asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If there is any truth in the accounts published in seve- ral newspapers, since the arrival of the last Australian Mail, of the destruction of the village of Nukapu in the Santa Cruz group, by Her Majesty's Ship "Rosario," when a considerable number of the natives are said to have been killed; if it is true that afterwards a quantity of live stock, of great value as food to the islanders, was carried off from the island of Vasulai, as a fine on the people of that island for an alleged act of cannibalism, and that various acts of retribution or revenge against the inhabitants of other islands were subsequently committed by the same ship; and, if these accounts are true, or partially true, if the officer commanding the "Rosario" was acting under instructions from any superior authority, or if these acts of hostility against defenceless persons were committed on his own responsibility?

, in reply, said, that the Admiralty were entirely without communication, direct or indirect, from the commanding officer of the Rosario since October last. A letter had, however, reached the Medical Director General of the Navy from the surgeon belonging to the ship, in which the writer expressed his regret that he had to report the death of a man who died from lockjaw, occasioned by an arrow wound in his left arm, received during an engagement with certain hostile natives at Nukapu on the 29th November. It was therefore clear that there had been some engagement of the kind; but the Admiralty were without official or unofficial information as to the events which had occurred. No doubt the correspondence had gone in the first instance to the commodore, and that circumstance would account for the delay in its receipt in this country. As to the instructions on which the commander of the Rosario was acting, all the Admiralty knew was, that Commodore Sterling had informed the Admiralty that the Rosario was to proceed on a cruise to the South Sea Islands, to inquire into certain murders of white persons alleged to have been committed, and into the labour traffic reported to be going on in those islands. As to the last Question, he believed that Captain Challis was not in command of the Rosario between October and February, the time during which these occurrences were alleged to have taken place, and he would rather not state at present the name of the officer whom the Admiralty believed to have been in command.

asked the Secretary of State for War, If it is intended to make provision in the new barracks to ensure greater privacy in the dormitories of married soldiers?

replied, that every married soldier had a separate room in the new barracks; and in the Estimates was voted a sum for providing the same accommodation in existing barracks.

asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether any information has been received that the water-logged vessel containing a number of dead and half-starved Polynesian Islanders, which was recently towed into a North Queensland port by one of Her Majesty's ships of war, is identical with the schooner "Peri," which brought a cargo of kidnapped natives to Kigi, from the Salomon Islands, and on board of which an attempt was made to shoot Mr. March; and, if not, if he can state to what country the vessel belonged?

said, in reply, that he was not in possession of any official information on the subject; and until he was, he was unwilling to make any statement; but he would gladly give any certain information as soon as he received it.

, in rising to move—

"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to take the needful steps for withdrawing from all Treaties binding this Country to intervene by force of arms in the affairs of other nations,"

said, that in introducing the Resolution he could not do better than read a passage from the great speech of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) at Manchester. In that speech, the right hon. Gentleman said—

"Your relations with other countries are the most important part of politics. There is nothing which so much influences the amount of taxation, and nothing which so much influences the enjoyment or the embarrassment of your industry."

He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) concurred in that statement, and he believed non-intervention in the affairs of other nations was rapidly being recognized as the rule of our political life. Last Session the House spent a large portion of its time in arranging for the reorganization of the Army, and this year we were still proceeding with the same business. We knew that we had a larger force than had ever been previously kept up in time of peace. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that we maintained it to defend ourselves; but neither the right hon. Gentleman nor his Colleagues had told us whom it was we were defending ourselves against, and there was therefore room for suspicion that these large armaments were kept up for some other purpose. He was induced to] think so, from what the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government had said last year, which was to the effect that our duties "extend somewhat beyond the limits of our own territories," and—

"That we were not prepared, absolutely and irrespective of circumstances that might arise, to withdraw from a position in which we might be called upon to perform duties over and above what pertain to the immediate safety of the country."

A little before that the right hon. Gentleman spoke of the Army as a force liable to be called upon not only to defend our shores, but for any great European purpose. At a later period the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland spoke of the Army not only as a defensive force to insure us against invasion, but—and here he differed from the Chancellor of the Exchequer—as "a standing Army, well organized, capable of striking a blow in any part of the world." It must be owing to the existence of the treaties he would allude to, that our statesmen spoke in this manner of our armaments. It must be through infraction of those treaties that the circumstances the right hon. Gentleman alluded to could arise which would call for action on the part of our troops. Therefore, if those treaties were of no use, and if we might honouraly get rid of them, he would say let us do so. Although it was all very well to spend our time in organizing the Army, it was still better and more profitable in his (Sir Wilfrid Lawson's) opinion, to spend our time in endeavouring to remove the causes of possible quarrels; and he wished to ask whether the benefit arising from these treaty engagements was worth the risk to which they exposed us; and whether it was advisable that the national credit should be lent to the undertakings to which he was about to refer? Last year the hon. Member for Merthyr moved for a Return showing all the engagements to which we were liable, and he was glad to find there were no more than 15 of them. He would state shortly the substance of these treaties, and he should leave it to the Ministry to state what was the advantage to us of adhering to them. First came three treaties, made respectively with Honduras, the United States, and Nicaragua, which had reference to the protection of railways and canals. These Treaties he should only name, as they did not appear to him to be of such serious importance as the others. Then came the joint guarantee of England, Prance, and Russia, for maintaining the independence and monarchical constitution of Greece, and he wished to know why the people of this country were to maintain armaments for that purpose? Then the Five Powers guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland, who, he should think, was well able to take care of herself. With reference to Portugal, there were an immense number of treaties, going as far back as 1373, but that which appeared to be binding was made in 1815; but what had the people of this country to do with protecting Portugal against France and Spain? England, France, Sweden, and Norway, in order to maintain "the balance of power"—which ought to have been exploded by this time—had come to an understanding to secure the independence and liberty of the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway against the aggression of Russia. Surely, that was not a work which we were called upon to undertake. Of the Luxembourg Treaty it had been stated both by the late and the present Earl of Derby that it was not a separate, but a collective, guarantee; which, of course, rendered it comparatively a harmless instrument, so far as involving us in war was concerned. He now came to a more intricate treaty, by which Austria, Prussia, England, and France entered into a guarantee to secure certain parts of Saxony to Prussia; and he should not have thought it worth while to dwell upon that, if it had not been for a speech made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) about the time the late war broke out. The right hon. Gentleman said these treaties were engagements to guarantee—and "probably the most solemn guarantee England ever gave, certainly in modern times"—not neutrality—but territory. Again, there was the treaty with Turkey, by which each of the contracting Powers pledged themselves to consider any breach of the treaty by the parties thereto as a casus belli. It was the Belgian Treaty, however, to which he desired chiefly to address his remarks. Under the Belgian Treaty, entered into at the end of the year 1870, an agreement was made between this country and France, and between this country and Prussia, to co-operate in order to preserve the neutrality of Belgium. He understood that that treaty was now dead and buried, as it was provided that it should only remain in force for one year after the termination of the war between France and Germany. It was necessary, therefore, to revert to the old Treaty of 1839, by which the Five Great Powers guaranteed the neutrality and independence of Belgium. Of this very Treaty the Prime Minister had said that—

"Under it we should have had to act, without any stipulated assurance of being supported from any quarter whatever, against any combination, however formidable."

It appeared to him to be a most unsatisfactory state of things that we should be bound to maintain by force of arms the independence of Belgium. A proof that the Treaty of 1839 was unsatisfactory was afforded by the fact that when in 1870 we became alarmed at what might happen in Belgium his right hon. Friend and his Colleagues did not think fit to trust to it, but made a new treaty, which was to remain in force during the war and for a twelvemonth afterwards. In the autumn of 1870 the excitement in that House was very great. It was thought we should be dragged into the war in consequence of Belgium being interfered with; and, accordingly, the Government easily obtained an additional Vote of £2,000,000 and 20,000 men. In spite of the treaty, however, he did not believe his right hon. Friend and his Colleagues would have taken upon themselves the responsibility of dragging this country into war, although, no doubt, they felt themselves justified in asking for this additional money and these additional men, and thus commencing a suicidal policy of extravagance. There was, he thought, ample evidence to show that there existed among the Belgians a great sympathy with France. His right hon. Friend had said that if France were to attack Belgium it would he the direst crime that ever stained the page of history. That was a very strong remark, considering what we had seen in Poland, Savoy, and Denmark. It seemed to him (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), however, that a crime still more dire would be committed if the Ministry of this country were to shed the blood of Englishmen in an insane attempt to protect Belgium against France, or any other Power. Not only that, but to show how these treaty obligations were observed on the other side, he would remark that in the treaty Antwerp was to be kept as a port of commerce only; but there had been a naval arsenal there for years past, so that Belgium herself had failed to carry out its stipulations. His hon. Friend the Member for Waterford (Mr. Osborne), in the course of the debate in 1870, summed up the popular opinion in a single sentence, when he said that were Belgium in the hands of a hostile Power the liberty and possessions of this country would not be worth 24 hours' purchase. All this fear about Belgium arose in consequence of the saying of the Great Napoleon, that Antwerp in the hands of France would be a pistol presented at the head of England. There was in reality no cause for alarm, for nobody could suppose that the addition of 4,000,000 to the population of France—already 40,000,000—and of 40 miles to her extent of coast—already extending to nearly 1,000 miles—could cause any additional danger to this country. Charity began at home, and it was no part of our duty to enter upon such Quixotic enterprises, for it was impossible to protect Belgium in the way that had been suggested. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had found out that our Army was only a defensive one, and if that were the case it could not be sufficient to protect the independence of Belgium from any attack. We were, therefore, not in a condition to fulfil these treaties. Moreover, our armed interference in Continental politics had never done any good. Remember our course during the Great War at the beginning of this century. We fought against Napoleon and his dynasty; but ultimately one of his descendants became our most faithful ally. Then, again, in the Russian War, what a large amount of blood and treasure were expended! Yet the other day, as the Leader of the Opposition said, we had "destroyed all the results to secure which the blood of England had been forfeited—for which 500,000 men had perished." We ought not to bind ourselves down by treaties, but cultivate friendship with all nations without entering into partnership with any. He would now say a few words to the objections which might be urged against his Motion by the Government. There were probably some hon. Gentlemen in the House who would boldly affirm that treaties were eternal. If that were so, there would be an end to this proposal; but he failed to see why treaties should possess the attribute of eternity to any greater extent than belonged to any other of the works of man. Commercial treaties were made for a term of years, and he thought the same rule might very properly apply to treaties generally. A strong case in favour of the view he took was the alteration made so recently as last autumn in the treaty affecting the Black Sea question. The Note sent by Prince Gortchakoff was, no doubt, a sort of threatening letter; but Her Majesty's Government nobly, honourably, and with a high degree of moral courage agreed to a Conference, at which many of the stipulations of the treaty were set aside, and the whole matter was amicably settled. He proposed nothing more serious than was done on that occasion, and to carry out his proposal would not involve this country in anything either improper or dishonourable. His Motion simply asked them to take such steps as might be necessary and desirable for withdrawing from all treaties binding this country to intervene by force of arms in the affairs of other nations. If this could not he done without dishonour, then let it not be done. At the present time, England was at peace with the world, and therefore the occasion was opportune for her to put her house in order, instead of waiting until possibly a war might break out and render the task difficult, if not impossible. He did not wish to dogmatize, and point out to the Government the course they should take; but simply to express his opinion that it was quite possible for them to carry out his proposal, if they only sought a way of doing so. He should be told, in all probability, that his Resolution belonged to the "abstract" class; but he contended that it was not entirely so, inasmuch as he moved for an Address. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had recently defended the expenditure of the Government by saying that it was forced upon him by Parliament. Why, then, should not a Resolution involving a retrenchment of expenditure also be forced upon the Government by the House of Commons in a similar way? He did not wish to point out the way in which these negotiations should be commenced; but he believed the Government could devise the means if they had the will to do so. It was dangerous that these treaties should be left like a red flag, to induce a Minister with war like tendencies to involve the country in a war by urging upon the House that the honour of England was wrapped up in her treaty obligations. If these obligations were not intended to be acted upon, they were discreditable, mischievous, and absurd. If, on the other hand, they were intended to be acted upon, they were calculated to lead the country into all manner of rash, dangerous, reckless enterprises, involving possible ruin to England and to other nations of the world. The hon. Member concluded by moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice.

, in seconding the Motion, said, that the terms of the Resolution called upon the Government to reverse the traditional policy of the Foreign Office. But he thought the House had a right to take that course when they remembered what that policy had been since the commencement of the present century. It had, in fact, been full of miscalculations and mistakes, and had frequently involved the country in difficulties and dangers. The most distinguished instance of the policy of the Foreign Office was the Treaty of Vienna, which was considered at the time of its ratification a great diplomatic triumph. It was, in fact, a congeries of treaties of guarantee, and no doubt the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers seated round the Conference Table, after they had, with great difficulty and great deliberation, parcelled out the territories of Europe, and settled the claims of contending Sovereigns without reference to the interests or wishes of their people; and when at the close of their labours they invoked the solemn sanction of the "Name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity," calculated that the treaty would be a work of long duration, and would promote the stability of Europe. But in the short space of 15 years it began to crumble to pieces, and had since been infringed by every State that was a party to it, until, eventually, it sank to the lowest point of degradation, when Louis Napoleon ascended the throne of France, from which the Bonaparte Family, by the terms of the treaty, were for ever excluded. All this furnished a strong reason in favour of the Motion of his hon. Friend, and it bore out in a remarkable manner the observation made by George Washington, 100 years ago, when he said—

"Whatever may be the Conventions entered into, my experience teaches me that nations and Governments rarely abide by Treaties or Conventions longer than it is their interest to do so."

So it was with the Treaty of Vienna—Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France all violated its provisions as soon as it was to their interest to do so. It was urged that England had not been a party to violating treaties, but had honourably maintained her engagements. He did not deny that such was the fact; but that was only another reason for withdrawing from mutual obligations and engagements with other Powers, because it must necessarily place us in a false position if we undertook obligations which we were determined to carry out, whilst the other Powers were only disposed to carry them out so long as it was their interest to do so. When Prince Gortchakoff wrote his Note in 1870, respecting the Treaty of Paris, there was great excitement, and people cried out that a great blow had been dealt to treaties; but they seemed to forget that since 1815 there had been a constant succession of blows to treaties. In the midst of that excitement there was a passage in the money article of The Times which he would read to the House. It said—

"The Russian Note has caused a hope to be entertained in the City that the warning thus given will cause England for the future to have as little as possible to do with treaties or guarantees. Her position in such affairs is compared with that of an established merchant, who might in good faith enter into a transaction in joint account with a number of partners, everyone of whom would simply intend to take any benefit that might accrue, and in the event of loss, to break off from their liability and throw upon his shoulders the whole responsibility."

It seemed odd that the shrewd people in the City, who were generally alive to their own interests, did not find that out long ago. He believed it would have been found out, and that treaties of guarantee would have been strongly condemned by public opinion many years since, but for the influence of one great statesman over the foreign policy of the country. Of course, he alluded to Lord Palmerston, and it was impossible to overrate his influence. From the time when Lord Palmerston became Foreign Secretary in 1830, up to the period of his death, he controlled the foreign policy of this country, with the exception only of a few years, during which Sir Robert Peel—whose policy was the antipodes of Lord Palmerston—was at the head of the Government. Whatever position he nominally occupied in the Cabinet, he pulled the strings of the Foreign Office. As Foreign Secretary in Lord Russell's Administration he refused to be controlled by his Chief; and when in consequence he had to retire from his office, he soon took an opportunity of breaking up the Government. Shortly afterwards when the positions were reversed, and Lord Russell was Foreign Secretary under Lord Palmerston, the noble Lord had made the curious confession that in important matters he allowed his Chief to write his despatches, and all he did was to affix his signature to them. That showed that Lord Palmerston had always a definite policy, and it was that policy which was struck at by the present Resolution. The late Mr. Cobden once calculated that Lord Palmerston had cost this country at least £100,000,000; and he said that taking his value as a statesman at the highest estimate, he thought he was dear at the money. He (Mr. Rylands) believed that Lord Palmerston's policy had involved this country in even a larger expenditure. Why, they were even now paying large sums because of the policy which Lord Palmerston steadfastly adhered to, and last year we expended still more for guns for the fortifications which some Members of the present Government, he believed, regarded as useless, but which they, nevertheless, continued to carry on. The policy of Lord Palmerston lay at the root of our treaty guarantees. It was a policy in support of what was called "the balance of power," by bolstering up small and weak States, and preventing their being absorbed by large and stronger ones. If men chose to believe that the swallowing up of small States and the increase of large ones was a disadvantage to this country he could understand their adopting such a policy, but everyone had seen that that policy had been utterly impracticable. It was not possible to put a strait-jacket upon Europe, as Lord Palmerston attempted to do, and to keep the European nations within the limits which they formerly occupied. It was an attempt to check the development of national elements of progress; and whilst this continual interference with the affairs of Continental States was, no doubt, believed by Lord Palmerston to be conducive to the interest of this country, he could not help feeling that, like most other selfish policies, it was a short-sighted one, and that so far from promoting the interests of England it had a contrary effect. He dwelt upon these considerations because the grounds of the present Motion entirely turned upon them. If Lord Palmerston's policy was right, then so far from withdrawing from existing treaty guarantees, they ought to extend them. But he maintained that the policy was a mischievous one. He would remind the House that on the other side of the Channel they had in M. Thiers the counterpart of Lord Palmerston's policy. The independence of Italy and the consolidation of the German Empire had been just as distasteful to M. Thiers as they would have been to Lord Palmerston, and the present degradation, distress, and suffering of France were due to the ambition, intermeddling interference, and national jealousy which were the natural results of that policy. And yet M. Thiers said the other day, amid the ruins of Paris, and while France was still suffering from internal disorders and weakness—"that France must become once more what she had a right to be in the interests"—not of the French people, but—"of all States." They could see the folly of all that on the part of Prance, and could trace the ruin and destruction that had followed her insane ambition to be the arbitress of Europe. But Lord Palmerston's policy was equally foolish, and equally dangerous. Indeed, it was only by accident—or, perhaps, he ought rather to say—by the good Providence of God, that Lord Palmerston's policy had not led this country into similar disasters to those which had fallen upon France. In 1852, Lord Palmerston negotiated a Treaty with Denmark, on the subject of the Schleswig-Holstein question, and pledged the people of this country to engagements in relation to a matter in which they had no possible interest. He ventured to say that at the time the treaty was negotiated, not one man in a thousand had the slightest idea of what was going on. In 1864, when the emergency contemplated by the treaty arose, we were bound to take action upon it. And what action did we take? We sent remonstrances to Prussia and Austria, and had a large amount of diplomatic interference and correspondence. Lord Palmerston stated in that House that if Prussia and Austria attacked Pen-mark, they would find that Denmark did not stand alone. Against the contemplated interference, meetings were held in Manchester and elsewhere; but Lord Palmerston was not the man to be influenced in that way, and probably asked what cotton lords and shopkeepers could be expected to know about foreign affairs. Mr. Cobden believed that the expression of public opinion had prevented intervention, but that was not the case, as at the very time Lord Russell had sent a despatch—probably one of those written by Lord Palmerston—to our Ambassador at Paris, Lord Cowley, to ascertain whether the Emperor of the French would join us in an offensive war, if necessary, to protect Denmark. It was the refusal of the Emperor to listen to that application, and not public opinion in England, that prevented our being dragged into a Continental war. It was most fortunate for this country that the Emperor refused to listen to Lord Palmerston's proposed intervention. Had he taken the other course, and there had been war, we could read now by the light of recent events what would have happened. If the military force of France had been crumpled up by the power of Prussia alone, it would have been crushed even more effectually by the combined forces of Prussia and Austria; and whatever we might have done with our Navy, the only result would have been enormous losses and degradation to England, ending in a humiliating peace. Lord Palmerston used to justify his policy by a very dan- gerous axiom. He said that "England is strong enough to brave consequences," and so we ought to be if we were to enter into such guarantees as we had done in times past; but it was because he (Mr. Rylands) believed that we were not strong enough to brave the consequences that he contended that it was our duty to avoid them in future. Lord Salisbury had last year, in "another place," made a speech full of wisdom and caution, in which he had pointed to the lessons taught by the late war. He said that the course of the future would be marked by the absorption of small States into large Empires; that small Powers would have hard work to live at all; and that the guarantees we had given would be no sinecure. "The territories," he remarked, "we have guaranteed, are of all others the very territories that are likely to be attacked." Lord Salisbury then pointed out that Germany possessed 1,000,000 soldiers, Austria another 1,000,000, and Russia 1,500,000, and asked how it was possible for us to support our obligations with 100,000 men. The alternative was thus forced upon us to consider whether we should withdraw from these treaties of guarantee, or maintain a force equal to supporting them, which was, in fact, absolutely impossible. But he contended that if England were powerful enough to enforce these guarantees, she had no interest in maintaining them. Experience had proved that the existence of petty States was a source of danger to the peace of Europe. The consolidation of Germany had been a positive advantage to this country already. A few years ago the small German States were centres of intrigue. France spread her net of diplomacy over Germany, and in all these small capitals crowds of diplomatists of high standing were stationed to promote the objects of the Emperor. Their high salaries made our own diplomatists' mouths water; and in the course of the inquiries of the Diplomatic Committee, upon which he was serving, this state of things was urged by the Foreign Office as an example to be followed by this country, and as a justification of a high scale of expenditure. Now, however, all this had come to an end, and there could be no doubt that the consolidation of a Conservative Power such as Germany, would tend to render the peace of Europe more secure. But to justify the continuance of this policy of guaranteeing small States, and of attempting to control the Great Powers of Europe, we ought not only to be strong enough to brave consequences, but we ought to have at the Foreign Office a faculty almost amounting to the power of prophecy. Lord Palmerston evidently had an impression that he was more gifted than others in that respect, for in a letter addressed by him to Lord Granville, when Minister at Paris, he complained of the difficulty he experienced in getting the Cabinet to act with as much vigour as he wished in some foreign intervention; and said—

"There are very few public men in England who follow up foreign affairs sufficiently to foresee the consequences of events which have not happened."

That was a kind of prescience the Foreign Office usually arrogated to itself; but considering the number of mistakes it made, there was considerable doubt as to whether any such power could be claimed for it, and certainly experience had shown that the policy which grew out of the fancied possession of the gift of prophecy was a policy of difficulty and danger. He therefore called upon the Government to withdraw from obligations which could not be fulfilled, and which were often detrimental to the interests of this country. He wished to limit our obligations to our own frontiers, and to the defence of our own people. The House would remember that striking passage in The Edinburgh Quarterly Review, which had frequently been referred to, but which he would quote once more—

"Happy England! Happy, with a special reference to the present subject, in this—that the wise dispensation of Providence has cut her off, by that streak of silver sea which passengers often and so justly execrate, though in no way from the duties and the honours, yet partly from the dangers—absolutely from the temptations—which attend upon the local neighbourhood of the Continental nations."

We might well rejoice over our possession of the English Channel as our first line of defence, and, certainly, if the Government were to content itself with looking after our own frontiers we should be in a position of enormous strength. It was generally acknowledged to be almost impossible, with the sea for a base of operations, to land upon these shores an Army sufficient to subjugate the country; but if by a stroke of the pen, as the noble Lord (Lord Elcho) had said, England was to make the frontiers of Belgium her frontiers, our circumstances would be entirely changed, and the Channel would be a source of embarrassment and danger to us rather than a protection. The Prime Minister when at the Mansion House recently had commented upon the security of our geographical position, and had advocated the wise course of inspiring the people of the world with a belief that our policy was not governed by base or narrow motives. He said he rejoiced that it was most unlikely, except by our own fault, that we should ever be called upon or tempted to take part in any future struggle, so happily were we exempted from foreign jealousy. But in order to carry out that high and noble policy, as sketched by the Prime Minister, we must free ourselves from entangling alliances. It was with that view that they asked the Government to take the needful steps for withdrawing from treaties of guarantee. They proposed that that should be accomplished by negotiation with other European Powers. It might be difficult to withdraw immediately from all such treaties, and he agreed with his hon. Friend (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) that we should not do anything which would bring dishonour on the country. But there could be no difficulty in the way of withdrawing from the obligations under which we rested by virtue of the shreds of the Treaty of Vienna—a treaty which had been broken by every contracting Power except ourselves. In the remarkable debate in that House in 1850, upon the conduct of Lord Palmerston towards Greece, he was defended by Lord Russell, who said—

"I can answer for my noble Friend that he will act not as Minister of Austria, or as the Minister of Russia, or of France—or of any other country—but as the Minister of England."—[3 Hansard, cxii. 106.]

That was said in defence of a bullying foreign policy in the supposed interest of England by thwarting the objects, and by attempts to lower the influence of the Great Powers of Europe. But there was a far higher sense in which a statesman might earn the proud title of Minister of England. It was the duty of the Minister of England to give the first consideration to the welfare, the happiness, and prosperity of the 30,000,000 of his fellow-countrymen, and not to imperil their happiness by supporting some fancied national interests of 4,000,000 of Belgians, or by the maintenance of a Government such as that of Greece, which was a disgrace to the civilization of the 19th century. Such a policy might be called a selfish policy, and a policy of isolation; but in pursuing it he believed the Minister of England would not only be a benefactor to his own countrymen, but would promote the happiness and progress of mankind.

said, he could not support the Motion, for, although he was as much opposed as anyone to needless intervention, the Motion of his hon. Friend seemed dictated by a policy of peace at any price. ["No, no!"] At any rate, the Resolution, if carried, would, it appeared to him, convey the impression that we were not prepared to take up arms in support of the Treaty, even when our interests demanded that we should do so. But whether that was so or not, he objected to the Resolution because it implied that this country was bound by the provisions of a treaty which could only be carried into effect by the taxation of the people; because if the hon. Mover were of opinion that the power of refusing to carry out treaty obligations rested with that House, he must admit his Resolution could not be productive of much good. His own opinion was that, in order to avoid foreign complications, it was only necessary that that House should exercise the power with which it had been invested by the Constitution. He recollected that the present Lord Derby, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in 1867, said, in reply to a Question which he had put to him as to whether this country was bound to interfere by force of arms in the event of any attack being made on Luxemburg, that—

"The House of Commons could, at its discretion, grant or refuse supplies for the purposes of a war, so that it was in the last resort sole judge of whether war should be made or not."

Such words, coming from a statesman of great weight, were, he thought, of the utmost importance; and if that view were correct, the Resolution of the hon. Member for Carlisle was not only unnecessary but it would suggest a recognition on the part of the House of the principle that they were bound, whether they liked it or not, to carry out the provisions of a treaty requiring the expenditure of public money. [Sir WILFRID LAWSON: Bound in honour.] He would touch upon the question of honour presently; but, meanwhile, he desired to read an Amendment of which he had given Notice, and which he intended to move in the event of the proposition of the hon. Member for Carlisle becoming a substantive Motion. The Amendment proposed to omit from the Resolution all the words after "that," and to insert—

"As according to the acknowledged principles of the British Constitution, the people of this Country cannot be taxed by any exercise of the Royal Prerogative, or in any other manner than by the votes of their Representatives in Parliament, this House is of opinion that in all Treaties to which Parliament has not given its formal assent, the nation is under no obligation to carry out such Treaties if, by so doing, money is required for making war, increasing our armaments, or for any other purpose."

Prerogative was the remains of the despotic power once possessed by the Sovereigns of this country; and at the Revolution of 1688 taxation by Prerogative was declared in the Bill of Rights to be illegal. Much of the Royal Prerogative had fallen into disuse; but what remained was so large and so important, that by common consent it was held that it could only be exercised by the advice of the Ministers; and self-government could not exist side by side with Prerogative if the latter were not, as a matter of rule, exercised through the responsible Ministers of the Crown. There was an opinion that the House had nothing to do with treaties while they were being negotiated; but if Parliament was not allowed to exercise control over such negotiations, and they resulted in treaties necessitating an outlay of public money, it was clear that taxation by Prerogative would take place. It was absurd to suppose that such an interpretation of the power of Prerogative with regard to treaties could be correct. The Ministers, in exercising the Prerogative of the Crown, were only to make use of the power belonging to the Prerogative. No one disputed the right of the Crown to make treaties; but he denied its right to tax the people of this country, and he asserted that a treaty requiring expenditure of public money could have no force until it had received the assent of the people through its Representatives in Parliament. Why, in the case of the Treaty with Holland for the surrender of certain Dutch possessions, the Secretary for the Colonies had stated that the treaty could not be laid on the Table until it was ratified, and that the only function of the House was to criticize the conduct of the Government after the treaty had been concluded. The hon. Member for Carlisle seemed to think that we should be bound in honour to carry out such a treaty, when ratified; but foreign diplomatists must know that the Government of this country could not give any pledge as to the action this country would take at some future time, if that should involve a violation of our constitutional principles. Whatever might be done by future Governments, the House of Commons ought to jealously scrutinize the course taken by the present Government with regard to the exercise of the Royal Prerogative. They were told that these questions of Prerogative were only of theoretical interest, and that no Government would do anything not in accordance with the opinion of the country; but the House could not have forgotten the manner in which the Prerogative was exercised in the Session of 1866 as to the Charter of the Queen's University. The right hon. Member for Tamworth(Sir Robert Peel) and the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, having heard of an intention on the part of the Government to grant a supplementary Charter to the Queen's University, put Questions to the Government with the view of obtaining a pledge that the Prerogative should not be exercised until the opinion of the House of Commons upon the project had been expressed. But towards the end of the Session, and just at the time when the Government left office, that Charter was granted; and more than astonishment was expressed by the two right hon. Gentlemen he had mentioned. In 1864, too, an extraordinary speech was made by the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the present Government, who told the House that in 1815 a treaty was concluded at Vienna by which this country gave up a sum of money due to us from Portugal, and expressed the opinion that the mere power of Prerogative was sufficient to cover the Government in making such a remission. As the exercise of the Prerogative was highly important, and as the circumstances he had referred to had shown that they must not trust to public opinion for restraining any Government from availing themselves of the advantages to be derived from its use, he hoped to have an opportunity of taking the sense of the House on his Amendment; but he regarded the Resolution of the hon. Member for Carlisle as being entirely uncalled for, as the House possessed in the fullest manner the power of protecting the interests of the taxpayers; and, therefore, if a division were taken, he should vote against the Resolution.

said,^* that after listening to the speeches of the hon. Mover and Seconder of the Resolution, he saw no reason for altering his indisposition to support the Motion, to which he objected on the ground that it was an abstract Resolution, and that it was incorrect and misleading in its wording. Now, to frame in an abstract Resolution an Instruction which was to be made to guide under all circumstances the policy of this country, must necessarily be a most abortive attempt. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle said that a string of treaties had been made at divers times, which either had brought, or might bring, this country into political combinations, involving responsibilities; and, as he disliked these, he wished at once, and for all time, to proscribe similar treaties. This manner of proceeding on his part resembled that of some one who, having filled his mind with the conviction that it was owing to the flank-march our Army failed to enter Sebastopol at once, should move that it be made the fixed rule for the British Army never to perform flank-marches again. The exigencies and requirements of policy were just as impossible to reduce to hard rules as those of strategy, and therefore a Resolution of the kind now proposed was quite beside the purpose for practical ends. But besides, its terms were misleading, for they implied the existence of stringent obligations on a scale and in a degree which were imaginary. He could not help thinking that the two hon. Gentlemen who moved and seconded the Motion could never have studied the treaties they spoke about as all involving such positive guarantees on England. For the most part the treaties in question were merely deeds of diplomatic registration, by which political facts that had arisen became recognized and received that sanction from the representatives of established Government which secured the said facts from challenge, and so protected them against violence. So these treaties, which were inveighed against as instruments of a mischievous policy in the main, had contributed to afford stability to facts and to prevent war. But really it was quite impossible to lump all the treaties descanted upon together. Each case had to be taken singly, and treated on its own merits. It was absurd to bring within one sweeping Resolution treaties dating from the 14th century that could have only an antiquarian interest with treaties concluded a few years ago. The real pith of the Motion was to obtain the authority of this House for two stock terms in modern political phraseology—to obtain a sentence of condemnation against the bugbear called "balance of power," and the affirmation of what was called the "doctrine of non-intervention." Now, really it was as well that they should look this bogie of the balance of power in the face, and see what it actually consisted of. The balance of power in diplomacy was really nothing more nor less than the balance in the internal arrangements of States. It was that distribution of forces which naturally was commanded by the centre of gravity. Taken in that sense, the balance of power meant nothing more than the development of national elements of progress—free trade given to organize forces. It insisted on elbow-room being given to what was growing up naturally. No doubt the theory of the balance of power had often, and for a long while, been seriously misconstrued. It had been made to serve the assertion of personal ambition and the prosecution of dynastic interests; but, because it had been misapprehended and perverted, the thing in itself had not ceased to exist, and could not cease to exist, for it really was a natural force. But the hon. Baronet, he maintained, in discussing the treaties he impugned, had shown, in his opinion, a singular inability to gather their respective bearings. He had began by eliminating, as of no serious consequence, the treaties with the United States and Central America in reference to guarantees for a neutral passage across the Isthmus. He really was amazed that supposed study of the Blue Book had led the hon. Baronet to such a conclusion; for if these were treaties of guarantee the country had entered into, which might become pregnant with consequences, it was precisely those very treaties which the hon. Baronet dismissed as quite unimportant. But then he went to Belgium, and dwelt greatly on the great obligations contracted in regard to it. Now, so much had been said, and so much had been spoken, wildly, about this Belgian guarantee, that it was as well to define its nature. It was comprised in the 7th Article of the Treaty between Belgium and Holland, defining the territorial limits within which Belgium should form an independent and neutral State, and should be bound to act neutrally towards all other States. The three lines giving these demarcations were substantially inserted in the Quintuple Treaty subsequently made by the Five Powers. To those three lines the whole guarantee was restricted, and not one letter beyond. Now, what did that really amount to more than that, by this diplomatic act, the existence of Belgium was recognized by the bodies constituting the Powers of Europe, and that its existence in peace was secured by this pacific instrument? Now, the hon. Baronet had inveighed against this treaty as a piece of that mischievous and ambitious policy which had led to wars and prosecuted fanciful purposes. But what was the first political fact which effectively broke in upon the political traditions which ruled the world under the order of artificial ideas con-firmed by the Congress of Vienna? Why, the successful assertion of Belgian independence—and the treaty denounced by the hon. Baronet was the first diplomatic instrument that breached the old diplomatic system of repression and coercion. It stayed the hand of war, and prevented intervention; so that the hon. Baronet—the would-be apostle of nonintervention—was denouncing the very instrument which first secured the sound assertion of that principle. But, then, a charge was made against the Government on account of the treaty which it entered into at the opening of the German War. Well, he would only ask his hon. Friend, whether he would dispute that both that treaty and the one entered into about Luxemburg had proved a most effective instrument for limiting the area of war? Was that not doing good work in behalf of peace? He would not go through the whole bead-roll of treaties; but something had been said about the extraordinary guarantee given to Prussia with regard to Saxony, which deserved a passing word. If ever there was a guarantee—given in a passing moment of grave exigency to meet a particular and temporary contingency—which was obsolete, surely it was this one; and he was perfectly at a loss to understand how, on a former occasion, the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire should have attached such importance to what was merely an historical incident of by-gone times. Well, then, there was the doctrine of non-intervention, on which it was necessary to fall back upon, and of which so much was spoken. Now, it was well to make to oneself a clear idea of what that doctrine actually meant. The name of Mr. Cobden was freely quoted as the great defender of that doctrine. He was, indeed, a powerful advocate of it; and he gave a curious definition of what he understood it to mean. Mr. Cobden, who knew well the meaning of words, and neither spoke nor wrote lightly, in one of his most elaborate writings, The Three Panics, defined "non-intervention" as a protest, not against ever doing anything, but against our Government interfering on the wrong side. That was a very different thing from the doctrine as propounded currently by many who considered themselves Mr. Cobden's disciples. A policy carried out according to their reading of Mr. Cobden's teaching, would lead to our rolling ourselves up in hedgehog-like fashion within the four corners of our strict insular limits. Now, no State could permanently confine itself absolutely within itself, without becoming hidebound and shrivelled. What the condition of such a State must come to, they had had knowledge of from China, as that country was before it became opened to other nations. China enjoyed many conditions of prosperity. It teemed with a busy, an industrious, and, in many respects, a cultivated population. But yet China was a stagnant country—an eminently stunted and unprogressive country. Why was that? Why, solely because it had cut itself off from all international intercourse, and so deprived itself of all the alimentations, without which progress became impossible. The hon. Member for Warrington said the true policy of this country should be to content itself with peacefully allying itself with the elements of progress, and yet he advocated a policy of exclusiveness which was incompatible with that active international sympathy without which progressiveness was out of the question. It was intelligible how that notion should grow up. England being geographically an island, the idea of insulation seemed plausible and specious. But England was not merely an insular Power; she possessed a Continental Empire, and the Queen was also Empress of India; and he would ask his hon. Friend what was to become of the whole series of Indian treaties, containing positive guarantees binding on the Crown? The Resolution before the House was one to guide the policy of the country, and therefore, if adopted, it must hold good for the whole policy of the State in every direction. But, as soon as they went to India, circumstances arose out of the very nature of that possession which at once imposed conditions that could not be dispensed with, and rendered impossible the acceptance of such a Resolution. But there were two pervading fallacies in regard to this non-intervention doctrine which it was desirable to expose. It was currently affirmed that the old policy of political interests on the Continent was entirely due to old-fashioned and exploded elements which had no root in the New World. On the other side of the Atlantic—in the great Republic—the absurd notions of a balance of power and of an encroaching desire for intervention could not exist. Well, he would ask hon. Gentlemen if they had never heard of such a thing as the "Monroe doctrine," and whether that doctrine was anything but the doctrine of the "balance of power" transferred to the American Continent, and clothed in an American form? And as for the impossibility of an intervention policy ever prevailing in America, he would remind hon. Gentlemen of the circumstances attending the Mexican War, followed by a forced cession of territory, which was quite unparalleled in extent. Those instances proved that much that was considered antiquated and exploded still had force in the New World. But if the political programme laid down by the hon. Member for Carlisle were carried out to the letter, a positive stop would be set to the development of that international policy which it was the especial object of Mr. Cobden's political life to promote. The great work of his statesmanship—the French Treaty of Commerce—never could have been made, if the narrow principles enunciated by the hon. Baronet had been the principles of his action; but he believed Mr. Cobden never was the advocate of such doctrines as the hon. Baronet maintained, and he had memorable words of Mr. Cobden's to warrant his disbelief. On the 8th of August, 1859, at the close of the Italian War, Lord John Russell made a remarkable declaration in that House. A Motion had been made very much in the sense of literal non-intervention as regarded the Conference at Zurich, then pending with respect to Italian affairs, and Lord John Russell asked if Austria, Prussia, and Russia should consent to an arrangement in which the wishes of the Italians would be consulted, was England to raise an objection to go into the Conference? The noble Lord further asked, was it not reasonable, if the House of Commons left every other important question to the Advisers of the Crown, that they should leave this question also? And he added that he could not believe in this new-fangled policy, by which this country could separate herself from the whole world and attend merely to her own affairs. On the 17th of August in the same year Mr. Cobden, speaking at Rochdale of this declaration, said—

"Lord John Russell in the House of Commons has laid down certain conditions upon which alone Government would be disposed to go into a Continental Congress in order, if possible, to arrange and perpetuate the terms of peace. He has made conditions which I think are good, although I am afraid they are not very likely to be accepted by the great European Powers."

Mr. Cobden, therefore, publicly declared his approbation of the principles laid down by Lord John Russell. He (Mr. Cartwright) did not wish to see this country enter on a course of needless, vexatious, and ambitious intervention; but unless they were going to abdicate their Imperial position, and to cut themselves adrift from all their connections, they must be prepared to encounter on some occasions complications of a more or less serious nature. Whether it was incumbent to withstand and boldly confront such complications, or whether they were to be quietly put up with, must depend on circumstances that could not be decided upon beforehand. He was convinced that an abstract Resolution of the kind before the House was perfectly incompatible with the exigencies of the public service, and could not be adopted consistently as a guide in foreign policy.

said, he wished to direct the attention of Her Majesty's Government to a particular class of guarantee treaties which appeared to him exceedingly objectionable, and which had a special significance at the present moment. Among those treaties which had been recently laid before them there were three, the professed object of which was to secure protection to routes of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans across the Isthmus of Panama. Of course, such an object was in itself desirable; but it was only proper to consider what were the risks incurred in order to promote it. The first of the treaties was the least objectionable, being a Convention (1850) between Great Britain and the United States for the joint guarantee and protection of a ship canal through the territory of Nicaragua—

"So that the said canal may for ever be open and free, and the capital therein invested secure."

The ship canal had, indeed, not yet been constructed; but by Article 8 it was agreed—

"To extend protection by treaty stipulations to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the Isthmus which connects North and South America."

It was, however, merely as a precedent that that Convention involved practical danger, for against Great Britain and the United States acting in concert no serious opposition could be offered in Central America. The two remaining treaties were between this country and the two Central American Republics of Honduras and Nicaragua, and bore the dates of 1856 and 1860 respectively. They were both Conventions—

"For the protection of all routes of communication, natural or artificial, whether by land or water, through the territories of these Republics, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans."

In the case of Nicaragua, the employment of military force on the part of Her Britannic Majesty was permissive, not obligatory; and the treaty was for 20 years only, after which it was terminable on due notice being given; and it would probably be well to terminate it in 1880, although the risk involved was not great. With the Honduras Treaty it was altogether different; in return for certain concessions, of which two free ports were the chief, the strongest possible guarantee was given by this country to the Republic—a guarantee which could only be withdrawn upon six months' notice, and under certain specified conditions. It was couched in these terms—

"Article 2. In consideration of these concessions, and in order to secure the construction and permanence of the route or road herein contemplated, and also to secure, for the benefit of mankind, the uninterrupted advantages of such communication from sea to sea, Her Britannic Majesty recognizes the rights of sovereignty and property of Honduras in and over the line of the said road, and for the same reason guarantees, positively and efficaciously, the entire neutrality of the same so long as Great Britain shall enjoy the privileges conceded to it in the preceding section of this Article; and when the proposed road shall have been completed, Her Britannic Majesty equally engages, in conjunction with the Republic of Honduras, to protect the same from interruption, seizure, or unjust confiscation, from whatsoever quarter the attempt may proceed."

Considering the nature and position of such a Republic as Honduras, its relations to its immediate neighbours in Central America, and its past history, no inconsiderable danger attached to the signature of such a treaty, to say nothing of the well-known Monroe doctrine, which might lead to the most serious complications. The recent intervention of European Powers in the affairs of Chili, Peru, or Mexico, had not had satisfactory results, nor would it be otherwise in Central America. But the consideration of these treaties had an immediate practical bearing upon our present policy. With the direct sanction of Her Majesty's Government, and of the India Office in particular, a Select Committee of that House had been appointed to consider the various projects for establishing railway communication between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, or Black Sea. Should that Committee report favourably of any one of those schemes, it was only too probable that our Government would be urged—and possibly induced—to contract with the Ottoman Government a similar treaty to those with Honduras or Nicaragua. Against such a course the strongest protest should be entered beforehand. The existence of such treaties as he had quoted was sufficient proof that a protest was required. They must, in fact, contract no more of those treaties, and they ought to take such steps as were consistent with honour to terminate those which already existed, especially in cases where it seemed as if the national credit and safety were imperilled, in order to promote the schemes of speculating capitalists.

Sir, the question upon which my hon. Friend who has just sat down has addressed the House is, in the main, distinct from the general subject of the Motion before us, and on that account, and not because I think it unimportant, I will not enter into its discussion at the present moment. Neither will I detain the House by dwelling on the speech of the hon. Member for the Kirkcaldy Burghs (Mr. S. Aytoun), a speech mainly consisting of a disquisition on an Amendment which, as I understand, he had no other reason for introducing into this debate than that he was otherwise unable to move it. It would be a waste of the time of the House to enter upon a controversy about the conduct of the Government in 1866, a matter upon which I know my hon. Friend entertains a conviction which he cherishes dearly, but which I regard as an entire delusion, though I should be sorry to disturb him in the enjoyment of it. My hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. W. C. Cartwright) has discussed the Motion before the House with an ability and force and likewise with a knowledge of the question which could surprise no one acquainted with him, and has suggested what, I think, must appear some very strong reasons, even to those who may not be disposed entirely to agree with all his objections, to the adoption of the Motion upon which my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) intends, I believe, to take the judgment of the House. But whether that is so or not, my hon. Friend has introduced his Motion to our notice in a spirit which I am sure is calculated to attract to it much attention. I am not going to take the objection which he anticipated, and to say that it is in the nature of an abstract Resolution, for it appears unimpeachable on that score; it is a declaration of opinion upon our foreign policy by this House which, if adopted, must lead to immediate action on the part of the Government. And I must also allow that there is not the charge against my hon. Friend which is generally applicable in the case of abstract Resolutions, to the effect that his proper course would be the introduction of a legislative measure, inasmuch as the subject of these Resolutions is not within the scope of the legislative functions of the House. But the practical objections to the Motion of my hon. Friend are conclusive, and those, too, are drawn from various quarters. In the first place, it would be no easy matter for this House to undertake to obtain a formal release from a number of covenants which, whatever they amount to, are covenants, generally speaking, without being limited as to time, and which it would be very difficult to assign special reasons for our desiring to decline and to annul at this present moment, after we have allowed them to the present time to stand. It would not be easy to attain such an object, and the very effort to do it would certainly lead to much misunderstanding. It would lead to a belief that there was, on the part of the Parliament and the people of this country, a conviction, suddenly arrived at, that there had been some fundamental error in the course of international policy down to the present epoch from which they were determined to escape for the future, and of which they intended to eradicate every trace and record from their public engagements. Well, my hon. Friend may be prepared to go the length of that proposal; but I do not think that his view is shared by the generality of the House, or by any large number of persons in this country. The distinctions of policy which may be drawn from our proceedings in foreign matters at one period and at another are distinctions of degree much more than of principle. There has never been that radical opposition of opinion in the policy of one party or another, or in the policy of one Government and another, with respect to foreign affairs, which may upon particular questions, at least, be traceable occasionally with regard to home affairs; and, although an opinion may be very usefully expressed in this House with reference to a modification of the spirit and the direction of the course of our foreign policy at a particular time, an attempt to revolutionize that policy would not, I am sure, receive from Parliament any degree of countenance. But my hon. Friend, in my opinion, aggravates the evil of guarantees, such as those evils may be—and I do not deny that certain inconveniences may be attached to them—but he aggravates those inconveniences by appearing to attach to a guarantee, as such, a more stringent character than it actually bears. He appears to be of opinion that every guarantee embodied in a treaty is in the nature of an absolute, unconditional engagement, binding this country, under all circumstances, to go to war for the maintenance of the state of things guaranteed in the treaty—irrespective of the circumstances of this country itself; irrespective of the causes by which that war may have been brought about; irrespective of the conduct of the Power on whose behalf the guarantee may have been invoked, and which may itself have been the cause of the war; and irrespective of those entire changes of circumstances and relations which the course of time frequently introduces, and which cannot be overlooked in the construction of these engagements. I have often heard Lord Palmerston give his opinion of guarantees both in this House and elsewhere; and it was a familiar phrase of his, which, I think, others must recollect as well as myself, that while a guarantee gave a right of interference it did not constitute of itself an obligation to interfere. Without adopting that principle as a rigid doctrine or theory applicable to this subject—on which it is very difficult, and, perhaps, not very convenient to frame an absolute rule—yet I think there is very great force in Lord Palmerston's observation; and that, as coming from a person who had so long been engaged in the conduct of the foreign policy of this country, and who was so thoroughly conversant with all the transactions of foreign policy, and the rules by which it is guided both here and abroad, it was an observation of great importance; and I have the more satisfaction in quoting it upon the present occasion, because I think it ought to remove that apprehension with respect to a guarantee under which the hon. Mover and Seconder of the Resolution appear more or less to labour. As the hon. Member for Oxfordshire has observed, there are immense differences among these guarantees. Take, for example, the case of the guarantee with Russia in 1814. That is one of the guarantees which one may mention without fear of misapprehension. I do not think that guarantee could have a powerful practical application to a state of things which has so entirely changed, as the state of things which has come to exist, since the time when it was contracted. Then, if we take one of the strongest of our guarantees in terms—the guarantee of a very ancient treaty with Portugal in 1661—undoubtedly the terms are alarmingly stringent. The King of Great Britain declared that he would take the interest of Portugal and of its dominions to heart, defending the same with his utmost power by sea and land, even as England itself. Now, that was apparently a very stringent guarantee; but let us see how it proceeds. The King undertook to transport two regiments of horse, each consisting of 500 men, and a body of 1,000 foot, to be armed at the charge of Great Britain; but after they were landed at Portugal they were to be paid by the King of Portugal. The sting of many animals and of many guarantees may be carried in the tail; but, undoubtedly, the tail of that guarantee takes the sting out of the preceding part. As the hon. Member for Oxfordshire had observed, as far as mere words are concerned, there is really one very stringent guarantee still in existence, for another very stringent guarantee was contracted with, I think, the deliberate approval of Parliament, by Her Majesty's present Government in 1870; but that guarantee contained in the treaty with France and Prussia, in relation to the kingdom of Belgium, expired on a day which my hon. Friend may think was an appropriate one for the expiration of such a guarantee—namely, on the 1st of April. There still remains a stringent guarantee in the Treaty of 1856, called the Tri-partite Treaty, to which Austria is a party with Great Britain and with France. That treaty is remarkable, because it contains a distinct reference to the obligation to take arms corresponding in terms with the Treaty of 1870. But undoubtedly that treaty constitutes an exception, and other treaties which exist are rather in the nature of general declarations, and strong declarations of policy and of general intention, than in the nature of covenants of a specific and determinate character, the obligation of which can, under all circumstances, be exacted. I will take the case of 1870. In 1870, when we had a guarantee of a general character already upon record, we proceeded to make a most stringent guarantee for the defence of Belgium against the dangers into which it appeared to have been brought not only by the war which had just then broken out, but likewise by certain circumstances anterior to that war. But why was it that this stringent guarantee of 1870 was entered into? It was not because of the guarantee contained in the Treaty of 1839. That treaty would have stood where it was but for the new circumstances that occurred, and for the universal feeling and sentiment of the country with regard to those circumstances. It is not possible, I think, to contend from the nature of these general guarantees, that they are such as to exclude a just consideration of the circumstances of the time at which they may be supposed to be capable of being carried into effect. I believe that consideration of circumstances will always have a determining influence, not only without derogation to good faith, but in perfect consistency with the principles of good faith, upon the practical course to be pursued. My hon. Friends, I think, have not been altogether just to these guarantees. I admit with them that guarantees are engagements to be looked upon with jealousy; not to be hastily or frequently entered into; never but for grave cause; and, if possible, in those more determinate forms which are perfectly understood as not being liable to misapprehension, and which are applicable to specific objects. But let my hon. Friends fairly make the concession which the hon. Member for Oxfordshire demands from them—namely, that gua- rantees have been powerful instruments for the avoidance of the causes of actual and positive intervention. Take the guarantee of the Treaty of Vienna. The vice of that treaty did not lie in its guarantee; it lay in this—that the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna were in various instances made with too little consideration for the feelings and convictions of the people with whose interests the assembled Powers had to deal. Take the momentous years from 1830 to 1839. I think my hon. Friends will hardly think that the moderately and cautiously expressed guarantee of the Treaty of 1839 was an unwise and unjust engagement. In my opinion, that treaty reflects great honour on the countries which acceded to it, and great honour on Lord Palmerston and those immediately concerned for this country. I believe, indeed, that in future times he will be remembered for nothing with greater distinction and honour than for the extraordinary perseverance, energy, and sagacity with which he conducted the whole policy of this country, and influenced so powerfully the policy of Europe between the erection of the kingdom of Belgium in 1830 and its consolidation in 1839. Though there are those who may think that on some occasions Lord Palmerston's policy of intervention was open more or less to question, I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that by those Belgian negotiations he was the main instrument in the avoidance of what otherwise would very probably have occasioned a general and bloody European war. Take, again, the guarantee of the kingdom of Greece. It can hardly be doubted that the union of Russia, Prance, and Great Britain not only stopped a very sanguinary intestine feud in the Ottoman Empire, not only raised hopes which may not have been altogether realized, but which still subsist for the future, but that it removed a great cause of political difficulty and danger. The case of Luxemburg has been referred to in like manner, and, I think, with equal justice. The general conclusion at which any dispassionate person, not hard-ridden by theory, must arrive is that, although it is quite right to regard these guarantees with jealousy, to admit that the presumption of the case must be against them, that the onus of proof is on those who contract them, that they ought not to be need- lessly multiplied, nay more, that they might, if bad, be advantageously qualified or annulled as opportunity may occur; yet that it would be a great mistake to pass upon them a sentence of general condemnation, because they may be effective instruments of composing quarrels and avoiding disastrous wars. My hon. Friend is not bound to accede to these reasons; but I think he should not ask the House to pass a judgment upon his Motion. He has referred to declarations of the Government which he thinks are not entirely consistent with one another. Now, some of us have at times spoken, and I think with great propriety, of defence as the end and aim with which in the main, and as a rule, the military and naval establishments of this country are kept up. That is a perfectly sound and just doctrine; but, on the other hand, we cannot undertake to register a positive and absolute vow, by which we are to be restrained from recognizing any duty beyond our own island barrier. The people of this country would not consent to record such a vow, and I am bound to say that if they did they would never keep it; for on great occasions, partly from considerations of danger which, though remote, might become proximate, partly from considerations of honour, partly from sentiments of sympathy, partly from the sense of an interest, not narrow or selfish, but wide and honourable, in the maintenance of general peace, they would think, without any disposition to a meddlesome policy, that there might be occasions when it would be their duty to look beyond what immediately and absolutely concerned themselves, to the general interest of the civilized world. To an abstract proposition of this kind we cannot be parties. General recommendations of caution we shall gladly endeavour to follow, for the pacific temper of my hon. Friends is worthy of all admiration. The past errors of this country, moreover, have not lain on the side of refraining from war, but on the side of needlessly rushing into it. Cautions, therefore, we ought to accept; but though they are likely to be useful warnings against the indulgence of a besetting sin, we cannot agree entirely to forswear brotherhood with other nations with respect to any dangers except those which menace an absolute invasion of our own territory. To that length we must decline to follow them, for to consent to it would be to make ourselves not the organs of a wise, comprehensive, and practical national policy, but rather the mouthpieces of ideas which, however respectable on account of the benevolent motives with which they originate, are, and must be, the ideas of only a narrow section of men, and are incapable of influencing the conduct of kingdoms at great crises.

, in rising to call the attention of the House to the organization of the International Society, and to move for Papers, said, that in prefacing the remarks which he had to make upon the subject, he must admit that he was possessed with a fear that but few hon. Members were much acquainted with the nature of the question which he was about to bring before them, although he trusted that he should be able to convince them that it was one that deeply affected the gravest interests of this and other countries. The House would probably be aware that representations had been made to Her Majesty's Government by nearly every country in Europe directed against the International Society; and that the reason why those representations had been made to the Government of this country was, because London was, as he should be able to prove, the head centre of that iniquitous Association. He wished it to be clearly understood that he made this Motion with no ill-feeling towards the trades unions, or towards any of those societies in which the interests of the employers or the employed were specially concerned. No doubt, from time to time, trades unions had been led into excesses which everyone must deplore; but those associations had been accepted and approved by the Legislature, and by the general opinion of the country. Neither did he bring forward the question with any want of confidence in the working men of England. He had had the honour of saying, in the course of the debate upon the Ballot Bill, that he had the fullest confidence in the loyalty of the working men of the country; and, indeed, had any doubt upon the subject ever been entertained, the spectacle that was witnessed a few weeks ago showed what a strong feeling of loyalty had been developed throughout the length and breadth of the country, and justified the most perfect confidence being placed in our working classes. He would even go further, and would say that the great majority of those who had joined this Society in this country—and their number was 180,000—were totally ignorant of the principles it was intended to carry out, which were carefully concealed from them while they were giving their subscriptions and lending their names in support of the Association. Those principles struck at the root of all morality, of all civilization, of all the rights of property, and of all belief in God. These were solemn and grave charges to bring against a society in that House, but they were well founded, and he should be able to prove them by unquestionable evidence; and that evidence he would venture to say was confirmed by the fact that the Society was creating a feeling of terror over all Europe with the exception of our own country. The principles of the Association, moreover, had already been denounced in eloquent and striking language in articles which had appeared in October last in The Edinburgh and in The Quarterly Reviews. It would be interesting to trace the Society from its foundation, and through its successive developments, until it reached its present dimensions. Strange to say, it originated during the Exhibition of 1862, when the workmen belonging to the different countries were collected in London; but it was not actually founded until the 28th of September, 1864, at a meeting held at St. Martin's Hall, when it obtained the title of "The International Association of Working Men." At that time its formation and proceedings had been looked for abroad with great interest, and one writer had gone as far as to say that the Hall of St. Martin, where it was formed, would be celebrated in history. The Society, as originally constituted, was founded upon the principles of the trades unions, and no political element was then introduced into it; and, therefore, those who then joined it did so in perfect innocence of its ultimate objects, which were even at that time well known to its foreign supporters. The explanation of that moderation was to be found in the language of one of their writers, which was to the following effect—

"We think that the founders of the International acted prudently in the first instance, when the Society refused to entertain political and religious questions; for the first object was to unite all the working classes in one common bond without alarming society."

The 4th Article of the Association said that the Council General should sit in London, and should be composed of workmen representing the different nations which had joined the Association. The first president was Odger, the secretary was General Cremer, and the treasurer was Wheeler. So far, both in the names of its leaders, and its ostensible principles, the matter did not sound very-formidable. But this Society, which had started with these moderate views, soon after rapidly developed itself; for in a paper called Le Progrès de Siècle, published in January, 1870, it was said—

"What we require is liberty and equality for all—a social revolution. And by a social revolution we intend not a miserable surprise made in the dark, but our object is a revolution which shall uproot all our institutions. It is a night of the 4th of August, 1789, that we want."

Let him show how the Society had worked. Only last week a M. Eugéne Dupont was arrested in Paris, to which he had gone secretly from this country. Now, that M. Eugéne Dupont was a member of the Commune, and also a member of the International Society. He should be able to show that those two associations were in reality one, and that the International Society, located in London, had given orders to the Commune to burn Paris, and to murder the Archbishop of that city. At the Congress held at Brussels, 1868, M. Eugéne Dupont said—

"The Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 were only revolutions of form, and not radical ones. We require the whole social question raised; we want no Governments, for Governments crush us with taxation; we want no armies, for armies massacre us; we want no religion, for religion stifles the intelligence. We are not Socialists on system; we are simply and purely Revolutionists. We appeal to the masses. Our principle, the rights of labour; our means of action, organization; our object, a social revolution."

But the clearest exposition of the views of the Association was made at Geneva, July, 1869, when the Congress met under the presidency of the Russian Socialist, Bakounine. There it was said that—

"The International proclaims itself Atheist. It demands the abolition of all forms of worship; the institution of science for faith, and human for Divine justice; the abolition of marriage, and, above all, the abolition of the rights of inheritance."

While the Volksstimme, the International organ at Vienna, wrote—

"For as the red flag is the symbol of universal love, let our enemies beware lest they turn it into the symbol of universal terror."

Under the head of England, the same paper called England the cradle of the International, and said that the important centre was always in London; it was from London that the impulse was given; the Council General was the tree from which sprang all the ramifications of the sections and federations. M. Tolan, one of the defenders of the International, who was put on his trial in France, said he well knew it was generally believed that all its members were under one order; that in London, for instance, it was sufficient for the president to raise his finger to command obedience over the whole surface of the globe. In 1870, M. Eugene Dupont, Corresponding Secretary for France, wrote thus from the head centre, London, in the name of the Council—

"Although the revolutionary initiative should start from France, England alone can serve as a lever for a social economical revolution. England is the only country in which there exists really agricultural labourers, and where land is concentrated in comparatively a few hands. It is the only country where the contest of classes and the trade unions have acquired a certain maturity; it is the only country in which any important commercial change acts on the whole world. The English have all the materials essential for a social revolution; what they require is the revolutionary ardour. It is only the Council General that can give this, and accelerate the revolution in this country, and so over the world. The place where we can strike the great revolutionary blow is Ireland. Here, the position of the Association is quite clear. Our first object is to force on the revolution in England, and with this object we must strike a great blow in Ireland.—By order of the Council General of the International Association, the Corresponding Secretary for France, EUGENE DUPONT.—London, 1st January, 1870."

Now, he concluded that the International Society had instigated the atrocities which were recently committed in Paris. He had in his hand a publication which had gone through several editions. It had been signed by all the officers of the General Council in London; and he presumed that it would be accepted as a manifesto declaring the objects, the feelings, and the principles of that Society. The manifesto, issued after Paris had been the scene of the horrors he had mentioned, was as follows:—

"CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE.

"ADDRESS OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION, 1871.

"In all its bloody triumphs over the self-sacrificing champions of a new and better society, that nefarious civilization, based upon the enslavement of labour, drowns the moans of its victims in a hue-and cry of calumny, reverberated by a worldwide echo. The serene working men's Paris of the Commune is suddenly changed into a pandemonium by the bloodhounds of 'order.'"

That was published in England, had been translated into every language on the Continent, and sold, he was sorry to believe, in tens of thousands. He now came to the execution by the Commune of the 64 hostages, with the Archbishop of Paris at their head. The manifesto proceeded—

"With regard to the execution by the Commune of the 64 hostages, headed by the Archbishop of Paris—when Thiers, as we have seen from the very beginning of the conflict, enforced the humane practice of shooting down the Communal prisoners, the Commune to protect their lives was obliged to resort to the Prussian practice of securing hostages. How could they be spared any longer after the carnage with which M'Mahon's Praetorians celebrated their entrance into Paris? Was even the last check upon the unscrupulous ferocity of bourgeois Governments—the taking of hostages—to be made a mere sham of? The real murderer of Archbishop Darboy is Thiers."

He now came to the burning of Paris. The pamphlet, from which he was quoting that exposition of the objects and principles of the International Society, went on to say—

"In war, fire is an arm as legitimate as any. Buildings held by the enemy are shelled to set them on fire. If their defenders have to retire, they themselves light the flames to prevent the attack from making use of the buildings. To be burnt down has always been the inevitable fate of all buildings situated in the front of battle of all the regular armies of the world. But in the war of the enslaved against their enslavers—the only justifiable war in history—this is by no means to hold good. The Commune used fire strictly as a means of defence. They used it to stop up to the Versailles troops, those long, straight avenues which Haussmann had expressly opened to artillery fire; they used it to cover their retreat, in the same way as the Versaillese, in their advance, used their shells, which destroyed at least as many buildings as the fire of the Commune. It is a matter of dispute even now which buildings were set fire to by the defence, and which by the attack. And the defence resorted to fire only then, when the Versaillese troops had already commenced their wholesale murdering of prisoners. Besides, the Commune had, long before, given full public notice that, if driven to extremities, they would bury themselves under the ruins of Paris, and make Paris a second Moscow."

That was the way in which the burning of Paris, and the murder of Archbishop Darboy and his fellow-victims, which sent a thrill of horror throughout the civilized world, were defended by persons, some of whom he regretted to say were Englishmen. Again, they said—

"After Whit Sunday, 1871, there can be neither peace nor truce possible between the working men of France and the appropriators of their produce. The iron hand of a mercenary soldiery may keep for a time both classes tied down in common oppression. But the battle must break out again and again in ever-growing dimensions, and there can be no doubt as to who will be the victor in the end—the appropriating few, or the immense working majority. And the French working class is only the advanced guard of the modern proletariate.…. Working men's Paris, with its Commune, will be for ever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society. Its martyrs are enshrined in the great heart of the working class. Its exterminators history has already nailed to that eternal pillory from which all the prayers of their priests will not avail to redeem them."

When all that proceeded from Englishmen, and was translated into French, Italian, and Spanish, and circulated far and wide, was it surprising that other countries asked us to do something to save them from that which might again produce bloodshed, misery, and ruin? He would read only the names of the English members of the General Council by whom the document from which he had quoted was signed. The first edition was signed by Mr. Odger and Mr. Lucraft; but he would do both of those Englishmen the justice to say that when they saw it in print they were ashamed of the document they had approved while it was in manuscript, and they withdrew their names from it. Mr. Odger, at Newcastle, repudiated it, and expressed his regret that he had signed it. Although Mr. Odger and Mr. Lucraft had withdrawn, the General Council still included several Englishmen, as would be seen from the following names:—

"M. T. Boon, Frederick Bradnick, G. H. Buttery, Caihil, Delahaye, William Hales, A. Herman, Kolb, Frederick Lessner, Lochner, T. P. Macdonnell, George Milner, Thomas Motters-head, Charles Mills, Charles Murray, Pfander, Roach, Rochat, Rühl, Sadler, A. Serraillier, Cowell Stepney, Alfred Taylor, and William Townshend,"

The following were the corresponding secretaries:—

"Eugene Dupont, for France; Karl Marx, for Germany and Holland; Frederick Engels, for Belgium and Spain; Hermann Jung, for Switzerland; P. Giovacchini, for Italy; Zévy Maurice, for Hungary; Anton Zabicki, for Poland; James Cohen, for Denmark; J. G. Eccarius, for the United States; Hermann Jung, chairman; John Weston, treasurer; George Harris, financial secretary, and John Hales, general secretary.

Many more documents might be produced in support of the same views, but he would not detain the House. The language of M. Dufaure, in supporting a Bill directed against the International in the French Assembly, in describing the nature of the Society, however, was plain and full of significance. He said, in replying to the objection that "mere affiliation could not be a crime, although assemblage and subscriptions might be illegal"—

"That is a complete mistake. The wilful offence is an affiliation. I am asked where is the proof of the offence to be found? I have here a card, which the Assembly will permit me to read and explain; it is a card of the International. This card is delivered by the central committee in London, and it is signed by the six secretaries of that committee belonging to the various nationalities—Belgian, French, German, Spanish, English, and Swiss. It is delivered with a number to each member of the Internationale. Now, how is it that a great number of those unhappy men, who have been arrested in Paris or at their homes, and who have been sent before the Councils of War, have been found possessed of these cards? Does not the possession of such cards and memorandum books as we have heard of constitute a better proof of the offence than meetings which can be avoided? We hold that to be the crime. You affiliate yourself; you consent to accept this fatal card. It is accompanied by a small book, which sets forth the obligations you have undertaken. You, a Frenchman, accept engagements towards this society; you renounce your soul as a Frenchman. You become the servant and the slave of those who have signed your card, and you think that although you have agreed to that, we ought not to regard it as a crime—we who believe that the International Association is a permanent menace to European society."

And, moreover, it should never be forgotten, in reference to the action of the International upon other countries, that there was a meeting held between the leaders of the International and the Commune before the burning of Paris; and in the decree of the Commune which commanded the destruction of the Column of the Place Vendôme, the approval of the International is signified. It was also noticeable that a man of extreme Republican opinions, such as Mazzini, was yet one of those strongly opposed to the International; but everyone knew—and even his strongest enemies were willing to admit—the high and irreproachable personal character of the man, just as everyone now admitted the same of Garibaldi. Well, Mazzini, who had long been known for his regard for the interests of the working man, published shortly before his death, in The Romadel Popolo, a long article addressed to the Italian workmen. He wrote—

"Now, from the natural movement of workmen has sprung up an Association which threatens to falsify this movement in its object, its conduct, and its spirit. I allude to the International. This Association, founded in London some years since—which I from the first refused to join—is governed by a Council. This International has exercised a predominant influence, especially at the period of the last insurrection in Paris. The principles laid down by the chiefs and the influential members of the International are the following:—1. The negation of God. 2. The negation of the country and of all nationality. 3. The negation of all rights of property."

Let hon. Members remember that the centre of that Association was in London, and he could produce the publication in which these views were promulgated. The International judged that it could not permit this disavowal of the Society to pass unnoticed, and the eminent Russian, Bakounine, was charged with the reply. It was headed—"The Answer of the International to Mazzini." It commenced with recognizing the purity, the nobility, the greatness of Mazzini's life and character, "which, however," it adds, "was compatible with great errors." It continued—

"Unfortunately, the revolutionary programme of the Italian patriot contained one principle, essentially false, the belief in a God. Mazzini reproaches us with not believing in God; we reproach him, on the contrary, with his belief, or rather we do not reproach him, we deplore his error, for truly we can no longer be deceived; for under the banner of God, from Napoleon III. to Bismarck, from the Empress Eugenie to Queen Isabella, are arrayed all the emperors, all the sings, all the privileged classes, all the bloodsuckers of industry, of commerce, of the bank, all the police, all the gendarmes, the gaolers, the executioners, not to omit the priests—those black police over men's souls. Here behold the army of God. And arrayed in the opposite callings, what is there? We who deny God, the divine origin of kings, and the principle of authority, and who are by this fact the true believers in humanity and human freedom. It is not the first time that Mazzini has hurled his accusations, his injuries, his calumnies against us; and as the illustrious patriot has had the misfortune to place his acts, even the most revolutionary, under the protection of this fabled God, so that he has sacrificed to this belief the real emancipation of his dear Italy, is it surprising that he is indignant with us who turn our back on God? He calls us Materialists and Atheists, and he says well. And if a sentiment of pride is permitted to poor creatures who, like waves of the sea, rise to sink again into the great ocean of life, we are proud of the name, for Athenism and Materialism represent the truth, or rather the basis of all truth, and it is the truth we seek for, and nothing but the truth. The Divinity established on a celestial throne, has become the curse of humanity, the ally of tyrants, of imposters, of all the tormentors and robbers of the human race."

He thought he had now said enough to prove to the House that it was not without cause that he had called their attention to the subject. We might smile at such bombastic nonsense, and say it meant nothing to us; but when these papers emanated from London, were translated, and circulated all over the Continent, was it surprising that foreign Governments should take alarm? Not only that, but it must, he thought, be borne in mind that the systematic spread of Atheism and Infidelity was no slight matter; and that although it might mean nothing to us now, still the day might come when we should bitterly regret that we had permitted such an infernal Society to exist in our midst. The feeling of foreign Governments as to our indifference—evinced by our repeated refusals to applications made on their part for assistance in putting the Society down—was his justification for bringing the matter forward, and good would have been done if he only succeded in eliciting from the Ministry a strong expression of sympathy with the countries who thought themselved menaced by the proceedings of the International. He would, to give the House an idea of the extent of the organization of the Society, further say that the estimate of the number of members in France alone reached 500,000, who paid a halfpenny each per week to a fund which amounted to £100,000 a-year; but he was unable to state the amount received from the 180,000 constituting the English contingent, but no doubt it was something considerable. Not very long ago he asked the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, whether he would lay upon the Table the Correspondence which had passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Spanish Government about the International? A month had elapsed since then, and although the right hon. Gentleman promised that it should be laid upon the Table, it had not yet been presented to the House.

said, the Correspondence was laid upon the Table last night.

thought that under the circumstances the production of the Correspondence ought not to have been so long delayed.

said, it was in print, but he did not know whether it had been circulated or not.

remarked, that however that might be he had been lucky enough to get it; but he had not got it from the noble Lord, to whom he owed nothing. He ought also to mention that he had only got the Spanish Minister's request, and not the reply of our Government. Senor de Blas, the Spanish Minister of State, said—

"Social order is menaced in its very foundations by the International, which breaks up all the traditions of humanity, erases from thought the very name of God, of the life of the family, and of inheritance; which also erases that of nations from the civilized world."

Senor Blas added—

"To arrive at a satisfactory result, it is necessary that measures should be taken by common 'accord.' This accord is required by the very nature of the Association, from its character of universality. To put down the evil, it is necessary that all Governments labour to the same end; all are equally interested. It is, therefore, to be hoped that in view of the gravity of the circumstances every State will benevolently and sympathetically lend its aid to the work of defence against the International."

He should like to know what answer was made by Her Majesty's Government to that appeal. It was only received about two months ago, and although we might treat the subject with indifference, it was clear that politicians on the Continent did not, and it was no wonder that the Journal des Délats should say—

"We shall see with infinite satisfaction our Government entering into negotiations with foreign States to modify the International principles of extradition. It is repugnant to us to see Vermuth, Gaillard, and our worst criminals welcomed in London."

To show how the operations of the Society were spreading, he would quote a resolution forwarded to the secretary of the International, by the Republican Club at Taunton, It was in the following terms:—

"The members of the Taunton Republican Club beg to express their deep gratitude for your great and unvarying kindness for the noble army of martyrs, the French Communist refugees, and beg to express their sympathy with the glorious objects and aspirations of the International."

Another indication of the growth of the Society was the fact that it had just started a newspaper, which announced that the time had arrived for unanimity on the part of the useful classes; and that it ought to be made known to the noblemen, usurers, generals, bishops, admirals, lawyers, and those kind of people who composed our Parliament, that the people, the real wealth-makers of England, were tired of all their jobberies and crimes, and that it was time for them to make way for the rule of the people by the people for the people. The article he had just cited concluded—"Organize, Organize, Organize!" No doubt such language might seem sufficiently absurd, but it was capable of working very disastrous effects. The police in Germany were using every means to follow the traces of this International, in presence of these audacious resolutions of the Socialistic Congress. Further hesitation was impossible. The men had thrown down the gauntlet to all human civilization, and the last resolution of this Congress of democrats was to proclaim that it is the sacred duty of all workmen to become members of the revolutionary propaganda, with the avowed object of sapping the foundations of all society. He had studied this question carefully, and was deeply impressed with the conviction that, even if the Society were unimportant at the present moment, an Association which desired to abolish marriage, denied God, and all right of property, and preached assassination, ought to be vigorously denounced by every honest man. Some consideration also ought to be shown to other countries; and it had been well said that we could not, and that we ought not, to shut ourselves out from all external relations with the outer world. Last evening, when Earl Granville announced that every facility would be given to Englishmen to visit France, he said that the abolition of passports was a proof of the kind feeling of France towards this country; but when publications such as he had quoted were allowed to appear in England, it could hardly be a matter of astonishment that Frenchmen should be pained and distressed by the attitude of the Imperial Parliament. He therefore hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would, in his reply, speak so as to show foreign countries the good feelings England entertained for them in this matter, even if he could not promise to take steps for the suppression of the Society; and that his answer would be one satisfactory to all who loved their homes and who venerated the Constitution under which they lived.

said, he thought that on reflection the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. B. Cochrane) would see that his speech was not founded on sound policy, for nothing was more prejudicial to the authority of a Government than an attempt to put down the exercise of the right of free expression of opinion, unless that expression of opinion were supplemented by an overt act of treason. In this country, Republican opinions were held only by a miserable minority; and he had yet to learn that there was any chance, by the action of any Government, of stifling or suppressing the free expression of opinions held by any minority, however constituted, of our fellow-countrymen. Moreover, if they were those of the majority the action of the Government would be altogether altered. But they were little more than playthings; and the great desire of the Republican minority was precisely that which had been accomplished through the instrumentality of the hon. Gentleman. All they wanted was publicity, and by denouncing them in the House of Commons more was done for them than could be effected through the papers which the hon. Gentleman had been reprobating with so much indignation. The only possible way of putting down principles of this kind was by a policy suited to the age, and, above all, by progressing in national education, which could alone correct those excesses into which liberty was apt to degenerate. He bitterly regretted that such a debate should have been inaugurated, for there had always been a great distinction made by the wisest in this country between an agreement to commit an offence and the offence itself, and he regretted that a course should have been taken in the present instance which would only serve to add fuel to a fire which otherwise would die a natural death.

said, he thought it was evident that the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had not studied the subject, or read the writings of the Internationalists, for if he had he would never have used towards them the word "Republican." In fact, the distinctive principle of the Association was, that there should be no such things as Republics or States at all. He also entirely differed from him as to its importance, although he saw that M. Louis Blanc the other day, as well as the Government in their reply to the Spanish Minister, seemed to treat the question as being of little consequence. He wished, however, to state, in a few brief words, his reasons for supporting the Motion of the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. B. Cochrane), and he was glad that that hon. Gentleman had brought the subject under the notice of the House. He (Mr. Eastwick) was sure that he valued as much as any man the fact that this country had been for centuries a safe asylum for the victims of religious and political persecution, and he was glad to remember that at various epochs of our history England had derived great advantages from the immigration of a considerable industrial population flying from the severity of foreign Governments, who met with a kind reception here. He need only mention the influx of the Flemings in 1570, and the 50,000 refugees who came from France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. He rejoiced, therefore, that political exiles should here breathe the fresh air of liberty, and have accorded to them, if they desired it, all the rights of citizenship. But to quote a maxim which had been mentioned by the Communists, with as much respect as it was in their nature to feel for anything—"There are no rights without duties, as there are no duties without rights." Now, if political refugees were to enjoy all the rights of free citizenship in this country, it seemed to him to be their duty to respect the laws, and acquiesce in the order of things established here, with which Englishmen were content. More than that, he thought it their duty not to commit acts which must certainly exasperate our neighbours, and end by embroiling us in war. Now, let the House see how far that duty was recognized by the members of the International. He passsd over the sayings and writings of some of the least violent fanatics, who would certainly be soon cleared out of the way by the real leaders of the party, and he would take the principles avowed by Michel Bakounine, by Malon and Schwitzguebel. These men were the true leaders of the International, and they would carry through their work without pity and without remorse, or perish in the attempt. Let them hear Bakounine first. He said—

"The business of the International is eminently political; but only in the sense of the destruction of all that is political by the abolition of States. For the complete realization of its work, it must destroy all existing institutions—State, Church, forum, banks, Universities, Government, armies, and police—these being only so many fortresses raised by privilege against the proletariat. We must overturn these institutions throughout the world."

He tells us that to obtain these ends the masses must be organized—

"To subvert an order of things which they detest, and crush to atoms all military and civil opposition."

He took the above quotation from The People's Almanack for 1872, published by the Communist leaders, which also contained an article denouncing the Bible and Christianity. Malon, in his Third Defeat of the French Proletariat, said—

"There is nothing in common between the Liberalism of the bourgeois and the Socialism of the workmen. What is it to us whether a Thiers, a Gambetta, a Jules Favre, or a Louis Blanc be in power? Our business is especially in the Propaganda. We shall not make a bloody war unless we are forced; but we shall pursue the struggle for the overthrow of society by strikes and combinations, until our final victory."

But as in every depth there was a lower deep, so was it also with the Commune. The writings which he had cited were put forth in decent language for the sake of the Propaganda, and were meant for ears polite. It was the music and singing before the Temple of Jagannath; but in the gloom within sat the filthy idol—monstrous, bloody, obscene. He held in his hands a number of the modern Père Duchèsne, printed last year, and bearing the date 23 Germinal, an 79, whatever that might be, for it was not worth calculating. Here they had the veritable Commune; here was the workmen's god, who was to reveal himself to all when the knife and the cannon had cleared the way for the new Avatar. He had heard it said that this infamous production of a band of miscreants was printed in London. That was matter for inquiry. If it were so he supposed our course was plain; we could not have one law for Holywell Street, and another for the protegés of Mr. Frederick Harrison. The Pére Duchèsne must remove his quarters to Newgate or Broadmoor, whichever might be thought most suitable for his crimes, for there could be no doubt as to what should be done with publications which outraged all sense of decency. But the more serious question remained—were we to allow the masses to be indoctrinated with crime and treason, and organized to attack society and overturn all government? It might be said that Englishmen were too wise to listen to these doctrines, and that even the most ignorant and debased would shun ces reptiles venimeux, as they were styled by their own countrymen. Well, he thought it was a matter for calm consideration how far we might allow these incendiaries to go on with their work, knowing that they would some day try to burn London, as they tried to burn Paris; knowing that one of them—Cluseret—in a time of riot here, offered to put himself at the head of a civil war. But he wished to know if we were indifferent to what these men could do against ourselves, whether we were justified in allowing them to organize bloody insurrections against the Governments of our allies? Were we to persevere in telling France and Prussia that we would keep these men among us, free to arrange combinations for the overthrow of the Governments of those countries? Would Her Majesty's Ministers, who had just accepted it as a duty not to allow an armed vessel to be equipped here, if it were suspected to be intended to take part in a war between our allies—would they permit open war—including assassination, perhaps—to be levied and arranged in London against all countries and Governments? If they had determined to accept that responsibility, let them declare it, in order that the nation might know the fact, and decide whether it, too, was prepared to incur civil and foreign war in such a cause. What did the Government say in reply to the Spanish Ambassador? Simply that they—

"Not only regretted, but highly condemned, any attempts on the part of foreign refugees in England to incite insurrection against the Governments of their respective countries."

Now, such milk-and-water language as that was, in his opinion, more calculated to excite hostility among foreign nations than to soothe their feelings; and he, therefore, hoped they would hear from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department some indication of measures that would sweep away this monstrous and detestable Association.

said, that he had devoted considerable attention to the subject under notice, and that to him it seemed to have been lost sight of during this debate that the International filled two functions. Its first was political, the second social and economical; and he believed the latter function to be far the most important of the two, and deserving more attentive consideration. With regard to the political aims and views of the International, he had a right to assume that neither the present Government nor any Government which could exist for an hour, would think of going in the slightest degree beyond the law to suppress an organization because it might happen to hold political opinions with which the majority of the country disagreed. If it could be shown that the members of the International had done illegal acts they might be punished; if it could be shown that they had published works of an indecent character, which came within the provisions of Lord Cambell's Act, let them be punished; but he must object to the introduction, by implication, in reference to indecent publications of the name of a gentleman who, whatever his political opinions might be, was a man of high honour and great cultivation—he meant Mr. Frederick Harrison. He wished, as an intimate friend of that gentleman, to repudiate the slightest insinuation which could be cast upon his honour and his delicacy of feeling. He thought he had a right to assume that the Government would be strong enough, if they found that the members of the International had done an illegal act, to pursue the same course which they would adopt with respect to any other person guilty of illegal acts, irrespective of their political opinions. But anyone who had studied the organization of the International must come to this conclusion—that it was an organization which had most important social and economic aims; and that was the point which he asked the House to consider. The International was undoubtedly a certain phase of economic and social force which was now prevalent among the working classes in this country. He had been told that the International had not many members in England—that it did not number more than 90,000. But whether it numbered 90,000 or 190,000, or more than that, it would not in his mind detract from its importance. He believed that the opinions held by the International represented certain ideas prevalent among the working classes, and unless these views could be resisted, they were likely to produce incalculable mischief throughout the country. If they wanted to encourage those opinions and propagate them, what would they do? If they attempted to suppress them by law, they would give them a false and factitious importance; but if, on the other hand, they wished to suppress or discourage them, let them trace calmly, dispassionately, and in a kind spirit, the causes which had given them birth. He would endeavour to show the social and economic ideas which were at the bottom of this International organization. Their growth was not so strange a phenomenon as might at first sight appear. A quarter-of-a-century ago certain ideas were prevalent in this country. From a thousand platforms the working men were taught to look for their social and economic regeneration in an increase in the production of wealth; and they were assured by every-day orators that if they extended the railway system, introduced free trade, and increased our imports and exports, in the course of a few years the lot of every workman would be different, that pauperism would be extinct, and that the age of gold and plenty would come to the labourer. Well, for 25 years there had been an unprecedented increase of wealth, our imports and exports had increased far beyond the expectations of the most sanguine, and yet what was to found? Why, they found that pauperism was not extinct, and that as the country became more wealthy the gulf between the rich and the poor widened, and the day was as remote as ever when plenty would be brought to the door of the struggling working man. What was more natural than, when the working men found these predictions falsified, that there should be a re-action? What was more natural than that there should be a re-action against the ideas which were prevalent a quarter-of-a-century ago; that they should look about for new remedies; that having lost faith in the old nostrums they should seek for other means of lessening that misery and poverty and pauperism which everyone deplored? A quarter-of-a-century ago Socialism assumed a certain form of development, but there was a most fundamental distinction between the Socialism then prevalent and the Socialism which was now the characteristic of the International. Twenty-five years ago Socialism was the combined effort of individuals urged on by visionary enthusiasts, and if the schemes they proposed failed, no one but themselves suffered; but with respect to the Socialism of the International, it was found that having lost faith in the old remedies they thought that their regeneration was to be worked by reliance on State help and appeals for State money. A letter recently published by the secretary of the London branch of the International set forth distinctly the programme of the Society. Their first article was that the State should buy up all the land and all instruments of production, and let them at a reasonable price to the people. The second article was that the State should regulate the hours of labour; the third article was that the State should provide gratuitous education; the fourth article was that the State should lend capital to co-operative associations. And then, as a coping stone of the edifice of State intervention, it was proposed that the whole Revenue of the country should be raised by a graduated tax upon property. It might be stated that that programme was so unsound that there was no chance of its producing any mischief. He believed that there was very grave danger that these doctrines might assume, and actually were assuming, increased significance in this country, for no attentive observer could fail to remark that the demands for State intervention were rapidly enlarging and acquiring more serious proportions. Why did he say that he apprehended danger from these economic doctrines? In the first place, he feared that they might get a false and unnatural importance from unwise attempts to suppress them. And next, he feared that the tendency that was shown by the working classes to rely upon State intervention might at any moment, and was at the present time, receiving a powerful stimulus from politicians anxious to obtain popularity, and from Ministers and ex-Ministers trying either to gain or to retain place. It was said that the ideas of the members of the International were absurd autumn some tribune of the people But what did they find? Why, every was found going to Lancashire or Yorkshire, and deluding the working classes by telling them that it was the duty of the State to regulate the hours of labour. He also found a powerful section telling the people that it was not the duty of parents to pay for the education of their children whom they had brought into the world, but that the State ought to find them gratuitous education. Looking to higher and more influential quarters, what was the Budget of the Chancellor of the Exchequer last year but one embodying the first principles of the International? What did the right hon. Gentleman then teach the people? He told them that if they wished for additional expenditure to carry out their views they were not to pay for it, but that it was to be paid by a limited class, and paid solely by a tax imposed on property. That was the view of the International. What did an ex-Cabinet Minister, the right hon. Member for Droitwich, say in his address as President to the Social Science Institute? Every working man who heard him went away from the hall with the belief that he had the authority of an ex-Conservative Cabinet Minister for the opinion that it was the duty of the State to provide the working classes with comfortable homes and wholesome food at reasonable rates. Knowing that these things took place, he believed the danger to be greater than it was supposed to be. Let them take up the measures that were introduced in any Session, and it would be found that many of them were vitiated by this fatal mistake—that they encouraged the working classes not to rely on their own feelings of self-dependence, but only on the State for ameliorating their condition. The more firmly and strongly that feeling was resisted, the better would it be for the future of this country. But it might be said, you object to the programme of the International, yet you admit that there are great evils to be remedied; and no one could be more convinced of the unsatisfactory condition of England in many respects than himself. Nothing deserved more serious attention than this fact—that as the wealth of the country increased the greater and deeper was the separation between the very rich and the very poor. We had a great load of pauperism and great misery. All these facts he was as fully prepared to admit as anyone. Were we content to remain satisfied with the state of things which existed? He was as anxious as anyone to see the state of things improved; but what he wished particularly to impress upon the House was this—If the working men in this country were taught to rely more upon the State, the only result would be that soon all that was bad in the country would become still worse. Our effort should be directed in entirely a different direction. We should do anything in our power to induce working men to rely on their own efforts and their own independence. He believed that much might be done in that direction. He believed that the Poor Law, charities, and endowments, as they had been administered bad done much to demoralize the people. In all these instances we had committed this mistake—that the bounty of the State, and of charities, and of individuals, had done most not for those who desired to help themselves, but for those who had done the least to protect themselves against the consequence of improvidence and imprudence. If he were to go step by step into the economic programme of the International, he believed he would not have much difficulty in showing, even the working men themselves, that if their ideas could be realized the only result would be to intensify the misery which it was sought to mitigate. With regard to the first article of their programme, to which the members of the International attached grave importance—namely, what was called the nationalization of land, he had held frequent communication with some of the leading members of the Society, and, after a great deal of trouble, had arrived at the idea of what they meant by that term. He wished the House to bear in mind that those doctrines to which he referred had obtained the enthusiastic support of tens and hundreds of thousands of working men in this country. They proposed that the State should buy up all the land and all the other instruments of industrial production at the present prices, and they thought that if they did so the people would be able to obtain land and those instruments at a cheaper rate. Now, a high financial authority had calculated that if the land of this country was bought, it would require something like £4,500,000,000. To raise such a loan as that it might be fairly assumed that the rate of interest would rise. If it rose only to 4½ per cent, the interest would represent £200,000,000 a-year. Now, if the land were let at its present price, it would only realize £150,000,000 a-year. Therefore, to begin with, as the result of that transaction there would be a loss to the nation of £50,000,000 a-year. But here we only begin to get into the difficulties of the question. There would be a loss of £50,000,000 a-year, supposing exactly the same price was charged as was now charged for the land. But if the same rent was charged as was then charged, why, of course, the people would be exactly in the same position as now, except that they would have lost £50,000,000 a-year by the transaction. They said that that was not the intention. They said that they wanted to put land and houses at a reasonable rent. Well, the more the rents were reduced, the greater would be the deficiency to be made up, and the greater the burden thrown on the resources of the country. But even admitting that the deficiency could be made up, see what difficulties would be produced. Supposing the State had the land, and was going to let it at less than its present value, who would be the favoured persons who would have the land in a favourable situation close to large towns, and who would be relegated to the moors of Yorkshire or the barren heaths of Devonshire? It was obvious that the only difference would be that in the end there would be brought into operation exactly the same force of competition, and that there would be placed in the hands of the Government an enormous and unprecedented power of political patronage—a power of rewarding supporters and of punishing opponents; and under such blighting influences England would not exist even for one generation. He believed that if he could go through the whole of the programme of the International, he could show that it would produce equally mischievous results. It was scarcely necessary to point out the mischief that would be caused by the Legislature dealing with the hours of labour. He was as much in favour of the Legislature regulating the hours of the labour of children as anyone, because children could not protect themselves; but if the Legislature was going to treat grown-up men as children, where was the interference to stop? In that case we should have the State meddling in every home, and life would become intolerable. Again, to educate children gratuitously would work most disastrously, because it would destroy all parental control on the one hand, and filial obligation on the other; and the people themselves would utterly neglect one of the first duties which they owed to their offspring. In like manner to lend State capital to co-operative institutions or other forms of social industry would be most injurious. They had seen that experiment tried in Trance. Many co-operative institutions had achieved remarkable success in Paris, but in no single instance, he believed, had a society succeeded which obtained loans from the State. Those societies alone succeeded which laid their roots deeply, strongly, and firmly in the soil of national development. In this country, too, when other people had interfered, such societies had generally failed, and those societies had attained the greatest success which workmen managed for themselves. If extraneous aid was brought in, the sentiment of self-reliance was lost, and in a few years there was inevitable failure; and that would be infinitely more the case if the industrial societies started by workmen felt that they could draw on the unlimited coffers of the State—those coffers being supplied, as they were to a certain extent last year, by a tax levied solely on the owners of property. Now, he believed that the remedies for the social and economic fallacies which prevailed among workmen were very evident. In the first place, what he had said afforded a strong illustration of how greatly the whole country was interested in the people receiving a sound and thorough education. But if he was asked how these particular arguments were best to be met, he would say by moral force only, for he had argued that question with workmen themselves, and he found that they did not respect a man the less for boldly speaking out his differences of opinion with them on that question. They were open to argument, and certainly appreciated anything like kindly sympathy. On the one hand, he felt perfectly certain that, if they wished to give the opinions to which he had referred an unnatural development, they could not do so more effectually than by straining the law in a vain endeavour to suppress them. While, on the other hand, he was of opinion that if they did not calmly reason with such persons, but turned upon them weapons of abuse, those weapons would, sooner or later, inevitably recoil with disastrous effect upon those who employed them.

said, he would not join with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Colchester (Dr. Brewer), who had condemned his hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. B. Cochrane) for bringing this subject forward. If he were disposed to find fault with his hon. Friend, it would rather be for having painted only the darker side of the doctrines of that Society of which the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett) had given the complete picture. The hon. Member for the Isle of Wight had insisted specially on those doctrines which led to the abrogation of the laws of marriage and the destruction of religion; but he would ask his hon. Friend, sensible as he had shown himself to the utmost of the virtues of his countrymen, whether he thought that it was on account of these doctrines that the International Society had gained its present hold in this country, or whether it was not rather for those economic reasons which had been mentioned by his hon. Friend the Member for Brighton? But before going further, he wished to allude to this point, how far those doctrines had taken root in this country, as well as could be judged by the number of members of the International. Now, the hon. Member for Brighton had put the number at 90,000, while the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight had reached 180,000; but he (Mr. Bruce) considered that in arriving at what was the correct number a great deal would depend on what was considered as membership. If they included all the trades unions which had joined the International for the immediate purposes of trade, and without entertaining any of those terrible opinions to which his hon. Friend had adverted, the number of members would far exceed the largest estimate which had been made that evening, for from inquiries he had instituted be believed that it would probably exceed 600,000. But that meant the societies taken collectively, and not individual members who had joined the International. Now, what was the actual number of members of the Society who might be supposed to entertain more or less the opinions to which his hon. Friend had called attention? On that point he had the most authoritative evidence. His hon. Friend, in reading the address of the International Society to the Communists of Paris, mentioned, among others, the name of John Hales, who was at that time secretary of the international, and had from the first taken a very prominent part in its affairs. Mr. Hales entered some time ago into a controversy with two of the leading Republicans of this country, Mr. Brad-laugh and Mr. Wade, in which he said—"I can prove that the International has more than 8,000 bonâ fide members in England who have paid subscriptions." That was the statement of a man not desirous certainly to underrate the importance of the Society of which he was secretary. And now he would refer for a moment to the larger numbers which he had before mentioned, and which had caused alarm in some minds. Ever since the publication of the documents to which his hon. Friend alluded, the number of trades unions connected with the International was stated on good evidence to have decreased. These trades anions had, it was notorious, joined the International for purposes most intimately connected with the policy of their own societies. What were they constantly accused of doing? By their constant strikes, of driving capital from this country and of obliging it to seek employment in parts of Europe where labour was cheaper. But one of the great objects of trades unions was to unite in one common bond all the working men of Europe, in order that the rate of wages night be as high on the Continent as in his country, and that capital might lave little to choose between the one and the other. Again, when strikes occurred in this country, one of the first efforts of the masters was directed to introduce foreign labour. But it was Dart of the policy of the trades unions to unite with similar bodies abroad, in order to defeat that attempt. Those, as his hon. Friend would admit, were comparatively, if not entirely, innocent objects, which the working men of this country had a right, if they thought proper, to pursue; and it was his firm belief, and, he thought, the belief of everyone who had thought on the subject, that the men who in their corporate capacity had joined the International by no means entertained the dangerous, social, and religious opinions justly attributed to it, nor even the economic fallacies which his hon. Friend the Member for Brighton had so powerfully argued against that evening. His hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight, having shown how dangerous was the propagation of the doctrines of the International, and having pointed out that the Central Committee resided in London, asked the Government what steps it had taken to prevent danger to this country and to other countries on the Continent. He would not for a moment insist that the doctrines of the International were not of a dangerous tendency. They were the growth of a soil richer in economic and political fallacies and in speculative enthusiasts of all descriptions than England had ever been. In the accounts of those Congresses, however, which had been held abroad, it would be observed that the English section which had attended had been taunted for their incapacity to hold enlarged and general ideas, and for their narrow adhesion to trade interests instead of adopting large cosmopolitan views. It was certain, at the same time, that the members of the International had established themselves here, because they knew that greater freedom existed in this country than in others, and therefore that there was greater impunity for the declaration of opinions. But while he was not at all disposed to underrate the mischievous character of the Society, he thought, so far as this country was concerned, that it was not by measures of repression and by forcing these people to join in secret societies that dangerous ideas could be put down. His hon. Friend had said—"What is the use of education, when thousand of papers like this are disseminated among the people?" His answer was, that education was not only the best, but that, in combination with a sound religious teaching, it was the only thing to prevent the spread of such doctrines. The Government of France had lately passed a law which involved in one common censure the acts of societies like the International and the proceedings of societies like our trades unions. It was not for us to censure them for doing so, and we should remember that France was exposed to dangers far greater than any we incurred, and that they were the best judges of the course they should pursue. The hon. Gentleman who brought the subject forward and the hon. Member for Penrhyn (Mr. Eastwick) seemed to consider it the duty of the Government, either to enforce the existing law against the projectors of dangerous opinions, or else to strengthen the law. He (Mr. Bruce), however, was convinced that any attempt to put down the International Society by any means having the least appearance of force, would be far more disastrous than the evils arising from a permission to discuss its doctrines freely; and he further believed that the existing laws of this country were amply sufficient to check any unlawful and extravagant consequences that might arise from their so doing. This country was not only a land of liberty, but a land of order; and if its own subjects—or if foreigners, to whom we had given a generous hospitality—were to abuse their position either by conspiring against the State, or by making this country the basis of their operations against other countries, there were laws which would be enforced against them. Whenever sufficient evidence was given of such designs, there would be no want of readiness to apply those laws; but he was also bound to say that, while he knew of the existence of these dangerous opinions, he was unable to discover anything which had been done by those who held them to bring them within the reach of the law. He was, therefore, satisfied that the best method that could be pursued was that suggested by the hon. Member for Brighton, and that when this debate was read by the working men of this country it would have some influence in combating the opinions which had been referred to. It was by arguments of the sort that had been used, and not by denunciations, however just in themselves, that we could hope to eradicate doctrines which, if allowed to spread, might become dangerous. Reference had been made by his hon. Friend (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) to the Correspondence between the Court of Spain and Lord Granville, and it had been stated that the language used in that Correspondence was not worthy of the occasion. That Correspondence, however, was now before the House, and would, no doubt, be read by hon. Members to-morrow; and when it was read, he believed that in the opinion of hon. Members on every side of the House the answer given by Lord Granville to the appeal of the Spanish Minister would be admitted to be, not only the best, but the only answer which any English Minister could possibly make on such a subject.

said, he understood that the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett), in his (Sir John Pakington's) absence, had referred to an opinion alleged to have been expressed by him in an address delivered in the North of England last autumn to the effect that Parliament ought to provide the working classes of this country with better food and better dwellings. He (Sir John Pakington) said he should be very sorry if it were to go forth that he had ever committed himself to an opinion which he held to be so erroneous. What he had said on the occasion referred to, and what he now said, was that two of the most serious disadvantages from which the labouring classes of this country suffered, were the want of obtaining better food upon more reasonable terms, and the want of being able to obtain better dwellings for more reasonable rents. If Parliament, therefore, by any legislation could in a legitimate manner facilitate those important objects, he knew few purposes to which legislation could be better applied; but he never entertained any idea so erroneous as that it was the province or duty of the Government or Parliament, or that it would be otherwise than most dangerous for them to endeavour to provide these things themselves.

said, he also wished to correct another misapprehension on the part of the hon. Member for Brighton. In the course of his speech, he (Mr. Eastwick) had spoken of the protegés of Mr. Frederick Harrison, to distinguish the French Communists and other foreigners—to whom he meant his remarks to apply—from British workmen, members of the International. He did not believe that the latter would endorse the odious doctrines he had condemned, and therefore he did not refer to them at all.

, in rising to call the attention of the House to the systematic exclusion of Irish Members from Select Committees; and to move—

"That, in the opinion of this House, there ought to be a fair representation of Irish Members on all Committees appointed for the consideration of Imperial questions,"

said, that in 1869 the number of English Members who served on Select Committees was 186, of Scotch Members 38, and of Irish Members 34. In 1870 the numbers were—English Members, 240; Scotch Members, 39; Irish Members, 36; and in 1871 they were—English, 246; Scotch, 37; and Irish, 36. The total for those three years was—English, 672; Scotch, 114; and Irish, 106. If the number had been in proportion to the number of Representatives for England, Scotland, and Ireland, the respective numbers would have been 664, 81, and 141; therefore, there was an excess of 8 English Members, an excess of 33 Scotch Members, and a deficiency of 35 Irish Members. Moreover, on several of the most important Select Committees on Imperial affairs which had sat during the last few years, there were none or very few Irish Members. In 1869 there were on the Abyssinian Committee 15 English Members, 3 Scotch, and 1 Irish; and on the Parliamentary and Municipal Elections Committee, 20 English Members, 1 Scotch, and 2 Irish. In 1870 there were on the Abyssinian Committee 15 English Members, 4 Scotch, and 1 Irish; on the Army Colonels' Committee, 13 English Members, 2 Scotch, and no Irish; on the Diplomatic Service Committee, 18 English Members, 3 Scotch, and no Irish; on the Factories and Workshops Committee, 12 English Members, 2 Scotch, and 1 Irish; on the Pilotage Committee, 18 English Members, 1 Scotch, and no Irish; on the Public Accounts Committee, 10 English Members, no Scotch, and 1 Irish; and on the Boiler Explosions Committee, 15 English Members, 2 Scotch, and 2 Irish. In 1871 there were on the Committee upon the Business of the House 21 English Members, 2 Scotch, and 1 Irish; on the Indian Finance Committee, 23 English Members, 3 Scotch, and 1 Irish; and on the Euphrates Valley Railway Committee, 12 English Members, 3 Scotch, and no Irish. Of those Committees to which he had referred, the case of the Pilotage Committee was one of the most striking he could instance in order to bring out the unfairness of the system. Dublin was the sixth port in the United Kingdom, and Belfast the eighth, while Cork ranked high. Two Irish Members ought, therefore, to have been placed on the Pilotage Committee, and this was suggested at the time, but not acceded to; and the consequence was, as he had before stated, that no Irish Member was allowed to serve upon that Committee, in which it must be allowed that Ireland had, at least, some interest. Another subject to which he wished to refer was the Committee on Public Accounts. In 1862 there were nine Members on the Committee on Public Accounts, none of whom were Irish. Objection was then taken by the hon. and gallant Member for Roscommon (Colonel French), and by other Irish Members, to the composition of this Committee; and at length, in 1864, the late Mr. Pollard-Urquhart was added; and for several years he acted as Chairman with great ability and assiduity; but why, when a vacancy occurred through the death of Mr. Urquhart, was not another Irish Member appointed in his place? If Irish Members did not take the degree of interest which they ought in Imperial questions, surely one of the best ways to induce them to do so would be to place them upon important Committees, for that would give them an acquaintance with and interest in them, thus promoting the consolidation of the Empire. He thought that there ought to be at least two Irish and two Scotch Members on every Committee appointed for the consideration of Imperial questions.

must say that he had some fellow-feeling with the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Pim), and would agree that a fair proportion of Irish Members should be placed on Committees, and he was aware that some of them felt the omission of that as a grievance. The Committee of Selection, however, of which he was Chairman, had found great difficulty in inducing hon. Gentlemen to serve on the Committees, especially Irish Members. Only once had it been his painful duty to ask the House to take into custody an hon. Member neglecting to perform his duty, and that Gentleman was an Irish Member. The Committee had that day, moreover, just excused two Irish Members who were detained by important local duties in Ireland, and whose only fault was that they had not intimated to the Committee the time when they would be at liberty to serve. Such duties made it more inconvenient for Irishmen than for Englishmen to attend Committees. If the House would place more Irish Members on Public Committees, a larger number of English Members would be available for the Private Business; and, therefore, his noble Friend opposite would be doing a service, if he took care that a fair proportion of Irish Members were placed on Committees.

said, he should be quite willing to agree to the converse of the hon. Member's proposition—namely, that the House should resolve that no Member be excluded from a Committee on account of his nationality. There was much force in the hon. Gentleman's observations; but it would be undesirable to adopt a rule that a fixed proportion of Committees should be Irish Members. Indeed, he did not think that it would be any improvement to say that a certain proportion of any Committee should belong to any nationality whatever. The persons who had most to do with the selection of Committees were generally those who moved for them, and those who conducted the Business on each side of the House; and, in almost every case, many Members were appointed on the ground of special knowledge of and interest in the subject, or because their Friends deemed them specially qualified. He believed they had invariably been chosen with reference to those qualities alone, and irrespective of nationality. The circumstances mentioned by his right hon. Friend opposite as to local duties had doubtless much to do with the comparatively small number of Irish Members on Committees. They attended the House less constantly than English and Scotch Members, 31 of the 64 Members sitting on the Ministerial benches being at present absent. In ap- pointing Select Committees, it was most important to choose Members who could give their continuous attendance, and it would be inconvenient if hon. Members were chosen who were frequently absent from the House. There were, indeed, some Committees upon which it was proper that an Irish Member should be placed almost as an invariable rule; for example, there was the Committee on Public Accounts. It happened that at present there was not an Irish Member upon that Committee; but it was intended to fill up the next vacancy by the appointment of an Irish Member. He could assure his hon. Friend that there was every disposition on the part of the Government, and he believed on the part of the House, to place Irish Members on such Committees as they could serve on with advantage; and he thought the House was indebted to his hon. Friend for the discussion he had raised on the subject.

said, that it seemed to be admitted on all sides that the Irish Members were not placed on the Select Committees of the House. The noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland assigned two reasons for this phenomenon—the one, that the Irish Members did not attend with sufficient regularity to make their services available; the other, that those Members were selected to serve out of the whole body who were most conversant with subjects in hand and most likely to give good value to the country. He would suggest to the noble Lord that he mistook the effect for the cause, and that the Irish Members did not come as regularly to the House as others, because they had learned from experience that their presence was not desired. The other reason could only mean that the Members representing Ireland were not likely to render as great service to the country on Committees as the English and Scotch Members. ["No, no!"] Well, that was the fair inference to be drawn from the noble Lord's remark. However, the Secretary of the Treasury had assigned another ground for this exclusion. On the occasion of the appointment of the Committee on Public Accounts, when his hon. Friend the Member for Dublin (Mr. Pim) drew attention to its composition, the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Treasury said that so many Scotch Members were appointed and no Irish Mem- ber, because the Scotch Members asked to be appointed. He thought, however, that Irish Members did well to decline to ask as a favour for that which ought to be conceded to them as a right, and for the good of the whole community. But that was not all. In his opinion there was an attempt, systematically, to ignore Irish Members in other things. In his own hearing an Irish Member who spoke upon an English Salmon Fishery Bill was told—though not in those words, for they would have been unparliamentary—that his interference was an impertinence, and he himself was hardly allowed to utter three words without interruption on the subject of education, although representing a large constituency greatly interested in that question. On such occasions a disrespect and disregard were shown to Irish Members which was in keeping with their systematic exclusion from Select Committees. Perhaps, in thus acting the House was gradually preparing itself for that which would inevitably follow—the entire withdrawal of Irish Members from that House. ["Oh!"] The question of a Legislature in which Irish grievances could be ventilated was becoming more and more serious; and at the next General Election a large number of Members from the sister country would assuredly make their voices heard and their presence felt in Parliament on this question.

moved the insertion of the following clause:—

"Nothing in this Act shall authorize the prohibition of the exercise of the right to which any persons may be entitled, of holding public meetings in any of the Parks included in the Second Schedule of this Act."

desired the Government would state what was intended by the Amendment placed on the Paper by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General, who proposed to insert the words "any right whatever," in place of "other easement?" The Amendment of the hon. Member for Warrington was certainly more definite, and the description "any right whatever" might include hunting or forestal rights.

said, the Government had given an assurance that they did not intend to interfere with public meetings in the Parks, which were held under certain conditions and in certain places. If, therefore, the clause were pressed to a division, the Government would vote against it. This was designed to serve as a Regulation Bill, and it was not proposed by it either to take away existing rights or confer new rights.

said, he had heard with satisfaction the statement of the Attorney General, to the effect that this was merely intended to be a Regulation Bill, and expressed a hope that the Amendment would be withdrawn.

accepted the assurance of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General that the public rights would be reserved, and wished to withdraw the Amendment.

moved the insertion of a new clause—

"No rule which may be made under the provisions of this Act shall prevent the holding of public meetings in Holyrood Park."

said, the Bill would not interfere with existing rights.

moved the insertion of the words "any right whatever," in place of the words "other easement," and remarked that the latter phrase did not convey the same meaning in Scotland as in England.

said, the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General had not defined the rights to which his Amendment referred. The Government had succumbed, and had surrendered at discretion to the lawless menaces of a seditious mob, meeting at the Hole-in-the-Wall, and therefore he must take the sense of the House upon the Amendment. He hoped that the House would refuse to sanction this abandonment of the principle they had originally announced.

repelled the accusations of the hon. Member (Mr. J. Lowther). The Government had never departed from the views it had originally announced. They took what they deemed to be the true Parliamentary meaning of the Bill, and he hoped that whatever Government was to succeed them would take a similar view. It was very desirable that the public should know precisely how the Royal Parks were to be managed; and they had explicitly declared that the right of public meeting in the Parks could not be recognized in the Bill, but that the usage would be respected as it had had hitherto been respected. Such charges as that of succumbing to a mob should not be made, unless the maker was prepared to sustain them by proof.

explained, that what he had referred to was, that when the question of reserving the right of public meeting in the Parks was raised, the Government declined to adopt any words that allowed any meetings to be held.

said, the hon. Member was entirely in error, for what was done was this—he (Mr. Ayrton) expressed his willingness to adopt the clause proposed by the hon. and learned Member for the City of Oxford (Mr. V. Harcourt), reserving the rights of the people; but when the words of the clause came to be examined, they were found to be not the words which ought to be used, and he then promised to take the proper opportunity—which was the present opportunity—of revising the words so as to make them suitable and proper.

said, his recollection was that after the clause was adopted the hon. Member for Edinburgh pointed out that the word "easement" was not a Scotch law term, and then the First Commissioner of Works promised to introduce some word which should be equivalent to it. But the word "right" could not be taken to be equivalent to the word "easement," for it covered a great deal more.

said, that the 18th rule of the First Schedule provided that no persons should enter the Parks after sunset nor before sunrise. He proposed to add, "except for the purpose of passing along the way kept open for the use of the public."

(who had an Amendment on the Paper proposing the omission of "Linlithgow Peel or Park and Holyrood Park") said, that after the concessions which had been made by the Government, he should abstain from troubling the House on the question. He merely wished to point out to the right hon. Gentleman who had charge of the Bill, that owing to the particular character of Scotch Parks, which were certainly Royal possessions, and could not be strictly called parks or gardens, the regulations in this Bill might, and probably would, act oppressively on the people of Scotland, more so than they would on the people using the Parks of the metropolis. Almost every enjoyment which the people of the neighbourhood had had in those Parks would be prohibited until the rules and regulations were made. Those rules did not, as far as he knew, yet exist; and, therefore, he should like to have from the right hon. Gentleman an assurance that he would make such regulations as would allow the people of Edinburgh and Linlithgow to enjoy the Parks in those places as they had hitherto done.

undertook to do what the hon. Baronet desired.