asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is true that sixteen women, wives of agricultural labourers, have been sentenced to imprisonment, with hard labour, by the Rev. Thomas Harris and the Rev. W. E. D. Carter, sitting as magistrates at Chipping Norton under the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, and, if so, whether there is anything in the circumstances of the case which in his opinion would justify his interference in favour of the prisoners?

Sir, I have received no communication or memorial on the subject; but I directed a letter to be written to the magistrates to-day, and I shall, of course, in due time receive an answer.

asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the inquiry into the financial transactions of the Post Office and Telegraph Departments undertaken by the Treasury on the recommendation of the Public Accounts Committee has been completed, and how soon he will be prepared to communicate the result of the inquiry to the Committee or to the House?

I am told, Sir, the Report is almost complete. As I have not seen it yet, I cannot say when we can lay it before the House but no time shall be lost.

asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether the scheme for the commutation of the pensions of the officers of the late Telegraph Companies has been approved of by the Treasury; and, if so, when is payment of the commutation to be made?

The scheme referred to by my hon. Friend cannot be acted upon, until Parliament has provided a further sum for the purposes of the Telegraph Acts.

said, he wished to recall the attention of the Committee to the observation of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty the other night, when the subject of stores was under discussion, that statements were repeatedly made by Members of the Opposition, and as repeatedly denied, with reference to the scarcity of the stock of stores in the dockyards. The right hon. Gentleman was perfectly correct; those statements had been frequently made, and repeatedly denied. They would be made again, and in all probability denied again. In order to show that he was not entirely wrong in the statement he had made on this question, he would point out that, according to an account which had been placed in the hands of hon. Members that Session, it appeared a large amount had been transferred from the Shipbuilding to the Store Vote. The Admiralty had sold a very large quantity of stores, and had expended the proceeds in the purchase of other stores; but the money so obtained not sufficing for the purpose, a letter signed by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty had been sent to the Treasury, making an application for the sum of £121,000, for the purchase of further stores. It was thus clear that a most incautious and imprudent reduction of stores had been made, and that the Admiralty had since been increasing, sub rosâ, the amount of the stores, which were even now in a very bare state, in consequence of the sales to which he had referred having been made. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that the storehouses were overflowing with stores. He could not see where those stores were; and he had been informed on reliable authority, that there were not in all Her Majesty's Dockyards stores sufficient to fit out four or five sail of the line. It was only when the Appropriation Amounts were brought forward that hon. Members who found fault with the Admiralty administration had the means of verifying their statements, which right hon. Gentlemen opposite usually met with a flat denial. On the subject of anchors and cables, he had been informed that several of Her Majesty's ships had been endangered by their cables and anchors being inadequate to the work they had to perform, and he could not help expressing his opinion that Mr. Trotman's anchors, which were used on board the Great Eastern and the Royal yacht, were the best in existence, and he saw no reason why they should not be supplied to the Fleet.

said, he rose for the purpose of pointing out that the observations of the hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone), to the effect that the sale of Admiralty stores had been excessive ought to receive some notice from Her Majesty's Government.

said, that he had only delayed rising in order to see whether any hon. Member would wish to address the House on the subject, and that the only answer he could offer to the allegation of the hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone), that the storehouses of the Admiralty had been emptied of their contents was, that it was not supported by the real facts of the case. The evidence which had lately been given on the subject before the Committee sitting upstairs should have convinced the hon. Baronet that there was no real ground for his complaints on this question. The sum which had been expended in 1871 in the purchase of stores was only slightly in excess of the sum that had been voted by Parliament for that purpose, and the reason why the expenditure was in excess of the Vote was, that it was thought desirable to keep a six months' supply of a particular class of stores in the dockyards. He believed the decision on the subject had been arrived at by the Secretary to the Treasury before he (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) came into office, and by the consent of the Treasury the money was transferred from another Vote. That operation had been largely resorted to by all preceding Governments.

said, the evidence of the Committee which the hon. Gentleman opposite had just alluded to was satisfactory as regarded the quality of stores; but as to the other matters in question, nothing very definite could be determined until the evidence was com- pleted. Vote 10 was by far the largest sum which had been voted by Parliament under that head for many years, or, perhaps, ever. Probably the whole amount was wanted. The last Vote of the late Government, £892,000, was reduced to £779,000, and considerable sales of stores were made when the present Government came into power. As his hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone) had frequently observed, a lamentable deficiency in stores was the result of that reduction. He thought it was wrong on the part of the Admiralty to appropriate to the purchase of stores, part of the money that had been voted for the building of ships, as thereby the Admiralty led the country to believe that certain things would happen, which were never realized. For instance, the Admiralty, before the Vote for the building of ships was granted, held out the hope that 20,000 tons of shipping would be built—namely, 12,000 tons of armour-clad and 8,000 tons of wooden shipping. No such amount had been built, and money voted for shipbuilding had been applied to the purchase of a mere supply of six months' stores in excess of the Vote for Stores.

complained that no notice had been taken by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty of the remarks made by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone) on the subject of Trotman's anchor. He was alarmed at that statement and hoped the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty would be prepared to give some satisfactory assurance to the Committee upon the subject.

said, he took exception to the statement of the hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay), that the Vote for Stores that year was larger than it had ever been. [Sir JOHN HAY qualified his assertion by saying "since 1867–8."] The expenditure for stores in the year in which the Abyssinian Expedition was made, the last year of office of the late Government was £1,085,000, or more than £200,000 in excess of their proposal to Parliament, and larger than the Vote of the present year, when the cost of all kinds of stores had largely increased. He protested against any comparison between the expenditures of different years, unless that clement of in- creased cost was taken into consideration. The Committee had already been informed that the increase of the Vote in the present year was owing entirely to the increase in the cost of coal and metal—a matter over which the Admiralty had no control. In fact, the increase of prices caused an addition of £150,000. With regard to anchors and cables, he could only repeat that it was entirely a professional matter. Officers of the Navy were not in favour of Trotman's anchor, and it was his duty to be guided by their opinion on the subject. Though Trotman's anchor might be admirably suited to merchant ships, it did not necessarily follow that it was suited to the ships of the Navy. He was informed by his professional advisers that though Trotman's anchor held well, it did not bite well. He was willing, however, to undertake that there should be a further investigation of the matter if necessary. The Admiralty was fully alive to the subject of anchors and cables. The question of cables was undergoing an examination by the present Controller and other Naval Lords in conjunction with manufactures of cables.

said, he was glad to hear that the subject of Trotman's anchor was under consideration, in consequence of the numerous casualties which had occurred; but why had it not been considered before? He had heard with great surprise that the naval authorities to whom the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty referred were not satisfied with the biting powers of Trotman's anchors. If such were the fact, it only showed that the highest authorities might differ, because a Commission, consisting of four or five distinguished Admirals and other persons, appointed to investigate practically the relative merits of the different descriptions of anchors, after applying ample tests, reported unanimously in condemnation of the Admiralty anchor as the worst, save one, of all the competing anchors, and as wanting in every essential quality which should distinguish an anchor. They also reported that Trotman's anchor was the best of all, and fully equal to others of much greater weight—a point of much importance in maritime work. Before the Committee of 1861, Admiral Denman said that since 1854, in his experience on board the Royal yacht, he had always found Trotman's anchor hold perfectly, and that it never failed under the most trying circumstances. He added—

"It is vastly superior to the Admiralty anchor in every respect; and I cannot understand why the Admiralty have not more readily supplied these light and more efficient anchors."

Other evidence was to the same effect. He should like to know who were the officers who now objected to Trotman's anchor, in direct contradiction to the results of a test supplied by the Admiralty themselves? It was due not only to Mr. Trotman, but to the Service, that the case should be fully gone into. Mr. Trotman had now no personal interest in the matter, for his patent had expired. He was influenced solely by a desire to benefit the Service, and the safety of Her Majesty's ships required that the matter should not be allowed to remain in abeyance. Hereafter he would move for a Return of the recent Report made respecting these anchors, and presumed that the right hon. Gentleman would not refuse to produce it.

said, the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Admiralty had stated that the dockyards were not now denuded of stores; but the complaint made by his hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone) was, that when the dockyards were so denuded the House was constantly assured that they were full of stores. When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) came into office, he abandoned wooden shipbuilding, and sold timber in large quantities. In 1871 a change of policy became necessary; and his hon. Friend's case was that, if the dockyards had not before been denuded of stores, the House would not have been called upon to increase the stock of timber at the enhanced prices of to-day. He could not help thinking that during the last four years there had been, in dealing with this subject, a want of that candour on which the right hon. Gentleman had laid so much stress. It would have been more candid on the part of the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty if he had stated that although the dockyards were not now they had been denuded of timber.

said, he thought it satisfactory that the charge made against the present Board of Admiralty had been abandoned, and that another charge which was equally without foundation had been substituted—namely, that the late Board of Admiralty three years ago had denuded the dockyards of stores; now, what was the fact? In the year 1867 the stock of timber amounted to £1,500,000, and as the average consumption was only one-tenth of that amount, it followed that the Admiralty had 10 years' stock of timber in hand. That amount was perfectly unjustifiable and caused the greatest possible waste; indeed, the loss arising from the deterioration of timber amounted to several thousands a-year. The noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox) had spoken of the palmy days of Lord Palmerston, and pointed to the accumulations which in those days were made. But what was the result? Why, that they had now on hand no less than 13,000 loads of Italian oak which was unsaleable and unfit for shipbuilding. That was a species of economy which he for one could not advise or approve. The wise policy was to lay in such an amount as was or might reasonably be expected to be required. They had now timber to the amount of £500,000, and the annual consumption averaged £150,000 during the last few years. Of course, the necessary consequence of such an operation was, that they should from time to time make purchases as they had done last year. From the accounts they had received from the dockyards, he believed they had no reason to apprehend any deficiency of stock. The statement of the noble Lord had, in fact, no greater foundation than many of the statements made by him at a recent meeting at Reading, at which his (Mr. Shaw Lefevre's) rival for the representation of the borough, Mr. Attenborough, attended. He had waited to see whether the noble Lord would repeat those statements in the House; but as he had not done so, it would not be necessary to do more than to give them a general denial. For his part, he thought that during the sitting of Parliament it was the duty of a Member who had complaint to make of the administration of the Government, to make it in the House, and not to go down to particular constituencies, and retail at second-hand those misstatements. He understood the noble Lord the other evening to admit that he had somewhat drawn the long-bow, and, therefore, he would only remind the noble Lord that the House resented any attempt to make political capital out of the Navy. It was far too important a branch of the Service of the country to be allowed to become the shuttlecock of party. Why did the noble Lord make attacks on the Admiralty out of the House, which he did not repeat within its walls? Why was the noble Lord continuous in his attacks upon his (Mr. Shaw Lefevre's) right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) during his illness and consequent absence—attacks which he never ventured to repeat in his presence? Because the noble Lord knew very well that there was no ground for the charges; because he lived in a glass case himself; and, next, because he knew the House would not allow political capital to be made out of the Navy. He hoped the noble Lord would excuse him (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) if he advised him to give up his connection with that troop of itinerants that were now paying visits to the suburban towns, or in future to confine himself in the provinces to the wise course he pursued in that House, where his conduct had been usually cautious and courteous.

I can only say, Sir, that anything more irregular has never proceeded from any hon. Member of this House, than have been the remarks which have just fallen from the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty. Irregular remarks proceeding from any hon. Member of this House are to be deprecated; but when they come from the Treasury bench; from a Gentleman who is supposed to be selected for the position he occupies, because of his superior accomplishments and extra knowledge of the forms of the House, they are doubly to be deprecated. A right hon. Friend of mine, and other hon. Members near me, wished more than once to interfere and put a stop to the unseemly exhibition of alarm which the hon. Gentleman has just displayed as to the safety of his seat for Reading; but I will not enter further into the matter than to say, that I was amused to hear from the hon. Gentleman that I had refrained from making attacks in this House upon the naval conduct of the right hon. Gentleman opposite the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers). I thought that, on the contrary, I had taken up too much of the time of the House in doing so, and I frequently curtailed my remarks for fear of interfering with the progress of Public Business. I believe that no other hon. or right hon. Gentleman opposite will charge me with having abstained from challenging the naval administration of the present Government. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty says that I live in a glass house. Well, I can only say that if I do, and that there is no stronger arm in the House than that of the hon. Gentleman to throw a stone at it, I shall remain very comfortably in my glass case to the end of my Parliamentary career.

suggested that if the 30,000 tons of timber, to which the Secretary to the Admiralty had alluded as unsaleable, were unfit for shipbuilding, they should be sold for firewood.

denied that there was any indisposition on the part of the Admiralty to introduce new anchors. They had recently introduced two, and were making trial of Trotman's. He thought the hon. Baronet opposite the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone) would admit that naval men were not generally in favour of Trotman's anchor.

observed that with respect to holding power, Trotman's anchor was considered the best; but there was an objection to it in the Navy, in consequence of the difficulty of stowing it.

was surprised to hear that there was a large quantity of timber in the shipbuilding yards utterly useless. He could not conceive that any timber, even with the most careless management, could be so deteriorated as to make it necessary that it should be destroyed, like so much tobacco.

objected to the sale of excessive stores at a sacrifice, if there was a chance of using them; and asked for an explanation of the statement by the Secretary to the Admiralty that there was a large quantity of useless timber in the yards? He thought that, with regard to all these matters of detail in relation to cables and anchors, there were so many circumstances to be taken into consideration, that they ought to hesitate before pronouncing a censure on the conduct of the Admiralty. The anchors used in the Devastation were essentially of the character of Trotman's anchors.

urged upon the Committee the great importance of abstaining from making expenditure on stores for Army and Navy a party question. Having had the honour to serve under the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) he could speak of the anxiety felt by him to provide the Army with stores, in such quantities as would combine efficiency with economy; and doubtless the present Secretary of State for War had evinced the same desire. As respected the Admiralty, he was favourably impressed from information obtained in "another place," with the efforts made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) in regard to stores. It must be remembered that the change made in the fleet of the country by the recent Admiralty administrations necessitated a change in the character as well as the quantity of stores used. The change had, no doubt, been going on for years, but practically it was only since 1868 that the old establishment of the wooden Navy of four fleets, each of 30 line-of-battle ships, with the due proportion of frigates, and mounting in all 18,000 smooth-bore guns, had been effectually changed into an iron-clad fleet mounting only about 2,200 guns. The experience derived from the previous numerous vessels of the wooden navy, as to the quality, cost, and description of stores required for use, could not be made applicable to the stores of the present iron navy. Indeed, the old and long-established proportions of stores to be kept in reserve for war, could not be adhered to in the present day. These changes in the fleet had therefore raised difficulties in deciding on the outlay to be incurred on stores: It was one of the most difficult operations in Army or Naval administrations to determine the proportions of stores to be maintained in excess of the annual expenditure. It was comparatively easy to settle the amount required to provide all that was to be consumed within the year; but it was entirely different when stores had to be laid in as a reserve for unforeseen emergencies. It was in the loss on stores which became obsolete, that waste was to be expected, and the economy of good administration could best be shown by minimizing the inevitable loss on stores that must deteriorate from long keeping. Now, as regarded the present and past expenditure on stores, he urged on the attention of the Committee that the House could not judge of its propriety; seeing that the money provided was only for laying in stores, and no information was before the House as to their future employment. Until therefore the state of the stores for Army and Navy, as to the remains in stock at the beginning and end of the year, and the receipts and expenditure within the year, were known, these criticisms on money expenditure were of no use.

said, that the timber in question had been purchased for a special purpose, in the construction of ships' frames, but iron was now used for that purpose. A large portion of the timber had been put up for sale, but no purchasers were found for it. Seven hundred loads had, however, been utilized during the last three years, and efforts would be made to turn it to account as speedily as possible.

said, he deemed it improvident, considering that the teak forests of India were rapidly being exhausted, to sell timber which could not be replaced at the price. As to Italian oak, it was thought important to obtain it in 1862 for heavy screw line-of-battle ships, and when the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty said it could not be used, he ought to be superseded, for with very little ingenuity it might be made serviceable. Unless stronger evidence were adduced, he could not credit the alleged extent of its deterioration, the only deterioration which he knew of arising from the penurious practice of not protecting it from the weather in some of the dockyards. The time of the Committee might be much better occupied than in electioneering matters. Members often visited each other's boroughs, sometimes in peace and sometimes in war, and it should be remembered that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord himself went down to Bristol. [Mr. GOSCHEN: By invitation of the Members.] The present Board were struggling against the adverse circumstances bequeathed them by the late First Lord (Mr. Childers) but they had not the fairness to acknowledge that his administration was a failure, and that they were doing their best to repair his errors.

complained of the repetition of charges against his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) which had frequently been refuted. He took little interest in the recriminations of the two from benches as to which had been the more extravagant, but he maintained that the present expenditure was excessive. Of course, we must keep up our Navy; but that was no justification for buying a large quantity of stores which might become useless, and lead to absolute waste. In a short time, we should probably find the price of coals and the price of iron falling in the market. He, therefore, regarded it as an improvident policy to put on additional men and buy large quantities of materials in order to find them work. He was anxious for the production of the Return, promised by the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord, of ships which had vanished from the Navy, and hoped it would comprise the last 15 years, believing it would show that money had been wasted in ships of types which, while they were actually on the stocks, had become obsolete.

said, that the stock of timber formerly kept in store was about 60,000 loads, it being assumed that 20,000 loads would be necessary for one year's consumption. About 80,000 loads was, he thought, the quantity in store when the late Government left office. What quantity of timber was now in store he did not know, but it was very desirable that the Committee should be informed what was the condition of the wooden ships of the Navy. Unlike his predecessor, the right hon. Gentleman the present First Lord of the Admiralty had recognized the necessity of wooden ships. We had nine frigates now in commission, two building, and 20 in reserve. He should like to know how many of the 20 in reserve were fit for commission. He was led to believe the number was only four. He should also like some information as to how many corvettes, sloops, &c., were fit for commission, as to the cost at which they could be repaired, and whether they were worth repairing? With regard to iron-clads, we now appeared to be reduced to 22 or 23, exclusive of the Devastation and two ships now building.

referred to a Return before him, by which it appeared that the Admiralty had actually re-purchased some of the material of vessels which they had disposed of by private contract.

inquired as to the quantities and value of the stores sold?

explained that when stores were sold the proceeds did not go to the Admiralty, but passed to the Exchequer. The increase in the sum for stores this year was due not to any increase in the quantity bought, but to the extraordinary rise in prices. He also denied generally that there had been any undue reduction of stores made by his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), or any undue increase made by himself. The country required a certain number of ships, and if the number was diminished by ships vanishing from the Navy, it was necessary to replace them. He had no Papers then before him by means of which to gratify the natural curiosity of the hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay). As to frigates, the hon. Baronet's statement seemed to be substantially correct. There might be differences of opinion as to whether a frigate was worth repairing or not. No country in the world was, so far as he was aware, at present building frigates, and few were repairing them. Large corvettes, heavily armed, were taking their place. As to sloops, every effort was being made to build them.

complained of the difficulty which he found in making out from the Estimates, in their present state, the sums which were expended on unarmoured vessels built by contract during the year, and the ships on which the money had been laid out. In the year 1872–3 the Admiralty asked for a sum of £106,340 for those ships, and there was a Supplemental Estimate of £18,000, making altogether £124,340. Now, according to a Return which he held in his hand, and which had been moved for by his hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Laird), he found that in that year the Admiralty bad ordered 17 new ships, and the total estimate for the first cost was, he found, £182,000, whereas the sum authorized by Parliament was only £124,340. It appeared, however, by the Return before the Committee, that only £152,000 was actually expended. Now, there was no reference made in the Estimates as to any balance, and he understood from the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty that we had under Section B a liability this year of £211,411 to complete unarmoured ships already begun, or upwards of £100,000 more than Parliament had authorized. He hoped next year an Appendix would be given to the Vote, something like that attached to Vote 6, and showing what was the work which had really been done in the dockyards, as well as the work done under contract. The Return, too, was drawn up in a somewhat careless manner, because under the head "now building," some 11 vessels were set down which, according to the Return itself, had been completed in 1871.

explained that there was some foundation for the remarks of the noble Lord, the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox), and that the sum of £211,411 for ships already ordered was a mistake caused by a misprint. He might add that full particulars had never been given with regard to Vote 10, as to ships building by contract, inasmuch as it was not considered by the Admiralty desirable to show contractors at what price the ships had been estimated by the Admiralty. With regard to the past, he was willing to investigate the former Admiralty accounts, in order to see if it could be more accurately shown what had been done during the past two or three years. The increase in the Estimate for the present year, under the head of contracts for building ships, was due to the fact that several contracts had not been entered into last year in consequence of the high prices demanded, and the delay had resulted in a gain of £40,000 to the country. It was, however, necessary that the vessels authorized to be built should be ordered to be commenced by the contractors during the present year, and it was owing to these arrears in the shipbuilding that were included in the Estimates for the present year that the latter showed an increase over those of last year. The increase was also partly owing to the fact that it had been deter- mined to build the corvette Rover by contract, instead of in the Government Dockyards. He complained of the noble Lord opposite, because, in the long list of ships which he alleged had not been completed, he did not give the Admiralty credit for several vessels which had been completed.

complained of the proportionately small amount of ships which were being built by contract this year as compared with those which were being built in the Royal Dockyards. He did so, because he was convinced that contract ships were built for fully 20 per cent less than the same vessels would cost in the Government Dockyards. This evil, from an economical point of view, was growing worse and worse, as at present, it was only intended to spend £91,000, as against £2,200,000, proposed to be expended in the dockyards.

said, the true test of the proportion mentioned by the hon. Member who had just sat down was the amount of tonnage proposed to be built. The hon. Member simply took the amount of new ships, and left out those ordered last year and completed this. The real proportion was this—the Admiralty proposed to build 14,000 tons in the Dockyards, and 6,000 tons by contract, the latter being paid for.

pointed out that there appeared to be a sum of £100,000 asked for in excess of the amount required for building vessels by contract, and, perhaps, it would turn out next February that this sum had been appropriated to increasing the stores.

explained that the whole of the money taken last year had not been spent in shipbuilding. He would place an explanatory Paper on the Table.

drew attention to the enormous cost of maintaining compound engines, which would go a long way towards swallowing up the sum saved by those engines by their smaller consumption of coal. He suggested that a Return should be presented to the House showing the cost of maintaining these engines, and how much coal they saved annually.

thought the private builders had got the "lion's share" with respect to the building of ships for the Navy, for £144,000 of new work was proposed to be given them altogether, although only £91,000 was to be spent this year.

said, the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Samuda) had put himself out of court by the apology he made for the Government the other night, when a proposition was made to reduce the number of men in the Dockyards to 11,000. As, however, they had chosen to employ 13,000 or 14,000 men in them, they must find them something to do, and could not, of course, give out so much contract work. It would seem from the statement of the Government as to a great part of the Vote for the Dockyards and of that for Stores being required for repairs, that the iron-clads were more injurious to each other than to anything else. The Admiralty ought to produce these accounts in such a shape that the Committee might know more accurately what was being done by contract, and what in the dockyards. As it appeared that ships were built in private yards at a cost less by 20 per cent than those built in the dockyards, he thought the policy of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) of purchasing from private yards at least a fifth of the ships added to the Navy was a right policy, and he should like to see it carried out.

said, the accounts laid before the Committee were very elaborate and costly. Of the 20,000 tons of shipbuilding required by the Admiralty, 6,000 would be obtained from private yards—that was to say, private builders would build much more than a fourth of the 20,000 tons. Some of the ships built in the dockyards cost less, others more, than those constructed by private firms.

said, it had been shown before the Committee presided over by the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. Seely), that if a very moderate sum were added for Establishment charges, a vessel would cost £100 per ton in the dockyards, whereas if built by private contract, it would cost very considerably less.

said, it must be remembered that the Establishment must always remain for expansion during war. Private shipbuilders might compete with the Royal Yards for the building of a certain class of vessels, though it was doubtful, whether they could build so cheaply. But there was much loose assertion as to the cost of building in the dockyards.

as a representative of a dockyard town, could not help saying that much of the work done in the Royal Yards for repairs was rendered necessary by the badness of the shipbuilding work done for the Navy by contract. He maintained that the dockyards, though at one time they were not well managed and the accounts were irregularly kept, were cheaper and produced better work than private yards. He protested, therefore, against attempts to run them down. He held that the time had come for placing the men employed in the steam factories, now a permanent branch of the Service, on the Establishment, they being entitled to equal advantages with the shipwrights and others in the old-fashioned yards.

wished to know whether the schooners required to regulate the labour traffic in Australia, for which a Supplementary Estimate of £18,000 had been taken, had been completed?

believed they must be all completed by this time, as they were to have been launched last February. The Estimate of £18,000 taken for them would not be exceeded.

took occasion to urge on the Admiralty the desirability of erecting naval barracks at Portsmouth. They would prove a great comfort to the men, while they would lead to a diminution of crime and to increased regularity in the service.

requested explanations of the four following items:—£1,000 in respect of a permanent hospital to be erected at Portland at a cost of £30,000; £2,000 for workshops in connection with Somerset Dock, at Malta, which would cost altogether £22,000; £1,000 on account of £10,000 for new storehouses at Sydney Garden Island; and £1,000 on account of £10,000 for dredging and forming landing-stages at Port Said.

stated that the works at Portsmouth undertaken by the contractors would be completed before the end of the financial year, but the work in the hands of the convicts would not be completed so soon. With regard to naval barracks, no decision had been, at present, come to on the point. The land at Port Said had been bought as a coaling station jointly by the Indian and Imperial Governments, and it was intended to embank it also at their joint expense. It was proposed to build a hospital at Portland for the men of the Channel Fleet, and it was intended to utilize the Somerset Dock at Malta by building workshops in accordance with the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee in 1864.

said, in his own personal view, a great deal might be advanced in favour of the establishment of naval barracks, but it was a matter of so much importance to the whole of the Admiralty, that he was not prepared to make any statement at that moment, and without consultation with those whose opinions were of the greatest value. In regard to the works at Chatham, too much praise could not be given to the director of those works, for the energy and great intelligence with which he had conducted the whole of the operations, and he was glad to think there would be a surplus on the original estimate.

said, that a great deal of money was being spent on defensive works in the Southern part of the Island, but little or nothing was being done north of the Thames, and especially on the east coast. He submitted that defensive works might be erected at a comparative small cost about Queens-ferry in the Firth of Forth. There was at present before Parliament, a Bill for erecting a bridge across the Firth of Forth, and he hoped the First Lord of the Admiralty would direct his attention to that scheme, in order to see that the bridge was not constructed at such a low level as to prevent vessels of war from passing under it. The height proposed was 150 feet, with an alternative plan of 140 feet, and he doubted very much whether this altitude would prove sufficient for all purposes.

could hold no hope that any proposal would be made, at all events, for some time, to construct works at the point mentioned by the hon. Member for Leith.

suggested that a work recently published by Dr. Fayrer on the subject of wounds from Indian snakes should be supplied to naval hospitals for the information of medical men. He wished a few copies of the book could be obtained and distributed.

said, his attention had been directed to the subject.

called attention to the services rendered by Mr. May, at Portsmouth, who had been rewarded by the miserable pension of £17 a-year.

said, if a special application were made to the Admiralty it would be favourably considered.

asked whether it was intended to appoint Naval Attaches at foreign Embassies?

believed there had only been two permanent Naval Attacheés—namely, at Washington and Paris. Instead, however, of continuing them, it had been thought desirable to gather information as to the various European Navies, and Captain Goodenough had given valuable Reports on the French, Italian, and Russian Navies. On his resignation, Vice Admiral Ryder had been deputed to go over the ground again, and he had been in France, and would go to Russia in the summer. [Mr. RYLANDS: Not as a permanent appointment.] No; his engagement would terminate two years hence. Captain Gore Jones would also be sent to Washington, where he would remain some little time.

said, the Vote presented an increase, which was accounted for by certain changes made in the retirement of classes of officers other than those to whom the scheme of his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) applied. A certain number of sub-lieutenants had been promoted to be lieutenants, it being thought undesirable that persons should remain sub-lieutenants more than four years. He wished to state a few points connected with the Vote to which attention had naturally been drawn. It had been stated that the scheme had not diminished the lists as rapidly as his right hon. Friend expected. His right hon. Friend never, however, intended to strain the regulations so as to drive the younger captains off the list by refusing them employment. It would be unfair to diminish the lists by compelling officers to quit the service by such a course. As regarded age, indeed, the scheme was compulsory; but as regarded a great portion of its attractions it had to be worked voluntarily by the officers. The question, therefore, was how they could offer sufficient inducements to officers to retire? He must repeat that, although the Admiralty were sometimes accused of being over-economical in working the system of retirement, a more liberal scheme than that of his right hon. Friend had never been propounded. It offered larger pecuniary inducements to retirement than any previous scheme. He entirely agreed that it was a matter of most serious importance that they should diminish the number of officers on the Half-pay List; and there were only two ways of doing that; either by employing them or offering them terms of retirement which they would accept. It was impossible to create employment simply to appoint more captains and commanders of ships. He entirely denied that the number of unemployed officers was greater now than in former years. In 1868 there were 171 captains on the Half-pay List; in 1869 the number was 187; in 1870, 199; in 1871, after the retirement scheme, the number was 150; in 1872, 146; in 1873, 139. There were now 139 captains on the Half-pay List, as compared with 171 in 1868. The number of officers unemployed, though large in itself, was therefore small as compared with former years. With regard to commanders the number on the Half-pay List had been 203 in 1868; in 1869, 222; in 1870, 231; in 1871, 157; in 1872, 156; and in 1873, 148. Though there were more officers on the Half-pay List than anyone liked, it was not true that there was anything in the proposal of the Admiralty which had increased this, which was always considered one of the "blots" of the Service. He had seen in several quarters that there was a disposition to put pressure on the Admiralty with a view to reduce the Half-pay List by some further proposal. Now, nothing could be more agreeable to the Admiralty than to receive a proposal by which, through some quick operation, they could place the lists on their normal footing, and give officers more rapid and continuous employment, because nothing could be worse for the efficiency of officers than to remain so long on shore when ships were changing so rapidly. In regard to age, no system of compulsory retirement less stringent would be applicable. If such a proposal as he had seen in some of the public organs—namely, a scheme involving a cost of £18,000 a-year by which the lists would be reduced to their normal numbers, and more continuous employment be provided for officers could be devised, he should regard it with the greatest favour; and Parliament, he thought, would not be disinclined to sanction it. But it required the greatest care and delicacy in examining it, for the more it was looked into the more questionable it would appear whether any rough-and-ready scheme of giving an extra 10 years' service to every officer to induce him to retire, as was done in the Civil Service in cases of compulsory abolition of office, would be satisfactory. All he could say was, if some such scheme would have the desired effect, the Admiralty would most cordially entertain it. He thought it right to make these preliminary remarks in proposing this Vote; for if such a scheme were carried out, a Supplementary Vote would be necessary. He did not consider that officers had now more grievances to complain of under this head than previously; but still he thought the retirement of his right hon. Friend should be helped on by every possible means, and if the Half-pay List could be reduced by any scheme of voluntary retirement the Admiralty would examine it with every wish to effect the object in view.

suggested that the Vote should be deferred.

in rising, pursuant to Notice, to call attention to the course taken by Her Majesty's Government with reference to the alterations in the International Law sanctioned by them prior to the negotiations, said, that the transactions of which the present Vote might be regarded as the last stage, formed one of the most remarkable episodes in the history of that or any other country. He must express his surprise and regret that they should have arrived at such a stage without having been fully discussed in the House of Commons, and he could not better show in what position we stood when the Alabama Claims were first raised, than by quoting the words of a statesman whose authority in the matter would be regarded as paramount on both sides of the House, both from the position he occupied when the subject came under consideration at the first, and also, because through a long career, he had shown himself eminently qualified to give an opinion upon the question. He alluded to Lord Russell, who, writing to Mr. Adams in December, 1862, said—

"Her Majesty's Government cannot, therefore," having given his reasons, "admit that they are under any obligation whatever to make compensation to the United States' citizens on account of the proceedings of the Alabama."

Nothing could be more clear and intelligible than that statement; but in the face of it, what course did the Government adopt? Lord Russell distinctly stated, and proved, that under existing International Law, the position of England was impregnable, and that she was not liable to pay a shilling, whereas in the statement of the matter referred to arbitration, as understood by the Government, they set forth new rules of International Law under which such liability might be established. The object of the Government, in fact, seemed to have been to frame rules by which England might become subject to a responsibility which could not be established under the previously existing law. They said—

"Her Britannic Majesty has commanded Her Commissioners to declare that Her Majesty cannot assent to the foregoing rules as a statement of principles of International Law which were in force at the time when the Claims mentioned in Article 1 arose; but that Her Majesty in order to evince Her desire to strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries, and to make satisfactory provisions for the future, agrees that in deciding the question between the two countries arising out of those claims, the Arbitrators should assume that Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to act upon the principle set forth in those rules."

Was it possible to conceive a more marvellous course for a great country to adopt? Her Majesty's Government framed an ex post facto law, and stated their willingness to have it assumed that that law existed at the time the claims arose, and their readiness to abide by it. He was much struck by a remark made to him by an hon. and learned Friend on this subject, to the effect that if he had done what the Government had, he should lose every client he had, and be deservedly branded as a fool into the bargain. What said one of the Arbitrators—the Lord Chief Justice—whose remarkable Judgment could not be perused without admiration? Why—

"That the effect of this part of the Treaty was to place the Arbitrators in a position of much difficulty, because obligation for a non-fulfilment of which redress could be claimed, presupposed a prior existing law, under which a right existed on the one side, and a corresponding obligation on the other."

But here they had to deal with obligations assumed to have existed prior to the Treaty, yet arising out of a supposed law created for the present time by the Treaty itself. His Lordship further ob-served—

"It was to be regretted that the whole subject-matter of this great contest, in law as well as in fact, was not left to be decided by the Arbitrators according to the true principles of International Law at the time when those alleged causes of complaint were said to have arisen."

The Government, in fact, committed a double mistake. The first was that of rendering this country liable under an ex post facto law, and the relinquishing of the impregnable position which they had occupied, and which might have been maintained with perfect justice and in entire accordance with everything due to the honour of this country; the second—an inconceivable blunder on their part—was the notion that by doing so, they were generating a strong feeling of friendship between the two countries. One result of the course they had taken would be to tempt other nations to insult this country and claim damages against it, seeing how easily we yielded in the case to be tried by laws framed for the purpose, and it appeared that the Government could leave done nothing snore likely to engender bad blood between England and the United States, than this very concession on their part. It was better to speak out plainly than to use the wretched subterfuges, the unmeaning expressions of friendship, adopted by Governments when hostile feelings really existed, and in that view he was supported by a remarkable book written by Mr. Caleb Cushing, in which that gentleman stated that there was in the United States not only a strong feeling of animosity against England, but likewise a feeling of triumph at the victory obtained by the Government of the former over that of the latter. The latter feeling was very natural, for it was a great victory so to have arranged matters that we had been mulcted of £3,200,000, for acts which did not make us indebted to them one shilling, and the excuse for the writer's tone of undue triumph was, that he was unfortunately a native of a country with Republican institutions, so that the high and chivalrous feeling prevailing in diplomatic matters in older and monarchical countries could not be looked for. As to his attack on the Lord Chief Justice of England, no man was better able to defend himself than that eminent gentleman, and his high character and position could never be affected by the attacks of a writer of so unworthy a book. With regard to Her Majesty's Government, the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Treasury (Mr. Glyn), a man of ability, thoroughly acquainted with their proceedings, and probably speaking under their orders, had told his constituents that the object in paying the money was to avert hostilities with America. Such a statement was degrading to the country, holding out an inducement to the United States to make other demands on us; and, as he presumed, our temper and forbearance had some limits, we might eventually be forced into a war which would have been avoided had the Government possessed the common sense and courage to say—"We owe you nothing, and will pay you nothing." The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, too, had expressed a hope that we should often be called upon a similar award; in other words, he hoped that England would again be degraded, and a large sum squandered in meeting unjust claims. Whatever the feeling of the people as to the honour of the country, the Government appeared indifferent to it. Instead of carrying on long negotiations and almost petitioning America to waive the Indirect Claims, the Government ought, the moment they were preferred, to have broken off negotiations, and insisted on starting de novo, and seeing whether one country was indebted to the other or not. What, moreover, had become of the counter claims of English subjects in connection with the Alabama depredations? [Viscount ENFIELD: They are going on.] That was no explanation on the part of Her Majesty's Government. They ought to have formed part of the Case before the Arbitrators. Why had they not been submitted to arbitration. [Viscount ENFIELD: They have been.] Then, why were they not set off against the £3,200,000? Why pay that sum first, and settle those claims afterwards? Again, the Government professed a wish to maintain the connection with Canada, though they had ingeniously put themselves in a position of inability to protect her. He wanted to know why they had heard nothing on the subject of the Fenian Raids into Canada, which, according to the accounts given in the newspapers at the time, were owing to the negligence of the United States Government, at least quite as much as the escape of those vessels from our ports was owing to the negligence of our Government? If we still held to the connection between this country and Canada, why was the grievance of Canada entirely lost sight of? Was that also to conciliate the goodwill and friendship of the United States? Was there no sense of shame left in this country? Did the Government think the Canadians were blind or indifferent to those facts, and would not conclude, either that we had not the courage, or had not the power to protect them? On what grounds were the claims against England submitted to arbitration, while those counter claims were still under discussion? Further, he wanted to know what was the state of the negotiations between this country and the United States with respect to the damage inflicted on Canada by the Fenian Raids, resulting in a large loss of property and a considerable loss of life. He contended that the honour of a great country ought never to be submitted to arbitration. A country which was not in a position to say what were its own liabilities and what was due to its own honour was no longer able to call itself a great Power; and the mere fact of our having sanctioned the principle of arbitration was a blow to our national honour. He brought that question forward in no party spirit. He believed Her Majesty's Opposition were as culpable as the Government, because it was their duty to have raised a discussion on that subject in the earlier part of those transactions. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote), whose good faith in that matter no one doubted, was there to speak for himself; but Her Majesty's Opposition in a body were absent, and therefore he said they had shown a most lamentable indifference to what was due to the honour and interest of this country. In conclusion, he must say that he trusted he should be followed by those who were more competent to deal with the question than he was; but having carefully, and to the best of his ability, studied that question, he believed there could not be found in the records of any country in the world such a marvellous monument of human folly, or such a signal instance of national degradation, as was presented in that transaction.

thought that, although the payment of that money was a foregone conclusion, it was well that the country should have before it the circumstances under which that liability was incurred. The hon. Member then traced the course of the negotiations from the beginning, as given in the official Correspondence, and expressed his belief that if Her Majesty's Government had adhered to the line originally adopted by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon, and insisted on a clear basis being laid down for any Treaty which might be concluded, much of the difficulty and the unfriendly discussion which had occurred between the two countries would have been avoided. The eagerness with which the Government had entered into the negotiations must have led the Americans to suppose that we were willing to accept terms less favourable than had been before insisted on, and therefore they proposed to raise them. He also thought it much to be regretted that the full powers and confidence which, according to the terms of their appointment, were to be given to the Commissioners, were not ultimately reposed in them. The Government had hurried them off, and when they refused, as was natural and proper, to accept the proposals of the American Commissioners, the Government repudiated that sensible decision, and assented to principles upon which all these liabilities had arisen. He thought no man of any legal experience in that House could remember a case in which an ex post facto law had been employed to control an antecedent state of things. He should have been ashamed of himself, and should deserve to lose any professional reputation he might possess, if he had ever consented to such a settlement. It was not only an unprecedented but a monstrous settlement, and he thought the House should enter its decided protest against the principles on which it was based.

said, he saw the right hon. Baronet the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote) in his place, and he should like him to explain what up to this time had never been explained, and that was—why the surrender of General Lee was taken to be the end of the war, after which no claim on behalf of British subjects was allowed to be brought forward? Now, the surrender of General Lee was not the end of the war, because three Confederate armies were in the field for weeks afterwards, and damage was done to British property after the date of the surrender. Surely, the proper end of the war ought to have been taken from the period fixed by the American Courts in dealing with cases amongst their own subjects. He could not help thinking that the Americans got the better of us in the late negotiations, with regard to that portion of the subject. The noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Viscount Enfield) had been asked whether British claims arising out of the Alabama depredations were to be considered, and he replied that they were going on; the noble Lord, however was mistaken, for the claims now under consideration at Washington were not British claims arising from Alabama depredations, but counter claims for a totally different thing. But the question at issue was not confined to the destruction of American ships and goods by the Alabama; and he regretted to find that while the Government were going to pay America over £3,000,000 for the damages inflicted on American subjects by the Alabama, yet they were not going to pay for the damages sustained by British subjects. The Alabama burnt a number of vessels in which British cargoes were stowed. He had heard of an instance in which an American ship loaded with British goods of the value of £5,000, belonging to a constituent of his, having been boarded by Captain Semmes, the captain of the ship had informed him that the goods in the vessel were British and not American, and showed him the papers signed by the British Consul. Whereupon Captain Semmes said, he knew that very well; but, nevertheless, he told his lieutenant to take out of the ship what he wanted and then to burn her, which was accordingly done. If we were obliged to pay for damages sustained by the Americans by reason of the conduct of the Alabama, why were we not equally bound to pay for the damages sustained by our own subjects by reason of the acts of that vessel? He had that night asked for the production of the Opinion of the Law Officers, in which they had enunciated that doctrine; and he was sorry it was not produced, for the position of the Government in the matter appeared to him to be untenable. He was not influenced by the fact that the Law Officers of the Crown had advised Her Majesty's Government not to accede to these claims on the part of the British owners who had sustained losses by the Alabama, because he was aware that the opinion of counsel was largely influenced by the manner in which a case was laid before them. The present state of this question was most unsatisfactory, and these claims could not be allowed to remain unsettled. As for the American claims, which had been awarded by the Geneva Arbitration, we must pay the money, and he could not agree that in so doing we should, as had been suggested by some hon. Members, undergo any degradation.

expressed his approval of the principle of arbitration as a means of settling international disputes, although there were some points in the negotiations that had occurred between ourselves and America which he did not approve on account of the loose manner in which they had been conducted. At the same time it must be remembered that this was the first occasion when the principle was applied to the affairs of two great nations, and that the circumstances were of a highly complicated character. There was therefore nothing to cause discouragement in the fact that difficulties had arisen in the course of such a transaction. He trusted that the Government would pay the whole of the sum awarded to America by the Geneva Tribunal out of the revenue of the current year, as it was possible that our finances might not remain in so prosperous a condition as they were at present. He objected to the ex post facto Rules that had been agreed to as the foundation of the Geneva Award, and regretted that the language of the Lord Chief Justice, when acting as our Arbitrator, should have been censured by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, instead of being supported by Her Majesty's Government. Another matter to be regretted was, that the Government had not been more urgent in reference to the Fenian Raids; and there was this still further cause for regret, that the Arbitrators were not allowed to choose an intermediate channel at San Juan. The fact that this channel was not navigable appeared to him an argument in favour of it as a desirable boundary. He rejoiced in the fact that the Arbitration had been submitted to, as it had produced a very friendly feeling between the two countries, and had put an end to all present danger of ruptures between England and America. These dangers were past; he hoped there were no dangers to come. But he was not free from fear lest the settlement, satisfactory as it might seem at the moment, should ultimately prove the cause of grave complications in international relations.

said, that until quite recently he had thought it would be well that this Vote should be allowed to pass without comment. But, of course, it was open to any hon. Member of the House to take—and, perhaps, not unlikely that some hon. Members would take—the opportunity, when this Vote came on, of challenging the whole question; and he himself certainly would not be at all disposed to find any fault with his hon. Friend the Member for West Norfolk (Mr. G. Bentinck), either for having called attention to the subject, or on account of the general character of the remarks which, from the point of view he had taken, he had thought fit to make. He himself, however, should not have taken part in this discussion but for the pointed references made to him by one or two speakers, and especially the question which had been put to him by the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson). He must really ask the indulgence of the House for anything he might say on this matter. He felt that he was in a position of very great difficulty. He accepted the appointment—the very honourable appointment—of one of the Commissioners in 1871, at the request of a Government with which he was not connected, for the purpose of carrying through what he believed then, and what he still believed, to be a work of great national importance. He found himself with Colleagues officially connected with the Government, and who, of course, had much greater authority than himself on matters in which the sentiments of the Government were concerned. And the Commissioners as a body found themselves in this remarkable position—which, probably, never had been the position of any other nego- tiators in a matter of similar importance—they were at the end of a telegraph wire, every stage in their proceedings was reported home, and they received from time to time communications from Her Majesty's Government which, although they had plenipotentiary powers, they felt themselves bound to obey. The consequence was that the negotiations were conducted with great difficulty. He had never disguised from himself the fact that parts of the negotiations had not been so thoroughly and satisfactorily settled as he thought they might have been, if the negotiations could have been conducted in another manner. With reference to the question which the hon. Member for Glasgow had put to him, he was sorry to say he was not able to give him as satisfactory an answer as he ought to give. He violated no confidence, however, in telling him what really did occur. On the original draft of the Articles to which the hon. Member referred, it was pressed on one side that compensation should be made for claims for loss to British subjects which had occurred during the recent rebellion in the United States. On the other side, the British Commissioners did not like the phrase "Rebellion;" they preferred the phrase "Civil War," and there was a very animated discussion between the two bodies of Commissioners on the question whether the word "Rebellion," or the words "Civil War," ought or ought not to be admitted into the Treaty. They were very near the end of their proceedings, and as it was very hard to get over the difficulty, a suggestion was made, he thought, at the last Conference, that the difficulty might be got over—neither side being willing to waive a particular expression—by inserting dates which would cover the period that was intended. The suggestion was adopted, and dates inserted. For himself, he was ashamed to say that he did not—whatever others might have done—take particular notice whether the last date that was given really did coincide with the termination of the war or not. But it was his full belief that it did, and he believed it was everybody's idea that it made no difference at all. He believed there was no intention of making the period less than was originally intended by both parties. However, if the changing a word in the original clause had the effect of ex- cluding parties who otherwise would have been entitled, he, for one, was very sorry. He did not know whether that was so or not. He doubted whether any claims had been excluded that would have been admitted if a later date had been taken. That was the history of the case. With regard to the matter generally, he would rather leave it to the Government to define, if it was necessary to define, the precise terms of the Treaty, because the terms were altered from time to time. They assented to the terms which were proposed; and with regard to expressions which had been criticized, they were really more expressions of Her Majesty's Government than of the Commissioners. But this he wished to say with reference to the agreement generally. Both now, and on other occasions, the Treaty had been spoken of as something derogatory to the honour of Great Britain. That was a view which, if it was a correct one, would reflect great discredit not only upon the Government that negotiated it, but also upon all who in any way took part in it. He thought the way in which the Treaty was spoken of in that and in the other House when it was first laid before Parliament, showed that at all events those who were responsible for the negotiation could not and would not admit that in the very slightest degree they had been parties to any measure of national humiliation. He hoped he could speak of this matter irrespective of any personal connection with the proceeding. He hoped that he could look upon it as an independent Englishman and a Member of the Legislature; and he would say this—that whether or not the arrangement which was made was altogether the best that could have been made—which question he left aside—the arrangement was made with a strict regard to what was believed to be by those who negotiated the Treaty the honour and the real interests of England. With regard to the particular point brought forward by his hon. Friend the Member for West Norfolk, he must say distinctly that it would have been quite impossible for the English Commissioners to have accepted the Rules originally suggested by the American Commissioners, but that the Rules which were ultimately adopted went very little beyond what he believed was acknowledged to have been International Law at the time when the Act of 1870 was under discussion, and moreover that the Rules embodied principles coinciding very closely with principles on which Lord Russell and the Government of the day professed themselves willing to act; and therefore he (Sir Stafford Northcote) could not admit that the Commissioners took an ex post facto view of the case. At the same time the expression in the Treaty, to the effect that Her Majesty's Government did not admit these Rules to have been rules of International Law at the time, was one which he did not like, and was fitted to produce the misunderstanding which had since arisen. If anybody would read the decision of the Arbitrators, he would find that with the exception of the Lord Chief Justice, they held that the Rules as they stood added nothing to International Law; and upon the merits of the general question, even if these Rules had not been laid down, the decision of the majority would have been precisely the same as it was. The Lord Chief Justice, on the other hand, would have decided that we had not committed any violation of International Law, as it was understood before the Rules were laid down. But then, the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice upon the facts of the case would have been, that we had not exercised that vigilance which we ought to have exercised, and which Lord Russell in his despatches at the time always expressed himself desirous of exercising. That position would have been a most unpleasant one, and it was far better, then, that we should have endeavoured before going to arbitration to come to an understanding with the United States as to what we really wished, for the sake of this country and of civilized countries generally, should be held to be International Law for the future. Well, then, what was the substance of those Three Rules? The substance of the Three Rules, their intent and animus, was to prevent, for the future, that which we endeavoured to prevent, but entirely failed in preventing when the Alabama escaped. There was no country more interested than our own in preventing the sending out of privateers or vessels of that character from neutral ports. We believed that the great object to be gained by means of this settlement was not so much to obviate a quarrel with America, as to get a good rule for the future, which should free commerce from the dangers to which it had been exposed. He moreover wished it to be understood, that it was on every account most desirable that that sort of ill-feeling which had been engendered between the two countries should be set at rest; not that there was any idea whatever of this matter leading to a war between the two countries, but what it would lead to was obvious enough in the negotiations about a wholly different matter. In the case of the Canadian Fisheries, upon which it was most important that there should be a good understanding between the two countries, we found that a sort of soreness which was felt by the Americans really prevented practical and good arrangements being made. Therefore, it was most important that good relations should be restored between the two countries, and the whole scope, spirit, and tendency of the Treaty of Washington was to establish such relations, and to lay down satisfactory Rules with respect to commerce for the future. He did not deny that what had happened since had been in many respects unsatisfactory. Reference had been made to discussions of last year, which we all viewed with great pain, and which we should be happy, so far as possible, to forget. He, however, was not at all anxious that we should huddle up and put certain misunderstandings out of sight, for it was much better if we thought there was anything wrong in the language used by the Americans, as, for instance, last year, with respect to the Indirect Claims, or recently, with regard to any indications that might have been given as to the result of the Arbitration, that these matters should be temperately and fairly discussed, and cleared up, if possible. Having gone so far, therefore, it would be a great pity if we allowed ourselves to stop short of a clear and satisfactory arrangement of this question of International Law; and though seine few persons in America, in a prominent position, had uttered expressions which he thought deserved the reprobation they had received in this country, he believed the great mass of the Americans themselves felt quite as much annoyance and sorrow that such pretensions should have been put forward. The House was now about to pass this Vote, and it was really no matter of regret that some discussion should have occurred upon it; but he hoped that the House and the country would feel that we ought not to allow any sense of having been losers by the Arbitration, or in some respects not having been met in the way we hoped, to interfere with our passing it in a cordial manner. It was for the interest of this country and of the civilized world generally that we should be on cordial relations with America, and he believed that these relations could only be maintained on two conditions—the one that we should be uniformly courteous and considerate in our dealings with them, and the other that we should not be afraid to speak out plainly, when we thought that they were, as they sometimes were, in the wrong.

said, he did not grudge any money we had to pay on account of the Alabama, because he believed our Government made a great mistake in not taking more effectual measures to prevent the escape of that vessel. He was very much of opinion, however, that other countries besides America—France, for instance—had suffered from the depredations of the Alabama, and he was afraid that we should be called upon to pay their losses also. There were certain of our own countrymen who suffered losses in the War, and although the Law Officers of the Crown asserted the non-liability of our Government to pay these losses, he very much doubted whether the assertion, though it might be based upon strict law, could be considered to be based on national justice or on natural justice. If compensation were paid to the foreigner for his ship, surely the subject should be compensated for the cargo carried in that ship. In these remarks he was looking forward to another question that must arise—namely, how far the Arbitration in which we had engaged rendered us liable to further extension of our liability. If the effect of an Arbitration upon a neutral Power was to render that Power liable to every species of loss, then every Power that was injured ought to be re-imbursed for the loss which it had incurred. Unless that were so, no great Power would in future resort to arbitration. If we believed the plan of arbitration to be the method by which we were to get rid of all wars, and find ourselves in halcyon days, he doubted whether the advantages of arbitration had not been overrated.

Sir, It would have been advantageous if this Vote had been agreed to without discussion, but still I cannot complain that hon. Members have taken this opportunity of expressing their views upon it, and certainly I cannot complain of the course taken by the hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. G. Bentinck). On the contrary, I am bound to tender the hon. Member and his Friends my thanks for the very considerate manner in which they have conducted the discussion. I desire, in the first place, to disclaim, on the part of the Government, all responsibility for the expressions which have been ascribed to the hon. Member for Shaftesbury (Mr. Glyn), and I must also take exception to the hon. Gentleman's view of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's feeling on this subject. The hon. Gentleman seems to think the Chancellor of the Exchequer exults in opportunities for throwing away £3,000,000 or £4,000,000 of surplus, and feels it to be in the nature of absolute relief. Liberal and open-handed as my right hon. Friend is, I do not think he would carry his generosity to such a degree of extravagance; and as regards the hon. Member for Shaftesbury, I do not think he made use of the expressions that are put into his mouth by the hon. Gentleman. Perhaps, however, it is not necessary to enter into these matters, which are really by-gones, but as regards the Treaty of Washington, I consider the observations made upon it have been stated with perfect fairness, though on the other hand, the hon. Gentleman says it was a great and capital blot on the Government of this country, that the Washington Treaty was not set aside when the Indirect Claims were preferred. That opinion I cannot regard as either absurd or extravagant, but I must say it is unsound. The question in a great measure depended upon the presumption of good faith. One party thought the Claims within the scope of the engagement, and the other considered they were not. It was impossible in our view to conceive of a more gigantic error than was made by the American Government in importing the Indirect Claims into the Treaty, for as was shown by the documents of the British Government, they were so enormous, that it was incredible anybody could seriously advance them. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) has stated that they were estimated at £100,000,000, and in my reply to that right hon. Gentleman, I have stated that the description was, I believed, within the mark. In fact, it was difficult to limit the number of millions to which these Claims extended, but the question is, were they advanced in good faith? If we could have shown they were advanced in bad faith, then we should have been justified in withdrawing from the Treaty altogether; but some allowance ought to be made. We have been blamed for not having used forensic statements and arguments, but such weapons have their dangers as well as their advantages. We were bound to give credit to the American Government for the same good faith as we ourselves were actuated by. If we had done what the hon. Gentleman complains was not done, we should have exposed ourselves to the most serious charges of having tampered with those principles of honour and truth which I am sure he would be the first to deplore. The hon. Gentleman went on to say that the honour of this country should never be submitted to arbitration. That is a sound doctrine, but the honour of the country has not been challenged. I am of opinion that the honour of a country should never be submitted to arbitration. It may be said that Lord Russell thought that the honour of the country had been challenged; but I feel sure that the Governments which succeeded those of Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell did not proceed upon that view, or that the honour of the country should be submitted to arbitration. Indeed, if the question had been the truth of a charge of wilful departure from national obligation, we should never have thought of going to arbitration. There are, however, some on the other side of the Atlantic who believe the neutrality of the British Government was insincere, and that it was challenged on that account, but we did not go to arbitration on that ground. The question whether a Government's subordinates had exercised all the care and diligence the case required, was a question quite apart from the honour and intentions of the Government, and that was the question sub- milted. Then the hon. Gentleman asks why the Arbitrators decided upon the Claims of the United States before they considered the British Claims against the United States? The hon. Gentleman is in error in supposing it was intended to give such precedence, or that precedence was actually given to the Alabama Claims over private claims. The Alabama Claims were public claims, arising between the two Governments; the other Claims were made by citizens of the United States against the British Government. The arbitration upon these private claims undoubtedly lasted much longer than the Arbitration at Geneva, and no wonder; because whereas at Geneva, there were only a small number of questions for decision, the cases for decision at Washington are exceedingly numerous, and may be counted by hundreds, if not even by a larger figure, and so far from there having been delay in carrying these cases to arbitration, as compared with the Alabama Claims, the arbitration upon the private claims at Washington began long before the proceedings at Geneva. They began, I think, in October, 1871, and have since been conducted with as much expedition as it was in the power of the Commissioners to use. Then the hon. Gentleman refers to the Fenian Raids, and complains that they were not included in the Treaty of Washington, founding upon this complaint, the further observation that a great wrong was thereby done to Canada, and must be felt by our fellow-subjects in the Dominion. Now, the conclusion at which the Government arrived was, that it was not part of their duty to insist that the Fenian Raids should be made subjects of discussion and settlement along with the other matters included in the Treaty. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the Government on that account forfeited their title to bring forward claims arising out of the Fenian Raids, and nothing has at any time been said or done by the Government to weaken their title to claim compensation from the United States on account of the Fenian Raids. The only question we decided was, as to the propriety, or at any rate the necessity, of mixing up the consideration of this subject with the other questions included in the Treaty. It is quite true that the Government have made a separate claim upon the United States in the matter of the Fenian Raids; but that fact does not bear upon the credit or the discredit of the Treaty. The Treaty of Washington did not surrender, and did not include these claims.

Why did it not include them?

I need not now go back to the considerations which influenced the decision of the Government, because Parliament knew well what our decision was, and did not press us to include in the Treaty the question of the Fenian Raids; and I say that that claim, whatever it may be, suffered no prejudice whatever from the proceedings in connection with the Treaty, but stood upon its own merits after, as it did before, the conclusion of the Treaty. Then, again, Sir, I wish to remove an entire misapprehension—that the non-inclusion of this claim in the Treaty was a wrong done to Canada. The question as regards Canada was a question of money. Canada was informed by the British Government that we were perfectly ready to recognize her claim for the damage done by the Fenian Raids; and the Canadians, so far from being discontented, appeared by no means disinclined to entertain that view of the matter. The losses they suffered were fully discussed between the Government of the Dominion and this country, and the question of a money payment was considered, but the views of the Canadians rather inclined to a different form of compensation. It finally resolved itself into an Imperial guarantee for the purposes of a great work in the Dominion; and the Canadian Government recognized this guarantee as in full satisfacfaction of any losses sustained through the Fenian Raids. The hon. Member, then, should bear in mind that the Canadian Government had nothing to complain of in the shape of pecuniary losses from Fenian Raids, for which they had received ample compensation—and I apprehend that they think so too. Further, Canada herself had a far greater interest than any other part of the Empire in the conclusion of the Treaty of Washington. The Fishery question alone continually menaced the peace of Canada. No doubt, it also menaced the relations of this country and the United States; but Canada had the most direct and vital interest in the speedy and complete set- tlement of all these questions. So far, then, from admitting that the Treaty of Washington ought to be a subject of dissatisfaction in Canada, or that it is a. subject of dissatisfaction there, I believe that the Canadian people do not view the Treaty at all in the same light as the hon. Member, and that great satisfaction prevailed throughout the Dominion at the settlement of these alarming and menacing differences. Let me, further, remind the hon. Member that Canada possesses a free and effective Parliamentary Government, and that Government has had its conduct tested since the Treaty was concluded. The hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire has paid a just tribute to a distinguished Member of the Canadian Ministry whose recent loss we all deplore; and the test applied at the elections to the conduct of the Government has been to give it the approval, and not the disapproval, of the people of the Dominion. The hon. Gentleman the Member for East Sussex (Mr. Gregory) has stated that Her Majesty's Government repudiated the acts of their Commissioners. He has nothing upon which to found this extraordinary statement, except a passage in the published Correspondence, in which the Commissioners stated that they were limited by their instructions in a certain matter, and that with regard to a demand made by the American Commissioners, they would refer it home for the instructions of their Government. The question was referred home, and the effect of the reference home was a modification of the ground previously taken by the British Commissioners under their instructions, but that does not give the smallest colour to the assertion of the hon. Gentleman that the British Government repudiated the act of their own Commissioners. A point of greater importance was his statement, that the fatal error of the negotiations was, that we allowed our conduct to be judged by an ex post facto law, and that, in consequence of such assent on our part, the country has been not only condemned to pay a very large sum of money, but likewise stands discredited and dishonoured by the condemnation. Now, I agree with the hon. Gentleman—if our liability for this payment accrues in consequence of any gross error of that kind, the payment does in itself imply a great deal of discredit, as well as mere pecuniary loss. But we do not admit the main proposition of the hon. Gentleman; we deny that we consented to be judged by an ex post facto law. There are various points to be considered in this connection. First, was the Award made at Geneva either in whole or in part due to the operation of the Three Rules? [Mr. GREGORY: Hear, hear!] The hon. Member evidently thinks it was; I do not presume to say that the declarations made at Geneva give us the means of saying with absolute certainty that it was not, but the opinion of many of those who are most competent to judge, and who have most carefully and completely mastered the effect of the whole proceedings at Geneva is, that the Three Rules did not either in whole or in part bring about the Award; that if the Three Rules had not been included in the Treaty the Award would have been the same; and that the Award depended upon the Arbitrators' view of the obligations of International Law, not upon the principles embodied in the Three Rules.

The right hon. Gentleman will remember that the words "due diligence" run through the decision of the Arbitrators.

That is perfectly true, but it is also perfectly immaterial. What can be more trivial or indefinite than the stress laid here upon the words "due diligence!" They are quoted as if they involved some new and unheard-of principle. But surely it is mere matter of course—the mere A B C of international duty—that whenever obligations are cast upon a State, duo diligence—that is to say, common ordinary care, must be shown in the discharge of those obligations. But suppose that the Three Rules were responsible, as I do not admit they were, for the Award, did we on that account suffer any injustice? Were they, as regards us, an ex post facto law? I say, they were not. We deemed that they formed part of the International Law at the time the Claims arose, but we never denied that they constituted part of our own obligation. We had a municipal law, the execution of which we ourselves recognized as part of our duty to America, and the true construction of which, though it was not admitted in the Courts, was in strict accordance with the terms of the Three Rules. It was the standard of duty we ourselves set up for ourselves, although we had not taken it as part of the International Law. It was not, therefore, an ex post facto law so far as regards us, but a new form of expression given to that which we had recognized as part of our own duty. Why was that form of expression used? Because the great advantage of this proceeding was to make some approximation to the International Law of the future, and we knew that the concurrence of those two great countries would be a great step achieved towards the incorporation of those Rules in the general Code which binds nations together. Therefore, I hope the hon. Gentleman will, at least, understand that to be our view. We, in no degree, admitted them to be an ex post facto law. We look upon that as a vulgar error which widely prevails in the popular mind—prevails, at least, to some extent, and no wonder it should, when supported by authority so respectable as that of the hon. Gentleman, but it is one which for the sake of the common sense and intelligence of the country ought to be dispelled. Sir, the hon. Member for West Norfolk summed up all his difficulties and objections, by stating that we did not owe a shilling, and consequently had undergone humiliation and degradation without precedent by being placed in a position in which we have to pay a great deal. Probably we may all think that a severe view was taken of our case at Geneva. That is a sentiment which it is most natural we should entertain. But let us remember that we are not the most impartial judges in our own case, and that the Arbitrators have, at least the presumption of impartiality. We must also bear in mind that high authorities here, before arbitration, declared publicly that if arbitration resulted, we should have to pay a considerable sum. It is but fair to remember these things on behalf of Arbitrators to whom our obligations are admitted for having undertaken a case of such interest to us both. But suppose it is true that we have to pay more than a temperate, or perhaps I should rather say exact, view of our conduct would have awarded. At any rate, that excess is one which, although it tells against us for the moment, will tell in our favour in the long run. The interest of this country is in the strictness of the Code, not in its relaxation, and it is highly for our interest that the obligations of neutrals in regard to the escape of cruisers from their ports should be highly estimated, strictly defined, and rigidly enforced. We should, therefore, remember that whatever may be considered the undue strictness of this judgment—if there be undue strictness—it is certainly a fault not likely to be injurious to us, but the contrary, in the long run. But we must look a little higher than the precise question whether the Arbitrators exactly hit the mark. They accompanied their Judgment with a multitude of propositions which have become the subject of debate, but these are in our view the preamble of the sentence, and have no relation to the general law on the subject. The hon. Gentleman will not, I am sure, forget that if we look beyond the mere question of success and failure, there are important deductions to be borne in mind. Suppose the position of the two countries with respect to the Indirect Claims were reversed, and that the hon. Gentleman, instead of being, as he is, a patriotic Member of the House of Commons, was a patriotic Member of the American Congress. What would he have thought of the position of his own Government with respect to those Indirect Claims? Because he will bear in mind that the Indirect Claims were not waived. They were excluded, and therefore repelled not on the merits, but on principle, by the Arbitrators. I am endeavouring to find some soothing consideration for the hon. Gentleman. He will have the satisfaction of bearing in mind, also, that although we are going to pay a large sum, it is not the sum asked for by the Government of America at Geneva. Well, that is some consolation. The damages claimed were between £8,000,000 and £9,000,000, the damages given were between £3,000,000 and £4,000,000, a large sum certainly; but instead of voting $40,000,000 the hon. Member will have to vote only $15,000,000. In our view, whether in that respect the judgment is a right or accurate judgment, or whether some considerations may not have been pressed against us beyond what exactitude would warrant—that, in our view, is a very small matter. It is a small matter compared with the cost of war; it is a small matter compared with the value of the goodwill and the improved and peaceful relations subsisting, and happily likely to subsist, between this country and America. I have heard the criticism of my hon. Friend behind me upon the Government of America, and we are told that that Government is not in the right hands. Well, there are a great number of people who think that the Government of England is not in right hands. We ought not to rest the case too much upon criticisms of that sort. It is not easy to understand the entire spirit of the institutions of a country, and unless we do, criticisms upon particular features of them are apt to mislead. If it be true that there are many of the most illustrious citizens of America who do not hold public offices of responsibility; on the other hand, it is admittedly true, as we have seen in the case of the Trent and other cases, that the Executive Government in America does enjoy a very considerable independence, and it is, again, a purely vulgar error which prevails on this side of the water, to suppose that the pressure of the mob or the afflation of the moment governs as a matter of course the proceedings of the authorities in America. I believe that to be entirely wrong. I believe in the genial, cordial, good feeling of the bulk of the American people towards this nation, from which it springs. I believe, also, that whatever be the defects of the American institutions—and, of course, they are defective like our own and all others—they will suffice to give such expression to the good feeling of the American people as will powerfully tend to maintain good and cordial relations between the two countries. Sir, it is a great happiness to see this serious and menacing cause of alienation and estrangement, if not of war, removed by a great international arrangement. Naturally, we wished, as Englishmen, to win at Geneva—I did for one—probably all of us did; but any amount of disappointment we may feel at the result is but an inconsiderable deduction for the satisfaction attendant upon an arrangement which removes such causes of difference between two great countries like England and America, and does so much, as I contend, for mankind at large by the example it sets of a peaceful settlement of disputes as a substitute for the bloody arbitrament of war.

said, it had never been his lot to hear a statement more bewildering and unsatisfactory than that which had just been made by the Prime Minister, and he felt the House was indebted to his hon. Friend the Member for West Norfolk (Mr. G. Bentinck) for his courage in speaking the plain truth upon the Washington Treaty, when the subject was sought to be stifled by the occupants of from benches. Availing himself of this, the legitimate opportunity for a discussion upon the results of the Treaty, and before the usual answer of "You are too late" could be given, he desired to ask the Government and to press for their answer, what were their intentions with regard to the communication of the Three Rules to Foreign Powers? The policy of the Government, was in a state of uncertainty, extremely injurious to the maritime interests of this country; and it was absolutely incumbent upon the Government to announce, without further delay, whether an attempt was to be made to maintain these Rules, or whether they were to be dropped in ignominious silence. He was afraid that in this respect, as well as in all others, the Treaty would prove a failure—as a failure it was admitted to be—by Members of all parties except the occupants of the Treasury bench—and indeed they were by no means strong in any opinion to the contrary. But his main object in troubling the House at that late hour was to argue and maintain that the disasters which had occurred were due to the unconstitutional course pursued by the Government in not submitting this Treaty for the consideration and ratification of Parliament after it had been approved by the Cabinet on behalf of the Crown. A section of the House of whom the hon. Members for Warrington and Kirkcaldy were amongst the exponents, maintained the doctrine that all Treaties should be submitted to Parliament for ratification. He would give no opinion upon these views which, whether right or wrong, did not touch the Treaty of Washington, for this was a Treaty which was, by the leading principles of our constitution, under the control of Parliament, because the Crown, as of strict right, could in no case "engage to pay money" without the authority of the House of Commons. He had ventured to urge this point upon the Government so early as the Address in answer to the Queen's Speech last Session, when the First Minister admitting his (Mr. Bentinck's) case, urged that the Government—

"In concluding the Treaty on their own responsibility, had a right to assume that Parliament as well as the country approved the general principle of a reference of these unfortunate differences to impartial arbitration."

But granting the right hon. Gentleman's argument, it failed to meet his (Mr. Bentinck's) objection, which applied, not to the general principle of arbitration, but to the particular principles established by this Treaty. The policy of the Government had been unconstitutional at the commencement, and unhappy and unfortunate in its termination, and was carried on, moreover, in distinct violation of all precedents, for it had never been assumed by the Crown in any similar case that Parliament would, as a matter of course, vote the money. He would cite two instances only in support of his argument. In 1815, when the Treaty by which the Russo-Dutch loan was guaranteed in pursuance of the Treaty of Vienna, an article expressly provided that the King would "engage to recommend to his Parliament" to pay the money. In 1857, when the Baltic Sound dues were altered, an article in the Treaty again provided that Her Majesty "engaged to recommend to her Parliament to pay;" and during the Session of that year a Resolution was submitted to the House by the Chancellor of the Exchequer for effectuating the provisions of the Treaty, and carried after no small opposition by the late Mr. Williams and other hon. Members below the gangway. If, in like manner, the Treaty of Washington had been constitutionally dealt with, Parliament would have jealously guarded the interests of the country, and advantageous results would have followed—the Three Rules would have been repudiated, we should have saved the Island of St. Juan, and what was of more importance, we should have obtained an impartial and efficient Arbitration. He could conceive no greater want of due diligence on the part of the Government than their assent to the nomination of the three independent Arbitrators who sat at Geneva. He would not for a moment cast any imputation upon them—he believed them to have discharged their duties with honesty, honour, and impartiality— but they were unfitted for their office by want of sufficient acquaintance with English law and the English language. The Prime Minister had that evening proved the ease against himself when he admitted that the judgment of the majority of the Arbitrators was formed independently of the Three Rules, for it was a matter of common notoriety that according to English law we could not have been held liable for a shilling, unless for the retrospective action of these Rules, and this was the ground upon which the Lord Chief Justice decided the single case of the Alabama against us. And yet, notwithstanding these considerations, the right hon. Gentleman said the Rules had no operation, and that whether adopted or not, we should still have had to pay the money. Was there ever a conclusion so preposterous? Had Parliament obtained its clue control, care would have been taken to nominate efficient Arbitrators, and the ordinary rule of a fair arbitration would have been followed by the appointment of an Umpire upon the well-known principle, "no umpire no arbitration," and thus additional security for a right decision would have been obtained. Allusion had been made to the professional career of the hon. Member for East Sussex (Mr. Gregory). He (Mr. Bentinck) would plainly say, that if that hon. Member, or any other solicitor, had in a private case submitted a similar question to similar arbitrators, he would have been open to the charge of simple idiocy, if not indeed to a charge of a more serious nature. The real secret of the transaction was that the Treaty and Arbitration were the creatures of political exigency—that they were adopted by the Government in the erroneous belief that the exploded doctrines of the late Mr. Cobden and of the right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) still had hold upon the country. Therefore they were determined to secure peace at any price, no matter how ignominious the conditions. The truth of this view was established by the speech of his right hon. Friend the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote), who had with frankness and even simplicity, admittted that evening that he and his Colleagues sat, as High Commissioners, at the end of a telegraph wire, and that they derived all their inspirations from the Go- vernment, to one effect only—"Sign the Treaty whatever the terms imposed." He (Mr. Bentinck) was quite satisfied that the true opinion of the House, and the true opinion of the country, were adverse to the humiliating and un-English policy of the Government; but though their country had, by the machinations of the Manchester school, been degraded to the rank of a third-rate power, insomuch, as had been testified by the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson), that it was almost impossible for a British subject now to obtain relief against injury by a Foreign Power, he hoped and believed there might be better days in store, and that old England would again assert her strength and resume her position, in spite of the enmity and envy of other nations and the incapacity of her Government.

said, that the Amendments made by the Lords in this Bill were merely formal, with one or two exceptions.

proposed, after the Lords Amendments relating to the qualification of Commissioners, to insert words providing that no Commissioner should be in any way interested in, or directly or indirectly carry on any business which would tend to his emolument or profit.

admitted that the feeling of the House was in favour of some limitation of the kind, but he was not prepared off-hand to accept this particular form of words. He would, therefore, promise to consider the subject, but for that purpose it would be necessary to postpone the further consideration of the Lords' Amendments.

in moving that the Bill be now read a second time said, its object was to carry out the recommendation of the Select Committee, by raising the qualification of special and common jurors in Ireland. The measure was only a temporary one, and would in no way interfere with the power of Parliament to deal with the whole subject on some future occasion.