfer to the Corporation of London, required a better explanation than any that had yet been offered. Last year, in answer to a statement he made in that House, the First Lord of the Admiralty declared that there was not the smallest truth in the assertion that Mr. Austin was a relative of the Solicitor to the Admiralty. Now, if a Committee were granted on the subject, the correctness of the statement he made would not only be proved, but probably something might be found out about the Greenwich election. He moved for the appointment of a Committee of the House to consider the subject.

seconded the Motion. As the hon. Baronet stated, Mr. Evelyn, the former ground landlord, made the assertion in the public papers that Mr. Austin's offer must have been very much under the value, because he was aware that a much larger sum had been offered. He had himself been informed by a professional gentleman in the City that a client of his own was prepared to give a much larger sum—from £100,000 to £125,000—for the Dockyard, but that he felt it would not be accepted, for, if divided into lots, it would fetch a much larger sum. A valuation of the Dockyard was made in 1865, and since that time considerable sums of money had been expended upon it. A portion of the Dockyard was purchased of Mr. Evelyn in 1856, on condition that it should be devoted to none other than dockyard purposes, and was sold by Mr. Evelyn for about £33,000. Mr. Evelyn had since purchased about 15 acres from the Government. To show the difference in valuation in reference to this land, Mr. Murrell, an official of the Government, valued this land at £46,000; another valuer valued it at £20,000; and the referee fixed the price at £27,900. But this did not fairly represent the proportion of the value of the whole, because the land so purchased by Mr. Evelyn had no river frontage; the piece, however, which had been sold to Mr. Austin had 1,000 feet of river frontage. It was contended that the sale to Mr. Austin must have been very much under the value because a larger sum had been offered, and it was alleged that if the Dockyard had been put up for auction it would have fetched a much larger sum. Mr. Murrell, who was consulted on a former occasion, was not asked, but Mr. Marsh, the agent of Mr. Austin, was engaged in arranging the bargain. He believed there were other names than the name of Mr. Austin connected with the transaction, and that for some time it was proposed to turn the locality to shipbuilding purposes. It was only in despair of being able to pay over the amount to the Government that the Corporation was applied to with a view to a cattle market. This matter ought to be referred to a Committee in order that they might know in what position the sale to Mr. Austin really stood. The hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter) had stated that the Corporation had asked to have the title made out to them. When Mr. Austin did not complete the purchase, why did not the Government recover possession of their ground, and effect a sale to the Corporation on terms clearly advantageous to the public? It was for the purpose of clearing up the whole transaction that he seconded the Motion of his hon. and gallant Friend.

said, that if the statements which had been made were true, he quite agreed that it would have been necessary that a Committee should be appointed to inquire into this question. He fully agreed that whenever imputations were made against an individual in a case of this kind a Committee was a proper tribunal to consider them. This matter, which was discussed in July last year, had been again brought up, and he could only repeat the explanation he then made to the House. It was extremely unfair again to have imputations cast upon Mr. Bristowe, the Solicitor to the Admiralty, a gentleman so highly respected, and formerly a Member of the House. As he told them last year, if anyone was to blame in the sale of Deptford Dockyard, it was not Mr. Bristowe, but himself. He acted on the best advice he could obtain, and if he had done wrong he was amenable to the censure of the House. He complained that, after the explanations given, the hon. Baronet should have come down to repeat the accusation. Mr. Bristowe had nothing to do with the sale except, as Solicitor to the Admiralty, to carry it out. This had been called a mysterious bargain; but there was no mystery about it whatever. When the present Government came into office they found it had been decided by a Committee unanimously that Deptford Dockyard should be closed. That decision was accepted by both sides of the House—by several Executive Governments, and it became the duty of the present Administration to carry the decision of the Committee into effect. The first thing to be done was to take advice as to the mode and manner of selling the Dockyard. He consulted a number of professional and commercial gentlemen—he saw 12 or 15 leading gentlemen connected with the City of London, who knew the value of property on the banks of the river, and their unanimous advice was on no account to put up Deptford Dockyard to public auction, for they said in the present depressed state of trade on the river very likely there would be no offer at all, which circumstance would injure the eventual sale of the property. They advised that two or three gentlemen, acquainted with the value of such property, should carefully go over the Dockyard, and value if confidentially for the Admiralty. It was said there had been an offer of £200,000; but there was not a syllable of truth in that representation. It was pure invention from beginning to end. Steps were taken to let it be known all over the kingdom that Deptford Dockyard was for sale. It was announced in the Money Article of The Times, and was mentioned in almost every newspaper, that the Government were most anxious to sell Deptford Dockyard, either in whole or in part. That announcement was copied into nearly every newspaper in the United Kingdom, but the only offers received were £45,000, £50,000, £55,000, £58,000, and £60,000. The valuation made by the Government official was £80,000. The offer accepted was £75,000 from Mr. Austin—that is, £71,500, and an obligation on the buyer to put up buildings for the Government to the extent of £3,500. The hon. Baronet (Sir James Elphinstone) said there was a valuation of the property at £134,000. Now, they got £75,000 from Mr. Austin and £30,000 from Mr. Evelyn—in all £105,000.

observed that the £134,000 was only the value of the site, and did not include materials, stocks, and slips.

said, the property was much more valuable at the time of the valuation than it was at the time it was sold; that being the case, the Government made a good sale, and it was rather hard lines to ask for a Committee to inquire into a sale effected under these circumstances. Of course Mr. Austin did not get the benefit of the plant and stores in the Dockyard; a large portion was sold and realized a large sum for the Exchequer, and ever since the Government came into office men had been employed in removing stores from Deptford and Woolwich, and in sending them to Portsmouth and elsewhere. Personally he did not know anything about Mr. Austin until the time arrived for handing over the property, and it was not until Mr. Marsh disclosed his principal that the name of Mr. Austin was mentioned at all. He was told that Mr. Austin was not at first over-satisfied with his bargain; and at one time would have accepted a profit of £500; a Member of that House had told him (Mr. Baxter) so. It was not Mr. Austin's fault that the money was not paid down; he was anxious to pay it at once; but when the sale had been effected it was found that there was a dispute between the Woods and Forests Department and the Admiralty; it was doubtful which of the two could give Mr. Austin a title; the question had to be referred to the Law Officers of the Crown, and it involved an investigation which necessitated months of delay. If anything was wrong, it was that the Corporation should pay so much money for the property, and he would suggest the appointment of a Committee of the Corporation to investigate the matter. Everything had been done by the Admiralty in the most open manner. It was merely bound now to hand over the property; and the only question was, whether the title should be made out to Mr. Austin or to the Corporation. After that explanation, he hoped the House would not assent to the Motion for a Committee of Inquiry.

did not think the statement of the hon. Gentleman satisfactory. He had no wish to cast imputations on anyone. He (Sir John Hay) could not see the necessity of the Board of Admiralty forcing a sale of this Dockyard at a time when they admitted that all such property was greatly depreciated. Surely the Admiralty were not so pressed as to be compelled to sell the property at a time when it was impossible to obtain anything like its value. It could be of no consequence to the country to force a sale of this property. It was only of consequence to the Admiralty, who thus desired to make a fallacious show of low Estimates. It was the conduct of a petty tradesman who, being on the verge of bankruptcy, desired to get rid of his stock at an alarming sacri- fice. The Dockyard, too, was sold to a gentleman who had not paid the purchase money for it, amounting to £75,000, and Mr. Austin quietly hands it over to the Corporation of London for £95,000, being a profit of £20,000. And now we hear this further disclosure that the Admiralty, instead of handing the property over to Mr. Austin, were about to transfer it at once to the Corporation of London, who wished to establish a cattle market on it. The advantage of this arrangement was completely on the side of Mr. Austin, who pocketed £20,000 profit, which was thus lost to the public. Now, that was one of those questions which he considered ought to be inquired into by a Committee of the House. He did not intend to attach suspicion to anyone connected with the transaction. At the same time it was notorious that in all parts of the country insinuations had been made of certain persons having been discreditably mixed up in it.

rose to call attention to the postponement of the sittings of the Committee on Business of the House, and to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Committee was to sit on Tuesday next. The hon. Member said he was anxious to make a few observations on this subject, believing that it was one involving the rights and privileges of the Members generally. Well, the simple facts connected with his inquiry were these—The Committee in question sat for the last time on Tuesday, the 14th March; it was then adjourned until Tuesday, the 21st March; but it having been subsequently found that that day was an inconvenient one for several of its Members, it was further postponed until Friday last, the 24th. That day having been also objected to as being inconvenient to the Members, it was agreed upon by the Committee itself to postpone its next deliberation to Friday next, the 31st instant. It appeared, however, that in the course of Friday evening last, the 24th, a circumstance took place which he believed was unparalleled in the annals of Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer having, on the evening in question, had a private conversation with one or two Members behind the Speaker's Chair, and communicated with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) fixed the next meeting of the Committee on the Business of the House, not for Friday next, as it was previously arranged, but for to-morrow (Tuesday)—thus taking it on himself to change the day of such meeting. He (Mr. Cavendish Bentinck), happening to be in the House late on Friday evening, had received early intimation of this change, but he believed that most of the other Members of the Committee did not receive notice of it until last Saturday afternoon. Apart from these considerations he would urge two objections to this course of proceeding. Now, the Chairman, as he contended, had no right, power, or authority to fix a day of meeting in this way, and in this he was supported by a text writer, Sir Erskine May, who, in his Usages and Laws of Parliament, after stating that it was sometimes permitted, added that the practice being irregular "could only be resorted to for the convenience of Members, and with their general concurrence." Neither of these conditions had been complied with. But although a Member might postpone a day for which he had given Notice of Motion, he could not, according to the established practice, appoint it for a day earlier than that which he had already fixed. Now, to-morrow, would be inconvenient to other Members of the Committee; and as it was known that attacks were to be made on the rights and privileges of Members, it was of importance that the convenience of independent Members should be consulted. He would suggest a further consideration in respect to this matter. The Committee in question was one of 23 Members, who, from the nature of the inquiry entrusted to them, would probably have to frame new rules regarding the Business of the House. He must enter his emphatic protest against any Resolution which the Committee might come to if they met to-morrow (Tuesday). And he begged, in conclusion, to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it was intended that the Committee should meet on that day?

hoped the House would not be led astray by the eloquence of the hon. Gentleman opposite, for, if he was right in his argument, he had clearly demonstrated that the Committee never could meet again. According to the hon. Gentleman, the Committee not having met on the day it adjourned to, there was an end of it. It was matter of common sense that, whenever necessity arose, the Chairman of a Committee, having conferred with all the Members whose opinions he was able to learn, should have the power of doing what was for the general convenience. It was at the request of Members of the Committee, and, certainly, as he understood, for the general convenience, that Tuesday had been appointed for the meeting of the Committee. He hoped his hon. Friend would not raise such dreadful legal difficulties as to prevent them from proceeding on that day.

objected, not so much to the naming of a day by the Chairman, as to the alteration of the day after once it had been appointed, for the convenience of individual Members. Some discretionary power might well be vested in the Chairman, but it ought to be a continuing power, not one that went backwards and forwards to suit the convenience of particular Members.

denied that his right hon. Friend was in the least degree responsible for the meeting upon Tuesday. But it so happened that several Members of the Public Business Committee were also Members of the Westmeath Committee. And as there were witnesses connected with the administration of justice, whose detention in London while waiting to be examined before the Westmeath Committee might cause public inconvenience, it was suggested by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli)—in which suggestion he entirely concurred—that the Westmeath Committee should, if possible, sit on the following day and take the evidence of those witnesses. It was accordingly arranged that the Chairman of the Westmeath Committee should write to the Chairman of the Public Business Committee to request that the meeting of that Committee might be postponed. Subsequently, in compliance with a desire strongly expressed that the Public Business Committee should, if possible, complete its sittings before Easter, and with that object should have two sittings instead of one during the week, the earlier meeting on Tuesday was arranged. But this also was upon public grounds, and not to suit the convenience of individual Members.

regretted that this subject had again been brought under the notice of the House. He thought it might have been left to the good feeling of the Committee generally.

said, the real question was, whether a meeting of the Committee, having been fixed for the 31st instant, an irregularity had not been committed by the Chairman and three or four Members of the Committee in arranging to antedate that meeting, and to hold it upon Tuesday.

thought a mistake had been made originally in not meeting upon the Tuesday and adjourning proformâ, or some other day. Full notice, however, had been given of the meeting to-morrow; therefore, if by sitting on two days during the present week they should be able to come to a Resolution, and report before Easter, he hoped that Members would attend and make progess with the business.

said, he should attend to-morrow, but it would certainly be at considerable inconvenience.

I hardly think I can with propriety be called on to intervene in this matter. When a Committee is appointed it elects its own Chairman and appoints its days for sitting, and, as has been said very properly in the course of this discussion, it is often necessary, for the general convenience, that the Chairman should take upon himself any alteration in the course of business which may become necessary. The only point which seems to be submitted for my consideration is, whether in a case where a meeting of the Committee has been settled for a later day, as for Friday, the Committee can with propriety be summoned for an earlier day—that is to say, for Tuesday. It is a rule of this House that when Public Notice has once been given of a Motion, it being obviously impossible to communicate with every one of the 650 Members, the day fixed cannot be altered—at least, it cannot be anticipated. But on this occasion the Chairman was acting, as I understand, to the best of his judgment for the convenience of the Committee, and in accordance with the desire of such Members of the Committee as he had been able to communicate with. There had been, moreover, no fixed adjournment of the Committee. The Chairman had merely intimated to the Committee a proposal that they should meet upon Tuesday. In this there does not appear to me to have been anything contravening the rules of the House.

I cannot enter upon the difficult task which I have to perform to-night without saying in the first instance how deeply I regret that my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) is not himself moving these Estimates. Every Member of the House must regret his absence on account of illness, and that feeling of regret must be heightened by the fact that his illness is in great part due to the exceedingly zealous and public-spirited manner in which my right hon. Friend discharged his duties. I feel confident that, although some of his proposals may for a moment have produced a little discontent, the permanent services which the right hon. Member for Pontefract has rendered in the administration of the Navy will prove of great value hereafter, and render it much easier for his successors to deal with the questions connected with the administration of the Navy. It is very difficult to make the Statement which falls to my lot to-night after the very short time which has been at my disposal for preparing myself to do justice to the great interests at stake in this matter, and I can assure the House that I feel the difficulty in the strongest manner. I feel the difficulty the more because it cannot be de- nied that the events of the past year have been extremely interesting as regards naval affairs. The events of the war, the loss of the Captain, and many other circumstances, have excited an interest and attention as regards naval matters which make it peculiarly incumbent on those who are responsible for the efficiency of the Navy to be equal to their task. I feel confident, therefore, that the Committee will, under the circumstances, be indulgent towards me this evening. I spoke just now of the events which have happened in the course of the year. One of those events has been already alluded to this evening—namely, the expedition of the French fleet. It cannot be denied that the fact of that fleet, gallant and efficient as it was believed to be, and as I believe it was, being unable to accomplish anything, seriously excited the attention of all persons who were seriously interested in naval affairs. Certain questions have been raised which must continue to excite the careful attention of everyone interested in matters of this kind, and, as far as I am concerned, I can assure the House that the causes which led to the failure of the French Expedition shall be most carefully examined into, with a view of ascertaining whether any lessons can be learnt from that result in the administration of our own Navy. If there had been any naval action, we should doubtless have gained ample experience with respect to the experiments which we and other countries are making. Other countries have constructed iron-clads; and, while continual strictures are being made on our iron-clad vessels, it remains to be proved that the ships in the possession of other Powers are either safer or more powerful than our own. I will now approach the subject of the amount of money for which the Government ask, and the number of men whom we desire to employ. The amount which we ask the Committee to allow us for the whole service of the year for the Navy is £9,756,000. That is an increase of £385,000 on the Estimates of last year, exclusive of the Vote of Credit granted in August. When I say the total amount is £9,756,000 I do not take into account a reduction which must be made from that figure, in consequence of the extra receipts, amounting to about £400,000. The expenditure on the Navy is so large that the country may well expect to know, and to see clearly in every respect, how this vast sum is distributed, and especially how much goes to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract used to call the personnel of the Navy, and how much to the matériel. It is important to draw this distinction in order that the country may know how much money is really disposable for new ships, new armaments, new docks, and increase of stores, irrespective of the large sums which go into the pockets of our officers and seamen, because among all the many questions of doubt and controversy connected with the Navy Estimates, there are few persons who think that either our seamen or naval officers are overpaid. If, then, there is to be a reduction, it can hardly be made on Vote 1, for the wages of the men; but it must be made in regard to the number of the men employed. I do not think any reduction can be made in the pay of either seamen or officers. Therefore, it strikes me that the country will be interested to know how much of this total amount of £9,756,000 really goes into the pockets of the men. The amount is a large one. If you take not merely Vote 1, but also those Votes which deal with the half-pay and with the retirement of officers—for that must be considered as part of the cost of the personnel of the Navy—together with the wages and the sums allowed to the Reserves, you get the sum of £5,518,000 as the total given, directly or indirectly, as I shall presently show, to the personnel. That amount, £5,518,000, includes the wages, the victuals, and the clothing. I will now show how I arrive at the figures. Vote 1, exclusively for wages, gives £2,693,000. Then there is for the wages of Coastguard on shore and Reserve, £130,000; half-pay Votes, exclusive of half-pay of civil officers, £1,460,000; therefore, the actual amount of pay, pensions, and retiring allowances, is £4,283,000. For clothing and victuals, £1,040,000; victualling establishments, £70,000; medical establishments, £125,000. These sums give a total of £5,518,000. Taken as a whole, I submit that these figures represent the cost of the personnel of our Navy, excluding entirely the administration, the pay of all the civil servants connected with the Admiralty and the expenses of the Admiralty itself. I will proceed to give the figures which represent the shipping and matériel. First, there is Vote 6 for the Dockyards, £967,000, to which I must add about £200,000—a sum representing pensions and retiring allowances to officers and artificers connected with the dockyards. Then there is £751,000, for steam-engines, and ships building by contract, under Section 2 of Vote 10; and £837,000 for naval stores under Section 1 of the same Vote. To that I should also add a sum of £765,000 for the extension of the dockyards. The total, therefore, under this head is £3,520,000, as the cost of our shipbuilding and dockyards, including £765,000 for the extension of our dockyards, which latter sum, although a heavy liability, cannot be regarded as a permanent charge, although we shall still have heavy liabilities on that score. Under Vote 11, or the Works Vote, as it is usually called, there is naturally a large sum annually set aside for new works, buildings, machinery, and repairs, and I have stated that this year it amounts to £765,000. I now come to what may be called the miscellaneous charges of administration. For the Admiralty Office, £163,000; administrative expenses of the Coastguard, £48,000; scientific branch, £67,000; miscellaneous services, £144,000; the conveyance of troops, £173,000; retiring pensions not hitherto included, £112,000. Therefore, in round numbers, we ask for £5,500,000 for officers and salaries, and £3,500,000 for shipbuilding and dockyards; while about £700,000 represents the miscellaneous expenditure of the Navy. I think it most important to separate these matters, so that when the public see a sum of upwards of £9,000,000 they may know how much really represents the emoluments of the men, and how much the expenses of the construction of ships and administrative and miscellaneous charges. Now, Sir, as I have already remarked, we ask for £9,756,000, which I regret to say is £385,000 in excess of the Vote of last year. What is the position of this sum as compared with the Estimates in previous years? The Navy Estimates were in 1866–7, £10,434,000; in 1867–8, £10,976,000; in 1868–9, £11,157,000; and in 1870–1, £9,370,000; when my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract was responsible for the Estimates. I quote these figures to show that, although we have the misfortune to be obliged to ask the House for more money than the Vote of last year, yet the Estimates are the lowest that have been presented since 1866, excepting those of last year. It will, of course, be the duty of the Government to justify thoroughly this increase of the Estimates by putting the figures side by side with those of former years, in order that the Committee may appreciate the amount of the increase. There may be some who prefer high Estimates, and we are continually being told that we ought to spend more; but I think, notwithstanding all that has been said, that the Government is bound to show good cause why there should be any increase of the Estimates. It was said when my right hon. Friend came into office, "It is easy to make low Estimates, but it is not so easy to keep to them." Have the Estimates been accurately framed by my right hon. Friend? In 1867–8, when the Estimates were £10,976,000, there was a deficiency of £336,000. In 1868–9, when my right hon. Friend came into office, and when, owing to the substitution of one Ministry for another in the course of the year, there was a divided responsibility, the Estimates were £11,157,000—there was not a deficiency but a surplus of £100,000, exclusive of the Abyssinian Expedition, the items of which I have not regarded in this comparison. In 1869–70, when the Estimates had been reduced by £1,200,000, there was a surplus of £200,000. That is the last year of which we have the complete accounts, but with regard to the year 1870–1, I think I may say there has been no miscalculation whatever at the Admiralty, and that the Expenditure has been lower than the Estimates. By "surplus" and "deficiency" I mean the difference between the Estimates and the Expenditure. Those figures will show whether the Estimates have been made aright; because it is easy to ask only for a limited sum, and then to exceed it in our expenditure. I have now made a comparison of the Estimates as regards money. As regards men—including boys and Marines—the figures are as follow:—In 1868–9, 67,000 men were asked for; in 1869–70, the number 63,300; and in 1870–1 it was 61,000; and the number we ask for is precisely the same this year. Before I proceed to analyze the Esti- mates of the present year it may be convenient that I should briefly state the result—upon the Estimates of last year—of the Vote of Credit which was given in August last, when it will be remembered that in consequence of the outbreak of hostilities the Government asked for a Vote of Credit of £2,000,000, of which the sum of £600,000 was asked for and used for the fleet. The employment of a sum of money such as that affords a test of the condition of the Navy, for the uses to which the money was put will show whether there was any truth in the numerous allegations that our Navy was perfectly unprepared, and that there was no ship which was fit to be sent to sea. When a war arises every country in Europe puts its Army and Navy upon a war footing, and asks for more money, and, therefore, the fact of our asking for that sum is not in itself a proof of the want of preparation. I will state to the Committee what was done with that £600,000. There was spent for victuals and clothing, £39,000; wages of artificers in dockyards, £98,000; naval materials and stores, £150,000; steam engines and ships built under contract, £230,000; dockyard extension, £92,000; and for the conveyance of troops, £2,000. I will now show the Committee the bearing of these figures. Why did we require to spend £39,000 for victuals and clothing? Was it because our stores had been too much reduced? £39,000 is a very small sum to take for stores if we had been unprepared. Was that sum spent on some of the essentials of the Navy? Was it found that our dockyards were so devoid of materials that when war broke out we were obliged to hurry to buy them? We spent £29,700 to increase the stock of provisions at Malta, Gibraltar, and Bermuda, and £7,000 to increase our store of salt pork at home. It may, however, be said that Malta, Gibraltar, and Bermuda were insufficiently provided, and I dwell on this point because so much has been said with regard to stores that I feel this to be an important point as regards our naval administration. There are two courses which the Admiralty might pursue—to have either large stores or moderate ones; but in hot climates large stores are subject to continual deterioration and waste. Are we to conceive that with our powerful Navy we should not, when war breaks out suddenly, be able to send out stores to those places which require a larger stock of provisions? The amount—£39,000—is not large, and it appears to me to be far better to spend that sum of money when the need arises than to accumulate large stores of food in hot climates, because you can obtain such stores at a moment's notice. It must not be assumed that we cannot lay our hands on these stores at any given moment, because if there is one circumstance which more than another makes this country stronger than others it is the great resources that we have at our command for producing large quantities of stores at the shortest notice. That £7,000 worth of salt pork was provided because the autumn was the most convenient time for obtaining it. There are proper times for laying in stores of all kinds, and it would be a wasteful policy not to observe common sense rules in that respect. The same remarks apply to clothing, and I think the general rule which ought to guide us in our administration is that we ought to provide large quantities of those articles which cannot be produced or manufactured at a short notice, and moderate, or small stores, of such things as can be readily obtained. I think the expenditure of £39,000 for stores does not prove that the Navy was unprepared. The next sum was £98,000 spent on the wages of artificers in dockyards, and I will take that in conjunction with the sum of £150,000 for naval stores, because those two sums represent the increased shipbuilding that was immediately resorted to. I may remark that nearly the whole of that £600,000 was employed to produce more ships, and for hastening towards completion the dockyard at Chatham, as we considered at the time that both courses were necessary, and I think they were natural courses for any Government to take in a time of danger. The sum of £230,000 was provided to hurry on the engines of ships that were already contracted for; to provide engines for those new ships which were commenced; and also for giving out several new contracts for ships. That brings me to a consideration of the class of ships that were put in hand. It was felt to be necessary to provide ships of small draught of water, and four ships such as are known as the Cyclops class were immediately put in hand. Another measure was taken which I am sure will be peculiarly satisfactory to the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Graves)—namely, six gunboats of the Staunch class were ordered, most of which, I am happy to say, are finished, and are at this moment ready for sea. With regard to this Vote of £2,000,000, I have only one thing further to say, and that is that £90,000 was taken for "extension of dockyards," especially at Chatham. The whole of that amount has not been utilized, but only one-half. I am happy to say that two large docks, and a very large basin, will, I believe, in a few months' time be available at Chatham. The whole of these works have been conducted in a most economical manner, and are in a very forward state. And on that question of docks I wish to remark that those gentlemen who are continually croaking as to the state in which this country is, compared with others, do not appear to be aware of the enormous advantages we have in our large dockyards. It is difficult on these occasions to steer clear of two dangers—the being too reticent on the one hand, and the saying anything as to the possible aggressive intention of any foreign Power on the other. But I may say this, that if I look to the Powers from whom aggression might possibly come, I do not see that their dockyards are in such a position that they would be able suddenly to produce fleets which would sweep down upon us, and render necessary the enormous extension of our naval power. At this moment one of our greatest naval competitors is, unfortunately—and I say that most sincerely—in such a position that, as regards our great fighting fleet, we, relatively speaking, cannot be said to have been stronger at any previous time. What is maritime power? We do not wish, I suppose, to have an ideal fleet; we do not wish to say what number of first-class ships we ought to have in the abstract. What we want to know is what our power ought to be in order to meet any combination of Powers against us which may be considered possible or probable. I do not think it is possible for us to go too far in insisting upon absolute security. I am quite confident that the commercial classes of this country would support the Government in any expenditure which they think really necessary to secure not only immunity from attack, but that confidence which the country ought to possess. The confidence of the country would be much greater if there were not hon. Members, writers in newspapers, and professional croakers, who are continually bringing out exaggerated statements as to defects in our ships which do not exist, and who are endeavouring to frighten the country by making out that the ships of all other nations are perfect, and that ours must necessarily be imperfect. Foreign Powers think otherwise, and they take exceeding care to secure all the designs we invent. And now I will ask the House to consider these Estimates which I am introducing. There is a net increase of £385,000. There is an increase in the victualling and clothing of £70,000; for dockyards, wages to artificers, £90,000; for naval stores and other materials, £60,000; for steam engines and ships built by contract, £285,000; for works, £20,000; for pensions and allowances, £25,000; making a total of £550,000. On the other hand there are reductions in three Votes—in the transport of troops, £64,000; in the half-pay Vote, £73,000; and in various miscellaneous Votes, £29,000; making a total reduction of £166,000. That amount of reductions being taken from £550,000, the amount of increase, leaves a balance of £384,000 against the present year. I wish, in the first instance, to deal with the question of the reductions in several Votes. The most important, perhaps, is that in conveyance of troops—namely, £64,000. That item, I am happy to say, is one of those, which for some time past have been showing a decrease. In 1867–8 this item for the conveyance of troops was £406,000; in 1868–9 it was £350,000; in 1869–70, £316,000; in 1870–1, £237,000; and in 1871, £173,000. The Committee observes that this Vote has gone down from £406,000 in five years to £173,000. I think that reduction of expenditure is the more gratifying as this item of charge represents sheer waste—I mean we get nothing for our money, and it does not increase our power. It is the mere shipping of troops to and fro. To what is this great decrease due? It is due partly, no doubt, to improved administration, and in the last year great good has resulted from an improvement introduced as regards the hiring of ships. The matter has been treated commercially. Brokers have been employed to get the best ships at the cheapest price they can, and I am assured that the result has been a reduction of 20 per cent in the expense of the ships, and a reduction also in the cost of coal. But the reduction on the Vote has been mainly due to a circumstance connected with policy. If you keep fewer troops in your Colonies, you will have fewer to move to and fro. The general policy pursued in this respect has lightened the Navy Estimates by the sum of £250,000; and while some of the items in which our expenditure has been increased are mere temporary matters, this item of decrease is of a permanent character. Then there is a decrease on half-pay; but that is only apparent, arising from the fact that we took credit last year for £120,000 more than was spent in that item. That larger sum was taken to give the opportunity to officers of being paid monthly instead of quarterly; but few, if any, officers availed themselves of that opportunity. I come now to the least satisfactory point—namely, the question of increase. Before I proceed with the question of increase in the Votes, which increase is mainly in the Shipbuilding Vote, I wish to say a word on the Vote for Victualling and Clothing, in which there is an increase of £70,000. Last year was a singularly favoured year in this respect—that the stores were large enough to enable the Admiralty to take so much less money for victuals and clothes. This remark applies to clothes rather than provisions. There are articles of which you need not keep a large store. Discovery was made that some of the stores deteriorated by keeping, and, therefore, it was determined, to allow the amount of those stores to drop instead of replacing the outgoings by an equal amount of purchases. Last year, therefore, was a very fortunate one as regards clothing, inasmuch as it was unnecessary to buy more, the existing stores having been utilized. Such a process, however, cannot go on for long, and this year we have returned nearer to our normal state, and we are obliged to ask for an increase in Vote 2, for the purpose of buying clothes, that increase, however, not rendering the Vote larger than it was in previous years, with the exception of last year. I was anxious to ascertain what was the comparative cost under this head in previous years as compared with what it will be in the present year. If the amount of the Vote be divided by the number of seamen, it will be found that the cost per head for expenditure incurred under this head was, in 1868–9, £19 18s.; in 1869–70 £18 10s., and that it will be only £17 in the present financial year. The calculation by which these figures have been arrived at is an exceedingly rough one; but the results obtained by it are sufficiently accurate to serve us as a guide in comparing the amount of the present Vote with that of those of former years. I need not detain the Committee with reference to any increase in the smaller figures, such as that in the sum asked for the extension of dockyards, and £20,000 for further machinery in those yards, and, therefore, I will proceed at once to the great elements in the Navy Estimates—namely, the cost of the men, the classes of the men, and the classes of the ships. We have to deal with four great subjects—namely, men, ships, guns, and dockyards. In reference to the number of men, I may state, in the first place, that we have asked for the same number of men for the present year as were taken last year, and the question arises upon this point whether it was our duty to ask for more than we have done. In discussing this question, we must not forget that, although our vessels are infinitely larger and more powerful, yet they require considerably less complements of men to work them than the old style of ships. Every one of these new turret-ships have a very small crew compared with their enormous fighting power. I should be the last to suggest that we should take a single man less that was necessary for the proper defence of this country, or for the adequate manning of the ships; but I can prove that, even as compared with that of former years, the number is satisfactory. Looking at the composition of the 61,000 men we now ask for, it will be seen that a very large number of them are not blue-jackets, who, indeed, only number 18,000 or 19,000 of the whole. The total number of men asked for is composed of the following classes:—Officers, 5,314; blue-jackets, 18,900; artificers, 2,600; stokers, 3,800; non-seamen class and servants, 3,600; and Kroomen, 286—making a total of 34,500 men who may be said to belong to the fleet proper. Then there are 4,300 Coastguards ashore, 4,000 boys for service, 3,000 boys in training, and 1,200 men in Indian troop-ships. Lastly, there are 14,000 Marines—making a grand total of 61,000 men and boys. But then we have to ask ourselves this question—if the Government thinks that the country requires this number of men, can it get them; and, if so, how can it get them? The number at present borne on the books is 60,573, and I regret to say that the difference between the number of the force voted, and the number borne on the books is not inconsiderable, there being a deficiency of 500 blue-jackets. I admit that that is a deplorable circumstance, and the more so when it is known that that deficiency is due, in part, to the loss of the Captain. There were, I deeply regret to say, more than 300 blue-jackets lost in that vessel. The men so lost have not hitherto been replaced. It is certainly a curious fact, the cause of which I do not wish to discuss at the present moment, that it is difficult in times of peace to induce a large number of blue-jackets to enter the service from the shore. I will frankly state to the Committee that since September last it has been wished to secure an additional 400 or 500 blue-jackets for the Navy, but that we have only succeeded in obtaining 50 out of that number from the shore. That is a very serious fact. We are to a certain extent, however, independent of the usual sources for obtaining blue-jackets from which the mercantile marine obtains its seamen. That is due to the circumstance that we recruit the Navy on a system which, I am informed, is a very successful one—namely, that of training our own blue-jackets in the schools. The Committee will notice that we ask in this Vote for 7,000 boys. These represent our future blue-jackets; and the real problem that the Admiralty and the Government have to solve is whether that number of boys is sufficient to supply the wear and tear, and the loss from desertions and discharge of our blue-jackets, or whether they should ask for an additional 500 boys in order to keep up the proper supply. What the Government propose to do, therefore, is not to attempt, at present, to obtain the number of blue-jackets in which the Navy is deficient from the shore, but to increase the number of boys in training. It is, doubt- less, a somewhat costly thing to train a large number of boys, more than half of whom are of no present use, but I am assured by those who are competent judges that the seamen from this source are very superior to those whom we could obtain elsewhere. I may also add that the seamen so obtained, are, as a rule, highly educated. They not only read and write, but they receive much excellent training, which fits them to become seamen-gunners, which is a most important matter. The possession of this large nucleus of trained men and seamen-gunners is a matter to which the country may justly attach the greatest importance. The next questions to which I wish to call the attention of the Committee in connection with this point are—where are the men? are they at home, and can we lay our hands easily upon them? and what is our present force as compared with the force we used to maintain, for the defence of our coasts and our position at home? On all these points I may say our position is satisfactory. The Committee may recollect that we had 67,000 men some years ago, and that therefore we are now asking for 6,000 less than we then had, but have we that number less for the protection of our coasts? The Committee will not forget the interesting statement made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) as to the reduction effected in our ordinary squadrons, and the substitution for them of flying squadrons—a change that, in the opinion of officers whose opinions are entitled to the greatest weight, has been followed by the most excellent results. This reduction has been rendered possible not only by the fact that our ships are so much more powerful, but by the policy which the Government initiated two years ago of reducing our foreign squadrons. I may state that, having been in some of the Transatlantic republics myself, I found that the occasional visits of single men-of-war belonging to America were much more feared than was the continual presence of powerful squadrons belonging to other nations. Those Republics looked not to the force of the squadrons, but to the despatches which the Admiral had in his pocket. If they thought the commander of a single man-of-war was not likely to be very scrupulous in carrying his point, he was dreaded far more than the Admirals of squadrons, whose instructions were known to be of a pacific character. I do not think that the fact of our having fewer men in those distant regions can be cited as a proof of the diminution of our power, considering the increased strength of our men-of-war sea-going ships, and considering also the mode in which the men withdrawn from distant stations can be utilized at home. I would state for the information of the Committee the following facts:—There are now, or there were on the 1st of March, in our ships on foreign stations, 14,840 men and boys. On the 1st of December, 1868, before this policy had been inaugurated, the number was 19,153. Therefore there has been a diminution in our foreign squadrons of upwards of 4,000. But if I take the detached squadrons, the Channel squadron, the home ports, particular service, survey ships, and ships ordered home, the number is now 16,596, as against 17,898 in 1868, showing a diminution of 1,000. It will be apparent, therefore, to the Committee that this diminution in our number of men is accounted for by the reduction of our squadrons abroad, but that we are as powerful at home as we ever were. And let me say one thing about the character of the men who are at our disposal. Nearly the whole of our blue-jackets—in fact, 17,500 men out of the 18,000—are continuous service men; and we cannot lose them except by casualties or desertion. The terms on which we have engaged them, they having entered as boys and being bound to render continuous service, obviate the danger that would otherwise exist of our losing the blue-jackets we have. The Committee, therefore, need be under no apprehension lest, through any sudden cause, we should be deprived of any number of these men. Another circumstance worthy of notice is that of the entire 18,000 blue-jackets no fewer than 8,000 are seamen-gunners or men trained at the guns. I think that is a most satisfactory state of things. It takes a great deal more time to produce a seaman-gunner than any other class of seaman; and it is exceedingly difficult, as I am told, for foreign countries to compete with us in that respect. Such, then, is our condition in respect to men; slightly unsatisfactory as regards the number of our blue-jackets, very satisfactory as regards the quality of the men whom we have got, and the service we may expect from them; and satisfactory also, I hope, in the circumstance that they are stationed at places where we can readily command their services when they are required. The Reserves in the home ports, I believe, were never stronger than they are at this moment. And this leads me to the general subject of our Reserve and auxiliary naval forces, a matter which naturally excites considerable attention. Of the Coastguard on shore we have 4,300 men; then there are the Royal Naval Volunteers—a small force of 2,000, to which it is unnecessary to allude; then there is the Royal Naval Reserve, amounting to 14,000 men; and there are also the Seamen and Marine Pensioners to whom my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract alluded in his speech last year. As regards the Coastguard, I may mention that more stringent regulations have been made than were ever before adopted in reference to that force. They are entered now straight from the Navy, and every effort is made to eliminate from the Coastguard every element that is not purely naval. The men come, as I have said, straight from the Navy; and if there has been a break beyond a certain time in their sea service they are not allowed to go into the Coastguard at all, the object being to secure that every Coast-guardsman shall really be a seaman available at once for the Reserve in case of emergency. The Committee may remember that my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract introduced the system—and a most excellent system, as it appears to me—of sending the Coastguard to sea in alternate years, in order to accustom them to the service. I am informed that heretofore in the Coastguard there had been a large number of civilians, but that civilian element has also been gradually withdrawn; and not only are the Coastguard seamen, but I believe the preference is given to seamen-gunners and trained men. Of this Coastguard force 75 per cent are either seamen-gunners or trained men. Thus we have a nucleus of artillery which appears to me to be exceedingly valuable. As regards the second force—namely, the Royal Naval Reserve—if its numbers are not satisfactory, it must be remembered that the policy has been adopted of endeavouring to secure a force possessing the highest efficiency rather than a large body of men who would be of little use when their services were called for. I will read to the Committee one or two of the changes which have been made in the constitution of this force upon the recommendation of the Committee of 1870. Previous to 1870, men were examined and passed by any officer in the Coastguard, and by a chief boatman in charge. Now they have to be examined by a commander and surgeon on board one of the First Reserve ships. Again, candidates used to be eligible who had served five years at sea within the previous 10 years. Now they must have served at sea within the last six months; and if they permanently quit the sea service they become ineligible for the Reserve. Again, a large number of men—upwards of 4,000—were formerly drilled at the shore batteries, where they could not be efficiently trained. Now, some of these batteries have been closed, and the men are sent to the First Reserve ships, and drill ships for practice, their travelling expenses being paid. It is obvious that these regulations may diminish the number of men by excluding many possible candidates; but, surely, to have men in your ships on whose efficiency you can thoroughly rely, is much better than having on paper a greater force on which you cannot depend in time of need. Then, one word as respects a new force to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract referred in his speech last year—the Seamen and Marine Pensioners. These men are liable to be called out in case of war in the same way as the Army Pensioners; but it would be of comparatively little use calling them out if they had become entirely unaccustomed to the sea. It has, therefore, been thought advisable to offer them a small pecuniary inducement to come to drill for a certain time every year. An inspection has also been made of the whole of the Pensioners to ascertain what number of them were fit for sea service, and it was found that 6,000 Seamen and Marine Pensioners were in that condition. The regulations have been only very lately issued, in consequence of its having been a question whether the Marines should become Army Pensioners or form a Reserve for the fleet. I ought, perhaps, to allude to the second class of Naval Reserve, which was mentioned last year by my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract. The proposal that the men of that force should go to sea instead of being trained in the usual drill ships has proved to be unpopular, and the numbers who have entered are insignificant. It has been suggested that the matter should be re-considered as to whether those who enter the First Reserve ought not previously to pass through the Second Naval Reserve. I now pass from the question of the men and Reserves, and come to a subject which is possibly more interesting—namely, the ships. And in the first place, I wish to state to the Committee what was done under that head last year. The Committee will remember that we are asking for an excess upon shipbuilding—namely, £90,000 on Vote 6; £60,000 on Vote 10, Section 1; and £285,000 on Vote 10, Section 2; making a total increase of £435,000. I must state that the ships which have been finished in the course of the year 1870–1 are the iron-clads Vanguard, Iron Duke, the Sultan, and the Glatton. Then the Swiftsure and the Triumph, also iron-clads, were nearly completed. The Glatton is a turret-ship. In the class of "rams" the Hotspur is nearly complete for sea. Of corvettes the Druid, and of sloops the Tenedos are nearly ready for sea; while of gunboats the Plucky and four others of the same class (Snakes) are practically completed. Of despatch-vessels we have the Lively and the Vigilant nearly completed. The addition to the Navy accomplished in 1870–1, therefore, was one ram, the Hotspur; five powerful iron-clads besides the Glatton; one corvette, one sloop, seven gunboats, and two despatch-vessels; and progress was made in 1870–1 with one ram, the Rupert; two large turret-ships, the Devastation and the Thunderer; four smaller monitors, the Cyclops and three sister ships; two frigates, the Raleigh and the Blonde; one corvette, the Thetis; one large gun-vessel, the Woodlark; six gunboats of 245 tons; one large gunboat of 295 tons, the Coquette. I submit that this is not at all a bad programme, and that we shall be at the end of the year infinitely more powerful than we were at the beginning; but the House may ask how it is, if so much progress has been made in shipbuilding, that we ask for an in- creased grant of £425,000. The increase of last year was partly due to the fact that the gunboats and monitors were ordered under the Vote of Credit, and the circumstances of the war have impressed the public and the Government with the fact that it is advisable to build vessels for coast defence and coast attack rather than push on so much with the large iron-clad fighting ships, so that we may have a fleet capable of offensive operations in shallow water, as well as of protecting our merchantmen on any part of the ocean. The possibility of Russia coming down the Baltic to attack us has been suggested to-night; but although I do not believe any of the Russian fleet could pass our iron-clads, I agree that every precaution should be taken to meet every contingency that may arise, and that we should not only be able to put a strong fighting force in the Baltic Sea and the Channel, but be ready to meet other combinations which recent events may have made possible. For the defence of our own coasts, therefore, and the attack of the enemy's, the Admiralty have contracted for the construction of four new turret-ships of the Monitor class, designed as sea-going ships. The hon. and gallant Admiral, in the course of his remarks, alluded to a Report made on the Cyclops, and the other three ships of that class. [Sir JOHN HAY: I alluded to a rumour, not a Report.] A Report is sometimes called a rumour; but some of the information which the hon. and gallant Admiral has obtained—especially in reference to a particular wave—so closely resembles the actual Report, which was placed on my Table only two or three days ago, even as regards the words used, that I presume the rumour must be traceable almost to the fountain head. I have stated what was done last year, and I now come to the programme for this year. We purpose building a total of 22,210 tons, of which 15,512 tons will be built in our own dockyards, and 6,698 by contract. 4,747 tons will consist of large iron-clads now in hand; but we do not intend to lay down any new broadside iron-clads this year; 3,907 tons will consist of unarmoured frigates; 2,846 of unarmoured corvettes and sloops; and 4,012 of gun-vessels and gunboats and miscellaneous vessels. The ironclads now in hand are the Thunderer, the Devastation, the Fury, and the Rupert. The Devastation is to be completely finished, the Thunderer to be nearly finished, the Fury, as the gallant Admiral was perfectly well-informed, is to to suspended for the present, and until reported on; the Rupert is to be finished. This makes up the total 4,747 tons. The unarmoured frigates now in hand are the Blonde and the Raleigh. Of the Blonde 1,750 tons are to be built, completing her to about one-half; and of the Raleigh 2,150 tons, leaving 650 tons. We do not intend to lay down any new frigates in this year. Of the unarmoured corvettes and sloops we purpose building 496 tons of the Thetis, which will complete her, and to build three new vessels of the Blanche class, about two-thirds of each, making 2,350 tons, and a total of 2,846 tons for this class. Of gun-vessels and gunboats, we purpose building 463 tons each of four new Kestrels, also called Boxers, composite twin-screw gun-vessels, making 1,852 tons. Of the Coquette class, the Coquette itself to be completed 54 tons, and six new Coquettes to be built and completed 295 tons each, making 1,844 tons. The total gunboats and gun-vessels is 3,696 tons, and of the miscellaneous 316, making 4,012 tons. The total tonnage proposed to be built under contract is 6,698 tons, and comprises the completion of the Triumph and the Swiftsure, which are nearly ready, the Cyclops and sister ships to be completed to about ⅞, making 5,002 tons; ¼ each of two iron corvettes of the Blanche type, making 532 tons; two gun-vessels of the Kestrel type to be advanced to about ⅖; and two Snakes, to be completed to about ½, making a total of 1,164 tons. We have therefore projected of quite new ships, unarmoured, six Coquettes, 1,800 tons; three composite gunboats (Kestrels), 1,395 tons; and parts of three Blanches, 750 tons each, making a total of 5,452 tons. It is our desire to make all the progress in our power with the three classes of gunboats which are considered specially useful. Therefore our practice is practically in accord with that of the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Graves), except that we do not think it necessary to order 50 gunboats at a time. The Committee will remember that these gunboats can be produced much quicker than the large ships, which take one, one and a-half, or even two years to build. If any of those Powers of whom we appear now more especially to be afraid were to design attacking us, they could not obtain these gunboats quicker than we could produce them, for our docks are larger, and we have coal and iron, and everything necessary to produce these ships. Certainly unexpected events do occur, but I do not think it possible that any combination of Powers could venture to attack us without our receiving warning of their intention. Now, the Committee must remember that we practically require three classes of ships. We require the large fighting ships to maintain our supremacy at sea. In these, I believe, we are exceedingly strong. One or two rams, with all the known improvements in shipping, will add considerably to our power in that respect, but it does not appear necessary to go further in that direction at present. We should concentrate our efforts upon the rapid corvettes, and upon those gunboats to which I have so often alluded, and in so doing we should, I believe, be best consulting the interests of the country. Now, let me allude for one moment to the Committee which has been mentioned by the hon. and gallant Admiral opposite (Sir John Hay.) After the deplorable loss of the Captain, and looking at the experiments which were being made in shipping, my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract thought it desirable that, besides his own professional advisers, eminent as they were, and who had already, from time to time, given their opinion on the experiments in question, to intrust the task of considering the scientific questions and problems which had arisen, and the connection between them and shipbuilding, to a Committee composed partly of naval men and partly of men eminent in science. Lord Dufferin is the Chairman of that Committee, and the naval element is represented by Admirals George Elliot, Ryder, Hornby, and Houston Stewart, Captain Goodenough, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pasley. The scientific element is represented by Sir William Thomson, Professor Rankin, Mr. Lloyd, formerly Chief Engineer to the Admiralty; Mr. Bidder, Mr. Rendell, and Mr. Froude, Civil Engineers; Dr. Woolley, and Mr. Denny. The Committee will perceive from these names that every effort was made to secure the services of men eminently qualified for dealing both with scientific and practical problems. Cer- tain special designs were referred to this Committee, and upon some of these they have already reported. Now, I confess it struck me as questionable how far it would be wise to publish the materials collected by this Committee. I thought it a matter of some importance; and, viewing the publicity which everything obtains in this country, I thought it a matter that required consideration. However, I unfortunately feel no longer able to delay a decision upon the subject; and as the hon. and gallant Admiral opposite has alluded to a rumour which tends to the prejudice of the ships now building, I must quote some passages from the Report and lay it upon the Table. Now, the Committee state that—

"They are of opinion that, whether completed as originally designed, or with the superstructure subsequently suggested by the Constructors' Department, the Devastation will prove a formidable and efficient warship, a safe and stable vessel, and a valuable addition to Her Majesty's Navy."

Again, they say—

"The question of her stability, even under conditions of wind and sea far more unfavourable than any she is likely to encounter, has been carefnlly examined by the scientific members of the Committee."

Then the Committee proceed to suggest several alterations in detail, and the sub-Committee add—

"The sub-committee conclude that ships of the Devastation class have stability amply sufficient to make them safe against the rolling or heaving action of the waves."

observed that his remark in the earlier portion of the evening had reference to the Cyclops, and not to the Devastation class.

With reference to the Cyclops class, the sub-Committee reported—

"The general principles of the stability of this class of unmasted ships of low-freeboard are the same as the Devastation class."

I submit, therefore, that the Report, and the scientific data on which it is based, are eminently satisfactory with regard to these vessels. The Cyclops and her sister ships have been built specially with a view of being used near home and in the Channel for fighting purposes, and not as cruisers. But the statements made by this Committee amply justify the construction of these ships, and, in fact, compliment the design. I trust that good may come out of these controver- sies, and that the scientific opinions elicited may be made available in guiding us for the future. It seems to me, as one understanding, I confess, very little of these matters, that it may be found an impossible problem to combine first-rate fighting with first-rate sea-going qualities, and that it may be necessary for us to have ships constructed, some for one purpose and some for another. But the question of stability is one of such enormous importance that I am glad the right hon. Member for Pontefract has brought together a Committee to elicit opinions on this subject. If the Committee were to find that our ships were unsafe, and to decide against any of these designs, I am quite sure the House of Commons would deem it right that all the money should be considered as wasted rather than we should use ships which were likely to endanger the lives of our sailors. If that were to be the result, we should consider it our duty at once to eject the design without regard to the money which it cost, and to set about building a better class of ships. But the Committee will not fail to notice how, what is regarded as the best ship which can be built at one period, is before long condemned as inferior to some other of more modern design. We must look, therefore, not only to the present but to the future in determining how we can best arrange the various classes of our ships. We consider it our duty to make progress with some of our great fighting ships, to increase the number of our cruisers, and especially to make progress with our gunboats. I have dealt with the questions of men and ships, and I come now to the third point—that of guns. The guns do not appear upon these Estimates, it is true; but it will be interesting to the Committee to know how far we are prepared with guns for the ships which we are building. I am able to submit to the Committee a statement to show exactly how we stand upon the subject of guns, and it is advisable to say something upon this, as I have seen it stated in newspapers that we are very ill provided with guns for our big ships. The total number of guns available for the naval service is 1,901; the total number requisite to complete the armament of every ship built or building, which is retained for sea service, is 1,876; we have, therefore, an excess upon the total number of guns. But it may be said, perhaps, that the excess is in guns of an inferior class; it will, therefore, be necessary to examine the list a little more in detail. The vessels of the Devastation and Thunderer class will carry 35-ton guns, which are believed to be more powerful than those at the disposal of any foreign Power; 12 of these guns in all will be required, and provision having been made for them in the Army Estimates, they will be ready in the course of the year. Of the 25-ton guns 7 only are wanted, and 9 are already in store. Of the 18-ton guns 44 are wanted, and 32 are already in store; these will be required for gunboats of the Snake class, which vessels will require 1 each. There are 140 of the 12-ton guns wanted, and 150 are now in store; 115 9-ton guns are wanted, and we have 131. Then of the 6½-ton guns we require 529, and have 566; and of 64-pounders we need 1,005, and 1,000 are actually in store. Thus, with the exception of the very heaviest guns, we have a supply ample for arming the whole of our vessels with the best weapons of the day. But, of course, it would not be considered wise or prudent to depend on the actual numbers of guns; a reserve must be provided to meet casualties, and in the Army Estimates sufficient money is taken to provide these additional guns, amounting to about one-eighth of the original number. In that case 213 guns would still be necessary to be provided, and the whole of these additional guns will be provided before the end of the year. The House of Commons, therefore, and the country may rest assured that we are, in this respect, in a satisfactory position. For the purposes of docks, a slight increase of money is taken; but it is satisfactory to be able to state that great progress has been made at Chatham; the major portion of the works have now been completed, and the country will before long be in possession at this point of two first-class docks of 20 acres each, and before the end of the year of a noble basin of water, leaving only one to be added; the whole of which will be constructed by convict labour. The amount of the Vote for the extension of dockyards will, in consequence, be reduced in future years; but this year the diminution in the Vote as regards Chatham has been compensated by increased expenditure elsewhere. I have now come to the end of the long story with which it has been necessary for me to trouble the Committee, and I cannot adequately express the strong sense which I entertain of the responsibilities attaching to the great questions with which, at a moment's notice, I have been called on to deal. But I can assure the Committee that I have approached the consideration of these questions with an unbiassed mind, and that if the Committee should manifest a decided opinion that any one design is preferable to another, or that any change in the policy of the Government upon these matters is desirable, such opinions will be received by the Government with great deference, and with every desire to weigh them in the most favourable spirit. I cannot conclude without expressing my hope that there may be as little party difference or professional difference in these matters as possible; for while we desire to be strong in men, in ships, in guns, and in docks, we must look also to be strong in the professional feeling of the Navy. And it would be a source of great regret if there should be anything like a conflict of opinion between the Navy and this House. Every member of the Navy, be he officer or seaman, ought to be aware, and must be aware, that the disposition of this House is to be generous in its treatment towards them. If the House at times is economically disposed, it is never as regards the men, but as regards the administrative expenditure and the outlay on the building of ships; it is when the House fears that there is an expenditure of money without adequate results. It is essential to our security and our strength that there should be that sympathy of feeling between the naval profession and this House which I, for one, desire to see established and maintained. I believe that we are really strong, and that many of those persons who are continually saying that they apprehend danger, are exaggerating even in their own eyes, and that they do so rather to strengthen their demand for improvement than because they believe that there is really any cause for panic. If there were any cause for panic, I repeat the observation which I made at the beginning of my remarks, that the security of the country is the paramount consideration, before which all others must yield. But I believe we are at this moment strong enough to maintain our own, to protect our coasts, and to keep our shores inviolable. I beg, Sir, to move that a sum not exceeding £2,693,336 be granted to Her Majesty to defray the charges for seamen and marines.

Mr. Dodson—I regret extremely that the absence of my right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry), who is suffering from a severe cold, and of the noble Lord the Member for Chichcster (Lord Henry Lennox), who is suffering from a similar calamity, has rendered it necessary for me to address the Committee on this occasion. It is advantageous on all occasions that the Committee should receive at the hands of those who have had any experience of the business of the Department some comments on the subject; and as I had the honour of being a Member of the Board of Admiralty, from 1866 to 1868, I trust the Committee will afford me their kind indulgence whilst I address a few remarks to them on the subject of the Navy Estimates which have just been explained to the Committee. I would desire to compliment the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty upon the statement which he has made to the Committee, and I can assure him that, in my opinion, the Navy has lost nothing by the recent change in the person at its head. I wish to approach this subject, as the right hon. Gentleman has suggested at the conclusion of his speech, with a desire not to allow the Navy to degenerate into an affair of party. I desire to criticize the statement which he has made, and the Estimates which he has submitted, without reference to anything but their bearing on the national strength and the national honour. There are three or four points which have been incidentally alluded to with reference to the Navy which I am about to avoid dwelling upon at present; because, according to the Notice Paper, the subjects will more properly form the subject of separate discussion—I mean with regard to the change in the Board of Admiralty caused by the dismissal of Sir Spencer Robinson; and also with regard to the very serious national calamity, the loss of Her Majesty's ship the Captain; and with regard to the question of ordnance, which, on this occasion, has been introduced by the First Lord. The first sub- ject which I should like to comment on is the number of men. The right hon. Gentleman will understand that, looking to the fact that he has just come into office, no personal blame can attach to him with regard to any deficiency in the present Estimates. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman in the opinion which he has expressed with regard to the character of our seamen; but I also concur with the right hon. Gentleman in the remark which he made when he said they were singularly few—[A laugh]—I mean with regard to the number now on our books, as well as with regard to those who are available for the service of the country. Owing to reductions which have taken place in the last two years—I speak of the seamen and boys—the reduction in the Navy has been 4,077; and these men having been discharged, we now find that only 70 seamen could be obtained during the autumn, when it was desirable to increase the number of men. The Vote for 1868–9, excluding Marines, was 52,070; but my right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone discharged certain pensioners and ship-keepers, reducing the Vote for 1869–70, if it had been proposed by us, to 51,077. The Estimate, however, of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) was, in 1869–70 actually only 49,000, being a reduction of 2,077 below what we intended to propose, and in 1870–1 a further reduction of 2,000 men, leaving 47,000 for the Fleet, being the same as that now proposed. The total reduction since the Estimates of 1868–9 is 5,070; but of these, 993 were reduced by the Conservative Admiralty, making, as I have said, a reduction of 4,077 of the seamen classes by the present Government. Now, if we cannot obtain more than 70 seamen of 4,077 discharged, it seems to show that the reduction which then took place was not a prudent reduction; because the plan, as I understand it, about to be introduced into the Army with regard to the Army of Reserve is, as you train your men, to discharge them into the Reserves. It seems to me that it will be desirable that the boys, who have been trained at a great cost to the country, should not be discharged entirely from the Navy; but that they should be transferred either into the Naval Reserve or Coastguard, so that they might be made serviceable to the country in time of danger. And the question with regard to the Marines also is of considerable importance. The Marines were reduced 700 men by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract; but preparation for the reduction had already been made. The preparations for the reduction were nearly completed, because 566 were below the Vote when that Gentleman came into office; and the intention of my right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone was not to discharge the number of seamen in addition to reducing the Marines, but to give the Marines an opportunity of being more afloat, and so to make them as serviceable as they ought to be for the defence of the country. It was found that the Marines were not receiving that service afloat which was desirable and necessary to give them the requisite information and the requisite capacity for serving at sea. In addition to the great reduction of men which has already taken place, I find the Estimates placed upon the Table of the House show that not only are the Estimates reduced, but they are 951 men below the Vote. Now, 951 men is a very considerable number, and the number of seamen actually below the Vote is 747, for I find that there are 121 boys over the Vote who are included in the total. It may be said by the right hon. Gentleman that when the Member for Tyrone left office he left the seamen below the Vote; but he left them below the Vote with reference to the reductions which were then in contemplation. [Mr. GOSCHEN said the Vote had been increased 400 men.] I am very glad to hear that; but even excepting your 400 men, and deducting them from the 951, there are still 551 men below the Vote. I was merely alluding to that for this reason—that we may not be liable to the objection that we left the Vote also considerably below the number; but, as a matter of fact, it was only 24 below the number, for we left 1,583 below the Vote 1868–9—namely, 566 Marines in anticipation of the 700 to be reduced, and 993 ship-keepers and others, being 1,559, or only 24 below the number proposed to be voted had we remained in Office. Before I pass from the subject of men, I should like to allude to a point which has not been touched upon by the right hon. Gentleman, and it is one which gives great dissatisfaction to the Navy at present—and that is the total absence of promotion. Since the sudden alteration of promotion by the retirement scheme, which was discussed in this House last year, there has only been 1 flag officer promoted, 6 captains, 13 commanders, and 27 lieutenants; and there have been 71 cadets entered; whilst there are 415 sub-lieutenants, 357 midshipmen, and 205 naval cadets, being 977 officers in the lower ranks, waiting anxiously for promotion. Now, the proposal of retirement which was put forward was with the view of decreasing the list; but calculations which have been made will show that there is no improvement in reference to promotion, and that there is that dead-lock on promotion which throws a damper on the spirit of the profession. To obtain an effective and contented list of officers the country voted a large sum of money: in 1869, the Vote for retired officers was £700,166, and in 1871–2 £829,238—an increase of £129,072. I desire to call attention to that on behalf of the public interests as well as in the interests of the Navy, and to show what a difficult thing it is to manage in any profession promotion by selection, and to show also what a dangerous thing it is to have a retired list always increasing, and yet failing to give that just amount of promotion which is necessary to maintain a vigorous and contented service. There is a presumed decrease this year in that Vote of £72,862; but hon. Members will see that that is only dependent on the Supplementary Estimate of £120,000 of last year. The actual increase this year is £47,138. There is one other point which has not been alluded to by the right hon. Gentleman, and that is the supposed saving, under Vote 3, of the Admiralty Office. The Vote of the Admiralty Office has been, to a certain extent, reduced; but the civil pension list, bearing upon retirements, has been very largely increased, and the amount of saving to the country has not been such as will commend itself to the Committee. In the last year that the right hon. Member for Tyrone was at the Admiralty the decrease in the civil pension list was £3,448, and in 1870–1 the net increase is £28,749. In 1868–9 the civil pensions were £91,435, and in 1869–70, £87,987, being a decrease of £3,448; but, in 1870–1, we find them raised to £119,893, being an increase of £31,906. In 1871–2 they were £116,736, being a decrease of £3,157. The net increase by the present Government of the civil pension list in connection with the Admiralty Vote 3 has been £28,749; of this, £9,559 12s. 2d. is for the Admiralty Office alone, which we may compare thus under Vote 3–1869–70, decrease £13,660; 1870–1, decrease £13,442; being a total of £27,102. From this deduct increase, 1871–2, £4,131, we have the actual reduction claimed of £22,971; from this abate the civil pensions £9,560, and the excess expenditure, 1869–70, of £9,074, we have an actual saving of only £4,337. But against this supposed saving of about £4,000 a-year, it must be recollected that the strength of the Admiralty Office has now to be largely recruited from officers paid under Vote 1. I allude, among others, to the Director General of Naval Ordnance, as well as to the Chief of the Staff, to a Rear Admiral employed last year with the Coastguard, and to a Paymaster employed for clerical duty by the First Naval Lord. The salaries of these officers, and certain others, goes far to swallow up the presumed saving of £4,000 a-year by the changes at the Admiralty. The House must not, therefore, go away with the idea that a great saving is effected by the recent changes. I think, moreover, that this seeming reduction has not been obtained without great loss of efficiency. There is one Naval Lord of the Admiralty, for the proper administration of the Navy, less even than was considered necessary by Sir James Graham when the cold fit of economy was most aggravated; there is no Controller General of the Coastguard; there is no Chief Constructor; there is no Chief Engineer; there is no Storekeeper General; there is no Controller of Victualling—all these great officers have been placed upon the pension list, and they are enjoying unwillingly considerable pensions in idleness, instead of devoting their abilities to the great advantage of the country. While I am on that point, there is a question I should like to draw attention to, as the right hon. Gentleman had made no reference to it in his speech. I see in the Vote which is proposed that the First Lord of the Admiralty is no longer to reside on the premises. I believe that it is of great advantage to the service that the First Lord of the Admiralty should be on the spot. I do not think that any arrangements of certain departmental offices can compensate the country for the loss which it will sustain by having the First Lord of the Admiralty living at a distance; and I would urge very strongly on the Committee that they should not agree, without careful consideration, to make this important change. I may mention an old historical anecdote worth remembering. When Lord Nelson was returning from his famous chase of the French Fleet under Villenouve, he despatched a swift sailing ship, under Captain Bettesworth, to carry the news to the Admiralty. Lord Barham was awakened at 1 o'clock in the morning, and issued orders which resulted in Cape Ferrol and Trafalgar before 3 o'clock in the morning. The captain of the Curieux was travelling back to his ship with these orders in an hour from his arrival; and England was saved from invasion by the presence on the spot of Lord Barham the First Lord of the Admiralty. The recent arrangements of telegraphs, and other rapid means of communication, make it absolutely requisite that the First Lord should be on the spot to receive and decide on the movements of the Fleet. I must, before leaving this subject, call the attention of the right hon. Gentleman to the fact that none of these changes in the Admiralty Office have increased the efficiency of the Department. In the late Controller's official Report, I find that he reports as follows, with reference to scarcity of clerks in his Office:—

"[Paper 37, page 8.] The current work in the Constructor's department was at the time excessive, and overtasking them for its due performance."

A ship is therefore lost because, for economical reasons, clerks are discharged and pensioned. Now, as the Admiralty is worked at high pressure, when any extra work comes to be done, it falls into arrears. I find, from the Report of Sir William Dunbar, the Controller of Audit, that accounts which should have been rendered on the 30th of November are not received till the 24th of January; and the reason is, that the Department was so pressed with work that they were unable to complete their current accounts. That is not the condition in which a public Department ought to be. While I was commenting upon the reduction of the men just now, the right hon. Gentleman observed that some portion of them were stokers. It is somewhat difficult to understand the policy of the Admiralty in regard to stokers. The right hon. Member for Pontefract stated that—

"We have made an arrangement under which a number of blue-jackets will be employed as stokers at an increased pay, the plan being similar to the one which has been effected with success in the French Navy."

And, at the same time, the noble Earl, who represents the Admiralty in "another place," stated that "he feared stokers would, in future, be of more account than seamen." And the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontetefract (Mr. Childers) thereupon obtained the discharge of a considerable corps of stokers, who had been got together with no inconsiderable difficulty during the Administration of which I was a humble Member. However excellent our seamen may be, their ability in that respect does not make them good stokers, because the latter require special training. If an untrained man be put to stoke, he will only waste fuel, instead of getting up steam. I have always considered that this sudden discharge of stokers was an inconsiderate proceeding; and I should like to know what policy the right hon. Gentleman proposes to take in that particular? I now come to the ships. The right hon. Gentleman has said one thing in which all of us concur—namely, that it is desirable the ships should not sink. We all agree that their stability should be ascertained. The right hon. Gentleman has congratulated the Committee on the large number of ships we have; and I am only too happy to know we have them; but to whom does the right hon. Gentleman owe these ships? Let me review our iron-clad Navy, adopting the classification proposed by the late First Lord, and I think that in recapitulating that list the Committee will forgive me if I remind them to whom the country is indebted for the powerful fleet for which the right hon. Gentleman takes credit. He has reminded the House that his predecessor has conducted affairs with low Estimates. What have his low Estimates produced? The first-class iron-clads are the Hercules, built by the Duke of Somerset, and the Sultan, built by the Conservative Admiralty. The second class are the Audacious, the Invincible, the Iron Duke, the Swiftsure, the Vanguard, the Triumph, all of them built by the Admiralty of which I was a member, and all of them amongst the most powerful ships in the world, and capable, from their light draught, of being manœuvred in the Baltic and the St. Lawrence, or in the narrow seas. The third class are the Bellerophon, Lord Warden, Minotaur, Agincourt, Northumberland, Royal Alfred, Repulse, Penelope, and Lord Clyde, all built by the Duke of Somerset. The fourth class are the Achilles, Royal Oak, Prince Consort, Caledonia, Ocean, Valiant, Hector, and Zealous, all built in Lord Palmerston's time. The fifth class are the Black Prince, Warrior, Defence, and Resistance, also built under Lord Palmerston by the Duke of Somerset. The sixth class are the Pallas and Favorite, with similar parentage. I shall not allude to the Enterprise, Research, Viper, Vixen, and Waterwitch, failures of an early date in the history of iron-clad construction. But we now come to turret-ships, of which we are reported to have 15. The first three are the Devastation, Thunderer, and Fury. Now, with regard to the Devastation and the Thunderer, I am glad to learn, from the Report of the Committee which is to be laid on the Table, that the Devastation is to be a satisfactory ship of her class. I took the liberty, at the time she was proposed to the House, of criticizing the design for that ship. I have never believed in a low freeboard, and I cannot but think that 4 feet 6 inches out of the water at one end, and 9 feet at the other, is not consistent with safety; but as the Committee, I am told by the right hon. Gentleman, have given their sanction, it is not for me to offer any criticism until the Report is before us. But the Committee evidently do not approve of her very highly, because, as I understand, the Fury, a similar ship, whose history is very singular, is not to be proceeded with. It will be in the recollection of hon. Members that about a year ago the Fury was, notwithstanding the opposition of the right hon. Member for Tyrone, and other hon. Members, agreed to by the Committee. In the month of August last a friend of mine happened to visit the dockyard at which the Fury was to be built; but he could not discover even the slightest symptom of the work. However, very soon afterwards an article on the war appeared in one of the daily papers, and reference was made in the article to the British Navy. The writer remarked that our Navy was not suffering in consequence of the dismissal of the Chief Constructor, Mr. Reed, because one of the finest men-of-war ever designed was being built and was rapidly approaching completion—the ship was to be culled the Fury, and the persons whose skill had mostly contributed to the production of the vessel were the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract. On inquiry, I found that so much of the vessel had not been created as was supposed (only ⅞ths of ⅛th), and now the Committee has arrested any further progress with the work. So that even the Prime Minister and the right hon. Member for Pontefract are as liable to fail in their constructive skill as humble individuals are. As only 1/56th of the ship has been completed, it is hoped the Exchequer may not suffer. But what becomes of the statement that the Fury was rapidly approaching completion? I remember, when it was proposed to the Committee that these costly ships should be proceeded with, the Member for Tyrone protested, and urged the Committee to try such costly experiments one at a time. The result, however, now appears to be that we are going to have two ships of enormous draught of water, of an uncertain construction, with very low freeboards. With regard to the other ships—the Hotspur and Rupert rams—the latter is the creation of the present Admiralty; but I am afraid that is the only ship ordered during the last two years of which we have a satisfactory account. All the others are experimental in their character; they are on their trial, not at sea, but before the Committee. The last class of ships to which I shall allude are those mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman as drawing 16 feet of water—namely, the Cyclops, Hecate, Hydra, and Gorgon. If they were more stable, they would be very good vessels; but they are of a class the stability of which I very much doubt in the midst of oceanic waves. I fear that if they venture out of harbour into the Atlantic, and meet the oceanic waves, they may come to the fate of the Captain. Their steam-power—250 horsepower, is far too little for ships of 2,171 tons. As to the gunboats, I am happy to concur with the right hon. Gentleman in the course he is taking. At present, it appears to be decided to build them of the Staunch class. And here I must allude to the fact that the Staunch is a class of which the right hon. Member for Tyrone is the parent. All these vessels—the Arrow, Blazer, Bloodhound, Bustard, Comet, Kite, Scourge, Snake, and Mastiff—are in process of construction and near completion. They are very valuable for the defence of our harbours, and I agree with what has been already said—that we ought to increase their number for the more complete defence of our ports and harbours. I have a word or two to say on the Vote for the Dockyards. I think Chatham Dockyard ought now to be completed for the service of the Fleet, seeing that Woolwich and Deptford have been closed; and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will press forward the work. There is a decrease in the Vote for Chatham extension this year of £61,556. Only £480,000 is required to complete this most necessary work, and of this only £205,000 is to be voted this year. Before we come to Vote 11, I trust the right hon. Gentleman will have reconsidered this matter, and will have decided to expend within the year the whole of this terminable expenditure, which is so necessary for our safety. There are other questions, on which, as only Vote 1 is to be taken this evening, I will defer any observations I may have to make. When my right hon. and gallant Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance produces his Report, I shall take an early opportunity of drawing attention to the condition of our ordnance. With reference to the estimate of the guns, I think the right hon. Gentleman is mistaken when he reckons the number required for the effective list of the Navy at 1,800; for I believe that they rather approach 6,000 altogether, including gunboats, launches, and field-pieces, and the 1,800 must apply to rifled guns alone. I regret to learn that several of the ships still supposed to be in readiness for commissioning, and to be effective, have not been altered for the modern ordnance. This is a subject to which I hope the right hon. Gentleman will give his particular attention. I would urge upon the War Office and Admiralty to have a reserve of 500 guns for the use of steamers and other vessels which might be hired from shipowners in this country in the event of war breaking out, which would be so useful in a naval war. I am inclined to believe that the Surveyor General is imparting considerable vigour to the creation of ordnance, and that he will do his best to place us in a satisfactory position in this respect. I offer these few remarks to the Committee with an earnest desire, which the right hon. Gentleman has himself expressed, of introducing no party animosity into the debate, and with a view solely to assist him in increasing the efficiency of the Navy.

considered that the House had a duty to perform which went much beyond criticizing the details. A great change was occurring in the organization of the Navy, and their duty was to assist as far as they could the head of the Admiralty in carrying out that policy. With respect to ships, the Estimates divided themselves into three heads—first, great fighting ships; second, large cruisers; and third, smaller defence vessels. The great fault of our naval administration had always been found in the continual changes it had made. There had been hitherto a total absence of anything like a general, comprehensive, well-understood principle with regard to the description and character of the ships that should form the different classes in our service; nor, so far as he could see, were we making any advance towards the adoption of any such principle—which, however, was a matter of the utmost importance. Practical schemes had been suggested and Motions made; but they had been uniformly rejected, because those who sat on the Front Benches on both sides combined to throw them out. He believed it was in 1866 that the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. Seely) proposed a well-considered, and sensible Motion, the object of which was to urge the Government to obtain the assistance of a Scientific Committee with reference to the best description of ships to be built to complete the Navy; but the Motion was opposed by the Government in power, and on a discussion it was rejected, the majority being swollen by the right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) and other official Members of the Opposition. But when the right hon. Gentleman found himself in power he appointed a Committee such as had been suggested, and the appointment of which he had resisted when it was proposed by an independent Member. At the same time the Government resisted appeals made to them to obtain the best advice as to the building of well-arranged turret-ships; and, instead of doing that, they went on adding to our broadside Navy, and again the right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) took a leading part in the opposition. When, however, he became First Lord of the Admiralty he took great credit to himself for proposing in future to build turret-ships. Again, it pointed out at that time that the Admiralty proposed designs which were capable of improvement; and we were now told that the matter had been submitted to the Scientific Committee, who recommended that the turret-ships should have the protection of more buoyancy than they had in the first instance—the very improvement suggested to the right hon. Gentleman that he totally ignored. Such things as these were not satisfactory; and the interests of the country would be promoted if the Government would take the House more into its confidence, and if it would discuss with the House more frankly the policy to be pursued and the character of the ships to be built. There were several things in the Estimates which were of a magnitude sufficient to warrant the discussion of them on the first Vote, and the first of these was the effect of the change introduced last year in the economy of the dockyards. The First Lord then said that he was selling off the old vessels; that he would reduce the number of men; and that he would employ a larger number usefully in the building of iron-clads, and a smaller number uselessly in repairing old ships. He said that, whereas in 1869–70 5,800 men were employed in building ships and 8,100 in repairing them, he would employ 6,300 in building, and 4,700 in repairing, and that he should be able to build 15,500 tons of shipping—a greater tonnage by 300 tons than was built in the preceding year, and that with a smaller number of men. At the end of the year however, it appeared that, instead of 15,500 tons, only 9,600 had been produced, and that £399,000 instead of £726,000 had been spent.

said, that 13,000 tons had been completed.

said, the figures given showed that 1,980 tons had been "advanced" at Chatham, 3,206 at Portsmouth, 826 at Devonport, and 3,603 at Pembroke, and that gave a total of 9,669 tons.

was understood to say that other ships had been begun.

said, he had every confidence in the accuracy of the right hon. Gentleman, but he had searched the Estimates with great care, and he could find only the figures he had quoted. Again, he could not find evidence of the economy we were to look for from rotten ships being sold, and useless repairs being done away with. Indeed, instead of having maintained the proposed relative proportions of men employed in building and in repairing, we had now 5,200 employed in building and 7,500 in repairing; and therefore we had got back as nearly as possible to the relative proportions which were considered so disadvantageous in 1869–70. Although £2,000,000 were so freely voted last year for the defence of the country, of which £600,000 was, he believed, apportioned to the Navy, the four armour-clad vessels then ordered had not really been paid for in excess of anything voted last year, but in substitution of a decreased tonnage which it was intended to build in the dockyards. Against the whole sum which it was contemplated to spend in the building of ships by contract in the present year was £45,000 only. The cost of new ships ordered would be £153,000, but they were to be advanced so slowly that £108,000 was reserved for the future, and therefore the country was to receive only £45,000 next year. Was it not trifling with the country to propose that so small a sum as £45,000 should be thus spent put of the enormous sums proposed by the Estimates for the naval service of the country? They were not looking the difficulties sufficiently in the face if they deceived themselves by the mass of figures that was presented to them into the belief that more was done than was really accomplished. There was another matter on which he wished to make a few remarks—the recent change in the constitution of the Admiralty. Sometimes proposals were agreed to so hurriedly that one hardly knew how they passed through the House, and he confessed that before he was aware that any alteration was being made at the Admiralty he found the right hon. Member the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) standing at the Table and explaining that the whole state of things had been changed and that he no longer required the consultative advice, to say nothing of the control of the Board of Admiralty, to guide him in his deliberations, but that he had been elected the absolute head of the Admiralty, every Department being responsible to him only, and he himself being responsible to the Queen. He could not say how it was done, but it appeared to him most wonderful that a right hon. Gentleman who, to say the least was a very young Minister, should have been allowed by the House to usurp a position so different from that which all previous First Lords of the Admiralty had occupied. Something might be said for such a change if the position of First Lord were held, by a man who possessed a greater amount of knowledge than the heads of the various Departments with which he had to deal; but any man acquainted with the operations of great manufacturing establishments must know that a person to stand in that position must possess a greater amount of practical knowledge than any of the others with whom he had to deal, or that inevitable confusion and failure would result. The House must be aware that it would be impossible to find on either of the Front Benches anyone who was more thoroughly acquainted with naval affairs than the experienced heads of Departments at the Admiralty. Therefore the First Lord not having a superior amount of knowledge, must absolutely accept the advice of his subordinates in consequence of his inability to refute it without the assistance that the discussion of any matter when submitted to the Board would have furnished to guide him in accepting or rejecting it. Nevertheless, the House had placed the Member for Pontefract in this extraordinary position. He was astonished that a matter of so grave and serious a character should have been permitted to pass through the House without a protest on the part of those who usually took a prominent part in the discussion of naval affairs, and indeed he had expressed his surprise in private to some of the leading Members on the other side, and among them the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry), that they had not pointed out to the House the great leap in the dark they were taking in confirming this arrangement. If it had not been for this change which had been effected, it appeared to him possible that the country might not have had to bewail the unfortunate loss of the Captain. In conclusion, he complimented the present First Lord on the able way in which he had introduced the Estimates, and assured him that the foregoing remarks could not be regarded as criticisms on any acts of his, because every hon. Member was aware that the Estimates had been framed independently of the right hon. Gentleman's guidance.

said, two or three points had been raised by the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty to which he wished to allude—namely, first, the provision made by the Government for our coast defences; and, secondly, the condition of our Reserves—because the country would consider the right hon. Gentleman's statement on both points very unsatisfactory. There had been, no doubt, considerable supineness in the conduct of other Governments with regard to both subjects. When the Vote was granted last year, a war of vast proportions had broken out on the Continent, which required this country to renew her solemn engagement to defend the neutrality of Belgium. Had it been violated by France we should have had to side with Germany, in which case we should at once have found ourselves confronted by the naval power of France, with every harbour from the Forth to the Thames in a defenceless condition. Impressed with the defenceless condition of our harbours, Her Majesty's Government ordered six gunboats of the Staunch class to be constructed, which was taking a miserably small gauge, not of the wants only, but the necessities of the occasion; and of these, two only, he had been informed, had been completed within the year. When it was considered the gigantic transactions which we carried on with foreign countries, we must see the importance of having all the ports and harbours of the country placed in a proper state of defence. A few years ago he visited Liverpool; and, after seeing the whole of that port, he asked—"Supposing an enemy's ship should come up to the Mersey, what is there to stop her?" The reply was that the only defence of that port was a wooden frigate, which would probably be sent to the bottom by one shot from an iron-clad, at whose mercy the whole of the shipping and wealth of the port would then be left. That was not a condition of things which ought to be allowed to prevail, and those who represented vast commercial interests had a right to complain of their harbours being left in a defenceless state. In respect to our Naval Reserves, every Government had fallen far short of the recommendations of the Manning Commission; that Commission recommended a complete and ample system of "Reserves," that the "Naval Reserve" itself should consist of 30,000 men; that the Coastguard should number 8,000 or 10,000 men, and that we should have good training ships for boys in all the principal ports. The Government had, however, shown much supineness and neglect in the establishment of a proper system of training and education for our reserved forces. It was true we had several training ships in the ports of the country, but they were supported almost wholly by voluntary contributions. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the decrease in the annual charge for the conveyance of our troops—stating that the transport service had fallen from £400,000 to £170,000—the Vote of the present year. But could the Committee rely upon that decrease being permanent? The basis of the Army re-organization scheme proposed by the Secretary for War was short service; and, as the relief of the vast Army of 63,000 men, which was necessarily maintained in India could only be effected by a great increase in the transport service, the prospect of the present low Estimate being permanent was illusory; for it would be necessary, under a short service system, to have a continuous stream of men constantly passing between this country and India. The Manning Commission recommended two distinct classes of Naval Reserves. A first and a second class at a smaller retaining fee of £2 10s., to be composed of "ordinary seamen" and fishermen. In respect to the latter, the whole number that the Admiralty had induced to join was half-a-dozen men. One of the reasons of that failure was the absurd requirement insisted upon that every man belonging to the northern ports who wished to join must go to Hull to present himself either for enrolment or for training, and our poorer seamen could not afford the cost of the journey with the risk of rejection at the end of it. On those points he thought that the statement of the Government was unsatisfactory, and that the question of our "Naval Reserves" and of our "coast defences" demanded prompt attention at the hands of the House.

called attention to page 3 of the Estimates, from which it appeared that, for the year 1870–1, the gross Estimates were £9,370,000; whereas, when put before the House last year, they were only £9,250,000. Again, the net Estimates for last year, after deducting extra receipts and repayments from India, stand in this year's accounts £8,926,000; whereas, when put before the House last year, the figures were only £8,740,000. Taking the figures as put before the House in last years' Estimates it followed that the gross Estimates were, of this year, £500,000 in excess of those of last year, and £539,000 net increase. Now, he should like to know the grounds for this large increase in the Estimates, and also for the large increase of tonnage of the ships proposed to be built. There was a great increase upon the amount of tonnage to be produced as compared with what had been stated to be necessary by the late First Lord of the Admiralty. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Goschen) proposed to build 22,000 tons per annum; whereas the right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), in the comprehensive scheme that he brought before the House two years ago, said it would be necessary to build 15,000 tons per annum. Would the right hon. Gentleman tell the House what were the European dangers which made that increase necessary? The French, not having vessels of light draught, could not enter upon our coasts any more than they entered upon the Prussian coast. He (Mr. Candlish) thought, too, that much more new tonnage should be entrusted to private yards, and less to the Government yards; for it had been demonstrated that the Government could contract more cheaply than they could build themselves. He regretted our greatly increased expenditure in extending our dockyards; but it would, probably, not be wise policy to arrest their progress now that three fourths of the money had been spent upon them. But there were ample opportunities of revising and reducing the details of the Vote for Pay, especially of the high officers. While the pay of two admirals was £1,825 per annum each, their extra allowances exceeded their pay. The total of their pay was £3,650, while their extras, under the head of allowances, amounted to no less than £3,738. Then the vice-admiral received £434, and the rear-admiral £342, in extra or supplementary payments. He hoped these would soon disappear from the list. The total increase in our Navy and Army expenditure this year would be about three and a-third millions—a sum unprecedented in our history during a time of peace. He could not have been able to face his constituents if he had voted for such enormous and extravagant Estimates.

said, the people of this country would look with jealousy at the large increase in the Army Estimates, although they wished that the Navy should be kept in first-rate order. In fact, they were determined to support any Ministry who would propose such measures as would put the Navy in such a position as would maintain our security at home and our prestige abroad. He did not urge excess in our naval expenditure; but the country should be put in such a state of preparation that we need not fear any attack upon ourselves, or apprehend that our commerce would suffer through our not having vessels of light draught to protect it.

, referring to observations of the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Candlish), said, he should be ashamed to face his constituents if he grudged any money which the Government thought necessary for the Navy, and asked whether there was no other country than France from which we might apprehend attack? But take even that case. France had the power of obtaining in a few weeks such vessels as could be sent to those shores. We ought to be prepared for all contingencies, and in times of peace we ought to make preparations, because we could then do so without offence, and properly. He differed completely from the hon. Member for Sunderland as to the extension of Royal Dockyards. All along the east coast there was no depôt of any considerable dimensions where a fleet could be sent for repair. He had no selfish object in stating so; but if the Admiralty authorities came to Scotland on their summer cruise they would find that the Firth of Forth presented advantages in that respect such as was possessed by no other country in the world. Some general system of defence should be adopted, not only for the home, but for the colonial portions of the British Empire.

had for the last four years insisted upon the necessity of training up boys who might in time become available for recruiting our Navy and he was glad to hear that the Admiralty had at length opened their eyes to the importance of the subject. He had endeavoured to point out the gradual diminution in the number of our bluejackets, and that, so far from the number being regulated by the Votes of this House every year, the Votes were brought down to harmonize with the number actually obtainable and in the service. He considered the supply of boys quite insufficient to keep up the proper number of men, and trusted that an effort would be made to throw 500 more boys into the service. He pointed out a discrepancy, amounting to 900 men, between the numbers of blue-jackets in our Navy as stated by the right hon. Gentleman and those which appeared in a Return furnished to the House by the Admiralty about a month ago. He regretted to hear from the right hon. Gentleman that so few of the smaller classes of vessels were to be built during the present year. The number of these vessels was quite inadequate to meet the wants of the country, and for the protection of our commercial harbours. The country would not be satisfied with the statement that had been made that night, and it was not impossible that another opportunity would be found to raise the question again, and to test the opinion of the House upon it. He was anxious to know whether any differences of opinion had existed in the Committee upon Designs for Ships with reference to their last Report, and whether they had presented a second Report?

repeated the inquiry which he made a short time since as to the time for which the Committee on Naval Science was likely to sit, and the cost of the inquiry.

remarked that the various objections which had been taken to the Government proposals as to shipbuilding, in a great measure, neutralized themselves. But, in the first instance, he begged to state, in reply to the hon. Member for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell) as to the cost of transport being increased by short service, that the Government of India defrayed the cost of the conveyance of troops to and from that country. In reply to the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox), he had to say that the number of sittings of the Committee on Designs would depend on the rapidity of their progress. He must also explain that the civilian members of the Committee, although mostly professional men, had very handsomely voluntarily declined to receive any remuneration for their services, with the exception of one gentleman, who received the sum of £200, which he had to pay a substitute. The Committee would last until they had concluded their inquiries, which were of a very extensive character. The travelling expenses of the Committee were paid out of the £2,000 annually voted towards the expenses of that Committee. An hon. and gallant Admiral (Sir John Hay) had spoken of the necessity of increasing the number of seamen last autumn on account of the war. That was not the circumstance which rendered it necessary to look for more blue-jackets. The necessity arose from the loss of the Captain and another vessel, and they were short 300 or 400 men on that account. As regarded the employment of stokers and other minor points, he must defer an explicit explanation till he had had time to look carefully into them. As to the discrepancy pointed out by the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Graves), the Return referred to by the hon. Gentleman was probably for the month of January, and since then it had been discovered that there was an error in the Return, and that they were not so short of men as had been supposed. At the same time, he admitted that they had fewer blue-jackets than was voted in the Estimate, and measures would be taken at once to increase the number of boys. With regard to gunboats for coast defence, the reason why they had not more of those small vessels was because, for several years past, they were completing the large ships. Was the country to be asked to do everything at the same time? But, in fact, never had there been so great an increase of vessels for our coast defences as during the last six months. The total addition to their gunboats during the 18 months dating from August last to the end of the present year would show a greater increase than had ever occurred during any corresponding period. 12 vessels of the Staunch class for coast defences had been completed, or would soon be completed. There were, further, 10 gunboats that either had been commenced or would be immediately. But he dissented from the opinion that those small vessels were the only coast defences we had. Large ships which would protect the Channel, the North Sea, and prevent the approach of an enemy's fleet to our shores were coast defences also, and could not be wisely neglected. An hon. Member (Mr. Macfie) had said that France might improvise a fleet to attack us; but he did not think any Power could do that. At all events, if any Power could improvise a fleet, it would be England, which possessed more resources of rapid production than any other country. He regretted that the proposal of the Government in regard to gunboats was not satisfactory to some hon. Gentlemen, and he admitted that it was a question whether one of the large frigates might be delayed to hasten the completion of more gunboats. That was a point which could be considered hereafter. But at a moment when our maritime power was, relatively to that of other States, greater than ever it was before, he did not think they would be justified, considering the state of Europe, in going much beyond the expenditure now recommended by the Government. The hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Samuda) had mistaken the tonnage built in the Government Dockyards last year. It was not 9,000 but 15,000 tons. They proposed to build 22,000 tons, of which 6,000 would be built in private and the remainder in Government Yards. With regard to the 7,500 men employed in repairs, it should be stated that those men were likewise employed in the construction of a large number of materials used in shipbuilding. During last year a large number of men were taken off new ships and put on repairs, in consequence of the desire felt in August to have a large force available at once in case of necessity. Therefore, several older ships were put in repair at that time, thus to a certain extent interrupting the progress of shipbuilding.

explained that he had not said that France could "improvise" a fleet, but that she might improvise an Alabama that would harass our commerce.