asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether more than one opinion was obtained by the Colonial Office from the Law Officers of the Crown, or other legal advisers, respecting the Bill passed during the last Session of Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, for the purpose of empowering Committees of the Dominion House of Commons to examine witnesses under oath; if he will state whether there was any and, if any, what divergency between such opinions, and whether the advice given to Her Majesty with reference to that Bill is now considered to have been correct; and, whether there was any Correspondence between the Governor General of Canada and the Colonial Office on the subject, and if he will cause Copies of that Correspondence to be laid upon the Table?

, in reply, said, that it was not in accordance with precedent to give any information respecting the Opinions of the Law Officers of the Crown, but that it was an error to suppose in the present case that there had been a divergence of opinion. Her Majesty's Government had every reason to believe that the Opinions given by the Law Officers were entirely correct.

asked the Secretary of State for War, If it is true that the Catholic inmates of the Royal Military Hospital at Kilmainham, Dublin, are obliged to leave the Hospital in all weathers and at all seasons to attend Divine Service, though many of them are advanced in life and infirm, while their Protestant comrades, though little more than one-fifth of the whole number of pensioners, have a chapel and resident chaplain of their own religion in the Hospital?

If the hon. Member means by "obliged" that there is any compulsion put upon the Catholic inmates, he is entirely incorrect. The only obligation is a moral obligation which they may feel themselves. The Roman Catholic pensioners who are able to march, go to a chapel half-a-mile distant if the weather permit. The sick and infirm do not go, and the aged pensioners go how and when they please. Episcopalian pensioners, who number 29 per cent of the whole, have a chapel and chaplain on the premises. The chaplain of Kilmainham performs service in the chapel for the troops stationed in the neighbouring barracks without remuneration. The Roman Catholic chaplain receives £50 per annum for the inmates of the Hospital, and is chaplain to the troops in his parish, receiving the authorized allowance.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If the Correspondence received from Her Majesty's Representative in Spain and from other sources, relative to the increasing magnitude of the Carlist War, does not warrant Her Majesty's Government in recognizing the belligerent rights of the troops of Don Carlos, and what correspondence has passed upon the subject with other Powers?

No question has as yet arisen requiring Her Majesty's Government to consider whether belligerent rights should be accorded to the followers of Don Carlos, and there has been no Correspondence on the subject with foreign Governments.

said: The Government have no present intention of introducing a Bill for consolidating the Merchant Shipping Acts. I hope they will never attempt, by any measure, to specify in detail what is meant by seaworthiness as to model, hull, &c, or to affirm that seaworthiness should depend on any prescribed model. The erroneous information given by the hon. Member for Derby (Mr. Plimsoll) in the case of the Parga. cost the country £1,239 11s. 7d. The Board of Trade have never stopped any ship named the Western Chief; but in the case of the Western Ocean. which was stopped, the sum of £600 was paid as compensation. These and all other cases are stated in the Appendix to the evidence given before the Royal Commission. There are the Somerset. £7 16s.; Effort. £40; Lady Head. £30; and Fountain. £50. The Board of Trade exercise a discretion as to the information upon which to take the proceedings which Parliament has imposed upon them by the Act of 1873, and will be cautious in acting upon information coming from quarters from which previous informations have failed of proof. Their principlo is to prosecute the worse, and clearest cases as examples, and to interfere as little as possible with the legitimate course of trade.

, who had the following Motion on the Paper:—

"That in the opinion of this House, the continued imposition of the Income Tax, except in time of wars or some great national emergency, is unjust and impolitic, and it is advisable that such Tax should be gradually reduced and further altogether repealed at the earliest possible period,"

, in rising to move, "That in the opinion of this House, the Reserves for the defence of this Country should be formed of men who have passed through the ranks of the regular Army," said, the Army Re-form Bill which was brought in by Lord Cardwell in 1870, ought to be known—and, he thought, would in future be known—more as a Bill for the Abolition of Purchase than as a Bill for the Re-organization of the Army. Moreover, it was considered by hon. Members generally that it ought to have been the means of promoting economical administration in the Army; and some regret was expressed that more prominence had not been given to the question of Army Reform. While saying this, however, he did not mean to ignore the fact that it was to Lord Cardwell's Administration they owed the introduction of the great principle of short service. The stops which the late Government took with reference to short service appeared to him (Major Beaumont) inadequate; they did not sufficiently recognize the difficulties that might stand in the way of the carrying out of that principle. The object of his Motion was to carry to its legitimate conclusion a principle which had been already accepted by Her Majesty's Government. There was nothing in his proposition which was inconsistent with the steps in Army Reform taken by the late Government, and there was nothing in the details of his proposal which would run counter to the general requirements of the English service. There was no need to go into the question of the comparative cost of the English and foreign armies. Our recruiting cost more than that of Continental nations, partly because our system of enlistment was different, but chiefly because the immense prosperity of the country diverted labour to more profitable channels. One difference between us and foreign nations was, that there was a far greater proportion between the cost of our non-effective services and those of other countries. That, in his opinion, clearly pointed out the necessity of some reform what ought to be the principles which should guide them in considering the question of Army Reform? He could not do better than repeat what was stated by Lord Cardwell on introducing the Army Bill in 1870. Lord Cardwell said it was necessary that the whole of their military force should be effective, and that it was desirable that their Army organization should be under one head. He further stated that the Reserve should be so constituted that in time of peace the Army should supply the Reserve and that in time of war the Reserve should supply the Army. He regretted that Lord Cardwell did not succeed in giving more effect to those views. One of the salient features of the Prussian system was that any man who entered the Army must calculate on 12 years' service, three years with the colours, five years in the First Reserve, and four years Militia; but there was, in fact, no analogy between them, because the Militia were specially enlisted and derived no benefit from training in the Regular Army; whereas the Landwehr were all old soldiers, preserving, while completing their service in the Reserves, all their associations and connections with the Army. The system of localization also contributed to the homogeneity of the Prussian Army. In the Prussian Army, further, the great principle was simplicity, no jealousies between different corps, no competition of recruiting sergeants in the market. The unit was the company, and that unit was cumulated until it formed a complete Army corps of 40,000 men. The system upon which the Prussian Army was constituted combined in the most effectual manner the principles which Lord Cardwell had laid down as necessary to be secured—simplicity, efficiency, and the power of expansion. He was perfectly well aware that on the Continent the principle of conscription was acted on, whereas that was not the case here. He was not in favour of conscription, and he believed there was no necessary connection between conscription and the system of the Prussian service. Let the House consider what their English system was. In the first place, the Regulars were now enlisted for a limited time, and received neither bounty nor pension. Next there were two Army Reserves. The men were liable in the first of those for service abroad, but in the second for home service only; in neither had they any recognized position in the Regular Army, and it was a matter of chance whether they had had any training in it or not, so that they were really not efficient Reserves. Next came the Militia, whose engagement was different from that of the Regulars; and there was the Militia Reserve, which formed part of the Militia itself, but the nature of whose engagement was different from that of the ordinary Militia. Lastly, there were the Yeomanry and the Volunteers. Now there was no direct connection between the two Reserve Forces which he had mentioned and the ranks of the Regular Army. It was true that the first part of the Army Reserve was liable to serve abroad; but still it was no part of the Regular Army, and the men of the two forces had different sympathies. Under these circumstances, Army re-organization must be a matter of considerable difficulty, because the operation would be like welding together two metals of a dissimilar character. He did not propose to alter the number of men at all. That number was not too large, but it was desirable to see what the number actually was. The Secretary of State for War stated the other evening that nom 458,000 and 459,000 men were provided for in the Estimates. But the Estimates themselves represented—he believed correctly—that 442,500 men were provided for; and as the number of the Militia was short by 8,000 men, and the First Reserve by 8,000, the total number of available men was reduced to 431,500. From this grand total he would deduct the number of Volunteers, who could not be considered in any scheme of Army Reform, as they were not subject to the direct and entire control of the Secretary for War. There were, then, 289,500 men available for home service, and after deducting the 125,000 Regulars, there was left a residue of 164,500 Reserves. He cited these figures because he wanted to get at the cost of the Reserves. The First and Second Reserves, with the Militia, cost £927,500, which represented an expenditure of £6 per man. His proposal was to carry out more fully the system of short service by making the number of men who formed the ranks of the Regular Army with the colours, 80,000," and by copying the Prussian system of passing these men successively into the ranks of the First and Second Reserves. He would make each Reserve consist of 100,000 men. The Regulars, he suggested, should serve three years with the colours, eight years in the First Reserve, and nine years in the Second, after which he proposed that they should be entitled to a pension. That would give them 280,000 men available for home service, while 180,000 would be available for service abroad, against 165,000 who were available for foreign service at the present time. If these figures could be realized, the Army would fulfil all the requirements it did at present, and would enjoy the advantage of being perfectly homogeneous and capable of the most economical administration. Unlike Continental countries, they had to garrison largo colonies and also to protect India; but whether it were deemed desirable to have a separate Army for India or to keep the Indian Army as a part of their Home Army, his proposal would lend itself equally to both suggestions. No doubt the new system would require that there should be a greater number of men passing through the ranks than was the case at present, the number which would be required per year being something over 30,000. The number last year was 17,000, in addition to those who joined the Militia, When they looked to the small inducement which was held out to men to join the Reserve there was nothing which could lead them to infer that the 30,000 men per year could not readily be obtained. To try short service properly, they must give men a sufficient inducement to remain in the Reserves, and they must fix the time of service with the colours at a period long enough to make men soldiers, but not sufficiently long to break off altogether their connection with civil life. He would like to take that opportunity of protesting against the results of the Short Service System, if tried under proper conditions, being judged from what they had seen of the system under its present regulations. To work the system properly, they should alter the length of service from six years to three, give the men in the Reserves larger pay, and provide for them afterwards by means of a pension. When these three conditions were fulfilled, he felt certain the results would amply justify the introduction of the Short Service System. He was of opinion that three years were sufficient to make an Infantry soldier, provided his military practice was refreshed and his efficiency was kept up by being called out from time to time, and this opinion was endorsed by the highest authorities. But if three years were sufficient to make an Infantryman a soldier, it was obvious that length of time would not be enough for a man enlisting in the Cavalry, who would have to learn, not only to walk and shoot, but also to ride, for an Artilleryman, who would have to be taught to manage guns, or for an Engineer, who, besides his military duties, had to go through courses of instruction in subjects such as photography, telegraphy, bridge building, and other specialities. If, therefore, it was the intention of the Secretary of State for War to make the length of service in the Engineers and the Infantry the same, he trusted the right hon. Gentleman would reserve the matter for further consideration. There was another aspect of the question, and that was the financial aspect. It would be seen from the Estimates that a man in the Regular Army cost the country approximately £50 a-year, while the figures he had quoted in the early part of his remarks would show that their Reserves, speaking roundly and roughly, cost £6 a man. Now, in proportion as they made their Reserves efficient, they could diminish the numbers of their Regular Army. If they took 50,000 men from the Regular Army at £50 a man, they would save £2,500,000; and if they paid their Reserves £12, instead of £6, a man, taking the number at 200,000, they would have to set the additional cost of six times 200,000, or, speaking roughly, £l,250,000 against this saving of £2,500,000, which would leave a balance in favour of economy of £1,250,000. And in course of time the saving would be considerably more, because they could not have a system improperly constructed—round service in square holes and square service in round—without involving increased expense. The objections to his proposal were three; but he would premise by remarking that military men could not deny that his theory was right; and if it were right in principle, and there were only certain practical objections in the way, it was time to find some mode of getting over them. It was said, in the first place, that it would be unconstitutional to do away with the Militia; secondly, that his proposal would spoil the Army; and, thirdly, that they could not get the men. As to the first objection, what they wanted was, not that a thing should be constitutional, but that it should be good; and if a thing that was constitutional was not good, the sooner they got rid of it the better. As to the second point, no doubt colonels would object to their men passing so rapidly from their regiments into the Reserves, and that was a perfectly legitimate objection for colonels to take. But from the taxpayer's point of view they were indifferent whether the Regular Army or the Reserves might be the strongest, provided only that the country were sufficiently defended. With reference to the question of not getting the men, that, in his judgment, depended simply on offering sufficient inducements or not. It was obvious if they offered every soldier in the Army £100 a-year they could get all the men they wanted; and, on the other hand, if they gave only 2d. a-day to the men in the Reserves, they would have no Reserves at all. But between these two extremes there was a figure far within the limits of economy which might be safely and effectually adopted. With reference to what the Militia had done for us, he might mention that during the Peninsular War men were drafted from the Militia into the Army by ballot, the result being that the men so obtained to supply Wellington's army were got at great difficulty and cost. In the Crimean War the men were supplied without ballot, but the supply was found to be uncertain, and the Militia itself was very largely diminished in consequence. They found it necessary, therefore, to have recourse to German levies, and they knew what a lavish amount of money was expended on them. If they looked to the hasty levies of Gardes Mobiles raised in France during the late war, they would find that, when brought face to face with the Prussians, no matter what their superiority in numbers might be, they were not able to stand before a Regular Army. But these French levies were similar in character to English Militia. Sir John Burgoyne had stated that, before their military organization could be considered to be in a satisfactory condition, they must dismiss any idea of the Militia or Volunteers being effective for recruiting their Regular Forces until there was a considerable improvement in their organization; and another high authority had said that the experience of recent campaigns had proved the Militia to be a very valuable auxiliary, but not at all fitted to fill up gaps in the Regular Army. The opinions he had quoted seemed to show that some re-organization of their Militia and Reserves was needed; and he was of opinion that it could not be effected in a piecemeal way. If they were to have a complete and comprehensive system of Army reform, they must adopt altogether either a long system or a short one, for any halting between the two would inevitably bring them to grief. The object of his Motion was to enforce the view that uniformity of system was absolutely essential to economy of administration, and that the true solution of their difficulties was to be found in adopting gradually, but surely and in its entirety, the principle of passing their Reserves through the Regular Army. The hon. and gallant Gentleman concluded by moving his Resolution.

seconded the Resolution.

said, there could he no doubt that it would be most advantageous to this country if they could have a reserve of old soldiers; but the first thing to secure was a real and substantial Army, which he was afraid at that moment they did not possess. There was an important difference between our Army and every Continental Army, because we had no conscription, and consequently no means of raising our strength, on an emergency, to any extent whatever. In 1854, the strength of the Army was 124,801, and there were actually serving 122,464 men, leaving a deficiency of 2,337. In 1855, when the Crimean War broke out, the Army was raised to 189,956 men, and the number serving-was 143,298, leaving a deficiency of 46,658. In 1856, the Army was raised to 205,808, and there were 155,406 serving, leaving a deficiency of 50,402. In 1857, on the conclusion of the War, there was an immediate reduction of 60,000 men, the number voted being 144,518: but the number actually serving was 149,538, an excess of 5,020; but it had hardly been made before the Indian Mutiny broke out. In 1858, the Army was raised to 169,413, and the deficiency was 21,881. Then came the Franco-German War. On the 1st of August, 1870, they had an Army of 167,979; the number serving was 163,386, and the deficiency on the outbreak of the war was 4,593. In consequence of the outbreak of the war, the Army was increased by 20,000 men; but the deficiencies were—on the 1st of October, 16,915; on November 1, 14,530; on December 1, 12,741; on January 1, 1871, 9,606; on February 1, 7,255; on March 1, 5,283. In the same year, on the 14th of July, the French Reserves were called out, and on the 16th of July the mobilisation of the German Army took place, that force—amounting to between 400,000 and 500,000 men—being officially declared ready for war on the 1st of August. When Marshal M'Mahon talked of 500 men as the proper strength for a battalion, he knew he could have 1,500 marching in a week; but, as he (Colonel North) told Lord Cardwell last year, a regiment of 500 would not muster 350. It was all very well to talk about such changes as that now proposed. The other day a proposal was made to reduce the number of men by 10,000, and now it was proposed to abolish the Militia and create a body of Reserves. In the case of the Expedition that had recently finished so gloriously, the whole strength of the three regiments sent out was not equal to that of one regiment sent to the Crimea; and in order to make up the number of 600 to send to the Gold Coast, the 79th Highlanders had to be broken up by 126 men being taken from the regiment. He would ask, was that satisfactory? Was the country safe? Were they not rather living in a fool's paradise? He admitted that if they had a first-rate Army, the men who had passed through it would make a magnificent Army of Reserve; but they had no Army at all. A General Order had been issued on the 14th of November authorizing recruits to be enlisted 5 feet 4½ inches in height for regiments of the Line; and in February last there was a General Order authorizing enlistment for the Artillery at 5 feet 6 inches. In the Artillery Lord Card well made a clean sweep of 101 officers, 216 non-commissioned officers, and 1,600 men, and they had never recovered from that. Then volunteers were called for, and other regiments lost their best men. He recollected his noble Friend (Lord Cardwell) laying down the proposition that their Army ought to be comparatively small, as regarded men and materials, in time of peace, but its efficiency high. He would ask, was that the case now? It was admitted that there were difficulties in the way of calling out the Reserves.

said, there was no difficulty about calling them out, but as to whether they were amenable to punishment for breach of discipline.

said, it was a very strange state of things if the colonel of a regiment could not inflict punishment for insubordination without fear of the law.

said, that Mr. Ayrton, the late Judge Advocate General, had drafted a clause to meet the difficulty, and it would have been inserted in the Army Discipline Bill to be introduced this Session.

And the sooner it was done the better. Instead of breaking up the 79th Highlanders, the Reserve Force should have been sent to the Gold Coast, by which the country would have been saved a considerable expense. He was afraid the Army of Reserve was a myth, for although it had been said to be in existence for several years they had never been seen in a body—on one occasion, however, about 250 of them attended the Autumn Manœuvres. He hoped the Government would pause before it adopted this three years' system. It came to this—that they had an Army consisting of men who might leave it after three years service, and who, if not allowed to do so, became discontented soldiers; they were to be encouraged in purchasing their discharges; and they had a Reserve of men who, when they were out, might disobey their officers as much as they pleased. If Englishmen would not stand conscription, they must pay for such an Army as could be depended upon. Changes, no doubt, might be suggested; but the expense must come out of the pockets of the ratepayers. What did they pay for recruits during the Crimean War? From £13 to £17 per man. As many as five regiments of Militia went to the Mediterranean during that war, and when they came back it was impossible to find a finer body of men in the Army. He was perfectly shocked to see some regiments; they were not to be compared to the soldiers they had 20 years ago, being for the most part more boys without stamina or anything else. According to a Return which he held in his hand, it appeared that of 24,000 recruits in one year, 14,000 had passed and upwards of 9,000 were rejected. What did the Royal Commission over which Lord Panmure presided in 1867 report? They said—

"Recent events taught us that we must not rely in future on having time for preparation; wars would he sudden in their preparation and short in their duration, and woe to that country which was unprepared to defend itself against any contingency that might arise or any combination that might be formed against it. No doubt the measures that would he necessary might tend to increase the cost of the Army; but, considering the vast interests at stake and the wealth of the country, whatever that increased cost might be, it would, after all, amount to a very trifling insurance to pay for placing the Army in a satisfactory condition."

said, he rose for the purpose of making a few short, soldier's remarks. It was the great weakness of the military theorists of the day to urge the adoption of a slavish imitation of the military system of Prussia. Those who did so seemed to hint to for get that the system of that country was entirely founded upon conscription, and it was utterly impossible to adopt that system with advantage without consolation, which Englishmen would never have. First of all they must find men, which they had the greatest difficulty in doing, although they had reduced the standard of Infantry to 5 feet 4½ inches. Most of those enlisted were mere boys—many of them 16, though calling themselves 18—and they would not be made fit for the field in less than three or four years. The Prussians did not admit men for short service under 20 years of age, and who were able to march and carry their kits; but in our infantry regiments, he could state from observation that one-third the men would hardly be able to carry their rifles and ammunition in a campaign. In order to remedy that state of affairs, the first thing to be considered was our system of recruiting, and that must be encouraged in a more rational way than it had hitherto been. It had been the fashion of late to take all the loaves and fishes away from both officers and soldiers. They had thus nothing to look forward to, or to attach them to the service. They must improve the position of non-commissioned officers both as to pension and pay. They must also endeavour to re-adopt the system of giving bounty, considerably increase the bounty money, which they could not now do for the best of all reasons—namely, because they had given up tattooing for desertion. This had been for political clap-trap called branding, and designated military tyranny. He should like every one to know that marking with the letter "D" was never a military punishment. Officers objected to it; indeed, he denied that they had ever willingly tattooed deserters, and it was only adopted to save the taxpayers from fraud, and for that reason was forced on the officers who, in the case of convicting a soldier of desertion had, if they omitted to mark him, to attach a special letter to the proceedings of the Court Martial, giving their reason for the omission. Whether the custom should be re-adopted or not was a question open to consideration, for, no doubt there was an immense amount of desertion, and it must be checked in some way or other. In his regiment, after the "D" was abolished, desertion increased in a most extraordinary degree. Indeed, he had at one time amongst his recruits, he believed, 30 men who had deserted from the Artillery. Every man wanted to be in a mounted corps, not knowing that there was such hard work to be done. They first went to the Artillery and then to the Cavalry, and finding the work there, too, no sinecure, deserted to the Infantry, some of these appearing on the strength of three regiments at the same time. A great deal had been said of the different Forces; but it should be remembered that in the case of voluntary service, the great object should be to utilize the whole of the population as far as possible for military purposes; and those who served in the Yeomanry and the Militia would be lost to the country but for those two Forces, for bon. Members in the command of Yeomanry regiments knew that it was composed of men who would not servo in any other Force. With regard to short service, like most men who had commanded regiments, he was strongly opposed to it as regarded the Cavalry and Artillery, as it was impossible that, under that arrangement, the necessary efficiency could be obtained. For instance, too, it was a mistake to suppose that a man would be useful after he had long left his regiment. A Cavalry soldier, at the end of 18 months, if, as would be probable, during that time he had never mounted or groomed a horse, would be as difficult to train, and of as little use, as a fresh recruit.

said, that the questions of recruiting and the Reserve, which were inseparably connected, had yet to be solved. Looking at the question practically, and believing the proposal of the hon. and gallant Member for South Durham (Major Beaumont) to be impracticable, he was not prepared to recommend its adoption. The object was practically to imitate the Prussians in having a strong Reserve, upon which we could lay our hands at any moment; but this, however desirable, would be impossible without the conscription, which never would be tolerated in this country. The short service of three years was equally impracticable; for to carry it into effect you must take in recruits below the age of 20, or even 18, and the result would be that the average age of the whole Army would be below 20. All the recruiting officers declared that by the time an Englishman attained the ago of 20 his mind was made up, and that not 1 in 100 had any other intention than to adopt the profession of arms. This was, therefore, an objection, in his mind, to shortening the term of service to three years. His hon. and gallant Friend had said that the pay and pension of the men must be increased, and with regard to the pay, the cost of every man in the Army Reserve had been put down by the late Secretary of War at £6, and he said he should be able under his plan to spend £12. The question, however, was whether the increase from £6 to £12 on the Reserve would be such an attraction as to draw to it large masses of recruits. With regard to pension, too, the hon. and gallant Member seemed to forget that any increase of pension, to be really worth anything, would be an enormous addition to the Estimates. It was a heavy item under the former system of long service, when fewer men lived to claim the pension. The three recommendations of the hon. and gallant Member would, therefore, in his opinion, practically break down. He agreed with his hon. and gallant Friend that 32,000 or 34,000 recruits would be required annually to keep up the Army to its proper strength. It had been pointed out that no less than 44,000 men had altogether been raised for all branches of military service last year. Not less than 29,000 of this number, however, had been enlisted for the Militia, and there were thousands of men who enlisted for the Militia who would never enlist for three years' service in the Line. He ventured to think that for carrying out the three years' term of service entirety and satisfactorily at least 34,000 recruits would be required every year. It was inexpedient to make more changes in our Army system than were necessary, for they might knock the life out of institutions by reforming them, and with regard to the point-under discussion, the difficulties of recruiting lay at the base of the entire system. Practically, the number of recruits obtained last year—namely, 17,200—did not keep up the strength of the Army, and the Commission on Army Recruiting, of which he was a Member, went carefully into the subject, and reported that to keep up the Army to its proper strength about 22,000 recruits a-year were required. It was said that they might get more by shortening the term of service; but the Inspector General of Recruiting thought a good number of recruits had been lost because they did not see their way to serving permanently, and it was a question worth consideration whether it was not advisable to accept recruits for whatever term they could be got, for experience showed that the ordinary Englishman was not inclined to serve for a term in the Army and then immediately to leave it. In countries where the conscription existed the authorities had only to say how many men between certain ages should be called out; but in England the problem was yearly to find 32,000 men who were willing to serve for three years. Most of the men who entered did so because the had a turn for soldiering and intended to remain in the Army for the whole of their lives. It was said that of the 17,200 recruits enlisted last year 9,000 had enlisted for short service and 7,000 odd for long service; but that did not show conclusively the attraction of short service. The whole question of the Army Reserve was unsolved, and it could not as yet be said that Lord Card-well's plan had shown a prospect of success. It was a valuable experiment, and had not done the least harm; but it had been found that, under existing conditions, it could not be carried out. Captain Vivian told the House in March, 1871, what the Government were going to do. He entered into actuarial calculations, from which it appeared that the Government required 32,449 recruits the result was that the Government had obtained only 17,200. Captain Vivian's calculation was that the plan of the late Government would produce in the fourth year after the system had commenced 13,674 men. Altogether it had produced just half what it had been estimated to produce in four years. The Army was to get 14,000 men in the four years, while practically they had got 7,000 men in three years. Could it be said, under these circumstances, that the scheme had been a success? The Army was not kept up to its proper strength by 17,200 recruits, and 5,000 more were wanted. The hon. and gallant Member for South Durham proposed to do away with the Militia in order to get the additional men; but the Militia had always been the most valuable source of recruits for the regular Army. There were endless authorities to prove that, and therefore he would suggest that the Militia should be improved and made as attractive as possible. The evidence of Adjutant-General Wetherall was decidedly in favour of the class of agricultural recruits. He said that their conduct and stature were superior. The Militia obtained the agricultural recruits and they constantly passed from the Militia to the regular Army. It stood to reason that they should do so because the Militia, being a local force, and being a halfway step to the Army, the men joined first the Militia regiment and then volunteered into the Line. Ft had been remarked that the Militia who volunteered into the Line at the time of the Crimean War were not first-rate men, but it must be recollected that the men who then volunteered into the Line were not Militiamen, but merely Militia recruits. He ventured to say that the trained Militiamen who joined the Line, were far superior to the ordinary Line recruits, and that if they were mixed up with the regular soldiers in reasonable proportions, they would be a great addition to the strength of our regiments. The system of Militia Reserve introduced by General Peel, by which a hold was obtained over the men while in the Militia, and made them thus available as a Reserve for the Line, was a most valuable improvement in our military arrangements. It had been said that our Militia were no better than the raw levies of the "French during the late war, but thousands of the French recruits were mere boys who did not know which end of their breech-loader they were to load at, and that while they were within 30 miles of the enemy, and surely our Militiamen would be more likely to make effective soldiers after a short training than such a class of recruits as that. It had been very properly pointed out that at present we had no hold whatever upon the men who went out of the Army into the Reserve, and that there was a great difficulty in finding them when they were wanted, and he, therefore, suggested that the Reserve men from the Regular Army should, as far as possible, be passed into the Militia, which they would greatly strengthen by their presence, while, at the same time, by their being made to drill with the Militia, their whereabouts could be easily ascertained. In his opinion the right hon. Gentleman the (Secretary of State for War) could not do better than attempt to carry still further the localization of our Forces by means of the system of what might be called "linked regiments "—the system of linking the Line with the Militia—a system which might have imperfections in its working, but which he believed would prove of great advantage in making the Militia regiment a support and feeder to the Line regiment, and at the same time making the Line regiment to a still greater extent a feeder to the Militia regiment. Hitherto the linking system had not been carried out to any appreciable extent, although, as he believed, it was essential to a good system of recruiting that it should be carried out. In order to effect that object commissions in the Line should only be given to the officers of those Militia regiments from which a certain number of men had volunteered into their associated Line regiments during the previous year. He had made these suggestions, because he believed that the question of placing our Recruiting and our Reserve upon a satisfactory footing had not yet been solved, inasmuch as, instead of our having obtained 22,000 recruits last year, we had only obtained 17,000 men, and, instead of having 14,000 in the Reserve, we had only 7,000. For his part he had no desire to see another Commission appointed to inquire into the subject; but I if one were to be appointed, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would not do one thing—appoint a large one. If one was much required, far better have a small than a largo one.

said, he wished to call the attention of of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to the present unsatisfactory position of non-commissioned officers, in the hope that something might be done to improve it, so that an inducement should be held out to such men to re-engage at the expiration of their time of service. The non-commissioned officers under the old system were as fine a body of men as ever were uniform; but, under the present system, he was afraid that such men would disappear altogether, there being no inducement whatever to them to re-engage in the Army, while the inducements held out to them to become civilians were very great. He should recommend, in the first place, that every sergeant should have a room to himself, it not being right that a married man, holding a responsible position, should be compelled to occupy a room shared by another married couple. He would also recommend that they should be offered more advantageous terms of pay; that they should have an increase of pay after six years' service in the event of their reengaging, and a further increase on reengaging for a third term of six years, at the expiry of which, or after 18 years' service, they should be entitled to a pension. Until the non-commissioned officers had their present position improved so as to offer them sufficient inducement to serve in the Army as a profession, with a fair prospect of a comfortable retirement in the end, he was afraid that the system of short service would break down, particularly in so far as they were concerned.

said, he could not concur in the view that there was at present any greater deficiency than there had always been in the effective strength of the Army, as compared with the established strength. Although the House had been told that the Militia was a great feeder of the Army, the information which was laid before the Recruiting Commission led him very much to doubt the accuracy of that assertion. During the Peninsular War the Regular Militia furnished, as compared with the numbers of that Force, but little aid in keeping up the effective strength of the Army, which derived its chief supply from the local Militia of Lord Castle-reagh—a body which amounted to something like 400,000 men, and from which considerable supplies of men were obtained. At the commencement of the Crimean War it was confidently expected that the Militia, if called out and embodied, would amply supply the Army with recruits; but the fact was, the Regular Militia supplied very few men indeed. After the first few months of that war the Government were urged to call out the Militia, and after great delay that measure was adopted; but so far from the Militia furnishing a number of men at all commensurate with the expense so incurred, only one half the number of men expected to join the Army did offer. Recruiting for the Army depended very much upon the popularity of the service. While the Crimean War lasted every effort was made to obtain recruits, but the number enrolled did not greatly exceed the number ordinarily obtained before the war broke out. They amounted only during two years to 61,000, whereas, so popular was the Indian service, that during two years of the Mutiny, 64,000 recruits were readily obtained. Men were found to flock into regiments intended for India and for the India service with readiness, and desertions were far less numerous than during the Crimean War. It happened, too, that after incurring the cost of raising the Militia for the express object of filling up the ranks of the Army, yet the Infantry of the Line at the time of the Crimean War, when its strength was highest, was 50,000 below the Establishment. While, therefore, the system of voluntary recruiting prevailed, unless the service was made popular, and the recruiting parties kept up in an efficient state the difficulty of obtaining recruits would continue to be experienced. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War observed with great truth the other evening, that while some branches of the service were easily recruited, others were not. The Indian Service, as he (Sir George Balfour) had mentioned, was among the former, and was formerly so popular that recruits were easily procured, and, as already stated, during the Mutiny he believed every man at Aldershot would have volunteered for India if he had been asked or allowed to do so. In the present time they should take advantage of this popularity, and provide for the service in India in such a way as to enable men to go out and serve there; then they would find many who were ready to go, and thus give great relief to the service out of India. One great difficulty in the way of forming Reserves arose from the manner in which the regular Army was scattered, and they might fritter away their whole available strength in forming this Reserve and that Reserve, and thus fail in having a reliable defensive Force. In July last they had 94,000 privates of Infantry of the Line, 52,000 of whom were serving in India and the Colonies, leaving 42,000 to be employed in Ireland and Great Britain. How was it possible to form a great Infantry Reserve out of the Infantry, and with an. Army so circumstanced as our Army was, requiring all its regiments to be in a state to go abroad? It would, in practice, be found necessary to increase the number of recruiting stations, and it was known by experience that in proportion as the number of recruiters was increased, and the required stature was diminished the greater would be the number of recruits coming to the standards. Then, again, it would be found very beneficial to add to the number of existing depôts throughout the country, so that young men might be properly trained and kept until they were fit to enter the ranks. This was one of the suggestions of the last Commission on recruiting, and hitherto neglected. Ten men with pith and stamina were worth four times the number of weak striplings, and only men who were able to face and endure fatigue ought to be sent to India or Africa. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would give his attention to the subject of the re-organization of the Army, so as to diminish the cost of our skeleton battalions of Infantry, and would not lose sight of the fact that the Militia, by its distribution throughout the country, was an opposing competitor of the Regular Forces, and drew away a large proportion of men who would otherwise enter the Army, and especially agricultural labourers; than whom there were no better soldiers in the field. He was rather surprised to hear that the Army was now not in a state of efficiency as to numbers, in comparison with the established strength, and the more so, that it appeared from a Return presented that morning, that last year the effectives of the Army were more closely up to the Establishment than they had been for many years before. If hon. Members would turn to the Returns in the Appendix to the Report of the last Recruiting Commission they would see that even when they had the long-service men, the effectives were considerably below the Establishment. In order to enable Members of this House to consider matters of Army reform more satisfactorily, he trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would do something towards improving the existing official Returns laid before the House. The Army Statistical Abstract, that morning distributed, was a good beginning, but it must be admitted that the information given was very meagre, and in certain points was exceedingly defective. The Returns were not drawn out in a uniform manner with Returns previously laid before the House, and were so prepared as to defy comparison with former years. Hon. Gentlemen ought, at all events, to have accurate data before they alarmed the country by saying that the Army was greatly deficient in strength.

said, that every practical soldier, whether within the House or out of it, would agree with him, that there was a growing feeling in the House and in the country that the short enlistment system was slowly but surely destroying the strength of the Army. It was increasing desertion to an extent never known before, and it was denuding the regiments of old soldiers. The Duke of Wellington declared that the old soldiers were the life, the soul, and the heart of the British Army, and yet they were, within 20 years of the death of that distinguished Captain, introducing the system which he strongly condemned, the result being that if a war broke out, our regiments as at present constituted would be quite unable to cope with Continental armies. He ventured, in 1870, in that House, to protest against the introduction of short enlistment; and he found that many of the evils he then predicted were gradually being realized, while he failed to find that any of the promised advantages had been reaped. It was said that the country would save the expense of bounties; and so it had, but by sacrificing its old soldiers. Further, Lord Cardwell anticipated that the short-service system would increase the popularity of the Army, and make it truly national; but so far from becoming popular, the difficulties of recruiting were greater than ever, for the class of recruits was worse than formerly, while desertions were steadily increasing. Lord Cardwell held out another inducement. He said that the new system would provide an Army of Reserve. He (Major Dickson) doubted very much whether such an army existed; but if it did, he should be curious to know how it was that the 42nd Highlanders were not recruited from the Reserve. He hoped that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would brigade the Reserves at Aldershot, and would go down to inspect that phantom Force, and at the same time inspect the ranks of the regiments, and see the great extent to which they were composed of striplings. The right hon. Gentleman would then see that the country had paid very dear for losing its old soldiers, who had always been the backbone of the British Army.

said, he did not attach any importance whatever to the cuckoo cry of making the Army popular. It was not a question of making the Army popular, for he did not believe the Army was at all unpopular, but a question of organization; and while the labour market was in its present state—and the labour market was more likely to get dearer than cheaper—they would have difficulties in getting soldiers for the pay which was offered them. This was a serious question which affected both the safety and the policy of the country, and he could not conceive any subject of greater importance. They had been promised an Army Reserve, but after an experiment of four years-after the introduction of the short-service system, and after the British Army had suffered in its efficiency, they had got 7,000 men of Reserve. When they compared that number with the hundreds of thousands composing the Re-servos of Continental countries, it was so paltry that it was evident that the system had entirely and absolutely broken down. If they asked any old soldier his opinion of the short-service system, he would toll them that it had been destructive to the Army in more than one important point—especially in the efficiency of the non-commissioned officers. Even in France, since the introduction of the Prussian system, they had great difficulty in getting property-qualified non-commissioned officers. This state of things had arisen, in his opinion, from an attempt to combine two objects entirely different. In England they wanted two kinds of armies absolutely distinct—the one was for the defence of their country, and to be able to take the hold to support the policy of the country, if necessary; and the other for service in India and the Colonies. For the defence of the country, and in order to have an adequate Re-servo, he could conceive that the short-service system might do; but if they wished to have large bodies of men to go to India, nothing could be more unsatisfactory than the short-service system. It seemed to him to be too hastily assumed that the country would never put up with the conscription the conscription, such as it existed among Continental nations, he believed to be perhaps impossible, and to be at any rate unnecessary; but a modified system of compulsory service he thought the country, in a time of danger and peril, would be ready to bear. If they had a Militia in which every man was obliged to serve oho year without any kind of exceptions for rank, wealth, or birth, and those who had served in it became fused with the mass of the population, they would have a Reserve from which their Regular Army might be recruited on the long-service system. Their Volunteers would then consist of men who had served a year under the standards, attaining much greater efficiency, and no Reserve would be required, for the whole population would be the Reserve. In the event of a popular war—and with our institutions no unpopular war could be waged—the Army could be recruited Up to any point desired. Recruiting was becoming such a great and increasing difficulty that he believed it would be necessary before long to have some such system of modified compulsory service. They might give a man the option of serving any year from his 17th to his 24th year, and there were few men who would not be be better for one year's service with the standard. With the exception of paying taxes—which they all knew was a privilege and not a burden—especially the brewers and those assessed under Schedule D of the Income Tax, as could be testified by every Chancellor of the Exchequer—and occasionally serving on juries, there was not a single personal sacrifice which an Englishman was required to make for his country. He believed that if the statesmen of England told the people that their national greatness depended upon having a great national Force, they would be prepared to submit to the sacrifices necessary to secure a Force adequate to maintain the honour and dignity of the country, and such sacrifices were embodied in his suggestion, which he held to be perfectly practical.

said, the House would feel much indebted to his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Durham (Major Beaumont) for raising a discussion of which he might say Quot homines, tot sententiœ, almost every Speaker having had a theory of his own. In his opinion, they were treading on dangerous ground when they proposed to introduce sweeping changes, for all the arrangements now existing were purely tentative, and the differences of opinion which had boon disclosed were a proof that the course now being pursued was the wisest, since it would develope any latent good in each separate; force. The Militia, under the localization system, brigaded and drilled identically with the Zone, would be brought up to a pitch of efficiency not hitherto reached; the Reserves would be more ready of identification; and the Army itself would be more popular in the country. That had been the object of the system, and till it had had a fair trial it ought not to be interfered with. His hon. and gallant Friend had said much on the Prussian system; but though on smaller matters there might be suggestions which we could adopt, it was fallacious to compare two countries differing in political systems and in the character of the people. Our own Estimates showed the whole cost of our Army, except, indeed, the value of the labour employed; but that was not the case in Prussia. We must remember the enormous indirect charge which fell upon the inhabitants of that country, which did not appear in the Estimates, and which was hardly assessable in money at all. In talking of the financial result of his proposed system, the hon. and gallant Mover of the Amendment had introduced an element of considerable uncertainty when he said the Reserve men would have to go on to pension, for it had been deemed an undoubted advantage of the short-service system that it did away with the necessity of pensions altogether. Reference had been made to recruiting under the new system, and it had been alleged that the men who now offered themselves were not so good, physically speaking, as those who used to offer themselves, and that the numbers obtained were insufficient for the requirements of the Army. Those facts, if they were true, might be accounted for by the exceptional state of the labour market of late years, the rise in wages, and the consequent temptation to accept employment elsewhere than in the Army. The same circumstances would account for and answer the allegation that desertions were more numerous than formerly. As to the character of the recruits, the recently issued Report of General Taylor, the Inspector General of Recruiting, showed that of 258 who were objected to, after thorough enquiry and examination by commanding officers, 117 were retained and 141 released, being a proportion of less than 1 per cent on the total number of recruits raised during the year; and, according to the same authority, our standard of height, 5 feet 5 inches for the Infantry, was considerably higher than that of any other Army in Europe. No other Army in Europe required such a high standard, and that of itself added greatly to the difficulty of recruiting. He thought that if we secured a good chest measurement, with good stamina and physical endurance, we should have quite as good an Army, even with a lower standard of height, though the men might not look quite so well on parade. With regard to the Ashantee expedition, there was nothing exceptional in men of the 79th Highlanders being drafted into the 42nd, instead of men of the Reserve; it was quite in accordance with the process described in General M'Dougall's Report, which was laid before the House at the time the Army Localization Bill was under discussion. It was never intended to call out the Army Reserve men, except in cases of great emergency, such as an European War, when they would be taken to fill up the ranks of our regiments. The late expedition, however, was simply a case of sending regiments abroad. Observations had been made upon the military authorities, for sending three distinguished battalions to the Gold Coast. The fact was, that seven battalions were last year kept at a higher-strength than others because they were first on the roster for foreign service. During last year, four were prepared and despatched to India, and the three that remained, and were therefore first on the roster, were the 42nd Highlanders, the Second Battalion of the 23rd, and the Second Battalion of the Rifle Brigade. The 23rd and the Rifle Brigade, not being up to their full establishment, were filled up from twin battalions; but there being no twin battalion for the 42nd, that was filled up from the 79th, which was the linked battalion, and with it formed the Perth Brigade. In five or six years a sufficient number of men would have been enlisted for the Brigade, but at present there was a deficiency of men who had been so enlisted, and therefore volunteers were called for from the linked battalion. This was the simple explanation of the facts, and he could not conceive that it involved anything to be found fault with. It had been stated that after the lapse of four years of short-service, the number of Reserves was only 7,000 instead of 14,000; but the short-service had commenced so recently that the larger number could not have been raised. If men were enlisted for six years we must wait that time for them, and their non-appearance in the interval furnished no argument against the Reserve, and if Captain Vivian had made use of the language that had been attributed to him, he must have referred to a period after 1876, or he must have contemplated a shorter period of service than six years. The number of men who had been voluntarily passed into the Reserve was 7,000, and it would be remembered that the Reserve system would not come into real operation until after the year 1876. He could not agree that short-service caused desertion, because there were most desertions from the Artillery, in which short-service had not yet been introduced. That was a sufficient proof that desertions were to be attributed to other causes. He quite agreed with all that had been said with regard to the desirability of the Militia regiments having an opportunity of being united as closely as possible with the regiments of the Line in their respective localities for drill and service. That was the desire of the late Government, and he presumed that the right hon. Gentleman who was at present at the head of the War Department could only have the same desire, and would do his best to realize that object. It was, however, a question of time, and could only be effected gradually, as many difficulties were found in the way, and to do it in the short period mentioned by many hon. and gallant Members would be quite impossible. He hoped the Amendment would not be pressed to a division, and that the hon. and gallant Mover would be satisfied with the expression of opinion which he had elicited, and would leave the matter as it at present stood until it had been further tried by the test of time.

I have very little to say, because any observations calling for remark relate mainly to what was done by the late Government, which is now represented by the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, and who has replied on the points calling for any explanation. No doubt, it is the desire of everyone that the Army, however constituted, should be thoroughly efficient; that we should get the best possible recruits; and it is equally desirable that our Reserves should be of such a character that we should be able to find them when we want them to do their duty to their country. Now, it has been admitted that, so far as our present Army of Reserve is concerned, that certainly is not the ease, and I can quite understand how the difficulty has arisen. When the Army of Reserve is called out by proclamation, in the case of a national emergency, it will stand on the same footing as the Regular Army—that is, a man who does not respond to the call is liable to be punished as a deserter; but sufficient provision is not made for putting your hand on the men in ordinary cases, or for controlling them when they volunteer for service—in such cases, for instance, as that in which they volunteer to take part in the Autumn Manœuvres. Last year a number of men volunteered for these Manœuvres, and their conduct was such as to bring discredit on the corps to which they were attached, but there was no means of dealing with them in the way of punishment which was at all efficient. There is certainly the option of discharging; but when you have had a man in the service for a certain number of years, to discharge him from it would, probably, be to give him the relief which he desires. You cannot, therefore, make that a punishment; and now, with respect to the remarks of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North) respecting the Army, I would observe that, with every desire to look the thing fairly in the face, I think he is disposed to take a somewhat pessimist view. There are many things which may stand in need of amendment; but it appears to me that be is mistaken in supposing that recruiting is in absolutely so bad a condition as he seems to imagine. I am told by the hon. and gallant Member for Dover (Major Dickson) that I should take an opportunity of examining the regiments myself, but I am afraid my skill is not so great as that of others who are accustomed to the training of men. What I have to do under these circumstances is this—I get the Report of the Inspector General, and that I have endeavoured to sift by asking him questions in order that I may attain the utmost accuracy. I have called for Returns from commanding officers from every part of the country, and I have before me their remarks on the class of recruits of the present as compared with the few last years, and although in certain districts and in particular regiments a deterioration may be observable, yet I am bound to say that the reports generally go to show that the recruits are at least as good as they have been in recent years, and that they are of a class which improves very rapidly by good treatment. There is a Return which has been moved for by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms), bringing the condition of the Army up to November 30, 1873, and hon. Members will observe that the ages of the men given in that Return range from 17 upwards. There is no doubt that recruits do sometimes misrepresent their ages, and that boys of 17 may say that they are 18; but if allowance be made for that I think you will find that the great mass of the Army consists of men in what I should call the prime of life—that is, from 20 to 34 or 35 years of age—in other words, the very class of men we should all like to see in it. With regard to the younger men, it is, no doubt, very important that you should have men who, from the very beginning, should be able to do all the duties of their position. I am afraid, however, that such a class of recruits could not be very readily secured in the present state of the labour market, probably, therefore, for a year or two after entering the service the young men whom we get may not be able to perform all the duties which they would be liable to discharge. Men of great experience too tell you that the ordinary recruit is not able to bear the fatigue of his profession at the outset without a certain amount of training; but I am informed that after a year or two of such training, accompanied by better food, they become capable of doing all the duties which are required of them. Still, no doubt, the loss of a year or two tells much in the case of short-service. I would now, in reply to the remarks of the hon. and gallant General opposite the Member for Kincardineshire (General Sir George Balfour), beg to say that there is no one more interested than myself—as a matter of duty and wisdom—in laying accurate Returns before the House. They are just as essential to me as to any other hon. Member, and I should be quite ashamed of myself if I were to keep anything back and did not state the facts of the case as they impressed themselves on my mind. The hon. and gallant General says that the service in India is a popular service, and there are many things to bring that popularity about. There is, in the first place, practically double pay, and, anxious as the House may be for the efficiency of the Army, I am afraid I should not obtain a grant for even the present pay and a half. It must be borne in mind, too, that the men in India have a great deal less work to do, and that they are waited upon, and have done for them, many things which in England they are obliged to do for themselves—such as the cleaning of their accoutrements. Now, as to what has been said about 140 men having been taken from the 79th Regiment, I would observe that those men were volunteers, and were not in any way taken by compulsion, and because they were volunteers, I have had the pleasure of restoring them to their old regiment. I would, in the next place, remark that the hon. and gallant General opposite has set me a most formidable task. Listening to the debates on military questions in this House during the last four years, I had at all events supposed that the Army was being re-organized; but I am to-night told that I must begin to reorganize it and place it upon a new footing. Well, it is rather startling to be told that; but all I can say is that when I am more acquainted with the duties of my present office, I shall not hesitate, if I find the Army requires to be reorganized, to come down to this House and ask it to assent to some proposal with that object. The first duty I have to discharge is to see that the Army is really efficient, and if I were to be prevented from taking steps to do that which was deemed to be essential in the interests of the Army and the country, I should very soon cease to fill the position I have now the honour to occupy. As to the Motion of the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite the Member for South Durham (Major Beaumont), he will forgive me for saying that it seems to me to be a somewhat extraordinary process that, while seeking to bring about the greatest efficiency in the service, he should attempt to stop the Supplies, and thus prevent us from having any Army at all. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said we must not attempt to compete with foreign armies; but we do not, and if we wished, we could not, neither are we required, as everyone admits, to keep up an Army to compete with those of foreign nations. There is in our case a first line of defence which does not belong to the Army. We have our Navy, which must not be lost sight of in dealing with the questions of home service and invasion. When you send men abroad to take part in a foreign war you must provide for a different state of things, and must take care that your Army is efficient for the purpose which you have in view. But I do not suppose that even the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite dreams of our sending out an Army of such dimensions as those which are maintained on the Continent. He spoke of an Army of 280,000, which I imagine he means should be available in the case of foreign war. Now, in Great Britain we have 98,000; in the Colonies, 24,000; and in India, 62,000. The hon. and gallant Gentleman at the same time gave us a quasi estimate of expense, but it seemed to me there were many circumstances which he left entirely out of view. It is necessary, in making a calculation of this kind, to bear in mind all that appertains to the interests of an Army of the size contemplated. If you had 280,000 men you would have to increase all the appliances which at present exist in connection only with the Regular Army. No doubt, there is also the Militia, but it is not kept in the same state of complete equipment and readiness as if it were a part of the Regular Army. With regard to the number of recruits supposed by him to be needed, I am by no means convinced that it would be anything like sufficient, and I found my opinion upon a careful actuarial calculation which has been made as to the number of men available in this country, and the number we are likely to get. I do not believe that the kind of service contemplated would be found very attractive to recruits, and, moreover, I am quite certain you would require an unexpectedly great number of men if you wished to pass them as rapidly as is suggested from the Army into the Reserve. The hon. and gallant Gentleman moreover leaves out of sight, in considering our Reserve, the great Volunteer Force of the country. That Force can never be passed through the Army, and therefore the present Motion would be a condemnation of the Volunteers. "Whether we can ever come to a better position with respect to the Militia is a totally different question, and one which no doubt calls for consideration. It might be possible that instead of the Army of Reserve being a distinct thing altogether from the Militia, it might in some sense be united with the Militia, to the great benefit of the Militia itself, and probably of the country, and that is a question which may well be reserved for future discussion; but after the discussion which has taken place I trust the House will allow the Estimates to be proceeded with in Committee.

inquired whether some mode could not be devised for the reward of those chaplains for the Forces who had accompanied the Gold Coast Expedition. They could not be promoted unless the number of chaplains was augmented, and suggested whether some of the Crown livings might not be very properly and usefully devoted to that purpose? The chaplains who had accompanied the troops in Ashantee, he understood, had admirably performed their duty.

, in reply, said, that the principle of selection, with a view to promotion, was never applied in the case of chaplains of the Forces, and that it was not the practice to raise one chaplain above the others, by exceptional advancement, for service in the field. Moreover, he was afraid that the livings at the disposal of the Crown were very few indeed, and as his right hon. Friend who had the disposal of them was not present, his hon. and gallant Friend would see that no answer could be given to that part of the Question.

pointed out that while there was a decrease in the other details of this Vote, the same sum was put down for the apprehension of deserters.

said, the amount in question was an annually increasing item of expenditure. The apparent inconsistency arose in consequence of certain new arrangements as to the mode of keeping the accounts.

, in calling attention to cases of soldiers who, whilst really guilty of desertion, were, under the existing system, only tried for being absent without leave, and therefore did not forfeit the advantages accruing to long service and good conduct, said, he wished to refer to the case of a man belonging to the Coast Guard, who, although he had been away from duty from July 8, 1872, till March 27, 1874, had been tried, not for desertion, but for absence without leave, and had been allowed to reckon that period of a year and nine months in his "good service." He believed that two-thirds of the men in the Army who were punished for absence without leave ought properly to be tried by court-martial for desertion. One man had actually joined 13 regiments and got 13 bounties, which never would have happened had he been tried at first for desertion.

said, he was aware of the case to which reference had been made, and of others which were not, perhaps, quite so bad. A practice had grown up of trying men for absence without leave rather than for desertion, and it arose in some measure from an opinion that, as familiarity with crime led to crime, so if men became accustomed to constant trials for desertion, they would come to consider it a venial offence. Yet, if they were to search for motives, it would be found impossible to suppose that a man, who stayed away for two years, did not intend to desert. With the information he had obtained, he quite agreed that such a case as the one to which the gallant officer alluded was carrying the theory too far. It often happened that a soldier lost all the advantages of good conduct badges on account of some petty larceny he had committed, while the man who had undoubtedly been guilty of desertion might, if tried by a regimental court-martial for absence without leave, retain those rewards. It seemed to him that this might cause a great deal of injustice, and he thought that when a man was undoubtedly a deserter he should be tried for the offence which he had actually committed.

expressed a hope that the number of good-service pensions in this department would be increased. There were at present only eight of them, and the number of officers was 943; three had received the honour of a K.C.B., 32 had been made Companions of the Bath, and no fewer than nine had received the Victoria Cross; 84 medical officers had served with the Gold Coast Expedition. The officers of the Marines, who were fewer in number, enjoyed more good-service pensions, and without wishing in any way to depreciate the services of that gallant little army, yet he thought it was impossible not to be struck with the heroism and devotion of the medical officers in the late expedition.

, in advocating a higher rate of bounty and pay for Militiamen, said, that in consequence of the inadequacy of the present scale they were fast losing men. If a man enlisted now under the present system, by the substitution of six years' service for five, he would get less by £5 16s. than he would have obtained under the old system in 13 years' service. Now, Militiamen were not quite such fools as some supposed them to be, and they could not see any benefit accruing from the reduction of the bounty. Efficiency combined with true economy was a very good thing, but the Militia were by no means as efficient as they might be. He urged that with regard to pensions to the permanent staff there should be greater liberality on the part of the War Department, with the view of enabling men who had been long in the two Services to retire. At present the Colonels had not the heart to recommend those men their discharge. For the staff sergeants he would suggest an increase of pension after 10, instead of at 20 years' service, with a graduated scale. As to the adjutants, he thought they were very hardly treated. Some of them had come out of the ranks; they were picked out as intelligent men, and after having given the best of their time to the service an allowance should be given to them which would induce them to retire, but that was not the case. He trusted that the present Government would not carry out the whole of Lord Cardwell's scheme, as it would not give satisfaction to the Army. In his opinion the training of Artillery Militia was not long enough, as he believed they might be made a very useful force. He would suggest that for Artillery Militia a longer training than at present should be the rule, and that they should be allowed the use of the guns at the different forts along the coast. In case of invasion they would then be able to fall into their places, and know all about the guns they would have to use. For years past they had practised only with obsolete smooth-bore guns, and when one year, one of the two 32-pounders assigned to them was dismounted by an accident to the carriage, they had to finish their practice with one gun only. In speaking of Reserves, also, it should not be forgotten that the Militia Artillery alone mustered about 20,000 men, and if properly drilled would prove a most important force in case of invasion. He hoped the House would not forget how useful the Militia proved in the Crimean War and in the Indian Mutiny, at which latter period his (Mr. Naghten's) regiment supplied the nucleus for a new brigade of Artillery. In fact, the Militia ought to be made a national force and a nursery for the Army. He was glad to have some reason for believing that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War intended to devote greater attention to this branch of the service, so as to render it more efficient and useful than heretofore.

thought an explanatory Appendix would be found a serviceable addition towards the comprehension of the Estimates.

said, he had on a former occasion called attention to the subject of the promotion of officers from the Militia into the Line and asked his right hon. Friend to consider the matter. A letter from an "Officer in the Militia" had since been published, stating that he had been mistaken. But the statement he made was this—that two young gentlemen went up for examination, of whom the one passed exceedingly well and entered the Army as a sub-lieutenant, the other had been plucked, but afterwards was promoted from the Militia into the same regiment of the Line as lieutenant over the head of the man who had passed the successful examination. The other day he was in a railway carriage with some gentlemen of his acquaintance, and this matter became the subject of conversation. A young gentleman, with whom he was not acquainted, hearing what was said, remarked that it was a very hard case, and then told his own story. "I was twice 'ploughed,'" said he. "I went up with a friend of mine, who passed admirably. He got nearly the highest marks. We are both now in a most distinguished regiment. I have passed in from the Militia, and am a lieutenant, while he is only a sub-lieutenant in the same regiment, and I venture to say he is a much more able man than I am." He (Colonel Barttelot) had letters from officers commanding districts and others, stating that if this system were allowed to go on it would create a feeling of discontent which it would be difficult to allay. He ventured to recommend this matter to the earnest consideration of his right hon. Friend, for it was important that no rivalry should be allowed between the Militia and the Line; the great object was to make the Militia as efficient as possible. The Secretary of State for War had remarked the other night that the numbers of the Militia were not as satisfactory as he could desire. But that was not extraordinary, seeing that the men were now receiving for six years' service what they used to get before for five; and if any one would read the letters which had appeared in The Times from Lord Charles Kerr and others, he would see that the present state of the Militia was very unsatisfactory, for from them it appeared that in consequence of the change in the bounty, a Militia regiment had lost half its strength. [Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN dissented.] the hon. Gentleman opposite shook his head. Would he say the statements were incorrect? [Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: They are incomplete.] It was not very likely that a man would write a letter taking up two columns in The Times and yet leave his statements incomplete. He would like to ask his right hon. Friend whether he had made any inquiries as to the men in the Militia Reserve being fit to take their places side by side with the Reserve of the Line. His right hon. Friend would probably find this Reserve not as efficient as it ought to be. Then, again, Lord Cardwell proposed that an adjutant should do duty for two regiments. But could there be anything more injurious to the service than that? We were told that a man could not serve two masters. But here was a man who would have to serve under two masters, the colonels of two different regiments. Then, with regard to musketry instructors, what was proposed? The weak point of the Militia was their musketry instruction and firing, for they never had acquired in this respect the efficiency of the Volunteers or the Line; but now it was proposed to have only one musketry instructor between two regiments, which would destroy anything like emulation between them. To have but one adjutant and one musketry instructor for two regiments would be a fatal thing and would reduce the Militia to a condition far inferior to what they were in at present, and unless proper facilities were given for carrying out practice, a serious responsibility would rest upon the Government.

said, with respect to the change in the Militia bounty, he had remarked that the statements on the subject, however accurate as far as they went, were very incomplete, He saw the letter signed by Lord Charles Kerr, and it appeared to him very extraordinary that an adjutant of Militia, responsible for the recruiting of his regiment, should without any representation to the War Office, have addressed such a sensational communication to The Times. conveying a very one-sided notion of the facts. With regard to what he had stated the other night, he had satisfied himself that the Militia recruit gained more by the arrangements with respect to the ration stoppage than he lost by the change in the bounty system. As to a certain Militia regiment having fallen from 1,000 men to 500, that could hardly be attributed to the change in the bounty system, which was announced only two months ago. The hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Colonel Barttelot) knew quite well that it was all along contemplated to replace the permanent staff of the Militia by officers and non-commissioned officers of Line regiments located at the depôt centre, and that duty they could do as well for two battalions as for one, more especially when it was considered that those battalions were trained at distinct times. That, he considered, could not be deemed to be serving two masters. As to one musketry instructor for two battalions, if there was any benefit in musketry competition, which he sometimes doubted, it was desirable to have them instructed by one man. The work would be done under the officers of the Line regiment, stationed at the brigade depôt; and in case of any clashing of time, an additional officer would have to be employed.

said, he would at once admit the existence of a curious difficulty as to sub-lieutenants, but it was in some degree redressed by a subsequent process. On the sub-lieutenant becoming a lieutenant, his commission was ante-dated a year or two years, according to the examination he had passed, and he would very likely thus rank above the man who had come in while he was a sub-lieutenant. That shifting, however, was not a good thing, and there were difficulties in it. He would see whether it could be put on a footing fair to both parties. It would be necessary for him to introduce a Bill respecting the pay and clothing of the Militia. At present an Act regulating this was annually passed as a matter of form, but the dispensing with this form would not affect the control of Parliament over the force. With regard to the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member for Kincardineshire, it was undesirable to swell the bulk of the Army Estimates, but such Returns as were desired he would endeavour to procure.

wished the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Naghten) to understand that he did not blame the Militia for not comprehending that they would gain by the stoppage of rations the pay and clothing being fixed by Act of Parliament, it was impossible to announce the other parts of the plan simultaneously with the alteration in the term of service which Parliament had sanctioned, and on which future recruiting must be founded. Steps were taken, though unfortunately rather late, to announce what was intended, since which there had, he trusted, been no misapprehension.

remarked that the allowance for travelling expenses made to adjutants in the Volunteer service was only 5s. against 10s. allowed to be paid to adjutants in the Militia, and asked that the same allowance might be made to both parties. He regretted that the recent amalgamation of battalions had involved the discharge of many sergeant-majors. The correspondence of the adjutants was so much increased that the second sergeant-major, where there had been two, might well be employed as an orderly-room clerk.

said, the allowances to adjutants were under consideration, and it was intended to assimilate those of adjutants in the auxiliary forces as far as possible to those in the Line. As to the amalgamation alluded to by his hon. and gallant Friend, it was intended to consolidate, because it was most desirable to avoid keeping up so many separate corps whose numbers were decreasing, and likewise to avoid the unnecessary expense of adjutants appointed when the numbers in the various corps were much higher than they were now. His right hon. Friend would endeavour to act with duo regard to all parties, and to local considerations.

, while approving the change, suggested that in future particulars of the Vote should be given more in detail.

, having had something to do with the transfer of these charges, explained that while the formation of a pay department had been resolved on, the scheme had not yet been submitted in a revised form to the Treasury. Next year it would doubtless be set forth in the Estimates.

stated that at an early date the proposals would be fully determined on, and the fullest information would be given hereafter.

congratulated the right hon. Gentleman upon the great reduction which had taken place in the Vote for warlike stores, and thought that it might be reduced still lower. No greater evil could possibly happen to an Army than to have an abundance of stores of old and useless articles. He urged the desirability, on economical grounds, that an entire separation should be made between stores for the Army and stores for the Navy. Until that was accomplished there could never be any real economy in the two branches of the Service.

said, the principle which the Treasury had laid down in all the Estimates was this—that the Department having control of the expenditure should bring the charge into their Estimates. It struck him that when they came to investigate the subject it would be found almost impossible to separate the charge for transport, for instance, required by one Service from what was required by the other. The subject had been carefully considered, and the only safe principle appeared to be that laid down by the Treasury.

, in recommending that the houses occupied by general officers, as in Chelsea Hospital and at Portsmouth, Devonport, and Chatham, should be furnished by the Government, and that officers should be charged a percentage on the outlay, as was the case under the Admiralty, said, that nearly twenty years ago he had brought this subject under the consideration of the House, and he thought some change was necessary. Take the case of Chelsea Hospital. The governorship of that institution had been vacant three times in three years. Sir John Pennefather had told him that it cost him £1,600 to get into the house then, though he only occupied it a year and nine months. Sir Sydney Cotton had to go through the same performance, though he only occupied the house a year and eight months. He hoped his right hon. Friend would give the matter his earnest consideration, so that such anomalous cases might not recur.

believed the country would gain very much by the alteration, which would at the same time be a great boon to officers.

said, that the arrangement proposed by his hon. and gallant Friend might be more economical than that now existing. The subject was one of great detail; but he would give his best attention to it, and he trusted that some satisfactory conclusion might be arrived at.

said, he took exception to the amount expended in carrying out the provisions of the Contagious Diseases Acts, and would move that the Vote be reduced by that amount.

said, he would not detain the Committee long upon this very unsavoury and disagreeable subject, but the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) had taken the extraordinary course of moving an Amendment to compel the War Office to cut off the money necessary to carry out an Act of Parliament without repealing the Act itself. Now, if there were any body bound to obey the law, it was the Government. He had made inquiry into the working of these Acts, and he had found that the cases arising in towns which were under the Act were about 9 per 1,000, while in towns in which the Acts were in operation they only amounted to about 4 per 1,000. This was a proof that something was done, and so long as the Acts were in force he trusted that the House would vote the money to carry them out.

, in moving to reduce the Vote by the sum of £200, said, it appeared that the Protestant chaplain at Kilmainham received a salary of £250 per annum, whereas £50 per annum was the entire sum paid to the Roman Catholic priest who ministered to the spiritual wants of the in-pensioners of his own creed. This disparity was increased from the fact that those pensioners far out-numbered their Protestant brethren. He would much rather, if the forms of the House permitted, move to increase the salary of the Roman Catholic chaplain to the same amount which was paid the Protestant chaplain; but as he could not do that, it was only by the reduction of that gentleman's salary he could bring about the equality which he wished to see established.

hoped that the hon. and gallant Member would not persevere with his Motion as he thought the salary could not be reduced under the terms upon which the hospital had been founded. Not only that, but it had been paid, without question, for a great many years, and it would be unjust to alter it now at a moment's notice. A Committee had two years ago carefully inquired into the state of the two hospitals in question, and they had recommended no modification of the salaries of the chaplains. Kilmainham Hospital afforded a great deal of relief to a large number of men who had served their country, and as regarded the question of percentage it varied from time to time.

said, that from his local knowledge, he wished to point out that, although the number of Roman Catholics in Kilmainham during the week might be greater than the number of Protestants, yet that on Sundays the state of things was reversed, inasmuch as the Protestant chaplain had the troops from the barracks in the neighbourhood to minister to.

said, the case was as stated by the hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down; but oven if it were not so, he did not see how the Committee could, until the next I vacancy occurred, reduce the salary of I the Protestant chaplain, as his was a permanent appointment. There was no Roman Catholic clergyman holding a similar appointment, and he believed that the higher authorities of that Church in Ireland preferred that the regular parish clergyman should attend the members of his own flock. He was not sure whether or no this was the case at Kilmainham; but knowing that such was the case elsewhere he rather thought it. If it were, the salary of the Roman Catholic chaplain might be considered an addition to the resources of the parish priest in these cases.

thought that some arrangement might be come to which would be fair and satisfactory to all parties.

also thought that an arrangement might be come to which would meet equally the demands of all denominations by a portion of one of the numerous rooms in the hospital being fitted up for the use of the Roman Catholics on Sundays.

said, the hon. and gallant Member had started a proposition which was entirely foreign to the Amendment. However, if a proper representation were made, he had no objection to give the matter a fair consideration at the proper time; but he trusted that the hon. and gallant Member, who had moved the Amendment, would withdraw it.

expressed a hope that the passing of the Bill would not shut out the claims of the civilians from being fully considered.

said, that by this Bill the Government sought to absorb the corpus of a fund of £3,000,000, which had been declared to be private property. The sum appeared as a book-debt, it was true; but by this Bill it would be converted into an asset. None of the annuitants would be damnified except 44 gentlemen, or their representatives, who had persistently claimed a refund of all payments, with interest, over the half value of their annuities of £1,000 per annum, paid quarterly. It-was difficult, of course, to contend against the fact that the Courts had given an adverse judgment to the claim of those retired annuitants, on legal and technical grounds which excluded from consideration the equity of the claim. It would meet the whole justice of the case if the Secretary of State would introduce into the Bill a clause declaring that no class of annuitants should be damnified by the absorption of the fund, and that if power were taken by the Secretary of State to refer disputed claims of dissatisfied annuitants to arbitration he should reserve to himself the right of moving such a clause in Committee.

said, he was aware of the claim to which the hon. Member had alluded. It did not, however go to the principle of the Bill. If there was a real case of hardship it was right that there should be an opportunity of discussing it. He would venture to advise the House to read the Bill a second time. A sufficient interval would be given for the consideration of the subject, and a clause could be introduced in Committee, if necessary.

, in moving that the Bill be now road the second time, said, that the object of this Bill was to throw the protection of the Legislature round young girls, and to save them from crime the principle of the measure had been unanimously agreed to by the Royal Commission of 1866, and it had received the assent of the House on two former occasions.

believed that his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary would not oppose the second reading, but would, in Committee, move the insertion of certain clauses.

, in moving that the Bill be now read the second time, said, that the object of it was to mitigate the severity of the punishment of this crime; and, if possible, to prevent the committal of it. The Bill was founded upon the unanimous recommendation of the Commissioners of 1866, and now an effort was made to carry that recommendation into effect. He would be glad to refer the Bill to a Select Committee.

, in seconding the Motion, said, he believed the measure to be good and useful. He would suggest that the Bill should be so altered as to include other persons than mothers of infants.

said, he would not object to the second reading; but considered that the clauses would require modification. There was a Bill of the right hon. and learned Member the Recorder of the City of London upon the larger subject of homicide before the House; and, upon the understanding that these Bills would be referred to the same Select Committee, he would offer no opposition to the Motion before the House.