asked the Postmaster General, If he can hold out any hope that the upper portion of the county of Carmarthen, comprising a district of between thirty and forty thousand inhabitants, will soon have the benefit of the postal telegraphic system; and, if he can explain the cause of the delay in completing such communication, inasmuch as the wires connecting the various Post Offices with the Railway stations have been erected for a period of eighteen months, and have remained ever since in an useless and unproductive state?

in reply, said, that the opening of the postal telegraph offices of Llandilo, Llangadoch, and Llandovery, upon the Llanelly line of railway, had been delayed by the objection of the Railway Company to allow the wires which had been erected to be brought into use until the agreement with the Department had been formally executed. That agreement would now very shortly be in force, and the postal telegraph offices would at once be opened.

asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Committee appointed by the Treasury to inquire into certain financial irregularities disclosed by the First Report of the Committee on Public Accounts have yet made their Report to the Treasury?

No, Sir. The Report of that Committee has not yet been received; but we shall have it very soon, and I beg to assure the hon. Gentleman that no time will be lost in laying it before the Committee of Public Accounts.

asked the Postmaster General, Whether a complete Account of the Capital Expenditure on Telegraphs from the date of their acquisition by the Government has been laid before the Treasury, in accordance with a statement made by Mr. Scudamore on the 5th March last before the Committee of Public Accounts, that

"The Account of the Capital Expenditure is now made up to the 30th November last; the Account for December and January is in active preparation; and I can undertake to promise that, before the end of April, a complete Account, with full explanations of everything that has been clone with regard to capital outlay, shall be in the hands of the Treasury?"

Sir, the account up to the 31st December was rendered to the Treasury on the 29th March., The capital account, so far as construction is concerned, was closed on the 31st March, and the account from January 1 to March 31 will be ready in about five weeks from this time.

asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether any steps are being taken to relieve those Colonels of the Queen's Army who have been superseded by Colonels of the Indian Army; and, whether any steps are being taken for preventing in the future such supersession?

Sir, the rank of Major General in the Indian Army for the officers promoted since May 3, 1870, is local only, until the British colonels senior to them have been promoted. As each British colonel is promoted to Major General his commission is ante-dated so as to place him as General in the position he occupied as colonel. In 1870 a Committee of the House of Commons considered, but did not recommend, a proposal for increasing the establishment of British General Officers. They recommended that an amalgamated list of colonels should be at once formed from the British, the Staff Corps, and the Indian local lists, from which promotion should be made to Major General, according to seniority as colonel; but this recommendation was considered by a Royal Commission, of which Lord Cairns was Chairman, to be at variance with the guarantee given by Parliament to the Indian officers, and was, therefore, not adopted. At present the operation of the Royal Warrant of June 15, 1864, is to give for a time to British colonels all the promotion of the colonels of the Indian Staff Corps.

asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he has any objection to state the date and purport of the Treasury Regulations under which it is understood that the promotion of the subalterns of the 95th Regiment has been retarded, contrary to the usual rule adopted in other regiments, by the absorption of the third vacancy caused by Captains originally placed on the supernumerary list on the return of the regiment from India?

The promotion, Sir, of the subalterns of the 95th Regiment has not been retarded, contrary to the usual rule adopted in other regi- ments, inasmuch as what is called in the Question the third vacancy was in reality the first. The so-called first vacancy was rendered null by the return of the officer who had joined the Indian Staff Corps on probation, giving at the time a step which his return absorbed; and the second was that of a captain who went on temporary half-pay, absorbing a supernumerary, under the Royal Warrant of February 24, 1873.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If he will lay upon the Table of the House Copy of any Correspondence which may have taken place between Mr. Consul March and the Foreign Office from the 1st day of January 1872, up to the time of his leaving the Fiji's, with reference to the state of affairs in those islands?

Sir, the Correspondence between Mr. Consul March and the Foreign Office is more or less of a confidential character, and in the present position of affairs in the Fiji Islands I feel I could not undertake to make that Correspondence public.

asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, What has been the cause of provocation leading to the Ashantee incursion on the Gold Coast, and whether it appears capable of removal; whether this Country is engaged in the way of protectorate on that Coast, not only to aid the Fautee tribes in their own defence, but in disputing the access of the interior powers to the sea for commerce; whether the protectorate has been extended to the territories adjoining the forts newly acquired from the Dutch; whether we are actually implicated in a third Ashantee War on behalf of the neighbouring tribes by naval and military interference and supplies; and, if so, at whose expense; and, whether the King of Elmina is now a prisoner for refusing the oath of allegiance to the Queen, in reversal of the policy accepted by this House in 1865?

It is not easy, Sir, to state what has been the cause of provocation leading to the Ashantee invasion. It is reported to be connected with the transfer of Elmina from the Dutch to the British flag; but it happened at a time when we were engaged in friendly negotiations with Ashantee Envoys, who profess their ignorance of the cause. So far from disputing the access of the interior tribes to the sea for commerce, we desire to facilitate trade in every way, and have given particular assurances to the Ashantees to this effect. We exercise the same protectorate as the Dutch over the territories adjoining the ceded forts. We are assisting the tribes of the protectorate against this invasion, and the expense of arms and ammunition supplied to them, and of the Houssa Police, will be borne by Colonial Revenues. The King of Elmina is now a prisoner under suspicion of treasonable practices. The oath of allegiance was tendered to him as a test of loyalty, which he refused, and I know of no policy accepted by this House which has been reversed by this proceeding.

in rising to move—

"That, in the opinion of this House, it is desirable to redress the inequalities of the distribution of Electoral power in England and Scotland as well as in Ireland,"

said: Mr. Speaker—My first duty is to express to the House my sense of the disparity which exists between the magnitude of the subject to be raised tonight, and the humble position which who move the Resolution occupy among the Members of this House. It is, however, a topic with which the constituencies are in a peculiar degree concerned, and the consideration, which as an individual I could not claim, will not be denied by the House to the electoral body that I have the honour to represent. Forced to touch for a moment upon the theory of representation, as gathered from our history, I will not weary the patience of the House by dealing with it at length. Briefly, I may state the matter thus:—In the earliest Parliament in which the Commons were represented, their Deputies seem to have been summoned only to express the consent of the people to taxation. The origin of the modern Parliament is to be found in the necessities of the Crown. There was in early days no general representation of popular opinion, but the desire was to find men who by their consent could bind their fellow-townsmen to new taxes. All towns that were held worthy of having their consent asked, were asked in equal degree; all places sent the same number of Members—that is, two. In the reign of Edward I., "two or three" was the phrase often made use of in the Writs, showing that no importance was attached to the number of representatives of a constituency in this House. Indeed, while "two or three" were summoned it was entirely sufficient if one came. It is even known to Members whose researches have led them to the early history of English Parliaments, that the practice of sending a second Member was based upon the notion that when one Member was detained by sickness, or by the then terrible hardships of the journey up to London, the other should be present to express the opinion of the town. As late as the 22nd year of Edward III., all tow ns sent two burgesses alike, and the first time that we hear of some places having more Members than others was when the Cinque Ports—their inhabitants being zealous partizans of a particular opinion—were directed to send four Members each. In this brief history we find the key to all the difficulties by which the subject is embarrassed now. We have tried to put new wine into old bottles—with the usual success. While, little by little, the idea of general representation has been growing up, by the gradual assertion of the principle of redress of grievances before taxation, the House of Commons has still continued to be, in the strict theory of the law, representative of places, not of persons. No one, however, who gives his attention to this subject can fail to see that, whatever may be our view in here, the outside public, the newspaper writers, the voters—in short, all who are not strangled with a hempen rope of precedent—have come to speak of the House of Commons as a great national Assembly where opinions—if they be worthy of representation at all—ought to be represented as near as may be in proportion to their prevalence in the country at large. All now admit that not the majority of communities but the majority of voices should bear rule; and the measures of 1832, of 1867, and of 1868, have by the disfranchisement of small places, and the increase of the representation of large ones in a ratio based on population, wholly upset the old theory of representation. It is now admitted on both sides of the House that it would be monstrous that a small minority of the voters should impose their will upon a large majority in national affairs of moment. But I think it can be shown that although this position may be taken as admitted, it is far from having as yet received expression in our law, and that a minority may still rule a majority of the voters of England, through the overrepresentation of decayed communities, and the under-representation of the most prosperous portions of the land. There are 100 Members of the present House who were elected by communities which contained in 1868 about 80,000 voters. Their constituencies are dwindling away—growing "small by degrees and beautifully less." There are another 100 of us who sit for communities who then had not 80,000, but 1,080,000 voters. 80 of us now have in our boroughs and counties 1,040,000 electors, while 124 Members at the other end of the scale have but 104,000 electors, or one-tenth as many. Half the Members of the House represent less than 500,000 voters, and the other half of us represent considerably more than 2,000,000 voters. One Gentleman sitting opposite polled 18,702 votes, and one Gentleman also sitting opposite polled 64 votes. There are now 12 Members of the House sitting for boroughs which contain more than 50,000 voters each. There are another 12 sitting for constituencies containing less than 336 voters each, of whom 6 sit for constituencies with less than 257 voters each. 1,600 voters in the small Irish boroughs have 7 Members; 16,000 voters in a single Irish county have but two Members; and 25,000 voters in the great county of Middlesex have only the same number. I said just now that the small constituencies were dwindling away. Why, taking English boroughs alone, and comparing the figures of 1868 and those of 1873, we find that Evesham, which was a constituency of 750, is now a constituency of 721; Tavistock, which had 857 electors, now has 810; Midhurst, which had 995, now has 979; Ripon, which had 1,132, now has 991; Tewkesbury, which had 745, now has 676; and Marlborough has fallen from 616 to 598. Woodstock, Warwick, Flint, Eye, Wenlock, Cocker-mouth, Berwick, and many others also, show a falling off; as do Whitehaven and Droitwitch, indeed, although the hon. Member for the former (Mr. Cavendish Bentinck), and the right hon. Member for the latter (Sir John Pakington), show no falling off at all. The big boroughs are growing fast, while the small ones are declining. For instance, my mention of Warwick reminds me that while it has two Members for its 1,600 voters, and is declining in number of electors, Birmingham hard by has only three Members for 54,000 electors, and has increased by 11,002 voters since 1868—that is, has an increment greater than the entire constituencies of five-sixths of the Members of the House. In old times there was a self-acting machinery for the cure of these strange anomalies—namely, the issue of Orders in Council, a return to which practice was, I think, proposed in the first draft of the Whig Reform Bill of 1832. Moreover, the increase of trade in the present century, and the rapid movement of population from one part of the country to another which railroads have brought about, have made the anomalies more apparent now, as well as greater, than they ever were before. I am far from sharing the view of those who say that there is any sort of understanding that these questions should not be reopened for a time. As for the redistribution of Irish seats, the Government have promised to deal with that "in a complete manner" next year. On the 10th of February the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland said—

"The Government are of opinion that a measure dealing with the redistribution of seats in Ireland is required, and I hope it may be possible for the present Parliament to consider such a measure before its dissolution…. and We think that if the thing is done at all, it should be done in a complete manner."—[3 Hansard, ccxiv. 195.]

Yes, but I think that I have shown that such a measure is needed in England, too, and that is what my Motion says. It was speaking, not of Ireland, but of some of the small English boroughs saved in 1868 that the present Premier, on the 8th of June of that year, said, that "the odds were 100 to 1 that they would not take part in more than one General Election."—[3 Hansard, cxcii. 1248]. Which means that the odds are 100 to 1 in favour of the redistribution of seats being successfully undertaken next year—not with regard to Ireland alone, but for England and Scotland too. It is surely impossible to justify the continued existence of boroughs with between 200 and 300 voters a-piece. The old contention that these tiny towns open our doors to men who could not otherwise find their way into the House has been given up. The Prime Minister used to be a staunch supporter of small boroughs, but in the last speech which he made about them he used these words—

"I am bound to say that, having particularly watched the working of our small boroughs during the last two General Elections, I do not think that the small boroughs now possess the advantage in the degree they did at one time, or, indeed, in any degree beyond other classes of constituencies."

If this be so—if they have no advantage—they surely have disadvantages enough to ensure their condemnation. Without using strong language, we may take it as admitted that there is more temptation to bribe and intimidate in small boroughs than in large, because each voter, however poor, however weak, tells more and has more political influence than has any voter in a large constituency. Those who maintain small boroughs say that political power should be given, not to numbers, but to property and intelligence, while the only effect of their acts and words is to leave the representation of the people in the hands of the pauperised and ignorant inhabitants of decaying towns. On the other hand, look at the large cities and the larger counties. Can anyone say that the county of Lancaster and the county of York are sufficiently represented in this House, or that the City of Edinburgh and the City of Bristol, for instance, make their weight felt in the government of the country in a due proportion to their wealth and size? Can anyone contend that the county of Middlesex, with its 25,000 electors—increasing fast—with their intelligence and wealth as well as number, is entitled only to the same weight in our counsels as Portarlington and Kinsale, with 300 voters between them? I do not even speak of such towns as Croydon, which still go wholly without any special representation here. There has, indeed, for some years past been a general disposition to regard redistribution of seats as a matter not urgently needing action. It seems to have been thought upon both sides that if the Liberal party had a majority at the last Election under the present system, it could not have had more than a majority, or less than a majority, under any other; and it has been argued that when a party in a majority among the voters came to be in a permanent minority in the House it would be time enough to raise the question of redistribution. In other words, it is supposed that, parties being more or less nearly equally divided throughout the country, it does not much matter if the voters in big places are under-represented, and the voters in small places over-represented, because if we were to adopt an electoral system based on population, the two sides of the House of Commons would not of necessity undergo any considerable change. But this may be true, and is true, without its following, as a matter of course, that there are not practical inconveniences in the present state of things, and practical necessities for a change. The view which I have stated assumes that the voters belong to the one party or to the other party, and nothing more; that the one party have certain views, and that the other party have opposite views, and that all that is important is that the party that is in a majority among the voters should be in a majority among the Members. But there are the greatest differences upon both sides of the House—differences of opinion among Members of the same party upon most subjects, and clearly marked party lines only upon a few. Will anybody maintain, for instance, that the hon. Member for Westminster (Mr. W. H. Smith), and the hon. Member for Whitehaven (Mr. Cavendish Bentinck), or the hon. and learned Member for Dungarvan (Mr. Matthews), and the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), or the hon. Member for Belfast (Mr. W. Johnston), and the hon. Member for Boston (Mr. Collins)—who believes in nothing but the Athanasian Creed—represent absolutely identical views? I will not point to the still more flagrant cases of difference upon this side. The truth of these considerations may be seen if we take as an instance either the opinions of the large counties on taxation questions, or the opinions, upon many subjects, of the great towns. If we look to the latter we find, for example, that many Lancashire Conservatives are Conservative upon Church matters, and upon little else. A large number of Liberals, again, differ from the Liberal Government upon most questions. Above all, we can show that divisions continually take place upon subjects which those who are immediately interested in them consider of importance, in which the majority in the House of Commons does not represent the opinion of a majority, but the opinion of a minority of the Commons of England. Surely if this be so, then clearly it must follow that redistribution is a matter of practical and of pressing importance. Yet, Sir, many such instances might be found in the divisions of any Session of any Parliament that has sat. Let us take but a single one from our deliberations of last year—that afforded to us by the Birmingham Sewage Bill. 147 Members voted in favour of that Bill, and 150 Members voted the other way. Now, there are many modes by which we may test the amount of the voting power which each Member ought to be considered to express. We may take the number of his constituents at the time of the division; we may take the number of his constituents, if he has no Colleague, half that number if he has one, a third of that number if there are three Members, and a fourth of the number if he sits for the City of London. Another mode would be to give to each Member the number of electors who voted for him at the last Election, or a proportion of that number upon the second plan. But, Sir, whichever of these four modes we may adopt, and of whatever year we may take the statistics, the minority of 147 Will be found to outweigh the majority of 150. On the first plan, and on the statistics of 1872, the 147 represented 1,455,000 voters, and the 150 represented 1,063,000 only, so that the minority outnumbered the majority by nearly 400,000 electors. On each of the other plans it will be found that the minority represented or were voted for by a majority of from 200,000 to 400,000 electors. In short, on every system that can be devised, we find that if the opinions of the Representatives of the majority of the people are to be consulted, the minority should have been the majority, and the majority the minority in that division. I venture, Sir, to think that, for many years now past, we should have been justified in the assertion that the representation of the opinion of voters, and not of that of places is the true theory of the Constitution, and that divisions in which the majority here represents the minority of the voters are a scandal to which an end should properly be put. If that be so, we can only be confirmed and strengthened in that opinion, when by his appeal to the highest Courts in support of his claim to vote in the election of Members to this House, we see Lord Salisbury himself take the most democratic step that has been taken by any man of note in modern times, and virtually admit that the House of Commons now represents not the Commons only, but the entire people. There is but one difficulty, so far as I can see, which stands in the way of the adoption of a sweeping reform of our electoral machinery—I mean the representation of the Universities. It is true that the Universities send distinguished Members to this House, but those Members most certainly are men who would be able to find seats elsewhere. It could not be maintained for a moment that the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. G. Hardy), or my hon. Friend the Member for the University of St. Andrews (Dr. Lyon Playfair), or their Colleagues in the representation of the Universities, would not be able to find constituencies to return them; but, on the other hand, I cannot but confess that the representation of the Universities as such seems to me to be indefensible. The Masters of Arts and Laws, and the Doctors of Law and of Divinity who constitute the voting body of the Universities, are men who almost all of them have votes in University towns, or in the parts of the country where they dwell. I know not upon what principle it can be claimed that they should have special representation. If it is on the ground that science should be specially represented in the House of Commons, then the Royal Society would return far better Members for that purpose than even the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, who send us politicians. If it is to improve the standard of the House of Commons that University Members are returned, then it is for us to consider whether such fancy means of doing so are not opposed to the whole principle of popular election. The men thus sent to the House belong to the very class which from its wealth, its education, its ability is the most represented of all classes in the country, and therefore not the most entitled, but the least entitled, if any difference is to be made, to exceptional treatment, or special representation here. Looking, indeed, to the importance of giving to all men a hearing in this House, a certain case, though not a conclusive or even a strong case, might be made for the special representation of some orders. It is, for instance, hard to foresee—it is impossible to foretell—when agricultural labourers will succeed in returning any Members to this House. On the other hand, it may be shown that their interests are more directly affected by legislation than are those of any other class, and that they are the most numerous single body of men engaged in one employment in the whole engaged Here is a case for special representation, and one which can only be met by a stern resort to general principles. But, at all events, it is a very much stronger case than any which can possibly be made for the special representation of the clerical gentlemen, who for political purposes control the older English Universities. It is not the duty of those who call attention to the existence of these anomalies to point out at the same time, and before they have secured the universal acceptance of their general propositions, the character of the remedies by which redress could be obtained. We cannot be asked to decide upon the manner in which this question should be settled before it has first of all been decided that it shall be settled. The decision rests not here with us, but with you upon those benches. The great constituencies will not long permit the neutralization of their Members' votes by those of Gentlemen who sit for decaying towns; but the Conservative party has power, if so minded, to defeat any of the first attempts that may be made to substitute a better state of things. On the other hand, when the Conservative party has been brought to see that reform has become unavoidable, that party can cause whichever plan it may support to be that one which will ultimately prevail. Those who are raising this question are not supporters of a one-sided agitation that would neglect the counties, while it pressed only the claims of the great towns. But Conservatives will have only themselves to thank, if by resistance to the principle of the reform they should cause that reform, postponed for a few years, ultimately to take a shape hostile to themselves. The machinery by which the change when decided on should be carried out, is a secondary question as compared with the necessity of the change itself. The present state of our representative system is a menace to the peace of the country. Look at the justification it affords to the persons who are in the habit of assembling tumultuously in the Parks to denounce this House. All that we contend is that it ought to be our aim, especially in these days of paternal legislation, to obtain the maximum of popular consent to every measure, on the ground that the majority of the whole community is the best judge of the interest of the community at large. All we ask is that security should be given that the majority in the House of Commons shall represent the opinion of the majority of the electors. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Resolution.

in seconding the Motion, said, that very little had been left for him to urge in support of it. He contended that a change in our representation was very urgently required. It had been promised with regard to Ireland next year; but all the three countries ought to be treated as one, and one great measure ought to be applied to the whole. If a measure of reform was to be applied to Ireland only, it meant of necessity that Ireland was to retain exactly the same number of Members as it now returned, and that the other countries were to be treated in detail. Was Scotland to retain the same number of Members that she had now? Why, Scotland already complained that she had not nearly enough Members. He did not know how far he should be able to show that that was the case; but he should try to do so. A Return had been laid before the House on the Motion of the hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. M'Laren), in which a comparison was made between the number of representatives and the population and taxation of the three countries. It was shown that, according to population, England ought to have 470 Members, instead of 490; Scotland ought to have 70, instead of 60; and Ireland 112 instead of 105. On the other hand, according to taxation, England would have 514 Members, Scotland 79, and Ireland 65. If, however, a mean were taken between the two, England would be entitled to 494 Members, Scotland to 75, and Ireland to 89. It therefore followed that if Ireland was dealt with on the basis of retaining her present number of Members, that would be unjust to the other countries, and that there was very flagrant injustice in the present system had been very abundantly proved. The hon. Baronet (Sir Charles Billie) had brought forward some figures and he (Mr. Anderson) should bring forward some others. He found that there were in this House eight Members who represented constituencies having an aggregate of 1,800 electors, but there were eight other Members who represented constituencies having 146,000 electors; therefore, the 1,800 electors in the one case had exactly the same political power as the 146,000 in the other. He found that there were 14 Members who represented 3,800 electors; but there were 14 others who represented 239,000. He found that in England there were 57 Members representing constituencies of less than 1,000 electors. Ireland had 28 such constituencies, but Scotland had only 3. England returned 14 Members to represent constituencies of less than 700 electors; Ireland had 23; but Scotland only 1. Eight Irish Members represented less than 300 electors, and 2 of them less than 200. When they came to consider the matter of power in an election the contrast was equally remarkable. In the little borough of Portarlington 70 voters were enough to return a Member to this House; but in such large constituencies as Glasgow, Liverpool, and Hackney, it required 18,000 or 19,000 votes to secure a seat. There could be no sort of comparison between such cases, and he was at a loss to know how any case could be made for the existence of such small boroughs. The only defence he had over heard made for them was, that it was desirable to retain them for great statesmen who wished to be free from local work in order to devote their time to the consideration of great questions. But fact was contrary to theory, for they did not find as a rule, small boroughs returned great statesmen. He did not think he should be saying anything derogatory to Portarlington when he said that it had not yet returned a great statesman. There were many double constituencies very little better. Tiverton had two Members for 1,200 electors; Berwick had two for 1,300, and Weymouth two for 1,300. Against Truro, with two Members for 1,400 electors, he would place Aberdeen, with only one Member for 14,000. These small constituencies which now had double representation might very well be deprived of one Member; but he would go a great deal further, and say that he could not see any good argument for the existence of double and treble constituencies. He thought that every Member ought to have a constituency of his own, and every constituency ought to have but one Member. The present system of double and treble Members involved a great deal of injustice. For instance, a Member who was giving satisfaction to his constituents was obliged to fight for his seat just as if he were not giving satisfaction. Again, when one Member did not wish to sit again, his Colleague was obliged to fight if there was a contest, although that Colleague might be giving so much satisfaction that alone he would not be required to fight it. That was, he thought, a very strong argument for the abolition of double constituencies. The case of the treble ones was far worse. The system of giving two votes when three Members were returned was productive of nothing but confusion, If there were added to that the cumulative vote, as had been suggested by the hon. Member for Boston (Mr. Collins) it would make "confusion worse confounded." In the elections to the school boards in Scotland they had gained much experience as to the cumulative vote, and he thought that in hardly a case were the same men returned as would have been the case with single voting. The cumulative vote was simply a scheme for the stultification of majorities. He should not trouble the House at greater length, for he thought they had made out a very good case for the Resolution which he seconded.

moved, as an Amendment, to add the words—

"By the application of the cumulative vote or otherwise, so as to secure a better proportional representation of the people in the respective constituencies."

He thought that the House would look at this question in a very different light from one simply of arithmetic. The hon. Member opposite (Mr. Anderson) went into figures to show that Scotland ought to have more Members; but the question they had to discuss was this—in constituting a new House of Commons they had to consider how they could get a proper reflex of all the opinions in the country; and before they pulled the House about their ears they had to take care that the House, as reconstituted, would be as likely to give them a fair representation of the people as the existing system of representation. He contended that before they examined into the question of the redistribution of seats they ought to have some sort of knowledge upon what principle the reconstitution was to be. In England there were 75 county constituencies that returned two Members, and of these 59 returned two Gentlemen who sat upon the same side of the House, whilst only 16 returned Members who sat on different sides—Cornwall, for example, returning all Liberals, and Kent all Conservatives. Now, if they were to give an addition of Members proportioned to population, every one of these counties would have additional Members; so that unless they had the cumulative vote there would be an increase of the existing evil—that of a representation of a bare majority. In 1832, on Mr. Mackworth Praed proposing that in three-cornered constituencies each elector should have two votes, Lord Althorp assured him it was impossible to return in any county constituency two Members exclusively of one party; but that state of things had passed away, and at the General Elections in 1852 and 1859, when party feeling ran so high, of the 21 Members returned by the unicorn counties in England 20 sat upon the same side of the House, and at present only one county constituency in five was divided between the two parties; and if the principle of the present Motion were unqualified it would aggravate the evil. Adding a third Member to counties would only increase the injustice. If population were to be the basis, and if variety of representation were desired, there must be districts with three or five Members; and with the modern and scientific principle of cumulative voting, which had operated successfully in the English, and, he believed, in the Scotch school board elections, this would represent not the dominant majority, but the various elements in their approximately proper proportions. He had no sympathy whatever with Mr. Hare's plan of personal representation, seeing no reason why an elector in Westminster should vote for a candidate at Glasgow. Such a question and that of the cumulative vote should by no means get mixed up together. At the last General Election in the metropolis, if the theory of mere numbers was a right one—which he thought it was not—they should have had for the metropolis about the same number of Representatives as Scotland had. At that Election there were 22 Members returned for the whole metropolis, with its 275,000 electors; but of these, except for the University representation in the City, there was only one Gentleman who sat upon the Conservative side of the House, his hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith). Even if the metropolis were divided into wards, as had been suggested, the result would be precisely the same; and no one would pretend to believe that the Conservative party in the metropolis was in the proportion of 1 to 22. Not the wildest Liberal fanatic would assert that. This evil as to the returns would not be remedied by merely giving an increase of Members to the metropolis, when they would be returned by a bare majority. They had so managed that with a party numbering one-third of the constituents of the metropolis they had only one twenty-second part of the representation. It might be said that the Conservative Members for certain counties and boroughs represented in some way the Conservative minority in the metropolis, and that was all very well so long as they left things alone; but it was now said that the representation should be placed upon a basis on which such an argument would no longer be available. In re-constituting constituencies they would have to go further than the consideration of mere numbers; and in an old country like this they should have some means of representing minorities. What he said of the metropolis applied equally to other parts of the kingdom— for example, to Ulster or to Scotland—where a dominant party prevailed. Let thorn look at the representation of the county of Lancaster which, of course, according to his view, was in a most satisfactory condition. Everyone knew that in Lancashire there was a large and important Liberal element, and this was practically disfranchised. At the General Election there voted in Lancashire for the Conservatives 26,400 persons, whilst the Liberals polled 23,190; so that, considering the Members returned, it was only a majority of 3,000 that sent eight Members to the House, and the 23,000 sent none. He did not complain of this; but still it would aggravate the inequality if Lancashire returned 20 or 24 Members. There was a similar state of things in Kent. The hon. Members who sat on his side of the House were voted for by about 11,900 persons, whilst those on the opposite side had 10,800 votes; and the odd 1,000 really returned six Members. The Motion of his hon. Friend opposite would go far to augment this evil. He (Mr. Collins) did not wish to see that House filled with middle-aged merchants representing large towns, and broad-aged squires representing counties. What they wanted was a representation of persons, interests, prejudices, and all the various opinions in the country, and not a representation of mere numbers. Before they passed an abstract Resolution of this sort, they ought to have some sketch as to the form in which they would re-model the constituencies. This Motion simply was that our present system was defective; but he had himself shown the inequalities that prevailed, and he contended that it would be unjust if some means were not taken to give representation to minorities in such places as Lancashire and the metropolis.

Far be it from me to deny that there is great force in the speeches which were made by my hon. Friend who proposed and my hon. Friend who seconded this Motion, or to deny that there is much force also in many of the views urged by the hon. Member for Boston (Mr. Collins), whose speech, as far as it goes in relation to the particular illustrations he gave us in the cases of the metropolis, Lancashire, and Kent, is in harmony substantially with the speeches of the Mover and Seconder of the Motion; because the general upshot of his argument is to show that there is great force of reasoning in favour of a change in the present system of representation. For my own part, I am not able to support either the original Motion or the Amendment, for reasons which I will briefly state, without entering into the merits of the question. I wish first to observe that there is something peculiar in the wording of the Motion. We are called upon to vote—

"That, in the opinion of this House, it is desirable to redress the inequalities in the distribution of Electoral power in England and Scotland as well as in Ireland."

I do not know whether I interpret the intention with which these words have been drawn correctly; but I interpret the Motion to assume that we have already arrived at a determination to remedy electoral grievances in Ireland. My hon. Friend founded upon that assumed concession an inference that we should enter into the redress of similar inequalities in England and Scotland. I can only say that I am not aware of any announced determination of the House to apply at any given time a remedy for the inequalities of electoral power in Ireland, nor am I aware of any engagement given by Her Majesty's Government to submit the subject at any given time to the consideration of the House. It has been mentioned once or twice with regard to the proposal of the appropriation of certain vacant seats in Ireland, and I think my noble Friend the Chief Secretary for Ireland has gone so far as to express an opinion, in which I concur, that it would be advantageous at some early opportunity to consider the question of the redistribution of seats in Ireland, more extensively than the appropriation of the seats which are now vacant. So far it is easy to go; but I am not aware that anything has occurred to lead the House to assume that there is a fixed intention on the part of the Government to deal with the redistribution of seats in Ireland in a given time. Is it desirable, then, that we should proceed to deal with the question of the redistribution of seats generally? or if we do not think it desirable, should we pass a Resolution affirming that it is desirable? It appears to me that both these questions should be answered in the negative. My hon. Friend himself has shown indisposition to go beyond the delivery of a speech. I take it that this Motion is one of that class of Motions which are intended to act on opinion out of doors, to make a contribution towards a gradual formation of public opinion on a great subject. I do not venture to censure those who think fit to adopt that mode of proceeding, or who think fit to make their place in Parliament the place in which they attempt to instruct and enlighten the country on these matters; but that certainly is the construction which I put on the Motion of my hon. Friend. If he means more than that, it is his duty to embody his intentions in a Bill, and to lay before us in clear and intelligible detail, not merely the defects which exist in the present system, but likewise the mode in which such defects are to be remedied. Let us recollect that this is, after all, a choice of many evils. I believe that of all the subjects that could be submitted to Parliament, there is no one that embraces a greater multitude of topics than the redistribution of seats. It appears to me that when next the question of redistribution is to be dealt with, it must be dealt with on a scale of considerable magnitude. Further than that I do not profess to see. It would hardly be possible to enumerate all the topics that enter into this subject, or the various modes that might be pursued in legislating upon it. The relations of town and county representation, the relations of town and county franchise, the question between single representation and plurality of representation, the mode of qualifying plurality of representation—all these are merely heads under which again the subject branches out into other heads; and therefore it is that I say when the question of redistribution is again touched it must be touched on a large scale. But there is one other proposition which I think may be laid down with considerable confidence, and that is that it is a question which it is idle for the House to approach, with any desire of attaining a practical end, unless it is approached at the commencement of a Session which it is able to devote to the work. The subject is one on which there is so much room for differences of opinion that it is only by a mere balance that the several points can be decided, and that balance cannot be ascertained except under circumstances favourable for introducing the question. I do not dispute that various abstract arguments can be advanced in support of the redistribution of seats; but I am at issue with my hon. Friend on the question of urgency. Is this a matter which it is urgent that Parliament should deal with at the present time? If it is, I can only say that all the other questions which we have now in hand, and which we contemplate dealing with before the close of the Session, had better be thrown overboard at once, in order that we may have something like a clear start to address ourselves to this question. It is not enough to show that there are great defects in the present distribution of seats. It is necessary to show that the public mind, the public opinion of the country, is in a state of expectancy and of preparation for dealing with this matter. I must confess that I have not seen any clear or manifest sign that the public entertain the opinion that this is a subject which has stronger claims on the House of Commons than many other matters with which we are or may be occupied. My hon. Friend, I am bound to say—however ingenious and able his statement has been, however telling in some striking descriptions of the defects now existing—has really given us no assistance with regard to the mode of change which is to be adopted when we come to consider the question of change. My hon. Friend referred to some declarations made by me to the effect that it was highly probable that this year or the coming year this subject would be dealt with. He professed to quote my words; but I certainly cannot exactly recognize any word used by me in the reference that he made. That a recurrence to the subject of the redistribution of seats is a probable event within a limited period of time I have thought and still think. So far as that I am prepared to go; but I am not aware that at any time I, for one, have indicated a particular period at which it would be the duty of Parliament to apply itself to the consideration of this subject; and I think it pretty plain that it is not in the present Session of Parliament that we can deal with it. This is a Parliament in the fifth year of its existence, and with plenty of arrear of work of urgent necessity to deal with during the remaining period of its constitutional life. I may say that I am not very sanguine in the expectation that it would be possible that this subject could be dealt with even if there were greater urgency in the demand for it than appears to me to be the case. I will not enter into any other question of reform of the representation of the people further than to say that it does appear to me that there are other matters connected with the representation of the people which have stronger and more urgent claims on the attention of Parliament than the question of the redistribution of seats. But I would really hope that my hon. Friend will not press the House to do that which of all things is objectionable—namely, to make a declaration that it is desirable to redress defects in the representation of the people, which is in the nature of a promise to do what we are not able to do at the time, and which we do not know when we shall be able to do. Nothing is to be gained, and much is to be lost, to the prestige and influence of Parliament by promises of that kind. Let us reserve all such promises until the time comes when we may be in a position to redeem them. If hon. Gentlemen think it expedient to the public interest that we should have from time to time discussions on this question without intending to proceed to a practical issue that is a matter on which it is not for me to give an opinion; but, for my own part, I feel the greatest objection to ask of Parliament anything in the nature of an abstract declaration of such a character. I think that whatever may be the personal opinion of my hon. Friends who moved and seconded the Motion, they cannot give to the Motion any other character than that of an abstract declaration without any promise or probability of early fulfilment; and on that account, without entering into the argument of the expediency of a change, I hope that the House will withhold its assent from the original Motion; and if it does, I do not suppose that the Mover of the Amendment will grieve very much if the words that he proposes to add are not agreed with.

said, the right hon. Gentleman's principal objection to this Resolution was that it was an abstract Resolution, and he (Mr. Dixon) did not suppose that anyone would imagine that the carrying of this Resolution, if it should be carried, would be likely to be followed immediately by the introduction of a Bill. The object of any Resolution of this kind was to test the opinion of the House and to enable it to form some idea as to the opinions of the country. The Government could not bring in any great measure without having first ascertained what the opinion of this House and of the country might be upon the question with which they desired to deal. He would venture to say that in large constituencies which were inadequately represented, at the present moment there was a very considerable amount of feeling on this question. That feeling had already found its utterance in various parts of the country, and in his opinion the time had arrived when it was advisable to discuss the question more fully. What was it they had to go the country upon at the next General Election? They would have to go to the country upon something. There were, no doubt, many hon. Gentlemen in the House who represented constituencies of a very convenient character—which required very little expression of opinion, and cared very little about what opinion was expressed. That was not the case with those who represented the large counties and boroughs; they had to state what their opinions were on the questions which were already before the country, and also upon those which were likely soon to come before the country. He (Mr. Dixon) could not attend a meeting of his constituents without being asked his opinion on this subject, and whether he thought it likely that the question would be taken up by the Government. Would hon. Gentlemen prefer to take up the question of the disestablishment of the English Church? Would they prefer that they should take up the land question? These questions were the alternatives of this question of reform. The Government of the future would be bound by the very condition of their existence to consult the opinion of the people on this question, and take it up one way or the other. He would point out to the House that this question had been fully considered at Birmingham, and Birmingham had a right, through him, to state their grounds for the feeling that existed with regard to the great injustice thus done to such constituencies. He had ascertained that within a radius of 50 miles of Birmingham there were 15 boroughs which were in their constituent elements essentially different from Birmingham. They had no manufacturing or commercial elements in them. These 15 boroughs sent 20 representatives, and these representatives represented 150,000 inhabitants. Birmingham, with a population more than double that number, only sent to that House three Members. Did they believe for a moment that a large constituency like Birmingham could be satisfied with one-fifteenth of the political power of these small boroughs which were in the immediate neighbourhood of Birmingham? What was the difference in the circumstances of those boroughs that should give to them 15 times as much political power as Birmingham? Were they more wealthy? It was well known that in Birmingham the working classes had much higher wages, and the shopkeepers and others were in a more prosperous condition. Were they better educated in these small boroughs than they were in Birmingham? On the contrary, they had in Birmingham many elements of education which did not exist at all in these small boroughs. Birmingham had technical schools, and higher class education, of which the working men availed themselves. They had also free libraries and museums. They had a degree of self-government in large constituencies which did not exist to the same extent in small boroughs, and he would venture to say that, besides being better governed and more educated, they were, from the very necessity of the case, more intelligent. There was scarcely a question which was not discussed in a borough like Birmingham. They had meetings innumerable on all questions. [Laughter.] Hon. Members might laugh, but how were they to arrive at a knowledge of, and a conclusion upon, any question unless they were to discuss it, and listen to those who understood it? In a constitutional country like this it was the only way in which an intelligent and enlightened opinion could be arrived at. He was justified in saying that these constituencies must be more intelligent than those small places where they never held meetings. He had been told in some constituencies the Members did not think of going near them once a-year. He thought there was more than that. He thought these large constituencies were more independent, as well as more intelligent. He would venture to say that there was not a representative on either side of the House, of a large borough, who was not perfectly aware that it would be out of the question to think of bringing to bear a personal interest on the great mass of the voters. If he wished to do so, he could not. The way in which elections were carried on was by addressing the constituencies. In small boroughs it was far different. The influence which was brought to bear on the individual voter was a personal influence; it was the influence of the employer, the influence of the customer at the shop; it was the influence, it might be, of the landowner. They knew perfectly well that this direct personal influence was, unfortunately, greater in the smaller constituencies than in the large ones. The result was that in our large constituencies there was an amount of independence which did not exist in the small ones. If in those large constituencies the working men were richer, if they were mere intelligent, if they were bettor educated, and if they were more independent, he would again ask on what grounds were they to be told that they were to rest satisfied, although these small constituencies had 15 times the amount of representation in this House than the large constituencies had? It was a question of simple justice. In a constitution self-governed like England each individual ought to have the same power as his neighbours. He knew that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) would call that mere theory. At any rate, lot the justice of it be acknowledged. Let them say that they would consider the question at the earliest possible date. That, at least, was what they had a right to expect from the House.

said, he had examined the Papers which had reached hon. Members with reference to the numbers of electors in each borough. On turning first of all to his own constituency, Clitheroe, he found that the name was spelt wrongly, but that was of small importance. He next of all discovered that the number of electors was set down at 727. Now, as he himself polled more than that number, and as the gentleman who did him the honour to oppose him unfortunately polled nearly as many, he naturally came to the conclusion that the Return was inaccurate. He accordingly telegraphed to the town clerk, and had received a reply stating that the number of Parliamentary electors for the borough of Clitheroe was 1,727. By this it would be seen that in the Paper furnished to hon. Members the first figure was omitted, and as there might be other trifling omissions of this description, he would suggest that before they did anything in the matter, it would be advisable to obtain reliable Returns.

Sir, when my hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles Dilke) moved last year that

"No measure dealing with the redistribution of Electoral Representation will be satisfactory to this House which does not extend to Scotland and Ireland, and which does not give an equal share of political power to all Electors,"

I supported his Motion, and I am now also prepared to support the converse proposition which he has submitted to the House—namely, "that it is desirable to redress the inequalities of the distribution of Electoral power in England and Scotland as well as in Ireland." The hon. Baronet has pointed out so clearly the necessity for reform in England, and my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson) has made out so strong a case on behalf of Scotland, that I shall entirely confine the few remarks which I trust the House will allow me to make to an examination of the state of the Irish representation. I shall endeavour to show that not only is the distribution of electoral power in Ireland unequal and anomalous as it is in England, but that Ireland has been left, if I may so speak, a stage behind in the progress of reform. I do not intend to trouble the House with many figures drawn from the statistics of Irish constituencies. One or two facts will be sufficient to show the existence of a state of things which is most unsatisfactory, I might almost say absurd. There are, in round numbers, 1,500,000 men of mature age in Ireland, and of these, according to a Return issued this morning, about 220,000 possess the Parliamentary franchise—170,000 in counties, and the remaining 50,000 in boroughs. Of the total number of these Irish electors, 66,000, representing constituencies with an aggregate population of about 1,500,000, return 59 Members, leaving only 42 Members, exclusive of the representatives of Dublin University, to represent the remaining 157,000 electors, or constituencies with an aggregate population of nearly 4,000,000. That is to say, a considerable majority of the Members are returned by a comparatively small minority of the electors. It is evident, therefore, that in a division of this House a majority of the Irish Members may represent a minority of the Irish people. There are 28 constituencies, with an aggregate population of about 300,000, represented by 31 Members; while one great constituency, with a population of 400,000, has only two Members. In this way a population of 300,000 possesses 15½ times as much representation as the larger population of 400,000. When we inquire into the causes of this anomalous state of things, we find that it is mainly due to the enormous numerical disproportion between the small urban constituencies and the counties. There are, according to the Return to which I hate already referred, 19 boroughs in Ireland of which the population is under 10,000, and of these five—namely, Kinsale, Mallow, Portarlington, Downpatrick, and Dungannon, have less than 5,000 inhabitants, and under 270 electors. It is evident that the electors in these little towns, or rather villages, have an entirely disproportional amount of political influence. The question at once suggests itself, why not disfranchise these small and comparatively unimportant towns, and transfer the seats to the great constituencies of such counties as Cork, Down, and Mayo? No doubt the separate political existence of such a place as Portarlington cannot be defended, and I have no intention of attempting to defend it; but there are, in my opinion, some very serious objections to a wholesale transfer of seats from boroughs to counties. I am inclined to believe that the most glaring anomalies in the Irish electoral system can best be removed, not by weakening the urban representation, but by reforming and widening it. This can be done by the application of principles which have already been ap- plied to England and Scotland. In dealing with this portion of the subject, I am much indebted to the published letters of the hon. and learned Member for the City of Limerick (Mr. Butt), in which the state of the Irish urban representation is very fully examined. The first fact that strikes one in connection with this matter is the extremely small number of persons who possess the borough franchise in Ireland, in proportion to the population either of the whole country or of the cities and towns. The total number of city and borough electors is 50,000, and if from this number we subtract 28,000—the constituencies of Dublin and Belfast—there are only 22,000 votes left for all the remaining cities and towns of Ireland. In England there are 1,350,000 borough electors; and Scotland, with its small population, has over 180,000. This great difference is no doubt, to some extent, to be attributed to the fact that Ireland is an agricultural country, with an almost exclusively rural population, while this country abounds in great towns which are centres of manufacturing and commercial industry. It would, however, be an error to suppose that the extremely small number of Irish, as compared with English and Scotch borough voters is entirely due to this cause. This is clear from the fact that the disproportion is far greater between the aggregate number of electors than it is between the aggregate populations of the cities and towns of the three portions of the United Kingdom. One great cause of this disproportion is the fact that the popular franchise which prevails in the English and Scotch boroughs has never been extended to Ireland, and that the boundaries of Irish boroughs have not been altered and enlarged, or new electoral districts formed on the principles which were applied to England by the Reform Act of 1867. We can realize the significance of this fact when we remember that the provisions of this Act more than doubled the English borough constituency. Before the year 1867 the English borough electors did not amount to more than 500,000, now, as I said before, they are over 1,300,000. I am anxious to call the attention of the House to the useless and invidious distinction between the borough franchises of England and Ireland. In English and Scotch boroughs, as hon. Members are aware, the last Reform Bill admitted every rated occupier to the franchise, and as a remarkable achievement of Conservative policy, virtually established household suffrage. In Ireland, on the other hand, the Act of 1868 limited the borough franchise to occupiers rated at £4. This distinction lies so much at the root of the whole question, that I must venture to enter into it a little more fully. In English and Scotch boroughs every rated occupier is entitled to a vote, and the officer whose duty it is to make out the rate is obliged by law—no matter by whom the rate is paid—to find out the name of the actual occupier of every house, and to place it on the books. The English Reform Act specially provides that nothing is to be allowed to interfere with the proper registry of every occupier as a payer of rates, and consequently as an elector. Contrast this really liberal and popular franchise with that established in Ireland by the Act of 1868. By that Act the borough franchise is fixed at £4 rating, and as the letting value of most houses, especially those in towns, is considerably above the sums at which they are rated, I do not think I exaggerate when I say that all occupiers of houses let under £6 are absolutely excluded from the vote and deprived of that constitutional privilege which every Scotch and English borough householder enjoys. In addition to this, the Irish provisions as regards the rating of occupiers over the franchise limit are extremely defective. There are two ways by which we can roughly estimate the effect of the distinctions of which I have been speaking in excluding Irish borough householders from the suffrage; one is by comparing the number of inhabited houses with the number of registered electors in the Irish boroughs, and the other is by contrasting the number of electors in Irish boroughs with the number of electors in Scotch and English boroughs of about the same population. The total number of inhabited houses in Irish boroughs is over 120,000, and the total number of electors is only 50,000. Let us see the proportion in two or three cases. Armagh has 1,196 inhabited houses and 621 electors; Carlow has 1,383 houses and 317 electors, and Belfast 27,000 houses and 15,000 electors. Now let us compare the proportion of voters to the population in English, Scotch, and Irish towns respectively. I shall only name a few instances, not specially selected. Galway has a population of 19,000 and 1,400 electors. Boston with a population of 18,000 has 2,600 electors. Ayr, a population under 18,000 and 2,400 electors. Again, the City of Waterford with a population of 30,000 has a constituency of 1,300. Dover with a population of 28,500 has 3,500 electors. Perth with 25,000 inhabitants has 3,700 electors, and so on through the whole list. It only remains to ask on what grounds many thousands of Irish householders are thus excluded from the enjoyment of the political privileges which have been intrusted to the great body of English and Scotch householders? What sufficient reason is there why the occupier of a house should be excluded from the franchise because his house is situated in an Irish instead of a Scotch or English town? I believe the distinction is arbitrary and unreasonable, and one which ought to be removed. One effect of introducing household suffrage into Irish boroughs would be to admit a considerable number of working men within the pale of the Constitution, and I believe that the progress of education and enlightenment among that class would fully justify their admission. The Irish working man of the present day is very different from what he was 30 or 40 years ago. He has probably attended a good primary school; he is acquainted with the English language; he knows how to read and write; and he has begun to study the newspapers. His mind is active, and he is potential for good or evil. He finds himself, however, completely shut out from constitutional political influence; and remember this, the exclusion of the non-electors from any voice in public questions is far more complete now than it has been. It is only a short time since every elector was made feel, to some extent at least, that he held his vote in trust for others; he went openly to the polling booth under the observation and influence of those about him, and with that sense of responsibility to others, which always accompanies the public discharge of a public duty. All this has been changed. I am far, indeed, from approving of violence or intimidation; I know that deplorable excesses in this respect have sometimes taken place; but, still, it must be admitted that under the old system of open voting the non- electors were able to exert a certain legitimate influence which they no longer possess. I was one of those who voted in favour of the Ballot; but I did so on the principle of choosing the lesser of two evils. I had seen enough to convince me that, in Ireland at least, secrecy was absolutely necessary for the protection of the humbler class of voters from various kinds of undue influence. My argument simply is, that since the working classes have been deprived of the indirect but legitimate influence which they possessed before the Ballot—and this at a time when they are advancing in education and intelligence, and consequently in the capacity for comprehending public questions and discharging public duties—it is desirable to compensate them for this loss by admitting them to a greater degree of direct political power. I believe that I establish a strong case for immediate reform when I show that this can be accomplished by doing for Ireland what has been done for England and Scotland—namely, by assimilating the borough franchises, and thus abolishing a useless and invidious distinction between the different portions of the United Kingdom. I am perfectly certain that if the Irish working classes had more direct political power than they possess at present, more earnestness would be exhibited on their behalf by the Government, and some effort would have been made to meet the often-admitted necessity of introducing a measure dealing with their condition. Returning, however, to the question of Irish urban representation, we find that a considerable reform of its abuses could be effected by a just and equal application of the principles by which the English and Scotch boroughs were reformed in 1867 and 1868. The hon. and learned Member for Limerick has made a calculation by which he shows that if this course were adopted we might have in Ireland 31 towns returning 39 Members—that these towns would have an aggregate population exceeding 900,000, and an aggregate number of electors of more than 120,000. None of these towns would be in population below 5,000. All of them would have, on the lowest estimate, constituencies of more than 600, and in very few of them would the electors be less than 1,000. I do not pretend to say that this would be a thorough and complete removal of the inequalities of the Irish representation; but I do maintain that it would be a great improvement in the existing state of things; and I hold that it is a simple and moderate measure of reform, which, with the precedents of England and Scotland in view, there is no ground for refusing to extend to Ireland. I must protest against any proposal—and we have heard something from high quarters of such a proposal—to diminish the inequalities between the Irish constituencies by any scheme which would narrow the bounds of political privilege, and decrease the number of enfranchised persons in Ireland. This would be the direct result of a transference of seats from boroughs to counties. The county franchise is limited to £12 rating, while the borough franchise descends to £4. If therefore you were to throw borough into county constituencies—which is the meaning of a transference of seats—while the difference in the franchise remains unchanged, you would actually disfranchise altogether a large proportion of the present boroughs electors—all those whose rating does not come up to the county qualification, and you would transfer their political power to the existing body of county electors very slightly increased. This would be a retrograde step—a measure of disfranchisement directly opposed to the principle of extending the limits of political privilege as education and intelligence advance. In Ireland, at the present time, the basis of electoral power is unduly contrasted as compared with England and Scotland; for while a majority of English and Scotch Members are elected by household suffrage, only about one-third of the Irish Representatives are returned on the lower franchise, and even that is limited to £4 rating. You must not increase this disproportion by diminishing the number of Irish Members elected on the more popular franchise. I hope the House may be of opinion that I have shown some grounds for my statement that Ireland has been left a stage behind England and Scotland in the progress of electoral reform. No doubt, if the Irish urban constituencies were treated in the way I have indicated, there would still remain considerable inequality in the distribution of political power. I do not see how this inequality can be altogether removed without injury to popular right while the present distinction is maintained between the county and the borough franchises. Reform as you may, you cannot get great urban constituencies in Ireland for this simple reason—that there is no great urban population there. Whether, this being so, there is any sufficient ground for maintaining any distinction between county and borough Representatives—a distinction which does not altogether correspond to any real distinction in the character of the population—is a question into which I shall not enter. If this distinction were abolished, and an uniform franchise established, all irregularities and anomalies might be removed by dividing the county into electoral districts, and assigning a certain number of Members to each. This, however, is a question more of the future than of the present. I have simply desired to point out a moderate and practical measure of reform which Ireland is justly entitled to claim, and which, I believe, would tend to make her Parliamentary representation a more true and adequate reflection of the national mind.

in reply, said, that not being responsible for the Returns he must leave the hon. Member for Clitheroe (Mr. Assheton) to deal with the Home Office as to the accuracy of the figures he had cited. With regard to the promise of the Government to deal with the redistribution of seats in Ireland, he remembered it well, because it was made on the 10th of February by the Chief Secretary, and gave rise to a general laugh, because the noble Lord said that while the Government were prepared to deal with the question in this Parliament they were not prepared to do so in this Session, thereby implying that the Parliament would not come to an end in the present year. He was opposed to the hon. Member for Boston's (Mr. Collins') Amendment, because it was like counting one's chickens before they were hatched, and he should prefer to divide the House on the original Resolution.

expressed his willingness to withdraw his Amendment, and said he was sorry the good example he set was not about to be followed by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea.

in rising to move—

"That, inasmuch as it would greatly conduce to the diminution of our Military expenditure and the improvement of our Military organisation, that our establishment of officers, in all ranks, should be founded upon the actual requirements of the public service, the House is of opinion that no further appointments should be made to the honorary Colonelcies of regiments,"

said, there was, perhaps, nothing more striking than a comparison between the discontent felt in the country about the amount of our military expenditure and the small effect which that discontent produced upon our proceedings in that House. Anyone who contrasted the size of the Estimates with the Division List of the minority that voted for their reduction might believe that the nation was satisfied that its money was well spent, or else that the House failed to represent the national sentiments. He believed that neither the one nor the other was the case, but that the real cause of the apparently small number of economists on these benches was that the Resolution on which they were called upon to vote often mixed up questions of policy with questions of administration, and even when it was more carefully drawn the debate generally took such a course as to give almost every one, whatever his opinions, a reason for voting against it. The object of his Resolution was to give hon. Gentlemen something definite to vote upon. It did not touch the question of foreign policy, or of the increase or diminution of the fighting strength of the country. It left alone altogether controversies about military organization, reserves, recruiting, and auxiliary forces. Taking our Army as it stood, since the reforms of the right hon. Gentleman, it asked the House whether the interests of the nation, financial and military, had been sufficiently consulted in the arrangements for officering and commanding it. He did not propose to indulge in any sensational statistics, which only led to controversy, and controversy, too, of rather a one-sided character. The last time he ventured upon that dangerous ground, by adding up how much a head it cost to officer each of our soldiers, his calculation was falsified by the very simple pro- cess of publishing a Return of the cost of our officers, in which the allowances for provisions, forage, servants, and lodging, besides other items, were omitted, which produced very much the same effect as those rhetoricians who gave the weekly money wages of our agricultural labourers, and took no account of his cottage and garden, his payment in kind, and his hay and harvest money. He should confine himself exclusively to statements which might be challenged separately and on the spot, and, after hearing those statements, he felt satisfied that many hon. Gentlemen who would refuse to support a Resolution for reducing the number of men would join in a protest against a state of things under which the tax-payer suffered, while the Army, so far from gaining, positively lost in efficiency. He would begin with our regimental officers; and examine whether, in the words of the Resolution, they were in accordance "with the actual requirements of the public service." It was at once manifest that no fair comparison could be made between the peace establishments of different arms of the service and different nations. In our own case he proposed to take our Indian establishment, for in India, in case of war breaking out, it was manifest that a regiment must be, as far as recruiting was concerned, on its war footing. In taking the number of officers, he proposed to exclude the honorary colonel, the paymaster, and quartermaster, and, in the case of the cavalry, the riding-master and the veterinary surgeon. Our cavalry, then, had. 22 officers to 460 men, exclusive of the depôt troop, or a proportion of about 1 officer to 21 men. The proportion of officers in the four war squadrons of a Prussian regiment was 1 to 28. But it was not fair upon our Army to take this single case. In Russia, Austria, and Italy, the proportion was 1 to 24, and in France 1 to 17. The exigences of modern warfare, where cavalry charge less and scout more, require a large outfit of regimental officers to command detachments, and by comparison with the continental average our cavalry showed well, with the exception of the Household Brigade. It was almost ridiculous to talk of the war strength of a regiment which had never, in the lifetime of its oldest officer, been exposed to the dangers of an unhealthy climate, and which bore no name on its standards of a later date than Waterloo; and it was hardly creditable to our military administration that the most highly-paid of all our cavalry officers should be in a permanent proportion to their men of 1 to something over 18. With regard to what might be called the regimental officers of our Artillery—those who were attached to the batteries—the account was better still, for there we had 5 to a command of 150 men, or 1 in 30, which did not differ essentially from the Prussian. Why our artillery officers continued to do so much duty might be seen by anyone who examined the Return of leave granted to officers laid on the Table in 1871. He would discover that all our artillery officers quartered in England together obtained 13,571 days' leave, or 40 days a-piece, while the officers of our Household Brigade, commanding three weak regiments, got nearly 10,000 days' leave among them. That was to say, each officer in those regiments was absent from his regimental duties on the average 140 days in the year. It was not, therefore, surprising that it took five of them to do the work which was performed by three artillery officers. But it was a very different story when we came to the infantry. In this instance our practice was contrary to that of every other contemporary people. Prussia had 69 officers to a regiment of 3,097, or 1 to 45 men; France, 1 to 50; Russia, 1 to 40; Austria, 1 to 52; and Italy 1 to 38. Our infantry regiments on their Indian strength contained 885 non-commissioned officers and rank and file, and 30 officers, or a proportion of 1 to 29. On this point it was most important that we should not be misled by any talk of strong cadres, ready to receive our reserves in case of an emergency. When 885 men were distributed among eight companies, the cadres of an English regiment were at their fullest. Why did we require in this country 3 officers to do the work which was done in Prussia by 2? It could not be said that that was on account of the inefficiency either of our non-commissioned officers or of our officers themselves. It was difficult to understand, therefore, why we needed half as many again captains and subalterns as France and Prussia, except, perhaps, on the principle that we could not have too much of a good thing. We had at home and in the Colonies 98 bat- talions, or, including the West Indian regiments, exactly 100. At the rate of 10 officers to a battalion, that made 1,000 superfluous officers, which, at a very moderate computation of pay and allowances, amounted to £200,000 a-year. But this was only a small part. We must also take into consideration the battalions quartered in India, for, though their pay came from Indian funds, when they returned from India they were upon our hands as long as their lives lasted. So that we had 1,500 superfluous claimants for their share of half-pay, full-pay, retirement, and pensions, posthumous and during life, of every description, which this year amounted, for our commissioned officers alone, to the gigantic sum of £740,000 a-year. With these facts before him, he could not understand how his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War in October, 1871, appointed 20 young officers to the Brigade of Guards. There was no such great hurry to add to the officers of a corps in which, though the pay was higher, and should therefore be harder earned than in the infantry regiments, yet in the year preceding the appointment the officers of the seven battalions had, among them, enjoyed 23,648 days' leave, at the rate of three and a-half months for every officer. Among our own Marines, 320 officers commanded 13,500 men. If those admirable soldiers, instead of knocking about by sea and land from West Africa to Japan, were to be quartered between Dublin, Windsor, and the Birdcage Walk, they would require 520 highly paid officers to do the work which was now done by 320. He had gone through the weakest part of his case. When they came to the superior ranks of the Army, the case was entirely altered. Taking our Indian and English lists together, we had very considerably upwards of 2,000 colonels and lieutenant-colonels, all of whom were in some shape or another supported by the State, but a small proportion of whom were actually engaged in its service. Again, we had in the two armies upwards of 800 generals, who, like the colonels, were all a burden to the State under one form of payment or another. Now the name of general was very honourable indeed when it signified service; but he could not consider it so honourable when it was handed about in such a way as this. Of these 800 generals how many were employed? There were employed 15 in administrative duties at home; 21 commanded at home; 12 in the Colonies; and 43 in India—that was to say, 91 in all. But of these officers, 23 were colonels commanding brigades, so that we were in the position of having 10 generals doing nothing to one who was actually employed. The cause of this scandalous and, from the taxpayers' point of view, this cruel state of things was that, if not for the purpose, still with the practical effect of bewildering and bamboozling the nation, Government after Government had refrained from extending to the Army the wholesome rule which had prevailed in every well-ordered service as the first condition of efficiency and economy, that rank should always be accompanied by corresponding duties. Instead of this simple, rational, and almost universally accepted principle, we lumped together a vast, and to any but a practised professional eye, indistinguishable multitude of officers paid under a multitude of different heads, and of every degree of merit, and he wished he could add of age. Unfortunately, one of the worst results of this system was that we never got a general promoted at an age when his promotion would be useful to the public. The reason was obvious—the number of generals was to be determined not by the needs of the service, but by the utmost which could be squeezed out of the Exchequer. There would always be so many officers unemployed that inefficiency whether from age or demerit would escape notice. In the Peninsular War the Duke of Wellington became major general at 33, Lord Anglesey at 34, Lord Hill at 33, Lord Beresford at 39, and Lord Combermere at 31. Of all the generals employed in that great war, only two had passed the age of 40 without becoming major generals. But the average ago of the officers promoted in 1851 was not less than 60. Was the case any better now? He had recently taken the last four in each rank of our establishment, computing them to have entered the Army at 18; and he found that the four major generals in the Staff Corps were respectively 60, 65, 65, and 51 years of age, and the four not in the Staff Corps, 51, 55, 53, and 49. The last four lieutenant generals—that is to say, the youngest men—were 71, 54, 71, and 80. The last four full generals wore 63, 70, 75, and 71. But he would be told that the title of general gave gratification to an old officer who had served his country faithfully in days gone by. But why in the Army more than elsewhere should a man wait for honour and reward until he was on the verge of the grave? See how the present system weighed upon officers who could work and fight. Let hon. Gentlemen look at the 3rd Buffs in The Army List. There was no man whose reputation for soldierly efficiency stood higher than that of Colonel Walker, at present serving as junior major of four in that regiment. He purchased nothing. He had the Victoria Cross. He cut his way up, sword in hand, till he had no longer an arm with which to wield a sword. He had not been unfairly used. His superiors had done all that they could for him. In Army rank he was not behind the purchasing officer of his own age. But it was not too much to say that before Colonel Walker could, as a general, with general's rank, command his brother soldiers who had so much confidence in him, he would be well on to his grand climacteric. But if it was hard upon the officer that we surrendered the principle that rank should mean service, it was doubly hard upon the taxpayer that we had surrendered the principle that men should be paid by salary for work that they were doing or by pension for work that they had done. Now, in the case of our generals this distinction was utterly lost sight of. Some were paid by what was called salary, and was really pension; others by what was called pension, and was really salary. Others were receiving at the same time both the one and the other. Their principal sources of revenue he would proceed to indicate—£19,000 a-year under the head of Staff pay, and £80,000 a-year as pay for general officers. Then there were the salaries at the Horse Guards and the War Office, and the half and full pay which retired generals received according to the rank in which they left the Army. A considerable number were paid by the Indian Exchequer under the head of colonels' allowances, and in this case he must request attention to the fact that our habit of considering the claims of officers instead of the necessities of the service had, in the case of India, betrayed us into what was nothing short of a national crime. Dealing with other people's money instead of our own, we had placed no effective limit to the number of officers who were to succeed to colonels' allowances; and the consequence was that for the Native Army alone there would seven years hence be £500,000 paid away in colonels' allowances, and before 20 years were out, our Indian fellow-subjects would be paying over £1,000,000 sterling in annuities to superior officers under this single head. We were distributing among our generals a sum of £720,000 a-year, which was equal to the pay of 30 battalions at war strength, or it was sufficient to provide elementary education to Scotland and Ireland. The last and largest items were the £203,500 paid to the fortunate holders of honorary colonelcies; and it was on the existence of these that he was going to take the opinion of the House. Their origin was well known. In old days men of rank and property raised regiments which they paid and clothed out of a lump sum which the Government disbursed for the purpose. He had on a previous occasion related by what steps these offices changed gradually into pure unadulterated sinecures to which fixed incomes wore attached. He deliberately called them sinecures, for they did not fulfil the conditions of a pension. The first condition was that it should vary in uniform proportion to the length of service and amount of salary. But the colonelcies were not uniform, but varying in nine separate amounts from £990 up to £2,200 a-year. The next condition of a pension was that it should not be held at the same time as salary. But about 20 generals were enjoying these so-called pensions at the same time as salaries. No wonder that the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) declared two years ago that he had always thought the system of honorary colonelcies an anomaly and a most objectionable mode of paying for the services of officers. Nor was there anything very elevating in the associations connected with them. From their very foundation they were made the vehicle of the most monstrous jobbery by rich landholders, who took advantage of the danger of their country to plunder and cheat her. The story of what happened in 1745 might be read in Horace Walpole's Letters, and more concisely in Lord Stanhope's History, and what they were at a subsequent date might be seen in the Report of the Committee of this House on Garrison Appointments in the year 1833. That Committee showed that the colonel of the regiment in his character of contractor derived a profit by his regiment being sent to an unhealthy climate, or if a great mortality fell on it. They analyzed the receipts of the colonels, and, in the case of the Grenadier Guards, found them to consist in the colonel's own pay of £1 16s. 7d. a-day, in the profit on allowances for clothing sergeants, corporals, and drummers, 2,184 real men, and 104 fictitious men at £3 17s. and 19–84ths of a penny a-piece; in the pay of 26 fictitious men at 6⅞d. a-day, and in allowance for clothing fictitious warrant men and hautbois for which no deduction was made. The Committee recommended a consolidation and diminution of these allowances; but so perverted was military feeling by the existence and contemplation of these sinecures that in the face of all these 8ths and 84ths of a penny, and these warrant men who never drilled, and hautbois who never played, they actually recommended that—

"In consideration of the great and glorious military services of the Duke of Wellington, exemption should take place in his person from the operation of this rule, and that no change should be made in the emolument of the 1st Guards so long as his Grace shall continue to hold the colonelcy of the Regiment."

But in other respects the example of this Committee—one of those fine outspoken Committees appointed by the first Reform Bill—was well worth the imitation of this House. They had to consider the old garrison appointments, of which the Staff of the Tower of London was now almost the sole relic, and which were defended on precisely the same grounds that the colonelcies are at this moment, and they reported that—

"After fully considering the question of the non-effective garrison appointments with the opinions expressed in their favour by the Duke of Wellington, the Committee are still of opinion that, upon the principle laid down by Parliament that all sinecure offices ought to be abolished, no garrison appointments should in future be made where no efficient military duty is performed; but the Committee do not recommend the withdrawal of the salaries to the prejudice of any existing interests."

They then called attention to the large number of general officers on the list, and expressed their anxious hope that no addition should be made to it, except upon very strong grounds of public necessity. Those who supported the Government in the Abolition of Purchase did so on the ground that the preceding would prepare the way for economies. He had showed in the course of the debate on Purchase that the sums paid for retirement, if properly utilized, would more than provide for a system of pensions, and the Secretary of State for War had in reply to a Motion of his two years ago stated, that when purchase was abolished the question of retirement would be a subject of great care and interest. The first application of that care and interest should be to discover what sources of economy have become available in consequence of the abolition of purchase. Every Commission and Committee that had ever sat was of opinion that the existence of the purchase system was the cause of the great money prizes provided in the higher ranks of our Army, and, above all, the cause of the continuance of the honorary colonelcies. Over and over again this opinion was laid down by the Duke of Wellington. "They cannot," said the Duke of the honorary colonels, "be allowed to sell out. Their money is sunk in the service and lost to them and their families for ever," and the Secretary of State said, in 1871—

"The truth is that when an officer arrives at a certain rank he must choose between two things, whether he shall realize his money or go in for the prizes of the service."

That was the reason for continuing those sinecures upon officers who had already become major generals in 1871; but surely it was an overwhelming reason for refusing to create any more vested interests. During the past two years, however, no less than 47 officers of the British Army had become major generals, of whom, he supposed, 20 or 25, at the least, had sacrificed their money and established a claim for the honorary colonelcies. Would the Government continue to condemn these officers, and continue to allow the creation of fresh vested interests? Would they go further, and defend the system on its merits? We had just as many Secretaries of State as we wanted, and as many Judges. In theory they had only just sufficient Commissioners of Customs and Inland Revenue. In the case of the sister service, no one thought of rewarding the Navy by establishing honorary post captainships or honorary purserships. The fiat had gone forth that thenceforth the ranks of officers in the Navy should be reduced to what the service required—that there should be only 50 admirals, 150 captains, and 200 commanders. Labour unions were denounced on the ground that they did not make regulations with a view to produce as much work as possible, but to increase the number of workmen who did it. Surely the House should set the labour unions an example, and conduct the establishments under its control upon principles recommended for the guardians of the unions? Already an idea had got abroad that they reduced from below and not from above, and that there was one law for the rich and another for the poor. A few years ago several thousand workmen were discharged from the dockyards, and the credit or discredit of that measure—for his own part he regarded it as a creditable measure—rested upon both sides of the House. The discharged persons were not established men, and had no pension; but the implied condition of their service was that they should succeed on good behaviour to the establishment, and obtain continuous employment and a right to pension. They stood exactly in the same position as those officers still on the colonels' list stand with regard to the appointments now in question, and as they stood in 1871. By not treating the officers as the dockyard labourers had been, the country was charged with a prospective expenditure of many thousands a year. How far we had been actuated by unjustifiable tenderness for individuals in dealing with military questions might be seen in the Correspondence between the Home and the India Governments in 1871. Lord Mayo as Commander-in-Chief, and the rest of the Council earnestly pleaded for a large reduction in the number of regiments and batteries in the interest of the overburdened people of India. The opinion of those on the spot, however, was overruled by advice which, under the circumstances of the case, should never have been set against that of Lord Mayo and Lord Sandhurst writing from the Council Room of Calcutta. The Home Government returned an answer stating in so many words that the Army was kept up in the interest of the officers. In conclusion, he would say that it was a very pleasant thing to deal in abstract Motions about economy, which were applauded and ignored, but which nobody resented; but it was much less pleasant to run counter to the feelings of his own class, and incur charges of inaccuracy, the real meaning of which was that he had been only too accurate to suit the interests and susceptibilities of persons strong in numbers, influence, and leisure to write to the newspapers. He could assure the House that in nothing that he had said had he any intention of wounding the feelings of any officer. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving his Resolution.

in seconding the Motion, said, he had no wish to attack any of the honorary colonels, but simply wished to show why the existing system should be altered. The honorary colonels' list now cost the country £230,000 a-year. From age and infirmity few of those on the list could be regarded as effective, yet the charge was made upon the Regimental Vote. No doubt the position was given as a reward of long and distinguished service; but it would be more consistent if the cost of these rewards was placed on the Distinguished Service Vote. Hon. Members were in the habit of making unfavourable comparisons between the cost of the British Army and that of the armies of other countries; but they overlooked or were ignorant of the fact that this disparity was due in great measure to the effective service in this country being charged with a large amount of non-effective pay. The existence of honorary colonelcies would, in his view, entirely prevent the establishment of a satisfactory system of retirement; and therefore, as the creation of such a system lay at the base of the Government measure for the Abolition of Purchase, he thought the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War ought to accept the proposal of the hon. Member for the Border Burghs (Mr. Trevelyan).

said, he could not agree with the proposal of his hon. Friend the Member for the Border Burghs (Mr. Trevelyan), and hoped to be able in a few words to satisfy him that it was not desirable to press his Motion to a Division. It was extremely easy to lay down the principle that, as in civil life, so in the Army, they should only have as many people as were actually required to do the current work. If the Army were intended for peace and not for war, and if it did not happen to be the fact that, while in the earlier ages of the soldier's life there was occupation for a very considerable number of officers in the various positions in the regiments while in the higher ranks of the service they could only employ a small proportion of officers; and if it did not happen further that in time of peace gentlemen did not die exactly at the period that would suit the public Exchequer—namely, at the period when their regimental services were over and they were ready to enter upon the higher ranks—then they could act upon the principle which prevailed in the Civil Service, and only employ as many men in each rank as were actually required for service. The opposite, however, was the case in the Army. It was all very well for his hon. Friend to say that there was an impression created that the Government was very ready to deal harshly with those in the lower ranks of life, but to be unduly circumspect when dealing with persons in the higher ranks, and, in support of this view, to quote the way in which dockyard men not occupying established positions were discharged, and then to compare this with the discharge of officers. But the fact was that were there was a life interest—whether in the Royal Dockyards or in the case of officers in the Army—that life interest had been respected in any changes which might have taken place. His hon. Friend seemed also to have forgotten that when, in the judgment of the Government, it appeared desirable to disband certain regiments in order to reduce the expenditure, no personal interests of the officers stood in the way of the execution of the purpose. So far from this being the case, several regiments were disbanded out of regard to the interest of the taxpayers, and almost entirely without regard to the interests of the officers. His hon. Friend must also excuse him for denying any belief in the opinion that those who had regulated the Government of India, either in the present or any former Administration, had employed the Indian Army for the benefit of the Army and not in order simply to maintain the great and beneficent purposes for which England retained the Empire of India, and the fulfilment of the great charge which England had undertaken in that part of the world. He knew that when the revenue of India was deficient an application was made to him to relieve them of certain forces, and this wish was immediately carried into effect. Now he would say a few words as to the details of the speech of his hon. Friend. Going through the question of the proportion of officers to men in the various branches of the service, he said that in the cavalry branch our Army compared favourably with that of Prussia, where there was one officer to 28 men, and with France, where the proportion was one officer to 17 men, the proportion in our own Army being one officer to 21 men. While admitting, therefore, that our cavalry regiments compared favourably in this respect with those of other European countries, his hon. Friend said that if it came to a war and it was necessary to increase the numbers of the rank and file it would be necessary also to increase the number of officers to command them, and also to meet the casualties of warfare. His hon. Friend had fastened upon the Household Brigade. No doubt the proportion of officers to men was small in the Household Brigade; but if he had come down early in the Session to propose an increase of the number of men in that Brigade he should have been met with the objection that he was proposing to increase that which was the most expensive portion of the Army, and to increase it in a time of profound peace. He regretted the expressions which his hon. Friend had used with reference to the Infantry, because they would give pain to those who read them and would excite feelings in their hearts which he was sure his hon. Friend, who took a real interest in the Army, would be the last to wish to prevail. His hon. Friend should have remembered that three years ago the number of officers was reduced by 1,291. That was a very considerable reduction, and one which should be mentioned when complaint was made that so many officers were retained. Speaking of officers in the Infantry, it was asked—"Why should we have three to two officers in our Army as compared with Prussia?" He would give reasons which to him at least appeared to have some weight. In the first place, he believed it was no secret that the Prussian army at the close of their victorious war was very considerably under-officered. In the second place, we had not in this country that which would be much more objectionable than any excess there might be in our Army Estimates, and that was the system of conscription. But if we were not to have that system we must appoint officers who could lead our troops, and who were of the higher classes, and had received the benefit of a superior education. We must, therefore, be prepared to maintain a larger number of officers, comparatively speaking, than a country that draws its troops equally from all classes of the people. Again let us compare the total number of officers in the British Army with the number of French officers at Sedan. At the capitulation of Sedan 2, 866 officers were surrendered, besides a very large number that had been taken prisoners during the battle. If the number of our officers was greater in proportion to the number of our men than was the case in other Armies, yet the absolute number of our officers was small, and it should be remembered that our Army was designed, not for a period of peace, but for a period of war, and that when we came to be engaged in war, particularly if it were for the defence of this country, we should be very glad indeed if we could avail ourselves of a certain number of superfluous officers, as some called them, to supply casualties, and to join the Auxiliary Forces. With regard to the Motion itself, he was not in the least degree disposed to say any more than his right hon. Friend who preceded him in office (Sir John Pakington), that the institution of honorary colonels was one that he regarded as he did a portion of the British Constitution. He did not think that our regulations in that respect were like the laws of the Medes and Persians, incapable of alteration and improvement. But he thought he could submit to his hon. Friend some reasons why he should not persist in the present Motion. He had to remind him that of the many who entered the Army as officers only a small proportion could find active employment in the higher ranks. We must provide for these men who could not find such employment. How? If by a compulsory retirement on a lower rank, that would be an extremely unpopular thing, and it must be remembered that these men did not enter the Army with the view of compulsory retirement. His hon. Friend said that it was a very agreeable thing to be called a general. That title was, no doubt, part of the inducement to a young man to enter the Army, though with only a small chance of attaining it. But if they told him (Mr. Cardwell) that they were going compulsorily to reduce that man, when his services as a general were not wanted, at the rank of captain—of two things one—either they must give him a very good retiring allowance, and to do so to young men would be a very expensive process, or else if they did not do that they would be called upon to increase the pay of the Army generally; for if they did not give them either one or the other of these advantages they would find a want of candidates for the Army. His hon. Friend who spoke last said—"Let the honorary colonels receive their present allowance, only let them receive it in a different part of the Estimates." That would not contribute much to diminish the burden on the taxpayer. His hon. Friend (Mr. Trevelyan) had admitted that those who had sunk their money under the old purchase system had an equitable claim to be regarded as having a vested interest. His hon. Friend said that a certain number had already risen to be majors general since the abolition of purchase, and that it was not economical for the Government to have permitted that. Now, with great deference to his hon. Friend, he was not prepared, without Anther proof, to admit that it would have been a very economical—certainly it would not have been a reasonable—thing to force those gentlemen to go to the Purchase Commissioners for a settlement of their claims, and so to retire from the service in which they desired to continue, and for which their previous experience and training had qualified them. But there was another point—this question was not deemed by those who had an opportunity of looking at it to be so simple as some persons supposed it to be. It was, in reality, one of the most complicated and difficult questions which anybody could undertake; because what it really meant was not the mere abolition of the name of honorary colonels, nor was it the mere settlement of the question whether the present sum of about £220,000 a-year which was to go to the general officers should be distributed exactly as it was now distributed. The upshot of the thing was that a general, after a service of, perhaps, 40 years, received in round numbers from £460 to £1,000 a-year. The Motion was levelled at the honorary colonels of the Cavalry and the Infantry, but in order to deal with them it was necessary to take into consideration the case of the Artillery and the Engineers. It was a subject that had been inquired into by two Royal Commissions. But further than this, when the Cavalry, the Infantry, the Artillery, and the Engineers were dealt with, that was not all, we should have to deal with the Indian officers, whose rights had been the subject of a Parliamentary guarantee. He was perfectly willing to consider this question with great care as regarded the interests of the taxpayers, and with the view to all the claims of those possessing vested interests who had sacrificed their money and had entered the service with a prospect of obtaining rewards for their services; but as it was a large and complicated question, it could not be dealt with off-hand by a Motion like this in the House of Commons. There were reasons why it was necessary that this question should be examined, and, in point of fact, it was now being examined. One reason was that last year they had established a new scale of promotion for the Artillery and Engineers, which, although it was sufficient for its present purpose, would not be sufficient for all time. There was, however, another reason. After the fixed establishment had been created upon the advice of a Royal Commission, there came a Royal Warrant amalgamating the Indian with the English Army, and the result of that Warrant would be to give an enormous preponderance to the Indian over the English establishment. It was impos- sible for him to agree to a Resolution which, dealing with a complicated system and interests curiously intertwined, would, by a single stroke, effect so great an interference as he had pointed out. It would, in his view, be unjust and unwise to do so. The Government had already taken steps which he should be prepared, if it were necessary, to explain at length to the House; but, for the reasons he had already given, he hoped the House would not adopt the Resolution of his hon. Friend.

considered the arguments of his right hon. Friend fair and temperate; but still he was not satisfied with the explanation.

in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, the monuments it was intended to preserve had in past times been upheld owing to the traditional—he did not like to call them superstitious—feelings of the people. That state of things had, however, passed away, and now some of the most interesting relics of antiquity, including many of our Ancient Camps, were being sacrificed owing to the increasing value of land; and the material of which the megalithic monuments were composed was used for building and other purposes. He held in his hand a letter from the President of the Society of Antiquaries, expressing a conviction that unless some such Bill as this were passed, very few of them would long remain. [Cries of Move.] Seeing that the House concurred in the object he had in view, it was needless for him to enter into particulars, and he should therefore move the second reading.

sympathized with the object which his hon. Friend had in view, and on the part of the Govern- ment he had no objection to offer to the second reading of the Bill. He desired to say, however, that while the Government were willing to give every facility towards the institution of a body to take charge of these monuments, and towards enabling it to acquire the necessary property in the land on which they were placed, still they were not of opinion that it was a purpose to which the public funds should be applied. Nor did he think it was necessary that the public funds should be so applied. He was sure there were persons sufficiently interested in antiquarian matters to supply the requisite funds, and any appeal made to them by the hon. Baronet, who had done so much to elucidate the history of these monuments, would be cheerfully responded to. If the hon. Baronet would consent to expunge the provision as to the Treasury, the Government would give him every assistance; otherwise, as a matter of principle, they must oppose a Bill to which they had no other objection.

said, that under the circumstances, he had no option but to accept the conditions of the right hon. Gentleman.