asked the Postmaster General, When the Report of the inquiry into the question of Sunday Labour in the Post Office Department may be expected?

said, in reply, that the whole of the information now necessary to form a judgment upon this important matter had been collected, and a précis of it had been made and put into his hands. The Report would also be soon in their hands, and he would take care that it should at once be communicated to the public, even though Parliament should not be sitting at the time.

asked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether Her Majesty's Government will take measures to give effect to the Report of the Committee on the Thames Embankment, by appropriating to the use of the public, in the manner recommended by the Committee, the portion of foreshore reclaimed from the Thames near Whitehall; and, whether if further legislation is required in order to give effect to that object, the Government will undertake that the land in question shall not in the meanwhile be dealt with in any manner inconsistent with the recommendation of the Committee?

I do not know, Sir, whether the hon. Member has seen the evidence taken before this Committee, but I have not seen it. I apprehend it is not yet published; it would, therefore, be premature for the Government to consider the Report of the Committee, and undoubtedly the Government will not think of taking measures which will in any way fetter their own consideration, or the consideration by Parliament of the Report of the Committee, whether they agree with it or not.

asked the First Commissioner of Works, Whether Westminster Hall is under his control; and, if so, why the sale of refreshments therein is suspended during the Recess?

, in reply, said, it was a remarkable illustration of the curious way in which the affairs of this country were administered that while the buildings on both sides of Westminster Hall were undoubtedly under his charge as First Commissioner of Works, and he had a good deal to say to them, yet the Hall itself was by Letters Patent under the charge of the Commissioners of Woods and Forests, and they were the parties who had the regulation of the sale of fruit and edibles in Westminster Hall. With regard to the person who accommodated the public by selling provisions there, he had received a communication from the Commissioners, who explained that, during the sitting of Parliament, a large number of persons frequented the Hall, and required refreshments; but during the Recess the number of visitors was much smaller, and they were to a great extent visitors to the Courts of Law, for whose accommodation refreshments were sold inside the doorway of the Court of Queen's Bench, from which the inference might be deduced that it was not deemed necessary that they should be sold outside that doorway.

asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If, seeing the early age at which many of our soldiers are sent to India, as shown by the return of the ages of the non-commissioned officers and men of the 54th regiment, the authorities there will send as many as possible (of those under twenty-one years of age) to the hill stations to be there employed in industrial pursuits, until of an age better calculated to bear the effects of the Indian climate?

said, the Government of India was quite alive to the expediency of sending as many young soldiers to the Hill Stations as the interests of the service would permit; but it would not be conducive to discipline that general instructions should be given to send to the hills all young soldiers arriving in India.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, What is the reason that passports are required from passengers landing in Belgium from England, while none are required for those entering Belgium from Germany?

said, according to official information received, travellers entering Belgium were not required to exhibit their passports unless they entered from the French frontier. But under present circumstances it was ad- visable for all persons intending to visit the Continent to provide themselves with passports.

asked whether it was not a fact that notices had been put up in Belgium that passports were required, and that Belgian officers had gone on board steamers to demand a sight of them before travellers were allowed to land?

said, he had heard rumours to that effect, but they were not justified in making that demand. Travellers entering by the French frontier were obliged to show their passports; but not those entering direct from England.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If there be any objection to lay upon the Table a Copy of the register or record of the "Megæra" when she was placed out of commission; also, a Copy of the Surveys and Reports made by the Surveyor or Dockyard authority from the period she was put out of commission to the time when she was again commissioned for her recent voyage?

I do not, Sir, precisely know the nature of the document which my hon. Friend calls the register or record of the Megæra; but with reference to that and the other documents he asks for, I have to state that there will be no objection to give them the fullest publicity. I do not think, however, it would be advisable to publish certain documents piecemeal without producing, at the same time, the Minutes of the Lords of the Admiralty on those submissions. My right hon. Friend at the head of the Government has already said that a full inquiry will be instituted into this case, and I shall take care to have all the documents prepared, so that the whole of the facts may be submitted to a competent Court of Inquiry. I may add that I have given directions to the captain of the Megæra to return home by the ordinary mail steamer, in order that the proceedings may not be delayed.

asked the Secretary of State for War, What steps he has taken, or is about to take, in fulfilment of the promise made by him, that a complete and searching inquiry should be made into the organisation and efficiency of the various branches of the Royal Artillery?

said: The step I have taken, Sir, with regard to the Artillery service is this—Immediately after the discussion in this House, I requested the Adjutant General to communicate on the subject with the Director of Artillery and Deputy Adjutant General of Artillery, and be ready to discuss the question with me when the diminished pressure of Parliamentary Business shall enable me to devote sufficient attention to it.

asked the President of the Board of Trade, If his attention has been called to the case of Daniel Delay, an engine driver on the South Eastern Railway, who, on the 22nd of last month, died on the foot plate of his engine, after being at work from 3·30 a.m. till 10 p.m. 18½ hours, with intervals for breakfast, dinner, and tea; and, whether he considers such protracted hours of labour for drivers of locomotives on Railways compatible with the public safety?

I am not, Sir, able to give any information, or to express any opinion as to the case referred to in the Question of my hon. Friend. It has not been reported to the Board of Trade. The railway company would not be bound to report it, nor would they be bound to do so even under the stringent provisions of the Railway Regulation Amendment Bill now under the consideration of Parliament, as the case was not a railway accident.

asked, Whether it is intended by the Board of Trade to make any further inquiry in reference to the case, with a view to protect railway servants generally from the recurrence of similar casualties?

I will take care to inform myself as to the result of the coroner's inquest in reference to the man's death; but I can scarcely speak as to subsequent proceedings by the Board of Trade. The death was not one resulting from accident; but so far as I am informed was the death of a man from natural causes in the discharge of his duty.

, in rising to move that the Bill be now read a second time, said, he had been prevented by the lateness of the hour when he introduced the Bill from making at that stage any statement either of the circumstances which led to the introduction of the measure or with regard to its provisions. He therefore considered it right he should do so now. Some such statement was, in his opinion, necessary; and, among other reasons, for this one—as was stated the other night by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli)—there existed in the minds of many persons some disappointment and perplexity in regard to the subject with which the Bill was intended to deal. He hoped that what he should have to say would remove both. He believed it was very well known to the House that in Prussia it had long been the custom, as soon as the harvest was over, to put the different arms of the service through a series of manœuvres in order to their improvement in the higher branches of military art. The men were assembled under different officers, the Commander-in-Chief regulating the whole plan of operations and acting as umpire. Her Majesty's Government believed the practice in question to be most advantageous, and desired to introduce it into the British Army. It might be asked why the idea had never been acted upon before, and he supposed the answer would be that his predecessors in Office felt that in this country there were difficulties to be overcome which did not exist in Continental countries. Her Majesty's Government had now come to the conclusion that the difficulties ought no longer to be regarded as insurmountable. The difficulty arose mainly from the fact that while in Prussia, speaking generally, the military spirit was in the ascendency, in this country, on the other hand, the civil spirit was in the ascendant; and he, for one, should be very sorry to propose to reverse the existing order of things. The question to be solved was whether they could, consistently with British habits and institutions, reconcile the two principles to which he had referred. The Prussians on the occasion of their annual manœuvres occupied a country which was as though it was in a state of war. They were billeted in the villages or bivouacked in the open; they carried no tents, blankets, or other impediments; they had no ambulance or provision columns, and for whatever carts or other vehicles were required for transport they made requisitions on the people of the districts through which they passed. That was to say, in Prussia they had a right to traverse any person's grounds, to billet in any person's house, and use every person's means of transport for military purposes. They had not that power in this country; if they wanted to go over even unenclosed lands they must ask the sanction of Parliament in the manner he was then proposing. In this country an exactly opposite state of things obtained in time of peace, in other respects of scarcely less importance. Tents, food, fuel, water, and everything that was required for the accommodation of their soldiers must be taken to the troops, and what transport was wanted in the neighbourhood could only be obtained by hire and payment. If, unfortunately, they should be in a state of war, they would act as if in a foreign country, and requisition what they required; hence, if in this country this had been a difficult question it was not because they could not do under similar circumstances what the Prussians could, but because English habits and institutions created difficulties to be overcome which did not exist in Prussia. Having stated the object of the Bill, which he hoped would meet the approval of the House, it would be necessary for him, in order to make the whole proceeding clear, to give a brief narrative of what had actually taken place. Early in February last His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, knowing the intentions of the Government, sent to him a statement from General Sir Hope Grant, the general commanding at Aldershot, to the effect that he proposed during the approaching summer to march a force of from 15,000 to 20,000 Regular troops from Aldershot to the New Forest. This proposal was considered at a War Office meeting, and he would explain what the phrase "War Office meeting" meant. He did so the more because there was a Motion on the Paper touching the responsibility of gentlemen serving in the War Department. Now there ought to be no doubt about the responsibility of the War Department. The War Department was not like the Board of Admiralty, for the reason that there was no Board, but simply an Office presided over by a Secretary of State, who was alone responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his Department. In the last Session of Parliament an Act was passed providing that there should be two additional officers attached to the War Department, and Orders in Council were issued immediately after the passing of that Act, defining exactly the responsibility attaching to the Commander-in-Chief, to the Surveyor General of Ordnance, and to the Financial Secretary, the whole of them being subject to the ultimate responsibility of the Secretary of State; and he (Mr. Cardwell), occupying that position, was perfectly prepared to answer for anything that was either wrongly done or left undone in the Department. The House would, however, agree with him that there ought to be consultations between a civilian at the head of a military department and the professional men who carry on its executive branches before technical questions were decided by the responsible head of the Department. Accordingly, they were in the habit of holding meetings at which the Secretary of State for War was assisted by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, the Surveyor General, the Financial Secretary, the Parliamentary Under Secretary, and the Adjutant General in the consideration of questions of importance, and the Permanent Under Secretary also assisted at the discussion, and kept the record of it. Well, what he had called a "War Office meeting" was held on the 11th of March, and there was a discussion, in the course of which he opposed the proposal to confine the movements to Regular troops as being likely to defeat a great part of the object of the Government in determining upon holding a camp of manœuvres. The following was the Minute made by the Permanent Under Secretary:—

"It was decided to form a camp of 30,000 men, composed of Regular Troops, Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. The time to be 'for sixteen days from about the 26th of August.' The place to be 'the neighbourhood of Aldershot, looking towards Portsmouth—i.e., some locality convenient for Aldershot being utilized as the base of operations. Sir Frederick Chapman' (the Quartermaster General) 'to go down with General Haines' (the head of the Corps of Engineers) 'next week to look over the country and inquire about the land, &c., and then report.' Committee appointed to consider matters of detail."

He would ask particular attention to this Minute of the War Office, merely because it would be perceived that after all the inquiries they had made, and the doubts which at various times they had had as to what the precise place of operations should be, Her Majesty's Government by the Bill proposed to carry out that Minute in its integrity. On the 15th of March Sir Hope Grant withdrew his recommendation with regard to the New Forest on the ground, among others, of the excessive heat and the quantity of flies that abound there during the summer months. But whatever else was intended, it certainly was not intended to postpone the movements until the arrival of the equinoctial gales. About that date the War Department were also informed by Sir Hope Grant that—

"Colonel Loyd Lindsay has informed him 'that a large area of country in Berkshire, to the westward of Reading and in the direction of Salisbury Plain, some sixteen miles long by five or six wide, is in every way adapted for encamping and manœuvring on a large scale, and that the country gentlemen generally as well as the farmers are very anxious that the troops should assemble and exercise in this locality when the crops are off the ground.'"

Upon this the Quartermaster General and the head of the Corps of Engineers were sent to examine the country in question, and communicate with Sir Hope Grant on the subject. It was intended, if the first suggestion had been adopted, to make an attack upon the garrison at Portsmouth, and to bring the garrison out as to meet an advancing Army; but this scheme was, to his regret, abandoned, because of difficulties connected with the water supply. On the 17th of April Sir Hope Grant reported that the farmers of Berkshire were very much pleased at the prospect of the manœuvres taking place on their lands, and that they would require no compensation if the manœuvres were held after the harvest had been gathered in. On the 30th of May, however, it was reported that the farmers would require a distinct promise from the War Office that they should be repaid for any damage done by the troops—a perfectly reasonable request, as it seemed to him. Upon this Sir Hope Grant proposed that the troops should be put in motion from Aldershot as soon as it was ascertained that the harvest had been cleared off the ground. On the 10th of June they had another meeting at the War Office, for the purpose of fixing the time of holding the camp. It was reported to the Department that last year in the part of Berkshire proposed to be used for the purposes of the camp the harvest was over on the 26th of August, and in 1869 on the 24th of the same month; and it was determined to extend the time a little so as to meet the convenience of the Reserve forces. Circulars were accordingly issued to the Yeomanry and Volunteers, informing them that probably the 9th of September would be the day fixed; but the War Office determined to defer fixing the exact day until they had received further Reports from Sir Hope Grant. These Reports were accordingly received on the 4th of July, and on the 8th they met to consider them. He should have to refer to them, and there would be no objection to produce them. He considered that with regard to the three routes from Aldershot to Lockinge the Reports were favourable; but with regard to the encampment at Lockinge he did not think it was, on the whole, practicable. But he did not then determine upon the site and plans. He desired before doing so to have further information as to the fitness of the country for the purpose. Sir Hope Grant had recommended the encampment of 30,000 men at Lockinge and Wantage; but he (Mr. Cardwell) was sorry to say he could not give his assent to this. They had heard a great deal about the Berkshire Downs; but he was informed as follows with regard to them. The Reports speak of fine open downs, and it was naturally supposed that they were uncultivated. The fact, however, is that, with the exception of a small strip along the Ridge Way, about 600 acres at East Ilsley, and a few patches here and there, there is no uncultivated land, the Berkshire "downs" consisting of a large extent of country perfectly devoid of fences, but closely cultivated, the crops consisting of corn, peas, beans, turnips, &c. Lockinge was not, as described in the Medical Report, a suitable place for the encampment of a large body of men. The following was a fair summary of the Report:—

"The position chosen is partly arable and partly grass, and in nearly every instance good natural drainage. Surface soil chalk, covered with a thin layer of clay; chalk marl below chalk, and underneath that again upper green sand. Shallow and deep wells, varying from 10 to 50 feet."

The village of East Hendred, which would form one extreme of the camp, was described as—

"Move or less infested with typhoid fever; its wells and other sources of water are probably likewise affected with the fever poison,"

and for these reasons it was, therefore, discarded.

"Wantage," he was informed in the Medical Report, "lies low, and has suffered from smallpox; water supply tolerably pure, with a considerable quantity of lime, removable by boiling. In some places it is polluted by drainage, the water in the canal being very impure."

Thus far he had summarized the Report; but the following passage was so important he would read it to the House in extenso:—

"On the whole, I think it admirably suited for an encampment; but I think, on sanitary grounds, it would be injudicious to mass the whole force of 30,000 men here, as I believe is proposed. I do not think the ground extensive enough in a sanitary point for this number of men, and the amount of the water supply would be severely tested. Again, from the peculiar course of the stream I think the massing of the men undesirable, as the slightest fouling above would cause inconvenience to the troops below."

[Colonel C. H. LINDSAY asked who had made the Report.] He believed it was Dr. Madden, who was sent from Aldershot by Sir Hope Grant. He (Mr. Cardwell) did not throw blame on anyone; but he was endeavouring to explain in a narrative the circumstances that led to the decision. On the 8th of July it was decided again to send the Quartermaster General and the head of the Engineer Corps to make a more complete examination of the country, and see what was the then state of affairs. They returned on the 24th of July, but not like Joshua and Caleb, full of expectation of a land of promise. They reported as follows:—

"We find this country open and suitable for the purpose. It is, however, principally arable land, covered at present with grain and root crops, over which it is out of the question to think of moving troops until the former crops are housed. From information we obtained on the spot there appears every probability of the harvest being unusually late, in which case more difficulties are likely to present themselves in occupying this ground than were anticipated when the project of moving troops into Berkshire on or about the 9th of September was first under consideration. We would here observe that, should the autumn be wet, the encampment of troops on these lands would be objectionable, and likely to be inconvenient to the necessary traffic. On the other hand, should the weather be dry, no objections or inconveniences are to be expected from camping on these grounds."

He gathered from the letter which the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay) had written to The Times that the period at which it would be advisable to have the encampment would be fixed by the expectation that the harvest would be finished some time from the 10th to the 20th of September—that is to say, that the manœuvres could not be appointed to commence until after the 20th; but a Report of the Commissary since sent down into the country in order to ascertain the possibility of procuring transport informed him that the harvest would be very late this year, and would certainly not be concluded before the 20th or 25th of September, and in his Report, dated 6th August, this gentleman, Captain Milne, himself a native of Berkshire, says—

"On the 4th instant I had an interview with Colonel Blandy, chief constable of the county, who confirms what I have already stated as regards the feelings of the farmers, and concurs in the Report I have already made as to the lateness of the harvest—namely, that even with favourable weather harvest operations will not be general for a week or ten days, and certainly not concluded before the 20th or 25th proximo."

He believed he had done with the narrative portion of his statement; but it was necessary to comment upon some particulars. On the 4th of July it was absolutely necessary for the War Office to come to a decision. Nobody, he thought, would venture to assert that this large quantity of men could be encamped in the cultivated country till the harvest had been removed. The harvest, according to the most favourable vaticinations, would last until the 10th or 20th of September. It would therefore be impossible to fix an earlier date than the 20th for going upon those lands. He did not hesitate to say, for his own part, that nothing would have induced him to sanction the encampment of 10,000 or 15,000 men on low lands in a clay country at the time of year beginning on the 20th of September, the very wettest part, he believed, of the whole year in that part of the country. The War Office accordingly decided to revert to the unenclosed country, which he had shown to have been originally in contemplation. They had already called out the Militia, and given notice to the Yeomanry and Volunteers, with a view of beginning operations on the 9th of September; and he was not prepared to disappoint the auxiliary forces of their share in the proposed manœuvres, nor was he prepared to expose them to the inconveniences which a change of date would have occasioned. Further, he thought it would have been in the highest degree culpable to fix the period of short days and long nights, and probable bad weather, for the first introduction into this country of this system of military manœuvres. What the War Office wanted was to give instruction to the Regular forces—to combine them with the Auxiliary forces—and to do so in a manner which would conduce to the success of the whole operations. To have chosen the period of the short days and long nights would have diminished very much the prospect of successful instruction, while he need not say it would not have been favourable to the chance of maintaining discipline in so large a body of men, considering that these various forces were to be assembled for the first time. There was also another consideration which hon. Gentlemen opposite were, in many instances, even better qualified to judge of than he was. In that part of the country he understood that whenever there was a late harvest, farmers were desirous of getting upon their lands immediately the harvest was gathered in, with a view of making preparations for the next season. The consequence was that the military operations would interfere with this natural desire on the part of the farmers, while upon their part they were not willing to let their horses for hire. All these reasons were sufficient, he thought, to induce the Government to give up the enclosed for the unenclosed lands. Having so decided, let him put the House in possession of what it was actually proposed to do. The same force was to be assembled which was originally contemplated. He had a Return before him from the Adjutant General, in which the numbers that were to come were set down at 33,552 rank and file. They would perform manœuvres which he understood from the Adjutant General would be quite as beneficial to the Regular forces as any manœuvres that could have been practised if the other site had been selected; and which, in the opinion of those who were responsible for the Auxiliary forces, would be as useful to them as any manœuvres that could have been performed upon the other site. The area to be used for the contemplated operations was larger than under the original scheme. [Mr. BOUVERIE: What is the proposed area?] He was not prepared to state the exact extent; but the area was set forth in the schedules to the Bill of which he was about to move the second reading. The distance from the base of operations would be less. If the Lockinge plan had been adopted the distance from Aldershot would have been 40 miles; whereas, acording to the present design, no part of the area would be further than 12 miles. The Control department, however, would be as severely tested as it would have been elsewhere. On the part of some persons there was a disposition to suppose that the whole object of these manœuvres was to test the Control department. He begged to say, however, that while both he and his right hon. Friend at the head of the Control department were very desirous that the department should be thoroughly tested, and that it should be proved whether it could discharge its duties satisfactorily, it was not less important that every branch of the service should be equally tested. The object of embarking in these manœuvres was not merely to make a fine show and a good appearance, but the object of the Government was, while taking such measures as should ensure success, to discover also what the weak points in our defences were, so that these might be remedied in another year. He had already stated that the Berkshire district was never finally adopted by the Government; but he was bound to admit that at one period he himself had acted as if it had been adopted. With regard to compulsory powers over lands, he had communicated exclusively with the Members for Berkshire, and not with the Members for Hampshire and Surrey, being, before the Report of the 24th of July, under the impression that the Lockinge plan would be the plan acted upon. Therefore, to that extent he was perfectly ready to plead guilty. The department had not finally adopted the plan, but he had acted as if they had adopted it; that he freely acknowledged. But on the 29th of July the Government were obliged to decide. Up to that time they had expended nothing, and had kept the settlement of the matter entirely in their own hands; but it was then only six weeks from the time appointed, and it was absolutely necessary to take measures. Even if with the fine weather now existing the harvest were gathered in early enough, which it undoubtedly would not be, to enable the troops to go to Lockinge, he should still feel that he was bound in July to decide according to the circumstances of that time, and not of the circumstances of any subsequent period. His duty was to consider what would tend most to the success of the operations, and what would do the least amount of injury to cultivated lands, and give the least opening for large and indefinite claims for compensation. For if he had acted upon any other grounds, he might have laid the foundation for its being urged another year—"We will have no more of these operations on account of the want of success attending them," or "on account of the injury which they did to cultivated lands, and the enormous claims which were made for compensation in consequence." It had been said repeatedly that the War Office could not move 30,000 men a distance of 30 miles. There never was a greater mistake in the world. If the War Office could do what the Prussians could do in taking up the local transport there would not be the least difficulty in moving troops over any specified part of the country. If the War Office could act as they would do in case of war there would not be the slightest difficulty about it. But here they were obliged to depend upon hiring; and under the circumstances of this year the farmers were not disposed to lend their horses. But hon. Gentlemen might say—"Why have you not horses of your own? Why is not the Control department in a position to undertake this work for itself?" They heard a great deal in that House occasionally about extravagance; but he held that if there was anything more extravagant than another it would be to maintain such an enormous number of transport horses in time of peace. Nothing could be imagined which would derogate more from the efficiency of an Army than allowing the money voted by Parliament to be diverted into such a wrong channel. What was wanted was the nucleus of a Transport force which on going into the country that was to be the theatre of war should avail itself of the local transport of that country and convert it to the purposes of our Army, and he fully believed that in the Control department we possessed such a nucleus. There were many who seemed to have no other object than to run down the Control department. He had no particular or personal reason to be the advocate or defender of the department. The department was not any creation of his own; it was brought into existence by the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir John Pakington) in consequence of the recommendations of Lord Strathnairn's Committee. He thought it had been a wise step to create that department, and he did not shrink from any responsibility fairly attaching to him for having given it the most cordial support in his power; but he had never assumed with regard to it the credit belonging to his predecessors in office. It was now said that the department had broken down. To that assertion, as far as his lights and knowledge extended, he was bound to give an emphatic denial. On the contrary, the department had been tried and had succeeded in the face of great difficulties upon the Red River Expedition. His right hon. and gallant Friend the Surveyor General, to whom belonged the principal credit of the organization of the department, would be able to defend it far better than he was able to do. But this he would undertake to say—that if the Control department could, by hiring, have obtained command, at a moderate cost, of the same means of transport as the Prussians could obtain without hiring, the department would successfully have carried out all that was essential. But when, without the possibility of hiring, the Control department was expected to provide all necessary facilities, it must be borne in mind that the operations would have borne no resemblance at all to those of actual warfare; that they would have proved enormously expensive; and that they would meanwhile have been of little real value for the instruction of our troops. He would now proceed to describe the Bill to the second reading of which the House was asked to give its sanction. It was a Bill to enable the Government to enter on inclosed land and to encamp on uninclosed land. Over inclosed lands the Bill took very small powers; but it must be obvious that in passing from one great open district to another it might be necessary to cross some inclosed lands; and if the right to pass over these did not exist, the whole of the military operations might be impeded. The Government, therefore, proposed to create a Commission, consisting of the Lords Lieutenant and Representatives in Parliament of the districts affected by these military operations, with power to add to their number, and with the sanction of the Commission it would be competent for the troops to pass over those special portions of enclosed lands lying between the unenclosed tracts. The 3rd section of the Bill, however, restrained the Commission or the troops from entering upon, or interfering with, any dwelling-house, farmyard, pleasure garden, orchard, nursery-ground, and certain other places specified in that section. By the 6th section a Court was constituted to give rapid arbitration where demands were made; and under the Bill also there were police arrangements for preventing strangers from entering upon grounds in an unauthorized manner and occasioning damage. These were the main portions of the Bill, and having stated them, he should at once resume his seat, if it were not for the Notice which had been placed upon the Paper by the hon. and gallant Member for Bewdley (Colonel Anson). That Amendment stated that the House had heard with regret that the autumnal manœuvres in Berkshire had been abandoned. He (Mr. Cardwell) had shown that the plan for the manœuvres in Berkshire had never been finally adopted at all, though it had no doubt been supposed that it would be. The Bill before the House, moreover, extended to parts of Berkshire, Hants, and Surrey, so that it was not literally true to say that all the autumnal movements in Berkshire had been abandoned. The Resolution of the hon. and gallant Gentleman went on to assert that from the Correspondence laid upon the Table, it appeared that a

"State of things exists in the War Office highly detrimental to the efficiency of the service from the difficulty of fixing responsibility on any one individual in the event of any breakdown in our military system."

He had already answered that by stating that the responsibility for any breakdown rested upon the Secretary of State for War, and that he did not seek in the smallest degree to relieve himself from his proper share of any responsibility. If a Vote of Censure were to be brought forward upon this subject it must be directed against the Secretary of State; there could be no mistake about that, and the hon. and gallant Gentleman need not therefore have the smallest difficulty in fixing the responsibility upon the proper person. Last year an Order in Council was laid upon the Table, in pursuance of the requirements of the statute, defining the duties of the several authorities at the War Office, and any person objecting to the manner in which these functions were divided ought rather to have urged his objections at that period than to have brought them forward now in the shape of a Vote of Censure. He took upon himself the full responsibility of the decision which had been arrived at, believing it to be for the good of the public service. If he had decided otherwise, and adhered to the Lockinge plan, probably some critic would have been as ready as the hon. and gallant Member now to come forward with a hostile Motion. Such a Motion he should have found it far more difficult to meet. He certainly should not wish that anybody who might be disposed to move a Vote of Censure should have it in his power to say—"In the face of the Medical Report, and of the advice of military men as to other lands, you persisted in encamping your men upon a clay soil at the time of the equinox, and by doing so you incurred enormous expense and a liability to compensation the extent of which it is impossible to foresee." He believed this Bill would enable the authorities to carry into effect one of the greatest military improvements ever adopted in this country—namely, the imitation of the great Prussian autumnal manœuvres with a force of 30,000 men, in a portion of the country and at a time affording a reasonable hope that the movements would be attended with success. If such were the results it would doubtless lead to a desire to renew the operations in future years, and thus to keep up a practice which more almost than anything else would tend to promote the real efficiency of the Army of this country. On these grounds he respectfully recommended the Bill to the favourable consideration of the House.

said, he thought it a somewhat novel practice that an elaborate answer should be given by antici- pation to a Motion which had still to be brought before the House; but he sincerely hoped that the House at last had got to the bottom of the knowledge of the Secretary of State for War on the causes of the failure of the Berkshire manœuvres. The right hon. Gentleman had dwelt on a variety of subjects, among others the different positions which the Prussian and the British Armies occupied in respect of these autumn manœuvres. But the difference between the positions of the two Armies in this respect was well known before these autumnal manœuvres were undertaken, and it was quite clear that considerations of that kind had no influence in putting a stop to these manœuvres in Berkshire. A great many reasons had been given for the failure since the first Question was answered which he himself addressed to the right hon. Gentleman at the beginning of August. Even the reasons just advanced, however, were not altogether satisfactory, especially as the documents from which the right hon. Gentleman had freely quoted were not before the House. He must remind the right hon. Gentleman of the cause which he originally assigned—the lateness of the harvest; no other reason was then advanced, and even after the able speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay), the same answer continued to be given. The responsibility for this statement was thrown almost entirely upon the Report of the Quartermaster General. In the words of the right hon. Gentleman himself—

"He submitted with great deference that the Government were bound to take the opinion of the Quartermaster General upon a subject of this kind."

But the Quartermaster General never gave any opinion of that kind; in fact, his references to the harvest were very slight indeed, though his observations on the probable lateness of the harvest, and on the effects of the wet weather upon the clayey soil, were greatly magnified and their importance exaggerated in the Minute made upon them by the Surveyor General of Ordnance. That probable late harvest was at once transformed into an unprecedentedly late harvest by the Surveyor General, who then refers to the fact that in some places the corn was quite green. Anybody, however, who read that Minute attentively could see at a glance where the shoe pinched, and that the real cause of the breakdown was the want of transport. It was originally proposed to concentrate the whole force at Aldershot, and to send out columns of such strength as the transport available would allow; but on the 28th of July the Quartermaster, assuming that the operations would be held in Berkshire, drew up another scheme in order to reduce by one-third the amount of transports that would be required. That scheme was laid before a War Office meeting, but was not considered satisfactory, and the Quartermaster then drew up another scheme reducing the transports to one-third of his original proposal. Whether it was the inability to provide the transport or the unwillingness to find the money to pay for it, it was clear that the failure of the Berkshire campaign was owing to the want of transport. The military manœuvres had been made entirely subordinate to the present capabilities of transport of the Control department, instead of the resources at the command of the Control department being raised to the necessities of the occasion—raised to the necessities of the military situation. A worse state of things could not exist. Universal regret had been expressed by all classes, and by persons of all shades of political opinion, at the abandonment of these long-talked of manœuvres. Virtually they were abandoned, a march or two out of Aldershot over well-known ground being a very different thing from that which was to have taken place. The public knew the great advantage that the Prussian Army had derived from the carrying out of such measures, and saw that there was a great increase in our Army Estimates. After that enormous sum had been expended in trying to improve the state of our Army, and the expectations raised in the minds of the public, he thought that every one would agree with him in thinking that the first part of his Motion was not uncalled for. It was absurd to suppose—even if the harvest could not be got in before the 9th of September—that the English Army would be afraid to go under canvas at the end of September, and as to the wet weather, he need only remind the House that in the Red River Expedition, which occupied between 90 and 100 days, there was for 45 days a continuous downpour of rain, and during that time there was not a single sick man in the expeditionary force. With respect to the question of responsibility, which was much more important, he appealed to the common sense of the merest civilian whether, when an officer had been selected to command troops in such manœuvres, he ought not to be left to make himself acquainted with the country and to carry out his instructions. If that plan were adopted any defect could be at once discovered, and it would be known who was responsible. In the Report of the Committee which had inquired into the conduct of business in the War Department, Lord Northbrook stated that there was too great a tendency both in the Horse Guards and the War Office to centralization, in matters of detail, and pointed out the necessity for each person having a sharply-defined sphere of action. Had there been carried out what he now suggested the War Office would still have retained their constitutional check over the military authorities. The Secretary for War would have been supremely responsible in his office; but he would have had simple arrangements and he would have shown a reasonable confidence in the men who had to carry out the operations that were proposed. Instead of that the Quartermaster General reported to Sir Edward Lugard, the Permanent Under Secretary of the War Office, who was appointed to superintend the general conduct of business there. Had it ever occurred to any hon. Member to consider the position in which this state of things had placed Sir Hope Grant, who was to command these manœuvres?

said, that Sir Hope Grant was not appointed to the command.

said, he assumed that Sir Hope Grant would have commanded, from the reference which was made to him in the Quartermaster's Report.

said, that Sir Hope Grant was referred to as being the Lieutenant General in command of the forces at Aldershot, and in that capacity he reported to the Secretary of State; but if the hon. and gallant Member wished for further information, he could tell him that the proposal was for Sir Hope Grant to command a Division; but the whole of the manœuvres were to be under the command of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief.

said, he did not regard it as important who was to command; but he contended that the Quartermaster ought to have reported to the General to whom the command was intrusted, and not to an official at the War Office who had no defined position. Upon that Report the Surveyor General of Ordnance wrote a Minute in which he dealt with military matters that were not within his department. This raised the important question whether the Surveyor General ought to have a seat in this House, since the fact of his having a seat appeared to give him so great an influence at the War Office that his opinion was taken without reference to the military authorities. Reverting to the question of responsibility, he defied any hon. Member to lay his finger on any person who was responsible for the failure of these autumn manœuvres, or would have been responsible for the breakdown of these manœuvres, if the original plan had been persevered with, and anything had gone wrong after they had commenced. The Secretary for War had made use of the fiction that he and he alone was responsible; but that only showed that the House ought carefully to see that all questions were so dealt with as to make subordinates responsible for anything that went wrong. It was a fiction to say that the Secretary for War was responsible, for any exposure of the shortcomings of a department affected its head, and the decision was held to involve the fate of the Ministry, so that party warfare was entered into, and such a matter could not be dealt with in the proper way, the Secretary of State being the only person whom there was not the means of punishing. He needed no excuse for bringing the matter before the House at the present time; but if he did need one he had it in the words of the First Minister of the Crown, who recently said it was only by crucial cases that valuable information could be obtained respecting the working of the system, or that errors in the future could be prevented. The hon. and gallant Member concluded by moving his Amendment.

, in seconding the Amendment, said, that when it was announced by his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War that the plans for the autumn manœuvres in Berkshire, which had been under consideration during four months, were to be abandoned for the reasons which were given—namely, the lateness of the harvest and the difficulty of obtaining local transport—he ventured to move the adjournment of the House, and to state that in his opinion the reasons assigned were inadequate, and that the real cause was the insufficiency or inefficiency of the Control, and that this inefficiency disclosed a state of affairs most alarming for the very existence of our Army. He did not retreat at all from that statement. The common sense of the country, as shown by letters and articles in the Press, had entirely extinguished the reasons assigned by the Government as childish. It was never understood that the troops were to be encamped on arable land, but on grass; and if anything more was wanted it would be found in the statement which he now made to the House—namely, that the War Office had taken no steps to inquire from the proprietors or farmers as to the state of the harvest in Berkshire, or as to the willingness of the farmers to lend transport to the troops—an inquiry they would certainly have adopted had they been candidly anxious to acquire a knowledge of the truth. Had these reasons been valid, which he denied, a delay of a week would have set them right; but other reasons were given, as unsound as the first. They were, the uncertainty of the weather at the end of September, and the difficulty of postponing the calling out of the Militia. With respect to the Militia, most of the men were those who would be engaged in harvest work, and the delay would have been a positive advantage to them. He felt bound to do the Inspector of Reserve Forces the justice to say—though he had not the information from him, and had not even spoken to him on the subject, he had it on the best authority—that he was perfectly ready to postpone the calling out of the Militia until after that period if desired to do so. As regarded the uncertainty of the weather, why it was always uncertain in this country, and therefore the excuses about the equinoctial gales appeared futile. The right hon. Gentleman now brought forward other and new reasons, such as typhus fever at Hendred, and the lowness of Wantage. Now, Wantage was just 200 feet above London, and a most healthy town. It had never been in contemplation to encamp 30,000 men in the neighbourhood of Wantage and Lockinge, for every day's march was laid out from the time the men were to begin to leave Aldershot. But he wished to consider the alternative plan of operations to that which was proposed in Berkshire. The alternative plan was a camp of instruction on the heath land of Chobham and Woolmer, being distant just 12 miles from Aldershot. Now, they all knew that the heath land was very limited in extent. It was very well suited to field days and operations which might be described under the head of tactics. Every mile of it was familiar to officers and men, and he had no doubt that every one, save the junior ensigns, could predict the precise movement which would take place. It was said by the War Office—none but a civilian would have ventured to say so—that these operations on the heath land at Aldershot would be precisely similar to those contemplated in Berkshire.

said, it was not asserted that the manœuvres would be exactly the same. He had absolute authority for stating that they would be as useful to the troops as those which were intended for Berkshire would have been.

said, anybody who knew the difference between tactics and strategy would not venture upon that assertion. That which would be done at Aldershot and Chobham would be a costly and expensive field day, where manœuvres would be carried out which might be described under the name of tactics, which were operations where the opposing parties were within sight of one another, or, at all events, where they knew the precise position and situation of each other—very useful instruction, no doubt, but differing from the operations which were contemplated in Berkshire, and which were to have been of another and higher character, and might more properly be described under the head of strategy, or feeling for the enemy. In this latter case the capacity of all persons and branches of the service would have been tried and tested—the generals, for instance, carefully feeling their way through an unknown country, and taking all the necessary precautions, the infantry officers com- manding regiments, or detachments on outpost duty, making proper disposition for the safety of the Army whose front they were covering—reporting the same in writing to their chiefs—the enterprising cavalry officer making a reconnaisance of 20 or 25 miles to ascertain the actual force and position of the enemy. Again, the various branches of the military administration, the Transport Service, the Commissariat, and the Store department, would be severely tested and tried at 40 miles from their base of operations. It was impossible to test their capabilities at a distance of only 12 miles, because if anything went wrong it was easy enough for an orderly to gallop back to have it all set right. Now, if the War Office had elected to have this first year's operations on the heath land near Aldershot, no one would have said a word; but the ground for complaint lay in this fact—that they undertook to do a great deal more, and having made it thoroughly known that the Berkshire campaign was to come off, they suddenly, after four months' preparation, collapsed, and gave the most ridiculous reasons for the breakdown. It was not too much to say that the Government had offended the country and humiliated the Army by this display of weakness and incapacity; they had brought upon the Army and the country a sense of humiliation, which would not be forgotten or forgiven; and this failure came at a time when the Government, in the most self-confident manner, had undertaken to pull to pieces and re-construct the whole of our Army system. To say the least, it was far from reassuring to the public generally, who began to suspect that in Army affairs Her Majesty's Government did not display absolute wisdom. During the last two years the Control had been established, and brought into what was called working order, but there was a grave suspicion that the Control was inefficient and insufficient. The operations of the autumn were looked forward to as an occasion when these suspicions might be dispelled, for it was thought if the Control could transport 30,000 men and feed them at a distance of 40 miles it was pretty good evidence that the system was not unsound. But the fact was that the Control had, during the last three months, been laughing at the very idea of being put to this test, and its officers had said that the Minister of War was under a feeble delusion when he supposed that this 40 mile march could ever take place; and, finally, that which the subordinates had said out-of-doors had been repeated by their Chief in his Minute before the House. The Controller General said the plans for the proposed operations had been submitted to him for his consideration, and that under the circumstances, having considered them, he recommended that the extended operations should not be undertaken—in short, he advised that his own Department should not be put to so severe a trial as moving 30,000 men 40 miles from home. Now, he wanted to point out to the House what it was that the Control was asked to do in the way of transport, and to inquire whether it was so very tremendous in its difficulty. According to General Ellice's plan the force was to be separated into two armies, equally divided. The southern Army, coming from Aldershot, was to meet the northern Army, which was to be brought up by train. The bulk of the northern Army had, therefore, its transport conveyed by canal and by railway, by both which lines there was great facility of communication to Aldershot. Transport, therefore, was only required for 20,000 men. Now, estimating 8 tons as the usual allowance of baggage to a regiment, and counting 48 regiments as making up the 20,000 men, it came to something under 400 tons weight of baggage to be removed—not a very enormous amount either. During the late French and German War the society with which he (Colonel Lindsay) was connected moved through districts disturbed and broken by war no less than 900 tons of goods. The 400 tons of regimental baggage would have to be moved day by day, and estimating a waggon and three horses for every ton and a-half of baggage, it came to 300 waggons. Now, paying handsomely for a waggon and three horses at £1 per day, it amounted to the sum of £300 per day, or £4,200 for 14 days. Was it, therefore, wise to collapse for that sum? Was it wise to become ridiculous before Europe for twice that sum? Would it not have been worth while, considering how liberal the farmers had been to Government, to have been liberal to them, and paid them even more handsomely than he had stated? But were the farmers ever even asked whether they would lend their horses and waggons? From inquiries he had made amongst the landowners and farmers of 36 parishes in Berkshire, it would seem that no official questions had been asked them as to whether their crops would be off the land, or whether they could provide horses and waggons in sufficient number for the transport of stores at the time mentioned. The farmers throughout the district were ready to give all the assistance they could, and he believed they would not ask for more compensation than as business men they would be entitled to. It was said that the manœuvres at Aldershot, Chobham, and Woolmer, would be as useful because they would be as extended, and at the same time much nearer for transport; but before accepting this, let the House examine General Ellice's plan of campaign, which he was bound to say was an admirable one. It commenced at Hazeley Heath, south of the Kennet, and terminated at Drayton, two miles from the Thames, a distance of 35 miles, every bit of which the soldiers had obtained leave and liberty to move over. The Duke of Cambridge had said in "another place"—

"In truth the officers of the British Army are exposed to enormous difficulties. We have never been allowed to collect large bodies of troops together, as is constantly done upon the Continent; and though theory may be very well in its way, it is valueless unless combined with opportunities for practice. It is much more difficult in this country to carry out combined movements of troops, such as take place upon the Continent, than your Lordships generally may imagine."—[3 Hansard, ccv. 761.]

Now here was the opportunity. The Berkshire farmers had placed it in the hands of the Government, and the right hon. Gentleman had deliberately thrown it away. He (Colonel Loyd Lindsay) supposed the Government would not repeat the assertion that the movements on the heath land would be as extended as those proposed by General Ellice. Where would they find heath land in Hampshire 35 miles long? Before concluding, he wished to say a few words about the Control, which, in his opinion, was in a most unsound and unworkable state. The Control gathered under its government the most incongruous elements and the most widely-separated duties. The Ordnance Store departments, the Commissariat, which included the Transport; the Purveyor, or Medical Commissariat; and the Barrack department—all these departments were administered by Control officers; and the House would hardly believe it possible, but such was the case, that officers who had been all their lives accustomed to commissariat or transport duties were called upon to take charge of and issue ordnance stores of the most technical and complicated character. Officers who knew all about beef and pork were called upon to exercise the control duties over shot, shell, powder, fuses, and all the things belonging to the complicated condition of our Artillery forces. The result was the usual word of command of these gentlemen to their subordinates was, "Take action," which meant, "You do the work and I'll sign my name." This state of things might work tolerably well when they had good non-commissioned officers; but what would happen in the time of war, or what would happen in Berkshire, 40 miles from Aldershot? There was but one opinion with regard to the Control, and that was, that it could not continue as now constituted. It was reported that one of the most trusted officers in the Control had stated that the personnel of the establishment was too small, and must be increased 50 per cent; but before this was done a thorough inquiry should be made, especially as regarded striking off from the establishment all that which related to the Ordnance Store branch, which belonged much more properly to the artillery. Another great improvement, in his opinion, would arise from attaching to regiments a certain amount of transport service, which would render regiments practically independent of the Control, and enable them to move their regimental baggage without constantly sending requisitions for the smallest article of transport. Some of the regimental officers might be instructed in the business of the transport service, which would add to their general efficiency and usefulness as officers. The waggons and horses need not always be moved at each change of quarters, but might be handed over from one regiment to another on such occasions. The fault of the Control was that it was assuming to itself too many incongruous duties, and was grasping at the exercise of power which it was unable to wield. Without having any wish to carp, or to make any political capital out of this lamentable breakdown of the War Office, he yet thought it his duty to point out to the House that the state of affairs disclosed was most alarming for the safety of our Army, and most discreditable to a practical nation, who were paying £16,000,000 a-year for an Army which was so ill-governed by civilians at the War Office taking upon themselves executive functions, as not to be able to do the commonest duty when called upon.

said, the hon. and gallant Member for Dungannon (Colonel Stuart Knox), whom he was sorry not to see in his place that night, had on two occasions applied two different designations to him. On the first occasion—during the altercations, for he really could not call them the debates, on the Army Bill — the hon. and gallant Member did him the honour to describe him as the destroying angel. He told him he had destroyed their connection with the Ionian Islands, that he had destroyed the public reputation of a Governor of Jamaica, and that he was then engaged in destroying the British Army. On another occasion the hon. and gallant Gentleman described him as the "accused party." Well, there was a great tumble down from being a destroying angel to becoming an "accused party;" but it appeared to him from what he had heard that evening, that the two hon. and gallant Gentlemen who had spoken that night considered that at the present moment he was a combination of both those characters. It was very clear that an impression had existed in the public mind and in the Press, as well as among hon. Members of that House, that there was some mystery, some secret, about the Berkshire manœuvres, which the War Office preferred to conceal — that there had been some arrière pensée. He trusted, however, that the statement made by his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War that night had gone far to dissipate that impression. All he (Sir Henry Storks) could say was, in all sincerity and truth, that the only reason these manœuvres were not to be carried out in the manner originally proposed was that which had been assigned from the first—namely, that the harvest would not be gathered in in time. This must be a sufficient reason to any reasonable person. He was sure that there was no member of the military profession, and, he should think, very few Members of that House, who would not say that it would be a very inconvenient, not to say dangerous thing, in a country where the crops were on the ground, to carry on military operations with a force that was not highly disciplined. It must be remembered that the force in question would not be all Regulars, many would be Volunteers, Militia, and Yeomanry. And not only would the movements be hampered by the corn on the ground, but the bill for compensation would be a very heavy one if the manœuvres were carried out as originally contemplated. He wished, however, to point out that practically the same manœuvres would be carried out in the neighbourhood of Aldershot as were contemplated in Berkshire. 30,000 men could be assembled there in different bodies to be manœuvred against each other, and a certain portion of the 16 days would be devoted to the instruction practised in the Prussian Army. Outpost duty, camp duty, and other things essential to military life would be practically learnt; and, in short, he had no reason to suppose that there would be any difference whatever, either in the character or the extent of the manœuvres. The hon. and gallant Member for Bewdley (Colonel Anson) had referred to his (Sir Henry Storks) Memorandum on the proposals of the Quartermaster General and the Inspector General of Fortifications; but the Secretary of State for War had clearly explained the circumstances under which that Memorandum had been written. The hon. and gallant Member had supported the view taken by "One Who Knows the War Office," in a letter to The Times, that the whole responsibility and control should be directly under the officer who is to command the forces; but that was precisely what had been done in this case. The Duke of Cam- bridge was to be the Commander-in-Chief, and the subject was considered at a War Office Council, composed of the Secretary for War, the Commander-in-Chief, the Under Secretary for War, the Permanent Under Secretary, the Adjutant General, the Surveyor General of Ordnance, and the Financial Secretary. The Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Edward Lugard, acted as Secretary, and the officers who made the Reports in question naturally addressed them to the Secretary from whom they received their instructions. The Memorandum he had made on the Reports he was prepared to stand by, and the suggestion that the manœuvres might be postponed had been disposed of by the Secretary of State for War. Upon this point, however, he might add that it would have been very inconvenient for the Yeomanry to assemble later. Another thing to be considered was the long nights. They all knew that in camping out long nights were an element of danger, and what would be the effect upon young troops, most of whom had never been in camp before. As it was not desired to test the constitutions of our forces, much less to disgust young soldiers with camp life, but simply to instruct, the season was an important element in the matter. Some noble critics in "another place" had ridiculed his allusion to the equinoctial gales, and it had been said that it might have been comprehensible if the troops had been going to sea. He did not know whether those who thought his reference absurd had ever passed a night under canvas in a ploughed field, with a strong gale on, and the rain pouring down; but he ventured to say that if they had they would never wish to pass another. What if the time of meeting had been postponed, and bad weather had set in, followed by sickness in the camp, and perhaps by the enemy which has already knocked once at our doors, the cholera; what would everybody have said? Would there have been any end to the Questions on the Notice Paper of this House in reference to that subject, and should we not have been told on all sides that the arrangements of the camp at Berkshire showed nothing but the utmost imbecility and helplessness on the part of the authorities? Well, he thought he was quite right in alluding to these circumstances and to the possibility of bad weather. The hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay) had stated that no inquiries had been made in the county respecting transport, but he held in his hand a Report made by a very experienced officer who was commissioned to make inquiries on this point, and who wrote—

"I hasten to tell you that, from all I can learn, we may expect very little transport assistance. The farmers say that, even with the most favourable weather, the harvest will not be over till the 25th September, so that no horses can be spared till then, and there is a great objection to hiring horses for military purposes out of their own county."

said, he should like to know who the farmers were that were applied to?

said, he did not know whether he might not be able to afford his hon. and gallant Friend the information.

said, he knew that no inquiries had been made among the farmers on the committee of the 36 parishes.

said, the gentleman who made that report was a Berkshire man and a Transport officer. There was no difficulty in supplying the troops. One of the great difficulties was in conveying the baggage, the impedimenta, so to speak, of English troops. There was no analogy between the circumstances of a time of peace and those of a time of war. What would be difficult now would be done with facility during war. For instance, if he wanted fuel in time of war he would simply cut down the trees and burn them, but that could not be done now; he was obliged to carry every pound of fuel for 30,000 men. The fuel required for 10,000 men for four days amounted to 60 tons. Again, as to forage. If he could forage he should go down to the pleasant meadows of Berkshire in time of war and help himself, and not be at the expense of carrying hay. Then as to meat, he should now be obliged to take dead beasts, because an Act of Parliament would prevent him from marching living cattle along with him as might otherwise be done. He merely mentioned these things to illustrate the different arrangements necessary in time of peace and in time of war. If they intended to carry out the Prussian system as it was carried out in Prussia, the first thing to do was to Prussianize the country and also to Prussianize our Army. For the autumn manœuvres in Prussia no tents of any kind were taken; the officers were allowed 60 lb weight of baggage, but the men only took their knapsacks; there were no field hospital arrangements; each man was limited to about five rounds of ammunition per diem; while fuel, forage, and otter articles were obtained by contract or by requisition. That he gathered from a Memorandum of the Prussian military attaché in this country. Here, on the other hand, they had to carry tents, camp equipage, ammunition, water, fuel, food, forage, horse rugs, cooking utensils, entrenching tools, and many other things. It had been said that the Control system had collapsed. He contended that it had not collapsed, but had given satisfaction everywhere when it had been tried. [A laugh.] The hon. Gentleman might laugh, but he should be happy to test the matter by the opinion of general officers. It was very easy to criticise and very agreeable to criticise in a hostile spirit; but would hon. Gentlemen allow him respectfully to ask them to say honestly whether they had had sufficient experience as to the supply of an Army? Had they ever looked closely into the Control system? had they ever read "the regulations?" ["Yes!"] The hon. and gallant Member for Bewdley (Colonel Anson) might have read them; but he should think the general run of Members of that House, and particularly of those who criticised so much, had not done so. Under any system they would find people more or less intelligent, and people who often made small mistakes; but they were not to condemn a system on that account. He asked hon. Gentlemen to be good enough to name the failures of the Control system. It had given every satisfaction in Ireland. During the last two years Ireland had been in a very anxious state; they had Fenian disturbances there some 18 months ago; troops in flying columns were sent in every direction, quarters were taken up, supplies sent; and he had every reason to believe that the general officers commanding the Army had not experienced a single lapse or want on the part of the Control department. The Red River Expedition was said indeed to be a very small affair; but it was attended with great difficulties, which were overcome with great patience and resource; and he believed the Control officers did their duty on that occasion. Last year the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) wrote several letters to the newspapers, which were afterwards printed in a book. One of his chapters was devoted to the Control system, and he pointed out how it had broken down. Now, he thought that was rather ungracious. [Lord ELCHO said, he had pointed out its wrong principle.] Well, last year a letter was sent from the Council of the National Rifle Association conveying to the Secretary of State for War their thanks for the kind assistance given them by him on the occasion of the late Wimbledon meeting, as well as on other occasions, and that letter wound up by stating that "nothing could be more satisfactory than the manner in which the arrangements made by the Control department were carried out." This year also another letter was received from the same Association requesting the Secretary of State to accept their thanks, and to allow them to record, through the War Office, their sense of the assistance afforded them by the various branches of the War Department, and especially by the Control department, whose representative at Wimbledon was indefatigable in his exertions to carry out the wishes of the Council, and contributed to secure the success of the meeting. At Wimbledon, then, at any rate, the Control department had done its duty. But there was no doubt the Control department was unpopular; and one cause, and perhaps the primary cause of its unpopularity, was its name. He was sorry for it; but there was nothing from which Englishmen shrunk so much as from "control." The very name of it stank in the nostrils of the true Briton, just as many a law-abiding man hated a policeman. He therefore thought the name "Control" was unfortunate. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) would recollect the early struggles and difficulties they had in connection with those matters. At first the civil element took alarm, and declared that there was to be no adequate check, no adequate constitutional control over the Army. At length that difficulty was got over. But in a short time the military element in turn took alarm, fearing that there would be every attempt on the part of civilians to get the control and command of the Army, and of everything belonging to it. That notion, however, had been to a considerable extent dispelled. The real reason why the Control department was so unpopular and was not liked was because too many interests were touched; and probably its control over expenditure, and its desire to see that the sums voted by Parliament were properly applied, had a good deal to do with its unpopularity. They had been accused of centralization; but if there was one thing that the Secretary of State desired to do it was really to decentralize. He (Sir Henry Storks) maintained that for supply services the general officer should have to do with a direct agent, who should be held directly responsible, and that the responsibility should not be filtered through the military staff officers. The officers of the Control department felt much aggrieved that it should be said the department had collapsed, that they had not done their duty, and that they should, in fact, be held up to the public as men not up to their work. All he could state was that he had received the most valuable assistance from them. Their duties were very serious and important, and he had met from those officers nothing but goodwill, zeal, and intelligence. He did not say the system was perfect; nothing human was so; nor that it had not defects which should be remedied. But it was too bad to condemn the department without trial and without a hearing. On a former night the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay) expressed his regret that the direction and control of the Army were placed in civil hands, and warned his right hon. Friend (Mr. Cardwell) lest he should become the scapegoat of others, lest he should find our Army as the Emperor of the French found his; and the hon. and gallant Gentleman went on to speak of his right hon. Friend as receiving from those about him false statements, and then communicating them to that House. The hon. and gallant Member had almost repeated the same remarks that evening. Now, he begged to tell the hon. and gallant Gentleman that he and his Colleagues associated with him in the administration of the Army repelled those observations in the strongest terms which he was permitted to use by the Rules of that House. He denied those assertions on the part of his Colleagues and himself. They had given the Secretary of State honest information and advice according to the best of their ability; and in their respective situations and stations they held themselves responsible for that information and advice.

said, a general feeling existed that not only was the Army inefficient in numbers but inefficient in discipline for the requirements of the country. The right hon. Gentleman had availed himself of the public feeling to introduce a Bill for the re-organization of the Army. The public had looked on with interest and astonishment, but did not feel that confidence in the measure which the right hon. Gentleman felt in himself. Early in the Session the right hon. Gentle man began to think of an extraordinary revolution and reform in the Army, by amalgamating and bringing together in one body 30,000 men of all arms. On the 10th of March he decided upon forming a camp of 30,000 men of the Regulars and the Reserve, and the idea was that the camp should be in the neighbourhood of Portsmouth. Officers were sent down to make a survey of the locality, and then it was discovered that there was no supply of water, but that there were plenty of New Forest flies. It was then determined that the meeting should take place in Berkshire, but it was suddenly discovered that the harvest would be exceptionally late—that the time of assembling the troops must be delayed, and that rain and the equinoctial gales might be expected. He had listened with pain and surprise to the long and elaborate and vain excuses made at the commencement of that evening by the Secretary of State, and he thought it would have been much better to acknowledge the utter breakdown of all the different departments of which the Secretary of State for War was the responsible head. What had occurred in this case tended to humiliate this country in the eyes of foreign nations. He submitted that the Government had no right thus to imperil the honour of the country, or to make the deficiencies of our military organization so manifest to the world. He considered that the greatest blame attached to the right hon. Gentleman for devising a plan unless he could be certain of carrying it out. It was his duty to have guarded against the possibility of failure, for what the country wanted was to see by experience that it had an Army which was adequate and efficient for the services which might at any moment be required from it. The right hon. Gentleman was now going to take the troops some 12 miles from Aldershot, but the proposed manœuvres could not be regarded as any satisfactory test of our military system. The country did not ask the right hon. Gentleman for this assemblage of troops. It was his own idea. After voting the largest peace Estimates ever submitted to the House, hon. Members would have to go before their constituents and tell them that, notwithstanding all their protracted discussions upon Army re-organization, and the enormous demands upon the tax-payers, the scheme had failed, and the want of water and the prospect of the equinoctial gales had prevented the movement of 30,000 men 30 miles. In the year 1826 Mr. Canning brought down a Message from the King requesting that an Army of 5,000 men should be sent to Spain; that was on the 12th December. The House voted the necessary supplies; the men were sent from Deptford on the 15th, and the first detachment was landed in the Tagus on Christmas Day. That Army was accompanied by artillery and everything that was necessary to render it efficient. He asked the right hon. Gentleman whether they could now send 5,000 men to the Tagus in this way?

said, he was of opinion that the statements of the Secretary of State for War and of the Controller General would be considered satisfactory by the country. For himself, he did not very much lament the fact that the Berkshire campaign had been allowed to drop, because he believed that, even if it had been carried out successfully, it would not have done much to train our forces. The manœuvres would no doubt have been interesting; but his conviction was that the only way to render the Army efficient was to divide the country into military districts, to have in each district a division of the Army with all the appliances necessary for war, and to make the general officer commanding in the district responsible for the completeness and efficiency of the force. If ever an invasion in this country were attempted it would not be by one Power, but by a combination of naval and military Powers, and at- tacks would be made simultaneously upon several parts of our coast. We ought, therefore, to be prepared in every part of the country. He believed that what was now proposed would be about as useful as the intended operations in Berkshire for making the Army efficient. No doubt it would cost something to keep up the different corps d'armée which he had recommended, but that expense would be a cheap insurance of the inestimable property that might be captured or destroyed by an invading force in this country.

said, as late Chairman of the National Rifle Association, he was anxious to make a few remarks as to the statement of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Surveyor General that the War Office had received letters of thanks from the Association for the assistance the Control department had rendered at the two last Wimbledon meetings. The Surveyor General had quoted those letters as if they established the great efficiency of the Control department; but similar letters of thanks had been addressed by the Secretary of the Association to the Admiralty, to the Home Office, and to the police, and it only showed how short of arguments the Surveyor General must be when he brought forward such matter as this. It was really childish to quote such letters as evidence of what the Control department could do. All that the Control department had done had been to lend 2,000 Volunteers a sufficient quantity of tents and of camp equipage; they did not feed, or light, or warm the troops. Further than this these stores, if he (Lord Elcho) were not greatly misinformed, instead of being conveyed to the camp by the 800 horses appertaining to the Army Service Corps, had been brought there, under a contract, by Messrs. Pickford and Co., who had been paid out of the funds of the Association. The Motion of his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Anson) resolved itself into two parts, the first being that which related to the Berkshire manœuvres, and the second that which referred to the Control department. He (Lord Elcho) could fully appreciate the spirit in which the Secretary of State for War contrived these manœuvres. Although the system of forming camps of instruction in time of peace had been adopted in Austria and Prussia 42 years ago, it was only in the present year that our Government had entertained the idea for the first time. He must confess that he was glad to some extent that the proposal to establish the camp in Berkshire had fallen through, because he thought that failure might be more useful than success. It was better that we should have a Battle of Dorking in time of peace rather than in time of war. The main point to be ascertained was the cause of the failure, and to apply the knowledge that might be acquired in investigating the subject in such a way as to prevent the recurrence of such breakdowns in our Army system. Our French neighbours were in the habit of distinguishing between "la vérité vraie" and "la vérité officielle," and he could not help pointing to the difficulty that had been encountered in endeavouring to get at "la vérité vraie et absolue" with reference to the reasons that had prevented the Berkshire camp from being formed. In the first place, the House had been informed by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War that it had never been decided to form the camp at all; then the Surveyor General had stated that the intention to hold it had been abandoned on account of the difficulty in obtaining sufficient local transport; then the Under Secretary for War (Lord Northbrook), in "another place," had explained that the camp could not be held in consequence of the lateness of the harvest, and on account of the length of time that it would be necessary to keep the Militia out; and, finally, they were told by the Secretary of State for War that the camp could not be held because of the equinoctial gales. As to the lateness of the harvest, having arrived that morning from Berkshire, he (Lord Elcho) could state that that county was covered in all directions with golden corn in perfect condition for reaping—he had brought some ears so ripe that the grain would not remain in them—and the only green crops were root crops, which were likely to continue green long after the autumn campaign. With the hot weather we now had it was probable that the crops would be off the ground at a very early period. As regarded local transport, his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Loyd Lindsay) had said that there would be no difficulty in getting waggons for £1 a day, and a Mr. Wrag, of 279, Whitechapel Road, had offered to lend 50 horses for 20 days for £314, or about 6s.6d. a-day.

said, that he had sent three times to Mr. Wrag on the subject, but had received no response from him.

said, that Colonel Shakespeare of the Volunteer Artillery had obtained horses from Mr. Wrag for the purpose of horsing his artillery at a very moderate price. With regard to keeping the Militia out longer than was at first contemplated, that would be of great benefit to that force. As regarded the time of year, if the Regulars and the Volunteers were not fit to go under canvas for a few days after the 20th of September, the sooner they gave up the military business the better. What had been said as to the equinoctial gales had been received, if not with laughter, still with a smile, and a shrug of the shoulders. Why, even if everything had gone on smoothly, and the camp had been held at the time originally fixed upon by the Government, he had reason to suppose the Regulars would not have reached the camping ground until the 15th of September, and they would therefore have been compelled, by the right hon. Gentleman's own showing, to undergo the rigours of the equinoctial gales. The Secretary of State had, however, suffered "la vérité vraie" to break out in his recent speech, and the real reason why the camp had not been formed was the cost that would have had to be incurred in hiring means of transport. Messrs. Pickford had asked £90,000 for furnishing the necessary transport, and that demand had frightened the Control department, who thereupon had said that the affair must not take place. It was a great pity that the right hon. Gentleman, instead of beating about the bush and laying the blame of the breakdown upon the equinoctial gales, the Militia, and the lateness of the season, had not boldly said that the Control department had not sufficient acquaintance with the farmers to avail themselves of the local means of transport, and that he did not like to ask Parliament for the large sum that would be necessary in order to carry out the proposal. It must be remembered that the Control department would have had to supply only half to the Berkshire Camp that it would have to supply in the case of actual war- fare, when it would have to undertake the transport of munitions of war as well as food, fuel, forage, &c. But could not the transport be considerably reduced? He maintained that an injustice had been done to the British Army in the comparison of the amount of baggage of the English and Prussian Armies; because the quantity carried in the English Army was not the fault of the soldiers and officers but of the Commander, who had power to regulate the matter. Officers who were willing to "rough it" in the Highlands or in South Africa, would willingly submit to a curtailment of their luxuries for a time if they were told that it was necessary that they should submit to the inconvenience. Again, why had the soldiers had waterproof sheets given them when they might easily procure straw? This was like keeping our soldiers in cotton. The subject of the abandonment of the Berkshire campaign had been animadverted upon by the Liberal Press, and nothing could be stronger to show how deep were the feelings of depair inspired by the conduct of the Government in military affairs than the language of one of the special organs of the Government in the Liberal Press. The Daily News said that the abandonment of the plan was a measure calculated to do a great deal of harm, and to render Army Reform almost nugatory—and that it was a great mistake. He could only hope that those feelings would be dispelled by the explanations of to-night, although the only satisfactory explanation was that of expense, and if it had been given earlier much trouble would have been saved. The most important part of this question was the constitution of the Control department. Admitting for the sake of argument that that department had not failed on this occasion, and that it never had; that it had succeeded in Ireland and at Wimbledon, and had done well whatever it had been called upon to do; he still contended, as he did in the letters that had been quoted, not that it had failed—for he had never said or implied that—but that its constitution was faulty, and that when it was tested it must fail, possibly in time of peace, certainly in time of war. The Secretary of State for War had said the Control department was no child of his, but was the offspring of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington), and that it was established to carry into effect the recommendations of Lord Strathnairn's Committee. But he (Lord Elcho) disputed that. The department as it existed was not what was recommended by Lord Strathnairn's Committee; when the Secretary of State came into office he put it upon a different footing. Only the other night a noble Earl (the Earl of Longford), who was formerly Under Secretary of State for War, said he did not now recognize Control as it existed in his time, and as it was intended to be. Regarding the latter part of the Resolution before the House as the more important, he (Lord Elcho) thought it better to discuss the question of the constitution of the department on the Resolution than to do so in Supply. As he stated in his letters, Lord Strathnairn's Committee recommended the separation of supply from transport, and that there should be a responsible officer at the head of each department. But the Surveyor General was responsible for both down to the minutest details; and if one man in a century had knowledge, energy, and strength to perform the duties of the office in time of peace, he would infallibly break down in time of war, when it was "too late" to avoid disaster.

said, the two departments were divided, and there was a head to each responsible to him, although he answered for both departments in the House.

said, nevertheless, it was not intended that there should be such an office as that held by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman; the principle of concentration was carried further in that office than it was in any Army in the world, and, as he showed last year, the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hardinge had said such a system must infallibly break down. It was avowedly founded on the French system of intendance; but in that there was separation of transport from supply, of forage, fuel, and the like from munitions of war, of the Artillery and of the Engineers; and although it was so far less likely than ours to break down, yet it failed equally in the short but victorious campaign of 1859, and in the more disastrous campaign of last year. One of the most practical authorities in this country, Sir William Power, who was at the head of the Transport and Commissariat under both systems, in his evidence before the Abyssinian Committee said that our centralization put more upon one department than it was compelled to perform, that he could not conceive it working in time of peace, and that it must break down in war, which was a bad time for revision. The view was corroborated in a letter of Mr. Fonblanque, late Deputy Controller, published in The Daily Telegraph. With reference to stores, it was pointed out, in a pamphlet written by Sir Edward Sullivan, that, under the system of Control, financing had been pursued in preparing the Estimates, that they were reduced to improve the balance-sheets, and that, when a stress came, they were raised to higher amounts than had been reached before. The Government would have done well if, when they found their own officers doubted the efficiency of the French system, they had simply copied the Prussian system, which, at all events, had succeeded where the French system had failed. He wished to say a word with reference to the position of the Surveyor General in the War Office hierarchy. An Order in Council had been published clearly defining his duties, and it showed that he was responsible for the purveying and carrying of all stores; and it certainly would not be inferred from the Order in Council, as now appeared from his Minute, that he would be called upon to give an opinion with reference to military manœuvres, which would have been supposed to be wholly beyond his province. It was clearly laid down by Orders in Council that the Commander-in-Chief should be responsible for discipline, military education, the training and enlisting of men, and strategic information, and that the Surveyor General should be responsible for the providing of all manner of stores, for issuing them, and for exercising a control over expenditure. It was his duty and also that of the Financial Secretary to render such other advice and assistance as might be required by the Secretary of State for War. He (Lord Elcho) hoped the Secretary for War would not think that any hon. Members on that side of the House were actuated by a petty feeling of rejoicing at the failure of the War Department in regard to these manœuvres, though he (Lord Elcho) was at a loss to understand how they could expect to succeed in this branch of Army organization after they had failed in every other. This Berkshire failure, after so much pomp and parade and big talk, had tended to humiliate the War Department in the public estimation; but it would not be wholly without profit if it induced hon. Members to regard questions of this sort from a national and not a party point of view.

Sir, after the astute manner in which the right hon. Gentleman opposite has referred to the fact of the Control system having been originated by me, I am sure the House will feel that I have a fair right to offer some few observations on the subject. In doing so I cannot refrain from alluding to the great disappointment occasioned by the abandonment of these intended Berkshire manœuvres; and here I must tender my sincere condolence to my right hon. Friend and his associates at the War Office upon the recent change of weather; because I think the main reason they alleged for the abandonment of the manœuvres in Berkshire was the unpleasant wet weather and the probable lateness of the harvest, and I now hear of nothing from that county but remarks on the heat of the weather and the rapid progress of harvest. If my right hon. Friend were to transport himself to Berkshire, in order to obtain evidence on that point, he would doubtless find, as my noble Friend (Lord Elcho) remarked, "the Berkshire corn fields ripe with the glow of harvest." Whatever reasons may be assigned for not carrying out the manœuvres, it is clear that the lateness of harvest cannot now be pleaded as one of them. In the course of the present Session we have had a great deal of criticism and attack upon the military policy of the Government; but amidst all that attack and all that criticism, there has been one point of constant praise and approbation, and that is the intention announced at the beginning of the Session by my right hon. Friend, to carry out these Berkshire manœuvres. Why has that not been done? As I have already shown, it is quite evident that the late harvest cannot be assigned as the reason. What, then, can be the reason? Am I at all guilty of unfairness when I say my belief is that the real reason is a financial one? I believe the real truth to be that the Govern- ment, finding that these manœuvres would entail mere expense than they had supposed, determined to abridge the whole arrangement, and so my right hon. Friend (Mr. Cardwell) tells us this evening that the carrying out of these manœuvres in Berkshire was never finally decided upon. But did not my right hon. Friend, by intimation to the Berkshire Members, or some other course, lead the county, as well as this House and the country at large, to believe that those manœuvres were to be carried into effect? [Mr. CARDWELL: I said it was my own impression.] It was certainly believed throughout the country that the manœuvres were to take place; and now it is made known that they will not be carried out, what is the result? Sudden collapse and disappointment, without sufficient explanation. Do let us have the truth in this matter. Is it a question of money or not? From the very day the lateness of the harvest was mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman the sun has continued to shine. Therefore that reason disappears; and I venture to assert that before the 9th of September there will be no corn on the ground in the county of Berkshire to prevent the complete execution of the original design of the right hon. Gentleman. Well, Sir, unless he can give us some better reason than any we have heard from him yet, I cannot refrain from appealing to the right hon. Gentleman and asking whether it is even now too late to have these manœuvres in Berkshire. The reason I would strongly urge that question upon the consideration of the right hon. Gentleman is that the Control system has been subjected to so much criticism during the present discussion. The right hon. Gentleman is quite correct when he says that I instituted the Control system at the time I had the honour of holding the office which he now so ably fills. I instituted that system because, judging by the best information within my reach, I believed it was one which would contribute to the efficiency of the Army, and also tend to diminish expenditure. Those were the two main grounds on which the Control system was adopted. We are now told that the system has broken down. It has been severely attacked by my noble Friend who has just addressed the House. For my part I do not presume to say whether it has broken down or not; I only state the reasons and motives which led me to establish it. Any Minister who ventures to make so important a change of course incurs considerable risk and responsibility, for a new plan may become a failure, and all he can do is to do his best, judging by the circumstances under which he acts. At the time I established the Control system I had good reason to believe that it would considerably conduce to the efficiency of the Army. If it has not done so, I would be the first man to say—"Give it up." The noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire thinks that whenever it is tried it must fail. I doubt that; but if it is a defective system, I have no desire to say that it should be continued. Therefore, my first wish is that the system should be fairly tried and tested; and I believe it would have that fair trial if these Berkshire manœuvres were carried out, as we should then be able to judge whether in a march of 40 miles by 30,000 men the Control system would be efficient. The new plan of manœuvres near Aldershot will not furnish a satisfactory test of the system. My right hon. Friend stated that it would be extravagant to keep up in time of peace a large number of horses equal to our requirements in time of war. That is an opinion from which I believe no one would dissent; and in regard to these manœuvres, as we must depend upon local assistance wherever the Army is encamped, there is no reason to doubt that such assistance may be obtained in the county of Berkshire at the present moment. Looking to the interests of the Army, I think it is a great misfortune that there should be such differences of opinion as have been expressed to-night on the subject of the Control system, and while admitting that it is far from popular with the officers of the Army, I do feel anxious that, at all events, its worth should have a thorough trial.

said, he thought the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cardwell) could not with justice be blamed for having been unable a week before to foresee that the weather would change on the 31st of July, and not carry out its threat of proving one of the wettest summers on record. And, accordingly, he (Mr. W. Fowler) was not prepared to join in a Vote of Want of Confidence. At the same time, he thought it one of the most extraordinary features in their political system that men were selected and placed at the heads of great professions like the Army and Navy for which they had received no previous training whatever. What would be said, for instance, if the hon. Member for Warrington (Mr. Rylands) were made Lord Chancellor? It would be said that it was a preposterous appointment, and the hon. Gentleman himself would probably be the first to admit his ignorance of law. But the heads of the Army and Navy — professions in the present day quite as difficult and complicated as the legal profession—were selected upon principles diametrically opposite. Because a right hon. Gentleman had made an excellent administrator at the Poor Law Board he was removed and placed at the head of the Admiralty. No wonder that blunders and waste of money occurred under such a system. No man would be taken from the Army or Navy and put at the head of a great mercantile business, yet a man was taken from mercantile life and put at the head of the Army or Navy. He could only suppose that this course of action was supported for party reasons by both sides of the House. But they would never get rid of all their sources of trouble until this practical absurdity was banished from their political system.

said, he did not think Her Majesty's Government need be in any way surprised at the revival of this subject, and he felt sure that the House must, on reflection, fully comprehend that, although it might seem a question of little or no importance at the first blush—and that after the discussion which his hon. and gallant Relative (Colonel Loyd Lindsay) had ventured to raise a few evenings ago, in reference to the policy of the Government, upon the Berkshire encampment — it must look upon the effect of that policy with a considerable amount of disapproval. The question which the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Bewdley (Colonel Anson) had raised, had been already, and more than once, discussed in "another place," and with some degree of warmth; and if one might judge from the sentiments that were expressed on those occasions, the position in which the British Army had been placed was serious and humiliating. It appeared to him that the remarks which were made by the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire were an unanswerable exposé of the inability of the Government to deal with the Army of England in such a manner as the guardians of its honour and prestige were bound to observe as responsible Ministers of the Crown. And he thought it was a very poor earnest for the future when they reflected that upon the very first opportunity they had had of, as it were, taking stock of their Army, and endeavouring to test the result of that re-construction and reform of which they had heard so much for the last two or three years, the machine was unable to work at the moment when it was required; that the steam could not be got up, and that, therefore, the power of progression was now at a standstill, owing to the reactionary drag-chain of departmental confusion; and when they considered the cause of this paralysis, it was almost ludicrous to find what it was, or what it seemed to be. But it was, nevertheless, a fact, and it came to this—that the supplies and requirements for 30,000 men on the line of march, and in manœuvre from Aldershot to Wantage, could not be transported or guaranteed by the Control department of the Army. Now, the abandonment of the intended operations on the downs of Berkshire, and the change of tactics, might seem to be insignificant, and paltry reasons for so much apparent alarm and discontent; and it might seem to those who did not understand these matters to be unnecessary and ungracious. But this apparently trifling change of plan was by no means a small matter; it was, in reality, calculated to tarnish the future character of their Army, and prejudice it in the opinion of the world; and it was for that reason, as well as for other reasons, that they considered it their duty to question the policy of the Government in reference to their Army administration. No doubt a simple change of plan and position from the border of one county to the border of a neighbouring county might appear to non-military Members, and the unreflecting public, as reasonable and of no moment, should the will and pleasure of the authorities so decide. Such an arrangement might be no more thought of than the change of route on the line of march from one point to another—an incident which must happen, and had constantly happened, on active service—and fully understood and approved. But when the Army had been made the great political idol and question of the day, and had in its proposed reform attracted the attention of the whole country for so many months; when such exertions had been made by the Government with a view to its entire reform and re-organization, for the purpose of putting it into thorough repair, and raising it, as it was asserted, to the highest standard of efficiency; when it had been repeatedly declared by the Government, in both Houses of Parliament, to be more efficient and ready for any emergency than it ever was before—a declaration which they were bound to respect, but by no means to credit, until they knew more than they did—when they were assured that all its departmental arrangements were in complete order and so elastic as to be easily and readily expanded; and when the country had been educated by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, into a conviction that all was serene, all was reality, and that everything that had been done was very good, and ready to be blended into one harmonious whole—they had a right to comment upon, and inquire into, so sudden and mysterious an abandonment of an experiment which had never been tried, and which, independent of the valuable instruction which it would impart to officers and men, was mainly intended to test the condition of their military machinery when put into motion for practical purposes. Now, it must be borne in mind that there had been no sudden emergency to strain their capabilities, by calling upon them at a moment's notice. It must be borne in mind that they were living in piping times of peace and plenty, in a country rich and rare in every requirement for the wants of 20 armies of 30,000 men; that four or five months had elapsed since the operations on the downs of Berkshire were contemplated, and to all intents and purposes decided upon and planned; that the actual scene for carrying on these operations had been fixed, as far as the Secretary of State for War was concerned; that the farmers of no less than 36 parishes in the district had—not as the right hon. Gentleman had said—been "anxious" for the troops to come over their lands; but had, from feelings of patriotism, come forward with the intention of co-operating and assisting in every possible manner, and engaged to provide local transport as far as they could—and when he said he must remind the right hon. Gentleman that local transport could by no means meet the requirements of such a force as 30,000 men, it would, of course, supply a portion; but the Control would have to look elsewhere for transport; that these farmers had formed themselves into a committee for the purpose of giving effect, by their resolutions, to their wishes and intentions—a committee which, in the first instance, had the respect, and received that acknowledgment from the War Office to which so important a body of men were entitled — he said, when all these facts were borne in mind to, without the slightest communication with that committee of farmers, suddenly abandon an experiment which would have fully tested the working machinery of the Army Control, and to adopt a position of a totally different and inadequate character, was not only uncourteous towards the Berkshire farmers, but evincing a sign of departmental weakness. He thought it right to mention that he had been in personal communication with the farmers in question, having attended the adjourned and last meeting at Wantage last week; and he would, with the permission of the House, read a few lines of the Chairman's speech on that occasion, which was to the following effect, and, indeed, in the following words. He said—

"That those present would remember what took place at the former meeting. In the meantime it appeared that a discussion had been raised in both Houses of Parliament, and, by that morning's papers, in the House of Lords, Lord Overstone had addressed the House on the subject. The statement which his Lordship made with respect to the harvest was quite true, and it was also true that Lord Overstone had asked him whether he had received any communication either from the War Office or the Horse Guards, and he had been taken quite by surprise. In the House of Commons Colonel Loyd Lindsay said, 'Immediately that I heard this, I asked the farmers, and other persons in Berkshire, whether any communication had been received by them from the Secretary of State for War, asking them whether the harvest was in such a state as to prevent the movement of troops.' Not a single syllable had they heard."

said, it was out of Order to read from the newspapers what had taken place in a former debate.

said, he would not read any more; but the feeling that was expressed by the Chairman, and agreed to by the Committee, was that of disappointment, and, at the same time, annoyance, that they had not, under the circumstances, been treated with proper courtesy. Now, he had it from the best authority—namely, the Chairman of the Farmers' Committee, that they had never retracted from their intentions, expressed by resolution some four months ago, that they would co-operate in every possible way, and provide transport, and that they were prepared to do so when the troops came, notwithstanding the threatened lateness of the harvest; and also that the Reports which had been laid on the Table and circulated, upon which the abandonment of the operations in Berkshire were based, were not framed upon any communication or information received from him or his committee. He (Colonel C. H. Lindsay) considered, therefore, that the abandonment of the Berkshire encampment involved considerations of a grave character, because it disclosed nothing more nor less than a breakdown of the mainspring of an Army—the collapse of the Control. Now, what did that seem to mean to the public and to the world? It had given an unmistakable impression that after the millions that were to be spent on the Army this year, they could not move 30,000 men three days' march straight on end from head-quarters. Now, the House of Commons and the British public might not altogether understand what this mysterious institution the Control department meant. It was the life and soul of an Army, because without its immediate application it could not exist—that was, it could not be put in motion without the risk of physical disaster. The Control department, upon its existing system, had a wide signification, for it was the centre, as it were, of a vast expanse. It was the point d'appui, from which and to which the arteries—if he might so call them—of its life and reality ebbed and flowed, and gave food and vitality to the power of accomplishing great results. It was the responsible agent of a vast estate of the realm, possessed by the nation for the protection of its honour. It was responsible for the food of an Army—for its medical requirements, for its immediate and rapid supply of reserve ammunition, for its camp equipage—and, in short, for everything that was essential to the complete efficiency of an Army in motion and in the field before an enemy, and in an enemy's country; and if it failed in meeting those paramount demands upon it, it would render the finest and bravest Army in the world nothing more nor less than a useless excrescence. He did not say that the right hon. and gallant General the Surveyor General of Ordnance was not fully prepared, as far as he was concerned, to meet his responsibilities and wishes: he did not say that his machinery was not in perfect order and ready for immediate expansion; but, for some unexplained reason or other, he could not—or, at least, he did not—put it in motion when an opportunity was given to him to test the quality of the great work over which he presided. It mattered not whether the causes of the collapse were the lateness of the harvest, the inability to procure local transport, the equinoctial gales in case of a postponement, or the refusal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to find the money. There was the actual fact—or, at all events, the impression was abroad—that the Control department had broken down in the face of the test that was about to be applied to it. As to the causes alluded to, no one for a moment had given the slightest credit to them, with the exception of the expense—so that the real causes were reduced to a narrow compass, which must either be the incompetency of the Control, or the refusal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to find any more money for transport beyond the £15,000,000 or £16,000,000 which he had engaged to hand over for the expenses of the Army for this year. As for the incompetency of the Control department, he thought it would be unjust to prejudge what had not been tried: one might just as well condemn one of the Whitworth big guns at Shoeburyness before it had been tried, and had the chance of bursting. He was inclined, therefore, to throw the blame of the collapse upon the want of money to pay for the necessary transport; and, if that were so, he thought it was a shame, considering the enormous Estimates for the Army this year. It was a shame that £200,000 could not be taken from the £15,000,000 alluded to, for the purpose of testing the power of the Control system. He thought the Surveyor General was a very ill-used man not to be allowed to put his machinery into motion, when he had declared himself to be ready for any emergency. He thought that he and the Secretary of State who sat along side of him might have arranged matters between them so as to have enabled the Surveyor General to have tested his department. He thought he was placed in a very unenviable position, for his department was decidedly condemned without being tried. He (Colonel C. H. Lindsay) did not join in such a feeling, nor did he consider it right until he had further information, which, however, could only be given by practical proof. As for the Correspondence which had been laid on the Table, and which from its very dates—namely, the 24th and 26th of July, was written after no less than five months' deliberation, it revealed a foregone conclusion on the part of the Government. It exposed no technical difficulties with which an efficient Control could not cope with ease. He should like to hear what the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to say on the subject. The noble Lord the Under Secretary of State, in "another place," distinctly told Lord Melville that the hire of transport would be too expensive. Then the Correspondence of the Quartermaster General and Inspector of Fortifications made a remark that suggested a foregone conclusion. He would read the passage to which he referred. It was in the second letter in continuation of the first Report, dated 26th July. It said—

"In accordance with the opinion expressed at the meeting which took place in the War Office on the 24th instant, we have the honour to inform you that we have inspected the country in the vicinity of Aldershot, and are of opinion that should it be considered desirable (owing to the lateness of the harvest and the want of transport) to forego the proposed march into Berkshire, &c., &c."

Now, what did that infer? Why, that before either of those two Reports were written the Government had decided that there was no transport to be got at their own price, and they would not give more—notwithstanding the £15,000,000 which were to be spent upon the Army. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was not to blame: he had a good case. He would naturally say that he had provided for the Army to that amount, and if the Secretary of State could not lay aside £200,000, or whatever might be required, he was not going to ask for more. He (Colonel C. H. Lindsay) must beg to correct the remarks which the Secretary of State made in reference to the downs of Berkshire, when he said that there were scarcely any continuous ranges of downs; that there was little or no open country—in short, that there were but few downs left in Berkshire. He (Colonel C. H. Lindsay) was able, on the best authority, to refute that statement, and in doing so he had nothing to do but to quote the concluding paragraph of a long and interesting letter which appeared in The Times of that day from Mr. Albert Williams, the Chairman of the Berkshire Farmers' Committee, in which he described the country round and in the neighbourhood of Lockinge and Wantage thus. He says—

"Going still west from Cwichelmslawe you look down upon Lockinge and Wantage, and there also before you, right and left of the Ridgeway, lie the Letcombe Downs, the Woolley Downs, the Lambourne Downs, and the downs at Ashdown Park, the Rockley Downs, the Russley Downs, and the downs at White Horse Hill. This glorious sight a thousand years ago the scene of half a-hundred real battles, on the site of which the Army is not to manœuvre."

Of course, those downs were occasionally interfered with by the plough; they were, nevertheless, connected throughout the whole centre by the renowned Ridgeway, the oldest known road in England, hundreds of feet above the level of the sea, wide, ample, and interminable—in short, one could go on downs for 30 miles without being off turf. He thought he had conclusively corrected the statement of the right hon. Gentleman in reference to the downs of Berkshire. He thought the only cause for congratulation that Parliament was still sitting late and dragging as it was, was that it afforded an opportunity of expressing a decided opinion upon our military policy, in order that the Recess might not labour under the sting of humiliation, unplucked, unchallenged, and unexposed.

said, he considered the abandonment of the manœuvres to be no cause for regret, but the error committed by the Government was in ever having contemplated them. He was confident that if they had taken place the cost would have turned out to be something terrific; besides that in time of peace no military manœuvres in an agricultural country could represent the actual exigencies of war. In time of peace everything had to be paid for, and permission must be asked before this or that ground was occupied; but in actual hostilities the armies went wherever they were ordered, took whatever they wanted, and paid for it at a reasonable rate, and not on the unreasonable demands of farmers. His experience was that in the presence of a military force engaged in sham manœuvres farmers were entirely without conscience. He had acquired some knowledge in connection with Volunteer sham fights, and he remembered a case in which a farmer, whose property had been slightly injured, made a claim nearly equal to the whole value of the crop. In another instance, when it had been proposed that 20,000 Volunteers should encamp at about the same period of the year as the Berkshire manœuvres were fixed for, the scheme had to be absolutely abandoned, because it was discovered that the farmers were allowing their crops to remain on the ground a fortnight after they were ripe in order that they might claim damages. No doubt the farmers of Berkshire had an equally keen eye to their own interest. It was noticeable that the crops had been singularly backward until the abandonment of the manœuvres was announced, and then they began to ripen with remarkable rapidity. Judging by the vehemence of the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay) he could not help thinking that his friends the Berkshire farmers were very much disappointed that they were unable to make a pull at the national purse; perhaps they would have been able to pay their rent out of it. He had no doubt if the review had gone on that the sums which would have been claimed for broken-down fences and other kinds of damage would have been so enormous that the country was well out of the matter.

said, he hoped the Secretary of State for War would take the advice of his right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington), and that the manœuvres would still take place as originally settled; and his hope was almost raised into the belief that Berkshire was included in the Bill; for if the manœuvres were to be merely from Aldershot to Chobham, and from Chobham to Aldershot, such a Bill would have been quite unnecessary. That puerile plan would be something like the marching of Major Sturgeon in the Mayor of Garratt—the marching and countermarching from Acton to Ealing. The right hon. and gallant Member at the head of the Control department (Sir Henry Storks) had asked if any hon. Member had read the Regulations. He (Mr. Neville-Grenville) would ask if the right hon. and gallant Member had been over that part of Berkshire where the supposed fights were to have taken place? There was such an enormous extent of down that it would have been very difficult for a commanding officer to encamp on ploughed ground or to damage the crops if they had been allowed to remain on the ground. He trusted that during the autumn the necessary arrangements would be made for carrying out the review in Berkshire, instead of marching the troops from Aldershot to Chobham and from Chobham to Aldershot.

said, he could see no ground for a Motion of censure on the Government, which rested solely on the alteration of the scene of the manœuvres from one county to another. The real cause of dislike to it was that private interests and expected advantages had been interfered with. The arguments of the hon. and gallant Mover of the Amendment (Colonel Anson), and of the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay), if carried to their logical conclusion, would cause the constituencies to rise in arms. Their arguments implied that we ought to have an Army in England always prepared to take the field. Now that could not be the case, unless they were prepared with a permanent mode of transport for stores, provisions, and baggage. The cost of such a scheme would never be borne by the country in a time of peace. That it was unnecessary was shown by the case of their Indian Army. There was no country where troops were more liable to be suddenly called upon to take the field than in India; but except on frontier stations, and two or three field forces, there was not any permanent transport kept up, and most of the regiments in marching from place to place in the annual reliefs were dependent on the supply of carts by the farmers of the district through which it was necessary to pass. The common sense of this country would never sanction a permanent charge upon this country for the possible movement of troops. Now with respect to the charges which had been made against the Board of Control, not a single proof had been given that it had broken down. Let any hon. Member point out where, when, and how it had broken down. The fact was that it had not broken down. It had got a bad name, because certain private interests had been affected by the concentration of offices in one Department, instead of allowing departments, as formerly, to jostle each other. The country owed a debt of gratitude to the Control department. In 1866–7 and in 1867–8 the Estimate for that department was £7,880,000, and the expenditure £7,577,499. In the years 1868–9 and 1869–70 the Estimate was £7,406,079, and the expenditure was reduced to £6,627,157, showing a saving in the Estimate for the two latter years of more than £400,000. The Control department, therefore, ought to be popular with tax-payers. With respect to carriage, there was no proof that it could not produce a sufficiency. If the department could provide for moving 30,000 troops 12 miles, the same preparation would be sufficient to remove them 30 miles.

said, he thought the ridiculous position occupied by the Government in consequence of the abandonment of the Berkshire plan might be very well set aside for the consideration of the more important lesson to be drawn from the failure of the administrative department, which he trusted would be long remembered. He was prepared to accept the reason which had been put forward by the Government for abandoning that plan—namely, the lateness of the harvest; but he did not consider it a valid or sufficient reason, and he believed that nine-tenths of the public would regard it as a transparent official subterfuge. It was considered that the cause was the state of the transport branch. The want of elasticity which was the characteristic feature of their Artillery was displayed in their system of transport. In the days when the Government professed to be economical, they cut everything down to such a starvation limit that the service was not only unequal to the emergencies of the moment, but to any possible contingencies that might occur. The Secretary of State for War had stated that all they required was a nucleus, which could be expanded, and that such a nucleus exists. This he denied. True, a nucleus existed which could be added to, but which had no inherent qualities which enabled it to be expanded. Its capabilities seemed to be exhausted when it had supplied the wants of some 20,000 men. Of what use would their 450,000 fighting men, of which they had heard so much from the Treasury bench, be if they could not provide transport for one-fifteenth of them without extraordinary efforts. He did not attach all the blame of this failure to the Government, for it was the natural result of a false system which had long prevailed. When any improvement was suggested, it was asked how much it would cost, and then perhaps one-fourth of the sum was given, and this turned out to be merely money thrown away. The difficulty of fixing responsibility was another grave point. Was it not absurd that the head of a Department should be an Under Secretary of State and a member of the Governing Body, to whom he was supposed to be responsible? Then, again, the most antagonistic duties were performed by the Department over which the Surveyor General presided, of any knowledge of which he was quite ignorant, having had no professional training. And so it was throughout the ranks of the Department; the most that could be expected of Controllers being a knowledge of one out of the three important class of functions devolving on them.

said, he desired to correct the erroneous impression that the Bill confined the manœuvres to the land lying between Aldershot and Chobham. The Government plan had really never been detailed to the House; but, so far as he could gather, if the Government were so minded they could under this Bill have manœuvres extending over 30 miles of country on either side of Aldershot; and this would be no unworthy ground for the purpose. The Government had already asked for £16,000,000 for the military service of the year, and he was sure that the country would be surprised and disappointed to hear that, notwithstanding such a Vote, the contemplated autumnal movements could not be carried out.

said, in reference to some observations made by the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson) upon the farmers of Berkshire, he wished to remark that whether or not it arose from their sunnier skies and warmer blood, the farmers of Berkshire were not so cannie and close-fisted as those of whom the hon. Member appeared to have had experience, and he desired to repel any imputation upon their patriotism and loyalty. The hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes) was wrong in supposing that so much money had been saved in two years by the Control department, for the truth was that they had during this time been living on the stores that had already been collected. He (Mr. Eastwick) appealed to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War not to give up the intention, which he admitted he once had, of forming the Berkshire camp—he could hardly retreat with honour from his position. No doubt there might be difficulties; but the very object of holding such a camp was to enable them to find out and overcome those difficulties. And besides, some of the supposed difficulties were purely imaginary ones. The harvest would be off the ground by the 15th of September, and the manœuvres would be finished by the 1st of October, and as to the equinoctial gales and the wet ground, he was really ashamed to hear such things mentioned. After all, in comparison with expeditions abroad, the camp in Berkshire would be merely a suburban picnic. The Secretary of State for War, with generous candour, had chosen to take upon himself the whole responsibility for the failure of the scheme. He thought, however, that it would be better if the right hon. Gentleman were to nominate a general officer to take charge of the expedition, and were then to wash his hands of all responsibility in the matter. He should leave it to the general to carry out the arrangements, and then most of the difficulties would disappear like the morning mist.

said, that their position was really this, that they were asked to sign a blank cheque to enable the Secretary for War to carry out certain manœuvres, all knowledge of the figures which were to be inserted into it being withheld until next Session. He, for one, should not refuse to sign that cheque; but he thought the details of the Bill most faulty. He would ask the House before passing this Bill to consider Clause 5. The Bill was to compensate the farmers for damage done to their land, and this damage was to be assessed by a Committee consisting of general officers in command, the three Lords Lieutenant, and 10 Members of Parliament. The majority of the Commission was also to determine what lands troops might be marched over. What general officer would undertake the command of the force if all his movements were to be subject to the approval of such a Committee? He (Colonel Jervis) regretted to hear that the Commander-in-Chief was to take the command, because if he commanded who would undertake the task of criticising him? It was for the Commander-in-Chief to remain quietly by, watching the movements that were taking place, rather than originating them, and when those movements were over to decide whether they had been properly carried out or not. In the meantime, the general officer in command should be intrusted with the entire direction of the whole proceedings, entirely independent of restriction or interference from either military or civil authorities, he being, however, responsible for the proper performance of his duties to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Secretary of State for War. Until that principle was laid down and acted upon they would never have the stuff they wanted for the command of the Army. They had now been discussing for the last six hours everything but the question—that of turning out an Army of 30,000 men in England. This camp was not to be formed in some desert place like Siberia, but in a civilized country, covered with magnificent roads and railways by which all necessary articles could be conveyed with ease and expedition, and of which in time of invasion their Army would make use. But what the House had been discussing was the supply of a certain number of horses and rotten carts. Were there no railways in Berkshire? He had no hesitation in saying that there would not have been the slightest difficulty in providing for the troops sufficient forage, fuel, meat, bread, potatoes, and, in fact, all that was required for the occasion. It was idle to say that cattle could not be moved about the country. They were moved about the country from the different markets of the country, and they were now being sent from Harwich to Berkshire. It was not expected that the Controller General would have had himself to supply cattle for the camp; but he would have found no difficulty in obtaining a sufficient supply of meat through the dealers in the neighbourhood, and the same with regard to fuel and other things. A Volunteer Corps had been formed, called the Engineer Volunteer Corps, consisting of nothing but colonels, and composed of all the managers and engineers of all railway companies, whose principal duty was to get the platelayers together for assisting in throwing up the neceessary earthworks, but had they been called on to render their services on this occasion? It was absurd to say that horses for transport service could not be had in Berkshire at 7s. per day. And with regard to Messrs. Pickford, it was well known they had asked the large sum of £90,000, or £2 per horse per day, in order to get rid of the Government offer, the acceptance of which would have deranged all their ordinary business. The Army Service Corps had entirely broken down; but rather than that the Berkshire camp should fail, he should like to see every horse belonging to the Artillery not taking part in the manœuvres pressed into the service of that corps for the time being. In fact, he would have done anything rather than have broken down on the great trial. It would be to the discredit of the country if the plan originally determined on were now abandoned.

, in reply, said, he would not take up more than a few moments of the time of the House. He would first reply to the hon. Member for North Hampshire (Mr. Sclater Booth). He (Mr. Cardwell) had stated, in the commencement of that evening, which was the first time he had had an opportunity of making a statement on this subject, that if the War Office had been able to obtain a sufficient amount of local transport at the ordinary moderate rate of charge, the Control department would have been ready to have discharged its duty, but instead of that they were informed that this year it could not be had at any price.

You could have had it under the 7th clause of the Mutiny Act.

Then they were to have put the Mutiny Act in operation, and have taken the farmers' horses by force or by requisition in the middle of the corn harvest!

said, it was done in his district with respect to baggage.

said, he thought that would not be at all satisfactory to the farmers. He commended this suggestion made by a soldier to the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. W. Fowler), who objected to civilians at the head of the War Department. He himself did not think that it was much to the comfort of a civilian to be at the head of the War Department; but the civilian who was in that position must resemble a soldier at least in one respect—namely, in being perfectly ready to fight. He only wished that his hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge, and those who wished to know why a civilian was put at the head of the War Department, would read the evidence of Sir James Graham's Committee. How would any hon. Member opposite, or any other hon. Gentleman, like to see the day when a military man at the head of the War Department would order the horses of farmers to be impressed under the Mutiny Act for services such as the War Office wanted them for, and that in the middle of a late harvest. He had been charged with inferring that their soldiers were sugar soldiers, and were not fit to go into the wet. That he indignantly denied. He had no doubt that when called into active service, they would cheerfully respond to the call of duty, and that they would not hesitate, whether they were called upon to encounter the rains of Africa or the snows of Sebastopol; but was that a reason why, when they were about to have a camp of instruction for the Regulars and the auxiliaries, they should choose a period of the year for it when the smallest amount of instruction would be gained at the greatest amount of inconvenience. He had also been charged with want of courtesy to the farmers of Berkshire respecting the autumnal manœuvres. He thought it belonged to the War Office to determine on behalf of the country what should be the operations of the Army; but he communi- cated with the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay) the knowledge he possessed respecting the proposed manœuvres. There was some misunderstanding, however, and mistake, he supposed, and the alleged want of courtesy had arisen out of it. He hoped the farmers of Berkshire would accept the explanation he had already given. On the subject of stores the remark had been made that evening that they were living on their "fat"—that was to say, living on that which had been heaped up in former years. With regard to such a statement, all he could say was, that he hoped hon. Gentlemen would dismiss it from their minds, as it was not in any way correct. One of the first things he did on acceding to his present office was to enjoin his right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Henry Storks) on no account to save the stores Estimate by the consumption of any stores in stock in order to present an apparent saving, because it would only cause increased expenditure in future years. To the statements of the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) respecting the Control department, he was not going to give a detailed answer. The French intendance was no doubt unsatisfactory in principle, because it was independent of the general officer who commanded the Army. He thought it was the first principle of a good Control that it should be subject to, and under the supervision of, the general officer. In our Army that was the case, and in most instances they had followed the suggestion of the late Duke of Wellington. He was safe in saying that the late Duke of Wellington's principle was that the Commissariat should have all those things under their charge which related to the immediate supply of the Army; but that the Ordnance should have under its charge all those things that were required to be kept in store. That was exactly the principle of the Control department at that moment. It had been said that the distinguished officer in whom the two departments were centred ought not to appear in the House; and yet almost in the same breath it was said there ought not to be a civilian at the head of the War Department, but that a military man should come into that House to represent it.

said, that as a satisfactory discussion had taken place, he would beg to withdraw his Amendment.

Sir, I wish to call attention to a circumstance connected with this Bill, as it comes down to us amended from the other House, which I think I have never observed before, and which I think ought not to pass unnoticed. I find that the consideration of the Bill as we sent it up to the House of Lords has been changed, and another consideration inserted in its place. I do not know at this moment that I can recall a similar case in my experience. The House of Commons consented to the levying of a considerable burden on the people for a consideration described in the 1st clause of the Bill as we sent it up to the Lords. I find that clause is struck out, and instead, in the Preamble a Royal Warrant is recited, which appears now to be the consideration of the Bill; and I am aware of no case in which the consideration of a Bill sent up by this House to the other House has been entirely altered and another inserted. We know very little—we have no authentic record—of what occurred in the House of Lords on this Bill. A certain statement was made in this House by the Minister; but it was an accidental statement. While the Bill was in progress in the House of Lords, or after some vote, I believe, had been arrived at there, very important information was given accidentally and casually to this House, not by a formal statement from the Minister, as might have been expected, but in answer to a Question, at the time when Questions only are asked, and when there is no opportunity for debate, even if notice has been given. On that occasion, if I remember rightly, the Minister informed the House that Her Majesty had been advised to take a certain step under a statutory power—that Her Majesty had issued a Warrant, as the right hon. Gentleman said, under a statutory power. The Warrant was not laid on the Table until several requests had been made for it, and then Her Majesty's Ministers consented to produce it. Now, the original consideration inserted by the House of Commons having been omitted from the Bill and a Royal Warrant substituted for it in the Preamble, it appears that that Royal Warrant was not issued under a statute. It seems to me that these are changes which require the attention of the House and demand some explanation from the Government. If Her Majesty was advised by her Ministers to issue a Warrant under a supposed statutory power, and Her Majesty did not possess that statutory power, the Ministers — of course unintentionally — deceived their Sovereign. And if that representation was made to the House of Commons, equally, of course, unintentionally, they deceived the House of Commons. But there is another alternative, a grave one, and I think requiring the consideration of the House. Assuming, as now appears by this Bill which comes from the House of Lords, that a Royal Warrant has been issued, and has not been issued under a statutory power, as we are under the impression we were informed by Her Majesty's Ministers the Queen had been advised—supposing that this Royal Warrant, as appears in the Bill sent from the Lords, was not issued under a statutory power, a very grave question might then arise touching the Privileges of this House, and we should have to consider whether, after a Bill has passed this House and has left this House, the most important provision in it should be struck out and withdrawn from the discretion of Parliament by any Proclamation or Royal Warrant. That is an alternative for us to consider. But, in fact, we are in the dark on this subject; we have, in a most serious affair, no authentic record of what the Lords have done. Something has passed in the House of Lords of a remarkable character, for the Bill that we sent up to them in the form we did comes to us in the form in which we now see it. We have never had from the Minister a statement on the matter of a satisfactory nature. Indeed, the only casual statement we have had is one that involved the subject in apparent inconsistency and mystery. What I think we ought to do is to take some step to obtain authentic information of what occurred in the House of Lords, and it appears to me that the proper step to be taken is to appoint a Committee to examine the Journals of the House of Lords. [A laugh.] An hon. Gentleman receives that suggestion with some derision. Probably he has not sat in previous Parliaments. Questions of this kind were always of great gravity. The last one occurred about ten years ago, I think in 1860, and we had the subject discussed by persons of authority who were qualified to guide Parliament in moments of difficulty. I believe the House will be of opinion that the course which I now recommend is the right one to adopt. It is to appoint a Committee to examine the Journals of the House of Lords, so that we may have authentic information as to what occurred in that House. It is not a matter that would take up much time or lead to any delay. But, whether it would lead to delay or not, it is for us to consider what is the proper course to take, what is the course which has always been taken under such circumstances, and what is the course which is conducive to our dignity, and not only to that, but to the public interest. I know the right hon. Gentleman opposite may say that we have the Votes of the House of Lords transmitted to this House, as our Votes are transmitted to the House of Lords, and that information may be found in those Votes sufficient for our purpose. I would, however, remind the right hon. Gentleman that this is a question which has been well considered by the House of Commons; and that under the advice of one of its most eminent Leaders, the late Lord Palmerston—a constitutional statesman, and one whose name will always be received with respect within these walls—this House came to the determination that it was not justified in acting in so serious a matter as a question arising between the two Houses on information supplied by the printed Votes of the other House. Lord Palmerston recommended the House, therefore, on that as on all previous instances, to act on the Report of their own Committee. I will therefore make, with the permission of the House, a Motion in accordance with the precedent to which I have just referred.

Sir, it appears to me that the precedent to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred to is no precedent which can at all be regarded as in his favour. If anything, it is a precedent against him. I understand the precedent is this — that the House of Commons passed a Bill for the abolition of the Paper Duty, and that the House of Lords thought fit to reject that Bill. We consequently heard no more about it; and it was, therefore, necessary for us to appoint a Committee to search the Journals of the other House. Until we had done that, we could have no authentic information before us as to what had actually occurred. The present, however, is not a case in which we have no authentic information. We have only to look at our own Votes and Proceedings, and there we find all about the matter. The House of Lords omitted the clause of the Bill which related to the abolition of purchase, as I apprehend they had a perfect right to do, the clause not being a money clause, and they refer to a Royal Warrant which, they say, was dated the 20th of July, 1871. They then go on to recite what was done by the Royal Warrant, and to state that, in substance, purchase in the Army has been done away with. The only question which can arise, therefore, I apprehend, is whether there is in this any interference with the Privileges of this House. We cannot gain anything by the appointment of a Committee. To do so would be the merest waste of time. The right hon. Gentleman said something as to the question whether the Warrant had been issued under an Act of Parliament or by virtue of the Royal Prerogative. Whichever it was, the question is one which has nothing to do with that which is before the House, which is whether we should consider the Lords' Amendments, which are before us in our own Votes and Proceedings. I hope the House will agree to do so.

Sir, if Ministers insist on our proceeding to consider, at the approach of midnight, a question so grave and important as that which is raised in the Amendment which stands in my name, it is not for me to shrink from the task I have undertaken—difficult although the task may be. I hope our attention will not be diverted from the real issue by any attempt to make this a Question of Confidence; or that our thoughts will be dissipated upon the merits or demerits, real or assumed, of the Administration. No word shall consciously escape my lips giving colour to such a plea. If the general conduct of Ministers were deemed worthy of censure, some one would have been found to give Notice of his intention to impugn it; and if in this exceptional matter, the purport or tendency of what has been recently done "elsewhere" with the Army Bill were deemed deserving of condemnation by a majority of this House, a challenge would, ere this, have doubtless been thrown down which Ministers could not have failed to accept. But no proceeding of this kind has been initiated. No one has given notice to restore the Bill to the form in which we sent it up to the Lords; or to reject the Bill because in spite of themselves they have been led to submit to its transformation. For myself, I am not about to question the motives or to quarrel with the object of the changes made in the Bill by the Royal Warrant. I took no part in thwarting the abolition of purchase; and after all that has occurred, believing the system doomed, I am bound to say that I think the sooner the controversies growing out of its abolition are finally settled, the better it will be for us all. But these are not, nor is any one of them the subject before us to-night. I am anxious to narrow the question as strictly and definitely as possible; but if, in spite of this sincere desire, I have to trench more than I should wish to do upon the patience of the House, I trust I shall be acquitted before I have done of having abused it. I can but throw myself frankly on your indulgent sympathy in attempting to plead a cause, which, if it be just, is one wherein we are all alike concerned, being all of us, I trust, careful to maintain the rights and privileges of this House uncurtailed and uninfringed, even as they have been handed down to us by our predecessors. The law of Parliament, as recognized and observed by us, is immeasurably more important than the fate of any measure, or the character of any Administration. The law of Parliament, of which we are the special guardians, I hold to be coeval, and in a thousand ways identified with the liberty of England. It was old when we were young, and it will, I trust, be hale with the vigour of youth when all of us have passed away. It is a sacred heritage whose keeping we are not free to neglect, devolve, or abandon. It is a precious possession worthy of our most jealous care. Parties may differ, but honest men and wise men, to whatever party they belong, ought not to differ about the duty of guarding the prescriptive rights of Parliament, as the very core of national freedom. We should forget our duty to the people and to ourselves if mutely we allow the integrity of those usages and customs, rules and traditions of which that law is composed to be set at nought by Monarch, Minister, or multitude. By this, and by no other course of deliberate and consistent conduct can we maintain the dignity, the power, and the authority of this House—its claim to bear rule jointly and co-ordinately with the other Estates of the Realm: for our claim hath ever been, and, I trust, that, it will ever be founded in principle and in practice on this—that no power on earth can make or unmake laws for this nation but the Queen, Lords and Commons, of England, in Parliament assembled. On the first day of the Session, you, Mr. Speaker, accompanied by many hon. Gentlemen, attended at the Bar of the other House, and there, in presence of Her Most Gracious Majesty, we were told that recent events on the Continent had suggested to the Queen and her Advisers the necessity of re-organizing the defences of the Realm; that without loss of time a Bill would be laid before Parliament for the purpose, and the Sovereign was pleased graciously to add that she felt she "need hardly claim for that measure our early and anxious consideration." We returned to our Chamber and unanimously voted an Address to the Throne, pledging our best endeavours to the legislative completion of the work Her Majesty had invited us to perform. For three months, laying aside the more pressing needs of our constituents, we devoted our time and labour to the elaboration of a scheme for the re-organization of the Army. We thought we had been called on to do so in good faith by the Ministers of the Crown, for we never had been mocked before. We never imagined that expressions not in earnest would be placed in the lips of Royalty to be publicly addressed to Parliament. But I confess I do not know what mocking means if, intentionally or unintentionally, the House, after devoting so much of its time and labour to the Army Bill, finds a document flung upon its Table, by which it is informed that without its aid the very thing has been done under the authority of the Sign Manual to do which our aid had been solemnly asked for as indispensable by the Queen; by which we are told that we are legislative fools for our pains, and that nothing remains for us but to pay the bill. All this may be capable of explanation, and if so, we hope it will be explained; but the present is the first moment since the Royal Warrant was issued, in which the subject has been mooted in this House, while no attempt at explaining or defending it has hitherto been made. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) has asked for a Committee to search the Journals of the House of Lords. If I am not much mistaken, that Committee, if it had been appointed, would have found something which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War seems to have altogether overlooked. Something tells me they would have found a very significant explanation of the conduct of the other House in sending down a Bill which is neither their Bill nor ours. The Lords, if they could have helped it, would never have sent down the Bill with the interpolated Preamble and the emasculated clauses we are now called on to consider. What is this Bill? Not the embodiment of the opinions to which the House of Commons spent three months in giving effect in the form of a legislative measure; but a novel, questionable, and unconstitutional substitute for what, by large majorities, this House declared to be necessary and expedient for the better regulation of the land forces of the Realm. This House must have greatly degenerated from that character and spirit which it inherited from its predecessors if it takes the mere ipse dixit of a Minister, or even the sudden edict of our most gracious Sovereign as a legal, adequate, or satisfactory substitute for the result of its labours. I claim for this House co-ordinate and equal rights in legislation even with the wearer of the Crown. I know of no custom or law which says that the privileges of any part of the community are to be taken away except by the consentient will of Queen, Lords, and Commons; yet here we have a recital that what our advice and aid was asked to accomplish has suddenly and summarily been consummated without our aid and counsel, and by the exercise solely of an obsolete power in the Executive, which is said to have been resuscitated for the occasion. Whether by custom or by statute, it is truly said by our great jurist that—

"The just limitation of the Prerogative is indeed essential to the idea of political or civil liberty."

Mr. Hallam states that—

"There is not a single instance from the first dawn of our constitutional history, where a Proclamation or Order in Council has dictated any change however trifling in the code of private rights or in the penalties of criminal offences,"

and speaking of the armed forces of the Realm, he says—

"The concurrence of the whole Legislature is deemed requisite to place so essential a matter as the public defence on a secure and permanent footing."

I therefore deny that it is open to the Government to legislate by Warrant. The House of Commons having done all that a Legislative Assembly could do to elaborate a scheme for the abolition of purchase, it is not for a Cabinet Council of some 14 or 15 Gentlemen, sworn not to reveal what passes at their deliberations, to dispose of the matter by framing a Royal Warrant. In support of this view I will not appeal to any recondite arguments or obscure instances; I will simply ask the House of Commons to look back upon its own history. The Prerogative of the Crown is talked of, but I entirely deny that there is any such power inherent and prescriptive in the Sovereign as by some seems to be supposed. Prerogative is a defective noun, used by the best authorities only in the plural. There are Prerogatives—some dead, some living—but anything like one general and unlimited Prerogative, which may be used or not at the bidding of a Minister, forms, I submit, no part of the English Constitution. The Queen has Prerogatives of two kinds—legislative and administrative, and the distinction between them is plain to the humblest comprehension. Legislative acts are public acts. When Her Majesty, in a Speech from the Throne, invites Parliament to take a subject into consideration, that is a public act; and when she assents to a Bill submitted by the two Houses, that likewise is a public act. When we in turn debate any subject, on which we think it necessary to address the Crown, Her Majesty is fully informed of the feelings and opinions of the people, legitimately and publicly expressed by their representatives in this House, and she therefore cannot be taken unawares. Legislative acts are public acts, but administrative acts are from their nature wholly different in kind. They are not debated here in the first instance. They are confidentially advised by the Minister at the peril of condemnation by either House, and that is a sufficient check in all ordinary cases. What I object to is, that the two things should be so confused that an administrative act should be substituted for a legislative exercise of a Sovereign function, and that by Warrant this House or the other House should be compelled to legislate without or against its will. As for dormant Prerogatives, I have heard of late a good deal of free and easy talk in high quarters on that subject with amazement. I do not like a Prerogative that walks in its sleep, and I do not think much of the idle curiosity or the vulgar interest shown by some in seeing it wander too near the edge of danger. Prerogative had better be in bed than be called up suddenly in the dark, and set to tread its perilous and mazy way towards the brink of the abyss. I believe that Prerogatives, like ourselves, must be regarded either as living and responsible, or as dead and beyond recall; and I do not understand investing them with a double character. For 160 years the Prerogative that once affected to organize and regulate the Army at its will has lain what you term dormant. We believed it dead, and dead we hold that we were entitled to consider it. It was not wise to summon it from its resting-place, and try to make believe that it can walk the earth again. Your Warrant is bad in point of constitutional law, it is worse in constitutional policy; but it would be worst of all if it were suffered to become a constitutional precedent whereby the rights, interests, and investments of any great class of the community should be decided at a blow by Prerogative in the middle of a Session. I wish to bring this matter to the test of your own historical experience. Parliaments die in point of law; but, historically and constitutionally, Parliament never dies. We are the legitimate successors of those who went before us, and it would be an evil day for us should we ever begin to think so much of ourselves as to forget the lessons of history. It may be remembered that a Prerogative once was claimed and exercised by the Crown on a matter affecting specially the composition of this House. Between the reigns of Henry VIII. and Charles II. 180 Members were summoned to this House by the mere exercise of the Prerogative alone. Warrants in the form of Charters were sent down, and Members were returned at the will and caprice of a Minister, and 180 seats were filled in that way previous to the Revolution. The last time the experiment was tried a Charter of enfranchisement was sent to Newark, which thereupon returned two Members. In the following Session Mr. Sacheverell, rising in his place, warned the Speaker that there were strangers within the Bar; the Speaker called upon Sir Paul Neale and Mr. Saville to retire; they asked audience, which was refused. Ah! there was a spirit in Parliament in those days. The two Gentlemen were sent below the Bar, and told that they might petition to be heard by counsel. They were heard, and, debate arising, it became a question whether they were to be admitted or not, and the House took a wise course, exactly such a course as I would have you take now. They refused to admit intruders who had come in under a Royal Warrant; but to avoid a collision between the Commons and the Crown, they ordered a Writ to be issued for Newark, which from that time sent its Representatives by Parliamentary sanction. The House of Commons refused to have Members sent at the capricious will of the Crown. It did not grudge any rising town Representatives; but it did grudge the Administration of the day the right to choose and dictate what places should have Representatives. Have we less self-respect among us than a Parliament of Charles II.? In the present instance what has been done is done, and cannot easily be undone. But we are not minded to be querulous with our Queen. If in the belief—a belief in which she ought not to have been left, Her Majesty supposed that she was exercising only a statutory jurisdiction, this Warrant has been signed—well, let it be so, only let us take care that the like shall never happen again. I have no objection that we should acquiesce in the Amendments of the Lords, provided that acceptance is not by implication made to compromise the dignity, honour, and independence of this House; but I would protest against it as the Commons of 1676 did against the Newark Charter, by marking the fact, and taking security that it shall not be drawn into precedent for the future. As our Code of Standing Orders does not in set terms forbid such interference by the Executive Government, with the legislative conduct of affairs, I respectfully submit that we should carefully and guardedly make such an addition to that Code as may prevent such a case as the present arising again, by giving standing notice that whenever a Bill is returned to this House which bears upon it the marks of having been tampered with unconstitutionally, or altered save by the free votes of the other House, we shall decline to take it into our re-consideration. There was another Prerogative of the Crown which is now never exercised — that of the Veto. When and how did it die? William III. by the advice of his Ministers rejected a Place Bill, which had been passed by both Houses after long discussion, and it was one affecting the honour and independence of this House. Parliament did just what was necessary and no more; they vetoed the Veto, as I hope this House will declare this Warrant to be unwarrantable. The House of Commons addressed the King, not disputing his authority, but praying His Majesty not to be so ill-advised as to exercise the power in future, because they felt that the growing independence and dignity of Parliament were incompatible with the exercise of a power which, when you have responsible Ministers, is unnecessary for the working of the Constitution. William was too proud and too ambitious a man to succumb on the spot; he sent an evasive Answer to the Address; but from that day there has been no Veto. The House did what was necessary; it accepted the fact and provided for the future. This is exactly what I want you to do, by adopting an additional Standing Order. We have the happiness to live under a Queen who is entitled to our utmost consideration in every act and circumstance of state, and there is no disrespect to the Sovereign in the Commons asserting that independence which will not brook infringement of their privileges, and which enables them the more completely to protect the rights, dignity, and honour of the Sovereign. Everybody admits that statute limits the Prerogative. There is no question about that. The real question and the only question is, whether custom or disuse by lapse of time does not as effectually limit Prerogative as statute law. The Sovereign is bound by the Coronation Oath to govern according to — what? Acts of Parliament only? Nothing of the kind—"according to the statutes and laws of the kingdom." The two things are named again and again in every high instrument of State; laws and statutes, statutes and laws; the two things, the written and the unwritten, the customary and the statutory. Were our fathers blunderers and drivellers when they came to make covenants with their kings? Do you think that after the Civil War, and the Restoration, and Titus Oates, and Jeffreys, and the forfeiture of James, and the calling in of William, do you think that the great men of 1688 were likely to make a fool's bargain with their foreign auxiliary and deliverer? Or is it conceivable that at each succession to the Crown the Prelates, Peers, and Gentlemen of England standing at the altar of Westminster, should put into the mouth of each Sovereign idle or unmeaning words to mark that solemn contract, the forfeit of which on either side must be liberty and might be life? The thing is preposterous. Our whole system of rule and order, property and freedom, rests on this hallowed and hitherto unquestioned fact—that the powers of the Crown, or what you call its Prerogatives, are to be exercised only within the meaning and limits of the customary laws and written statutes of the Realm. In the same reign Prerogative was again exercised and dealt with by the House. In 1693 a Royal Warrant was issued to abolish purchase in the Army. If ever there was a time when it would have been permissible and praiseworthy for a Sovereign to clutch at power for the common safety, it was in that dreadful year. Treason was everywhere; the land was full of counter-revolutionary plots; it was a matter of notoriety that the majority of the Bar, the clergy, and the landed gentry were in correspondence with St. Germains; the Secretary of State (the Duke of Shrewsbury) was paltering with the exiled Court; and, worse than all, the greatest soldier in the Realm had sold the blood of his own troops to the French, and had given information by which the expedition to Brest was discomfited. If ever Monarch was justified in seizing power to have the Army honestly and faithfully officered, it was in that trying emergency; and under similar circumstances, I do not believe there is a man in this House who would find fault with a Minister for advising a like course. There was no fault-finding by the House of Commons of that day; but, unfortunately, the King, by his Warrant, had endeavoured to impose on the officers of the Army an oath which he had no right, no power, no jurisdiction, no legal or constitutional authority to impose. Within two years he was glad to send down to Parliament by his Ministers to ask the House of Commons to take the failure off his hands and to do by enactment what he had failed to do by Warrant; and in 1695 the House, by a clause in the Mutiny Bill, imposed an oath against purchase in the Army. Parliament thus cured the defect, and that is exactly what I should be glad to see it do now. I have sometimes been reproached with democratic opinions, and I am content to bear that reproach; but I will never incur the infamy and the odium of seeking popularity at the expense of promoting a quarrel between two branches of the Legislature. Between the Warrant and the clause in the Mutiny Bill, one would have supposed the object was effected; but, after the Peace of Ryswick there was no longer the same occasion to keep down purchase, and it grew up again. In 1706 an attempt was made by the Duke of Marlborough, then at the zenith of his fame, when he had monopolized all authority in the State, to snatch the power of appointment and promotion in the Army by means of a Warrant. But he, too, failed; and only five years afterwards another Warrant was issued regulating the price of commissions, and stating that a certain number of years' service would be necessary to entitle a man to promotion. From the day when, in the reign of Anne, the prices of commissions and the terms of service entitling officers to sell, were regulated by special public Acts, I confidently assert that no vestige or particle of proof can be given that the practice of purchase in the Army was not recognized as a custom of the Realm. I hope we shall not hear of the paltry cases which have been trumped up elsewhere, such as the abolition of chaplaincies by Mr. Windham when Secretary for War. These were mere excrescences on the system, they were the perquisites of the colonels of regiments, and Mr. Windham very properly said that they should cease. A precedent cannot easily be made of that, if it can be called a precedent at all. In our own days Lord Panmure out of the Reserve Fund bought up certain commissions of the Guards without a Warrant or Act of Parliament. He had the fund in his hands, his Colleagues agreed with him, the purpose he believed was good, he bought up the commissions, and there was no debate, discussion, or dispute about the matter, which was hardly known outside the circle of the parties concerned. Then, the Yeomen of the Guard were treated in the same way. Here are the miserable shreds of what are called precedents against a system which has continued for 160 years, by which 19–20ths of the men who bled for their country paid for their commissions and got their money back. A man must quibble if he would make this anything but a custom, public and acknowledged, which when pleaded against in the Courts of Law and of Chancery was ruled to be right, and which until lately I have never heard impugned. This being so, it is part of the law of Parliament that nothing but the consent of the three Estates of the Realm can change or abolish it. I deny the power of this House singly, any more than that of the House of Lords or the Sovereign, to take away that which Lord Louthborough, adjudicating on the subject in the Court of Chancery, declared to be the property of the officers. If that be so, it does not become the Members of this House to be made accessories after the fact against their will to what has been done by Her Majesty's Government, unless they reserve to themselves the discretion to say that in future it shall not be drawn into precedent. With the good object for which it was done and the righteous motives of the men who inspired it, this House has nothing to do. Every bad course of policy in history began with a good object and a righteous motive. It is the ordinary plea for every sin of legislation and administration. If, after three months sequestrated from other public concerns, and devoted to the enacting of this measure, we are to be told that all our labour was unnecessary, because there was a stenographic expedient in the sleeve of the Minister by which he could attain his end in as many lines as it took this House weeks to frame this Bill, that would be setting up a new mode of proceeding in England to which I hope this House will never agree. I do not like shorthand in legislation or short cuts in policy. We have before our eyes a terrible example of what these have done. For 80 years France has been trying shorthand in legislation and short cuts in policy, and, whether at the dictation of a rampant democracy or of an over-ruling Monarch, what has been the result? I shall give two other illustrations in support of my argument. Time out of mind the Crown has exercised its Prerogative in the creation of titles of honour. I know of no statute and of no clause of any statute which can be pleaded in bar of that Prerogative. Well, a Minister whom we all respected, and who led this House with great skill and dignity for years, was recommended by his Cabinet to advise the Queen that she might depart from the usage and custom of the Peerage and create Sir James Parke a Peer for life. What did the House of Lords do? It did not pass a Resolution denying the Royal Prerogative, but simply said—"Outside the Bar is the place of the person who comes to us in a manner contrary to the privileges of this House:" The House of Lords refused to admit him, and Lord Palmerston who was a wise man in his day, thought it an evil quarrel to enter into, and advised the Crown not to contest the point, but to issue a new Patent with remainder to heirs male, and then Lord Wensleydale was permitted to take his seat in the House of Lords. What did the House of Commons do? It did what it was its duty to do—nothing. There were not wanting men in this House—I cannot be mistaken when I see near me the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. White)—who thought Life Peerages would be an excellent reform of the Upper House. I am not sure that Lord Palmerston, with his influence, and with the spirit of the time in his favour, might not have induced this House to express an opinion in favour of the change. But Lord Palmerston knew too well the line of demarcation between the two Houses; he resisted all suggestions of the kind; he did not interfere between the Crown and the Lords, and to the present time the question remains where it was before. There is another illustration. It will be in the recollection of the House that two years ago a case occurred which brought vividly to the minds of the most experienced Members that there was a great want in our code of privileges—namely, of power to examine witnesses on oath at the Bar and in Committees. There were not a few impetuous friends of the short- cut system who said—"Let us pass a Standing Order; let us assert that it is an inherent right of the House; let us take upon ourselves the rights and dignities of Privilege, and who shall say us nay." But wiser counsels prevailed. A Select Committee was appointed, to whom you, Sir, did the honour of giving testimony and advice, as did your distinguished predecessor (Viscount Eversley), the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Wilson-Patten), whose acquaintance with the practice of the House is so well known, and a gentleman at the Table (Sir Erskine May), whose knowledge of Parliamentary procedure is great and extensive, and to whose kindness and readiness to assist the Members of this House we are all so much indebted; and the unanimous opinion of all these authorities was that this House needed the power. Well, the unanimous decision of the Committee and of the House was, that they should frankly say to the Sovereign and the House of Lords that such a power was wanted, and they could not believe that it would be refused. A Bill was brought in on the subject, and only three days ago I had the happiness of knowing that it was read a second time in the House of Lords without a dissentient voice. Therefore, by patience and perseverance, coupled with moderation, anything that is wanting to secure, strengthen, or defend our legitimate jurisdiction and just authority as a co-ordinate branch of the Legislature is certain to be obtained. Whenever, too, the Crown requires anything from this House, there is nothing in reason which it will not cheerfully grant to show its confidence in the dynasty and the Sovereign. I wish to prevent this serious deviation from the Rules and Practice of Parliament being made a precedent. This is not the Bill which we sent to the House of Lords, nor is it their Bill. If, therefore, neither House have assented freely or voluntarily to the Bill in its present shape, it ought not to be put on the Statute Book without a guard. The guard, I ask, is nothing new or unprecedented, but one which I think I have shown has been practically adopted in other times and other circumstances to the great end that the laws of England shall not be changed by Prerogative, or the sudden advice of the Administration, nor until, after deliberate consi- deration, the Commons and Peers of the Realm have freely expressed their views.

I did not interrupt the hon. Member in his remarks, thinking he might be speaking to the Motion before the House. He has allowed it to escape his observation that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) has proposed an Amendment to the effect that the matter he referred to a Committee, and the House has decided that the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question; that is, that the Lords' Amendments should be considered. Then the Lords' Amendments began to be considered, and the first Amendment has been read, and the Motion that I have to put to the House is, that the House do agree with the Lords' Amendments. It is, therefore, quite impossible that the hon. Member can move the Resolution which stands in his name on the Paper. All that is open to us is to accept or negative the Amendment of the Lords, or to agree to an Amendment which can be engrafted on the Bill.

Can I move the postponement of that agreement?

The Question is, that the Lords' Amendments be now considered. The hon. Member can move the adjournment of the Debate.

I shall move the adjournment of the consideration of the Lords' Amendments.

said, he wished to express his intense gratitude to the hon. Member opposite (Mr. W. M. Torrens) for having so ably brought the subject before the House. He fully agreed with the hon. Member as to the anomaly in the transaction of the business of Parliament to which he had called attention. To what day did the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury think fit to adjourn the consideration of the Lords' Amendments.

The Question is, that the House agrees to the Lords' Amendments, since which an Amendment has been moved to leave out all the words after "that," in order to insert that "the further consideration of the subject be adjourned." The Question that I have to put is, that the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.

I apprehend, Sir, that, whatever may be the decision of the House upon the vote which is now submitted to it, we should hardly feel it satisfactory to come to a decision on so important a matter after what has passed, both in this House and elsewhere, without some statement or explanation on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Sir, it is perfectly within the cognizance of this House that this alteration which we are now considering is an Amendment which was adopted, not only after a serious division upon the question of the second reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, but after the passing through the House of a Resolution of a very unusual character. At the commencement of this discussion my right hon. Friend (Mr. Disraeli) suggested that it might be expedient to appoint a Committee to search the Journals of the House of Lords in order that we might be better acquainted with what passed in another branch of the Legislature, and I apprehend if it had been intended to take any important step in consequence of what has taken place there that would have been the regular course to pursue. But I suppose that, although the House has not considered it desirable to adopt that course, we are not precluded from taking notice of that which has been communicated to us as to the proceedings in the other House of Parliament. There was some discussion in the year 1860 upon a Motion made by Mr. Duncombe for laying on the Table of this House the proceedings of the House of Lords, and he gave as his reason that it would be convenient that this House should dis- pense with the necessity of appointing Committees to search the Journals when it was desirable to take cognizance of proceedings in the other House of Parliament. Lord Palmerston gave his opinion that although it would be convenient to know what passed in the other House, the practice of searching the Journals had better not be withdrawn. And I apprehend it was in reference to that view my right hon. Friend (Mr. Disraeli) suggested we should have a Committee appointed. The House has not thought that desirable. But we are perfectly at liberty to take notice of that very remarkable Resolution in the House of Lords, which was to the effect that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, in withdrawing from the consideration of Parliament a material portion of the measure which had been submitted to Parliament, while the subject was still under the purview of Parliament, was irregular. That Resolution has been allowed to pass without any notice on the part of the Government in this House, and, what is more, the able speech which has just been delivered by the hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. W. M. Torrens) is also to be allowed to pass without notice. Now, Sir, there is no doubt that the large majority of the Members of this House have approved of the Bill for the abolition of purchase, or rather—for it is that no longer—the Bill which is called the Army Regulation Bill, and that there is no question it will receive the assent of the House. But that does not absolve us from the necessity of taking notice of the position in which Parliament is placed by the proceedings which I have referred to. The hon. Member for Finsbury, by no means as an opponent of the Bill, takes notice of what has occurred for the purpose of placing on record the opinion of this House with regard to such interferences on the part of the Executive, and whether it is expedient to take such a stop. I think we have a right to ask that those who take the lead, and who are responsible for the conduct of business, and who are the guardians of the privileges of the House of Commons, should either tell us what we ought to do, or give us some reason for the conduct they choose to adopt. We have such an amount of silence as I think is hardly consistent with the duty which a Ministry owes to the House of Commons. Because it must be apparent that the Resolution passed by the House of Lords was not a Resolution affecting the privileges of one branch of the Legislature, but goes to the question of the privileges of Parliament altogether. It was not a question of at what particular time or in what branch of the Legislature the Bill might happen to be, but whether it is consistent with the freedom and independence of Parliament that in the middle of Parliamentary proceedings upon a measure whereon the Crown has consulted Parliament, the matter should be withdrawn from the cognizance of Parliament, and that one branch of the Legislature should be placed in such a dilemma as the House of Lords was placed by the Royal Warrant. What was the effect of that Warrant? You had, submitted to Parliament by the Crown, a measure for the abolition of purchase in the Army, coupled with provisions for compensation. The measure was considered — whether it was desirable to make this great change, and upon what terms; and then, because the measure did not meet with unqualified approval, the Crown settles the chief question; and settles it in such a way that the House of Lords was left the alternative either to accept the measure or do great injustice to the officers. If the House of Lords, on finding the first question had been decided without their consent, had declined to sanction the Bill, innocent persons would have suffered. We shall perhaps be told that this is a question, not for the House of Lords, but for the House of Commons, to settle; and, in fact, one of the hon. Members for Manchester (Mr. Jacob Bright) has already told us that this is a question not of the Prerogative of the Crown, but of the Prerogative of the people, and that the First Minister of the Crown, because he has a large and assured majority in the House of Commons, has ventured upon a step which he would not otherwise have taken. It is important to know whether the Government acquiesces in this view, and whether the House of Commons and the country accept the principle that the exercise by the Minister, having a majority in the House of Commons, of the Prerogative of the Crown, is to take the place in future of constitutional Acts of Parliament? These are points of some importance, and in forming an opinion upon them the House has a right to expect the guidance of Ministers. There is one plea urged on the part of the Government for the course which they have taken. They say—Our attention was called to certain illegal practices. We were in a position to deal with these illegal practices, and it was necessary to put a stop to them; there was a difficulty in doing so by Parliamentary action, and we had not the power to put a stop to them otherwise than by the course we took. But you did more. What was illegal was the over-regulation prices; but you put a stop not only to that, but to the system of purchase and sale of commissions in the Army altogether. I will assume that the Government acted conscientiously in taking the step which was necessary to cure the illegality; but I ask, why they went so much further? Their conscience, moreover, was awakened at a very remarkable moment, for it had previously slept for a great number of years, and did not even appear to be aroused by the Report of a Royal Commission. I am not attempting to argue either in favour of over-regulation prices or of the purchase system. I will not set up my opinion against that of the majority of the House. All I am anxious to press on the consideration of the House is this — A question has been raised of very material importance between the Crown and Parliament, for the precedent of interference which has now been set, unless we take notice of it, may some time or other be used against this House. A Government anxious to cut short what it looks upon as tedious discussions in Committee may say—"We have got your assent to the principle of the Bill; we will now carry out the details by the issue of a Royal Warrant." I cannot see why, after the second reading of the Bill, the Government might not have said—"We will cut short these long discussions and issue a Royal Warrant at once." Unless, therefore, we take our stand, and get a definition of the right and power which Ministers claim under the Crown, and unless we lay down some limits within which that power is to be exercised, we shall be forgetting our duty to the House, to Parliament, and to the country generally. Before the House assents to the Amendments of the House of Lords I think we are entitled to some explanation on this subject.

Sir, there has not been the slightest attempt on the part of the Government to conduct this debate in silence. The vote which they have just given proves their anxiety that the debate should proceed. The Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Finsbury (Mr. W. M. Torrens) was that the further consideration of the Lords' Amendments be adjourned, and the Government voted against the adjournment. I was perfectly ready before the division, and am equally ready now, to describe the exact position of affairs, and to defend, if it be necessary to defend, the course the Government have taken. The right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) by the course which he took prevented the hon. and learned Member for Finsbury from moving his Resolution, and it became impossible, therefore, to discuss that question; and we are now considering whether the House shall agree to the first Amendment of the House of Lords. The only objection to the course which the Government have taken is that it has been what the hon. and learned Gentleman calls an illegal course, or if that be too definite, and he cannot find sufficient support for that argument, that the course taken by the Government is what is sometimes called "unconstitutional." I will address myself to both these points. The hon. and learned Member for Finsbury stands almost alone in saying that the course pursued by the Government is illegal. Having carefully perused what passed in "another place," and especially the observations of noble and learned Lords, of whom some occupied a position of settled hostility to the Government, while others were disposed to indulge in that candid criticism which a colleague sometimes passes upon the acts of Friends whom he has left behind him in office, I can say that none of the noble and learned Lords who spoke ventured to assert that the course taken by the Government was illegal. Upon the authority, therefore, of those noble and learned Lords I rely in maintaining the perfect legality of the Warrant. A mere child in law knows that it has been laid down over and over again, in books of authority which it would be pedantry to quote, that the sole regulator and governor of the Fleets and Armies of the country is the Sovereign, and by several Acts of Parliament, and especially that passed on the restoration of Charles II., it was enacted that with the internal government and regulation of the Army neither House of Parliament has, or can pretend to have, anything whatever to do. ["Oh, oh!"] I am astonished to hear any Gentleman dissent upon that point. That Act, or a portion of it, still remains unrepealed, and I am astonished that any hon. Gentleman can doubt such a proposition, or that hon. Gentlemen who uphold the privileges of Parliament should withhold their assent and respect from an Act of Parliament which stands unrepealed upon the Statute Book. I now pass to the broader and more important question whether there has been anything unconstitutional in the action of the Government. I have had some difficulty in finding out what is meant by the word "unconstitutional." The best definition I can find is that given by Hallam, who defines "unconstitutional" as opposed to "illegal," by saying "it is a novelty of great importance which is likely to endanger public law." I undertake to show that there is neither novelty nor danger in the course which the Government has followed. Certainly the Warrant in question is no novelty, for from the time of Charles II. down to that of Queen Victoria there is an unbroken succession of Royal Warrants dealing with the question of purchase without the smallest interference in any degree by the Legislature of the country. The earliest Warrant in the time of Charles II. was issued for the purpose of getting together money to build Chelsea Hospital. The next was in the time of William III. in 1693, which not only abolished purchase, but provides that those who entered the Army should take an oath that they had not purchased their commissions. The Mutiny Act in 1695 imposed an oath respecting commissions. That remained on the Statute Book until the year 1701, when the clause imposing the oath was withdrawn from the Mutiny Act, and from that time it has never re-appeared. In 1701 there was issued a Warrant by which regulation prices were abolished by Royal authority. In the time of Queen Anne there were repeated Warrants altering the regulations for pur- chase in the Army, particularly that of the 11th of May, 1707, which declared that no sale or purchase of commissions was to take place in the Army except by Her Majesty's approbation, signified under her Sign Manual. This continued in force for a short time, and in September, 1711, a fresh Warrant was issued regulating and altering the prices and conditions. There was a very important Warrant in 1721, by which a regular tariff of prices was established by Royal authority in the Army. In 1765 George III. appointed a Board to settle the prices of regimental commissions and to report thereon to the Crown. The Report sent in was accepted, and was confirmed by Warrant on the 10th of February, 1766. Then in 1783, there was a regulation to recover the exchanges from half to full-pay; and there were more regulations in 1793, that being the last date at which there was any important change effected by Royal Warrant in the Army prior to the Statute of 49 Geo. III. in 1809, of which we have heard so much. The statute of 1809 declares that all sales and brokerages of offices are illegal; but from the penalties enacted by the 7th clause persons who purchase in the Army under Royal regulation are exempted. That was the Act of George III. under which the Warrant which we are now discussing was issued. The House will see that down to 1809 there has been a series of Royal Warrants dealing with the question of purchase in various ways, sometimes setting it up, sometimes abolishing it, and sometimes regulating it; but all emanating from Royal authority, and not interfered with by Act of Parliament. In 1809, however, Parliament did interfere, and passed an Act against the sale of offices, but exempted from the penalties of that Act persons who bought according to regulations made, or to be thereafter made, by the Crown. There is no doubt that the Act sanctioned, acknowledged, and gave Parliamentary authority to that which had existed before for more than a century, and there is also no doubt that if it had not existed before, the Statute of 49 Geo. III. would have authorized the Crown for the first time to make regulations. There is no doubt that the Crown could at any moment have cancelled or altered the regulations, either by its inherent authority prior to the Act, or under the Act itself, and have proceeded to deal with the question as it thought fit. That was the state of things in 1809, under which several subsequent alterations were made, down to the period at which the Royal Commission, presided over by the right hon. Member for Morpeth (Sir George Grey), was authorized by the Crown. That Commission made a long investigation into the subject of purchase, and its Report was sent to the Crown, and communicated to the Executive Government, and was laid on the Table of this House as early as possible last Session. The Commission reported against purchase altogether, and greatly upon this ground—that, as a matter of fact, they found that over-regulation prices, which by the statute of 1809 had been made a misdemeanour, had grown up into an inveterate system. They found, further, that the system was such that the over-regulation prices were inextricably mixed up with the regulation prices, and that it was impossible to maintain purchase without permitting a breach of the law by over-regulation prices, and that therefore the only way of maintaining the law was to abolish purchase. The Executive Government were thus formally and officially made aware that there was a constant and habitual breach of the law on the part of the officers of the Army. It was brought to their attention by a Royal Commission, and it would have been impossible, having regard to the character and conduct of Public Business, for them to have allowed the matter to remain as it then was. The Government, therefore, brought in a Bill to deal with the whole question. No doubt as a matter of law they might have abolished purchase by Warrant before they consulted the House of Commons just as well as after they had consulted the House of Lords; but they brought in their Bill, not only to abolish purchase, but to compensate the persons who, under the indirect sanction of the Government and the Legislature, had broken the law by giving over-regulation prices—to give to those persons that compensation to which, if not entitled in point of law, they were entitled in point of honour and fair dealing. That they could not do, however, without consulting this House, which has to provide the money, and it would have been mischievous and unjust to abolish purchase without consulting the Legislature, which alone could deal with the question as a whole and provide compensation. The Bill passed after full and deliberate discussion, by great majorities in this House, and was sent up to the other House, which apparently was not sufficiently alive to the fact that, whether they liked it or not, there was an end to the system of purchase. The other House refused to consider the Bill for the abolition of purchase until, in the words of the Amendment which they carried—

"They had had laid before them, either by the Report of a Royal Commission, or by the Government, a complete and comprehensive scheme for the first appointment, promotion, and retirement of officers; for the amalgamation of the Regular and Auxiliary Land Forces; and for securing the other changes necessary to place the military system of the country on a sound and efficient basis."

Now, that was a matter which the House of Lords had no right to ask for. If anything in the world is clear, it is that these matters of detail in the re-organization of the Army are matters which from the earliest times have been, and from the plain necessity of the case must always be, under the control of the Executive Government. If there be anything unconstitutional in this matter, it is on the part of the other House in insisting on that to which they have no constitutional right—to be consulted as to the practical details of the internal re-organization of the Land forces of the Crown. But because the Government has acted upon its own authority; because, purchase being condemned by the Report of the Royal Commission, by public opinion, and by a large majority of this House, and being defended by scarcely any one of the noble Lords who discussed the question in "another place," the Government have acted upon its own inherent authority, and abolished purchase, as it had a right to do, the hon. Member for Finsbury comes down and reads us an elaborate lecture on the dangers likely to result to the liberties of the people from the exercise of the Prerogative. Does any man in his senses believe that there is any danger of the House of Commons permitting that? In former days, when the Prerogative was a real thing, and meant the Executive Government in the hands of the Sovereign, there might be dangers to the liberty of the subject in its exercise. But what does it now mean? It simply means the action of the Executive, which is the action of the Minister who is retained in power by a majority of this House. When hon. Gentlemen talk of a dictatorship and of imperiousness they forget that if this Vote of Censure had been passed, there would have been an end of the dictatorship in five minutes. A single vote of a majority of this House of Commons at any moment will vindicate, if there is a necessity for vindicating, the liberties of this great Assembly, and to suppose that anyone could trench upon its liberties or confine its freedom is a matter which is really not worth consideration. The House of Lords had a legal right to take the course they did; but what were we to do? We exercised the power that we had, when we found ourselves in conflict with the House of Lords upon this question. What should we have done? Should we have dissolved? A dissolution would not have affected the constitution of the House of Lords. Were we to resign? It happens that the Liberal party is permanently in a minority in the House of Lords, and could never hold power at all if it were necessary to command a majority in that House. Could we have let the state of things remain as it was? Most certainly not, and if so we were compelled, for the sake of the administration of justice, if for nothing else, to take the step we actually did take. How could we continue to sanction the prosecution of poor people for petty offences against the law, and at the same time permit the rich to drive their coaches and four, as it is sometimes expressed, through an Act of Parliament. No one can say that the proper course would have been to legalize over-regulation prices; and, therefore, the only course that was open to us was to abolish purchase and to maintain the law, and afterwards to come to the House of Commons, trusting that the House would support us in maintaining the law, and in doing what was at our hands a simple act of duty.

Sir, it appears to me that the hon. and learned Gentleman (the Solicitor General) has not really addressed himself to the question before the House. That question was not whether the issuing of the Royal Warrant was a legal or constitutional Act. It may be both. All the arguments of the hon. and learned Gentleman would have been perfectly apposite if the policy of the Government had been that, feeling that they had the legal right to do so, they advised Her Majesty to issue a Warrant abolishing purchase, and then had come down to Parliament and asked the majority, of which the hon. and learned Gentleman appears so proud, to vote such compensation to the officers as was deemed just and right. That would have been an intelligible course, and one that probably would not have led to any long discussion. But nothing of this kind occurred. The hon. and learned Gentleman argues as if we were defending the House of Lords, who, as it appears to me, are quite competent to defend themselves, and have defended themselves. I still think it would have been advantageous to have had an authentic record of what took place in the House of Lords, as a means of throwing light upon what is at present an ambiguous Parliamentary transaction, and I have quoted a precedent for asking for such information when the Privileges of the House of Commons are in question. But Her Majesty's Government seem to prefer not to place before this House in an authentic manner the question which it has to discuss. What the House are, in my opinion, called upon to discuss at the present moment is, not the attack which the Government has made upon the Privileges of the other House of Parliament, but, as the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Finsbury (Mr. W. M. Torrens) stated, the attack which they have chosen to make upon and which has endangered the Privileges of the House of Commons. The Bill came down from the House of Lords with the consideration that the House of Commons had inserted withdrawn, and another consideration substituted, so that a material provision which the Lower House of the Legislature inserted in the Bill has been withdrawn from the consideration of Parliament. Is that a position in which the House of Commons ought to be placed? I narrow this question to the issue regarding the House of Commons. What is the result? We had taken great precautions, in assenting to the propositions of the Government, to abolish that which, in the opinion of the large majority of the House, was bad; but, as I understand, affairs have been so managed, that it would be perfectly possible for the Sovereign, in the exercise of Her Royal Prerogative, to revive purchase in the Army again at Her individual will. If that is a correct view of the case, I say that the House of Commons has been juggled out of its privileges, and that a state of affairs most serious has been brought about. And, in passing, I must be allowed to submit that it does not become the hon. and learned Gentleman to lay down as a principle that the only security for the liberties of the English nation is a majority of the House of Commons. That is not either a legal or a constitutional doctrine. We are bound to take steps to prevent, in future, Bills leaving this House having the most important provisions that we had inserted omitted, and in effect removed from the discretion of Parliament. We must remember the circumstances under which this Bill first came before the notice of Parliament. It was at the meeting of Parliament stated by Her Majesty herself in a Speech in the other House of Parliament, direct from the Throne, that the attention of Parliament would be called to the re-organization of the Army; and it is absurd to suppose that the opinion of the House of Lords was not to be taken on a question of such gravity—of course, with due regard to the Privileges of the House of Commons, in reference to the financial points involved. That appeal was made to us by the Sovereign personally. We gave all attention to that question: it occupied a considerable portion of the Session, and the Bill which resulted from that passage in the Royal Speech to which I am alluding has had a most injurious effect upon the progress of Public Business. But the House of Commons did not grudge the time necessary for its discussion, because everyone felt that the re-organization of the Army was a question of primary importance, and that it had obtained in its favour the entire feelings and convictions of the nation. We pass the Bill; it goes to the other House of Parliament, and then these extraordinary proceedings occur. An arrangement is made which is contrary to all usual custom, and now we have the Solicitor General telling us that the Lords have no right to come to the Resolution that they have arrived at—that practically they have no more right to express an opinion upon military than upon financial questions. We sent up the Bill, and what was its title? "A Bill for the better Organization of the Army." And yet this is one of those questions upon which the House of Lords had no right to utter an opinion. In that Bill there were provisions for the abolition of important privileges of Lords Lieutenant. The Bill, therefore, directly affected many of their Lordships, and how could you expect that they would not express an opinion upon it? The view of the hon. and learned Solicitor General is absurd. He commences by telling us that the exercise of the Royal Prerogative was in this instance both legal and constitutional—that the Prerogatives of the Crown cannot be questioned—and I am not here to impugn them—and he ends his speech by telling us that the Prerogative is not a real thing. I cannot agree with that. I respect the Royal Prerogative, because it is part of the law of England; but the Privileges of Parliament are so also, and both may be duly exercised without coming into collision. Further than this, I wish to have an explanation from the Prime Minister upon a Question which I asked previously. I want to know when that Warrant was issued by Her Majesty, whether she was recommended to issue it under a statutory power? Although the Solicitor General touched upon the Act of George III., I do not think that he maintained that under the regulations of that Act any Warrant could be issued by the Crown to confiscate the property of subjects. That Her Majesty could issue a Warrant by her sheer Prerogative, under the advice of her Minister, which would have altogether abolished purchase, and might virtually confiscate the property of her subjects, I am not here now to controvert. But I do maintain, if it be true, as the House understood from the First Minister of the Crown, that Her Majesty issued her Warrant by virtue of a statutory power—I will maintain, even against so great a lawyer as the Solicitor General, that it is impossible to abolish purchase in the Army under such circumstances. Sir, we have a right to an explanation on this point. We have had no explanation as yet. I want to know from Her Majesty's Government whether they advised the Crown, when Her Majesty issued that Warrant, that she was acting under a statutory power, or whether they advised the Crown that in issuing the Warrant she was doing so by virtue of her sheer Prerogative? Upon that point I think we have a right to an answer from the Government, and I think the House will be able to draw the proper inference whatever may be the reply. Are we to understand that the Ministers advised the Crown to issue the Warrant under a statutory power? If so, the Warrant would be ineffectual for the purpose. If, on the other hand, the Crown was advised that the Warrant was issued by virtue of its sheer Prerogative, then it cannot be denied that Her Majesty has been advised by her Ministers to do that very thing in a summary way herself which Her Majesty, in her Speech from the Throne, desired us to give our attention to in our legislative capacity. These are circumstances of a grave character, and I trust that some means will be found for a satisfactory explanation on the matter. I hope that that explanation will be given, and that some means will be found by which the Privileges of the House of Commons will be guarded and protected from any future assaults of this kind. I must impress upon the House the fact that they have passed a Bill of great importance the consideration for which has been expressed by one clause, which has been withdrawn, not by the constitutional action of the other House of Parliament, so that we might have another opportunity of considering the question, but has been withdrawn from the consideration of Parliament altogether. The principal provision was omitted in the Bill when it came down to us, and we find that it has been withdrawn by Royal Warrant, recommended by Her Majesty's Ministers; but up to this moment we are left in the dark whether the advice of the Ministers was given to Her Majesty that she was acting by statutory power, or by virtue of her sheer Prerogative.

said, there was one very simple question that he desired to put to the House; it was this—was it right that one House should be appealed to to repeal a statute under which purchase to the extent of the regulation price was authorized, and that when the Bill reached the other House, that House should be told that the exercise of the power of the Legislature was not necessary? This House was told that purchase existed under the statute of 1809 up to the extent of the recognized price, and under that statute vested interests had been created. He said nothing of the over-regulation price then; but vested interests in the value of commissions, up to the regulation price, had been created under the statute of 1809, and existed upon the faith of Parliament. Now, that was what was repeated to them over and over again in that House. They were told that there was a wide distinction between the over-regulation price, which was not sanctioned by the statute of 1809, and the regulation price which was sanctioned under that statute, and they had a division in that House upon that very point—upon the distinction between the vested interests created on the faith of Parliament by the statute of 1809, as contradistinguished from the over-regulation price, for which no such sanction existed; and then the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General came down to the House, and told them that that was all a mistake. But, while the Bill was in that House the Government told them that the interference of Parliament was necessary in order to compensate the interest which had been created on the faith of Parliament under the statute of 1809. When the Bill reached the House of Lords, the Government changed their tone. They now said that there was no statutory right in that security for the regulation price up to the limit assigned by the authority of the statute of 1809, and that the act of Prerogative was sufficient to abolish purchase altogether. Why, if the House of Lords had thought fit to throw out the Army Organization Bill on the second reading, the position of things would have been this—that Her Majesty, by Prerogative, would have abolished all the vested interests which had grown up on the faith of Parliament under the statute of 1809, and he (Mr. Newdegate) said that such abolition would have been an illegal act. But the House of Lords, whom the advocates of the Government treated so lightly, rather than place the Crown in that position, had sanctioned the whole Bill, including the compensation agreed upon by that House, and thus had saved the Government from the position of recommending the destruction of large masses of property by the exercise of the Prerogative without providing compensation. That was the position, and that was a position which he said would have been neither legal nor constitutional; but it had been rendered legal, and rendered constitutional by the act of the House of Lords, who had passed the Bill giving the compensation obtained from that House under a misunderstanding, that misunderstanding having rested on the representations of the Government that those regulation prices were secured by Act of Parliament, a position which they abandoned as soon as the Bill was opposed in the House of Lords. Now, that was an anomaly which it appeared to him that House was bound to notice; because the Government had only been saved from having destroyed large masses of property, secured on the faith of Parliament, though regulated by the Crown, but still secured under Act of Parliament, by Prerogative, and he said that that would have been reverting to some of the worst precedents of the abuse of the Prerogative. The House of Lords had saved the Government from that position; but the House of Commons stood in this position—that upon the showing and under the conduct of the Government themselves, they had been misled; they had been deceived into believing that the action of the Legislature was necessary to repeal the statute of 1809, and into granting a large amount of compensation in consequence of the action, which they were told was to be the action of the Legislature. That was their position, and he considered that the House was deeply indebted to the hon. and learned Member for Finsbury (Mr. W. M. Torrens) for having called attention to that fact, and that he was perfectly justified in saying that, although it might have been now condoned, and condoned by that House, it had been virtually condoned by the other House of Parliament, yet still the House of Commons, as the chief guardian of the property of Her Majesty's subjects, was bound to take some security that the precedent thus established, upon the showing of the Government themselves, for confiscating property which was secured upon the faith of an Act of Parliament, should not be repeated in any future case. At that late hour of the night he would not enter further into the subject than to say that he held it to be most monstrous that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General should have declared that the exercise of the Prerogative was not really in the person of the Sovereign, but that it was a mere appanage of the Prime Minister, who, as the exponent of the will, not of the whole of the House, but of its majority, and who had just taken a step which he might thank the House of Lords for having condoned, by the course which they had adopted with respect to that subject, a step which, he trusted, would not be drawn into a precedent, as it might be, without some remonstrance on the part of that House.

said, he would beg to move that the debate be now adjourned.

said, he hoped the Government would agree to the Motion. ["No, no!"] Hon. Gentlemen said, "No, no!" He knew perpectly well it was then the 11th of August, and that grouse - shooting commenced to-morrow; but they were engaged on matters of far greater importance than grouse. No question within the memory of living man had been before the House of so much importance as this, because it affected the Prerogative of the Crown, the Privilege of the House of Commons, and the rights of the House of Lords. He was one of those who thought that the course adopted by the Government could be defended; but he would vote in favour of any Vote of Censure, if that course was to be defended on the doctrine laid down by his hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General, who, to his (Mr. Vernon Harcourt's) surprise and regret, had founded his argument upon a Statute of Charles II., which was passed in the worst days of the Stuarts, and in the worst year of the most slavish Parliament that ever sat in this country. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that the statute was still in existence, and that it governed the relations of the Army to the Crown and Parliament; but that was not the case. On a reference to the volume of the Revised Statutes, he (Mr. Vernon Harcourt) found that it had happily been repealed long since; and he would remark that even if it were still in force it never governed the relations of the Army to the Crown and Parliament, for the best of all reasons—namely, that at the time it was passed there was no standing Army in England recognized by Parliament; because their ancestors had taken great pains during the reigns of Charles II. and James II. that there should be no standing Army at all. The Statute of Charles II. only had reference to the Militia "and to all the Forces by Sea and Land." ["Hear, hear!"] But at that time there was no land force recognized by Parliament except the Militia. Indeed, he was surprised that it should be necessary to teach the A B C of constitutional law at half-past 1 in the morning to a Government which was exercising the Prerogative of the Crown. The doctrine of the Statute of Charles, as applied to the standing Army, would not have stood 200 years ago, and the statement made to-night that Parliament had nothing to do with the Army, was one of the most extraordinary he had ever heard. Ever since there had been a standing Army in the country, the Army had existed by the authority of Parliament, and of Parliament alone. What was the Mutiny Act, which was passed every year? It recited that the Army was unlawful without the consent of Parliament. ["Hear, hear!"] He was happy to hear that this doctrine was not repudiated by all the Members of the Treasury bench. Then if that doctrine was correct, why was this House told that the House of Lords had nothing to say to the regulation of the Army? Why, they would find in the Statute Book statute after statute regulating the pay of the Army. The mere fact that there should be such a statement made as had been made to-night showed that the subject was one which required a great deal more consideration, as was well known. He desired to see purchase in the Army abolished; but there were things he did not wish to see abolished at the same time, and these were the first principles of the Constitution. To say that the Constitution of this country could be disposed of in a debate of two and a-half hours, at half-past 1 o'clock in the morning, was out of the question. Why, they would not take a Turnpike Bill into Consideration at that hour. He sincerely trusted that the proposal of the hon. Member for Brighton would be agreed to.

said, in reply to the statement of the Solicitor General that the exercise of the Prerogative of the Crown might be intrusted to the majority of that House, he believed that if, before the Warrant was issued, the First Minister had asked the opinion of the House whether purchase should be abolished by Warrant, many of the Gentlemen who had lately come into this House would have hesitated in sanctioning so extraordinary and eccentric a course.

Sir, we do not take any objection to the adjournment of the debate at this hour of the morning. The hour is too late to finish it. We should like to hear the defence of the Government promised by my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Vernon Harcourt), but which he forgot to give us. But, Sir, we shall not be able to do it without further progress in Supply, which we must take up to-morrow, as the question of Prorogation depends upon that; the debate, therefore, should be resumed on Tuesday.