asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, What protection the Government are prepared to afford to heads of families and the public against the "literature" on an indelicate subject which certain persons, members of a late deputation, threaten to force into their houses, which they say "it is their duty to sow broadcast," the subjects of which they declare "shall be discussed by women and children;" and, whether such persons can be prosecuted for such proceedings under the Act termed "Lord Campbell's Act?"

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it will be possible, consistently with the freedom of the press and the rights of the subject, to restrain the discussion of a Law of the land, a fundamental provision of which is condemned by the Report of a Royal Commission; whether it will be unlawful to publish in pamphlets, or otherwise, the Report and Evidence of the Royal Commission, which this House is itself in course of publishing in Parliamentary Papers; and, whether the most effectual method of preventing further violations of delicacy will not be to repeal or suspend the principal provision of the Contagious Diseases Acts?

I rather object, Sir, to be called upon to say what should be done under an exceptional state of things. The subject to which these Questions relate has to a certain extent been forced upon the attention of the country by the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission and of the evidence taken before it. If the comments on these documents are made in a fair spirit, it is impossible to suppose that any law exists to prevent their publication; but if, on the other hand, the subject is handled in a coarse and gross manner, it will be necessary for the Courts of Law to decide whether the offenders do not come under Lord Campbell's Act. Under such circumstances, the Government would be guided by the opinions of the Judges; but I do not think it right to anticipate unfairness in the discussion of the subject. During the course of last Session a large number of publications were forced upon individuals; but the justification then put forward was the alleged unwillingness of the newspapers to admit correspondence on this subject, especially communications which were opposed to the working of the Acts. I believe, however, that objection no longer exists, for I have seen discussions on this subject in journals of great respectability and large circulation, conducted in a spirit altogether unobjectionable. I trust that, for the future, this difficult and painful subject will be dealt with in such a spirit as not to be exposed to the objections which my hon. Friend has referred to. With respect to the latter part of his Question, I must state that this is really a matter for Parliament to decide, and that, in regard to it, other considerations than mere considerations of delicacy—namely, those connected with the principles of morality—ought to be kept in view.

asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether the greater part of the 64,000,000 acres in Southern Africa, shown to be un-alienated in the "Return regarding Crown Lands in the Colonies presented to this House in June, 1870," continues, as there represented to be, available for settlement; and, if so, to what extent the Home Government are acting in concert with the Government in Southern Africa with a view to disposal thereof; and whether it is intended, in arranging a federal constitution for the Colonies in Southern Africa, to take measures for the provision and permanent maintenance of facilities for employing to the best advantage the waste lands, with a view to securing the emigration thither of the classes of colonists most fitted to their requirements?

Sir, the Crown Lands referred to in the Question of the hon. Gentleman remain in the same state as at the date of the Report in June, 1870. No steps have been taken to dispose of them to emigrants, inasmuch as the reply of the Governor of the Cape to Lord Granville's Circular stated that there was no steady demand for the labour of Europeans and no prospect of their obtaining remunerative employment during any large portion of the year. With regard to the second part of the Question, I can only say that the House of Assembly at the Cape has had under its consideration some Resolutions favourable to federation, but that at the present moment it would be quite premature for me to assume or to make any statement relative to the prospects or the conditions of any such federal constitution.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any official confirmation has reached the Foreign Office with regard to the prevalence of cholera, typhus, and plague in Persia; and, whether if it be true as reported in the newspapers, that at Shiraz the famine is so great that inhabitants are reduced to eating their own children, any offer has been made by the Indian Government to afford such relief as lies in their power towards mitigating the sufferings of the inhabitants of a neighbouring and friendly State?

Sir, official communications have been received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and from other sources announcing the existence of cholera at several places in Persia, and also the appearance of a disease somewhat resembling the plague. The Reports on this subject have been sent to the Council Office. There is a story in circulation that at a place called Koom a man was discovered who had stolen and subsequently devoured two children, but the inhabitants had the man apprehended, brought before the local authorities, and he was put to death; but it is expressly stated that the inhabitants of that place, though suffering great privations, were far from being reduced to such horrible straits. I am not aware whether the Indian Government have proffered or forwarded any relief to those localities; but recent accounts say that the harvest prospects in Persia for this year were of the most hopeful character.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether the Factories and Workshops Acts Amendment Bill will apply to all Government Establishments where young persons and women are employed; and, if not, whether he will introduce a Clause making it applicable?

, in reply, said, that every Government Establishment in which manual labour was exercised by way of trade or for the purposes of gain was actually a workshop, and was subject accordingly to the regulations of the Factories and Workshops Acts. With respect to other Government Establishments where young persons and women were employed, they also were regulated by the same rules, although they were not under the operation of the Acts, as it was considered essential, in order to meet cases of emergency, that the Government should have the power, when they thought proper, of dispensing with a portion of the regulations.

said, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government would, in accordance with the promise given by him on Thursday night last, now inform the House what his intentions were with regard to an autumn or late Sitting.

I rise, Sir, to submit the Motion of which I have given Notice—

"That To-morrow, and upon every succeeding Tuesday during the remainder of the Session, Orders of the Day have precedence of Notices of Motions, Government Orders of the Day having priority."

The only fact necessary to be stated in its support is that we have now reached that period of the Session when it is usual to pass a Motion of this kind with a view to facilitate the winding up of business. On the 3rd of August, 1869, being a Tuesday, this privilege was granted, and on the 7th of July, 1868, it was also granted. This is enough, I think, for me to say upon this subject. I will now answer the Question of my hon. Friend the Member for Waterford (Mr. Osborne) with reference to the proposal or suggestion of an autumn adjournment. The Government have examined the state of the Notice Paper, and also considered the character of the remaining clauses of the Ballot Bill, upon which an answer to this question, as my hon. Friend may expect, principally turns; and what we find is this—According to the best of our judgment, there are two, and only two, questions remaining to be dealt with which present a character of some freshness and considerable importance. One of these is the question of polling-places, which has already been partially discussed, and with reference to this subject, although it is important, we are glad to observe that the proposal of my right hon. Friend near me (Mr. W. E. Forster), which has now been within the knowledge of the House for a considerable period, does not appear to have produced any crop of Amendments. That being so, we are rather sanguine in the interpretation which we put upon that state of facts, that that subject, important as it is, is not likely to cause much expenditure of the time of this House. The other question refers to the payment of certain election expenses, and with regard to that question, which is partially novel and also important, we are glad to observe that a Motion has been put on the Paper which will have the effect of practically bringing forward the principle at issue with great felicity and rapidity. Looking at this state of circumstances, we think we may without presumption anticipate the disposal of this stage of the Ballot Bill in the course of to-morrow. Should that expectation be fulfilled, we hope it will be unnecessary, as far as the transaction of the business of the House of Commons is concerned, any longer to entertain the idea of an adjournment to a period of the autumn. On the other hand, if that expectation be doomed to disappointment, we then think that the time is come when we could not keep the House waiting longer in order to meet the views of the Government upon that subject. If we are not able to finish, or substantially to finish, the Committee on the Ballot Bill in the course of to-morrow, aided, as I trust we shall be, by having at our disposal the Evening Sitting to-morrow, we shall then be compelled, however reluctantly, to look to an adjournment to a period in the month of October, for the purpose of carrying on to completion the business of the House. This answer is as explicit and as definite as the circumstances will allow me to give.

I think we ought to place all the time we can at the disposal of the Government, considering the late period of the year. But if this House accedes to the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, so that he will be able to commence business on Tuesday at the usual hour, it will not be necessary, I should think, to have any more Morning Sittings. It will be probably more effective for the progress of business if the House should meet at 4 o'clock instead of at 2 o'clock.

That is a point which may remain for future consideration. I should be sorry to change the practice to-morrow, but we will carefully consider the matter before we have any more Morning Sittings. My own impression is in favour of the plan of Morning Sittings, which was the offspring of the right hon. Gentleman himself. I think, as far as my knowledge and experience goes, it has, especially at this period of the Session, conduced to the convenience of the House; but I do not wish to express any foregone conclusion, and we shall have to inform ourselves on the subject.

said, that was a Motion which was usually made at the close of the Session; but it seemed to him that, with 40 Orders of the Day upon the Paper, the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government was presuming on the conclusion of the Session at a period which he had scarcely a right to anticipate, unless the threat which he had held out to them, that they should meet again in October if they were not good boys, and complete the task which he had set them within a very limited period, should prove effectual. Really that was a most novel proceeding. The right hon. Gentleman had adopted a completely new policy with respect to Parliament, which was now to be punished, if the measures he proposed were not carried; and he (Mr. Newdegate) did not hesitate to say that he thought Parliament ought to object to that sort of discipline, because it was really more becoming a public school than a deliberative Assembly. The right hon. Gentleman took the opportunity of announcing elsewhere, the other night, that he had adopted the principle that it mattered not what might be the objections made to the measures that he had proposed, for, sooner or later, they must pass, as the majority of that House supported him in his decision; whilst as to the House of Lords they must take care of themselves. Now, that appeared to him (Mr. Newdegate) to be rather the language of excitement; and although it might commend itself to his partizans—the party who supported him in that House, and whose interests he appeared to have bound up in those measures—it was not a policy that commended itself to thinking men in this country; and of that he believed there was sufficient evidence at the distinguished meeting which the right hon. Gentleman attended on Saturday. Of this he was perfectly certain—that the Legislature would lose credit in the country, and lose position in the country, if it quietly submitted to a policy of that kind; because what did it come to? Let him for a moment call the attention of the House to the state of its own business during the last month of that Session. He had a list of the Orders of the Day for every Monday during the Session up to the present time; and he invited the attention of the House to the singular contrast which that list formed to the list of Orders of the Day on Mondays, which were always Government days in any other Session. They met in February, and he found that the average number of Orders of the Day on Mondays in February, was 9½; in March, the average number was 11¾; in April, 15⅓; in May, 20; in June, it rose to 33; and in July, the average had been 39; whilst that day the number was 40. He asked the House, then, to consider what that meant. He was not alluding to the important measures that had been abandoned, but to this fact—that for the purpose of carrying two measures—the Army Regulation Bill and the Elections Bill, upon which the right hon. Gentleman had set his heart, and with which he had bound up the interests of his party—the really important and pressing business of the country had been postponed from month to month, until they had the announcement that the Session was about to close, if the right hon. Gentleman could force the closure; and yet they had still 40 measures to consider—nay, more than 40, for there were others standing for Thursday next; and they were to consider those measures in a weary House, shorn of numbers; in fact, they were to make over to the Government the entire disposal of that mass of legislation. Now, he held that it was the duty of the House of Commons to protest against that system—against the Government taking up two measures, occupying the whole available portion of the Session with those two measures, and thus by wearying out the House monopolizing the control of, and the decision upon, other important measures at the conclusion of the Session. What was that but virtually to set aside the functions of both Houses of the Legislature, by keeping them in suspense until they were so wearied out that they could not deal satisfactorily with measures necessary for the welfare of the country? The right hon. Gentleman was incurring a grave responsibility in that matter. The right hon. Gentleman had, no doubt, a right to plead that the reorganization of the Army was, to a certain extent, a question of urgency; but he could not plead that the Elections Bill was a question of urgency, unless he had determined on a Dissolution, and feared a dissolution under the present law regulating elections; or else he designed to starve out Mr. Bradlaugh, to distance every other agitator, and to render that House a centre of agitation for revolutionary change. Those were the aspects in which he viewed the conduct of the Government during the present Session. He had no wish to oppose Her Majesty's Government factiously. He had no party purpose to serve. The right hon. Gentleman, on Saturday night, expressed his acquiescence in, and approval of, the conduct of the Leader of the Opposition; they must suppose, therefore, that the two right hon. Gentlemen had come to an understanding in order to pursue the course which he had described; but he held that that House did not fulfil its functions, and disappointed, nay deceived the country, if it suffered legislation to be postponed in masses until from sheer weariness the House was precluded from the possibility of giving due attention to those important questions. That was the view which he took of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, and he trusted that that House, if not now, yet in another Session would enter an effectual protest against being thus superseded by the Ministers of the Crown.

said, he was anxious to say a few words upon the conduct of Irish Business during the present Session. With the exception of one measure—the Coercion Bill—no proposal of the Government relating to Ireland had ever come on for discussion till 1, 2, or 3 o'clock in the morning. Irish measures were then brought on pell-mell, at a time when it was impossible that they could receive adequate consideration. In fact, under the present system, an Irish Member, if he wished to do his duty in the House of Commons, must be prepared to sacrifice his health. That very evening there were ten Irish Bills standing upon the Notice Paper, although three-fourths of the Irish Members were absent—many of them attending the Assizes. He did not blame the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland or the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland for that state of things; for, owing to the position into which other Government Business had fallen, he believed it was practically impossible to bring on Irish Bills at a reasonable hour. Still, that did not alter the hardship of the case, as far as hon. Members and as far as Ireland itself were concerned. When he ventured occasionally to ask the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland what he considered a reasonable hour to bring on a particular Bill, his reply was, "A quarter to 2"—a time when it was plainly impossible that any Bill could be considered upon its merits; but that evening Irish Members were in the unfortunate position of being unable to get a pledge from any Member of the Government as to the time when any one of those Irish Bills might be expected to come on.

said, as an English Member, he wished to remark that the two last Sessions had been given up to Ireland. If, therefore, the remaining time of the House this Session was to be taken up with ten more Irish Bills, that certainly would not be treating English and Scotch Members fairly.

said, it was perfectly well known that many of the 30 or 40 Orders nightly appearing upon the Paper were put down merely to fix a future day upon which they might be taken into consideration. The Government perfectly well knew which of these they did not even intend to discuss, and if they would only let the fact be known it would save inconvenience to many hon. Members, who were detained till a late hour watching Bills which the Government knew were not to come on.

There is one point in the present discussion which has been treated somewhat jocularly, but which seems to me a very serious one. The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government has risen in his place and told us what his arrangements are for conducting the Business of the House to a termination. He finds in making those arrangements that, with the exception of two points in the Ballot Bill, one of which is to be under discussion to-night—all the rest will be easy to settle. We have now got to the 18th clause of the Bill, which is one of 57 clauses, and, omitting those which the right hon. Gentleman says are not to be pressed, there are still some 25 clauses to be discussed. The right hon. Gentleman says there are very few Amendments; but I hold in my hand from 28 to 30 pages of Amendments, some of them of the utmost importance, given as well by hon. Gentlemen upon the other side as by hon. Members upon this side of the House. There is, for instance, the question of polling-places, and not merely in England, for I observe that with regard to Ireland two sets of Amendments are proposed—one by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland, and one by the hon. and learned Member for Tipperary (Mr. Heron). And what I complain of is that the right hon. Gentleman says—if we do not pass this Bill to-morrow night—if we do not pass those 25 clauses and dispose of all those Amendments by tomorrow night, then the House is to meet again next October.

Pardon me; I never said any such thing. What I did say was, that if they were not passed by that time, we should make the proposal to the House.

Well, I can only say that if that proposal is made to the House, I trust the House will vote by ballot upon the question. But I must follow the speech of the right hon. Gentleman further. Night after night Bills of the greatest importance are brought forward after 2 o'clock in the morning, and if any serious discussion arises upon them what is the answer? Why, that if the Bill is discussed and amended, so as to become a good Bill, the time of the Session will not suffice, and we are accordingly urged to pass Bills which we feel and know to be incomplete, and to shut ourselves out from the opportunity of amending them, because of the way in which the business is crowded upon the Paper through the action of the Government. There is a Bill with respect to local government which stands third upon the Paper for to-night, and I am very anxious that that Bill, or some such Bill, should be passed; but if ever there was a Bill which ought to be carefully considered it is that, to make sure that we have got a really good head to the sanitary department of this country. And yet that Bill is brought on again and again at hours when it is impossible that a jaded House can give to the subject the attention it requires. To show the importance of that Bill, I asked a question of my right hon. Friend (Mr. W. E. Forster) the other night, and he told us he knew nothing whatever of the approach of the cholera—that it was still at a great distance. But, I see by the papers that that very evening the cholera was in the town of Hull. [Mr. W. E. FORSTER dissented.] Well, a vessel arrived at Hull from Cronstadt, and on board the vessel were passengers who were suffering from cholera. And so serious was the matter considered that an Order in Council was issued upon the subject. I refer to that as showing that if we are now engaged in organizing a system upon which dependence is to be placed in an hour of trial, it is of the first importance that there should be a full and proper opportunity of discussing its provisions; but, as matters are conducted, that Bill invariably comes on at an hour when most hon. Members have left the House, and the remainder are utterly fagged with the exertions they have undergone. The other night, again, we were told that the Navy Estimates did not come on because of an unforeseen circumstance—which was that the pockets of my right hon. Friend who presides over the Education Department were so empty that they could not go on paying any longer unless he obtained a Vote. And so matters go on—measures are introduced, but everything is kept back, not from any fault of the House, but from the fault of the Government in not properly arranging its business. ["No, no!"] Hon. Gentlemen opposite, of course, will not admit the fault is in any sense theirs; but they have admitted it nevertheless. For what have they done? They have put down Amendments to Bills, and at the request of the Government they have afterwards given up those Amendments. They have sacrificed everything to procure the passing of measures, not because they believe those measures in themselves to be good—for their own Amendments show that they can see their defects and know how those ought to be remedied—but because their desire is, not for the best, but for the best party legislation.

said, he begged to ask the Solicitor General for Ireland after what hour the Summary Jurisdiction (Ireland) Bill will not be proceeded with?

It is very difficult to answer a question of that kind. If the hon. Member for Armagh will induce his Friends not to be as communicative to the House as they generally are, I may take it at 1 o'clock.

And the Local Government (Ireland) Bill?

It will not come on to-night.

asked what arrangement, if any, would be made as to the Turnpike Bill?

Well, it is impossible for me to make any arrangements just now.

I am very glad to see that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department has returned to his place. I beg therefore to ask him whether he intends to proceed with the Mines Regulation Bill to-night, or at any other period during this Session?

I was in hope that by forming a very large select representative Committee of this House it would be possible to put the Bill into such a shape that it might pass substantially unopposed; but representations were made to me from every single Member of the Committee that the questions raised by the Bill were such as could only be satisfactorily discussed in this House, and that the labours of the Select Committee would not facilitate the passing of the Bill. Under these circumstances, I felt that it would be needless cruelty to inflict upon hon. Gentlemen the duty of attending the Committee. That was the last chance, and, as it would be manifestly impossible to carry through the House at this period of the Session measures of which the leading principles are so warmly contested, I shall move this evening that the Order for those two Bills be discharged.

asked the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department when he would take the Turnpike Bill?

said, that the Turnpike Trusts Bill would be taken next Thursday.

wished to know in what order. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department studiously paid no attention to appeals of this kind. He wished to know of the Under Secretary of State whether he would place it on the Paper, so that it might be brought on at an early hour, so as to secure its being properly discussed.

said, he had fixed Thursday at the request of certain hon. Members who were interested in the subject, but he had no power to compel its being brought on at any particular time. He was quite prepared to sit in his place till any hour of the morning in order to bring the matter on.

Sir, in pursuance of the Notice that has been given, and of the Orders of the House, I rise to move a Resolution which is the precise counterpart of one which was unanimously adopted some years past in the case of the Duke of Edinburgh; and the purport of that Resolution will be—

"That the annual sum of £15,000 be granted to Her Majesty, out of the Consolidated Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, the said Annuity to be settled on His Royal Highness Prince Arthur William Patrick Albert, for his life, in such manner as Her Majesty shall think proper, and to commence from the date of the coming of age of His Royal Highness."

Having had an opportunity not many months ago of dealing with the general considerations that bear upon this question, I should not have thought it necessary to say more than a very few sentences to the Committee, had I not been given to understand that it was the intention of some hon. Members of this House to question the grant which is about to be made. I therefore wish to remind the House briefly of the nature of the arrangement that subsists between Parliament and the Crown for making provision for certain Members of the Royal Family—an arrangement by which we waive all attempts to make a general provision at the commencement of each reign for the possible issue of the Sovereign, and we leave it to Parliament to deal with each particular case, as it arises, and according to what it may consider that the circumstances of the case demand. That arrangement has two obvious disadvantages. One of these is, that it requires some attention to the history of this class of cases, and to the deeper considerations of policy involved in them, to appreciate its character. And, consequently, by those who take what I may call a more rapid view of the subject—all that we can expect from a large number of persons out-of-doors—it is liable to be misunderstood. Another disadvantage is, that the arrangement being misunderstood, it is apt to cause unjust remarks to be made upon the Royal Family and the Sovereign. For those reasons, many have desired that a different arrangement should be adopted—nor will I now say whether the necessity for such a change may or may not arise; but I beg the Committee to consider whether there are not recommendations of a high order attaching to the plan as it at present subsists. What is that plan? In the first place, I will venture to say that of all the methods by which you can proceed to secure a provision for Members of the Royal Family, it is the one by far the most agreeable to the spirit of a free Constitution; for its effect is to establish a considerable degree of moral control which Parliament would probably lose if any other method were adopted. If we are to say that the Sovereign is to be responsible for realizing out of his, or as the case may be, her annual income funds sufficient to endow a family, however numerous, in a manner becoming their station, the first effect of that would be that it would become necessary to enlarge the allowance bestowed upon the Sovereign at the commencement of the reign; and, in the second place, you would also lose all the elasticity of your arrangement, because whether the Sovereign had issue or not, the sum at the disposal of the Sovereign would remain the same. But there is a third defect still more important, and still more disadvantageous, and it is this—Under the present system this method of provision, while it indicates and presupposes an entire confidence on the part of the Sovereign in the Parliament, and an entirely loyal readiness on the part of the Parliament to acknowledge and reciprocate that confidence, and while it indicates harmony subsisting between the great powers of the State, also tends greatly to confirm that harmony. It places the conduct of the Sovereign and the con-duet of the Royal Family, especially of the junior Members for whom a provision may be asked, in view of the public and of both Houses of the Legislature, and while it preserves a salutary general control in the hands of Parliament, it likewise preserves in the hands of the Sovereign an important control over the younger branches of the Royal Family. I adverted just now to the difficulties that would attend an attempt to provide for the Royal issue by making at the commencement of a reign additions to the annuity granted by the Civil List; but suppose that you adopted another, and in some respects a more practical method of proceeding—namely, that you granted for the Sovereign that which would be necessary for annual expenditure, but inscribed upon the Statute Book the provision that every Prince the issue of the Sovereign on arriving at full age, and every Princess the issue of the Sovereign on arriving at full age or at the period of marriage, should receive a fixed annuity—who does not see that to adopt that method, which would probably be the simplest and most easily worked method of dealing with such cases, would involve the relaxation or the destruction of a very salutary moral and general control over those Princes and Princesses? Having said thus much with regard to the general character of this arrangement, which presupposes, as I have said, a disposition on the part of Parliament to reciprocate the confidence of the Sovereign, and to appreciate that sort of feeling on the part of the Sovereign which is indicated by a willingness to submit to the representatives of the people, on every occasion as it arises, the nature of the provision to be made for the Members of the Royal Family, I must add that it is an arrangement which I think is excellent as long as it is worked in a spirit of liberality, of prudence, and of attachment to the Sovereign. It is an arrangement which undoubtedly would be grievously marred, and might become hardly practicable or hardly secure were it, unfortunately, to be dealt with in a different spirit. But upon all occasions when these proposals have been made to it this House has entered with the fullest development of loyal affection into the intentions and spirit of the plan, and as long as this House continues to act in that manner, I am confident that no better plan can be devised, and under no circumstances can any plan be devised so favourable to the privileges and influence of this House and to the liberties of the people. I would now, in a very few words, remind the House of what I meant when I spoke of the arrangement between the Crown and Parliament. I may be asked—if this matter is, unhappily, to become a subject of controversy even with a limited portion of those who hear me—"What is the nature of this arrangement? If there is a covenant, where is it written?" ["Hear, hear!"] I am glad I have anticipated that point, and I will at once admit that there is no written covenant, nor am I aware in what form of words it would be possible to frame such an engagement without very greatly fettering the liberty of the people and that constitutional control to which I have referred. But there are, however, other descriptions of engagement besides written forms of words, and it is on the evidence of facts which I find recorded beyond the possibility of doubt that I place the moral liability of Parliament to deal with these cases when they arise. In the first place, I refer to the terms of the Civil List Act. Let hon. Members read the Report of the Committee of 1837. Let them look at the mode in which the annual income is bestowed upon the Sovereign. It is not bestowed upon the Sovereign in the gross, but is bestowed after a careful investigation of details, and an exact appreciation of what, in the judgment of Parliament, each of the burdens to which the attention of Parliament is directed will require in order to maintain the dignity of the Sovereign, with which the dignity of the nation is intimately associated. As one instance, I need only give one, I ask, what are we to say of an income in respect of which more than one-third of the whole amount—namely, the sum of £131,000 out of £385,000—is by Act of Parliament allotted for the purposes of salaries and superannuations? There is no analogy between an income of that kind and an ordinary private and personal income. It is not possible, except to the most limited extent — and to a very limited extent it may be possible—to make an impression upon those hard and massive figures. Were the Sovereign to attempt to make a great reduction on those salaries and superannuations universal outcry would be the result. There is not that freedom of judgment in dealing with those incomes with which every private possessor of an income is endowed, and that is a circumstance which it is absolutely necessary for Parliament to bear in mind when it proceeds to appreciate its duties on an occasion of this kind. But I have been diverted somewhat from my purpose, which was to show what I conceive to be—to use a phrase which I hope will not be misunderstood—the moral liability of Parliament to recognize its duty of providing, to an adequate extent, for the junior branches of the Royal Family as they come to mature age. My first argument is the negative evidence that neither in the Report of the Committee on this subject nor in any debates of Parliament will there be found expressed the slightest claim or the faintest expectation that out of that income savings could be made adequate to a due provision for the junior branches of the Royal Family. But that negative evidence is supported by direct and positive evidence of the most substantial kind, and that positive evidence is to this effect—that upon every occasion, within the limits of those relationships which history recognizes as defining the bounds of fair claim upon the public, Parliament has without question almost invariably by a unanimous vote, and never except by an overwhelming vote, admitted the virtual bond of honourable obligation and made this provision, laying the gift freely and voluntarily at the feet of the Sovereign. The uncle and aunt of George II. had large Parliamentary incomes. The brother of George III. had a large Parliamentary income. The sons and daughters of George III. were all provided with Parliamentary statutory incomes. The nephews and nieces of George III. were provided with statutory incomes, and the grandson of George III., in the person of the Duke of Cambridge, has been provided with a statutory income. [Mr. WHITE: That was very wrong.] That is an assumption of my hon. Friend. He is entitled to entertain that opinion; but I am sure that he, as a man of candour and intelligence, will not question the assertion which I make, and to which I am anxious to call his attention—that a long and an unbroken series of practical acknowledgments by Parliament not only through years, but through generations, and embracing every possible case to which the principle could apply, does constitute a state of just expectation on the part of the Sovereign from which it is impossible for us to recede, and which I do not hesitate to say it would be utterly unworthy of the British Parliament to disregard. With respect to this supposed liability of Her Majesty to provide for cases of this kind, I have already pointed out that the nature and structure of Her Majesty's income, which does not, excepting only within very narrow limits, remain to be disposed of by herself, but of which Parliament has substantially disposed of beforehand by the very terms of a statute, subject only to a certain margin of difference between prudence and imprudence, do not admit of the same discretion as to economies and savings which is in the possession of every private person. But I think it is only just to Her Majesty to point out one or two circumstances in her condition as compared with that of former Sovereigns. In the case of former Sovereigns you have had claims made, which I grant were totally illegitimate, for the payment of the debts of the Civil List. You have not heard of such claims as these in the present reign. Has that been because the Queen has had means placed at her command which were not at the command of former Sovereigns? Quite the reverse. I believe that for several centuries every Sovereign, except Her Majesty, when there has been a Prince of Wales, has had the entire revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall until the Prince of Wales came of age. Her Majesty never touched these revenues from the day of the birth of the Prince of Wales until his coming of age, when they became his of right, except to the very limited amount which was required for the positive expenditure connected with his nurture and education. And do not let it be supposed that Her Majesty has not been at charges on account of the Royal Family. It is not for me to make minute investigations into these matters; but I can see what were the sums paid to George III. from the Civil List for the education of his children while they were under age, and they amount to some hundreds of thousands of pounds. Do not let it be supposed, for instance, that, in the cases of the Duke of Edinburgh and Prince Arthur, Her Majesty's real substantial charge for them only began on the day when they came of age. The manhood of Royal Princes for all purposes of expense begins much earlier than the manhood of persons in a less exalted station. I cannot pretend to speak from information; but I have not a doubt that several hundreds of thousands of pounds have been expended by Her Majesty out of her own annual income for the purpose of rearing her children in a manner which was liberal and becoming. Such being the case, I do not think there is any other question to which I need refer except that of the amount of this proposed annuity. We propose that in the case of Prince Arthur the same amount should be given as was given in the case of his elder brother (the Duke of Edinburgh), who was also one of the junior branches of the Royal Family—namely, £15,000 a-year. That is undoubtedly a large amount to grant; but is it a large amount relatively to the force of former precedents, relatively to the justice of the case, and relatively to the standard of income in this country? There are in this country numbers of persons possessed not only of that but also of a much larger income, among whom Royal Princes are to move, but above whom they ought somewhat to tower. Let it be recollected here again that just as the Queen's income is much less her own than a corresponding or any given amount in the hands of a private person, so the incomes of Royal Princes are much less their own. Not inconsiderable portions of their incomes are absolutely pre-appropriated and anticipated, not I admit in every case by the letter of a statute, but by the usages of their station. The attendants they require, the offices which must be established about them—offices which do not perhaps contribute in every case greatly to their comfort and enjoyment, but which the country expects and requires, and an attempt to drop which causes dissatisfaction in every class of society—make no inconsiderable invasion on the amounts that you may be asked to grant. I have said that £15,000 a-year sounds a large sum. But it is not to be considered as extravagant, or as more than a very fairly liberal sum. What are the incomes of this country? If you accede to this Motion—as I have confidence you will—I believe you are going to give to Prince Arthur an income less than the average income of the House of Lords. Is it only ill the House of Lords that incomes of £15,000 a-year are to be found? I look at Schedule D, which does not at all overstate the incomes of those whose case it represents; on the contrary, we well know that it does not represent their whole income, but only that portion which is the result of the capital which they hold engaged in business. Even in Schedule D, partial as is the representation made by it, I find that 800 persons are receiving from £10,000 to £15,000 a-year from the profits of trade, and a very considerable number are receiving over £50,000. Under these circumstances, I say that to ask for a child of the Sovereign an income of £15,000 is not unreasonable. It is an amount that could not bear reduction, and as to its diminution it would be totally impossible for the Government to listen for a moment to any such proposal. Am I to suppose that the House will begin by granting freely and ungrudgingly to one of the junior Royal Princes an income of £15,000 a-year, and then when another comes on under exactly the same circumstances, a youth of not less promise and intelligence, who is not less beloved by all those among whom he has moved, is this House going to refuse to him either the whole provision or even any portion of the provision that was freely and cheerfully made for his brother? With regard to precedent, I will quote two that I think more than justify the proposal that we make. They might even perhaps be urged if a larger grant had been proposed; but this House gave to the Duke of Gloucester £14,000 a-year, or within £1,000 of the sum that is now asked, he being not a son, but a grandson of a Sovereign. It is true that the Duke of Gloucester married, and when he married the Princess Mary he received another £14,000 a-year. The Duke of Cambridge is unmarried, and he being also the grandson of a Sovereign, receives from this House and by the liberality of the Legislature the sum of £12,000 a-year. In 1850, a year when undoubtedly far stricter notions of public economy governed the general proceedings of Parliament than those which now prevail, it was thought that £12,000 a-year was a proper and becoming provision to make for the grandson of a Sovereign, and we now for the son of a Sovereign ask for a Vote of £15,000. As I cannot believe that a different course will be taken now, than was taken then, I will not trouble the Committee further on the subject. I am persuaded that even if, unhappily, there should be a few who think otherwise, the mass of Parliament and the mass of the nation will recognize the fairness of the proposal which we make, and that the sum which we ask will not only be voted, but will be cheerfully voted by an overwhelming majority.

seconded the Motion.

Sir, I rise to oppose the Motion which has been made by the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government. Her Majesty's Government have not, I think, been very fortunate this Session in regard to the number and the excellence of the measures which they have proposed for the adoption of Parliament; and in my opinion, and in the estimation of the country, they have been still more unfortunate in having called upon the House of Commons, twice in the same Session, to make additional grants to Royalty which in the opinion of a large portion of the people of this country, are already excessive and extravagant. I am sure that the people of this country are anything but satisfied at the course of legislation, for that legislation represents nothing but confusion, and Her Majesty's Government seem determined to render the Executive unpopular by the continued cry of—"Give, give." There are masses of persons, and I think they are right, who feel that the expenses of Royalty are altogether too great, and that these expenses, as was said of the power of Royalty in the last century, "have increased, are increasing, and ought to be diminished." They think that £750,000 or £1,000,000 is an excessive sum to pay annually in making provision for Members of the Royal Family; and I do not hesitate to say that this feeling is spreading, and that any Liberal Government, so-called, however popular, hazard their popularity by defying that feeling on the part of the people. There are two special grounds on which I oppose this grant. The first is, that the people ought not to be taxed for services not rendered, nor to be rendered; and the second ground is, that if it be essential such provision should be made, the people have already made sufficient provision. It is hardly necessary that I should call witnesses or use arguments in support of a principle so self-evident as that on which I base my first objection. I think it may even be questioned whether we do not exceed the moral functions of the House of Commons when we raise a tax upon the community for that which is non-essential—for that which is rather a matter of sentiment than of necessity for the conduct of the business of the country. If, however, I am obliged to call witnesses in support of my argument, I will call upon the Prime Minister himself, who, when speaking of the aided emigration of the poor last year, said—

"Now, we are about one of the gravest, of all subjects, and that is a proposal to support individuals at the expense of the community—individuals who are to be supported at the expense of the community, but not for duties done to the community."—[3 Hansard, cxcix. 1066.]

The right hon. Gentleman applied that language to the humble and the poor, and did the right hon. Gentleman forget it when he was dealing with an individual who was at the opposite end of the social scale? I hope that hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House will not forget the noble sentiments contained in those words, and will apply it to the subject now under consideration. If this provision is really necessary for Prince Arthur, the people have already voted money sufficient for the purpose; and the whole question is, whether for the performance of duties of Royalty the people are not already sufficiently taxed without imposing upon them additional burdens? I do not esteem myself fortunate in fulfilling what I consider the duty of opposing these grants; but, according to rumour—and in this case, as I believe, a well-founded rumour—it is an alleviating element in a painful position, that the individual on whose behalf this grant is proposed, is one whose past conduct has been creditable and honourable. It is a compliment of the most sinister description to make a proposal of this kind to the House of Commons in favour of such an individual as this young Prince; and it would be a terrible condemnation of the principle of monarchical government, for that man is no friend to Royalty who would affirm that a son of the Sovereign could find no useful place for his energy and capacity. That would be too palpable a condemnation of the principle of monarchical government, and therefore it is a most sinister compliment to say to a young Prince with every arena of useful and honourable exertion open to him—"Nothing is expected from you; and we make you a burden upon the State, and a pensioner upon the people." We are told, that the Civil List is a matter settled at the commencement of the reign, and a thing which we have no business to deal with at all; that there is a moral obligation to find grants and pensions for the children of the Crown; and that the nation has made a good bargain by the exchange of the Civil List for the Crown lands. With regard to the last of these arguments, I believe it to be an unconstitutional view, and one which could never be acted upon. Crown land is only another name for national property, and it matters not whether the revenues of the Crown are sufficient or insufficient to pay the Civil List; because, if insufficient, it is the duty of the nation to provide a Civil List which shall be in harmony with its position and with the dignity of the Sovereign, while if there is a surplus, it should be applied towards reducing the people's burdens. Sir George Lewis said, in 1857, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, that—

"It has been deemed a matter of policy in this country wholly to strip and denude the Sovereign of all hereditary property, and to render him during his life entirely dependent on the bounty of Parliament."—[3 Hansard, cxlv. 724.]

It is questionable whether when the Civil List was settled it was wise that it should be fixed absolutely. It only gave additional force to the words of Lord Brougham when, in 1837, he argued that the Civil List ought not to be fixed for so long a time. It has been urged in the newspapers, and has been mentioned in the lobbies, that Royalty has not of late years fulfilled all those duties which form part of the understanding upon which the Civil List was founded; but I attach no importance to the argument, being one of those who did not value highly the social and ceremonial, as compared with the political, influence of the Sovereign. We are told that these allowances to Princes are part of a moral understanding; but there had never been one of these grants proposed which had not been discussed, both as to the ground of the proposal and the amount of the grant. Sir Robert Peel, in 1843, spoke of it as a recognized thing that the daughters of Royalty, until they married, should be maintained at the expense of the parent; and Lord Brougham acknowledged, in 1850, that the grants made to them on marriage were strict justice so long as the infamous, immoral, impolitic, and un-Christian Act — the Royal Marriage Act — restrained the freedom of choice. I most strenuously affirm that ever hon. Member who supports this grant on this occasion will by that act declare that he maintains, approves, and endorses that most iniquitous and cruel statute. If the Civil List is sufficient, it is unnecessary for, and improper to, ask the House for more. On the occasion of its establishment, Mr. Hume proposed to diminish the amount by £50,000, besides objecting to the Crown retaining the revenues of the two Duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster. Mr. Grote appealed, but in vain, to a Reformed Parliament with the same view, and it will, no doubt, be in vain to appeal now to a Reformed Parliament, for we find the present House more prone to extravagance than ever. If asked how that is, I have no answer to give; but the hon. Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Beresford Hope) the other day said, with that quaint and pleasant cynicism which so often amuses the House, the main object of Gentlemen coming to the House was to obtain an introduction to Court and the entrée to society. Upwards of 40 men, including Charles Buller and Sir William Molesworth—and not one of them revolutionary Radicals—voted for a reduction of the Civil List, and it would appear that in those unreformed days there were Radicals who had courage to declare their opinions, and Conservatives who were not ashamed to be economists. The right hon. Gentleman said it was impossible for the Crown to save out of the money voted by the people; but I remarked that he did not assert that it had not been done—nor is it the opinion of the community generally, and the best advice the Prime Minister could give to his Royal Mistress will be that the £50,000 which, according to the opinion of the best men of the House of Commons, ought never to have been voted, should go to provide the establishment for Prince Arthur, or any similar claim that might arise. One word as to the characteristic extravagance of the amount that was asked for. £15,000 a-year for the establishment of a young man who is just about entering on his majority! When it was proposed to give the Duke of Cambridge £12,000 a-year, and a Motion was made to reduce the amount to £5,000, Mr. Bright opposed the larger grant especially, on the ground that the time would come when the direct descendants of Her Majesty would have to be provided for by the State, and ventured to express an opinion that no Minister would venture to propose such a sum as £12,000 a-year in that case. Had the right hon. Gentleman said that no Tory Minister would venture to make such a proposition, he would have been nearer the mark; but he did not know the daring extravagance of a Liberal Minister. A Liberal Government which took its stand upon economy, if upon anything, dared to propose a grant of £15,000, and to take credit for moderation! Upon these grounds I call upon the House to reject this grant, which, I flatter myself I have shown to the satisfaction of every unprejudiced mind, is uncalled for and unnecessary; and in such case I do not think I put the case too strongly when I term the proposition one of wanton, wasteful, and wicked extravagance.

Sir, I rise to move an Amendment to the Motion before the House; and in doing so, I must express my regret that there is not a working man present among us to state the views of his class upon the subject. That being so, I will endeavour, as briefly as I can, to allude to some of those feelings which I know to actuate, if not the whole of the working classes, at any rate a portion of those whom I have the honour to represent. The Amendment which I have the honour to lay before you is to the effect—

"That a sum, not exceeding £10,000, be granted to Her Majesty, out of the Consolidated Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, the said Annuity to be settled on His Royal Highness Prince Arthur William Patrick Albert, for his life, in such manner as Her Majesty shall think proper, and to commence from the date of the coming of age of His Royal Highness."

Now in treating of the grant as proposed by Her Majesty's Government, the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government said the present system tended to confirm harmony between the Crown and Parliament. But, in my opinion, the expression of that sentiment evinces a want of knowledge on the part of the right hon. Gentleman of the feelings of the people. I think the present system is one which tends to disturb that harmony which I wish to see existing between the Crown and the people, because it brings periodically before the House and before the nation those questions of increased grants which the people on every occasion will wish to see reduced by their Representatives; and I would venture to say that this feeling on their part, which at this moment finds an expression in this House, will grow till it is utterly and entirely irresistible. The right hon. Gentleman said there was one advantage in the system, and that was that it would not fetter the control of Parliament, and therefore when any proposition was made for a grant to a Member of the Royal Family, it follows that it must be open to any Member of Parliament to move an Amendment reducing the amount of the grant. Therefore, I feel that I am only doing that which the present system admits; and that I am doing it, in some sort, with the sanction of the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman also defended the grant on the ground that the amount did not exceed the income of the House of Peers, and that there were hundreds and thousands of others who enjoyed incomes similar in amount. That may be true; but if there is one danger in this country greater than another, it is the existence, side by side, of these enormous incomes and that poverty which we are all so much in the habit of deploring, and seeking to remove. It has been supposed that if the pomp, the pageantry, and the hospitality of the Crown, which have been materially diminished since the death of the Prince Consort, could be removed, the expression of dissatisfaction, which has not been confined to the working classes, but which, in reference to the whole question, has been expressed by hon. Members of this House, by the leading organs of the Press, and by the middle classes, would be materially diminished, if it did not entirely cease. I do not believe that such would be the case as regards the working classes. I believe that the impression on them is that, politically speaking, no disadvantage has resulted, to the country from the retirement of the Queen—but that the cessation of the discharge of what may be called Her Majesty's duties, while resulting in no disadvantage to the country politically, ought to have led to a corresponding saving which might have been effected for the maintenance of other Members of the Royal Family. I will not deny that there is among the working people a large amount of Republicanism; I know that such a feeling does exist, and that it is increasing. But I think that that Republican feeling is of the vaguest possible kind. I do not believe that, with the exception of a small number, it would be capable of definition on the part of those of the working classes who call themselves Republicans. But there is one feature which is uppermost in their mind; and it is that, rightly or wrongly, they consider that Republican institutions would be less costly than Monarchy. And I have reason also to believe that if we could convince the people that Monarchy was less costly; if we could remove from our own Monarchy all unnecessary expenditure—all those excrescences which are apt to rise up and flourish round a Throne — we should do more than anything else we can devise to check, and it may be entirely remove, that tendency to Republicanism which exists amongst our people. It has been said—and I must admit that I greatly share the feeling—that it is after all but a paltry saving; and I have heard it said that to adopt the reduction is essentially mean. Now I give the answer to that remark which the working classes have made to me. They say—"Do not think that it is with us a question of £15,000 a-year, more or less; it is this—we have arrived at the conclusion that there is in high places, and on the part of the Government of this country, great, unnecessary, and wasteful expenditure; and we wish, now that we have the suffrage, now that we can dictate to our Members of Parliament, to impress upon them the necessity that exists that all this wasteful extravagance shall be discontinued." And not only so, but they have also this conviction—that there is a great deal of extravagance in the way of unnecessary salaries to people who give no return for them which they see, and they desire that Government should attack every one of these unnecessary offices. Could any hon. Member deny the justice of those feelings, when they brought home to themselves how hard it was to reduce any particular Estimate. It was that feeling that made the people more determined in their attack, when they knew they had a good case. Under these circumstances, I have no alternative but to attempt to bring before this House the views of no inconsiderable portion of my constituents. To show the feeling of the working classes, I will give some extracts from resolutions passed, and speeches made at meetings in Birmingham. One of the resolutions passed contained the following words—"While yielding to no class or order of the community in loyalty to the head of the State." This fully expresses the feeling of the people towards Her Majesty. One speaker objected to giving a large sum of money to people who did no work; another justified their opposition to any particular grant by saying that they could not break the bundle of sticks all at once, but might do so if they attacked them singly; a third, that the workmen were overweighted in their work by the competition of Germany and Belgium, consequent upon the heavy burden of their taxation; a fourth reminded his hearers of the dignity of labour, which was far greater than that of sloth and luxury—that the working classes were not children in the art of government, and would not long continue to support pomp and luxury at one end of society, while at the other there were millions of hard-working men engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand struggle with pauperism. From those we can judge the impolicy of letting such opinions rest unanswered. It remains but for me to say that I should have been prepared both from conviction of the propriety of the measure, and also on behalf of a large portion of my constituents in this matter, who have gone in with my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor) in opposing entirely this grant, to have supported his Amendment, but that I am prevented from that course by the explanation which the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government has given with reference to what he called, in answer to my Question, an "honourable understanding." But if the principle is to be accepted that we are to be prepared to grant annuities not only to the immediate children of the Queen, but also to all her grandchildren, then I say it is time that the Representatives of the working classes should make their voices heard in this House, and should represent to Her Majesty's Government that they are sanctioning a career of expenditure which will not be sanctioned by the working classes of this country. And let me remind the Committee that although the voice of the working classes is not now heard here, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) has given them a power which they are beginning to be conscious of, and that it will no longer be within the power of their Representatives in Parliament to assent to these grants to Members of the Royal Family, especially when they are so far removed from Her Majesty. But I feel it is the duty of all in Parliament, above all things, to tell their constituents that if there is one thing more sacred than another it is to hold to their engagements; and it is because I am convinced from what has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government that there is an honourable understanding on this question, that I am not prepared to support the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester. Yet we are bound to take into consideration whether this grant be of the proper amount. It will, therefore, be wise in the Government to accept the Amendment which I shall propose; for I believe that if the people perceive a disposition on their part to practise economy in high places as well as in low places, we shall be more likely to see a return of that loyalty among the working classes of this country which every hon. Member desires should exist. I beg to move that, instead of £15,000, there shall be substituted £10,000. Before I sit down I wish to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will in the ensuing Session institute an inquiry into the propriety of abolishing or diminishing charges on the Civil List. There is a strong feeling that many of the offices are entirely unnecessary, and I am quite certain that Her Majesty would willingly accede to any request which this House might make on that subject, her personal comfort and dignity in no wise depending upon them. The hon. Member concluded by moving the Amendment of which he had given Notice.

Sir, there are two questions now before the Committee in Amendment to the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government. The hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor) proposes altogether to reject the Motion, and the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Dixon) proposes, on the contrary, to reduce the amount. I confess myself that if I were not about to support the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone), which it is my intention to do, I would prefer the suggestion of the hon. Member for Leicester. It is an intelligible and definite proposition. But I cannot sympathize with the hon. Member for Birmingham, who admits the claim and then offers a composition. I cannot, however, agree with the hon. Member for Leicester in the view which he took of the Crown estate, nor do I think that the House generally agrees with that view. I cannot suppose that any but a very small number will agree with the hon. Member for Leicester, that we are to shut out from consideration the fact that Her Majesty on acceding to the Throne of her ancestors had relinquished the possession of a large estate, and that the Civil List was a settlement—a settlement, I think, not made to Her Majesty's personal advantage. I do not wish to enter into that discussion now; but I think it is of the utmost importance in all questions of this kind that the Committee should accurately reflect on the main circumstance under which the settlement was made, and that Her Majesty positively relinquished the large real estate which Her Majesty possessed by the laws of this land with as clear a title and as complete possession, as any of the Peers hold their estates to whom reference has been made. I wish to call the attention of the Committee to one financial consideration connected with this arrangement of the Civil List, by which Her Majesty surrendered all her hereditary estate. The net revenue of the Crown estate on the accession of Her Majesty was not more than £150,000 per annum. Now, if Her Majesty, when that settlement of the Civil List was made, had reserved to herself the right which, the late Lord Bessborough, who was then at the head of the Department, informed me he suggested himself—namely, that Her Majesty should have the power of charging her real estate, under the same conditions and liabilities which apply to almost all possessors of real estates, in favour of her younger children, and if Her Majesty had exercised that power at the rate which has been proposed on a former and in the present instance for all her younger children, the total charge upon the Crown estates could never have exceeded £69,000 per annum, and that upon an estate which, since that settlement was made, has increased £150,000, the income of the Crown estate per annum being now just double in amount. And, therefore, I think that is a consideration which should not be absent from those hon. Gentlemen who are going to vote upon the principle of public economy. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham talks of the working classes, and talks of them as if they were paupers. Now, I must say on the part of the working classes, on whom he says I have had the honour of conferring the franchise, that I protest against that description. The working classes are not paupers; on the contrary, they are a very wealthy class—they are the wealthiest in the country. Their aggregate income is certainly greater than any other class; their accumulations are to be counted by millions; and I am not speaking merely of the deposits in savings banks, but of funds of which I am aware they are in possession, and which are accumulated to meet their trade necessities and to defend their labour and rights, which can also be counted by millions; and therefore I protest against that language, which would hold out to foreign countries who would listen to the eloquence that evening of the hon. Member, that the great body of the working classes in this country are in a state of pauperism. The hon. Gentleman tells us that a Republican feeling is beginning to arise among them, and that they are calculating the comparative cost of Republican and Monarchical institutions. Well, Sir, I hope they will be well informed on that subject before they come to an ultimate decision. So far as I can form an opinion upon it, the cost of Republican government is much more considerable than that of our Monarchical government. Though you generally pay the principal personage in the Republic only a few thousands a-year, yet if you pay all the members of Congress, all the counsellors who add the weight of their advice, like the hon. Member for Birmingham, not exactly at the same rate, but at a relative rate, I think you will find the aggregate much more considerable than the cost of Monarchy to this country, even if you forget that we have taken from Her Majesty the possession and enjoyment of her real estate. This question has been often argued before this evening, but I have never found that the general feeling of the House has changed. Mr. Grote, after the Reform Bill, complained to Lord Grey that the Members returned by the now constituencies took the same wise and generous view of the circumstances which they had before that Reform Bill was passed. Well, the present House of Commons has been elected by larger constituencies than the constituency which returned Mr. Grote, and so far as I can form an opinion, hon. Members, still fresh from their constituents, will not hesitate to take a course which I think policy and wisdom and justice alike authorize and require. I think the country will remember the circumstances under which the necessity of an appeal like this takes place—that if Her Majesty had possessed that right of charging her life estate which is possessed by all her subjects, and if she had thereby provided for all her children, the amount would not have been half the amount of the increased revenue which is now derived from the estate she relinquished. I feel that everyone must come to the conclusion that in acceding to the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman we are not only generous, but just.

, on rising to move in page 13, line 36, to leave out "all," and insert "no," observed, that there were many reasons why the Committee should not accept the legislation proposed by that clause with undue haste. They were asked to shift the pecuniary burden of those elections from themselves and place it on the ratepayers at a time when, they were told that the state of local taxation had reached its utmost limit, and when the Government itself acknowledged that a final adjustment of that taxation was necessary. Let them look into the history of that subject, and see how the legislation upon it had adapted itself to the various circumstances of the times. For many years hon. Members of that House received payment for their services, and even after the Restoration they received the expense they incurred in going to and coming from the House, and in sitting therein. But times had changed, and now instead of the constituencies seeking Members, Members sought constituencies. When party spirit reached its climax in the reign of George II. the expenses of elections for counties were cast upon the Members instead of being borne by the constituencies. In the boroughs the burden continued to be borne by the constituencies, until at length, after nearly a hundred years of trial of these two systems, it was finally determined in the Reform Bill of Earl Grey that the expense of elections in both boroughs and counties should fall upon the candidates—a change which was the result of experience, although there were men like Mr. Hunt and Mr. Hume who expressed democratic views at that time. Those who supported the clause were prone to say that it was necessary to make a seat in that House obtainable without a large expenditure of money, and that the doors should be open not only to the powerful and the wealthy, but to the poor and the weak. It was his belief that if that proposition should be accepted, it would have an exactly contrary effect to the views entertained by its supporters, and that the result would he that only two classes of men would be able to secure seats in that House—namely, those who represented either great wealth or exhibited great daring and, as some would term it, impudence. So long as they freed the candidates from the expense of elections, they would be found to come forward in great numbers. The question, however, of a contested election would not rest with the candidates exclusively, or with persons seized with the laudable idea of representing their native borough or county, but lawyers, innkeepers, printers, house agents, and the host of other classes who profited by contests of the kind would unite their utmost endeavours to induce men to seek the favour of constituencies. The result would be that some men from mere ambition, others almost from amusement, others, again, prompted by direct gain, would all come to the common centre, resolved that a contest should take place whatever might be its consequence. He argued against frequent changes in the representation, on the ground that it was impossible to study legislation with advantage in a short period of time, or to gain the experience necessary to make an efficient and useful Member of Parliament. Under the present system no class of men were kept out of Parliament—not even the working men, who the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) had said were the richest classes, and who were assisted by a combination of wealth. But he held it was a mockery to tell a real working man that he should have a seat in that House. They did not pay their Members, and if a man were dependent upon the wages he received for a fair day's work, he could not earn them and at the same time occupy a seat in that House. By the change proposed they were seeking to drive peaceable men, men of moderate means, away from the House, leaving their seats to be filled by the wealthy and those who, as he had said, possessed great daring or impudence. Again, the change, if carried out, would cause frequent contests on account of there being a frequency of change amongst the Members, and the result could never be beneficial to the Constitution. There would indeed be greater commotion without and frequency of change within the walls of the House; one portion of the representation would be placed in the hands of the wealthy, whilst the other would be secured by the reckless and the daring, to the exclusion of men of talent, of studious habits, but of moderate means, who would be unwilling to undergo a contest, but who yet would be able, if elected, to give the benefit of their great experience, their wisdom, and strength to the Constitution. It had been said that the proposal would alter the arrangement between Members and their constituencies; but he maintained the constituencies ought to select the best men they could, and not expect candidates to undergo degradation in obtaining their seat. The proposal, no doubt, would lead to this—that there would be more men seeking for constituencies, because there would be nothing to pay. It had been said that if the ratepayers had to pay the expenses, good care would be taken on their behalf that unworthy men did not present themselves. He could not see how that could be achieved. It might be, if they could secure the absence of all party feeling and get the constituency to act as one body, determined to elect the best Member; but, so long as political excitement existed and party spirit of different kinds pervaded the constituencies there would be no concurrence of feeling, and it would be only at the polling-booth that the final selection of a candidate could be made. Many thinking men had come to the conclusion that a safeguard against all this would be found in the candidate making a deposit to a certain amount—and he believed that view was entertained by the Government in their proposed Amendment to be added to the end of the clause. Even if that were carried out, sham candidates would still present themselves, and there would be this narrow admission after all—that if a man could only secure £99, he would be treated as not seriously canvassing the constituency, whilst he who could raise £100, probably by the means of his friends, would be treated as a bonâ fide candidate, and as one who ought to be selected by the people. He maintained that the proposed deposit of £100 would, instead of being a benefit, produce a greater amount of evil than if no such qualification was enforced. Then it had been laid down that if he did not obtain a certain number of votes the £100 would be forfeited. In the case of a poor man, whose money had been raised by his friends—by the coterie at the public house, as it were—it would be the object of all who were concerned with him, and for their personal benefit, to poll as many votes as they could, so as to secure one-sixth of the number gained by the lowest successful candidate, and thus save their money. If their candidate happened to be a worthless man, the votes thus obtained would be votes taken from him who ought by his talent to be the representative of the people; whilst it would open a wide door for bribery, and which no Ballot Bill could ever stay. In concluding his objections to the clause and the proposed Amendments, he must say he entirely disagreed with the one proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Finsbury (Mr. W. M. Torrens), which, in effect, said that the expenses ought to come out of the Consolidated Fund. That, he conceived, would have all the evils suggested by the Government proposal, and none of its benefits. If the money came out of the Consolidated Fund, the ratepayers would not be able to check the expense, and no motive would exist for discountenancing improper candidates for the representation. The fund, indeed, would become a prey for all, and there would be a greater inducement to men to come forward, because they would know that from the Imperial Exchequer all their expenses would be paid. He would ask the House to ponder before they accepted the clause. Let them not suppose they were going to make elections cheaper, and render the House more accessible to men who, it was urged, ought to be there. They would be doing nothing of the kind; but, on the contrary, they would increase the number of elections, intensify them, and place them in the hands of men who had no real pretensions for legislative power. He was prepared to meet such unpopularity as would result from the vote he was going to give. Some would regret to oppose the Government; but they must look at that proposal as an independent and separate measure, and as if it came from a quarter which they did not view with favour, and he believed that if hon. Members would consider well the possible result of the legislation proposed, he should carry his Amendment by a large majority. The hon. and learned Member concluded by moving the Amendment of which he had given Notice.

, in supporting the Amendment, said, the clause was one to encourage sham candidates, by relieving candidates from those expenses the fear of which kept men from troubling constituencies. He divided expenses into three classes—first, legal, or official expenses, which were incurred by the returning officer; second, permissive expenses, such as those incurred for agents, meetings, and the conveyance of voters to the poll; and third, prohibited expenses, incurred in bribery and corruption; and, passing over the third class, he concluded that the second would be kept down to a minimum by a sham candidate, so that the first alone would exercise a deterrent influence. The result of paying them out of the public funds would be to increase the expenses of bonâ fide candidates, by compelling them to prepare for threatened contests; and no man of tolerable confidence in himself would ever think he could fail to poll the number of votes necessary to save the deposit, so that the supposed safeguard would prove to be a sham safeguard. Those reasons justified the description he had given of the clause, as well as the vote he should give against it.

said, the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Mr. James), able and exhaustive as it was, failed to remove the grounds upon which he supported the clause. He could not see why a man, who in other respects was fitted for the post, should be disqualified from sitting in that House because he could not put his hand on £100 or £150, a sum which often represented the whole savings of a working man's life. There was no reason why a working man should be prevented from getting into Parliament except by the charity of other persons. In the present state of society the House of Commons was far more likely to be inundated by rich than by poor men; but he thought it would be a good thing to have two or three working men representatives in the House, as the grievances of the class they belonged to would then be got at first-hand instead of second-hand, as at present; and, for his own part, he should prefer having those grievances discussed on the floor of that House rather than from the turf in Hyde Park or the pavement in Trafalgar Square. Moreover, he had great faith in the educating power of the House, and believed the presence of a few working men in it would have a tendency to remove the prejudices of the operative classes. The returned and admitted expenditure at the last General Election amounted to the enormous sum of £1,380,000, or an average of £1,700 per Member, and if that went on increasing, as it was almost sure to do, there would only be two classes of men in the House—namely, millionaires and adventurers. He heartily supported the clause, because he regarded it as a protest against the doors of the House being opened with a golden key.

said, he objected to the clause, which he asserted would inflict a peculiar hardship on the constituency that he had the honour to represent; and to show it, he asked to refer briefly to the effect of the two previous Reform Acts on his county (Herefordshire). Prior to 1832, they had ten Members, but by that Act they lost three seats, and were in future to return seven, although, as a compensation, each county elector was to have a vote for each of his three county Members instead of only two votes. By the minority clause of the Reform Act of 1867 this compensation was taken away, and again they had only two votes a-piece, and they were deprived of one of their Members for Leominster without having a fourth county Member, to which they were fairly entitled. While by this third Reform Bill—for, in point of fact, this was a third—although they were still only to have two votes a-piece, yet by this clause each county elector in Herefordshire, and similar counties, is to pay his share of the election expenses in the event of a contest of all three county Members, and also of the rejected candidates, and this proposition he considered a manifestly unfair one. If the right hon. Gentleman who had charge of the Bill wished to give a "sop" to Members of Parliament—and he quite understood that, as there were so many recent converts to the Ballot on the other side of the House, a "sop" was required; but he thought he could point out how he could do so without imposing any additional burden on the rates. For instance, in lieu of that clause, one might have been introduced for the abolition of the system of retainers to legal practitioners. One solicitor had told him that prior to an election he always received a retainer from one of the candidates, but as he regarded it as a bribe he invariably returned it. He knew of a case where a retainer was sent to a firm of solicitors in a southern county, who insisted upon having one for each member of the firm. He did not think the Government had treated the farmers of England fairly. Early in the Session they came to the Government with a statement as to the pressure of local taxation; the Government heard their case, and to a certain extent admitted the grievance, but now they were going to send Members back to their constituents with a ballot-box, and inside it a rate for election expenses. The substance of Clause 18, when embodied in a distinct Bill in 1869, was negatived by the House of Commons; and he trusted that on that occasion the majority would be so much increased as to stop all future attempts to throw husting expenses—which ought legitimately to be borne by candidates — upon the shoulders of ratepayers already overburdened.

said, he thought the clause should not prevent the passing of the Bill; but at the same time he thought the clause highly objectionable. He knew something of the feeling of Irish ratepayers, and he certainly did not believe the clause would recommend itself to them. As to working men being unable to return candidates of their own choice, were they loss wealthy or powerful than Irish peasants, who had not hesitated to send their representatives to Parliament? The clause, instead of diminishing, would invite contests; and as to the security against vexatious contests, it was illusory. In the country with which he was best acquainted a man might poll only 1/36th of the constituency, and still get back his £100. If analogy to the French system were good for anything, it ought to be good to the extent of requiring the candidate to poll one-third of the entire constituency, or else entail the necessity of a fresh election. The complement of this clause in the Bill would be the payment of Members of Parliament; for if the taxpayers were taxed to enable the working classes to send representatives into Parliament, it was plain that the ratepayers must be taxed to support them when they got there. The ratepayers had not been consulted about the clause, and if they had been consulted 99 out of every 100 would have been against it.

said, he must oppose the clause on the ground that it imposed a new, gratuitous, and uncalled-for charge on the already over-burdened ratepayers of the country. It was a very easy and cheap liberality for the House of Commons to make a present to Members of their election expenses at the cost of the ratepayers; but what would be thought of a proposal to provide for these expenses out of a Parliamentary grant? They had gone on long enough from Session to Session imposing on the ratepayers charges which the House was not called upon to provide, but which it insisted on throwing upon the ratepayers. He considered that the clause sprang from some confusion of ideas, based upon a supposed identification of ratepayers and electors, which did not exist in fact or in theory, and which had no foundation whatever. If it was thought expedient that the ratepayers should provide the necessary expenses of the election for the town or county—a proceeding which he held to be absurd and unjust, the only rational thing would be to make them pay for the expenses of a mere uncontested election. The average ratepayer cared very little about politics, and hon. Members would find that the cry for the Ballot proceeded from a disinclination to party politics, and from small tradespeople who did not want to offend those on one side or the other by the vote they gave. If these people had a greater taste for party politics they would not want the Ballot at all. There were other objections of detail. The clause must have been drawn by somebody who had little experience of county rates. It stipulated that the justices of counties were to provide the cost of the contest according to the proportionate number of electors in those parishes of the county in which the contest took place; but surely the right hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill must be aware that the justices had nothing whatever to do with parishes; they had no cognizance of the parish rates, and they collected their county rates from the clerks of the Unions, so that it would be necessary for the right hon. Gentleman to provide new machinery for the purposes of this clause if it was to be adopted. Such a provision as that contained in this clause would produce contested elections where they were not wanted, and would be very unpopular throughout the whole kingdom. It would make the whole Bill more distasteful than the introduction of the hole-and-corner nomination, and on those grounds he hoped Government would not be so unwise as to insert the clause.

said, that he was desirous of making a few observations respecting the clause. He was very much surprised to hear hon. and right hon. Gentleman say that this was a question with which the ratepayers had nothing to do. So far from that being the case, in boroughs every elector was certainly a ratepayer, though every ratepayer might not be an elector. But as a general rule, electors and ratepayers were synonymous terms. Another remark had been made to which he very much demurred, and that was the great expense which the clause would throw upon ratepayers. This point had been urged to such an extent that one would suppose some great calamity was impending upon the country in the shape of taxation. But the House would not be unmindful of the circumstance that in the large towns the great extension of the franchise would be accompanied after the passing of that Bill with a large increase in the number of polling-places. In places, for example, like Liverpool, Manchester, and Glasgow, as well as in other large towns with say 45,000 electors, there would be at least 100 polling-places; and supposing each polling-place, with its returning officer, clerks, and attendants, to cost £20, the expense thrown upon the ratepayers would not exceed £2,000. It was very possible that the polling-places might be used either a few days before or a few days after for the municipal borough elections. Now, the expense of those elections was already chargeable on the rates, and surely there was no reason why the electors should not think it equally natural that the expenses of the Parliamentary elections should also be charged to the rates. Suppose they took the case of a large city like the City of Edinburgh, which he had the honour to represent. The election expenses would come to about £1,200; and what did the House think it would cost the poor ratepayers, for whom there was so much commiseration expressed? Why, the £1,200 would be met by a rate of one farthing in the pound, so that the occupier of a £10 house would be called on to pay 2½d. as his share of the expense of the election, and that not every year, as they had to contribute to municipal elections, but once, perhaps, in three or four years. How, then, could they talk of this as a poor man's grievance, especially when they took into consideration the tens of thousands of poor men who lived in houses far below £10 in value? He did not mention the case of the city he represented as the fittest illustration of what would occur in the kingdom generally, but as an approximation. There was, perhaps, a larger proportion of high-rented houses in Edinburgh than in any city out of the Metropolis, which would naturally make the burden fall much lighter on the poorer classes. It had been said by hon. Members opposite that this proposition had been substantially brought before Parliament in 1865, and rejected. What he did know was, that it was brought before Parliament in 1868, and accepted on two divisions. In the Corrupt Practices Bill an hon. Member brought forward this precise proposition, and it was carried on the 18th July, the numbers being 78 against 69, and the clause was added to the Bill by a majority of 84 to 76. It was true that it was afterwards dropped out of the Bill, but on that occasion the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government spoke strongly and decidedly in its favour, and 10 Members of the present Government voted for it, besides several hon. Members on the opposite side of the House. That proved that it was far from being a new question. It was, in fact, much older than secret voting, which nobody in 1868 thought there was the slightest chance of carrying. Even at that time, the question was ripe for decision, and was practically decided by those two divisions. Reference had been made to the poor ratepayers so often that he must take leave to make one remark. He had met with many working men in the ranks of the employed, and his experience was, that they would be very glad indeed to pay that trifling expense, and thereby preserve their independence and dignity by sending Members to Parliament free of expense. Even at the present time that feeling was very general, and it was no uncommon thing in England to see men returned, every farthing of the expense being paid by the constituencies, particularly where they were returned by the popular vote. From the intercourse he had had with the working classes, he felt convinced that they would rejoice to have the opportunity of paying these expenses; and he held that that clause would be as valuable as the secret voting one itself. That it would be carried, if not to-day, at some future time, he was convinced. If, however, it was now dropped out of the Bill, it might be delayed for years; and he therefore earnestly trusted that the Government would not take the course which they had been advised to adopt.

, after referring to an Amendment which he had on the Paper, the object of which was to prevent the dangers arising from the operation of the clause, said, he would have supported the Amendment before the House if he had been unable to carry his own. He however supported the clause, denying that it would prevent the election of the fittest man, or lead to unnecessary contests or sham candidatures. He did not think that the clause would encourage sham candidates to come forward, and he believed that it was no good to have contests at elections, because it tended to keep up the political policy of the constituencies. He believed that with the Ballot a healthy public feeling would spring up, even in counties. In his opinion a great many of the objections which were made against that clause were made simply to catch the ear of the masses; but the time was not far distant when people would see that it was right that they should pay a small sum, in order that they might be represented. He hoped that the clause would be carried, and that it would then be amended by some such proposition as he had placed upon the Paper.

said, he was of opinion that the local rate was already overburdened, and that this additional charge should not be placed upon it. The local rate already paid charges for the poor rate, county rate, police rate, and highway rate, and also the charges for constables, vaccination, assessment committee, registration of voters, and the preparation of jury lists. He should support the Amendment.

said, he thought that the clause would tend to increase the number of candidates brought forward, and that under it there would be candidates who simply wished to air their private crotchet or to gratify a pique against one of the sitting Members. He should be glad to see the expense of polling-booths more looked after than it was under the present system. There was a very wide feeling abroad, which he must say he concurred in on principle, that the ratepayers were already unduly burdened by local taxation; and he doubted the prudence of throwing any further burden upon the local rate unless it were shown to be absolutely necessary. He should heartily support the Amendment.

said, he hoped as he had paid a good deal of attention, and taken a vast deal of interest in the subject of local rates, that he might be permitted to say a few words with reference to the Amendment now under discussion. In his opinion the tendency and effect of the proposal of the Government to charge on the local rates a considerable proportion of electioneers' expenses, would be to provide Parliamentary candidates, and also to offer a premium for Parliamentary contests, at the cost of the ratepayers. The result would be that many men would stand for the sake of advertising themselves and their particular interests — it would be the cheapest and most efficacious mode of attaining notoriety, of gratifying personal ambition, and promoting private interests. It would be impossible to prevent fictitious candidates and vexatious expenditure; there would be a greater number of sham candidates, and the expenses, of the ratepayers would be proportionately increased. The next step—the obvious and inevitable sequitur—the natural corollary of the proposition contained in the clause, would be that they would have to pay Members of Parliament. That proposal had already advocates in the House; and the next question would be whether that payment should also be charged upon the rates, and he contended that such a proposition would be equally as just as the one before the House. The difficulty of working men was not so much how to get a seat in the House of Commons. Many hon. Members were already returned by their constituents free of cost. The insurmountable difficulty of working men would be, unless they were paid delegates, how to live when they got into the House. The proposition contained in the clause was not only impolitic, but unjust. Impolitic, because Members of Parliament would be more under the direct control of their constituencies; there would be the danger of their degenerating into mere machines. They would be more likely to pander to local prejudices—to give their chief attention to local, rather than national interests. Such a proposal, if carried, would tend to destroy — at all events, would tend to seriously diminish—independence of thought, feeling, and action in Parliamentary representatives. He should probably be told that the cost of municipal elections was defrayed from local rates, but there was a wide and broad distinction. Candidates for municipal honours dealt only with matters of local interest—they were charged with the administration of matters which were the subject of rates. Candidates for Parliamentary honours, on the other hand, dealt with matters of national importance — with questions which concerned all classes, and every description of property. He would now say a few words with regard to the injustice of the proposition. Rates represented the value of real property only (lands and houses); not one-seventh of the total annual income of the country, not one-fourth of that which paid, or ought to pay, income tax. Why, he would ask, that anomalous and unjust exemption of the far greater proportion of national wealth from that impost? Why should capital or personal property be privileged? Why should it go scot free? Good laws and good government were equally conducive, and as absolutely necessary for its safety and security. Why should the monied millionaire pay nothing to the cost of a national institution which protected him, and secured to him the enjoyment of all he possessed, when the pauper, who occupied a miserable room, in a garret or cellar at 1s. a week, or the mechanic who rented a cottage at £5 a-year, was to be called upon to contribute towards that exceptional expenditure? Such an anomaly was calculated to foment rather than reconcile the invidious distinctions and differences between capital and labour—questions which already agitated men's minds at the present time, and should not be needlessly provoked. Suppose the proposition of the Government had been reversed—that they had suggested that personal property, instead of real property, should alone pay that new and novel tax. What a commotion there would have been! How much they would have heard of that invasion of rights of private property. And yet such a proposal would have been equally as just, for personal property was equally interested. They had abolished the property qualification for Members of Parliament. If, as formerly, income for real property were essentially necessary for a candidate, then he admitted there would have been some justification for this proposal. Now, a candidate need not even be a ratepayer; and yet in order too frequently to gratify his personal ambition, they proposed to give him power to inflict exceptional burdens on those who were. They had been told that that addition to the rates would be but trifling. But that was a question not so much of amount as of principle, and yet they must bear in mind that that was only one of a series of new charges proposed to be imposed on the rates during the present Session. They should, doubtless, be told that that fresh imposition would be considered when the whole subject of local taxation was considered. The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government gave him the same assurance last Session when he ventured to protest against the 6d. income tax, in the shape of an education rate, which was then permanently imposed exceptionally on ratepayers. He looked in vain for that promised consideration in the Local Taxation and Rating Bills, introduced by the right hon. Gentleman the then President of the Poor Law Board (Mr. Goschen). The object of those Bills, and the voluminous Returns with which they were accompanied was to prove that the owners and occupiers of real property were favoured rather than aggrieved; but those conclusions were founded on incorrect data and unreliable Returns. The right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Council gave him the same reply a short time since, when he (Sir Massey Lopes) asked in what way, and to what extent, he proposed to carry out the recommendations of the Select Committee on the Vaccination Amendment Act — namely, that a considerable proportion of the expenses should be defrayed from the national Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman assured him that though the Bill did not deal with that part of the subject, yet it would be borne in mind when the question of local taxation was again considered. Hope deferred had made them very impatient. They believed reality was better than expectation, and would endeavour to resist all attempts to impose any further burdens for any national purpose whatever on the local rates. He should be glad to see some representatives of the working classes in that House, and was not afraid they should see too many of them. He thought every class ought to be represented, and that it would be impolitic to shut the doors of the House of Commons against them, though he believed that their grievances and interests were very ably advocated and justly considered at present in that House, yet he was of opinion that they had less to fear from expressions of extreme views there than out-of-doors; they ran riot there, but they soon became toned down here. If it was considered advisable that certain expenses, hitherto paid by candidates, should be defrayed from other sources, those expenses should be charged on the national Exchequer and not upon local rates. If it was for the benefit of the community at large that poor men should have greater facilities for entering Parliament, the community at large should contribute to that object; but it would be manifestly unjust to impose burdens on one section of the community for the attainment of an object for the general good. Those costs should fall proportionately on all for whose benefit those services were to be performed. The object was not local but national, therefore the payment ought to be national. If it was deemed desirable to diminish the legitimate expenses of Parliamentary candidates, they could make paid agency and the conveyance of voters illegal; but they should not attempt to impose exceptional burdens on that section of the community which was already disproportionately taxed. Such a measure would be most unpopular; it would not tend to secure the seats of those who advocated it, or to promote the object which they professed to have in view; it would not increase the efficiency and disinterestedness of Members of that House, while it would seriously diminish the dignity, patriotism, and independence of the British House of Commons.

said, as a representative of the working classes, he wished to express what he believed was their real feeling upon the question. In discussing the principle of the clause, he observed that the hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Mr. James) had reminded the Committee that down to a very recent period a Member of the House of Commons was always regarded as conferring a benefit upon his constituency by attending in Parliament to represent them, and that until the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, the cost of the legal machinery of an election was borne by the ratepayers. To his great astonishment, however, his hon. and learned Friend had drawn a conclusion from that, the very reverse of the obvious one, and wished the Committee to infer that it was not fair that a constituency should pay the cost of the necessary legal machinery for obtaining representation in Parliament. The effect of the present system on the constituency was also very demoralizing, because it placed the Member in the position of a person who was receiving a favour from, rather than in the position of one who was rendering a service to, those who elected him. The Bill, therefore, tended to put the relations between the Member and his constituents on a true, sound, and healthy footing. His hon. and learned Friend feared that the clause would encourage "sham" candidates, and increase the expenses of elections; but it should be remembered that those necessary and legal charges were but a mere bagatelle in comparison with the entire amount of the expenses connected with elections, which deterred men from standing as candidates. Bagatelle, however, though they were, he objected to them on principle, and also because they were a considerable impediment to candidates of a humbler class. Mixed as were the materials of which that House was composed, there was still one class, and that the most numerous, and certainly not the least important, which was not represented as a class in it. He meant the working class, and it would be a great advantage, and only carrying out the true principle of representation, if there were three or four of those men in the House who could from their personal knowledge explain the wants and wishes of the class they represented; they would, he was confident, be heard with respect, and would receive a ready hearing. But when they imposed upon such a man, as a condition of becoming a Member, the payment of a certain sum of money, they might as well tell him that they did not want him there. When Mr. Odger stood for Southwark he paid a deposit of £100, but he was told by the returning officer that he must pay down £200—a sum greatly in excess of the actual requirements. Under the existing law a kind of contract was made between the returning officer and the candidates, and the returning officer, by the power given him to name the sum which each candidate must pay as his share of the expenses, had practically in his hands the means of excluding particular candidates. The deposit of £100 proposed by the Government was intended to prevent sham and vexatious contests; and he did not see that it would be any hardship to a working man, because he would get his £100 back again if he was a bonâ fide candidate. They came there not to serve themselves or to gratify a laudable ambition, but on the principle that men who were able to give their time and attention to public matters were ready to take on themselves the burden of serving their country. That was the only true and healthy principle upon which a true representative system could exist. He could hardly think that hon. Members were serious when they spoke of that being a burden to the ratepayers. The hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. M'Laren) had shown that the amount of rate which an individual ratepayer would have to bear would be infinitesimally small. He should support the clause, on the ground that it was a just principle that those expenses should be borne by the constituencies, and not by the persons who came to that House to serve them.

said, he had the misfortune to differ from a great many hon. Gentlemen around him, and also from the Government on that clause, although, happily, their difference did not arise on any question of principle. The question raised that night was one not so much of political principle as of political expediency—a matter which practical politicians should not ignore. Many large boroughs and some counties at present defrayed the cost of returning Members to Parliament, and if any constituency proposed to pay his election expenses he (Mr. V. Harcourt) would not object either on principle or on expediency. But there was all the difference in the world between a constituency doing that voluntarily, and its being made compulsory on them by Act of Parliament. While the practice was voluntary, the constituency paid only for persons whom they wished to have; but that clause would compel them to pay also for candidates whom they did not want. He objected further to the proposal, because it was altogether inopportune and likewise quite irrelevant to the Bill. It had clearly nothing to do with the question of secret voting, and, if dealt with at all, it should be by a separate measure. It was said they were asserting a principle on that occasion, but there was a considerable difference between a principle and a crotchet; for he understood a principle to have something which had a tendency to accomplish the object it professed to attain; but a crotchet was a thing which had no tendency to attain either that or any other object, and he thought that proposition belonged to the latter category. They were told that the principle in that case was to admit poor men into Parliament. If that proposal were calculated to effect that object, he should heartily support it. He admitted the importance of poor men having seats in that House, and that the most numerous, and in many respects the very important, class of working men had no direct representatives in that Assembly; but it was altogether begging the question to say that those necessary expenses kept them out of it. It was not those necessary expenses that kept the workingman candidate out at Stafford, Southwark, Chelsea, Bristol, and other places where their election expenses were found for them. Again, where there had been test ballots taken, there were no election expenses, and yet in no case were working men chosen; while, again, at the school board elections, very few working men had been returned. He believed that one of the strongest of all the reasons which had induced the working men throughout the country not to elect men of their own class was that strong common sense and practical knowledge which distinguished them, and which taught them that men in their own class were not the best fitted to carry out the business of representing them in that House. They knew that a man who had to live by weekly wages could not sit morning and evening in that House, and at the same time earn his bread. He could come in only on one condition, and that was as a paid delegate. If the Government bonâ fide intended by that clause to bring working men into Parliament, why had they not made the 19th clause one for charging the rates with the payment of Members of Parliament? They had lately heard a good deal of over-regulation prices, and he could not help thinking if they once established the regulation price for Members of Parliament they would very soon hear of over-regulation prices. Once pay a Member for his votes collectively, and he would very soon make a market for his individual votes, That was a question of political expediency, and they should ask what the constituencies as a body wished in the matter. It was eminently a question for the constituencies. At the last Election he was asked not to support the proposal of the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett); he willingly gave that pledge, and he had no right to retire from it. That proposal was distasteful to the constituencies. That was on account of the pressure of the rates. The existing system of local taxation was utterly indefensible, unjust in principle, and most unequal in its operation. He would be no party to placing any further burden on the rates till there had been some substantial attempt to redress the existing inequality on principles of justice. He was against that proposal in the 18th clause. The people had long looked for the Ballot as a boon; they were now going to give them the Ballot as a tax. A more imprudent, ungracious proceeding he could hardly conceive. The Government had not so large a margin of popularity that they could afford to throw any away. It so happened, unfortunately, that every measure of theirs that Session had been accompanied with the unpleasant feature of additional taxation. They began with the Army Bill, in a great part of which he concurred; but it had a sting in its tail—an additional 2d. income tax. That was an unfortunate circumstance. Then there was the Ballot Bill; and that was to be accompanied by increased rates. That, he thought, was not a fortunate concomitant of the Ballot Bill. It had also been the misfortune of the Government to fall out with a good many classes of the community. They had fallen out with the Army and the Licensed Victuallers, and many other people; but, as if that were not enough, they were going to clap a blister on the whole body of the ratepayers and to fall out with them. That was a most imprudent proceeding. It was most unwise and unnecessary in a Bill of this character to raise questions of this kind. They were told the wound they would have to endure would not be much. They must remember, however, that if they went close to a man with the gout in his foot, a very small thing would be sufficient to make him wince. That was the state of the country. It was at that present moment suffering from a severe fit of the gout of taxation. He did not think it was right of the Government to inflict such a blow upon any party as the passing of that clause would necessarily inflict on the Liberal party. The Liberal party had much to accomplish yet; but if it was split up into small parts, as it would be by the passing of that clause, it could not accomplish the ends it had in view. He did not contest the principle on which that clause was founded; but he did contest the political wisdom of introducing the proposal in this Bill at this time. He believed there would come a time when the country would accept the principle of the clause and pass it, and he hoped to see it do so. They were told they ought to educate the constituencies up to this; that was all very well for those whose constituencies were educated; but there was a preliminary process in which the constituencies might educate some of them off the face of the earth. While he approved of the principle of that clause, he would commend to his right hon. Friend the Vice President of the Council the principle of an equally wise legislator, Solon, who, when asked why he did not introduce a certain proposal into the laws of Athens, gave the very sensible answer—"I have given the Athenians not the best laws, but the best laws that they would bear." The proposal now before the Committee was distasteful to the constituencies, and its consequences would be disastrous to the Liberal party. Entertaining these opinions he opposed the clause, in the belief that if it were negatived the Bill would pass without the Government having recourse to an Autumn Session.

said, he made no apology for following his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. V. Harcourt), for he had clearly indicated the question before the House. It might be that nearly the whole of those on the opposite benches were opposed to the proposal of the Government. It might be that a large majority were in its favour; but he knew of no motives connected with party that ought, in his judgment, to influence opinions one way or the other. The House did not, in 1867, discuss the question as one of party, nor was it a question connected with which they could pretend to say that the fate of the present Bill ought to depend on the fate of that 18th clause. He was much attached to the principle of the clause; but it would be worse than idle to say that in the event of not obtaining from the House a sanction to the clause, the Government should forget the substantial good which they thought they had secured to the country by the clauses of the Bill to which assent had been given. With regard to the last speaker (Mr. V. Harcourt), he was left in considerable doubt as to the means by which the continuity of the speech was to be put into a consistent whole. From certain portions of that speech he judged that his hon. and learned Friend had no objection to the clause, but was inclined to give his assent to it. But in other portions of the speech the principle degenerated into a crotchet. In the close of his speech, his hon. and learned Friend said the Government were proposing to attain an abstract and ideal good. The Government were not seeking the best law in the abstract, but the best relatively to the present state of opinion, both with regard to the election of Members of the working classes. His hon. and learned Friend said that working men were not elected, and that it was not desirable that they ever should be elected.

I did not say that I thought it desirable that they should not be elected, but the opposite.

Undoubtedly, his hon. and learned Friend said it was desirable that they should be elected; but he went on to show that they had not been elected, and then how extremely shrewd and practical working men were as a body in refusing to elect them, and how strong and powerful were the reasons which had prevented their doing so. Without prejudice and without polemical spirit he wished to state what appeared to him to be the merits of the question. At present they had got a system of law under which the necessary expenses of elections were charged upon the candidates. The Government proposed to charge them on the constituency, as upon the local rates; and there was a third proposal—although he must admit it was rather ambiguous and oracular—to charge them on the Consolidated Fund. He agreed in the condemnations pronounced upon the third proposition; and here he cordially joined hands with the hon. Mover of the Amendment, who stated that that mode of proceeding had all the disadvantages of the charge upon the local rates without any of its advantages. As between the other two means of charging the expenses of elections, there were the system which existed and which was not intolerable, and the system proposed in the clause, which, in the opinion of the Government, would introduce a great practical improvement. He was thankful to the hon. and learned Member for Taunton for having placed the question in a direct and simple issue. The hon. and learned Member referred to the Parliament of 1832, and to the unanimity of that Parliament. No doubt he was correct in that as a matter of fact, and that that Parliament decided unanimously on placing the expenses on the candidates; but that was on account of the necessities of the then Government position. The Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill went as a cry through the country; but Mr. Hume and others who raised that cry must not be held to be authorities against the present proposal, because they were obliged to forego the expression of their own opinions with regard to the construction of the Reform Act of 1832. With respect to the mode adopted of taking security against frivolous and needless contests, it should be recollected that saddling the expenses on the candidates was not the only deterring power against frivolous contests. One question was a question of principle; the other was a question of policy. The principle was stated by the hon. and learned Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Serjeant Simon) when he referred to the false position in which the representative and the constituency were placed when the unavoidable expenses of election were charged on candidates. The present practice amounted to a legislative assertion that the candidate was seeking a favour at the hands of the constituency, and that the electors were conferring a favour upon him by giving him their votes. He did not deny that in the language of courtesy favour was given and received on both sides; but, looking to the essential elements of the calculation, the favour was done by the candidate to the electors, and therefore he should be glad to see erased the practical contradiction of fact which was written on the face of the Statute Book. The hon. and learned Member for Taunton had observed that it was in the time of George II. that the expenses were thrown on the candidates so far as regarded the county constituencies. But the hon. and learned Member would scarcely say that it was from the reign of George II. that they were to seek a model on which to found popular principles. The question must be decided on its merits—not from the model of the reign of George II., when the nation was under a totally different system from that which now prevailed, The proposal, as containing the sound and true principle as embodied in the clause, would tend to elevate the tone of representation; it would purify the atmosphere in which the Member of Parliament or the candidate met the constituency, and it would be an assertion on the Statute Book that the man who went to Parliament, even if he incidentally obtained that which benefited himself, did not go there with a charter to promote his own advantage, but to perform a public duty for the benefit of the nation. The policy of the change contemplated by the clause was a matter of more pressing importance than that of the abstract principle on which it rested, however sound it might be; that policy he took to be, as it was the object it was designed to facilitate, was the admission of working men within these walls; and here he felt that they were entirely removed from the ground of party differences. He was certain there was nothing that could render hon. Gentlemen opposite—he would not say more hostile, but less friendly to the admission of working men into the House, than the motives applicable to the minds and judgments of those who sat on that side of the House. Indeed, he would go further and say that there was nothing which he should esteem in the true sense of the word more truly Conservative than the admission of a sensible number of working men to those benches. What was it that they had long wanted, and that they wanted at the present day more than ever in proportion to the increased means of working men, and the increased activity of thought and communication among them? It was the establishment of links to connect them with the classes which were socially above them in regard to the political institutions of the country. They wanted in the political world that which the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett) had so well shown, in his interesting work on Pauperism, was wanting in the economical world, and which his hon. Friend thought the co-operative system was likely to supply. They wanted something which would unite the working men in a natural and legitimate manner with the rest of the community. The co-operative principle, placing the working man in the position of a capitalist, enabled him to enter into the feelings of capitalists, to appreciate the necessities which weighed upon the capitalist, and enabled him to form a just estimate of the relations between the two classes. The great blot of their representative system was that they had not been able to bring working men within those walls. When the Reform Act of 1867 was passed, so largely increasing the constituencies, there were few hon. Members who did not hope that one result of that change would be that they would have had the pleasure of welcoming in the House some of their fellow-citizens of the working class. Everyone had, however, been disappointed by the number and magnitude of the obstacles which had been found to intervene practically between the natural desire of the working class for representation in the persons of men of their own class, and the attainment of such desire. If the House was anxious in 1867 that those obstacles, so far as depended upon it, should be removed, there was an increased reason now for feeling that desire after the experience they had had. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. V. Harcourt) had, indeed, said it was not the expenses of elections which prevented the attainment of that object; but he would no doubt admit that that was one of the obstacles which stood in the way, and that the working classes themselves deemed it to be the most formidable of those obstacles. His hon. and learned Friend had also argued that the Government ought, according to their own principle, to go further, and propose a system of payment for Members of Parliament, in order to enable working men to enter that House. But that was altogether an ulterior question. His hon. and learned Friend had pointed out how that question might ultimately arrive at its solution by some voluntary system under which constituencies might if they chose, take the burden upon themselves. Perhaps some such system might be the means of solving the difficulty with regard to the maintenance of working men sitting in that House. For his own part, he strongly objected to a general system of payment of Members; but if particular communities and bodies of persons chose to establish that system for themselves, he knew of no good reason why the House should interfere for the purpose of preventing them. He had always understood that a highly respectable county Member who formerly sat for many years on the Opposition benches, was enabled to make his appearance in the House by means of an annuity fund raised by his constituents, and he did not know why the obstacles in the way of working class representatives should not be met in the same manner. Meanwhile, the Government must deal with these obstacles as best they could. They believed it to be of great importance that working men should be returned to that House, as everyone of such representatives would form a strong link and bond of union between the working classes and the classes of which that House was generally composed. He did not deny, however, that the public mind was much divided on this subject, and that many hon. Members objected to the proposal of the Government. The division about to be taken might, indeed, prove that the public mind was not yet sufficiently prepared; but, nevertheless, the Government thought it their duty to urge the proposal upon the House. He would accept the judgment of the House, whatever it might be. If it was in their favour, he hoped the House would impartially endeavour to adjust the details of the system; if it were adverse to them, they would, nevertheless, feel that the question was one which must make progress with the progress of thought and the ripening of the public mind on the subject. In that case the Government would have the consolation of claiming the future for their own, and whether in the form of an arrangement to be made by particular constituencies, or of a more general measure, they felt confident that by one means or the other the wisdom of Parliament, contemplating and acknowledging without question the desirableness of uniting, if possible, all classes in the personal composition of that House, would devise and effect a means by which that great object might be attained.

said, he would follow the right hon. Gentleman's (Mr. Gladstone's) example in treating that question as being in no sense a party one. It appeared to be understood, that if that clause were passed a door for the admission of working men into the House of Commons would be at once opened. Now, that he utterly denied. It was contrary both to the evidence of fact and of reason. The hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. M'Laren), in a somewhat inconsistent speech, had stated that the working men were so bent on having a measure of this sort that they had in part adopted it for themselves. Of course, no one objected to that. No doubt the highest and best principle would be that those who returned working men should show the sincerity of their convictions by paying the expenses, and certainly no one ever objected to a proceeding of the kind. With regard to the hon. Gentleman referred to by the Prime Minister, he was so esteemed by the farmers who returned him that they voluntarily assumed the burden which he was unable to sustain. A voluntary subscription was, however, very different from a permissive power to levy a rate, for a rate must be levied by the majority on the minority. He denied the correctness of the statement that no working men found their way into the House of Commons. He could not help thinking that men who, like Mr. G. Stephenson, had gone through every phase of labour both of body and mind, and passed on to the successful position which he at last attained, still retaining all his interest and all his knowledge of the feelings of the working classes, were better Representatives of those classes in the House of Commons than men could be who still continued in the ranks of workers for their daily bread. If working men did succeed in gaining an entrance to the House of Commons, they would find, he had no doubt, that they had been subject to many delusions; and, on the other hand, if they took the place of some of those who assumed to be peculiarly the working man's friends, he did not know that the House would suffer by it. As between the different modes which had been suggested of bearing the expenses of elections, he admitted there were only three ways of dealing with that question—namely, by means of local rates, from the Imperial funds, or by the candidates; and of those three he must say he was in favour of devolving them upon the candidate, as at present; but those expenses were by no means the largest expenses of an election, and, no doubt, if the defrayment of them were intrusted to the local authorities they might be considerably reduced, and with that object he would suggest that elementary public schools deriving a grant from the State might lawfully be used for polling-booths, being an Imperial purpose. With respect to the question whether the payment should be from local or Imperial funds, he did not feel called upon to decide; but if they paid for municipal elections from the local fund, he did not see why elections for Members of Parliament should not be paid for by Imperial funds. It was at least as just to pay out of the Imperial as out of local funds. The question of deposit, they had been reminded by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gladstone), was not embraced in the clause now under discussion; but it had been throughout debated in connection with the clause; and the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Forster), who, till the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government rose, had charge of the Bill, said that he had been convinced by the arguments that had been used, and therefore he put in the clause about the deposit to guard against the evils which he feared would exist if it were not there. If this were so he had forfeited the whole principle at once. Look how unjust they were. They brought in a Bill, which they said was first of all to do away with bribery, and they said that they were going to put a stop to canvassing, because a man would not know who were really going to vote for him. A man might come forward relying upon his ability and knowledge of the electors, and then, to his great astonishment, he found that he had polled but very few votes. They proposed to make him deposit £100, and he would be fined this sum because he had mistaken the feelings of the constituency. Now that seemed a very unjust thing. They had a system at present that did not prevent a poor man getting into that House. He could mention in former Parliaments many who were returned by extraneous aid. He said also that working men had been in the House; and he might mention one very remarkable instance, that of the late Mr. Brotherton, who frequently alluded to the fact that he had been a factory worker. The payment out of the rates would not relieve the candidates from the real expenses of the election, and it was not worth while to bring upon the public that new charge unless to attain a matter which was of great consideration. They could not do it without an innovation, and however small the imposition might be, it would create an amount of irritation that would be quite disproportioned to the amount of burden that was placed upon the people. He could not but think that the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government in speaking in that very temperate tone—he might almost say in that milk-and-water tone—seemed to be letting it down easy, and showing his followers that the Government would not be at all disappointed if the Committee rejected the clause.

said, that the history of this clause had been a very chequered one, for when originally proposed in the last Parliament it was carried by a majority of 8 votes, which was afterwards overruled by a majority of 7 at the instance of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), then the head of the Government. It was brought forward again in the shape of a Bill in the present Parliament, almost the first division being taken upon that proposition; but it was again unfortunate; all the Members of the Government, except three, were absent at a levée when it came on, and in the absence of the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, the Bill was left to be damned with faint praise by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Tower Hamlets; and, in spite of having to go through this trying ordeal, it was only defeated by the narrow majority of 3. That year the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government himself had taken it up, and he thanked him for his speech; there was, however, a tone of despondency about his remarks indicative of coming defeat, and he feared that in the hands of the Government the proposal would not fare so well as in the hands of a private Member. He had always been anxious that the British Parliament should be as fully representative as possible; but he felt that the working man had been dragged into unfortunate prominence in that discussion. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. V. Harcourt)—had made a speech which was really appropriate to that abstract question, that it was desirable that working men should be admitted. But if the effect of the clause were to exclude working men for 25 years, he should still advocate the principle it contained, believing that to be a proper one in itself. It not only gave a chance for their admission, but would secure economy of elections, which was particularly important, because the tendency of the Bill would unquestionably be to render the necessary expenses larger than before. The virtual principle of that clause was, that a seat in the House of Commons was not an honour to be bought, but a duty to be performed. His hon. and learned Friend, in a speech which was very perplexing, first said there was no principle in the clause, and afterwards, that it was so advanced that he was afraid of its effect, and that the question was unpopular with the constituencies; but he (Mr. Fawcett) would very much like to put the matter to a practical test in the constituency represented by his hon. and learned Friend, whose speech if not a crotchet was something worse, in that the first part contradicted the last. His hon. and learned friend was either afraid of his constituents, and did not dare, therefore, to support the clause, or his constituents were not sufficiently advanced to allow him to support the clause. The advantages of the Ballot would be dearly purchased if they were accompanied by cries which would increase the expense, and therefore he hoped means would be taken to give instruction in economy to the constituencies whose interest it now was to increase the cost of elections. The hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Mr. James) said the effect of the clause would be to increase the number of contests—a result which he (Mr. Fawcett) did not think at all likely to follow, because as the electors would have to bear the expense they would not encourage candidates to come forward, unless there existed strong grounds for changing the representation of a constituency. At present there was no pressure of public opinion to prevent contests which originated in a desire to obtain profit at the expense of a candidate. If that clause were law, the man who came forward as a candidate without any chance of success would have nearly all the ratepayers enlisted against him, and would be told that he ought to be kicked out of the place for subjecting them to useless expense. Much had been ominously said, and particularly by the Prime Minister, about the vast importance of passing a Secret Voting Bill; but he ventured to tell the House that among advanced Liberals even more importance was attached to the question of decreasing the cost of elections, than to the establishment of the principle of secret voting. What he wanted to see passed was a Parliamentary and Municipal Elections Bill, a measure which would affirm the principle that a seat in Parliament should not be bought, but that a man who was willing to discharge the duties connected with such a position should have imposed upon him in obtaining it the smallest pecuniary burdens possible.

said, he rose merely for the purpose of stating that, much as the Government regretted the decision just come to, and although, technically, the Amendment was only for the omission of the first word of the clause and the replacing of it by another, yet of course they took the decision of the Committee as a decision upon the principle involved in the clause. He was therefore in hopes that there would be no attempt to proceed with the clause, which would be merely wasting the time of the Committee. The Government were prepared at once to assent to its being negatived, together with the next three clauses.

said, he must repeat a question he had put on a former occasion, when the Bill was in Committee, as to the source from which the expenses of the Commission were to be defrayed.

said, the Bill provided no special fund upon which the expenses of the Commission should be charged. The Treasury would bear all the first expenses of that Commission, and it would be quite open to the House to deal with the future expenses hereafter in any way it thought fit. There was nothing in the Bill to prevent that.

said, he had two interests at heart. The interest of his constituents, and that of seeing the Bill successfully carried into effect. Both these interests he had endeavoured to secure by the selection of properly qualified gentlemen to sit as Commissioners. He trusted the House would be prepared to accept the Commission as a whole, and by that means carry into effect the object the House had in view.

said, he sincerely believed that by adopting the names proposed by the Government, they would be likely to carry into effect the object they all so much desired, and he trusted those names would be retained.

said, he thought the Commissioners would have given more confidence to the public if they had been entirely independent of the locality.

did not think the names proposed by the Government satisfactory. Parties should have been selected who were not resident on the spot; for he did not think it right to appoint men on a Commission who were personally interested in matters upon which they would be called upon to decide.

contended that the counties adjacent to the Forest had a right to be represented in that matter.

pointed out that the Commissioners were to be paid Commissioners; and it was rather an extraordinary thing for that House to enter upon a contest as to whether one of its own Members should not be appointed to a position which might be one of considerable pecuniary profit.

said, he looked on the Bill as an answer to an appeal from the people interested in the enjoyment of Epping Forest; and to carry out in full that answer the Commissioners should not be men subject to local influences, in favour of lords of manors, or otherwise.

said, he understood from the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the First Commissioner of Works that this was not to be a paid Commission. [Mr. AYRTON: Only the legal member is to be paid.] He objected to the constitution of that Commission. Two Essex gentlemen had been nominated. No doubt one of those gentlemen was to vote against the other, and the casting vote would be given to the Inclosure Commissioner. It was evident, then, that that question of Epping Forest was to be left in the hands of the Inclosure Commissioners. The House had, he believed, a just distrust of those Commissioners on questions of this kind.

, in moving the postponement of the further consideration of the Bill, said, it would be better that the Bill should be lost than that the Commission should be so constituted.

said, he would consent to add one name to the list of Commissioners, who fully understood that they were not to be paid.

said, that the object of the Bill was to repeal a section of an Irish Act of 40 Geo. III., which required the sanction of the Lord Lieutenant to bye-laws made by the trustees, a section in a prior Act, 35 Geo. III., had been repealed by the Irish Church Act. The Act of 40 Geo. III was omitted by mistake. The State had now nothing to do with Maynooth. The present number of trustees, all of which might be laymen, was 17, and the Roman Catholics wished the number increased to 28—this was also in the Bill. This was the whole Bill, and was the last Bill of any kind with reference to Maynooth, now completely severed from the State, Parliament would be troubled with.

said, it was not until that late hour—two in the morning—that Her Majesty's Government had vouchsafed to give the House the slightest explanation with regard to that Bill. The purport of the Bill was to increase the number of the Governing Body of the College of Maynooth from 17 to 28; when he saw that number of 11 trustees to be added, he confessed that it very much puzzled him to discover the reason for adding that particular number. On further inquiry, however, he found that 28 was exactly the number of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, including His Eminence Cardinal Cullen. Well, what would be the effect of that? There was at present 17 trustees, of whom, according to the old Acts now in operation, by the repeal of the statute of 1845, 11 must be continued as ecclesiastics, and be succeeded by ecclesiastics. If the six existing lay trustees, or a majority of them, thought fit, they might provide clerical successors to the lay trustees, as those might resign, or, in the course of nature, might be removed; and by continually filling up the vacant seats with clerics, they would gradually have Maynooth transferred to the Roman Catholic hierarchy solely. What would be the position of the College then? They would have all the powers under the old Act of George III., passed by the Irish Parliament. Under that Act they would have the power of continuing Maynooth either as a seminary for the exclusive education of ecclesiastics, or of adding thereto a department which should be applied to the education of the laity. They would in that way got a Roman Catholic University established in Ireland exactly on the footing which had been so much objected to by that House—that was to say, exclusively under the control of the Roman Catholic hierarchy; and although it would not have a Charter, it would have more, for it would have the authorization of three Acts of Parliament. By that process which he anticipated on the part of the Roman Catholic hierarchy—namely, the filling up of the places of the existing lay trustees by episcopal successors—they would most effectually establish in Ireland a Roman Catholic College or University precisely on the footing to which that House had constantly objected. Well, he had given Notice that if that Bill went into Committee, he would move an Amendment to the effect that only three of the future trustees who had to be elected should be clerical trustees—that was, out of the 11 now to be elected under the powers of that Bill. The effect of that would be to make the clerical and the lay trustees equal in number—namely, 14 of each: 14 laymen, and 14 ecclesiastics. Now, that was a Governing Body, the constitution of which he could quite understand that House sanctioning; but he did not think that that House would willingly proceed to grant further powers or exemptions to any exclusively clerical body in the control of that large property and the privileges connected with it, without re-considering the statutes under which the College of Maynooth was at present governed. That House should remember that the Act of 1845 (Sir Robert Peel's Act) was repealed, and that if they passed that Bill, as now proposed, there was nothing to prevent the establishment of Maynooth hereafter as an exclusively Roman Catholic institution, under the exclusive direction of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. For his part, he did not believe that that was the intention of that House, and unless the hon. and learned Gentleman (the Solicitor General for Ireland) who had charge of that Bill gave an assurance that there should be some provision introduced that should secure the perpetuity of the lay element—since the establishment of Maynooth had never received the sanction of Parliament, except as governed by a body consisting partly of laymen; no grant, indeed, had ever been made to it except upon that understanding — and considering that virtually that Bill provided the means of changing the constitution of the College of Maynooth in the direction to which that House had always objected, by making it an exclusively ecclesiastical seminary, through the process which he (Mr. Newdegate) expected to see carried out by the Roman Catholic hierarchy—for that reason he should propose that that Bill be read that day two months, unless, as he said, Her Majesty's Government gave some assurance that in Committee they would take measures to secure that the future constitution of the Governing Body of the College should be in some degree analogous to that which had hitherto existed; and that could only be effected by providing that hereafter, as heretofore, a certain proportion of the trustees should be laymen.

said, he must decline to give any such pledge as that required by the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate). The only qualifications in the Acts of Geo. III for the trustees was that they should be natural-born subjects of the Crown. There were now 17 trustees, all of whom were clergymen, except one. The new trustees were always elected by the surviving trustees. The Bill had no effect except to increase the number.

said, that Motion gave him an opportunity of briefly commenting upon the statement which had just been made by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland. That hon. and learned Gentleman said that he hoped the House would not be so illiberal, now that it was framing a new constitution for the College of Maynooth, as to clog it with any conditions. That hon. and learned Gentleman seemed to forget that he was asking them to pass an Act which was to possess those new trustees with that large property. Was it unreasonable or illiberal that they should indicate the nature of the body to whom the property was to be transferred? Did he mean to ask them to make over that property to the exclusive control of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, because, as he informed them, all the lay trustees had resigned? Did not that tally with the statement which he (Mr. Newdegate) had made to that House—that the number 28 was the number of the Roman Catholic hierarchy; and if all the lay trustees had resigned, and they were to add 11 to the present number, there would be 17 to be elected, and if all those 17 were to be Archbishops and Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church—which he understood to be the expectation of the hon. and learned Gentleman—they would be constituting, in fact, a Roman Catholic University, because there was power under the old Acts to connect with that College a lay department—in other words, to attach a lay College to Maynooth. Why, that was constituting a Roman Catholic University under the exclusive direction of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Now, he was perfectly certain that of hon. Members present at that moment in that House, not ten came down with the expectation of hearing that that was the real meaning of the Bill before the House. He should not attempt at that moment to propose any amendment of the Bill, because from the statement of the hon. and learned Gentleman that the six lay trustees had resigned, any Amendment to be effectual must go far beyond his, and must provide for retaining in the constitution of that new body at least the same proportion, if not a larger proportion of laymen than had ever been retained by Parliament for the government of that institution. For that reason he should take no further part in that discussion; but when the Bill came on for third reading he should certainly move an Amendment, the object of which would be to secure that, in the future government of Maynooth, there should not be a smaller proportion of laymen than had hitherto been. He was not going to divide the Committee on the present occasion, because he was not duly informed of the real nature and extent of that change until he heard the explanation of the hon. and learned Gentleman. He should not, therefore, put the Committee to the trouble of going a division until the House could act deliberately, and with a full knowledge of what it was asked to do by that Bill.