asked the Postmaster General, Whether it is necessary to destroy newspapers insufficiently stamped, when directed to the Colonies; and, whether an alteration could not be made in the regulation which requires that they should be posted within eight days of publication?

in reply, said, he wished to point out that no means had otherwise been discovered of dealing with such newspapers, for it was impossible to ascertain who the senders of them were. Experience had shown that insufficiently-paid newspapers, if forwarded to the Colonies, would not, in the great number of instances, be taken in by the persons to whom they were addressed, but would be returned to this country, so that the Post Office would have to carry them both ways without receiving anything for so doing. Moreover, in some instances where the papers passed through the United States, a charge would be made by that country. The Post Office took every means in its power to make proper regulations as to the proper posting of newspapers, and also to make these regulations known both at home and in the colonies, and the number of papers so insufficiently stamped was constantly decreasing. The reason why it was required that newspapers should be posted within eight days of publication was to prevent a vast number of newspapers being posted just before the despatch of the mail, which would have the effect of taxing the energies of the office to an undue extent. He could hold out no hope that this system would be changed.

in rising to call attention to the undue taxation now imposed upon the taxpayers of the United Kingdom for the defence of the Colonies, and to move—

"That this House is of opinion that the time has now come when, having regard to the best interests of the Empire, the taxpayers of the United Kingdom should be relieved from the unequal burden of taxation which they have hitherto borne for Imperial purposes; and that with this view each Colony should be invited to contribute, in proportion to its population and wealth, such annual contingents of men or such sums of money towards the defence of the Empire as may, by arrangement between the Home and Colonial Governments, be hereafter deemed just and necessary,"

begged to state that his object certainly was not to alienate the Colonies from the mother country, or to curtail their defences in any way. On the contrary, he should be very glad to bind more closely those ties of mutual interest and friendship which existed between the mother country and the Colonies, and to see such a re-organization of the land forces of the Empire that those forces might be available at any time for its defence, even for the most insignificant part of it. But in order to effect this object, it seemed to him that one of the first necessities of the case was, that the relations which existed between the mother country and the Colonies, so far as the burden of taxation was concerned, should be founded upon a principle of justice, and that principle, so far as the taxpayers of the United Kingdom were concerned, he had not been able to discover. He had taken some pains to ascertain what the cost of the Colonies had been to this country during the last half century; and he found that in a period of 57 years, from 1815 to 1872, it had been £103,000,000. None of this sum had been expended in keeping up the Navy, which might be looked upon as a proper charge upon the Home Exchequer, but it had been incurred for the civil and military expenses of our 31 Colonies, exclusive of India. If they examined into these figures a little more closely, they would find that about £86,000,000 of that money had been spent since 1845, and about £66,000,000 of it had been expended during the last 18 years. Previous to 1845, the Colonies did not on an average cost the country more, or even so much, as £500,000 a-year, but since that date the average expenditure had been between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000 a-year. In order to fortify himself with official support, he would refer to a speech which was made during the Recess by the Under Secretary for the Colonies (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) to his constituents at the Deal and Walmer Institute, in which that hon. Gentleman said—if he was correctly reported—he found, from a Report presented to that House in 1870, that the cost of the Colonies during the previous year was £3,693,000, but that part of that money was expended for Imperial, and not strictly Colonial, purposes. It seemed to him (Lord Eustace Cecil) that throughout the lecture upon this subject there had been a confusion of ideas in the mind of the hon. Gentleman as to what was the meaning of Imperial expenses. He did not blame the Government for this, because there was a very general idea that Imperial expenses were to be paid by the British taxpayer—although he, for one, had always contended against that theory, being of opinion that Imperial expenses should be borne by the whole Empire, and not by a part of it only. Such great stations as Bermuda, Malta, and Gibraltar were maintained for the benefit of the Colonies as much as for that of England, and therefore the whole Empire, and not Great Britain alone, should be called upon to pay for them. The sum which we now paid for the Colonies was so considerable that it would enable us to pay such a sum as the Alabama Claims every year, or it would enable the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give more agreeable answers to those persons who went to him in reference to the income tax and the malt tax. Whatever had been the theory hitherto in justification of this expenditure from the Home Exchequer, it was now altogether indefensible, because the Colonies were no longer dependencies, but had constitutions of their own. It might be said that the colonial Parliaments had no voice in the declaration of peace or war, but neither had the Parliament of Great Britain in theory. It had only an equal right with the colonial Parliaments to address the Crown upon a question of foreign policy, and surely in these days of steam and telegraphy that right could be as well exercised by the one as by the other. Lord Lytton, he believed, in 1858 wrote a despatch to the Colonies, in which he called upon them to raise local forces for the purpose of defence. A Return which the Under Secretary for the Colonies had kindly given to him showed how far that despatch had been acted upon. Exclusive of India and Canada—which, of course, had forces of its own, and to which great credit was due for having raised forces sufficient to meet any emergency—the Colonies, numbering 27 or 28, had a force of only 25,109, and were scattered all over the globe. Such was the result of a paternal Government. Last year he had brought the question of colonial fortifications before the House. He moved then, on grounds which he thought were sufficient, that the Vote for fortifications at Bermuda should be refused; and he should have more to say this year on the sub- ject at the proper time. In his opinion, so long as English money was spent in this way, so long would the expenditure incurred be enormous. He was aware that there were some military men in favour of a large expenditure upon our Colonies. He held, however, the opinion that military men were quite as ready to run riot in matters of expense as any other class when they were not subject to sufficient control. Now, the remedy for this large expenditure which he proposed, was that the Colonies should be invited to pay, according to their means, for strictly Imperial defences. What was worth having was worth paying for. If our Colonies were to enjoy the privilege belonging to this great Empire, they ought to be ready to bear their fair share of the expense. This was not his own opinion exclusively, for he found the same opinion had been fermenting in the minds of many others, and the object of his Motion was to elicit the view of the House and the Government on the subject. He might quote on the subject from an article which appeared in Fraser's Magazine of last February, written by Mr. Cyril Graham, formerly private secretary to Lord Carnarvon, in which he advocated the establishment of one Army and Navy toward which the Colonies should be asked to contribute in a given ratio. Mr. Baden Powell, too, the author of a recent work entitled New Homes for the Old Country, was in favour of a federal fleet, and said that a common Army would be a great source of union. The leading journal, The Times, of the 16th November, 1872, said that the Imperial integrity should be maintained "upon equal terms," and equal terms must mean that the Colonies should bear their fair share of Imperial expenditure. He might also refer to the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen), who, in a recent lecture delivered during the Recess to his constituents, said that the Colonies must henceforth take, not a Colonial, but an Imperial view of questions, according to their general bearing upon the state of the whole Empire. Lastly, he might quote the authority of Adam Smith, who, writing apparently at the time of the War of Independence with America, strongly enforced the policy of requiring our Colonies to bear a fair share of the burdens imposed for their own defence, and stated that if the British Colonies could not be made to contribute towards the support of the whole Empire, Great Britain had better free herself from them. Considering how wealthy the Colonies were, and how able they were to contribute towards Imperial expenditure, he (Lord Eustace Cecil) thought it time our Colonial policy in this matter was re-considered by the Government. He dared to say it would be advanced as an objection to his Motion that it would necessitate the representation of the Colonies in that House. He confessed he did not see any necessity for such representation. In Austria and Hungary and in Switzerland, considerable sums were raised by independent Legislatures for the purpose of Imperial and Federal defence. We had after all the machinery at hand. The Agents General of the Colonies might be empowered by their Governments to make arrangements with the Home Government as to the quotas of men or money which each Colony should be invited to contribute, and such quotas might afterwards be voted by the Colonial Legislatures. He merely threw out that idea as a suggestion, and if there was a better one he should be glad to adopt it, as he was only anxious that this matter should be considered by the Government. He was most desirous that no suspicion of hostility to the Colonies should for a moment attach to him in making this Motion. He was most sensible of the advantages which the Colonies conferred upon the mother country in promoting her wealth and grandeur, as well as of the fostering which this country had shown towards them, and which had contributed so much to the wealth of the Colonies themselves. But it was because there existed the joint partnership in interests and privileges between the Colonies and this Empire that he was anxious that there should also be a joint partnership in bearing the burden of Imperial defence. The Colonies were no longer dependencies; they were practically free States, with free institutions. They were not infants in swaddling-clothes; they were not even children at school; but had arrived at the mature age of manhood with all its privileges and responsibilities. They had a splendid future before them, with unbounded resources and enormous capabilities, while we had arrived at, if we had not passed, the meridian of our wealth and power. Was it not time, then, that the Colonies should be asked to contribute their fair share towards the maintenance of our common Empire.

said, he wished to explain the reasons why he could not concur in the Motion of the noble Lord (Lord Eustace Cecil). It appeared to him that as it stood on the Paper it implied a different object from that which his noble Friend had in view. At the conclusion of his speech the noble Lord said he was most anxious to preserve our connection with the Colonies, and recommended an appeal to the Colonies to contribute towards Imperial taxation; but he (Mr. R. N. Fowler) submitted that the Motion as it stood was not likely to effect that result. He thought that if such a demand were made on the Colonies it would result in the deepest discontent and heart-burnings in them. As it had been said in the American war of independence, it would be argued that we had no right to tax the Colonies when they were not represented in that House. There were great difficulties connected with the proposed plan. He was, however, not prepared to say that those difficulties were insuperable. It was, he believed, the general feeling of the British people that our connection with the Colonies should be preserved, inasmuch as they contributed to the greatness of this country, which was acknowledged in the common expression that the Queen reigned over an Empire upon which the sun never sets. Probably this country was never richer than it was at present; but looking abroad he did not think our power was as great as it was some 40 or 50 years ago. If they took up any foreign paper they would find quite as much, if not more, attention given to a small state like Switzerland than to Great Britain. What made this country great was her connection with Colonies scattered all over the world, and with her dependency of India, the most remarkable in the history of the world. The people of this country would cheerfully bear all the expenses incurred by our connections abroad rather than suffer the loss of our Colonies, which would reduce us to a third-rate power. He could conceive of nothing more fatal to the best interests of the Empire than a separation between this country and Canada, and he deprecated any suggestion of severance. He had heard with great pain the word "bribe" used in respect to the loan made to the Canadian government. That was a most improper expression. The national Exchequer did not risk one farthing in the transaction, while it enabled Canada to raise money upon better terms than they would otherwise have been able to do. He was glad to take that opportunity of repudiating the offensive word. In conclusion, he would express a hope that his noble Friend would not press his Motion to a division.

did not propose to follow the example of his hon. Friend who had last spoken, who never started in a colonial debate of any description whatever, without somehow or other finding his way to the Canadian Loan. He felt personally indebted to his noble Friend for the course he had taken, inasmuch as he had supplied him with the solution of a problem which had for some time past been a source of perplexity to him. During the last two or three years he had noticed that at many meetings held by gentlemen connected with the Conservative party speeches had been made in which, after the orators had exhausted their criticism upon the home measures of the Government, they had dropped dark and mysterious hints about the Government's fatal colonial policy, and had accused the Government of dealing in an unfriendly spirit with the Colonies and of adopting a course which tended to alienate the affections of the Colonies and to weaken the ties between them and the Mother Country. He had often wondered what could be the meaning of those speeches, knowing, as he did, that the colonial policy of the present Government differed in no material respect from that which had been pursued by every Government which had sat upon those benches for a quarter of a century; and his curiosity was considerably excited to know what would be the soothing, kindly, and remedial measures which the party opposite on their accession to power would adopt. His noble Friend was the Œdipus who had solved the enigma, and as he was the near relative of an eminent Conservative statesman, he could not question the authority with which he had spoken. It was, then, at last declared, that the real remedy for all colonial ills, the Conservative panacea for supposed colonial discontent, and the way in which the colonial craving for closer union with this country was to be satisfied, was to be a demand for increased contributions from the Colonies for the defence of Imperial interests. Whilst giving full credit to his noble Friend for the most sincere desire to preserve the connection between this country and her Colonies, he questioned very much whether the policy which he would initiate would have that effect, or whether the colonists were prepared to accept that policy of the Conservative party—["No, no!"]—as likely to conciliate the people of the Colonies. He had no apprehension that his noble Friend's policy was likely to be adopted by any party in that House. He believed that a fair share of the public burden was placed upon the Colonies, and therefore the House was not justified in adopting any such measure as that of the noble Lord. Without entering into the history of the last 30 years, during which there were many exceptional expenses, he would point out that the attempts of the present Government to reduce the expenditure on behalf of the Colonies where it could fairly be reduced, having regard to colonial and Imperial interests, had been persistent, and that a material reduction had been effected. Whereas in 1869 the expenditure cost this country £3,388,033, according to the Returns presented the other day, it was now only £1,708,290, and this saving had been incurred, not by really weakening any Colony by withdrawing the men, but by an economical system of concentration which the Government believed would be found beneficial both to the Colonies and to this country. From the noble Lord's statement he gathered that he had not paid very close attention to the Estimate presented the other day, because he found from it that the Colonies which had free constitutions and representative Governments were precisely those Colonies upon which they did not have any military expenditure. The expenditure at Nova Scotia and Bermuda was entirely for the defence of our maritime interests; the establishments at Malta and Gibraltar were Imperial; Cape Town was a great naval centre, and the Cape Colony paid towards the expenditure for the local advantages it received; Hong Kong paid a full contribution, and the Straits Settlements a sum which had been complained of as really more than their fair share. It would interest the House to know that the larger portion of the expenditure incurred on behalf of the Colonies was for Imperial purposes. He had carefully worked out the figures, and he found that, considering the Imperial interests that were at stake, and which required an expenditure that ought to and would be in any case defrayed by England, out of the total of £1,708,290,£1,205,026 might be fairly charged to Imperial purposes, leaving about £500,000 for local purposes in the Colonies. That sum, he believed, was really in excess of the right amount, and it might be fairly said that the £238,600 repaid by certain Colonies—as shown in a recent War Office Return—amounted to a full half of the total sum so expended; or, to put it in another way, it appeared that all the Colonies made full repayments, except the settlements on the West Coast of Africa and the West Indian Colonies. With regard to the former, even his noble Friend would not like to call upon them for a contribution, and in the case of the latter the local revenues had not been strong enough to bear the expenditure, though it was hoped that this might gradually become the case. But with regard to these Colonies our expenditure was the result of our policy in abolishing the slave trade, and was not an expenditure which would be grudged by the taxpayers of this country. But in truth the whole of this question hinged a great deal upon another question—namely, as to the value which the country set upon the possession of the Colonies. If the noble Lord believed that the Colonies were of little value to this country, of course he would be right in maintaining that no burden on their account should be imposed on the taxpayers of Great Britain. But he (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) held a very different opinion. The Colonies were not only standing monuments of the energy and enterprise of Englishmen; not only by their means the fame of England was spread abroad through every quarter of the world; but they were of great practical value also as depots for our trade, coaling stations for our ships, as homes for our emigrants, and safe channels for the extension and development of our commerce. But Colonies could not at all times be self-maintaining; in their infancy they required the fostering aid of the Mother Country; as they advanced towards maturity they became more and more independent of that aid, and the House might depend upon it that just in proportion to the kindness and equity with which that aid was distributed would be the duration of the affectionate connection between the Mother Country and the Colonies. It was very difficult to determine what exact sum should be paid in these cases, but it was the duty of the Government to take care that it was not excessive; and, on the other hand, he was sure that the people of this country would never allow the Government to deal with the Colonies in a niggardly or parsimonious spirit. The Colonies had a right to expect just and fair consideration; they did not expect that the Government should engage in any lavish expenditure on their behalf which would impose a heavy burden upon the ratepayers of this country, and the people of England on the other hand would be ready to sanction such wise and prudent expenditure as would tend to promote colonial prosperity, and at the same time to consolidate Imperial power. On behalf of the Government he could not accede to the Motion. It was their duty from time to time to see what Colonies were able to take upon themselves their fair share of the expenditure, and to take care that that expenditure should be borne by them; and anyone who would look back to the policy of the Government since it came into office would see that it had endeavoured to carry out that duty. The Government must decline to accept the vague idea of a great improvement suggested by the noble Lord in his Resolution, which, if adopted, would very likely awaken misgiving in the Colonies, and perhaps would not be attended by the good results which he expected and desired. But the noble Lord and the House might rest assured that no effort would be spared on the part of the Government, on the one hand to prevent the infliction of any unnecessary burdens upon the taxpayers at home, and on the other hand to deal with the Colonies in that fair, just, and liberal spirit which ought always to pervade the policy of a great and generous people.

regretted the total absence in the House of any direct representation of the Colonies; while their quota of indirect representation was very small; nor, indeed, was that deficiency made up by any surplus of representation in the Upper House; and although the Colonial Department was satisfactorily managed, it by no means spoke with the authority of a representative body. When he ventured to recommend the more intimate connection of the Colonies with the Mother Country a week ago, he did not speak on behalf of the Royal Colonial Institute. The noble Lord (Viscount Bury) had made an allusion to the subject, seeming to think that he had professed to do so. But he was happy to say that he had since received a communication from the hon. secretary, who, by authority of its council stated that his (Mr. Macfie's) views were in accord with the views of those colonists who assembled there. What was wanted to be done might be effected in a variety of ways; and what was proposed was virtually done by other countries in regard to their Colonies. The Colonies were quite prepared to pay their reasonable quota of our expenses; and by bringing them into the relation of contributories they would identify them more and more with the interests of the Mother Country. It was a question of justice and expediency, and one worthy of the consideration of the highest statesmanship. The noble Lord would act wisely not to press his Motion to a division.

said, he could not quite accept the argument of the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) against the Motion of the noble Lord (Lord Eustace Cecil), that the military expenditure of the Colonies was at this moment almost entirely for Imperial purposes, and that as the expenditure at Halifax was for Imperial purposes, the Canadian Dominion ought not to be called on to contribute towards it, and as the expenditure at Cape Town was for Imperial purposes, the Cape colonists should not contribute. If that argument were good it amounted to this, that as the expenditure at Portsmouth was for Imperial purposes, Hampshire ought not to be called upon to contribute towards the Naval Estimates connected with that port. In both cases the expenditure was as much for the local as for Imperial interests. In both cases the locality was part of the Empire. The same Sovereign in both cases had the sole prerogative of making war, under Parliamentary responsibility. That was not his argument against the Motion, but that this country had no right to tax the Colonies. They had their own Parliaments and their own way of raising taxation, and it was not for us to pass resolutions directing them what taxes they should raise, or how they should appropriate them. This country rather should abstain from taxing itself for what the Colonies ought to pay for themselves than resolve what they should pay. It was not more than 20 years ago that the Colonies did not pay one shilling towards their own military expenses; but this country taxed itself to the extent of £3,000,000 sometimes in one year for military and police expenses in the Colonies, which the colonial subjects of the Queen ought to have defrayed for themselves. For the last 20 years, England had gradually refrained from following out this foolish policy, which unduly burdened this country, demoralized the Colonies, and which often led to the stirring up rather than the putting down of wars. This country had withdrawn her troops from the Colonies, or called upon them to pay a contribution in the first place, and now the whole cost of the troops sent out from England for their benefit and protection. That plan was first adopted by Lord Grey, and it had since been adopted by every Government, whether Liberal or Conservative. It had resulted most successfully—the Colonies had become more prosperous, and local wars had been less prevalent. It had, in fact, increased the strength of the Empire, as well as saved our resources, and to no one was the country more indebted for this satisfactory change than to the present Secretary of State for War, who had boldly carried it out. Those who had criticized that policy as a desertion of the Colonies showed that they did not look on them as parts of the British Empire, able and as willing and interested in conducting their own affairs, as those at home. He hoped that policy would be adopted in the naval as well as military expenditure. They had begun to add local ships of war to the British Navy in Australia; and in Canada the armed flotilla which for some years had guarded the fisheries must be considered as an addition to the naval power of Great Britain. He hoped the policy he had indicated would be steadily encouraged, and thought it would have been wise, when we got rid of Woolwich dockyard-men as emigrants to Canada, if we had offered them to the Government of that Dominion, and suggested that Canada might have by their means set up a dockyard of her own. He rose rather to protest against the line of argument taken by the Under Secretary of State, and to insist that, as the Colonies had Parliaments of their own, it was their business to tax themselves, and that we should not again be guilty of the folly of attempting to tax them. Leave them to defend themselves, and the Queen will soon have as good an army as her home forces added by them to her power. Some of the elder Colonies had fought for the Empire and increased its territory, and we should encourage the present ones to assume this responsibility as part of a free and self-reliant Empire.

remarked that the right hon. Gentleman spoke of his having used the term "tax the Colonies." The right hon. Gentleman must have misunderstood him. The term he used in his Notice of Motion and in his speech was that the colonists "be invited to contribute."

I should be very sorry if this conversation should terminate in a manner which would leave it to be supposed that there was a serious difference of opinion on the subject. The noble Lord (Lord Eustace Cecil), I presume, does not intend to take a division on his Motion:—I trust that he will withdraw it, but not under a sense of being discouraged in the view that he proposes. For my own part, I feel indebted to anyone who opens a question of this kind in the spirit in which the noble Lord has opened it, because I understand him entirely as he has explained himself. I believe it would be far from his desire to do anything in the way of assertion of arbitrary power over our colonial brethren. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Charles Adderley) on all occasions, whether in or out of office, with regard to colonial questions, holds one and the same language, and his conduct affords one of those examples which may be quoted with confidence to confute the declarations of those rather vulgar politicians who consider that men hold a different language when they are out of office from that which they held when they were in. The consistency of the right hon. Gentleman is well known, and I must say that his services in reforming the relations between this country and the Colonies have been conspicuous. I should be, therefore, exceedingly sorry if the right hon. Gentleman were to remain under the impression that there was, what there really is not, a difference of principle between the noble Lord and the Government and himself with regard to this question. It is very right, as my right hon. Friend urged, that an important distinction should be drawn between difference of times, circumstances, and degree, between those cases in which Imperial forces are supported for colonial purposes, and those in which they are maintained in reference to the general interests of the Empire. But it is not at all intended on the part of the Government to draw the inference that the colonists have no interest in that which relates to the general security and prosperity of the Empire, or that under no circumstances could it be right and allowable that they should make contributions towards the charge of such forces. But I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will feel, in the first place, that anything like a Parliamentary interference by a declaration of opinion would have a very unfortunate effect in a subject of this kind; and, in the second place, that all progress in regard to it must be of a gradual character, and that an attempt to quicken the pace would probably produce a reaction. What we wish is, not that the Colonies should under pressure from this country be brought to make, probably not insignificant, but at any rate grudging, contributions towards the expenses of the Empire; what we wish is to see the growth of the true spirit of freedom in the colonial communities which would make them not only willing, but eager, to share all the responsibilities of freedom and to take a part in the common burdens. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman in the hope that he entertains that those views will not limit themselves with regard to burdens which are purely colonial, but that more and more will grow up the desire to claim the privileges as well as to submit to the burdens; to share in the great inheritance of the British Empire and in the custody of that Empire at large. That being the principle, the right hon. Gentleman opposite has himself in the fairest and handsomest manner acknowledged the efforts of the Secretary of State for War when he was at the Colonial Office, and has borne testimony to the fact that we are moving in the right direction. If that is so, he will, I am quite confident, confirm us in the belief that it is far wiser—possibly in the end far cheaper—but at any rate far wiser, to leave this matter to its free and natural growth; to endeavour to create in this country that harmony of feeling in the several parties into which we are divided which may gradually bring about that state of things that colonial policy shall no longer be a mark of distinction between us. If we can bring about that state of things we may naturally trust that the habits of freedom in the Colonies will secure to us, by their own spontaneous action—whether it be a little sooner or a little later is of less consequence—the aspiration of the colonists to fulfil in the largest sense all the duties, and bear their share in all the responsibilities, of citizens of the Empire.

rose to move a Resolution declaring—

"That it is contrary to Imperial policy to allow a break of gauge in the Railway communications between the important frontier town of Peshawur and the main Railway system of India."

He said, it was his object to prevent a misfortune of national magnitude, a break of gauge in the Indian railway system, at a point which was most important in a military point of view, and which might be regarded, in fact as the Metz of India. The main railway system of British India now comprised 5,000 miles actually opened, inaugurated by Lord Dalhousie, and constructed on the wide gauge of 5 feet 6 inches, by separate companies, under what was known as the guarantee system, at a total cost of £90,000,000, or between £16,000 and £17,000 per mile. The cost, though large, was not excessive, if difficulties arising from the inherent condition of the country—from the numerous rivers and torrents which had to be crossed—were taken into account. The general traffic up to the present time showed that under the guarantee of 5 per cent, there was a loss on the £90,000,000 of £1,600,000 a-year, or about 1½ per cent. That loss was, however, expected to disappear as the means of communication with the different stations opened up—such as branches, tramways, and above all, good common roads—the last named being essential for the conveyance of produce. Though the loss of l½per cent on the capital entailed a considerable burden on the empire, it would be taking only a narrow view of the subject if he were to say that the construction of these railways was not an enormous advantage to India. The progress of the Empire since their construction had been most extraordinary in its rapidity. In the period of about 15 years the Revenue had risen from £30,000,000 to £50,000,000 sterling a-year, and the aggregate imports and exports showed an increase during the same time from £50,000,000 to £100,000,000 sterling. Nobody would deny for a moment that a great portion of that progress was to be attributed to the introduction and extension of railways. During his Vice Royalty Lord Mayo, one of the most able and popular of the many great Governor Generals of India, became impressed with the great advantages conferred by these railways, and arrived at the conclusion that 10,000 additional miles of railway were urgently needed to supplement the first and main trunk system of 5,000 miles, which had then been completed. For the execution of such a work, economy of construction being obviously necessary, the Government of India had with that view adopted what was called the metre gauge, of 3 feet 3 inches for the lines of the new system, by which it was estimated that £1,000 per mile would be saved on their cost. The superior economy of the proposed break of gauge—though advocated by two distinguished officers of Public Works in India—was disputed by the common consent of all great railway engineers and practical managers. Mr. Hawkshaw, one of the most eminent engineers in the world, had predicted that the Indian Government would have to spend more money in remedying the evil of a break of gauge than they would save by introducing it. That prophecy was confirmed by the experience of all countries into which a break of gauge had been introduced, and especially by what had happened in regard to our own Great Western Railway. He would not, however, go into the general question, his Resolution being confined to the particular case of the line to Peshawur, which was not of local, or even of Indian importance only, but of Imperial interest. They had a continuous line of some 3,000 miles constructed on the 5 feet 6 inches gauge from the principal capitals and centres of India, leading up to Lahore where it terminated, while between Lahore and Kurrachee, the nearest point of shipment for England, and where in any emergency stores and troops would arrive most speedily from this country, the line was constructed already in great part on the wide gauge principle. The question was really confined to whether the line from Lahore to Peshawur, which was about 280 miles in continuation of the 3,000 already constructed, should be constructed on the same gauge, and also the central section of the Indus Valley line between Mooltan and Kurrachee. The hon. Member proceeded to show that from the anticipated saving of £1,000 per mile by the adoption of the metre gauge they must deduct the cost of the necessary alteration of gauge on the lines already made, and also the cost of the extra rolling stock which would be required for the isolated portion of the system. According to the Estimates of the Indian engineers the saving which would be effected by the adoption of the narrow gauge was £532,823, while, according to Mr. Fowler, an engineer not unfavourable to the narrow gauge under certain circumstances—and who, of all others, was most competent to speak on the question—it was only £30,000. Taking even the larger sum, it was not worth while for such a saving to have a break of gauge on a line of great political importance. There was not a man of the slightest experience in railway matters who would listen to such a proposition for a moment. This was the main line of communication between the Punjaub and the rest of India and with the port of Kurrachee, and on a line of this importance they were about to place the barrier of a break of gauge. The population directly or indirectly interested in this railway amounted to 20,000,0000. This was not a sparse population scattered over an infertile territory. The cultivated area of the Punjaub was alone 12,000,000 of acres, and there were 6,000,000 of acres not yet cultivated, which, under the settled rule of England, were rapidly being brought under tillage. The surplus produce of this territory was reckoned at 777,481 tons, the great bulk of which was of a nature that was ill adapted to stand the loss and expense resulting from a break of gauge. This railway also formed the line of communication for the growing trade with Afghanistan and the whole of Central Asia. They heard a good deal about Russian commerce competing with them in Central Asia, and could anything be more foolish than to interpose a break of gauge on the line by which the produce of British manufactures reached Central Asia to compete with the produce of Russia? Putting, however, aside the commercial interest, he would come to the military and political question, and ask if, for the saving which he had mentioned, it was worth while to interpose the obstacle of a break of gauge in a military and political line of first-rate importance? A break of gauge meant a great deal more than mere delay. It meant that the engines, carriages, and rolling stock on the other 6,000 miles of railway were not available beyond Lahore, and that in case of emergency 1,200 engines and 36,000 carriages, forming the stock of the main railway system of India, could not be employed on the 1,092 miles of the narrow-gauge line. The proposed complement of the latter, moreover, consisted only of 84 engines and 2,520 carriages, though if it had the same complement as the broad-gauge the estimated saving would be converted into a balance on the other side. Reinforcements of troops and matériel would thus be dependent on this amount of rolling stock. What were the peculiar special circumstances of Peshawur? He had never been one of those who had regarded the progress of Russia in Central Asia with particular apprehension. He believed that no collision was likely to take place between the two great empires in that quarter; but, at the same time, the best way to avert that calamity, or even the lesser calamity of a misunderstanding between the two countries, was that each should feel as secure as possible on her own territory. Experience had shown that there was no more fertile source of misunderstanding than when a nation felt that it was weak and was jealous about what its neighbours were doing. In the event, however, of a serious campaign in Central Asia, the great object of England would be to reach Herat first, and it was manifest that to do that the primary consideration was the possibility of concentrating rapidly at Peshawur every available man, horse, and gun. They ought to recollect also that in moving forces in India they had not simply to move men, but that the impediments of an Indian Army were necessarily cumbrous. Authority and experience both showed that an essential condition of success in the moving of masses of troops by railway was that there should be unbroken communication from end to end of the line, together with an abundance of material and rolling stock. This fact was demonstrated by Mr. Bidder, Mr. Hawkshaw, Mr. Maclean, and other engineers of eminence, who pointed out that on a great military line even the risk of disaster could not be expressed in money, and that a break of gauge might be the cause of actual dis- aster. At a meeting of the Institute of Civil Engineers, the Astronomer Royal, as a member of the old Railway Commission, denounced the evils likely to arise from the break of gauge. They had, too, the authority to the same effect of gentlemen who combined knowledge of railway working with military experience—he alluded to the inspectors of the Board of Trade. Captain Galton, an eminent officer of the Royal Engineers, who had been connected with the Society for the Aid of the Sick and Wounded during the late war, described the advantage the Germans derived from unbroken gauge, and added that in the case of a break of gauge the confusion in the forwarding of troops would be absolutely indescribable. Captain Tyler, another distinguished officer of the Royal Engineers, said that the difficulty in the forwarding of troops by railway was not the running of the trains but the getting of the soldiers into the carriages, and that in the case of a break of gauge that difficulty would have to be encountered twice over, and he went on to say that a break of gauge would do away with the advantages in a military point of view which they had been led to look forward to from the construction of railways in India. Then, again, they had the high authority of Lord Lawrence, Sir Bartle Frere, and General Sir Henry Durand as to the necessity, in a military point of view, and also politically as well as commercially, of having an unbroken gauge from end to end of the great and important line to which he referred. He could easily multiply authorities on the point; but the question was one not only of authority, but of experience. The value of railways in time of war was amply shown during the late war. If one thing more than another contributed to the astounding success of the Germans it was the fact that they were able to do that which we were about to preclude ourselves from doing in India—namely, to bring up their troops and supplies from the centre of their forces and reserves to the scene of operations. From Berlin, to the Rhine their lines had an unbroken gauge. There was a break of gauge at Metz, and in order to surmount it the Germans constructed a circular railway. Again, a tunnel 30 miles to the east of Paris was blown up and all the accounts of the war showed that the difficulty of moving stores and supplies over that one mile thus interrupted was as great as to bring them the 1,000 miles from Berlin to Paris. On the other hand, the want of adequate railway communication was the cause of signal failures on the part of the French. From an official account of Bourbaki's disastrous expedition to the East of France, he learnt that eight days were occupied in forwarding the 18th and 20th Corps d'Armée by two lines a distance of 150 miles; and that it took 12 days to move the 15th Corps a distance which the Minister of War had calculated could be accomplished in 48 hours, a delay which arose mainly from a deficiency of rolling stock. Some of the men were three days in the carriages with the thermometer at 15 degrees of cold. If they substituted 120 degrees of heat for 15 degrees of cold, they would have an example of what would occur if they attempted to mass a large number of troops at Peshawur. Such disastrous delay and confusion they ought by every means in their power to endeavour to avoid in the case of India. He had studiously limited the terms of his Motion so as to include only what he believed to be a question of Imperial policy. It related, moreover, to a subject on which they could act as he suggested without implying any slight or censure upon anyone. He trusted that they might avoid a division by receiving an assurance from the Government that the Indian Government would be recommended to reconsider the subject. Further than that, of course he did not ask the right hon. Gentleman to go. If this were done, he believed the result would be that there would be opened a door of escape to all parties from what he felt satisfied was a very false position.

I rise to reply to my hon. Friend with some misgiving, because he speaks with considerable authority as well on matters connected with railways as on matters connected with India, and because I know that he has on his side the sympathies of a large and influential profession, which is strongly prejudiced against the course that has been taken with regard to the change of the Indian gauge. I am comforted, however, by remembering that the decision of the Government of India, which I have to defend to-night, was the most distinctive act in the administration of the able and excellent man who was sent in the end of 1868 to rule our Eastern Empire; and 1 hardly think that the House of Commons, which knew Lord Mayo so well, will condemn a policy which all men know to have been his personal policy, without requiring the assignment of better reasons than I think my hon. Friend and those who agree with him, have given, or are able to give. Perhaps it will be desirable that I should explain very briefly to the Rouse how the idea of making these Punjab lines on the narrow gauge first arose. The making a railway up to Peshawur, which had been thought of at the time of the Mutiny, was first very seriously considered during or just after the Umbeyla Campaign, and the expediency of making such a railway became within the next few years an accepted article in the political creed of a great many persons who occupy themselves with India and its affairs. It was not, however, till 1 868,that a decision was come to by the Government of India upon the subject, and in the first days of 1869, a railway to Peshawur, and a railway from Mooltan towards and down the Indus Valley, were included in Lord Lawrence's great scheme of railway extension. That scheme was adopted by Lord Mayo, and was approved by the Home Government. Meanwhile, an engineer had been engaged and sent to make surveys for the proposed Peshawur line. After the Umballa interview with Shere Ali in 1869, this engineer was directed to attend Lord Mayo at Emballa and explain his plans. These plans were not approved, chiefly because in the opinion of Lord Mayo the proposed railway ran too far away from the old line of conmumication through the Punjab and would, amongst other things, have required a separate set of bridges over the great rivers from those which it was intended to construct to carry the Grand Trunk road. The engineer was accordingly ordered to make new plans, which plans were ultimately approved. Soon after this, however, Lord Mayo made a journey to Peshawur, and saw with his own eyes what manner of country the Punjab really was—how scanty its population, how enormous its desert spaces, and how narrow the limits within which its trade must lie for ages to come. The result of this journey was that he became possessed with the idea that to make a broad gauge line up to Peshawur would be simply a wicked waste of money, and this view he pressed with all his might upon the authorities at home. The question of the Peshawur Railway and the question of the Indus Valley Railway, which hung on to it, were accordingly most carefully discussed in the Council of the Secretary of State, and very decided opinions were expressed upon both sides. At last, however, it was determined that as it was just one of those questions in which a knowledge of local requirements and local circumstances was all important, the decision must be left with the Government of India. If in a matter of this kind a large expense was to be forced by the Secretary of State in Council upon that Government against its own most strongly expressed opinion, the Secretary of State in Council ought to have a very strong opinion indeed upon the subject. And that was not the case. There was at the India Office about as much argument and authority on one side as on the other. Such was the history of the determination to use the narrow gauge upon the Punjab lines, a determination which has called forth so much adverse criticism; which adverse criticism I shall now attempt to meet. But first the House should clearly understand the problem to be solved. Lord Mayo had to provide with railways the land of the Five Rivers and the great district of Scinde, regions larger than England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland put together. In all this enormous, thinly-peopled and poor country, there were only, if we except the end of the line from Delhi, two little lines—one of 105 miles, and one of 211 miles, or 319 miles of railway altogether. Both of these were on the broad gauge; but on the longer it is intended to lay down a third rail, and on the shorter to substitute the metre gauge, so that the whole Punjab and Scinde systems will be on the metre gauge, while Lahore will be the point of junction with the general system of the rest of the Indian Continent; and at Lahore there will of course be a break of gauge. I must admit that a certain amount of inconvenience will arise from this break of gauge; but the question which the Indian Government had to ask and answer was not, will the break of gauge occasion any inconvenience, but will the break of gauge occasion such an amount of inconvenience as to counterbalance the advantages which will arise from constructing the Punjab railways upon the metre gauge? That question obviously divides itself into two others:—What are the inconveniences that will result from the break of gauge? and, What are the advantages that will arise from constructing the aforesaid railways on the metre gauge? Now the inconvenience is obviously threefold—inconvenience to passengers, inconvenience to persons sending merchandise, and inconvenience in moving troops. To the first, few will attach much importance, because the inconvenience of a single change in going right across India from Calcutta to Peshawur—a distance of 1,546 miles—is infinitesimal. Somewhat more importance is attached by many to the inconvenience that will be caused to persons sending merchandise; but that inconvenience may be easily exaggerated. Here is what appears to me the fairest estimate of what it will amount to:—

"As regards goods, the gravity of the evil may be measured by the quantity of goods that would have to be transladen. There are two points at which such translading might take place, Lahore and Mooltan; at Lahore, of goods either arriving from the north and proceeding in the direction of Umritsur and Delhi, or arriving from trimitsur, or places beyond, and proceeding towards Peshawar; at Mooltan, either of goods arriving from the south and destined fur ulterior conveyance by the broad gauge east of Lahore, or of goods which having been brought by the same lines to Lahore for conveyance 1.o places south of Mooltan, had not been transferred to the narrow gauge at Lahore, and therefore required to be so transferred at Mooltan. Now of these last two descriptions of goods the quantity may be safely pronounced to be nil. According to the latest trade statistics, the total of imports into Mooltan from all places east of Lahore was, in 1870–71, only 10,130 tons, the exports from Mooltan to the same places being under 2,400 tons; and a glance at the map will suffice to show that no appreciable poriton of this insignificant traffic can have emanated from, or been destined for, the half-desert tracts extending for a considerable distance to the south of Mooltan. At Lahore, the other point of meeting of the gauges, the state of things is somewhat, but not materially, different. The quantity of traffic passing through that city in 1870–71, either from the eastward toward Peshawur, or eastwardly from Peshawur and places intermediate was, according to the Caine statistical tables, as follows:—imports, 414 tons; exports, 112 tons: total, 526 tons. Let us liberally suppose that on the completion of the Lahore and Peshawur Railway, these quantities will be doubled, becoming a total of 1,052 tons; and, with still greater liberality, let us admit that the out-turn of the Jhelum Salt Alines will simultaneously rise from 40,000 to 100,000 tons, and that not more than half of this quantity will either be consumed within the territory of the, Five Rivers or sent westward into Afghanistan, the other half being exported in the direction of Delhi, notwithstanding that only 13,000 tons seem to be as yet so exported annually, and notwithstanding also that it will thereupon come almost immediately into competition with the produce of the Sambhur Lake. Even then, and after all this amplification, the aggregate traffic compelled by break of gauge to break bulk at Lahore will be no more than 51,052 tons. Now, 4d. per ton is pretty generally considered to be the maximum representative in cash of the commercial ill effects of break of gauge. 51,052 fourpences, therefore, or £850 a-year, or interest at 5 per cent on a principal of £17,000, represents the very utmost commercial harm that can be expected to be done by break of gauge between the railway systems of the Punjab and of the rest of India."

I know that some English engineers have said that 4d. a-ton is too low an estimate; but, as a matter of fact, I am informed that translading from carts to their trucks cost the East Indian Railway not 4d., but 3d. a-ton. If it be replied that the inconvenience of delay cannot be measured by money, I would say, alas! would it were really so. If it were so, our Indian lines would pay better. Why are they paying so badly just now? It is because in India "time is not," so to speak, "of the essence of the contract." Time is no object whatever, save in exceptional states of the market. It is only now and then that the Indian merchant wishes to move his goods quickly. On this point I would quote General Strachey, who says—

"It is not in the least to the point that a break of gauge in England, under circumstances of a totally different nature, has been found to be intolerable. To complain of the injury done to the traffic on the Indus Valley Railway because vehicles started from Delhi, for instance, will not be able to pass to Kurrachee, would not be less visionary than a similar complaint as to interchange of traffic between Russia and Spain. No tendency to any such traffic can arise that will have the smallest practical importance."

There remains the inconvenience which will be caused in the moving of troops. Now that inconvenience, if it were as great as some consider, would have been unquestionably fatal to the wisdom of the course which was followed by Lord Mayo's Government. But for what purposes do we want troops on our North-Western frontier? Clearly either for the ordinary exigencies of the frontier service, or to meet an invader coming from beyond the passes. There is no doubt, I suppose, that any railway on any gauge will make it much easier for us than it is now to provide for the ordinary exigencies of the frontier service. You provide very well for them even now without a railway. You never had the least difficulty, except in the Umbeyla Campaign. We must look then entirely to the inconvenience that will be caused by break of gauge in getting up troops to meet an invasion. But can any human being picture to himself any conceivable concatenation of circumstances which would bring an invasion upon us as a surprise. Why, the very instant that a rumour conies of Russia's building a fort or moving a squadron of Cossacks a thousand miles away from our frontier, a number of well-disposed persons are even now seized with a fit of "Russo-phobia tremens;" and if there were the slightest shadow of possibility of any attack being made upon you, every coign of vantage which our own frontier and the passes which look down upon it, to say nothing of other points in advance if they were wanted, would be perfectly easily and perfectly quietly taken into the safe keeping of our commanders. People always seem to imagine, when talking of this question, that our troops would be drawn from Eastern and Central India in a great hurry. But that is not practically what would happen. The temptation in such a case as I have put would be rather to denude other parts of India too much of troops, than to be slow in getting them up to the frontier. Any railway on any gauge that has ever been proposed would enable us to send forward, at the very first whisper of danger, all, and more than all the troops we could possibly spare from other parts of the country; and a great many of the best native troops whom we could use for such a war as the one I am speaking of would, in all likelihood, not be brought up from other parts of India at all, but recruited in our frontier districts, just as were so many of the men who served us so well, and that against their own kindred, in the Umbeyla Campaign. What does our force—what does the transferable part of our force lying habitually east of Lahore amount to? There are some people who talk as if we were to expect an invasion by the hosts of Attila, and could bring to meet it the hosts of Xerxes, and that all these same hosts of Xerxes would have to be conveyed by railway from some points on the eastward of Lahore. But that is a dream. Why, out of our 195,000 troops, how many do you think we have now in the Punjab and Scinde? We have at this moment in the Punjab and Scinde, within marching distance of the frontier, 16,300 British troops and 18,500 Native troops, besides our Native auxiliaries. And when we wanted to reinforce these, we have our broad-gauge lines up to Lahore, and we could also draw reinforcements through Kurrachee, which when the Punjab system is complete, will be connected with the mouth of the Bolan, as well as Peshawur and the frontier generally, by the metre gauge. Now at what rate could we bring up reinforcements to these troops along our metre-gauge lines? I will answer in the words of Mr. Thornton—

"Even with rolling stock at the rate of one engine and 30 vehicles for every 13 miles, it has been demonstrated, by carefully and minutely detailed calculations, that in the course of a week 12,000 combatants of all arms—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—fully equipped, and with a month's rations, could easily be moved from Lahore to Sukkur, or 11,000 from Lahore to Peshawur, or three corps of 4,000 each, one from Lahore to Peshawur, a second from Lahore to Sukkur, and a third from Kurrachee to Sukkur."

Well, but if the inconvenience to passengers having to change carriages once in a journey of 1,500 and odd miles is really inappreciable, if the amount of inconvenience to persons sending merchandise can be measured by a figure of about £17,000 a-year, and if the inconvenience likely to be occasioned in the moving of troops is what I have represented it, how did Lord Mayo do unwisely in determining to save money by making the Punjab lines on the metre gauge? There may be much difference of opinion as to what the exact saving will be, but surely it stands to reason that there must be a saving; and in a huge country like India, where we have such endless work to do in road and railway making, every saving we can make means more roads and more railways somewhere. General Strachey, comparing our metre-gauge rails used on the other Indian lines, calculates the saving on the whole Punjab system at about £2,000,000. The present Government of India, comparing our metre-gauge rails with light rails laid on the standard-gauge, calculates it at about £750,000. Now the lowest of these estimates, or a lower one than any, would be quite sufficient for my argument. For every £5,000 we can save on these lines we can make another mile of railway, and I believe that Lord Mayo was perfectly right in saying that our Indian railway system is only in its infancy. It is a continent with which we have to deal, a continent where great public works are of the very first necessity, and a continent which is not rich. To reason about what may be wise economy there, from what would be wise economy here, is almost to court illusion. An impression has got abroad that Mr. Thornton admitted on behalf of the Indian Government that the saving would only be a saving of 10 per cent. Mr. Thornton, who is an excellent officer, carefully guarded himself from admitting anything whatever on behalf of the Indian Government. But he did not even admit as an individual what he is said to have admitted. What he did was this. In order to gain a dialectical advantage he said to his opponents, "I'll admit for the sake of argument that your figures are right, and even taking your own figures I will show that the saving was sufficiently considerable to make it worth the while of the Government to face the inconvenience of the break of gauge." It is all very well for our candid friends to say now, "We are quite in favour of cheap railways for the Punjab, but you should have kept the 5 feet 6 inch gauge and laid it with light rails." Our candid friends, however, know well that that was not the proposition which they and those who think with them put before Lord Mayo's Government. The engineers employed on the Lahore and Peshawur lines proposed 60lb. rails, and Mr. Andrew's engineers proposed 68lb. rails for the Indus Valley. The idea of the light rails was a mere after-thought of our candid friends, but it was in the meantime—no thanks to them—considered on its merits and rejected by Lord Mayo's Government. For not only would our light rails be soon destroyed if we worked upon them the heavy broad-gauge stock; but what would become of us if one of our bridges, built to carry our light stock, broke down when we were using the heavy broad-gauge stock? That is exactly the kind of thing that always in this contradictory world happens on an an emergency. I do not believe in these Punjab lines having to be used in an emergency, but our candid friends do. Their whole argument is based upon the probable occurrence of an emergency which will require half the broad-guage stock of India to be used over the Punjab lines. I firmly believe that when the Punjab system is complete its rolling stock will be sufficient even for any emergency. As for the sufficiency and much more than sufficiency of the narrow gauge for all the ordinary work of the Punjab, the remarks of General Strachey, which I will presently quote should, I think, carry conviction; but it must be remembered that it is intended to connect the Punjab metre-gauge lines with the Rajpootana metre-gauge lines, so that we shall have all their rolling-stock to supplement that of the Punjab lines.

"It has been ascertained," says General Strachey, "that the total traffic of the East Indian Railway—the heaviest worked line in India—may be taken to be about equal to 840 tons of goods, and 1,064 passengers, carried over every mile of railway in 24 hours. Also, it is found, taking the combined passenger and goods' traffic, that the average load of an East Indian train is about 71 tons of goods, together with 89 passengers, which we may consider as carried in a mixed train. Supposing, further, the passengers to be equally divided between the up and down traffic, and the goods to be carried in the approximate proportion that actually holds in the two directions, about six trains such as I have described, in both directions, would suffice to do the work. Now, if we set a narrow-gauge railway, such as those actually under construction at the present time in India, to carry this traffic, we should find that the load of an average East Indian train could be conveyed in about 14 narrow-gauge waggons and three narrow-gauge passenger carriages of the pattern now being supplied, supposing all the waggons and carriages to be run full. If the vehicles were supposed to carry only half their full loads, double the number of trains would be required to that actually run on the East Indian line. Such a narrow-gauge train as I am speaking of would consist of—say, 18 vehicles, including a break-van, and, if full, might weigh in the gross 144 tons; with vehicles half-full, the load might be about 100 tons. One of the 12-ton engines recently made for the Indian narrow-gauge lines, would suffice to draw such loads on the ordinary easy gradients of Indian lines. Hence it follows that the whole traffic of the East Indian Railway, as now existing, might be carried on a line of narrow-gauge railway, with an average of 12 trains a-day each way, such trains running hall empty. As such a condition of things could not possibly be necessary, and as two engines could be combined—an 18-ton and a 24-ton engines could easily be provided if desired—there can be no room to doubt that the narrow-gauge lines, as now being constructed, and doubled where necessary, are quite capable of carrying the heaviest traffic now existing in India, or ever likely to be brought on them."

I have been arguing throughout as if the matter was res intacta, because my object has been to show that Lord Mayo in this, the most distinctive act, of his too short Vice-royalty, acted the part of a wise and of a bold man. But the matter is not res intacta. A large part of the money required to make the Peshawur line on the metre-gauge is already actually spent for metre-gauge purposes. I am free to confess that I cordially agree with Lord Mayo's policy in the matter, but I will not ask the House to commit itself to anything of the kind. I claim the votes not only of those who think that Lord Mayo did wisely, but also of those who, although they would have preferred a different policy, are unwilling to reflect upon his memory in a matter which cannot be now altered without heavy money loss, and are content to say, Fieri non debuit, factunt valet; and I claim the votes of all Indian economists who object to large expenditure being forced on India by English opinion. The forms of the House do not permit me this evening to move the Previous Question or otherwise to evade the direct issue raised, but I think I may fairly ask hon. Members not, after a discussion of only two or three hours—a discussion to which they must in the nature of things come, with our natural prepossessions, against a break of gauge in England—to condemn a break of gauge in the very different circumstances of the Punjab. It is a strong measure hastily to condemn a policy which was ardently pressed upon the Home Government by the last Viceroy, which is being carried out by the present Viceroy, and which has been most cordially approved by the last Viceroy but one, that last Viceroy but one being the man of all men who has most right to speak with authority to his countrymen about the Punjab; for he it was who saved the Punjab to the British Empire. Thus speaks Lord Lawrence, and with his words I will conclude—

"In the particular case of the railway between Peshawar, Lahore, and the sea, which is a continuous line mainly desirable for military considerations, it no doubt appears at first an especial evil that there should be a break of gauge. But on closer inspection, I still think that there are preponderating arguments in favour of the more economical arrangement. From Lahore to Kotree, and indeed to the sea-port of Kurrachee, there are vast tracts of waste land, of what may be more or less described as wilderness, for the most part thinly inhabited and poorly cultivated. In progress of time, with the introduction of irrigation, all this will be changed. But for another generation the above description will generally apply. Under such circumstances, a cheap railway seems obviously the best arrangement in an economical point of view. Moreover, all along this distance, the railway will have to compete with the Indus, which in its downward course, for agricultural produce is amply sufficient. From Lahore to Peshawar the country is better cultivated, but for the most part somewhat poor, with little traffic except that of salt, between Jilum and. Lahore. As a military line, it appears to me that a break of gauge is not of first-rate importance. The demands on the line will obviously be for the transport of troops, of military stores and supplies. But in respect to the troops, halting places, where the men can rest and refresh themselves, are absolutely necessary, and there will be no difficulty in making the points where there will be a break of gauge some of the places for resting the troops. Indeed, I may remark that Kotree, Multan, and Lahore would be the very places along the line which would naturally be selected for such a purpose. And again, as regards supplies of all sorts, we have, or shall have depots and magazines, from whence the necessary articles would be pushed up or down the line as circumstances required. I can scarcely conceive a state of things where it would be of any real importance to push a convoy of troops and stores from one end of the line to the other without stoppage. The climate of India for many months in the year more particularly demands attention to such precautions in respect to the troops. On such a subject as that now under discussion, engineers have indeed a full right to be heard, and their opinions are doubtless of much value. But while we are bound to hear what they have to say on the subject, we must reflect that it is also one which involves many considerations on which the financier, the administrator, and the statesman ought also to have their say. So long as a railway is likely to pay a fair return for the outlay, within a moderate period after being opened, We may safely expend more than as a mere financial speculation may be desirable. But when there is no real prospect of such a result for many years, to incur large expenditure seems to me to be very unwise. It is only heaping up debt which we can never defray."

admitted that he approached the consideration of this question with strong prepossessions against a break of gauge; but that those prepossessions had been considerably shaken by the statement of his hon. Friend (Mr. G. Duff) who had just sat down. He was not so clear in his own mind as he had been when he came down to the House that the Motion represented the true policy to be adopted on this subject, and he should feel bound to record his vote in favour of the Government. He desired, however, to draw attention to one point that had hitherto escaped notice—namely, the position of the House of Commons in reference to the Government of India, on a subject like this. Did the House claim that its dictum should decide the policy to be adopted by the Indian authorities on a point of internal administration? The revenues of India had been placed under the Council of India by the House, and with it the responsibility ought to rest. He thought, too, that the military view of the question taken by the hon. Gentleman might be accepted as that of the most competent authorities. If this Resolution were carried, what security was there that the Secretary of State for India would send a despatch to the Governor General of India requiring him to carry it into effect, or that the Governor General would thereupon alter his present policy? He had been a careful student of Indian affairs for a great many years, and he would say that he had never entertained anything of the feeling which his hon. Friend had described as Russo-phobia. He could not support the proposition of the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing), or ask the House to express its opinion upon a matter regarding the expenditure of India.

in supporting the Motion, said, he desired to call attention to a very important point—he meant the disastrous effect in a military point of view the break of gauge would produce, in the event of a war breaking out, on the Northern frontier of India. And not only was the break of gauge involved in the question, but also the construction of railways by the State out of means provided by the State. At one time he was favourable to the construction of the great works necessary for the development of the resources of India by the Government, instead of by committing them to contractors; but he was no longer of that opinion. It was by the means of contracts that the great trunk lines of railway had been carried out, and he thought it would be a great mistake if that policy were abandoned. It was true that these lines had been constructed at a most enormous expenditure; but, in future, much of this expense might be avoided. Looking at the importance of the line from Lahore to Peshawur, and seeing the extent of the lines leading from Calcutta to Peshawur, he could not look with a favourable eye on any change of gauge which might interfere with the value of the rolling stock on the existing 5,000 miles of railway; for by relinquishing the advantages we possessed in the existence of the present large amount of rolling stock, we should materially affect its efficiency in assisting our military arrangements. It was impossible that we could look upon the line connecting the main lines of India with the line to Peshawur merely as a commercial undertaking—it must be looked upon as a military and political line. As a commercial line, he did not place any great value upon it; but the importance of having the military line completed as soon as possible well deserved the attention of the Home Government. In spite of all the confidence we ourselves felt, we could not prevent the people of India from feeling great alarm respecting the supposed advance of Russia towards our frontier, and he strongly urged on the Government the necessity of preserving the line from Lahore to Peshawur on the same gauge. Only 500 miles were wanting to complete the line of communication from Kurrachee to Lahore and thence to Calcutta. Kurrachee was a place of great importance, because the port had been of late years considerably improved, and vessels of great depth could now enter it. He wished to mention another point with regard to the break of gauge. Many persons underrated the serious inconvenience which this break of gauge would occasion in having to transfer men and stores from one carriage to another; but, in a military point of view, it was necessary to have all material arranged for transport on a uniform system throughout all the lines in India. He hoped the Government would think it desirable to refer this important question back again to India, in order that it might be reconsidered; matters being now in a different position from that in which they were when Lord Mayo first took up the project. For these reasons, he should support the Resolution of the hon. Member for Orkney.

thought the hon. Member for London (Mr. Crawford) had no ground for saying that this was a question on which the House ought not to express any opinion. The question was one of great Imperial importance, because the security of our Indian Empire very much depended upon it. He was willing to admit that metre gauge railways could be made at much less cost than railways on the standard gauge; and, on the whole, he thought the Government of India were right in adopting the metre gauge for branch lines and lines intended for commercial purposes only. The question at issue, however, was whether that gauge should be adopted for the completion of a system which was designed for great strategical and military as well as commercial purposes. His hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India said expense had been already incurred in commencing the construction of the line on the metre gauge, but omitted to say what that expense was. If it had been incurred for rails and iron girders for bridges they would be available for other lines. In his opinion, the Government greatly underrated the inconvenience of a break of gauge. Their argument was that the only circumstance that was likely to call for a great and sudden concentration of troops in the Punjab would be a menace of invasion by Russia, or some other foreign Power; and, in that event, we should have ample warning, so that the troops might be moved leisurely to the spot. Still, considering the uncertainty of war, it would be rash to assume that such an emergency might not arise as would necessitate the moving up suddenly of a large number of men, with guns, ammunition, and the impedimenta of war. The serious consequences which, in such a contingency, might arise from a break of gauge, it was impossible to overrate. He would concede that the saving from the adoption of the metre gauge would be quite as large as the Government estimated it; but, even if it were larger, it could not be set in the scale against the great inconvenience, and, possibly, disastrous consequences which might ensue from a break of gauge.

said, he was interested in one of the Indian railways, and wished to introduce railways, as far as possible, throughout the country. He was convinced, however, that this could not be done unless the lines were constructed on a much more economical plan than at present. He confessed that, as a rule, he did not believe in purely military railways, and thought it a misfortune that such railways should exhaust money which would be much better applied in developing the commercial resources of the country; but, in the present case, he thought it was of the utmost importance that if there was to be a railway from Kurrachee to Peshawur there should be no break of gauge in its course. It might be contended that such a line was a complete system, the basis of operations being Kurrachee and Lahore; but that involved the absorption of those parts of the Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi lines as were between Kurrachee and Kotree and Mooltan and Lahore, and was subject to the objection that the rolling stock for the system would be insufficient, and could not be supplemented from other lines for the military emergency for which alone the line was required. In his judgment, the arguments adduced by his hon. Friend the Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) were so convincing that it was hardly possible for anyone to vote against his proposal.

thanked hon. Gentlemen opposite for the handsome manner in which they had spoken of the late Viceroy of India, who was mainly or wholly responsible for the change of policy which had been adopted with reference to this railway question, and he was sure nothing would have pleased the noble Lord better than to have remitted the question for the decision of the House of Commons. One of the difficulties of the question arose from the fact that, on a prima facie view of it, all the arguments would be against the change that had taken place; for, as an abstract point, there could be no doubt that a break of gauge was a serious inconvenience. But Indian railways were very different from English lines. In this country we had a dense population and small distances to travel; but in India, so far as railway purposes were concerned, there was a sparse population and immensely long distances to travel. In India only 20,000,000 passengers passed over 5,000 miles of railway in a year; but in England 100,000,000 passengers were carried over the same distance in the same time; and the amount of goods carried in India was only 4,000,000 tons per annum, which was rather less than the amount carried over one English railway. What was the state of things when the change of policy in regard to Indian railways took place? During the last few weeks of his administration Lord Lawrence in an able Minute on the subject, stated that the ruinous extent to which the capital accounts of many English companies had been extended was a matter of public discussion, and if that was dangerous in England it was far more dangerous in India, where all ordinary restraints were removed by an absolute guarantee of the interest, which was now subject to no limitation whatever. Lord Lawrence went on to say that he regarded that danger with great concern, and that if the Government wished to avoid it they must take some means for putting an effectual stop to the insidious growth of the capital accounts of the old lines. Under those circumstances a reconsideration of the whole matter became almost imperative. The Government of India had already raised £90,000,000 of capital, and for interest on that the taxpayers of India had paid £17,500,000 from 1856 to 1869, in addition to the rates and fares paid for railway accomodation. The Indian railways had cost on an average between £17,000 and £18,000 per mile, or exactly double the original estimate. Had the cost been within the original estimate the railways would have been paying between 5 and 6 per cent, instead of costing the taxpayers of the country 3½ per cent. Under these circumstances it came under the serious consideration of the Government, and Government found themselves in this condition—They were perfectly impressed with the fact that India was starving for want of railroads; but they saw that if they were obliged to go on making at the cost at which they had been hitherto made, no country in the world could go on without coming to bankruptcy in a short time. Therefore it became necessary that the Government of India should take some means of making these lines at a far cheaper cost than railways had been formerly made. It was a little too late for the engineers generally, as a body, to come forward and say that the policy of the Government was wrong, and that the estimates were deceptive and theoretical—as, so far from being theoretical, the Rajpootana line was being made at £4,000 or £5,000 per mile. It was a common saying that no man would purchase an elephant to carry a donkey's load; but by constructing broad gauge lines in India that was precisely what they were doing. The traffic was altogether too small for the enormous weight of waggons that were to be found on the railroads. The consequence was, therefore, an enormous waste; and if the system of railways was to be begun again in India the broad gauge would not be adopted. He would give two or three figures to illustrate his meaning. Everybody connected with this question was acquainted with the Festiniog Railway, and men had come from America, Russia, and Norway to see it. Now, with a 2 feet gauge, it carried 9,388 tons per mile, while the broad gauge was carrying only 822 tons per mile; so that in India with a narrow gauge they would be able to carry 15 times as much as they were doing at this moment. The consequence of the broad gauge was that there was very much waste not only in power, but also in waggons, the weight of rails, and every single element that went to run up railway expense. And here he begged to refer to the authority of a nobleman who had done more than anyone else in England in the way of railway enterprize with a view to the benefit of the people among whom he lived, he meant the Duke of Sutherland. That nobleman having seen the Festiniog Railway, said—

"I have expended about £200,000 in promoting and making railways in the North. Had these lines been constructed on the narrow gauge, and had they in consequence cost only two-thirds of the cost that has been expended upon them, I should have obtained a direct return on this large sum, which I have laid out for the benefit of my estates and of the people in those remote districts. As it is, I shall suffer considerable loss."

The Duke evidently would not have been frightened by difference of gauge. He thought, therefore, if it came to be a question between narrow gauge and no railway at all that it was better to have the narrow gauge even though there should be a break. He would quote another passage from a pamphlet written by Mr. Fairlie, a distinguished engineer. He believed it was the opinion of Mr. Hawkshaw that although the Government of India might lay down a system of narrow gauge they would have to go to the expense of taking it up again. As Mr. Hawkshaw was an eminent authority, it was only fair to quote an eminent authority also on the other side. Mr. Fairlie said—

"It will be seen that, notwithstanding the absence of competition, and with everything to favour the working of the line, the actual dead weight is over five tons to one ton. If, on the other hand, the gauge had been 3 feet instead of 5 feet 6 inches, the dead weight under the same management would have been reduced from 5 to 1, or 1¼ to 1. Let us imagine the saving that this change would effect in fuel alone, considering that less than one-fourth of the tonnage now hauled would afford precisely the same accommodation to the traffic that now exists, and would produce the same paying result. It surely does not require a philosopher to see that the narrow gauge is infinitely superior in every respect, even to the 4 feet 8½ inch gauge, and it ought to be engraved on the mind of every engineer that every inch added to the width of a gauge beyond what is absolutely necessary for the traffic adds to the cost of construction, increases the proportion of the dead weight, increases the cost of working, and, in consequence, increases the tariffs to the public, and by so much reduces the useful effect of the railway. Let us suppose, for one moment, that the conditions in the cost of construction in the two instances were reversed, and that a 3ft. gauge line would cost twice as much to make as a 5ft. 6in. gauge—even in such a case the difference in the cost of working each ton of goods would be so enormous that the narrow gauge would be by far the cheapest of the two in the end."

If there was a country in the world to which those remarks would apply, it was India. It should not be lost sight of that the people of India were very poor and unless passengers could be carried at a very cheap rate indeed the Government would not be able to fulfil the primary duty of giving accommodation to the people, and would be prevented by the unprofitableness of the concerns from extending them. What, then, was the course which the Government of India had to pursue? A great responsibility was thrown upon them. They were aware of the outcry that would be raised in India if they attempted anything like a change of gauge, not only by the companies and the engineers, but also by everybody who was against a break of gauge in the abstract, and who did not consider the difference between the condition of India and of England. The most minute calculations were made by the most eminent engineers in India. The most eminent engineers that India could furnish were sent to England to consult with the engineers at home. The India Council was consulted, and they took the opinions of very great engineers in this country. Many of these gentlemen, looking at the matter from an engineering point of view, were diametrically opposed to the opinion of the Government of India; many, on the other hand, took the Government view, and some said that under the circumstances of India, though they objected to a break of gauge, they were in favour of the system proposed to be introduced. The Government at home took a long time to think over the matter; finally, they referred it back to India, and left the decision to the Indian Government. The Government of India then decided that they saw no reason to alter the opinion they had formed, and the railroads were begun. The late Viceroy of India writing to a private friend upon this subject in January, 1871, said—

"I have no doubt that our decision on the gauge will be very much attacked. The truth is, as regards India, 'Cheap railways or none,' and I would rather do without railways at all than incur the future risk of that normal increase of expenditure, and consequently of taxation, which is our only real danger in India. It is impossible in this country where the people are much poorer than is imagined, to dig deeply into their pockets. I say, then, let us have railways that will pay us, or no railways at all, if their effect will be to add £100,000 or £150,000 every year to the permanent debt of the State, I will have none. I have no hesitation in expressing a most decided opinion on this matter, and fighting for it, bemuse it is one that is not in any degree a commercial or engineering question. It is a question of high policy, which I am better able to judge than the merchant or engineer. The 3ft. 3in. gauge will give us all we want for years, and will save us hereafter from financial and political difficulty, and it is very clear our duty is to have it."

He now came to the question immediately before the House—the line between Peshawur and Kurrachee. The hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) did not lay much stress upon the commercial aspect of the question. He (Mr. Bourke) did not himself rest his case at all on the commercial view. Looking at the nature of the country he should say that nowhere could Government have been less justified in constructing a line of railway, than between Lahore and Peshawur, apart from strategical purposes. There was a sparse population, and the country was extremely unfertile. It was no doubt a very important strategical position; but it was impossible to imagine that any enemy could ever come across the Hindu Kush. It was absurd to compare Peshawur to Metz as the hon. Member for Orkney had done. There was not one point of similarity between them. Under these circumstances it was necessary that the railway from Lahore to Peshawur should be made on the cheapest principle possible. It was but an insignificant branch. When the line should be completed to Kurrachee they would then have a continuous narrow-gauge line all the way from Kurrachee to Peshawur; and the line would never have been made if it had only been intended to have a line from Lahore to Peshawur, because the whole question lay in having a line of 1,100 miles with all its rolling stock available for military purposes. The most eminent engineers all agreed that with the rolling stock of 1,100 miles of railway they could concentrate 12,000 troops in four days, with their artillery and food for some days. He did not mean that they could send elephants and camels as well, for he was not aware that they were sent by any line. They heard talk about the great masses of troops that it might be necessary to concentrate; but where were they to come from? In any case of danger they would have all their troops on the frontier, and every relief from Bombay, Ceylon, the Cape, and where else they could get them, would come to Kurrachee, from whence there would be a narrow-gauge system extending for 1,100 miles, which would be sufficient for all purposes. There would be another line of the same gauge for 180 miles, and indeed there was a very near chance of having in all 1,800 or 1,900 miles of narrow-gauge line. As regarded the break of gauge, there would be none along the whole frontier, and it was not so much a question of massing troops from the south to the north as the massing troops along the frontier. He could not but think, therefore, that the Government of India came to a right conclusion when they said that they would not spend one halfpenny more upon these lines than it was absolutely necessary to spend, because the danger in India which over-shadowed every other was the financial danger. What they wanted most there were railroads, but their only chance of having them was that they should be made cheaply. Under all the circumstances it would be madness to spend upon this railway a halfpenny more than was sufficient to construct the narrowest gauge line that would carry the traffic. The gauge fixed was 3 feet 3 inches, and it would carry 15 or 16 times more traffic than there was likely to be on the line for many years to come. He, therefore, hoped the House would pause before reversing the decision of the Government of India. He trusted that he might be allowed to say, in conclusion, that the Government of India, as constituted in 1871, would have been the last body of men to think the House of Commons was not a really good tribunal for this kind of question provided they took all the circumstances into consideration and and were not guided merely by one or two elements of the question.

said, that having in the past agreed with the Government of India, he did not now hesitate to express his difference from them. This was a question of first-rate importance. In a military and Imperial point of view it was difficult to exaggerate its importance, either independently of, but particularly in connection with, the present Central Asian question, which made this discussion very opportune. The Under Secretary for India (Mr. Grant Duff) had raised two objections to the acceptance of the Motion; first, that very considerable progress had already been made with the line from Lahore to Peshawur; and secondly, that they ought not to pass a Resolution which would be condemnatory of the action of the Government of India. The Resolution, however, was so worded that it would be simply an expression of opinion on the part of the House, and the Government of India might, of its own Motion freely reconsider the question with the advantage of the additional knowledge gained during the last 18 months. And if it came to a division he should feel compelled to vote for the Resolution, not without a deep sense of the impolicy of the House at any time interfering with the Government of India, but at the same time not deprecating that necessary and moderate expression of opinion on Imperial subjects which the House was occasionally called upon to give. He appreciated to the utmost the high character of the late Governor General, who took a conspicuous part in the action they were discussing, but, had they still the happiness of seeing him, he would, he was sure, have been the last person to object to public men expressing their opinions upon any portion of his policy. It could not be disputed that in extending railway communication in India it was desirable, wherever possible, to adopt the cheapest railway that the traffic of the country could support, and if this were an integral portion of a narrow-gauge line almost everything would be in favour of that gauge; but it was a mistake on military, strategical, and Imperial grounds to have a break of gauge, and particularly at this particular junction between two existing broad gauge systems. And if proof were wanting that the insertion of the narrow gauge between Kurrachee and Lahore and onwards to Peshawur was in the highest degree impolitic, it was at hand. For in order to connect this proposed narrow gauge along the Indus Valley with the same gauge in other parts of India, it was actually proposed to carry a line across the desert, from Ajmere to the Indus, 400 miles in length. And that simply because in no other way could the rolling stock of the narrow gauge travel from one part of the country to the other. The Report of the Viceroy and Council of India to the Secretary of State said that were this simply a question of constructing a section of the existing line between Lahore and Peshawur, they would dismiss all ideas of anything but a standard gauge line. That being the case, it was surely open to the House to review the decision of the Indian Government. It seemed as if the narrow gauge had been a foregone conclusion. There had been anxious endeavours on the part of the Government of Lord Lawrence, followed up by that of Lord Mayo, to find means of reducing the cost of railways in India, because it was impossible to continue a system which was causing so great a strain on the finances of the country. That was a very laudable object, and one which must commend itself to the approbation of all who had official knowledge of India. But the question was whether, having already expended about £90,000,000 on 5,000 miles of railways in India, it was worth while, for the mere saving of a single half a million of money, to destroy the completeness and continuity of their system of communication? Moreover, had the whole of the circumstances of the proposed line, with the new gradients, and new curves which had now been adopted, been under the consideration of the Government when their unfortunate decision was come to, he did not think that paltry saving would have led Lord Mayo to persist in that break of gauge at Lahore with all its acknowledged inconveniences and mischievous consequences. Having quoted a passage from a speech made by Captain Galton, in answer to the pamphlet of Mr. Thornton, the hon. Member complained that the military considerations involved in that question had been made light of and put in the background by the Under Secretary of State. The means of rapidly bringing up supports from the rear of an army massed on the North-West frontier had been treated as a very secondary matter; but if that was not a military or strategical line of railway, he wished to know what it was intended for at all, as it was admitted that the traffic would be of an insignificant amount? It was to be regretted that the Indian Government, in deciding on the question, had acted upon the advice of their military engineers, because there had existed an unfortunate jealousy between the military and civil engineers, which had produced injurious results in reference to railways. He could not see in what useful or constitutional way the House could express its opinion on so great a question, except in the form of a Resolution like the present, which was not one of a hostile but of a friendly character. In the opinion of the supporters of the Motion, it would be a serious error if the Indus Valley as well as the Lahore and Peshawur Line was not constructed on the same gauge, and made a continuous and integral part of the existing railway system. It was still possible for the Indian Government even now to reconsider its decision, for no steps of any importance had been taken which need prevent the question from being re-opened if there were any inclination to do it. If any expense had been incurred, it could not be so great as the cost of the triple line between Moultan and Lahore, which was to make their system fit in with what they proposed to do. The material for bridges and permanent way might all be diverted to Ajmere or elsewhere on the narrow gauge system. The estimate of the Government for making the triple line was £360,000, and still further expenses would have to be incurred in connection with it. He believed that it would still be the wisest course to abandon the metre gauge, and he feared that otherwise its adoption would in a few years prove to have been an injudicious measure.

said, that this subject did not seem to him to be a simple one. There was first the question, if we were now engaged in considering as a new question the proper policy to pursue in the construction of lines in India generally, what policy ought we to pursue? Then we had to consider, if we were free to act on our own responsibility, what would be the proper course to pursue with respect to a system in which a great deal had been already done? Again, there was the great question, what ought the House of Commons to do in a matter which had been properly left to the Government of India, and on which it had formed a decided opinion? He approached this question without prejudice, but with considerable interest, because when he was Secretary of State for India this question of railway extension was very much under the consideration of the India Office and of Lord Lawrence, and it was thought that what was to be done should be executed on a consistent plan. A large part of the main trunk lines of India had been constructed upon the guarantee system, which was costing the Government annually a considerable sum. At the same time, there were many districts of the country which needed an extension of the railway system. What had already been done was laying a heavy burden on the finances of India, and it was dangerous to go on adding to those expenses. The conclusion come to was that it would be de- sirable to adopt a system of extension of lines throughout India, and that they should be guided generally by the amount of money placed at their disposal, and select the lines most likely to be remunerative. It was, however, considered that there were cases in which it would be important to proceed at once, without question as to the prospects of profit, on account of political or military reasons. All these questions had been considered with reference to extensions on the standard gauge, for though one company had then obtained concessions for lines in Oude and Rohilcund on a lighter system, the question of a narrower gauge had not engaged much attention. Among the exceptional lines which it was thought desirable on political or military grounds to proceed with at once, the Lahore and Peshawur extension stood foremost, and connected therewith the completion of the line between Kurrachee and Lahore. The Home Government rather pressed the prosecution of those lines, and, Lord Lawrence concurring in that view, it was understood when he quitted office that they would speedily be constructed, and on the standard gauge, no other plan having been contemplated. The object in view was not to guard against possible invasion, but to strengthen the North-Western frontier and enable troops and supplies to be rapidly forwarded in case of disturbance. After he had quitted office, Lord Mayo, who had succeeded Lord Lawrence, with characteristic vigour and grasp of mind, applied his practical mind to a comprehensive view of the whole railway system, which he saw ought to be developed as rapidly as possible; while at the same time he thought no undue burden should be laid on the finances of India. The question of constructing railways on a gauge narrower than the standard was considered, and the conclusion arrived at was that under that system it would be possible, at a comparatively moderate expense, to establish important lines of communication as feeders to the main lines of India. It must be borne in mind that the extension of the narrow-gauge system was still in part on its trial, and it was possible that the same kind of question raised that night with respect to one railway might be raised with respect to other railways which might be constructed. It might be said that the break of gauge would be a great impediment to commerce, and that there were cases where it was not applicable. The policy of constructing additional railways in India rapidly and cheaply had been deliberately adopted by Lord Mayo's Government, and they ought to be very cautious how they broke into that policy by objecting to its adoption in particular cases. When the matter was first brought under his notice he confessed he was surprised and not pleased at the contemplated break of gauge between Lahore and Peshawur. The more he thought of the matter the more he saw the difficulty of the situation. He was not convinced that if the matter was now for the first time to be decided on, he would say that the system now adopted was the right one. Regarding the question in the abstract, it would, he thought, be better that there should be but one gauge the whole way from Peshawur to Kurrachee, and from Peshawur to Calcutta and the East, and that great difficulties would be avoided by the maintenance throughout of the standard gauge. He quite concurred, too, in what had been said as to the undesirableness of breaking up the Grand Trunk Road, as it would to some extent be broken up by the policy which had been adopted. Again, he thought that the pecuniary advantage to be derived from the adoption of the narrow gauge had been over-rated, as the cost of re-laying portions of the line would be considerable. Still, no doubt a saving would be effected, especially when they remembered what had been said as to the throwing out of a branch line to Dadur, which might lead to a communication being ultimately established between the points commanding the Khyber and the Bolan Passes. It would be great economy to make that line upon the cheapest principle applicable to a line for military purposes, and it was important that there should be no break of gauge in it. Under all the circumstances, he felt himself in a very balanced state of mind with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of the system, and if the matter were res integra and we were the proper persons to decide upon it, he was bound to admit with his present state of information he should be very much inclined to agree with the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing). There were, however, two considerations which should not be left out of view. The first was that the work had been commenced, and that a certain amount of progress had been made in it. A particular policy had been decided upon, and there would be no little inconvenience in interfering with it now and undoing what had been done. It would, he thought, be unfortunate if it should go abroad that the policy of making cheap railways on the narrow-gauge system had been abandoned and discredited. He did not feel very sure either that it was desirable we should hold out to the world that it was of such enormous and pressing importance that India should have the means of rapidly sending large masses of troops to the North-Western frontier against a great European Power, and that for that purpose we had changed our policy. What we had to fear was not an advance on the part of Russia, but the danger which arose from agitation in the native mind in consequence of a belief that Russia was advancing. Was it not probable that the native mind would be still more agitated by any hasty change of our plan or policy, with a view to check that advance? What weighed with him most was the fact that the matter had been deliberately, and for a considerable length of time, discussed by the Indian Government and by the Secretary of State in Council in this country. The Secretary of State and his Council appeared not to have any very strong opinion upon the subject, as he gathered from the speech of the Under Secretary for India. There must have been a considerable division of opinion upon the subject, for in effect they told the Government in India that they were the best judges of the matter, but they had now come to the conclusion that they must support the Government of India, and that there appeared to be no sufficient reason for over-ruling the conclusion at which they had arrived. It would be under the circumstances a very delicate task for this House to pass any formal Resolution such as that now under consideration, for it would be a sort of censure upon the Government of India, and to dictate the policy which they should adopt. He did not suppose, looking to the quarter from whence the Resolution came, that it was intended to be of a hostile character; but it would not tend to strengthen the hands of the Indian Government to have such a Resolution as this placed on the Journals of the House. When they considered that the policy which the Resolution would recommend to the Government of India was one urging them to incur greater expense, and to throw a greater burden than they think right on the Indian taxpayer, the House ought to be very cautious how they adopted such a Resolution. He regretted the absence of the hon. Member for Brighton, who took so much interest in the Indian taxpayer, because the adoption of the Resolution might be misunderstood. Approaching, therefore, the subject with rather a leaning towards the hon. Mover's opinion in the abstract, he had clearly come to the conclusion that it would be a very great misfortune if the House were to formally place a Resolution of this kind upon its Journals. The discussion was no doubt right and reasonable. He did not know if he might go so far as to hope there was still time for the Government of India to reconsider the question; but, at all events, it was a question well deserving the consideration which it had received from that House. He hoped, therefore, the Mover would be satisfied with the discussion, and would withdraw the Motion, and not put himself and others in the position of voting upon the Motion, thereby indicating a feeling as to its merits, which it would not be altogether just to attribute to them.

said, he ventured to second the appeal made by the right hon. Baronet opposite. His hon. Friend the Member for the Orkneys (Mr. Laing) must be sensible that all of them approached the discussion of this question with a prepossession in his favour. They bad had in this country much debate upon the break of gauge. The greatest of all the railway battles was fought in that House about 30 years ago upon that subject; and nothing could be more decisive than the victory, not only of the narrow over the broad gauge, but a victory of unity of gauge over diversity of gauge. Consequently, it had become with them a sort of fixed principle. And we were very slow to admit the possibility of a different arrangement. There were peculiar circumstances in this country, but they hardly detracted from the general rule. Coming to the question with a prejudice in favour of the Motion, there were very strong reasons why the House should not at the present time commit itself to a Resolution of this nature. In the first place, it would be a distinct declaration, in an abstract form, of a title by the House of Commons to give directions to the Government of India with regard to the executive details of that Government, and that would be an important precedent to establish. In the next place, the primary effect of the operation of the Resolution would be to increase the financial burdens of the people of India; and he could not help feeling that the House was a great deal stronger in cases where it interposed even beyond the recognized limits of its action presumptively in favour of those who paid the taxes and bore the expenses of Government in any part of the Empire than in a case where primâ facie it would be interposing with the direct effect of adding to those burdens. Then let them consider the effect as regarded the House itself. His hon. Friend and those who supported him were, from their experience of railway matters, entitled to speak with what corresponded to official authority; but he would allow that there was something a little difficult in the position of the independent Member like himself and others who could not feel that they had acquired by a tentative discussion of this kind such a true and proper competency to deliver a judgment in the matter as to warrant their laying down the law in the shape of a Resolution. There was this further consideration—that the authority of that House never should, by any voluntary act of theirs, be subjected to receive a rebuff; and he was by no means certain that, if they were to pass this Resolution, such might not be the result. The House would not pass such a Resolution in the case of a Colony having a representative Assembly. As a substitute, India had a body of gentlemen independent of Parliament. They had heard of the impartial attitude of the Council of India on this question, but he was not so sure that the Council, which Parliament had set up as a statutory authority, might not feel it to be its duty to oppose itself within the limits of its power to the claims of that House to pass a Resolution of this kind. The passing of the Resolution might leave the House in a painful position in case it did not produce the desired effect. He did not give a judgment of his own for or against what had been said of the Government of India. Under these circumstances, the wisest course for the House to pursue was that which had been pointed to by his right hon. Friend opposite. Those who knew his noble Friend the present Viceroy of India when in that House were well aware of his just balance of mind and his diligence and impartiality, and would readily believe that the arguments and statements made that night would be carefully considered by him and by his councillors and advisers. But if any further pledge were wanted, he could engage that the whole of this discussion should be duly commended to their consideration.

said, he thought that after the speech which had just been made, and the speech of the right hon. Gentleman formerly Secretary of State for India, the best discretion would be exercised by being contented with the strong expression of opinion elicited in the course of the debate, and refraining from pressing his Motion to a division.

in rising to call the attention of the House to the loss and misery produced in Ireland by the overflowing of the Shannon and its tributaries; and to move that

"The evils brought upon a large portion of Ireland by the periodical floods of the Shannon and her tributaries are attributable to the state of the navigation works, and to the neglect of the recommendations of the Commissioners appointed under the Act 5 and 6 Will. IV. c. 67, and that the navigation works, which are the property of the Government, and under their exclusive control, are far behind the present state of engineering science, and admit of great improvement at a comparatively moderate cost; and that it is reasonable and right that, whilst amply maintaining the means of public navigation, measures should be forthwith adopted to relieve a district of many hundreds of miles of the vast and unnecessary suffering inflicted upon it by the useless impounding of the waters of the River Shannon,"

said, the navigation of the Shannon, which was under the management of the Government, was the cause of a degree of misery-of which the people in Eng- land had no notion. For about 150 miles of the upper part of its course the Shannon was very sluggish, and presented great obstacles to navigation, which it was thought desirable to remove, because before the invention of railways, inland water communication had an importance which in the present day they scarcely appreciated. Under the Irish Parliaments, and after the Union also, various efforts were made, but it was not until the year 1831 that the present works were contemplated. Reports were made in 1832 and 1833, and in 1834 a special Commission was appointed, which included Sir John Burgoyne, Sir Harry Jones, Sir Richard Griffiths, and two civil engineers—Mr. Cubitt and Mr. Rhodes; but of these gentlemen one only—Sir Richard Griffiths—is now alive. The Commissioners made not less than five Reports, accompanied with elaborate plans, and an estimated cost of £532,668. Eventually the works proved more expensive than had been anticipated, and were consequently altered and economized, and, as it has turned out, in some parts were seriously deviated from and injured; but in the year 1850 they were reported to be complete, at a cost of £600,000, and shortly afterwards the Special Commission was dissolved, and the works themselves were transferred to the Board of Public Works in Ireland, in whose hands they still remain. He would not go into details which would be better left to his gallant Colleague (Major Trench) whose engineering knowledge gave great weight to his opinions. Of the sum expended the Government contributed one half, and the other half—not less than £300,000—was assessed upon the neighbouring counties, and was paid, not by the landlords or owners, but by the occupiers of the land. The money, after all, was insufficient to complete the undertaking, and the result had been that the condition of the unfortunate people who lived in the neighbourhood was made in rainy years even worse than it had ever been before. In ordinary years there was, perhaps, some slight improvement, but miserably slight after such an expenditure. The object of the Government had been to impound as much water as they could for the navigation, and six large stone weirs or dams had, therefore, been constructed, but no sluices were attached to them; and, conse- quently, the water could never get below a certain depth, and as the Shannon was fed by three large lakes, in rainy weather the river rose very slowly, and the water being impounded by the weirs spread slowly over the adjacent lands and drowned them. The Government was the possessor of these works, which if kept in a state of efficiency would improve both the navigation and the drainage, but which in their actual condition inflicted great loss and suffering upon the country around. No one would now propose to build solid stone walls across a river, and provide nothing to relieve the pressure of an unusual amount of water; and with all respect to the eminent engineers who were employed, it was impossible not to see that they had committed a gross blunder in this respect. Whatever excuses might now be made, he was certain that if the works were to be designed in the present day, there was not an engineer in Europe who would repeat this disastrous mistake, and the House ought to note that in the course of the long, repeated and expensive investigations instituted by the Government into the state of the Shannon of late years, no question had been raised as to the necessity of making sluices in these solid dams; but the question simply was what form of sluice should be adopted as most likely to prove effectual? Having made this preliminary statement, he trusted the House would be of opinion that the condition of the poor people in the neighbourhood of the Shannon was one of unexampled hardship, and demanded instant attention. He did not for one moment claim that the Government ought to drain any man's land—that was a matter for private arrangement, and could be accomplished in the usual way by borrowing money on the security of the land which was to be drained; but he did say that the Government were morally and equitably bound to see that their navigation works were so constructed as not to inflict unnecessary injury upon the occupiers of the soil. No human being could touch these works except the Government, and however plain it might appear that when the waters were rising some additional facilities should be given to let it run off, nothing whatever could be done by the people to help themselves, but there they had to sit, powerless, with their hands folded, and see the ruin gradually coming upon them, through the want of sluicing power. Human nature had sometimes given way, and the people had determined to destroy some of those artificial obstructions which were bringing such losses and misery upon them; but in every such instance better counsels had prevailed. Contrasting this with the action of the Welsh in destroying the toll-bars some years ago in Wales, he hoped the House would draw no unfavourable deductions as to the patience of Irish peasants. In the month of November last he made a tour of the Shannon for a distance of 150 miles, for the purpose of seeing with his own eyes the effects of the inundations; and in rowing in an open boat, he assured the House that for miles and miles they saw the crops still unreaped, waving beneath the waters, and very often found it quite as easy to row over the fields as to keep to the channel of the river. Rather than trust, however, to his own description, he would read the following extract from a letter lately addressed to The Irish Times, and he thought it would strongly appeal to the sympathy of the House—

"The inhabitants of the villages of Golden Island, Clonown, Carrick, and Bounaribba are in a pitiable state, nearly all the houses being surrounded with water. Boats are anchored at the doors, beds are slung like hammocks from the beams or rafters, iron pots are placed on tables or other permanent fixtures with fires in them, and in many instances, where doors will admit, boats remain stationary under the beds ready for the immediate exit of their cold occupants. Can anything be done to remedy this sad state of affairs?"

The depth of water maintained over the sills of the various locks on the Shannon, wanted for the passage of vessels from one level of the river to another, was far in excess of anything required even for the clumsy boats now employed in the navigation, and it was the opinion of engineers of great eminence that the introduction of sluices into the solid weirs, combined with a moderate amount of dredging in some places, would effectually control all the worst evils arising from autumn floods. In providing a remedy the Government would, no doubt, have to spend a large sum of money on their navigation works, but he held that, notwithstanding the expense, they were bound to put these works in reasonable and reputable repair. The proprietors and occupiers on the Shannon and the river Suck had frequently asked the Government and the Board of the Works for permission to drain their lands at their own cost, but this reasonable request had been invariably refused. He hoped the Government would put those navigation works in such order that terrible sufferings, such as those which he had mentioned, should no longer be inflicted on thousands of helpless people. That they should do so was, he contended, a matter of Imperial policy. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice.

observed that the original grant was £100,000 for these 2,800,000 acres of land; therefore a contribution of one shilling on each acre would raise £ 140,000. Why should not every man with 20 acres pay 20s. to improve those acres? and why should not every man with 1,000 acres pay 1,000 shillings for the improvement of his acres? The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Henry) seemed to have overlooked all this, and to have thought that Government was in some way or another the proprietor of this navigation, and could apply it to some useful national purpose. Parliament provided that £490,000 should be raised in one lot, and that when the works were finished, the Commissioners appointed by the Act should hand all over to the Board of Works in Ireland. It was assumed that they would be profitable works; for it was arranged that part of the costs should be paid by bonds, and part should be laid upon the land. The income from the river was only £1,200, while the expense of managing and keeping up the works was £3,200 a-year, so that in place of getting the expected pecuniary advantage out of it, there was a loss of £2,000 a-year. It seemed to him, therefore, that the landlords should themselves provide the money to effect the improvements to the extent proposed by the hon. Gentleman. He was afraid his hon. Friend had overlooked the fact that the weakest link is the strength of the chain, and that the shallowest part of the river was the gauge of the size of ship which could pass. There might be five or six shallows, but according to what he had heard, if two were deepened it might be rendered navigable, and he repeated that it seemed to him this ought not to be done at the expense of the taxpayers of the United Kingdom, but by the owners of the land, who would reap the benefit of the expenditure.

in rising to second the Motion, said: Sir, unless the hon. Member for Edinburgh has seconded the Motion of my hon. Friend and Colleague, I rise for the purpose of seconding it. Before entering into the matter which is before the House, I wish to say one word for the information of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. In referring to the statement made by the Mover of this Motion, "that he had found great depths of water this year on the lock sills, in some cases 13 feet," he said, that, though he might have found this depth in the deep places, there might at the same time have been no more than 5 feet on the shallows. Now, Sir, I wish to state that the depth of water in the river is so regulated that when there is a depth of 6 feet on the lock sills, there is a depth of 6 feet 6 inches on the shallows; therefore, at the time my hon. Friend made his registry of 13 feet at the lock, there was probably a depth of 13 feet 6 inches on the nearest shallows. After the remarks which have fallen from my hon. Friend, and after the graphic descriptions he has given us of the state of the country subject to the inundations complained of, it will be unnecessary for me to take up the time of the House by enlarging upon them. I will only say that I can confirm them, and say that the passage he quoted from a letter of mine descriptive of them is in no way exaggerated. I will pass on at once to some practical points to which I wish to call the attention of the House. My hon. Friend and Colleague, the Mover of this Motion, inserted the following words in it at my suggestion. They are the following:—"And to the neglect of the recommendations of the Commissioners appointed under the Act 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 67." Now, Sir, the reason I asked him to insert them was that hitherto it appears to me that the merits of this question have been much misunderstood. An idea has been prevalent that the full intentions of the Acts, under which the Shannon Navigation Works were constructed, had been carried out: this belief has, I have good reason to suppose, hitherto militated against the satisfactory dealing with this question. Now, Sir, although I am no lawyer, I nevertheless believe that I am correct in supposing that all proceedings, preceding and giving rise to the passing of an Act for a certain purpose, may be said to be considered in the spirit of that Act, more especially if they are referred to in the Preamble. Now, Sir, I wish to demonstrate to the House, that although the works undertaken under the Acts to which I shall have to make reference were mainly for the purpose of making the River Shannon navigable, they also were intended to accomplish—as a necessary consequence of the proper carrying out of those works—an object of immense importance to an agricultural country—namely, "the confinement of the river to its natural channel, and the relief of the lands hitherto inundated." To establish my case, I shall be obliged to show that certain works which ought to have been carried out were not carried out. I do not seek to put blame upon anybody; but, to do justice to the case, I consider it necessary to let the truth be known. Now, Sir, as I said before, that which is embodied in or alluded to in the Preamble of an Act, may be read in connection with that Act. I hold in my hand the Act 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 67. In its Preamble I find allusion made to certain surveys—

"And whereas certain surveys have been made under the direction of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, whereby it appears that the whole course of the said river….. may be improved and thrown open, &c."

These surveys are those alluded to by my hon. Friend and Colleague, and, with the permission of the House, I will read an extract from the letter of the Chief Secretary for Ireland (the late Lord Derby) to the Chief Commissioner of Works, directing the undertaking of those surveys. The letter is dated 18th October, 1831, and in it he is instructed to undertake inquiries which

"Should take within their scope the beneficial results which might be expected from a judicious expenditure of capital upon the River Shannon, both with reference to the improvement of its navigation, and also to the reclaiming of vast tracts of land, now either inundated periodically by the floods of that river and its tributary streams, or rendered permanently incapable of cultivation from the accumulation of waters which are unable to find a vent."

The instructions went on further to direct the Chief Commissioner to report his opinion as to

"The practicability and advantage of establishing such a control over the occasional floodings of the Shannon as may tend to a beneficial drainage and reclamation of the bogs and lowlands through which it passes,"

and it goes on to say that he is to take care "to connect with such a view the preservation of every advantage to be derived from the navigation of this great river." So far, Sir, I think the idea was navigation and reclamation. Now, Sir, what does the Act say about it. In the 4th clause I find that, in addition to providing for navigation, it enacts that "the said Commissioners for the execution of this Act shall" prepare the necessary plans, &c., alluding to navigation, "and for confining the waters thereof, and preventing the inundation of the contiguous lands." It appears to me that the intention embodied in the Preamble is clearly defined. In the 8th clause of the same Act it is enacted that

"In case they should find that any particular lands are likely to derive peculiar benefit from the waters of such navigation being confined to their natural channel, so as to relieve such lands from inundation,"

that they should be charged in proportion to the benefit likely to accrue. Under this Act, there was a Commission appointed of the most eminent civil and military engineers of the day. They proceeded to make the most careful examination of the river. I forgot to mention that the preliminary surveys, to which I have already alluded, were carried out under the direction of the Chief Commissioner by two most able men. Commander Mudge, R.N., executed that for the tidal portion of the river, and the fresh water portion was executed by Mr. T. Rhodes, C.E. His Report was approved of by the Commissioners, and the general principles laid down by him were adopted in the very elaborate series of recommendations, illustrated by plans and sections, which they prepared. I will not now enter into them, but merely state that, in 1839, the Act 2 & 3 Vict., c. 61, was passed, authorizing the carrying out of the plans and recommendations of the Commissioners. In the Preamble of this Act, with some few quotations from which I must trouble the House, I find it recites the passing of the Act 5 & 6 Will. IV., c. 67, and alludes to the Commissioners appointed under it

"for the purpose of ascertaining the works necessary to be executed for the improvement of the said navigation…. and for the other purposes therein mentioned."

What other purposes? If not those to which I have called attention! The Act then goes on to say—

"And whereas the said maps and plans are now deposited with, and are in the custody of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, and it is expedient that the several works mentioned and described in the maps and plans aforesaid should be carried into execution… Be it enacted…that the several works mentioned and described in the maps and plans aforesaid shall be carried into full and complete execution."

The remaining clauses of this Act principally relate to finance and to the giving of powers; but in the 38th, 42nd, and 44th clauses, I find allusions made "to the drainage to be effected under this Act." I ask the House whether, so far, it is not of opinion that drainage and the relief of lands were intended? Now, Sir, this Act was for the purpose of carrying out certain works; and I think I shall not be incorrect in saying that the "letter of the Act," as regards the works, may be taken from the very elaborate and carefully prepared plans referred to in the Preamble, and that the "spirit of the Act" may be taken from the Reports accompanying those plans, which are descriptive of them and of their objects. I have these plans and Reports here; they are very voluminous. I will not trouble the House by reading them all; but I have made such extracts from them as I consider necessary to establish my case. Now, Sir, it is gratifying to me to find that the Commissioners took the same reading of the Act of 1835 that I take. I shall have, I fear, to trouble the House at some length; but as this case has not been thoroughly put forward before, I will ask for its patience and indulgence. My hon. Friend and Colleague has given a very true description of the weirs or dams, and of their effects upon the country. Now, I will read from page 14 of the Commissioners' Report, dated December 5th, 1837, in which they describe the object of these weirs as being

"To pen up the water to a certain height, so as to preserve in the driest seasons a depth of 6 feet 6 inches in the shallowest parts; and at the same time, by extending their length, &c. ….. we anticipate such an increased rapidity in the discharge of the waters in wet seasons, as to prevent the flat meadowlands adjoining the river banks being flooded as they are at present during at least six months in the year."

In the very next paragraph in this Report I find a special description given of the objects to be attained by the weir at Killaloe—of which I shall have more to say presently—and, of course, the works to be accomplished in connection with it. It was intended "for the regulation of the waters as far as Meelick," and its working was thus foretold—

"In winter, or times of heavy rains, there will be an over fall adequate to the discharge of the superfluous waters, so as to prevent the evils arising from the overflowing of vast districts of land adjoining the river and lake, which are inundated during the whole of the winter months and frequently during autumn."

The intention was excellent, doubtless, and might have been accomplished if the works designed had been carried out. In another passage in the same Report they recommended that the works upon the Upper Shannon should be undertaken before the "Limerick Navigation," on account of "the navigation being in a most imperfect condition, and the country suffering greatly from the effects of inundations." I now, Sir, take up another Report, dated February 21st, 1839, to show that the Commissioners up to the period just preceding the passing of the authorizing Act, were still contemplating the relief of lands. In the very first page of this Report, they classify that which they have to submit under two heads. Under the first, they enter "the surveys, designs, and estimates for works…. for the improvement of the navigation and drainage." In the 5th page of the same Report, the objects of the proposed works are described as being "to remove shoals, eel-weirs, milldams, projecting points, and other obstructions to the navigation wind drainage." I might go on quoting passages to the effect which I wish to establish; but I will not weary the House by quoting more, except to refute the only argument which can be brought against my case. That argument would be founded on a passage in the Report of the Commissioners, with reference to the provisions of Clause 8 of the Act of 1835. It is in page 19 of their second Report, and is as follows:—

"With regard to an applotment upon individuals, in proportion to the benefit to accrue to their lands, we had that measure long under our anxious consideration. We had the extent of the flooded lands accurately surveyed, and employed valuators to draw up a scale of probable effects; but it is almost impossible to define the precise extent of these prospective advantages. …. The tax must be so inconsiderable, so difficult to applot and to levy, and of so irritating a character, that we cannot perceive how it can be done with justice, and therefore do not recommend its being attempted."

Now, Sir, I believe it has been stated that because these lands were not specially assessed, as provided under the Act, that they have no reason to complain if they are swamped. I beg to submit that this passage cannot be taken as a public declaration that the secondary object with which the works were to be undertaken was to be ignored; for, in almost juxtaposition, I find the following brilliant description of the change which the Commissioners hoped to make in the face of the country. It is in page 17 of the same Report, and is thus described—

"There cannot be a doubt that a successful regulation to prevent the rising of the waters, such as we anticipate from the effects of the weirs…. will cause a great though unequal degree of improvement in the lands that are subject to the floods; such as are naturally fertile, though now covered by herbage of a coarse quality, may hereafter be tilled, and become profitable under arable cultivation, or, if preferred, may be continued as meadows, but of a very superior quality; and many portions of the lands relieved from the most injurious inundations, will, in future, be susceptible of irrigation at pleasure."

Now, Sir, those who read this Report cannot have anticipated that relief was not to be afforded, and those who penned it must, it is naturally to be presumed, have intended that the good they anticipated would be accomplished. Again, among the closing observations of the Commissioners, in, I believe, their last Report, which preceded the passing of the Act of 1839, I find that in adverting to the heavy charge which it was intended should fall upon the counties, they say—

"It is true that the amount proposed to be assessed on the different counties and districts is considerable, but"—and they go on to encourage them to bear it cheerfully by adding—" the improved state of the callows, after the waters shall have been duly regulated, will more than compensate for the temporary sacrifice."

Now, Sir, though I could go on quoting, I think I have extracted enough from these Reports to show that the districts, which, as far as we know, allowed themselves to be rendered chargeable without a murmur, must have done so in full confidence as to the results that were to be obtained to the country. To say that the lands were not especially charged for immediate relief under the 8th clause of the Act of 1835, and therefore that they have nothing to complain of, is no argument. As my hon. Friend has said, the river, once the works were completed and it was declared navigable, became public property; and, being under the sole guardianship of the Government, the occupiers of the lands adjoining it became powerless to help themselves, as far as drainage is concerned, unless the river be first placed in a condition amply to discharge its flood and drainage waters. Before I close the Reports of the Commissioners, I will trouble the House with one more quotation, which bears directly upon the words which I got my hon. Friend to insert in his Motion. The passage is among the general observations of the Commissioners concerning the works to be undertaken, and is, I apprehend, of great importance. Knowing full well the difficulties attendant upon bringing the waters of the river into perfect regulation, and that failure would result if any fit of economy was to prevent the thorough execution of all the main features of the works recommended: they say, at page 12 of their second Report—

"Should it even be thought advisable to defer, for the present, the execution of any part of our plan, we recommend that each successive portion should be so undertaken as to lead to the eventual attainment of a perfect work."

Now, Sir, without wishing to find fault, or to raise any feelings of bitterness in any quarter, I feel bound, in justice to the country affected, to state what anybody who will take the trouble to look through these books of evidence will see to be a fact, and what, in part, I know from personal observation to be a fact, and that is, that the recommendations of the Commissioners were not carried out, more especially as regards the removal of shoals and the increasing of the sectional area of the river in places where its discharging powers are unequal to the calls that are made upon them. Immediately after the passing of the Act of 1839, the works were proceeded with. In the course of their progress much good was done. I do not pretend to say that the works have made the extent of the inundations greater than formerly. What I wish to point out to the House is, that certain works not having been carried out, and, as my hon. Friend's Resolution has it, some of those executed—the weirs—being behind the times, the country is placed in a much worse position than that which was intended to have been the result. But to continue. Great relief was in places afforded; but this was rather by works of "destruction" than of "construction." The eel-weirs which covered the shoals were removed, giving immediate relief; but the shoals on which they were situated were not removed, or, at any rate, not to the extent intended. Sir Richard Griffiths—the only survivor I believe of those eminent men whose recommendations were so wise—accounts for this in his evidence given before the Committee of the House of Lords in 1865, by saying that after the upper surface was dredged away they came on rock which they could not dredge, so it was left. No additional efforts were made for securing the eventual attainment of a "perfect work." Numerous serious deviations of this nature were made. I will not weary the House by mentioning many of them. I will mention two, which will serve to illustrate the nature and the importance of these deviations. These I have inspected myself, so I can speak of them with confidence. At Meelick, before the works, the river separated into two channels, enclosing a very considerable island. The works contemplated the closing of one and the increasing of the sectional area of the other in a compensating degree so as to give discharging room for the waters and depth for navigation. Now what was done? One channel was closed; the other was not widened and deepened as contemplated. The House can imagine the consequences to the country behind, all along the flat reach up to Banagher; but the non-removal of this very important shoal made its importance apparent as soon as the navigation opened. I think it was in 1847, it was found that the boats touched this, which was, and ought to have been removed. What was done? Was it removed? No! A timber superstructure was placed on the top of the weir, in order to retain water upon this shoal to enable boats to pass. The aggravation of the evils on the country above can be understood. One other place I will allude to is Killaloe, situated at the foot of Lough Derg. At this place, immense discharging power is necessary to enable the vast quantities of waters which come upon it to be let off. It was intended, as shown by the plans—which, I consider, form part of the Act of Parliament—to widen the channel between the Lough and the weir, to remove a large quantity of shoal, and certain islands which obstructed the passage of the waters, and to place the weir at a certain level. What was done? The lake was lowered, and the channel dried. The work of removing the shoal was commenced, but never finished, the islands were not removed, the channel was not widened to anything like the extent contemplated, and last, but not least, the weir was built six or seven inches higher than the approved level. Now, six or seven inches may appear small and insignificant to many hon. Members present who are unacquainted with the country; but let me assure them that six or seven inches are of the utmost importance in a country like that between Portumna and Meelick. Now, Sir, I think I have mentioned enough to show that the recommendations were not carried out in many essential points, and that the consequence has not been the relief of the lands from inundation. The inundations are still as described by my hon. Friend the mover of this Resolution. The people along the river who were rated, believe that they paid for relief from liability to inundations, and I really think I have shown that they ought to have obtained such relief. My hon. Friend I think is mistaken in fancying that all those far removed from, and those near the river, paid in like proportion for the works. I think I am right in saying that the baronies adjoining the river were charged at a higher rate on account of the benefits that were to accrue to them. I recollect when I was a child hearing rather an amusing story connected with the collection of this rate. A farmer who held a good deal of land near the river was called upon one day for his money. He pretended ignorance of what the call was for, and when the collector said it was for the Shannon Improvements, and that the charge was assessed upon his land, he said that he would willingly pay the collector if he would show him his farm. They looked out, and found that it was totally covered by the overflow of the river. Now, Sir, I come to ask what advantage has been obtained by this vast expenditure of money? Agriculturally, I may say none. I may even go farther, and say that a complete bar has been put to the improvement of the low lying saturated districts. Then, as to navigation, I do not deny that, taken from that point of view only, there is a navigable river with some fine locks and wharves upon it, but there is no traffic. While the means of navigation have been afforded, the improvement of the country, which would have created a traffic, has been prevented. That the traffic is very inconsiderable I can demonstrate. I have extracted from the Returns in the Library of this House an account of the receipts from and expenditure on the maintenance of this navigation. They show that the cost of maintenance has exceeded the receipts from tolls and wharfage from the year 1852 to 1872, by the sum of £32,320 5s. 7d. That is what has been gained (?) by the incomplete carrying out of the works at a cost of £600,000. But how has this deficiency been made good? I will tell you. The navigation is endowed. I called for a Return at the beginning of the Session which the House was pleased to order. We have not yet got it; but I believe that when we do get it, it will show us that a remnant of the money raised by the counties and granted by the Treasury remains unexpended, and is at present invested in certain buildings, lands, and premises, which are not required for the purposes of the navigation, except to meet the deficit by means of their rents. I will explain to the House how these monies came to be so invested. Under the Act all mills, water-rights, and fisheries were bought up, so that the complete control of the water might be obtained. Now, Sir, I maintain that when mill premises and weirs were purchased for this purpose, many of the mill sites might have been sold again, less their right to dam up the river, and a considerable sum of money might thus have been realized to have gone towards the completion of the approved works. I hope the money value of such premises may be made available to assist in meeting the expenses of carrying out the measure, which I trust the Government will see fit to introduce. I maintain that when it was found, or considered, necessary to leave certain essential works undone, the counties, which were joint partners with the Treasury in paying for them, should have been consulted and asked if they would pay more, before the nonperformance of these works, and the subsequent reporting of them as complete, was decided upon. The counties were unrepresented on the Commission, and relied in full faith on the Government that the approved works would be carried out. The approved works were not carried out, much to the detriment of the agricultural interests of the country, and I consider that the responsibility lies with the Government. I do not seek to lay blame on any individual; but, in justice to my country, I feel it my duty to state this plainly. I am sure that if the Shannon was in Scotland, that the hon. Member for Edinburgh would, under similar circumstances, with his brother Members, be far more zealous to obtain justice for his country than we have been in Ireland. Now, Sir, it may be asked what are the remedies for these evils? The question has been inquired into by some of the most eminent engineers of the day; but they, like doctors, differ. Their rival reports—doubtless all good—are in the possession of the Board of Works in Ireland. I will not presume to comment on them; but I will make a few common-sense suggestions, which I hope the Government will cause to be taken into consideration in connection with any measure they may see fit to introduce for the settlement of this question. I will first say, that I think if the Government was to propose to this House, that the important defects in the carrying out of the approved works should now be made good, this House would willingly consent to that which, in justice and equity, is right and reasonable. It is most important that the natural obstructions should be removed, as there is a fall of only 4 inches in the mile on the greater part of this river. The dams or weirs ought, of course, to be modernized and fitted with suitable sluices. But in connection with whatever works they may propose, I would most earnestly urge upon them the fact that however important the navigation of the River Shannon may have been before the introduction of railways, its importance now cannot be considered as having precedence of the agricultural interests of the country. I would urge upon them that it is unnecessary to keep an exceptional draught of water between Killaloe and Leitrim. The draught of water between Killaloe and Limerick is 4 feet 10 inches; between Leitrim and Lough Allen, it is, I believe, 4 feet 6 inches; the maximum afforded by the other canals in connection with it is 4 feet 6 inches, and but few of the boats navigating the Shannon at present draw more than 4 feet 6 inches. I would, therefore, most earnestly urge that the draught on the river should be assimilated to that on the canals. This change in connection with the other requisite works would be of incalculable value to the country. There is an idea prevalent in the county Limerick, among some who are nervous and fear that they might be reduced to the state of those bordering upon the Upper Shannon if the general level on the upper part of the river was reduced. Now, let me assure the hon. Members for Limerick, who I see on the other side of the House, that there is no need for apprehension on this score. If the waters are lowered, as I hope they may be from and above Killaloe, there will be so much less water in and saturating the country. The normal level will be changed; but there is no reason to suppose that more water will fall in the country than heretofore. Thus the discharge will be no greater than heretofore. There will be this great difference between the new state of affairs and the present. If the waters are lowered, the lakes can be used for storing flood waters, to be let off at pleasure when their discharge will inflict least injury on the reaches below. At the present time there are no means of controlling the flood-waters. I would beg to remark that every foot of lowering in Lough Ree and Lough Derg will give storage room for from twelve to thirteen hundred million cubic feet of water in each. A great amount of control might thus be obtained. I must thank the House for having given me its attention so long. I will not trespass upon its time much longer. I was very anxious, as we have a strong case, to let it be known; more especially as I felt certain, from the answer which the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave me on the last evening of last Session, that it must hitherto have been misunderstood by the House. On that occasion he told me that he would be very glad to introduce a measure, if he saw any prospect of carrying it, but that he was not encouraged by the reception which his measure of 1870 had met with in the House. I have since then been doing all I can to ventilate it, and I have, at some length, put it before the House now, feeling that it only has to be understood, to insure its being dealt with in a just and equitable spirit. I have not put forward my statement in any unfriendly spirit to anyone. I am anxious to show the Government that there is a strong case, and a sufficiently strong one to insure a favourable reception by the House of the measure which I hope they may see fit to bring forward. I am sure that the selection of the works requisite might safely, and in all confidence, be left to the highly-efficient Gentlemen who now preside at the Board of Works. I believe that though there are nominally three, there are only two working Commissioners; their hands may be already very full, but they are well acquainted with the subject, and I think that the country may have every confidence that if works are again to be undertaken they will be thoroughly carried out. There is one point ill connection with this question which I forgot to observe upon—that is, that it is not the people upon the banks of the Shannon alone who suffer by the present lamentable state of affairs. Districts at a distance from the Shannon are kept unimproved and unimprovable. I believe there are several; but I can speak for one, in which I live myself—that is, the valley of the Suck. This valley, with its 72,000 acres of inundated and injured lands, is in a most lamentable condition. Since the year 1845 or 1846 there have been repeated efforts made on the part of the landowners within this district to improve their river. They began their efforts in a most laudable spirit, in the famine year, when their desire was to afford employment to the famishing poor. It has never been drained, however, on account of the state of the Shannon, and the owners and occupiers of that district are now anxiously waiting to be allowed to drain their own river, if the Government and this House will only consent to the Shannon being placed in a proper state. I have now occupied the time of the House, I am afraid, too long; but before sitting down I will, with its permission, mention an incident which occurred to myself while travelling along the Shannon some years ago, when I was making an inspection of that river, with a view to ascertain the causes of the desolation which it spreads. I think it was in the county Tipperary that I met a most respectable looking man on the river's bank; he carried a gun on his shoulder, and seemed ready to shoot anything that came in his way—[A laugh]—of course, I mean in the way of game. He was a most intelligent man, and very kindly gave me a great deal of information regarding the floods and the river generally. After some conversation, and after he had ascertained the object I had in view, he exclaimed to me, "Ah, sir, if we had more gentlemen in the country like you there would be no shooting at all." To this observation, I replied, that I thought it would be a change for the better to have those dismal swamps, with which we were surrounded, occupied by cattle and thriving homesteads, instead of by snipe and wild fowl, but I re-assured him by saying, that even if the river was lowered there would always be some duck and snipe shooting. He rejoined, "That is not the sort of shooting I mean;" so I asked him what he did mean, "Landlord shooting, to be sure!" he replied. [Laughter.] Now, Sir, one may laugh at the man's innocent rejoinder; but I can assure the House, that whether there is anything in it or not, the adoption of such a policy as that advocated would tend much to produce contentment. It would be the means of conferring a great and lasting benefit on the country, as it would greatly develop its agricultural resources, and it would bring in its train prosperity and an increased revenue.

said, that the first portion of the Resolution of the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Henry) traced the evils complained of to two sources—one the bad state of the navigation works, and the other the neglect of the recommendations of the Commissioners. It might be true that those recommendations had not been followed; but that was not a matter of importance in deciding the question. In 1836 two Commissioners were appointed to make inquiries, and they reported, among other things, in favour of the construction of weirs and sluices in certain places. An Act was passed to give effect to certain of the recommendations made, but it made no reference to the weirs and sluices. The Report had not therefore been neglected. It had been considered and a portion of it rejected. But it was said that the floods in the Shannon were attributable to the state of the navigation works. Those works were partly paid for by the baronies and the neighbourhood, and partly by the Government, and he could not admit that the floods were caused by them, or that they were otherwise than beneficent to the Shannon and the land adjoining. In the year 1862 the Government appointed Mr. Bateman, the highest authority on the subject, to make inquiry. That gentleman stated that it was anticipated that the works for the improvement of the navigation would relieve the land from floods, and that this anticipation had been realized was proved by the final Report of the Commissioners on the improvement of the Shannon. He also stated that the injuries complained of had not been aggravated by the works recommended by the Commissioners; but still the injury sustained was considerable, and the steps which had been taken rendered the preservation of the crops very precarious. That was true; but it did not appear that it was the result of the con- struction of the works, as had been urged. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) believed the navigation of the Shannon to be altogether a useless affair, and would be glad to do away with it, if it were not that it would cost too much in compensation. The real cause of the present state of the Shannon was its great length and sluggishness. Throughout its whole length of 140 miles it had only 143 feet fall, 97 feet of which was in the last 15 miles. For 125 miles it had only 46 feet fall, and for 23 miles it had scarcely any fall at all. Sluices would not mend the difficulty; nothing would remedy it but deepening and widening the bed of the river, but that would involve too large an expenditure. The Motion, taken altogether, seemed to charge the Government with having caused the whole of the evils complained of, and to call upon the Imperial Treasury for the funds necessary to correct them. He could not possibly attend to the Motion in that light; if he did so, it would be to the prejudice of works having more claim upon the consideration of the Government. He hoped, therefore, the hon. Member would not press his Motion to a division.

said, the Government in the year 1870 undertook to expend £100,000 in completing the works on the Shannon, in accordance with the recommendations of the Commissioners, but the Bill containing the proposal was unfortunately rejected. He thought they were bound to adhere to that undertaking now, under the circumstances which had occurred. He asserted that one of the engineers sent by the Government to view the works had reported to the effect that they had injured the lands, and on that ground he claimed compensation from the Government.

said, the description of the banks of the Shannon exactly corresponded with what the people in some parts of Somersetshire had to contend against, except that the people living on the banks of the Shannon had benefited by the expenditure of large sums of money by the Government. He trusted the Government would be firm in their resistance of such demands as that contained in the Motion; compliance would only excite the jealousy of less favoured districts in England. He thought that if the Government would bring in a Bill to amend their own drainage Act, or pass a special Act to enable those districts to be properly drained, taking care, of course, to tax the lands benefited, a very material benefit would result.

expressed his surprise that the right hon. Gentleman should have taken up a position to-night so different from what he occupied when he brought in a Bill on the subject. The contention of the Irish Members was that a contract was made with the Government for the execution of a perfect work; the people paid their share of the cost, £300,000, and yet the work was left incomplete. This was no begging petition on the part of the Irish Members. All they asked was that the Government should perform their part of the contract, so as to prevent the country from being flooded by their imperfect works.

knew something of the river, as he lived within a few yards of its banks, and could bear testimony to the want of drainage, the amount of traffic, and what had been done upon it. It was lamentable to see the losses which frequently fell upon the unfortunate inhabitants in the neighbourhood of the river; losses which were increased by the erection of a fourth weir. Although that weir had been recommended to be removed, it was still standing, and materially stopped the outfall of the water.

referred to the difficulty of draining that part of the country, and said that drainage only spread the evil. He asked for some more explicit assurance of what the Government intended to do than had been given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and hoped the Government would be supported in the event of its bringing in a Bill.

said, he supported the Motion. £300,000 had been advanced for the purpose of drainage, and yet nothing had been done. He hoped the Government would take the matter into their consideration, with the view of providing a better remedy for the disastrous state of things that at present existed.

said, he did not believe it had been shown that the inundations were caused by the works which had been constructed; but he agreed that anything that would improve the navigation of the Shannon, and improve drainage also, would be of the utmost importance. He hoped that the Motion would not be pressed to a division, but that the matter would be left in the hands of the Government.

said, he thought that there were works on the Shannon which should be completed, so that the drainage might be improved.

said, this Resolution affirmed that the works on the Shannon caused the mischief complained of, that Government funds should be applied to remedy the mischief. It was simply this that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had declined to sanction. He denied that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had receded from the position he took up two years ago.

moved that the Committee report Progress on account of the lateness of the hour (1 o'clock).