, for Mr. STEPHEN CAVE, rose to move, in page 3, line 18, to add—

"(a.) Each ballot paper shall have a number or letter or other distinguishing mark printed on the back thereof, and have attached thereto a counterfoil, with the same number or letter or other distinguishing mark printed on its face;

"(b.) The presiding officer, before delivering a ballot paper to any elector, shall enter on the counterfoil of the ballot paper the number of the voter on the Register;

"(c.) At the close of the poll the presiding officer shall, in the presence of the agents of the candidates, or such of them as may be present, seal up the counterfoils of the ballot papers, and send them by the earliest practicable post to the keeper of the ballot papers;

"(d.) The production from proper custody of a ballot paper purporting to have been used at any election, and of a counterfoil marked with the same printed number, letter, or other distinguishing mark, and having a number marked thereon in writing, shall be primâ facie evidence that the person who voted by such ballot paper was the person who at the time of such election had the same number as the number written affixed to his name in the Register of Electors."

The hon. Gentleman said, he hoped the effect of the proposed Amendment would be, if adopted, to make the Ballot more workable, and not liable to the chief dangers which were apprehended from its adoption, such as personation and fraud. Whatever advantages the supporters of secret voting hoped to obtain from it, there was no doubt great danger that the Bill of the Government, as it now stood, would afford facilities for fraudulent voting on a large and extensive scale; and when he looked at the complicated details and arrangements provided in the clauses of this Bill, he was reminded of those well-known lines—

"Oh, what a tangled web we weave

When first we venture to deceive!

But be that as it might, if they were to have the Ballot, he should be glad to co-operate with the right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Council in preventing personation and fraud, for he was anxious to make the system of secret voting, if it was to be established, work as satisfactorily as possible, that the secrets of the Ballot should not be wormed out of poll-clerks, or able to be obtained by private individuals, and that no private person should have it in his power to tamper with the voting papers. In the words of Sydney Smith, there should be a plain opportunity afforded to everybody to tell an undiscoverable lie. Now, the scheme which he was venturing to propose was that the ballot paper should be attached primarily to a counterfoil; that on the counterfoil and the ballot paper there should be the same number; and that when a man presented himself to record his vote, the returning officer should tick off his name on the register, and should mark the number of the register on the counterfoil, so that it should be possible in the event of an inquiry by a Court of Law, and by a Court of Law only, that the vote could be identified and traced. He found that a good system of secret voting had been described as one winch furnished an easy means of identifying a vote by a Court or Judge, while it was made practically impossible that it should be traced by any other person. That test of secret voting had been propounded by the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland in the Bill of last year, and the right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Council had lately said that the essence of the Ballot was that it should be completely secret, adding that he meant by that expression that "a voter should not be able to prove to anyone how he voted," for if it were otherwise, the object of the present measure would be defeated. That being so, he maintained that his Amendment was not inconsistent with that definition, that it gave a really "secret" ballot, and, moreover, it was considered only last year by the Government to be essential. He would ask, what was the reason that they had changed their minds on this matter? There was, besides, danger that elections should be decided by the votes of persons not duly qualified to vote. Now, suppose the returning officer admitted 20 votes which he ought not to have admitted, were the candidates to be put to the expense and the constituencies to the turmoil of another contest because those votes could not be traced? That difficulty was felt in America, where the States of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, had found it necessary to adopt a plan whereby votes might be traced; it was much complained of in New South Wales and Queensland; and it was thought that the plan adopted in Victoria, which was in substance that contained in the Amendment, should be introduced in other colonies, especially as, according to Mr. M'Culloch, it had not tended to diminish the security to the voter. Again, the Bill afforded no means of proof that the voting paper put into the box was the same as that given by the returning officer to the voter. That shuffling of voting papers was one of the great means of bribery under the Ballot. The use of a particular stamp by the returning officer would not prevent forgery, for stamps might be got at and voting papers copied. That that was quite possible was evident from the fact that even the papers for a competitive examination in the Civil Service had on one occasion been abstracted. When that was done there was an unlimited power of bribery and personation; no check could be applied, because votes could not be traced; and, even if there was no fraud, the returning officer and his servants would be exposed to much suspicion. The crux of the Ballot had always been to find means for combining a scrutiny with a secret Ballot, and as the difficulty, which was a real and practical, not an imaginary one, was altogether ignored by the Bill, he asked the Committee, by affirming the Amendment, to say that, through the Courts of Law and the Judges, who were at all events above suspicion, votes should be traceable in the case of an Election Petition. He begged to move the addition of sub-sections providing that each ballot paper should have a number or letter, or other distinguishing mark printed on the back, with a counterfoil similarly marked, in order to trace the vote of each voter if necessary.

said, he trusted that the Amendment would be adopted, for, if so, his objections to the Bill would be to a great extent met. The measure would have this advantage—it would tend to produce greater peace and quiet at elections, and would relieve many persons from the notion that they were controlled or coerced. He objected to it mainly because it tended to fraud. As an employer of labour, having in his employment more persons than there were in many of the constituencies mentioned in these debates, he had hesitated as to whether he should not abstain from voting in this matter altogether, lost it should be supposed that he wished to ascertain how men voted. Some remarks had been made, especially by the hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Mr. James), as to the manner in which employers dealt with their hands. For his own part, he had not been told how more than half-a-dozen of the people in his employ voted; but he was informed that they acted with a degree of uprightness which he much commended. He believed most of them voted for himself; but those who had not done so suffered no inconvenience. When he canvassed his constituency he found that it would be useless to attempt to change the intentions of those who had already decided how they should vote; and he could not believe men were so open to intimidation and corrupt influences as was alleged by many hon. Members. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would make some concession to hon. Members on that side of the House, who only desired to promote purity of election; and that Amendment would not only meet their views, but would advance the objects of the Government, because it was similar to a proposal made by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) last year.

said, he had no hesitation in saying still that a system which admitted of a possible scrutiny was theoretically superior to any other system of voting. But it had never been the practice in that House to act entirely upon theoretical principles, nor did he think it would be wise so to act now. That was a question more of practical working than of theory, and in the opinion of a great many hon. Members—although in his opinion it was a very doubtful point—the plan now proposed by the Government was a better one than that proposed by them last year. The one advantage in the Bill of last year was that a scrutiny might follow an election, and the election be determined in favour of the candidate who had received a majority of good votes. A scrutiny, though difficult, would not be absolutely impossible even under the present system. But how seldom was the ordeal of a scrutiny necessary, and how seldom were the results of an election altered by a scrutiny! Again, it must be remembered that, with regard to the detection of personation and fraud of all kinds, nothing turned upon the proof of how a person voted. If they wanted to detect bribery or personation, they must prove, to begin with, that the voter was bribed or personated, and the question how he voted formed no part of the case. There was no reason why, under that Bill, just as at present, proof should not be given that a certain voter had received money, and, if he had received it, the return of the candidate on whose behalf he had been bribed would be vitiated. The same result would follow if personation could be traced to a candidate or his agent. Personation was an extremely dangerous game to play, and instead of the present cumbrous mode of proving personation in each case, and then striking off the vote, there were other provisions, which his right hon. Friend (Mr. Forster) would explain, to check and punish the offence, and which could easily be increased, if not found sufficiently stringent. That might be effected by sufficiently increasing the number of polling-places and taking other precautions to insure that the voters coming to particular polling-places should in the great majority of cases be personally known to some of the persons present. If the people were told that, under certain circumstances, the votes they gave might be subsequently proved, there would arise a doubt in their minds whether the votes might not become known under other circumstances than those contemplated by the law, and he ventured to doubt whether, if the Amendment now proposed were adopted, the reception given to the Bill by hon. Members opposite would in any degree be altered. When they were discussing the Ballot Bill of last year, the plan of a scrutiny which had been provided for by that Bill had met with considerable ridicule. Many hon. Members had no possible confidence in the plan. When the Bill was intrusted to him for preparation he did think that theoretically the principle of scrutiny was better, and he did not say that he had altogether changed his opinion. He did not think that anything would be found in his speech showing that he attached great importance to the two systems, or that he had attempted to convey that the question involved anything like a question of principle. He thought it was a question of detail. But his right hon. Friend, who had considered the subject more than he had done, had come to the conclusion that secret ballot would work best, and he was perfectly willing to support his right hon. Friend's proposal in preference to his own.

said, he had thought that the object of the Bill was to have elections truly representing the opinions of the constituencies; but the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) seemed to think that the paramount object of the Bill was to conceal the votes of the electors, and whatever injustice might be done by the reception of bad votes no redress was to be obtainable. However much he might admire the candour of the noble Lord, he was not at all satisfied with his arguments. It had been suggested by the noble Lord that provisions would be proposed by the right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Council which would render a scrutiny possible under the present Bill, and if the right hon. Gentleman explained by what means he intended to effect that object he might shorten the present debate. The question before the House, involving the consideration of how a proper representation was to be obtained, was of the deepest moment, and must be argued out. In those colonies where an absolutely secret ballot existed, the Governors represented that what was wanted was that very check against abuse now proposed; and the Select Committee of that House had also come to the conclusion that a provision of the sort was necessary to secure correct representation. There were two questions involved in a scrutiny—namely, the question of the criminality of the voter and the result of the election, and though the noble Lord said that the occurrence of a scrutiny was a rare thing, the correctness of which opinion he (Mr. G. Hardy) took exception to, still the constituency were entitled to have the power of scrutiny; and he had known the result of a great many elections changed by a scrutiny. If a disqualified candidate was rejected under a scrutiny, and if the next highest were to succeed him, justice was done; but if, on the other hand, it was said that a disqualified candidate should not sit, but a new election take place, the candidate who would be entitled under a scrutiny would be put to expense and the constituency suffer the evils of a new election. The point was novel in the debate, and he called upon the right hon. Gentleman to consider it. Then, again, if a candidate told voters to vote for him on the ground that the other candidate was disqualified, and that the votes would only be thrown away if they were given to that other candidate, how could anyone tell who had voted for the disqualified candidate un- less there was a scrutiny? The Ballot was intended in America to be a perfect cloak on the way in which a man voted, yet in Ohio they produced witnesses in some cases where the validity of votes was challenged, to prove by circumstantial evidence how the electors objected to had voted. Witnesses were brought forward to prove that those electors were heard to say that they would vote for so-and-so, and then the matter was left to the decision of the jury. The proposed Amendment in no way interfered with secret voting, and every honest voter might be assured that his vote was secret, because it would only be in the case of an Election Petition that a scrutiny would be made. With voting papers the scrutiny would be easy where required, whilst with a proper system of counter-foils it would be perfectly secure and secret. A constituency had the right to be represented by the Member they had chosen, and in a close contest, where the majority was only four or five perhaps, it would be impossible to ascertain without a scrutiny whether, in a case of bribery, the agent had bribed a certain voter, or if there was inability to prove the agency, it might still be the case that a number of bribed and bad votes might have been given to the candidate at the head of the poll. It had always been said that under the Ballot the bribery carried on would not be the bribery of persons but of classes, and supposing that the members of a club were told that, if a certain candidate were returned, the club should have a sum of money presented to it, would it not be of importance to ascertain whether the members of that club voted in favour of the candidate in whose success they had been bribed to feel an interest? The main object of legislation on that question, he contended, ought to be to provide that the constituencies were properly represented; and unless they adopted the principle of a scrutiny, they would be defrauding the constituencies of the country and sheltering criminals.

, while endeavouring to answer the questions of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. G. Hardy), must remark that the charge of inconsistency brought against his noble Friend the Chief Secretary for Ireland (the Marquess of Hartington) was rather severe, when they remembered instances of inconsistency of a much greater magnitude. He (Mr. Forster) thought that that question of the desirability of identification of a vote in the case of a scrutiny being required, might be fairly considered one of those points on which a person might change his course of action without exposing himself to the charge of a want of consistency. It was a matter of importance in point of detail; but its importance in point of principle might very easily be exaggerated. The hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment (Mr. Kennaway) had mentioned the instance of Victoria, as a case in which that identification had been found useful; but from all he (Mr. Forster) could gather on the point, it had been found there to seriously interfere with the secrecy of the vote. He felt it was quite right they should be asked upon what ground it was they had made a change from the scheme of last year, and he would presently answer it; but as to the case of the disqualification of a candidate, he failed to see the pertinence of the point raised by his right hon. Friend, for if the candidate were disqualified, and notice was given that the votes recorded for him would be thrown away, what more was wanted?

said, he must remind the right hon. Gentleman that, according to the practice before Election Committees, they must prove one by one that the voters had received notice of the disqualification, and that unless they had the names before them it would be impossible to put the scrutiny in force.

said, that point might require consideration, but it seemed to him that the difficulty might be very easily met; for nothing would be easier than for the returning officer to say that the candidate was unable to be returned; that the votes given for him would be void. The reason why they had made a change in their scheme was that the plan now adopted by the Government seemed to promise a more complete representation than that of last year, by assuring the voter of absolute secrecy, and thereby allowing him to record his vote free from any undue influence. He did not say that the point was of importance one way or the other; but it appeared more reasonable to the Government on the whole that there was some, though not, perhaps, great, dan- ger that the secrecy might be violated under the scheme of last year, or, at all events, that efforts might be made to violate it, and that the confidence of the voter in the absolute secrecy of his vote might be shaken. The only advantage of the scheme of last year was that under it there could be a scrutiny, bait that advantage was very much exaggerated. There were ten Petitions for an inquiry without scrutiny for one with scrutiny, and even when it was asked for, the expense was so enormous that the scrutiny generally ended before all the doubtful votes had been examined into. In such cases it was really a question of purse against purse. He could almost defy the right hon. Gentleman opposite to find out a case that would show that a proper representation had been obtained by means of a scrutiny.

said, the hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Mr. James) was now sitting by virtue of a scrutiny.

doubted whether all the bad votes had been struck out in that or any other case. There were generally circumstances that made one or other of the candidates not anxious to continue a scrutiny. Then it was said that by their present scheme they would diminish the checks against personation; but he believed that it was not probable that personation would increase. His case was that they would by the Bill very considerably check bribery, and there was hardly ever a case where personation was unaccompanied by bribery. He believed that the arrangements for voting would make personation more difficult than it was now. A man would have to take out his voting paper as well as to fill it up and hand it in, and that would afford better opportunities for detecting personation than the simple recording of a vote. A larger number of polling-places being provided, the voter would be better known there than he now was. A clause would also be brought up under which votes would be taken off when personation or bribery was proved. Attempts at personation were now generally made at the end of the day, when the state of the poll showed that the risk was worth running, and when it had been ascertained that somebody had not voted. But the state of the poll would not be known under the new system, and no information was to be given as to whether a man had or had not voted. Such arrangements would, he thought, check personation more completely than was possible at present.

said, he thought that no satisfactory explanation had been given of the extraordinary change of opinion which had occurred upon the Treasury bench. In Victoria the vote could be traced, and the fact that the example of Victoria was actually being followed in the neighbouring colonies was a very strong argument in favour of the Amendment. He believed that an increased number of polling-places would tend to check personation; but it should be remembered that these additional polling-places would cause a considerable increase of expenditure on account of scrutineers. To ascertain if a vote were illegal, they must be able to follow that vote. They had evidence that in Victoria personation was increasing under the system of secrecy, and that should be a warning to them. He hoped that the Government would again change their minds, and adopt the proposal that was now made.

said, the point raised by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. G. Hardy) in the case of a disqualified candidate deserved consideration. He was a Member of the Committee which inquired into the Cambridge election when Mr. Forsyth was objected to, and was declared disqualified as holding an office under the Crown. Three hundred voters had voted for Mr. Forsyth in defiance of the notice of disqualification, and the question might have arisen whether these votes were good or bad. He therefore suggested that in cases where a candidate was thus objected to some machinery should be adopted for following the votes, though he should be sorry to see such a system made general at every election, as he thought it would have the effect of clogging the action of the Ballot, the adoption of which measure he had not the least doubt the country generally was anxiously waiting for.

said, he had given Notice of a somewhat less complicated Amendment than that providing that the ballot paper delivered to the voter should correspond with a number upon the register. In that way they would get rid of the necessity for a counterfoil. The Bill held out a strong inducement to personation, because every vote given under the new system would be a good vote, since it could never be struck out under a scrutiny. Thus, the Bill held out a strong inducement to crime, and then inflicted heavy penalties upon the criminal.

said, the law seemed to be that votes would be thrown away at an election if it could be proved that the voters had received notice of the candidate's disqualification. An objection might be raised that if the notice of a candidate's disqualification were given after the commencement of the polling, it would be apparently very difficult, as the Bill stood, to ascertain who had voted before, and who after the issuing of the notice. Nothing, however, would be easier than to prevent any such inconvenience by bringing up a short clause, enacting that after the notice had been given all subsequent votes should be deposited in a separate ballot-box.

suggested the necessity of serving the candidate himself with personal notice.

said, that although the returning officers and agents of the candidates might act in the most straightforward manner, it would be difficult to persuade voters that their votes would not be ascertained if provision were made for a scrutiny; therefore the Radical Members had always declared they would rather have no ballot at all than one which was not really and truly secret. Personation could not be prevented by ascertaining which way a vote was given, as the chief risk which a personator incurred was that of being handed over to the custody of a policeman at the moment he tendered the vote. Personation, he might add, was extremely rare and extremely dangerous.

said, he fully shared in the confidence felt by the hon. Member who had just spoken (Mr. Melly) in the honour and impartiality of the returning officers. Now, under the old system of voting, there was little or no temptation offered to those officers to act unfairly; but human nature being naturally weak, they might not show themselves as fully entitled to that confidence, if they felt that under that secret system detection of offences would be impossible. The right hon. Gentleman opposite had adverted to the sudden and remarkable change of opinion on the part of his Friends and Colleagues in reference to the subject of secret voting. The course of the right hon. Gentleman himself had been straightforward and consistent throughout, and he had asserted that the conversion of his Colleagues was "reasonable," but he would have described the change more correctly if he had called it "seasonable." It had never yet been shown how, under a system of perfect secrecy, a stop could be put to bribery, and until a satisfactory explanation was given on that point the Committee ought not to pass a measure which, as it now stood, would practically prevent the detection of bribery. His noble Friend the Chief Secretary for Ireland had stated that the Bill he proposed last year was the best in theory, but that the present would be a better one in practice. He confessed his inability to understand how this could be. Again, as to his noble Friend's assertion that personation would not be resorted to because it was a very dangerous practice, he thought it was sufficiently obvious that danger did not always deter malefactors.

said, he thought the Act passed a few years ago was more effectual than the Ballot could be to check bribery; but, at the same time, he did not believe that the Ballot would facilitate bribery. He did not advocate the secret ballot because it would prevent bribery, but because he felt convinced it would protect voters against intimidation and undue influence. Hon. Gentlemen opposite talked a great deal about the desirability of freeing voters from undue influence, while leaving them subject to all good influences; but he should very much like to know what good influence could be weakened by the Ballot. By adopting an absolutely secret ballot they would, no doubt, be placed to a certain extent at a disadvantage in regard to a scrutiny; but that would be outweighed by the advantage of gaining the complete confidence of the voters. With regard to the suppositions case put by the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. G. Hardy) of a manager of a club being bribed, he would remark that the security of the ballot must be sacrificed if all the papers were to be examined in order to ascertain how particular persons voted.

said, that according to the hon. Gentleman's the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread's) argument, the object of introducing the Ballot was not only to protect men in doing what was right, but also to protect them in doing what was wrong. It was a strange thing that the Ballot should be defended on the ground that it would enable men guilty of one of the gravest political offences—that of selling their votes for money—to defy detection. It appeared to him that that was pushing the doctrine of secret voting to a most injurious extent. In the case put by his right hon. Friend the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. G. Hardy) of a manager of a club being charged with receiving a bribe for the purpose of obtaining 100 votes, it would surely be of the highest importance to ascertain how the members of that club voted. What they said on that side of the House was, that if they were determined to introduce this system they ought also to introduce facilities for preventing or detecting certain evils, such as bribery and personation, for no one could deny that such evils would exist, nor that the proposed safeguard would prove efficacious in preventing them. The only answer was, that, it would shake the confidence of the voter, either because there might have been or were strong reasons to believe misfeasance in the examination of the votes, or they would suspect if the votes were marked that they would become known. To say they had no confidence in the returning officers, and that they would violate their duties by publishing names, was a serious consideration, and if there was no confidence in the returning officer, what confidence could be had in the Ballot? If the returning officers were suspected at all, they would as certainly be suspected of tampering with the ballot-box as of wrong-doing in any other direction. As a matter of fact, however, he believed that the confidence of the voters would be secured if, after the experience of two or three elections, it was evident that secrecy had been observed. It was not easy to give a categorical answer to the question as to what good influences would be interfered with by the adoption of secret voting. There were, however, many good and sound influences at work under open voting which they would fail to feel when secret voting was adopted. A man's colleagues, his teachers, and others, induced him under the present system to give a vote on public grounds, and not from pique or spite. A man ought to be under the influence of legitimate public opinion when he was called upon to discharge a public duty; but he (Sir Stafford Northcote) would not press it so far as to make public opinion take the part of oppression. It was difficult to draw the line in certain cases as to where beneficial public opinion ended and where public oppression began; but there was a point at which one began and the other ended. They would lose by secret voting that kind of influence which a candidate, and those interested in an election, had to know how such and such a man voted, because how a man voted was an important fact in the eyes of the constituency. In a hundred ways they would lower the tone of the constituency and the moral effect of an election, if they rendered it impossible to say how a voter voted. On those grounds he was of opinion that some means of distinguishing the votes should be given.

said, they had already had a full practical discussion on the question affecting the Amendment. It was proposed only to have the vote kept secret till a scrutiny was called for in a Court of Law. But the vote itself, being known, would not enable them to trace the act of bribery, which was the guilty act. Inasmuch as the scrutiny in a Court of Law was not to take place until the vote was declared invalid, the bribery must have been first proved.

said, he objected to the Ballot and to the clause, not on political, but on moral grounds. It mistrusted individuals, and encouraged evil and dishonest men. The consequence would be, that under the Ballot promises would be given to anybody, and no one would know whether the promise would be kept or not; and if the election turned out differently to what was expected, the innocent would be punished for acts they had never committed. He must take advantage of the opportunity to congratulate hon. Gentlemen opposite on having at length broken the iron bonds by which their eloquence in relation to this Bill had been hitherto fettered. That no advantage accrued to right hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury Bench from the adoption of the practice to which he referred was evident from the fact that the torrents of eloquence pent up yesterday night burst forth early that morning, and swept away the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his New Mint Bill. No answer had been given by any Member of the Government to the proposition contained in the Amendment. He had, on a former occasion, to complain of the absence of the Prime Minister when the House was discussing important questions, a practice different to the course pursued by the late Lord Palmerston and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli). He asked, where were the Law Officers of the Crown? Why were they not on the Treasury bench, giving their assistance to the right hon. Gentleman who had charge of the Bill? There were two able English Law Officers, one Irish Law Officer only, because such was the Prime Minister's popularity in Ireland that he was unable to obtain a seat in that House for his Attorney General; but there was a Scotch Law Officer with nothing to do. That Bill referred to the Three Kingdoms, but there were no legal authorities present to assist the right hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman reminded him of the stag moralised by Jaques in As You Like It. He was "left and abandoned of his learned friends," and when he found himself in a fog or chaos, as he did continually on the 2nd clause, he had to stalk slowly down the House, to consult a hidden and mysterious oracle who sat in a dark corner under the gallery, and who he (Mr. C. Bentinck) was bound to say did not give any satisfactory response likely to save the time of the House.

said, in regard to that proposal, he would be glad to learn what safeguard it was proposed to establish against the agent on either side petitioning against an elected candidate, with a view to discovering how the electors had voted. He failed, moreover, to place much confidence in the returning officers, who, especially in the smaller boroughs, were frequently the most violent partizans. He would venture to suggest that when objections were clearly recorded against a candidate he should be considered as disqualified, the election declared to be void, and all votes given in his favour as thrown away.

observed that the hon. Member for Stoke-upon-Trent (Mr. Melly) seemed to be labouring under a want of self-appreciation, when he complained that a number of men in Preston had voted on one occasion for himself, and on another for the present representative of that town. There was, however, no real inconsistency in the case, inasmuch as the electors might have merely exercised on each occasion an independent judgment. For his own part, he entertained at one time a tendency towards the Ballot; but it seemed that the evidence from other countries, as well as the arguments urged in favour of the Bill, was scarcely sufficiently strong to justify the House in passing such a measure. He had a friend who resided in France a good deal under the late Imperial rule, and his opinion, after the experience of one election, led him to the conclusion that it would be preferable to have open voting as in England. He might also mention that he had the other day been talking casually to two American gentlemen, one of whom accidentally spoke of a man as commanding 100,000 votes. His remark to that gentleman was—"If that is the case you are somewhat too liberal in your distribution of the franchise." The response of the other American gentleman was—"We do not complain of the distribution of the franchise, but of the circumstance that the voters should vote two or three times over." The truth was, that the question involved in the present Bill was one which ought not evidently to be disposed of hastily, and winch required the most careful consideration. It would be far better, therefore, in his opinion, that a decision upon it should be delayed for another year. As to the Amendment, he regarded it as a protection which was almost as necessary for the good voter as against the bad. It was very desirable, in order to remove any imputation of fraud which might rest upon a constituency, that there should be some means of showing that persons to whom suspicion attached were free from blame.

said, the hon. Member for York (Mr. J. Lowther) seemed to think the Amendment would be an encouragement for the presentation of Election Petitions. No such fear as that need be entertained by his hon. Friend; for the prosecution of an Election Petition was a very serious business, involving much expense, trouble, time, and heartburning, and if an Amendment of this character were not adopted, no doubt the initiatory process of presenting Petitions would be seriously interfered with. In reply to a challenge which had been thrown out from the other side of the House by the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), he contended that the exercise of beneficial influences at elections would be greatly interfered with by a system of secret voting, observing that the responsibility to that calm, mature, and deliberate public opinion of which Sir Robert Peel spoke, and which came to be recorded after the excitement of an election was over, would be completely done away with under such a system. It would be one great advantage of the operation of the Amendment that a voter would know that he could not dissever himself from his vote; for a man would be tempted to yield more readily to the baser instincts which were at work at elections, if he knew that he would be relieved from all responsibility with respect to the manner in which he happened to have exercised the franchise. He maintained also that there should be a sense of responsibility thrown on the returning officer himself, because in accordance with the proposal of the Government great reliance must be placed on the respectability and trustworthiness of such persons. The importance of that point was all the greater because of the multiplication of the number of polling-places, to attend at which—and he threw the matter out for the consideration of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer—men of the required stamp could not be obtained without adequate payment.

, in supporting the Amendment, said, he regarded the question it raised from a moral point of view, and contended that, as the balance of political morality was being gradually restored, it was important to consider whether this proposition would tend to purify election proceedings more than heretofore. The conduct of the Government with regard to that question reminded him of the epitaph on the tombstone of an Italian patriot—"I was well; I tried to be better; and here I am." What was the evil to be guarded against in the secret voting? A certain number of men would vote corruptly in different constituencies. This fact would become notorious in the little sets in which they lived, and as there could be no Petition they would continue these practices with impunity, and would be imitated by others. There would be a gradual weakening of moral obligations, and gradually, not after one election but after two or three, the people would reach the low level of the electors of the United States. And how did the clause of the hon. Member for East Devonshire act? It provided the rod in pickle to punish gross corruption and gross personation. It would prevent the present large number of Petitions being sent in to be told off against each other, and it would often enable the defeated party to recover his own by making terrible examples of startling electoral corruptions. That Amendment would keep alive the terror of the Election Petitions, and the electors would be taught that they could not do wrong with absolute impunity—a warning which the Government Bill did not present. On that ground he should support the Amendment. The Government seemed bent on taking even a more dangerous plunge than that of last year; their ballot omnibus was a still crazier vehicle than that which then blocked up Temple Bar; and he hoped that they would return to a better mind, and, if they must have a system of secret voting, that they would have one with some means of preventing abuses.

said, as a Conservative convert to this Bill, he might naturally be asked why he supported it. He did so because he found that in the borough he represented the newly-enfranchised voters were unanimous only on one point—in demanding the Ballot. When he attempted to reason with them their answer was—"You don't know what you are talking about; you don't get your living by working in a Liberal mill." Now, he did not say that a Liberal mill was more of a barracoon for voters than a Conservative mill; he only cited the reply to show the feelings of the class. These men lacked moral courage, and were naturally suspicious. There should, therefore, be absolute secrecy of voting; and it seemed to him that there was no choice between the open system of voting or the absolutely secret system, with all its evils, proposed by the Government.

said, that unlike the hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Tipping), he knew constituencies where the feeling was universally in favour of open voting. It had been admitted, on the other side, that the Ballot would encourage personation; and that it would be a dangerous portion of the measure. Now, he once represented a city in which there were 10,000 or 12,000 voters; and impersonation was in such force that agents were placed in all the booths to prevent it. In some instances they succeeded. In another place every name in the lists was filled up, and when it was known that from 5 to 10 percent of the electors never attended the poll, the extent of impersonation was at once apparent. When by means of impersonation the wrong candidate was returned by a small majority, there was at present a remedy for the evil by petition. That Bill took away the remedy. About the middle of the day during the last year an admiral and a general went together to give their votes at Chelsea; and on giving their names they were informed that their votes had been given two hours ago. That Bill, by establishing the Ballot, took away the remedy for that kind of impersonation. He believed also that the Ballot would increase bribery to an unbounded extent. The mode of bribing would be a promise of so much money if Mr. So-and-So was returned. He objected to the Bill also because, while it destroyed undue influence, it also destroyed due and proper influence, rendering voters entirely irresponsible for the most important act of citizenship they could be called on to perform. At all events, the Bill should not be driven through just at the close of the Session—its consideration should be adjourned till next year.

said, his hon. and learned Friend the Member for East Sussex (Mr. G. B. Gregory) would not press the Amendment which stood in his name if the one before the Committee were rejected on a division. For the sake of simplifying the question, he thought it of great importance that the Committee should distinctly understand what it was they were discussing. The question was—"Were they to have a ballot which would prevent the detection of fraud and crime." That was the ques- tion they were discussing. Hon. Gentlemen sitting opposite said—"That is the matter; the protection of the voter should be the first consideration, and for this an absolutely secret ballot was necessary; and that for this the detection of the personator must be given up." Who were the people who would be personated? The electors who had died, and, in towns like Liverpool, those who were at sea. Suppose there should be a double return, how was the right man to be determined? The Government should legislate not for the few weak, but for the great majority of honest electors. He should vote for the Amendment.

, in reply, said, the want of a scrutiny had been found so great in some of the American States that they had legislated to provide one.

said, from his long electoral experience, and his knowledge of the proceedings in Election Committees, he felt that the Committee were asked to throw away the chance of purifying elections, for the Bill deliberately threw away all the safeguards against corruption and fraud; and for that reason he felt bound to support the Amendment. In Victoria it had been found necessary to make personation a misdemeanour. In this country thousands of men went to the poll who were not known to the returning officer, yet he was bound to take their word. He differed from the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) in thinking that the Ballot would be any protection to the working man, for a manufacturer who employed hundreds of hands would still be able to obtain information as to how they were going to vote at an election. He begged to ask whether, at that period of July, there was any chance of passing this Bill, and whether the Government intended to go on with it?

said, it had been conceded by hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House that bribery would not be abolished by this Bill, but would rather be encouraged; and therefore, if undue influence and intimidation were all that hon. Members had to fear, they might vote for the Amendment, because, as far as the total suppression of intimidation was concerned, that Bill would probably turn out to be a failure. Under that Bill it might be impossible to dictate which way a man should vote; but what was there to prevent his employer saying he should not go to the poll? A hint of that kind would be given in terms which could not be misunderstood. That, he thought, was a point that should receive some attention.

said, he thought there ought to be some mode of identifying votes in case of personation. By the present system the poll-book afforded that evidence, and a vote could be struck off, but under the Bill any unscrupulous man might personate a voter who was at sea. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Council would turn his attention to that part of the subject, with a view to bring personators to swift and condign punishment.

said, he could not understand the objection of the hon. Member for York (Mr. J. Lowther) in reference to Petitions, remarking that they had all heard of gangs of bribers going about to places like Lancaster and Bridgwater, Yarmouth and Norwich. He remembered once seeing half-a-dozen candidates advertised for a vacant seat in a borough since disfranchised; and four of the number were men who had been convicted of bribery or unseated for it. In fact, there were some constituencies where success could not be hoped for unless it was known that the candidate would spend money freely. He believed that, although undue influence would be diminished, bribery would be increased under this Bill; but if it did pass it ought to be accompanied by a new Registration Bill to prevent duplicate registration, and to remove the facility which several qualifications would give to personation under the Ballot. Under the existing system a large number of men, simply from vanity, and for the purpose of advertising their supposed wealth, caused their names to be put forward as being qualified to vote in five or six different places. Those persons should be compelled to select the particular place in which they intended to vote, and their qualification as regarded the others should be ignored.

said, he wished for explanations with regard to two matters, on the solution of which his vote depended. In the first place, if a voter going to the poll found he had been personated, would he be al- lowed to vote; if he was so allowed, what would be the positions of the candidate and the constituency; and were there any means of withdrawing the personated vote? On reference to a later clause in the Bill, it would be seen that a man would be able to go from town to town, personating a voter, and afterwards to state that he had been employed by the opposition candidate. As there were no means of tracing the personated vote, one vote would be struck off from the list of the wrong candidate, and his opponent would be a gainer both ways. Then, again, the returning officer in counties being the sheriff, would probably appoint as under sheriff his solicitor. The latter might have been engaged in corrupt practices at many elections, and his clerks employed as his deputies might assist personation, the opposition candidate having no protection against such practices unless he had check clerks on the spot. He had no objection to secret voting so long as the interests of the constituency and the candidates were considered. The hon. Member for Bristol (Mr. Morley) was the only Member of the House who had actual experience of the Ballot. It was said that there was almost more extravagance at the last Bristol election than at any previous one; and, if that was true, they ought to consider well before adopting the Government proposal. If the Government had permitted their followers to take part in the debate, they might have given much useful advice on this subject to other hon. Members who had not studied it so fully.

said, he must inform the noble Lord who had just spoken (Lord Henry Thynne) that the next following clause provided for the case of a man finding that he had been personated. He should be glad to consider any objections about the returning officer at the proper time, but he was not aware that the Bill would induce the sheriff to make any arrangements which he could not make at present. All the objections which had been made, and the danger which had been described, belonged alike to open and secret voting, and there was no more ground for putting them forward as likely to be fostered under the operation of the Bill than there was under the existing system. With regard to the remarks of the hon. Member for Boston (Mr. Collins), he could not see that the Bill increased the danger arising from a double qualification. On the contrary, under that scheme an impostor would be more likely to be detected; and as people could not discover who had voted in the course of the day, the risk accompanying personation would be greatly increased, so that it would be less liable to be attempted. The Government had no right to complain of the tone of the greater part of the debate; but the matter having been fully and fairly discussed, he appealed to the Committee as to whether they could not at once go to a division.

said, he thought it would be impossible under a system of secret voting to be sure, in the event of a close election contest, that the successful candidate was not returned in consequence of men having double qualifications voting twice.

said, he did not admit that the subject had been sufficiently discussed, or that the Committee had received from the Government an answer to the most important part of the Bill. He wanted to hear from the right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Council a distinct explanation as to what machinery there was in the Bill to prevent unlimited wholesale bribery under its operation. He had made several appeals to the right hon. Gentleman on the subject, and had not been able to get an answer. The right hon. Gentleman was in a false position—he was an honest advocate of a dishonest course, and naturally found it difficult to answer that which it was impossible to answer.

said, he thought the hon. Gentleman the Member for West Norfolk could hardly have done him the honour of listening to any single speech that he had made. From the beginning he (Mr. Forster) had always stated that he had advocated the Ballot because he believed it would put an end to bribery more than any other measure that could be adopted. [Mr. G. BENTINCK: HOW?] Well, how? Surely the hon. Gentleman did not expect him to reiterate the arguments he had already given; but the subject the hon. Gentleman had introduced was not pertinent to the Amendment, which was that when a voter was found to have been bribed, or to have personated some one, his vote was to be struck off. He must say the Committee would not be acting in its usual course if, after so many hours' discussion, the debate was adjourned before a decision was come to upon the Amendment.

, who spoke amid much interruption, said, that his vote was wholly uncertain, and he would suggest that the right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Council should bring in some clause or some addition to the Bill which would render personation easy of detection, because that would meet the general approval of the House; but if he would not pledge himself to do so he (Sir Lawrence Palk) would support the Amendment.

, in rising—

"To call the attention of the House to the recommendations of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the condition of the Irish Railways in 1868, and to move for Copy of the Memorial, signed by seventy-eight Peers and ninety Irish Members of Parliament in 1869, in favour of those recommendations; together with Copy of the Memorials and Resolutions praying for the reform of the Irish Railway system adopted at public meetings throughout Ireland, presented to the present Government since their accession to office,"

said, the time had come when the Irish public must be made aware of the footing on which that question rested, and he would proceed to sketch the history of it. Motions relating to it were brought forward in that House in 1865 by the Post- master General (Mr. Monsell), and in 1866 by the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. W. H. Gregory), and in 1867 the Postmaster General again called the attention of the House to the subject. The first of these debates was remarkable for having elicited from the present Prime Minister, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, the following words:—

"There would probably be no mode in which that boon could be confered so free from all taint of partiality, and at the same time so comprehensive and effective in its application, as some measures taken to secure to her the benefits of cheap railway transit."—[3 Hansard, clxxviii. 919.]

The right hon. Gentleman, being in Opposition in 1866, evidently had the same thoughts uppermost in his mind, and he thus expressed himself with still more spirit—

"One conclusion, however, I have certainly come to. I know of no boon that could be conferred upon Ireland so comprehensive in its application, so impartial, so free from taint or suspicion of ministering to any particular interest or to the views or convenience of any particular class, so far-reaching in its effect upon all classes and conditions of persons without distinction—I know of nothing that would be so universal in its effect as a better development of the railway system of Ireland."—[3 Hansard, clxxxiv. 1186.]

If he had not changed his opinions, why had not the Prime Minister introduced a measure dealing with the railways instead of the Irish Church Act, which injured a large portion of the community and did no good to the rest? Lord Derby's Government issued a Commission in 1867, which had large powers given it by special Act, and in 1868 it made two Reports, one in April, the other in December. In the three succeeding Sessions he (Mr. Gore) had put on the Paper Questions to the Government, which at their request he had postponed, until Ireland had realized the truth of the proverb that "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick." And now they were entirely at a loss to know whether the Government had sufficiently considered the subject, or had come to any conclusion whatever. The composition of the Commission was such as to do credit to those who selected its Members, and to give confidence in its recommendations. In their Reports they stated that in their opinion a saving of £32,000 a-year would be effected by concentrating the management of the Irish railways into one body, and that a saving of £88,000 a-year would be effected by the Government guaranteeing the interests on the debentures and other borrowed capital of the companies. They also recommended that the fares should be lowered, so as to bear some similarity to fares on the Belgian railways. They calculated that in the first eleven years this would entail a loss, and that in the twelfth year there would be a profit of £50,000, and in the thirteenth of £90,000. Now, he might be answered that no two countries could be more dissimilar than Belgium and Ireland, and with this, in a great measure, he concurred; but what was of infinitely more importance than his opinion, was that of the Commissioners, who, in the 16th, 22nd, and 23rd pages of their second Report, showed that they made full allowance for the different peculiarities of the two countries, and it was only after having done so that they arrived at the conclusions which he had already read. In consequence of that second Report, 78 Peers and 90 Irish Members of Parliament presented a Memorial to the Government, praying them to act on the Report of the Commission; but he (Mr. Gore) regretted they had not taken any steps in the matter. There was no doubt that low railway fares would conduce to the prosperity of the country. There were very low fares in Belgium and in Germany, and even in France they were about to lower their rates with a view to increasing their profits. But the fares in Ireland were even higher than on some of the great railways in England, of which he gave several instances. He would warn the Government that there was a strong feeling on that question in Ireland, and when the agitators for home rule said to their dupes—"Here are your own Peers, and Members of Parliament of all parties, expressing by a large majority of each House their wish that a certain subject should be considered, and a measure introduced, and no notice is taken of the appeal;" could they, with truth, say in return that they had done all that they had a right to expect? No! depend upon it, if they did not grant this boon quickly and freely, they would hear of it in a less welcome tone, and anything that they then granted would be attributed to other motives than a wish to benefit Ireland. In England, the London and North-Western receipts were £6,682,000; the Great Northern, £4,160,000; the Great West- ern, £4,161,000; while the whole of the Irish railway traffic amounted to £2,025,000—about equal to the receipts of the Caledonian Railway in Scotland, which were £2,005,000. But while the Caledonian Railway was managed by 11 directors, the 24 railways in Ireland were managed by 430 directors, supplemented by 56 solicitors, and 70 engineers. And now, what was it that was asked for? It was, first, that the railways of Ireland should be purchased by the State with a view to the lowering of rates and fares, and increased accommodation; secondly, than any guarantee given should be an Irish guarantee, so that any loss arising the Imperial Exchequer should not suffer. It was not asked even that which was granted to Canada—namely, an Imperial guarantee; but if any loss should result, Ireland should make it good. But the Imperial credit was wanted to raise the purchase-money—the magic name of "Robert Lowe" was wanted at the back of the Bill, he receiving a bond of indemnity from Ireland to keep himself safe. In his opinion, however, the Government ought not to take the detailed management of the railways directly into their own hands. He would recommend that the scheme of the Royal Commissioners should be adopted gradually, although that would involve a loss at the commencement, because Irish Members would not be justified in involving their constituents at once in liabilities amounting altogether to £525,000. The annual loss would be a gradually diminishing one say for nine years, and there would be an undoubted margin on which to work, made up of the £32,000 a-year saved by concentration of management, and the £88,000 a-year gained by the Government guarantee; making £120,000 a-year, which could be applied in the reduction of rates and fares, beginning with a reduction of 15 per cent, and making further reductions of 5 per cent every five years, until at the end of about 30 years the whole scheme of the Commissioners would be carried into operation. In conclusion, he would say, that whatever course the Government might adopt, he hoped they would bring the railway system in Ireland more into harmony with the wants and means of the people, and begged to move for Copy of the Memorial of which he had given Notice.

said, that unanimity was a rare occurrence in Ireland, but on that subject of railways lions and lambs had laid themselves down together and with one consentient voice landlord and tenant, farmer and shopkeeper, Whig and Tory, had expressed the most anxious desire for a reform of the railway system in Ireland. On another point Irish public opinion had also expressed itself—namely, that the deficit arising from any measure of reform proposed by the Government and deemed satisfactory by the representatives of Ireland should be defrayed from Irish resources alone. Had English Members been present—and he regretted to see only one English Member in the House—he was sure they would have put their hands instinctively to their pockets. But they need be under no alarm. The Irish Members did not ask for one penny of gratuity—they simply asked the rich and flourishing country to give the aid of her credit to the poor and backward sister country; to do nothing more, in short, than to extend the same assistance to Ireland as to Canada. He wished to re-assure the House thoroughly on that point. He had made inquiries recently at the office of the Public Works Loan Commissioners whether any loss had been sustained by them on account of loans to Irish railways, and he received the satisfactory reply that no loss whatever had been sustained. There were two main objects in view in any reform—the first, increased accommodation; the second, the lowering of freights and fares, especially third-class fares. One of the main objections urged by those who, as Members of the Government, considered it their duty to make the largest possible amount of difficulties was this,—that the railway companies in Ireland had given no sign, nor made any application to be dealt with. But was it likely they would do so? There were 66 railway companies in Ireland and 500 directors, as was mentioned by his hon. Friend the Member for Leitrim (Mr. Ormsby-Gore.) They were a formidable body, and if properly drilled and set up—though he would not envy the lot of the officer who would have to take them in hand, might form a portion of our Reserve forces, and be formidable enough so far as inert resistance went. It was too much to suppose that these men would be very ardent in their desire to give up positions of emolument, patronage, and importance. There was, no doubt, no desire on their part to do so. No less than 23 years had elapsed since an Act of Parliament was passed to enable the three companies, whose lines extend from Dublin to Belfast, to come to terms of amalgamation; but although various meetings had been held for the purpose, nothing had been effected. The directors of these companies were in too many instances petty potentates at variance with each other at different times, striving to injure and impede the traffic of each other—in other words, doing the greatest possible amount of injury to the general interests of the country. They reminded him of the small principalities in former days in Italy, where instead of encouragement being given to travellers every obstacle and annoyance was placed in their path. The state of things was absolutely intolerable. The united receipts of the whole of the 24 working companies in Ireland amounted only to £2,002,500 per annum, and occupied the attention of 500 directors; while one Scotch Company—the Caledonian—with 13 directors, managed receipts amounting to £2,000,500 per annum. Until all personal considerations were eradicated from the human mind they would certainly find no movement on the part of Irish directors in favour of amalgamation, and of their own "happy"—too happy—"despatch." But the Irish representatives, although many of them were directors—himself, among the number—were totally uninfluenced by mere shareholders' considerations. They wished to improve the condition of the country by the amalgama tion of these various and conflicting boards. They wished by concentration of management to effect a saving stated by the Railway Commissioners at £32,000, and which would be available for the reduction of freights and fares, especially, as he said before, of third-class fares, for he did not attach much importance to a reduction in first-class fares, as it would, not be reproductive. Then, if the debenture capital and other borrowed money were placed under a Government guarantee an additional saving of £88,000 would be effected, and all would be applicable to the same purpose of reduction. He did not wish the House to suppose that he ever ran away with the idea that the reduction of freight would be immediately recouped by an immensely increased traffic. He bore in mind that Irish railways traversed in many instances large tracts of thinly-populated country, from which no great increase could be expected. But of this he was convinced—that the lowering of third-class fares would be an immense boon to the agricultural population, which was only now beginning to be educated into railway travelling; and if freights were lowered a large traffic would spring up in the transmission of agricultural produce, which from high rates now lay congested; and, lastly, there was the question of minerals, and he might say to those who were in hopes of local manufactures springing up, that the high freight of coals rendered all such hopes vain in inland districts. They should bear in mind that in Ireland, the poorest part of Her Majesty's dominions, fares were often much higher than in England, and invariably than in Scotland. How could they expect the poorer classes to avail themselves of locomotion in such a state of things? How could they hope for any amendment when the chairman of the greatest system in Ireland—the Great Southern and Western—in his half-yearly address in 1865 or 1866, spoke thus of the issue of third-class return tickets even on market days. He said—"It is no use to issue them, nor is there any traffic of that kind." On the other hand, Mr. Forbes, traffic manager of the Midland line stated, in his evidence, before the Royal Commission, that—

"They tried the experiment of carrying third-class passengers at a single fare for the double journey, and the result had been that the trains which then ran empty were now crowded every market-day, and he believed if the same system were carried out every day in the week, it would be greatly to the advantage of the country."

As regards freights, the same witness said that—

"The rates of the carriage of agricultural produce was prohibitory in many cases. That in the county of Galway they were selling potatoes at 3d. a stone at no great distance from a railway-station, while the price of potatoes was 7d. a stone in Dublin, but the high freight prevented the Galway owner from forwarding them."

And he added—

"That if the high rates were lowered, an immense traffic with Dublin in grain, potatoes, poultry, and eggs might be expected from the West."

But directors could not lower their freights and decrease their dividends even for one year, however fair might be the prospect of eventually recouping the first loss. They had to deal with shareholders not unpatriotic by nature, but whose necessities did not allow them to exercise patriotism at the expense of their families. He would conclude by saying that he had not come forward with any particular plan; although he was of the same opinion as ever that the best course to pursue would be for the State to purchase up the railways. In saying that, he was entirely opposed to the State management of these railways; but after being purchased and got in hand, they might be leased out to two or three companies for certain periods and on conditions favourable to the lowering of freights and fares. He did not go even the length of saying that he was favourable to an immediate and inordinate reduction of fares and freights by placing them on the Belgian level. He wished to proceed safely and quietly—to cut his coat according to his cloth. He had seen the results of the purchase of the telegraphs used as an argument against the Government purchase of Irish railways; but nothing could be more favourable to his views than what had occurred in regard to the telegraphs. The Government had purchased them, and had borrowed the money for the purchase at 3 or 3½ per cent, and it was, he believed, a matter of notoriety that they had obtained a return of 4½ per cent on the capital expended; while the public, who had despatched messages, had gained beween £300,000 and £400,000 in one year—that being the difference between the price charged by the Government and that charged by the telegraphic companies. As to future undertakings, he did not wish to hamper the subject by taking them into consideration. He believed they would be carried out, according as the want of them arose, by private enterprise and local guarantees. He could not admit that there was any weak point in the harness of the Irish Members because they had not proposed a plan. The House knew perfectly well that an unwilling Government would rejoice in having a plan submitted, for nothing was easier or pleasanter to the official mind than to pick holes and to raise up difficulties. What he wanted was that the Government should simply state their own views and introduce their measure, and he was convinced that that measure, if effective to remove the evils of which they complained, would be received with acclamation by both sides of the House. He deeply regretted the long delay that had occurred in dealing with this matter. There was some difficulty in replying to the advocates of home rule when they declared that the first Session of an Irish Parliament would not pass over without legislating for railways, and that other Irish scandal—the condition of the Shannon. He did not wish to press hard on the Government. He recognized with thanks the great measures they had passed for Ireland. He saw all the difficulties which surrounded every attempt at legislation. All he asked was this—that an intimation should now be given that Government would consider this subject during the Recess and introduce a measure next Session, and that the Prime Minister would not forget his notable words only a few years back on this very subject—

"It was true that the difficult problem of intervention by Government in the case of railways was to a certain extent limited in Ireland by the circumstances of the case."

And he added—

"No boon could be secured to Ireland so free from all taint, so free from all partiality, so comprehensive and effective in its application, as by some measures taken to secure to Ireland the benefits of cheap transit."

These words had not been forgotten in Ireland, and the events of the last few years had given the people of Ireland a faith that his professions were in harmony with his intentions, and not more idle words, without significance and meaning.

said, he should support the Motion. The question which it raised was in his opinion one of the utmost importance, and the benefits which would result from its adoption would be two-fold, in that the resources of Ireland would be more directly developed, industry encouraged, and, as a consequence, wealth increased; while another result would be that the hands of the Government would be materially strengthened in the event of any crisis occurring, while in a financial point of view the policy recommended would be remunerative. The present condition of the Irish railways was far from satisfactory. Great loss was inflicted on the country by the jealousies of rival companies, and there was between them an utter want of any sort of co-operation. If the railways were amalgamated under one central authority those evils would be corrected, while there would be a large saving of expense. He found that in 1866 there were 66 lines of railway in Ireland, with 494 directors and 170 other officers, working 1,900 miles of line, the total income being £1,520,000 a-year. Now, on referring to the statistics of the London and North-Western Railway, he found that one board of directors and one staff of officers worked a system of railway which had an income of £5,300,000. It was clear, therefore, that a great saving might be effected by such a system of centralization as was proposed. It was the fact that on some lines in Ireland there was a director for every two miles of railway; and that, he must confess, seemed to him to be a greater number that was absolutely required. Mr. Dargan had estimated that the result of a scheme of centralization under one board would be a saving of one-fifth of the present expenditure, and as to the Government being asked to take up bad speculations, he would only say that the lines in Ireland had, for the most part, been well laid out, and the works properly and cheaply executed. There was not the least doubt that, with proper management, Irish railways would be fairly remunerative.

said, that question had naturally enough excited considerable attention in the minds of Irish Members, and it was quite natural that there should be some impatience and dissatisfaction produced in their minds by the fact that it had not resulted in any satisfactory consequence; but those who complained that the Government had not and did not bring this question to a practical conclusion should remember that with the Irish Church Bill in one Session, with the work of last year, and the Business which the House had undertaken that Session, it would have been impossible, even if it had been thought advisable, for the present Government to attempt to deal with the subject; while, as regarded himself, he would ask hon. Members whether it was possible, looking at the short time he had been in office, for him to have made himself acquainted with a subject so difficult and intricate? It had been said that if the Government had brought forward any well-prepared scheme, it would not have occupied much of the time of the House, and it would have received the unanimous support of the Irish Members, but though, no doubt, there was unanimity enough among Irish Members as long as the question was left in a dubious state, he doubted whether that unanimity would be enlisted in support of any specific and defined method of dealing with the subject, more especially when that scheme involved that dangerous article of contention, an Irish guarantee. Some years ago a Royal Commission appointed to consider the subject of railways and to inquire particularly into the subject of the Irish railways, reported directly against any increased interference on the part of the State with the railways in Great Britain and Ireland. They were told that the Report of the Commission which had been appointed since that date was to the contrary effect, and that was perfectly true; but the Commission referred to was not appointed to report upon the expediency of purchasing railways, but merely as to the time that would elapse before the immediate cost of the reduction of fares would be recovered. That Report placed a great impediment in the way of anything but a great and sweeping change, because it stated that a slight reduction of fares would only result in the throwing away of money, and that a reduction to be of any value would involve a loss of £525,000 a-year. They went on to say that in 11 years time that loss would probably be converted into a gain; but as that calculation was founded upon the experience of Belgium, which was exactly opposite to that of Ireland, he failed to see in what respect it could be regarded as trustworthy. Since that Report was published, a Committee of Peers and Members of that House had been formed to direct the attention of Parliament and the public to this question; but, though they had brought forward no particular scheme, and had contented themselves with urging that something must be done, their action did not, as far as he could see, appear to have been ratified by any considerable section of the Irish people. They were now told that what was proposed could be done without the expenditure of English money, as Ireland was willing to furnish a guarantee from her own resources to the Government, that no loss should be incurred by the acquisition of Irish railways; but even if that were so, it was the duty of a Government, before making such a proposal as that now suggested, to decide whether it would be wise to allow the Irish people to take upon themselves that liability, even if they were willing that it should be imposed—a fact which he very much doubted, as he was not aware of any public meetings that had expressed a decided opinion in favour of an Irish guarantee. But even if the Irish public were willing to incur some liability of this kind, the Government and Parliament could not be insensible to the consideration that that guarantee would assume a different aspect when the benefit would be reaped, and the liability undertaken. It would be a question whether it was wise of the Irish people to undertake that guarantee. It would also be a matter of consideration in the event of Parliament deciding upon taking action in respect to the Irish railways, whether the benefit would be worth the price to be paid for it, and whether the liability should be left entirely upon Ireland, and not to be shared in by the Imperial Parliament. Moreover, he was not aware that any request had been put forward by the railway companies themselves in reference to the interference by the State. The purchase of the telegraphs was instanced as a precedent for the consideration of the Government; but it should be remembered that the telegraph companies were doing a good and an increasing business, and paying good dividends, while the reverse was the case with respect to the Irish railways. There was nothing un- reasonable in the supposition that, if the change advocated were desired by so many Irishmen, some overtures should be made to the Government by the companies themselves. At all events, the present position of affairs was not one likely to lead to a speedy settlement of the question, and he could not see that the Government were in any way open to the reproach of not having acted more speedily in the matter, inasmuch as nothing whatever had as yet been done to conduce to a settlement of the question in the way desired by Irish Members. Gentlemen were urging the Government to buy concerns which were not lucrative, and the railway companies were being told that they might turn moderate investments into good ones. That was not the way in which it was desirable that those matters should proceed. If the Committee wished to produce speedy action, why did they not see whether some effect could be produced on the railway companies themselves? It was not for the Government or Parliament to go cap in hand suing the proprietors of unremunerative speculations to dispose of them; it would be much more natural that they should come to the Government seeking to be relieved from the difficulties in which they found themselves. He was not able to discover any trace of the unanimity which had been alleged. There were two schemes before the country than which nothing could be more unlike; and, probably, when the question had assumed a practical shape, there would be half-a-dozen more schemes. There was, indeed, no unanimity except in the belief that something ought to be done; and, therefore, no harm had been done by delay on the part of the Government. If the Government had rushed forward with enthusiasm to accept the proposals made, the companies would have been more than human if they had not made extravagant demands. They had, however, seen that, although the Government might ultimately think it necessary to do something, they were not extremely anxious to embark in unprofitable undertakings; and so far, if the expectations of the companies had been moderated, good would have been done by delay. He was not going to deny that if the companies would not come to the Government, it might ultimately be the duty of the Government to go to them; but he greatly doubted whether any such plan as that contemplated by the second Report of the Commission ought to be undertaken by the Government. No doubt there was fax too great a sub-division of railway enterprise in Ireland; but was it not possible that that might be reformed without the intervention of the Government? It was possible that the attention of Government and Parliament might be directed in the way of an arrangement to correct the admitted evils of the present system, to the principle of encouraging and effecting amalgamation, without plunging into any wild and extensive scheme such as that proposed. He was not in a position to announce any intention of the Government for next Session; but he could use the interval to make himself acquainted with the details of the question, and to enter into communication with those who took an interest in it, with the view of seeing whether any practical plan could be suggested, or whether there was in Ireland any such unanimous feeling as had been represented, and whether in the opinion of the Irish people they would be justified in taking upon themselves an onerous guarantee. That was all he was in a position to say, and the Government did not believe it would conduce to a speedy settlement of the question if they made a premature disclosure of their intentions.

said, he was disappointed with the reply made on behalf of the Government, and he believed the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland had not paid much attention to the subject. He (Mr. Downing) had expected the views of the Government would have been stated by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chichester Fortescue), who, he believed, was specially addressed in the speeches that had been made. He could testify from attendance at public meetings to the feeling in Ireland on this question, and he denied that money had been lent to Irish railways which had not been repaid. He never heard a better speech than that of the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland in favour of "home rule," for all that the Irish people asked was that they might be permitted to mortgage their own property, and that the State would do for Ireland what it had done for Canada and for India. He main- tained that there could not be better evidence of unanimity than the memorial of Peers and Members of Parliament, and said that the Representatives of the people were obliged to approach the Government, because, as the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. W. H. Gregory) had said, the railway companies never would do so. After all that had been said and done it was really too bad to assert that there was no unanimity of feeling in Ireland, and he would warn the Government, as the hon. Member for Leitrim (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) had done, against the consequences of maintaining the attitude they did.

said, he felt an interest in that question, in consequence of having been a Member of the Commission appointed to consider the subject. The result of the deliberations of that Commission was adverse to Government interference with Irish railways; but, as an English Member of Parliament, he was ready to admit that the question was one in respect to which the greatest deference should be paid to Irish feeling, and if the Government or any private Member of that House were to propose a scheme which would meet with the support of the majority of Irish Members, he should refuse to oppose it, though in his own judgment he might think it objectionable. He did not think that on this subject there was in Ireland that unanimity which the hon. Member for Galway described, and he conceived that there existed insuperable objections to every proposition which had been suggested; but, as there was great evil in leaving the matter open, the Government ought, if they could not think of a scheme which they could honestly propose, to state that circumstance candidly and decisively to Parliament, for at present the expectation that the Government would deal with the matter in some way prevented a reduction of fares and a system of amalgamation from being effected.

said, that the Irish people would hear with regret that the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland could not pledge the Government to bring forward a mature scheme next Session. He must, in contradiction to what the noble Lord had asserted, maintain that the Irish people were unanimously of opinion that the Government should introduce a measure dealing with the subject. With regard to the subject of Belgian fares for railway travelling, although they were only one-half the amount of the Irish ones, yet they were found to be highly remunerative to the State.

said, he had no intention of departing from the tenor of the language he had formerly used, as quoted by the hon. Member for Galway (Sir. W. H. Gregory); and he thought that no greater or safer boon could, at the time when he spoke, have been bestowed on Ireland than by a measure, if such could be devised, for securing to the different classes in that country the immense advantages of easy and cheap communication, but he had been careful to avoid committing himself as to the time or shape or the practicability of adopting a plan of that kind. To desire an object was one thing, and to see one's way to it was another, and there could be no greater mischief than for any persons likely to hold office in that country to give grounds for expectations which there might be no means of fulfilling. At the same time, he must say that to the full he shared in the responsibility of his noble Friend the Chief Secretary for Ireland. In the time of the Government of Lord Palmerston, a Railway Commission composed of persons of the greatest weight, authority, and experience was issued, and it was issued with the hope that some measure for the benefit of Ireland in reference to railways would be suggested by the inquiry; but the result was entire disappointment, for the Commission reported very unfavourably to the proposals which were suggested. The hon. Member for Cork (Mr. Downing) complained that Ireland was treated unequally with Canada and with India in respect to the railway question; but the fact was in regard to Canada the guarantee was given not to a railway company, but to the Legislature of Canada, and expressly on the ground that it was not given as a specimen of future policy, but because that country desired to wind up and close a vicious system. Then, what was the case with regard to India? India had never had an advance or a guarantee of a sixpence; not a sixpence had been advanced to a railway company in England; assistance was refused even to the Holyhead Railway; but there had been inequality, in favour of Ireland, for valuable assistance in the shape of loans had been given to Irish companies; and assistance had been given to Ireland which had been refused to England and Scotland. The hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Leveson-Gower), who was a stern freetrader, said that if he found there was a practical accord among the Irish Members and people on that subject, and that their demands involved nothing intolerable, he, for one, would waive his own personal disinclination, and would be ready to give his assent to a reasonable measure; and, for himself, he was Irishman enough to hail that declaration. That was approaching the subject in a spirit of equity and justice, and he would go so far as to express a belief that English and Scotch Members while approaching the question with a considerable amount of adverse prepossession on the merits, unaccustomed as they were to such interference, and while justly demanding strong reasons, would, in such a state of things, give their assent to any reasonable measure. When he heard it stated that no measure had been submitted to Parliament on the subject, and that no legislation had been effected, he would ask in what year did they live and in what circumstances did they stand? Was there a man in that Assembly who held that it was competent for the Government to deal with all subjects at any time, to deal with subjects in a manner that was desirable; to examine everything that could be examined; and to come immediately to conclusions as to what was to be done? The real question was, what were the powers of the Government in that House for practical legislation? He held that Ireland had no reason to complain of her share in the legislation of the last three years. During that time Ireland had occupied the attention of that House so exclusively that general legislation was in arrear, while English and Scotch legislation had been reduced almost to absolute stagnation. Therefore they had to consider the capacity of Parliament to dispose of public questions of that kind, for that was a difficult and complicated matter, not to be disposed of by an unopposed measure; and his hon. Friend the Member for Cork (Mr. Downing) had overlooked the main reasons why the Government had made no serious effort to arrive at a definitive judgment upon it—namely, the total impossibility of their doing so in the state of Public Business. If there was one matter which it was the fashion to reproach the Government for more than another, it was the practice of bringing in Bills which they were not able to carry. What benefit would they have confered upon Ireland if they had brought in a Bill upon this subject, novel in its character, complicated in its provisions, and raising many difficulties, without a reasonable prospect of carrying it forward; or could hon. Members be appeased or propitiated if, in the present state of Public Business, Government ventured to fix a time when they would make a proposal? Under existing circumstances, his noble Friend the Chief Secretary for Ireland had given Irish Members useful advice. It was important to consider not only what Government and Parliament could do, but how far and in what way parties in Ireland would meet them. Could there be a better way of showing friendliness than pointing out difficulties which in some quarters no attempt had been made to solve? Was it not reasonable to point out the attitude of the companies, keeping up high fares, waiting to be bought out, asking for the prolongation of miserable loans, and making no serious rational endeavour to realize some of those economies which were within their power, and by which £32,000 a-year was to be saved? Why was no advance made on their part? Let the hon. Member for Galway, and other hon. Members who were Irish railway directors, influence their own boards and good might be done. The best position of the question would be that those of the Irish companies which were not flourishing showed a disposition to move. Those Peers and representatives who were bringing pressure to bear upon Parliament would exercise a wise discretion if they endeavoured to bring those who could do so much to assist them into an attitude of greater readiness for the change desired. As to Government keeping the question open, Government had done nothing to open it; but they were ready to approach it when there was an opportunity of dealing with it in a practical way, and they would be exceedingly wrong if, in order to curry favour for the moment, they were to hold out large and vague language about the desirableness of mea- sures of that kind. It was more friendly to Ireland to state at once the difficulties that stood in the way, and to endeavour to turn the attention of the Irish railway directors, and of the representatives of Ireland to the means of overcoming those difficulties, and in justice to his noble Friend the Chief Secretary for Ireland, he must say he had shown no symptom of indisposition with respect to dealing with the question. There was no desire on the part of the Government to plead rigid hard abstract principles of non-interference in the case; they desired only to be governed by practical considerations, but those considerations were not of a kind that could be disposed of in a day. With regard to the difficulties attending the settlement of the question, for instance, equitable principles, alternating between a charge upon local rates and the income tax, had been laid down as to a guarantee, but it was not easy to decide upon the form in which those principles were to be applied. If it was suggested that the income tax could be made available for local purposes, it might be said with equal truth that the income tax could be used in the same way in England and Scotland; so that by pursuing this argument they would clog the question of railways with the necessity of solving, as a preliminary, one of the most difficult questions of Imperial or local finance. He did not go quite so far as the hon. Member for Galway, in saying that £525,000 would be nothing to pay, if it contented the people of Ireland; but if the Government could see their way to a useful and practical measure they would not be disposed, and he did not think the majority of the House would be disposed, to drive a hard bargain with Ireland; and at the proper time there would be willingness to deal with that subject upon those terms of equity which the Imperial Parliament had usually been ready to adopt when questions of that class had arisen between the two countries. The real reason why Government, had not dealt with this matter was, that Government had no wish to deal with it until they could see the means of dealing with it effectually. He counselled the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leitrim (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) and those who adhered to his Motion, to endeavour, in the interval before the question could come to a full Parliamentary solution, whether negative or affirmative, to bring the plans and views of the Irish people to a state of maturity, so that it might be comparatively easy, instead of being difficult to deal with the question when brought before Parliament for consideration.

said, he must express his disappointment at the answer of the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland, which he considered very unsatisfactory. He believed that what had been done by individuals in England laboriously, slowly, and at a great cost in the way of railway reform, might be done quickly and effectually in Ireland with the aid of the Government. The opinion of Ireland, he believed, had been clearly expressed in favour of dealing with that question, though he felt that it would be wise to abstain from advancing any specific proposal until they could do so with some effect. All that they asked was a pledge that between that and the next Session the Government would fairly consider the question, so as to be able to announce whether they thought it definitively desirable to leave the railway management of Ireland to the chaos and contention of individual interests to which it had been decided to leave it in England, or whether it was desirable in Ireland to encourage some other and better system. That proposal did not come from the Irish railway companies, who, as their property was to be purchased at no more than its value, had really no interest in the matter.

observed that the Irish Members did not hope for or expect immediate action on the part of the Government, neither did they wish the adoption of any intermediate scheme; but they had ground for complaint from the fact that hitherto they had always met with official repulse and cold criticism at the hands of the Government, who had shown no disposition to meet them even half-way upon the subject. He believed there was no objection on the part of the Irish community to making the guarantee a mere Irish guarantee. He did not see why Ireland should be treated differently from Canada.

remarked that the arrangement with Canada was entered into with parties who had power over the revenue, and there were no such parties in Ireland.

hoped some plan would be adopted by the Government with a view of satisfying the general desire in Ireland for a reduction of fares and the development of railway traffic. He thought the Government should not undertake the working of the railways, but they should guarantee the interest on the debentures, and have a control over the tariff.

said, it was the wish of all parties that the railway fares in Ireland should be reduced; but no reform could be effected except by the intervention of the Government.

said, the Government were in possession of all the information necessary to make up their minds on this subject, and any course they might think it necessary to pursue must be considered on Imperial grounds. If, however, they interfered at all, they must exercise control over the railways of Ireland, and there must be some security in return for the guarantee they gave.