asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is a fact that six additional magistrates have been appointed for the borough of Leicester without any recommendation or opportunity for discussion on the part of the municipal authorities; if he will state on whose recommendation such appointment has been made; and, if he will lay upon the Table any Papers relating to such appointment?

in reply, said, he had consulted his noble Friend the Lord Chancellor on the subject, and he was informed that it was a misapprehension to suppose that borough magistrates were appointed by the Lord Chancellor on the recommendation of any corporate body. County magistrates were appointed by the Lord Chancellor on the recommendation of the Lord Lieutenant of the county; but borough magistrates were appointed by the Lord Chancellor on his own responsibility. The Lord Chancellor was always ready to receive any communications from a municipal corporation or public body, or from individuals, as to the state of the bench; but he did not conceive it to be his duty to invite a public discussion of the qualifications of persons proposed to be appointed. In the case of Leicester the Lord Chancellor appointed six gentlemen whom he considered well qualified for the office, one of whom was the High Bailiff, a gentleman well adapted to discharge the duties, but of Liberal politics. There were at the commencement of the year 28 magistrates, four of whom had since ceased to reside in the borough. It was not the practice, and would be prejudicial to the public service, to lay on the Table the Papers relating to such matters.

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether it is the intention of the Board of Works in Ireland to carry on the repairs of the National Monuments for which funds have been vested in them under the 25th and 26th sections of the Irish Church Act, without obtaining the assistance of an Inspector specially skilled in the ancient architecture of Ireland?

Sir, the Board consider the Act in reference to these monuments to be confined to their preservation and not to their restoration. For the former the assistance of a superintendent, skilled in practical appliances and technicalities of building, is, in their opinion, of the first importance, and such a person they contemplate employing. But should circumstances arise at any time to render it necessary that the advice of an archæologist should be obtained, they would feel it their duty to seek for such advice.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the Sultan of Zanzibar, since the signing of the Treaty in May last year, has not, through Her Majesty's Representative, intimated a wish to visit England; and, if so, whether Her Majesty's Government will not, in view of furthering the object of that Treaty, deem it expedient to facilitate such a visit?

I understand that the Sultan of Zanzibar has upon one or more previous occasions intimated his wish to pay a visit to England; but no communication to that effect has reached Her Majesty's present Government. Two or three days ago a letter was received from the Sultan of Zanzibar; but there has not yet been sufficient time to ascertain Her Majesty's wishes upon the subject.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to carry out, during the Recess, the recommendations of the Judges with respect to the redistribution of Circuits in England?

in reply, said, it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to carry out during the Recess the recommendations of the Judges with respect to the redistribution of Circuits in England. Those recommendations were connected with the Judicature Act, and would come into force at the same time as the Act.

asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If he has yet decided as to the scale of remuneration for Assessors of Income Tax in Scotland?

in reply, said, the subject had been under the consideration of the Board of Inland Revenue, and they had recommended that the Assessors in Scotland should be allowed such an addition to their statutory poundage in 1874–5 as would make their emoluments equal to the amount of poundage in 1872–3, when the income tax was at 4d. in the pound, and the Government had intimated that they thought that arrangement would be satisfactory.

asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether he can promise, on behalf of the Secretary of State for India, that the right to purchase the Indian Guaranteed Railways, under the Annuity Commutation Clause, will not be surrendered, as it already has been in the case of throe Railways, until Parliament has expressed its opinion on the subject?

Sir, as I understand the Question of the hon. Gentleman, he does not wish me to pledge myself as to what exercise the Secretary of State for India may make of his present powers, but he wishes me to undertake that those powers will not be surrendered without due consultation with Parliament. I am authorized to state that should any alteration or modification in the present agreements be necessary, the Secretary of State will not surrender the powers of the Annuity Commutation Clause without consulting Parliament. This decision is, of course, not binding upon his successors.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the attention of Her Majesty's Government has been directed to certain reports and statements in the Continental papers regarding or encouraging foreign intervention in Spain; whether the Government have received any and what information on the subject of such intervention; and, whether Her Majesty's Government is prepared to use its influence in favour of the maintenance of the principle of non-intervention, that the Spaniards may be left to settle their own affairs?

Sir, Her Majesty's Government have seen various reports and statements of the nature referred to in the Question. They have no reason to suppose that armed intervention in the present disturbances in Spain is contemplated by any European Power. No such intervention certainly is contem plated by Her Majesty's Government, nor will they give encouragement to it in the case of any other Power.

asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If he will state when the allowance of one year's back pay, promised to the Custom House Clerks at the out ports, will be paid to them?

in reply, said, he understood a great many of these gentlemen had already received their payments, and that the others were in the course of receiving them.

asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether the Papers relating to the Bombay Riots will be distributed to Members before the close of the Session?

Sir, on Friday next, I hope these Papers will be in the hands of hon. Members. As the hon. Gentleman is aware, it has been necessary to hold back these Papers in order that Despatches might not be in the hands of hon. Members before they were received by the Governments to whom they were addressed.

said, that Ireland returned 64 county Members, two University Members, and at present, being shorn of two borough Members, 37 Members for towns. There were only 50,000 persons in the whole of Ireland who enjoyed the town franchise, and of these 28,000 were electors for the city of Dublin and the borough of Belfast. Only 22,000 people outside of Dublin enjoyed this franchise, and it was a total mistake to suppose the reason was there were no urban constituencies. The city of Armagh had a largo population and more electors than many boroughs in England which returned Members, and he should be sorry to see it disfranchised. What he affirmed was, that before 1867, when the Reform Bill for England was passed, there was comparatively a small number of borough electors in England, and the Reform Bill of 1867 trebled the number of borough electors in England, but the Reform Bill passed for Ireland scarcely increased them at all. There were four principles carried out in England which were not applied to Ireland. In England the franchise was lowered to make it a household one; in Ireland the franchise was left at £4. In England boundaries were extended, but not in Ireland. Occupiers were rated as far as possible in England, but not in Ireland. There was partial disfranchisement in England, or rather in Scotland, and seats were transferred from small to large constituencies; and there was ample room for applying that principle to Ireland. If these four principles were carried out in Ireland many grievances and anomalies would be corrected. In England there were 1,336,000 borough electors, and in Scotland 181,000; and in England and Scotland one in eight of the borough population was enfranchised, while in Ireland the proportion was one in 16. The application to Ireland of the rules which prevailed in England would double the electoral body. The Act of 1868 had scarcely increased the constituencies of Ireland. It was a mistake to suppose that the borough franchise had been lower in Ireland than ever it was in England. The qualification was really raised by the substitution of an £8 rating for a £10 rental qualification. If Government would take the matter in hand, and apply to Ireland the principles adopted in England, they would do much to conciliate the people of Ireland. As a matter of form, he would move the second reading of the Bill, so that he might not have made a speech on false pretences; but, of course, he did not mean to press the Motion.

regretted that the matter had not been brought forward earlier in the Session and before so many Irish Members had left town. The hon. Member for Carlow (Mr. Bruen) had given Notice of his intention to move the rejection of the Bill, and doubtless would have been prepared to reply to the hon. and learned Member, who, however, had travelled very much beyond his Bill, that was simply a measure to reduce the franchise in Ireland from one of £4 to a general household suffrage. He had to thank the hon. Member for his intention not to disfranchise his borough in his new Reform Bill; but there was little doubt if he carried the Bill he now proposed, instead of a majority which he had at present, he would absorb the whole representation of Ireland under the banner of Home Rule. Before the last Reform Bill the franchise in Ireland was at £8; it was now reduced to £4, and the reason for fixing £4 was that below that rental the landlord always paid the rates. In the present state of Ireland it would be a dangerous experiment to reduce the franchise below £4. Below that line they would introduce a class of people who were not worthy of the franchise, and who were not intelligent enough to exercise it.

said, he hoped the Motion would not be pressed to a division, because that would place in a false position many on the Ministerial side of the House who thought the franchise ought to be lowered, though not to the extent contemplated by the hon. and learned Member for Limerick. There were persons occupying houses at rentals of £2 who might be invested with the franchise; but it would not do to admit the class paying 5s. or 10s. a-year

could not see how it was possible for them to adopt any other principle than that there should be a fair and real representation of Irish feeling in that House. Parliament could not eventually resist the demand made by the Irish people, either that they should be allowed to manage their own affairs or be placed on a perfect equality with England and treated as an integral part of the United Kingdom.

rose to move—

"That this House is gratified to learn that Her Majesty's Government have yielded to the unanimous request of the Chiefs, Native population, and White residents of Fiji, for annexation to this Country, so far as to direct Sir Hercules Robinson to proceed to those Islands, with a view to the accomplishment of that object."

The hon. Member said, he had no hesitation in declaring that the decision which Her Majesty's Government had arrived at would give great satisfaction not only to a large majority of the people of this country, but to the colonists of New South Wales and the inhabitants of the Fiji Islands. He asked the House to excuse him for referring in the first place to a matter which was personal to himself. A few weeks ago, when, at the request of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, he gave way in favour of a measure of great importance then before the House, exception was taken to the statement he made on that occasion as to what he understood to be the course which Her Majesty's Government intended to pursue on this subject. In explanation he must now say that, in listening to the speech of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies, it seemed impossible for him to come to any other conclusion than that which he drew from it. What was the language of the noble Lord?

"On this general review of the circumstances, your Lordships will not be surprised to hear that it is the feeling of Her Majesty's Government that they cannot decline the duty of accepting these Islands. If we do not decline them, we accept them; and it then becomes important to know how this is to be done."

The noble Lord then proceeded to state that they could not accept the conditions laid down by Mr. Thurston, the so-called Prime Minister of Fiji, but that they had come to the determination of sending Sir Hercules Robinson to place the matter "fully, fairly, and candidly before the Chiefs and the White population." That was the statement of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies. For his own part, he regretted exceedingly that the cession was not made free of all conditions; but, nevertheless, he had no fear of the result. The King, the Chiefs, and the White population would, no doubt, agree to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, and trust to the honour of England to carry out such arrangements for the future government of the Islands as would be just and fair to all parties. The Government had acted wisely in deciding to send out Sir Hercules Robinson, and the country was laid under great obligations to the noble Lord at the head of the Colonial Department for the straightforward and states-manlike course he had taken in the matter. He trusted the House would approve the measure of the Government for the extension of British authority to the Fiji Islands; and he appealed to the House with more confidence because it could not be alleged that the subject had been prematurely brought forward, or that it had not been sufficiently discussed. On the contrary, no question submitted to the Imperial Parliament had occasioned a more protracted discussion. He would remind the House that the proposal to annex Fiji dated as far back as the year 1859. At that time Mr. Pritchard, our Consul at Fiji, came to this country armed with powers to make a cession of the Islands to the British Crown. Lord Russell was then Colonial Minister. He sent out Colonel (now Major General) Smythe to report on the state of the Islands and the feeling of the population. When he returned he reported against the cession, and the Government approved and acted upon the terms of his recommendation. Since then Colonel Smythe had acknowledged that he had been in error, and had expressed his regret at the course he had then taken. His belief latterly was that it was to our interests to annex the Islands. The hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Dixon) had also opposed the annexation, but only a short time ago he had acknowledged that his former opinion was wrong, and that it was our duty to accept the Sovereignty of these Islands. He (Mr. M'Arthur) contended that the objections against the annexation had never been based upon the merits of the question at all, but had been urged upon altogether false issues. In the course adopted by the late Government, doubts were suggested as to whether the inhabitants of the Islands really desired the establishment of British authority. Hopes were expressed that the attempt to found a Fijian Kingdom under European control might prove successful; a fair trial was asked for Cakobau, and his nondescript Government; and finally, when it was considered necessary that some definite steps should be taken, Lord Kimberley sent out a new Commission of Inquiry. Commodore Good-enough and Mr. Layard had since made their Report, recommending the annexation of the Islands, a recommendation which Her Majesty's Government had wisely thought it right to adopt. In the accounts of their interviews with the Fijian authorities no pressure of any kind appeared to have been employed, and the circumstances actually attending the offer of the Islands to Great Britain proved the bona fides of the cession. In the first instance, the King declined to cede Fiji; but soon after he expressed a wish to re-consider the matter, and the result was, that on the 26th of March last, a conference both of Chiefs and Consuls was held at Nasova, and then and there the King and Chiefs unanimously ceded the Government of Fiji to the Queen of England. These accounts showed that, in offering to become British subjects, the Native authorities acted solely upon their own sense of what was best for the interests of their country, and without any improper pressure being brought to bear upon them. It was clear from the Report of the Commissioners that Her Majesty's Government had no honourable alternative but that of annexation. The policy of the late Government led directly up to that point, and we could not now recede from it. If the Government had repudiated all responsibility and left the Fiji Islands to their fate, such a policy, though to the last degree un-English and antinational, would, at least, have been intelligent and consistent. But such was not the policy actually adopted. Her Majesty's Government did not act on the theory of maintaining a neutral position; but, on the contrary, perpetually interfered with the affairs of Fiji. During the last two years there had scarcely been a day on which a British cruiser was not anchored in the Bay of Levuka. The presence of that cruiser of itself constituted an act of intervention; but the interference assumed a much more positive political character. It was stated by the Commissioners that the Fiji Government was only able to keep its position by the aid which it received from one of Her Majesty's Ships. Was this a policy which could be justified? It was one which carried with it all the disadvantages which were said to be involved in annexation without any of its attendant benefits. Let not the House, however, suppose he was arguing that as between intervention and non-intervention it would have been better not to interfere at all. On the contrary, he thought it was better that a British cruiser should save the Islands from anarchy than that the peace of the country should be sacrificed by hostile factions; but the wise and just course, in his opinion, would have been to establish British authority in Fiji some years ago, before civil strife and the fear of bloodshed and massacre had driven the planters into bankruptcy, compelling them to mortgage their lands to absentees. There was therefore no alternative left but for the Government to accept annexation. "Were they to leave the Islands as they were now, there would remain no authority capable of preserving public order and of carrying on a Government sufficient to keep society together. He would, with the permission of the House, refer to the opinion of the Commissioners, who, when asked whether there was a reasonable prospect of that end being accomplished in the event of our withdrawal, replied—

"There is no reasonable prospect that a Native Government can continue to preserve order; it is, indeed, impossible for them to do so."

For his own part, he should be greatly alarmed at the prospect did he not feel that Her Majesty's Government fully realized the responsibility of accepting the duties which devolved upon them. It was therefore with no little satisfaction that he had read the concluding sentence of the Earl of Carnarvon's admirable speech, in which the noble Earl said—

"I believe the difficulties, when boldly faced, will not be found to be so very formidable, provided the cession comes to us untrammelled by unworkable conditions; and although I am quite aware of the magnitude of the task, I, for one, shall not be afraid to encounter it."

The Report of the Commissioners corroborated the opinion of Captain Washington, the Government hydrographer, as to the position of the Fiji Islands. Anyone looking at the map must be struck with the fact pointed out by Captain Washington of the entire want of Great Britain of any advanced position in the Pacific Ocean. While on the one side we had Australia, and on the other Vancouver's Island and Columbia, we had not an islet or rock on the 7,000 miles that separated those territories, and we had no island on which to place a coaling station where we could insure fresh supplies. Was that the position in which a great maritime Power like Great Britain should be placed in the Pacific? Recent events had rendered these Islands still more important. A line of steamers now ran between Australia and San Francisco, calling at Fiji on their way, and thus bringing it within 40 days' sail of England. France was about to establish a line of steamers to New Caledonia on the one side and Tahiti on the other, making Fiji its central depôt. The United States had secured an admirable harbour in the Navigators' Islands, and a movement had lately been set on foot—which he had little doubt would be successful—to annex the Sandwich Islands to that country. Surely, therefore, our interests in the Pacific imperatively demanded such a port as the Fiji Islands would give us, not only because of its strategic importance, but in connection with the trade which was likely to be developed. On this subject, the Report of the Commissioners was most satisfactory. They confirmed Dr. Seeman's Report, and said his predictions had been amply fulfilled by experience. These Islands might be regarded as the home of the cotton plant, but a new branch of industry had sprung up, which was likely to make Fiji the Mauritius of the Southern Hemisphere—namely, the cultivation of sugar; its hills also were well adapted for the growth of coffee. Persons who could speak with authority on Fijian matters bore testimony to the great capabilities of the country. There were two or three considerations in favour of annexation which he was anxious to impress upon the House. In the first place, the present depressed state of affairs rendered the time a favourable one for a bold change of policy. With property changing hands, and the prospect of the advent of a new proprietary, there was reasonable hope that the turbulent elements which had hitherto existed in Fiji might have left the country before the establishment of a new Government. At all events, now that a portion of the community was itself in a state of transition, we might confidently expect that a British Governor would have less difficulty in carrying out his measures than if he were surrounded by men whose passions, lately excited to fever heat, had hardly yet had time to cool. There was, however, another argument to which he had not adverted. Without annexation, was it possible to put down slavery or regulate the labour traffic? If Fiji was to remain a separate kingdom, it would be impossible for Mr. Layard to enforce those measures for the protection of the Natives which he had already instituted. We should stultify ourselves in the most extraordinary manner, because we should be compelled to abandon the duties which we knew to be essential to the successful prosecution of the national policy on the subject of the slave trade. He was not aware that in taking over Fiji that question would have to be considered. In the interests of civilization and humanity that consideration was not entitled to much weight on the part of a great country like England. But there was no reason to believe that the Government of Fiji might not be made self-supporting, and would not require one shilling to be taken from the pockets of the English taxpayer. A Crown Colony could be established at a moderate cost. Moreover, it would be fair to ask, what was the expense of the existing system? He should like to move for a Return showing the actual expense which had been entailed by the presence at Fiji for months and years past of every man-of-war stationed there, and also of those employed in the effort of suppressing kidnapping throughout the Pacific. On the ground, therefore, of economy as well as humanity, he advocated the annexation of Fiji. He had stated to the House some of the reasons which induced him to ask it to support his Motion. He now came to the Amendment placed on the Paper by his hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles Dilke), to the following effect—

"That this House considers that, having regard to the existence in the case of Fiji of difficulties caused by a heavy debt, by the necessity of 'subjugating and removing' 20,000 ferocious mountaineers, and by the fact that domestic slavery is pronounced by Commodore Good-enough and Consul Layard, in their official Report, to be 'the foundation of social order' in Fiji, it is necessary that great caution should be used in approaching the subject of annexation."

That Amendment divided itself into three heads—first, the debt; secondly, the existence of domestic slavery; and thirdly, the necessity of subjugating and removing 20,000 ferocious mountaineers. As regarded the first, there was really no difficulty in the way; for, only let confidence be established by annexation, and capital would flow in from all quarters. The cost of a Crown Colony might be estimated, at the very utmost, at £15,000 a year. He had very little doubt but that the revenue would soon be at least £40,000. This would pay all demands, and leave a good sinking fund. Besides, New South Wales and New Zealand had offered to take their fair share of any burdens that might press upon the Islands. As to domestic slavery, they knew it did exist, and they had it recorded by the Commissioners that prisoners taken in war were sold by the Fijian Government, and the money paid into the Treasury. But did any one imagine this would be tolerated, even for a day, when the British flag floated over the Island? Commodore Goodenough had already denounced the practice. The most effectual mode of putting it down was by annexation. Then with regard to the "20,000 ferocious mountaineers," he had reason to believe that the number was greatly exaggerated. The Commissioners stated that the Rev. Mr. Langham, who was a very good authority, had estimated the number to be about 7,000. It should be remembered, however, that a generation had already passed over since all the inhabitants of Fiji were in the same state. What was now the Report of the Commissioners? That of the 140,500 which constituted the outside limit of the Native population, 120,000 of them "lotued"—that meant they professed a wish to become Christians, and accepted a Christian teacher, and that the atten dance at Church worship numbered 113,000. They were also informed through the same document—

"Fiji is blessed with a most virtuous native race, who, aided by the good teaching of the missionaries, have managed to keep themselves wonderfully free from the contamination of the vices of civilization."

The same influence brought to boar upon the mountaineers would, he believed, produce similar results; and he concurred in the testimony of the Commissioners with regard to those devoted men who had been the means of accomplishing such great results, but who had been unjustly assailed in certain high quarters. He was content to set off the testimony of Her Majesty's Commissioners against the reckless assertions of a noble Earl (the Earl of Pembroke) and his doctor, who, after visiting the Pacific, foolishly rushed into print, and sent out to the world a book, bearing the singularly appropriate title of South Sea Bubbles. In conclusion, he would again congratulate Her Majesty's Government on the policy they had adopted in regard to this question. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, in a speech delivered some two years ago, justly remarked—

"No Minister in this country will do his duty who neglects any opportunity of re-constructing, as much as possible, our Colonial Empire and of responding to those distant sympathies which may become a source of incalculable strength and happiness to this land."

In those sentiments he fully concurred, and he rejoiced to know that the Colonial policy of Her Majesty's Government was Based upon those great principles, and that they were endeavouring to carry out that policy, not only on the Gold Coast, but now in relation to Fiji. Such a policy, he was convinced, would meet with the approval of the people of this country, because it was in harmony with those glorious traditions of the Empire which had encircled the globe with free communities of Englishmen. It was a policy in accordance with the sentiments of those noble Australian Colonies which had so largely contributed to the wealth of this country—a policy which, while it effectually crushed that cursed slave trade, hitherto our humiliation and disgrace, gave us, at the same time, the finest group of islands in Polynesia, and secured to England the maintenance of her maritime power; and ascendancy in the Pacific. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving his Resolution.

in seconding the Motion, agreed with the hon. Member for Lambeth that the Government had taken the wisest course which could be adopted in regard to the Fiji Islands. Their policy would be agreeable not only to Fiji, but also to the whole of the Australian Colonies. It would put down that sentiment which had existed for some time among some of the people of this country—he did not know how that sentiment originated, whether with the late Government or with the late Under Secretary for Colonial Affairs—that it was our interest, as soon as possible, to shake off connection with our Colonies. The position of these Islands was of vast importance to England. There was a distance of 7,000 miles between the Australian Colonies and the continent of America, and it was highly desirable we should have some intervening place for coaling our war steamers and for provisioning our Navy in case of war. He agreed with the account which Commodore Goodenough and Mr. Consul Layard had given of the character of the Natives of Fiji, and he believed there would not be many difficulties or dangers in carrying out the wise policy of Her Majesty's Government. The hon. Gentleman had, however, cast an undeserved reflection upon the work of Lord Pembroke, which was very interesting, and gave a clear notion of the disposition and character of these people. Nothing which the Wesleyans might have done in this country in the past century could surpass the remarkable results of their efforts in Fiji. All the people of the Islands were cannibals 33 years ago. The present Chief, whom it was ridiculous to call a King, had himself been a cannibal; and he could narrate one or two disagreeable anecdotes to show what the Chief had been guilty of. The Returns of the Fijian Mission for the year ending April, 1867, gave the following statistics:—Chapels, 481; other preaching places, 238; missionaries, 12; Native assistant missionaries, 38; catechists, 591; day school teachers, 1,351; local preachers, 474; church members, 17,829; attendants on public worship, 90,442; day schools, 1,215; Sabbath schools, 750. Considering the character of the people, and the dangers and difficulties of the work, this result of only 33 years' labour could not but be considered as most successful and surprising. Agreeing generally with the policy of the Government, he wished with great submission to offer them one or two suggestions. He had greatly admired the perspicuity of the speech of the Colonial Secretary in "another place," showing, as it did, a thorough knowledge of the subject; but the Government must look fairly in the face the fact that 20,000 mountaineers remained cannibals. In 1869, Mr. Baker, a missionary, and seven teachers who accompanied him, were killed and eaten by these mountaineers. The first difficulty to be encountered would be the land question. It appeared that every inch of land in Fiji was occupied under such laws and regulations as existed; and there was a Polynesian Company which set up a claim to 200,000 acres of land. He thought that before Her Majesty's Government hoisted the British flag they should distinctly know what was the position of the land question, so as to avoid getting involved in difficulties. He would make a suggestion on the subject. A gentleman well acquainted with the Islands said, that in taking possession of them they should at once assert a right of preemption—he did not say in what proportion—paying one-fourth more than its value. The effect of that would be that if the Government made an advance, or guaranteed a loan of, say, £50,000, for the purchase of the land, it would repay them not 10, or 20, but one hundred-fold, and immediately. In this way not only would capital be given to the settlers, which could be laid out upon the land, but the Government would be in a much better position to promote emigration. A good deal had been said about organizing a Native force. Before we attempted to colonize a country which a short time since was in a state of barbarism, we ought to do everything we could for the safety of the people. He would suggest that for four or five years we should send out a portion of an English regiment, as we originally sent troops to the Australian Colonies. We had withdrawn our troops from those Colonies because they had attained to a state of civilization which rendered it unnecessary for us to keep them there any longer; but he did not know of any Colony where we began our work with a purely Native force. Three or four companies of Home troops would give due protection to the settlers who would resort to these Islands. It was desirable we should not begin this work in a too economical spirit—that we should not look too closely at pounds, shillings, and pence. It was proposed that the Governor should receive £1,200, and that the other salaries should be in proportion. In this country, gentlemen of great ability could be found to give their services for £1,200 or £800 a-year; but an opinion of the importance of the new Colony would be formed from the position of the Governor, and no gentleman who engaged in such arduous duties as would have there to be performed should receive less than £4,000. As to the Legislative Council, and "his Majesty the King," "his Excellency the "Viceroy," and "his Majesty's Ministers," that was all nonsense and a mere burlesque, and must be abolished. Her Majesty's Government would do quite right to make this a Crown Colony of a rather severe type. Annexation would be most gratifying to the Australian Colonies; it would afford us a basis of operations for putting down the disgraceful Polynesian slave trade, and it would add to the stability of our Colonial Empire; and for these reasons he seconded the Motion.

said: Mr. Speaker, my Amendment says—

"That having regard to the necessity 'of subjugating and removing' 20,000 ferocious mountaineers, and to the fact that domestic slavery is pronounced by Commodore Goodenough and Consul Layard, in their official Report, to be 'the foundation of social order' in Fiji, it is necessary that great caution should be used in approaching the subject of annexation."

I have not spoken of annexation as being decided upon; but I have assumed that it is in view, and possible at an early date, and that, I fear, without fresh reference to Parliament. In fact, there is no cession as yet; but there may be one to-morrow if Sir Hercules Robinson pleases. It is unusual that Parliament should delegate the power to an individual of accepting the annexation of a now colony. But I do not dwell upon this point. I only mention it, and I pass on at once to my reasons for believing, that while there may be some hurry in this matter, there possibly may be too great a hurry, and that in the face of special circumstances, which make caution more than usually desirable. I have not named in my Amendment the debt of the Islands, with which I would couple the general expense of annexation, but have pointed only to the possibility of war with the mountain Tribes and to slavery. I will treat those subjects in that order, after first saying a few words as to the expense and the debt. With regard to the debt of Fiji, and to the cost of organizing its Government, the Earl of Carnarvon, in the course of his official statement, said that—

"There was not only the greatest possible difficulty in Fiji on the question of the land titles, which were inextricably confused,"

and as to which, I might add, our New Zealand wars ought to be to us for ever a warning; but he also went on to state, that the debt of Fiji would form another tremendous difficulty—

"In the course of two years," he said, "so reckless was the financial administration of the Government there that £124,000 was spent, and a debt of £87,000 remains as a legacy.…. The calculations of the Commissioners are not as satisfactory as I could have desired—indeed, I think, they are illusory—.… The first few years will be years of difficulty."

These last words, if I may make a comment, seem to show that annexation is looked upon as certain by the Earl of Carnarvon, and that the mission of Sir Hercules Robinson is really intended to alter the conditions upon which it is to take place—the fact itself being considered as settled. Now, what is this debt? It is a debt that was contracted by persons who have been called in this House, by a Member of the present Administration (Sir James Elphinstone), "a set of the most unmitigated ruffians in the world;" but whom I will only describe as adventurers. Mr. Burt and Lieutenant Woods contracted a large portion of this debt in Sydney, at 90 per cent. by pledging lands which they never owned, and which they would have had to steal before they could sell them for State purposes. I am not going beyond the words of the official Report, as will be seen by an examination of page 3, of pages 8 and 9, and of the Appendix. I believe that even the existing Government of Fiji has a Minister of Public Lands at a salary. Certainly, it has accepted a loan raised on the security of public lands; but there are no public lands in Fiji—not a single acre. In addition to this strange debt, we must look forward in contemplating annexation to a great expenditure; even putting out of sight the possibility of a war with the Mountain tribes, to which I will presently allude. When the late Government declined to accept the cession of Fiji, but proposed to New South Wales, that that colony should annex the Islands, the Government of Sir James Martin, in refusing, gave as their chief reason the very great expense of converting Fiji into a British colony; and they are near the spot and know what the expense would be better than we can know. The Earl of Carnarvon himself, however, in his official statement said—

"I do not mean to say that the Report of the Commissioners is, in my opinion, an altogether satisfactory one. I do not think the calculations of the Commissioners are so reliable that we can trust to them on all important points."

And in other words which I have already read he explained to us that the estimates of the Commissioners as to the probable revenue and expenditure are "illusory." So much for the first head of my case which deals with the necessity of caution arising out of the undefined—not to use a harsher word—nature of the Fiji debt, and the danger of great expense which would be caused by the annexation—leaving aside for the moment the bearing upon this point of the possibility of land riots, slavery riots, and war with the Mountain tribes, to which I will presently advert. I come now to the case of these Mountain tribes. The hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. M' Arthur) in 1872 said that the abominable existing Government of Fiji, of which he was at the time complaining, positively intended—

"to bring the Mountaineers under subjection by military force and to occupy their land. If Fiji were under this country nothing of the kind would occur."—[3 Mansard, ccxii. 196.]

Nothing of the kind would occur! Why our Commissioners, Commodore Good-enough and Consul Layard, actually inform us that this course will be of the first necessity, and that our very first act in assuming the government of these Islands, must be to "subjugate and remove" 20,000 mountaineers, whom I have ventured in my Amendment to style "ferocious," inasmuch as the Commissioners also inform us that amongst them "cannibalism, strangulation of widows, and infanticide," extensively prevail. The first statement will be found at page 10 of the Report and the second statement at page 15. Those persons it is proposed to "subjugate and remove"—where to, I do not know—by the use of a portion—for most of them will be needed to keep order in the settlements—a portion of the native police force of 300 men; and if a single man beyond that were needed, the estimates of revenue and expenditure made by the Commissioners, would become as the Earl of Carnarvon says "illusory." In 1872 the hon. Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) said that—

"there existed among the Mountain tribes many barbarous practices, which it would be impossible to tolerate in a British possession, but which could not be eradicated without great difficulty and no inconsiderable labour and expense."—[3 Hansard, ccxii. 206.]

But the present Commissioners are so well aware of the necessity of eradicating them, that giving up, it appears, all idea of reforming those mountaineers they propose to eradicate the mountaineers themselves and to remove them to a future place of residence unknown. I have been told by a gentleman from whom, I believe, the hon. Member for Lambeth gets his information that a gratifying spread of civilization is observable among these Mountain tribes; but I believe that it does not go further than this point—namely, that now they eat only their enemies, whereas formerly they used to eat their friends. I come now to the third and principal of the points which force me to beg for caution—namely, slavery. The Earl of Carnarvon did not mention in his statement the question of domestic slavery in Fiji but he said—

"It has, curiously enough, been my lot this year to propose to Parliament two Colonial policies, one with regard to the Gold Coast, and the other with regard to Fiji, …. which, if they differ in many respects, yet agree in this."

I thought he was going to have added that domestic slavery exists in both countries; but he did not—he made no reference whatever to that point, which I should have thought deserved some reference. At page 4 in the official report, it is stated that the Natives are already in many cases the temporary slaves of English planters, and that they are habitually in the relation of domestic slaves to the Chiefs. At page 14 of the Report we are told that the "existing system" of domestic slavery—

"can only be altered very gradually, and that any abrupt general change in this direction would weaken the authority of the Chiefs, who are now, and should be for some time to come, the Rulers of their own people under the Central Government. The old system should, in short, be allowed to exist on sufferance, unacknowledged, but, except in the case of extreme exactions, not interfered with. To abolish it, would be to take away the foundation of social order."

Now, I do not wish to use strong language—I will be very careful in what I say; but it must be remembered that this is not a Protectorate, like the Gold Coast—indeed, we are told that a Protectorate is out of the question. What is proposed is cession. This is to be an integral part of the British dominions—a Crown Colony governed directly from Downing Street in the name of the Queen; and we are told, by English Government Commissioners that in this integral portion of the British dominions, slavery must be "allowed to exist on sufferance un-acknowledged, not interfered with;" and that in this portion of British soil it is to continue to form the foundation of social order. I am able to remember the outcry that there was in this country when the most eloquent of the orators of the Southern Confederacy spoke of slavery as the corner stone of that Empire which they wished to found. I will add no words of mine, except that we now find the same phrase employed by the official Commissioners of the British Crown in reference to the formation of a new British Empire in the Pacific. The hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. M'Arthur), and Sir Charles Wingfield, who were the chief advocates of annexation in 1872 and 1873, rested their case mainly upon their wish to put an end to the kidnapping of the Natives in the Pacific; now if we seriously wished it, we could stop the kidnapping by an additional expenditure upon our naval force, without the still more costly policy of annexation; but I want to know with what face, after annexation, we should be able to put down kidnapping for the benefit of the colonies of other nations, such as those of France, when, according to our own Commissioners, slavery will be the foundation of social order in our own Colony of Fiji, and cannot be put an end to there. I remember the attacks that were made last year upon the adventurers who form the present Government of Fiji—attacks made in the supposed interest of the Natives and on a Government which it was said was "based upon the slave trade." According to our Commissioners our Government of Fiji is to be based not upon the slave trade, but upon slavery. I am not speaking against annexation—it may be shown to me to be wise—it may be shown to be necessary. I am only trying to demonstrate that the matter is not sufficiently clear for us to allow Sir Hercules Robinson to visit the Islands with power—without further reference to us—to annex them. Either we ought to see his instructions, or else we ought to let it be understood that Parliament is to be consulted before annexation is positively resolved on. Those who without consulting Parliament would bring to pass the cession, would be incurring a tremendous responsibility. You have in Fiji 4,000 White settlers well armed, some of them holding slaves, many of them occupying large tracts of land, to which they possess no title. You must either govern through these men or against them. If you govern against them, you must keep there a great military and naval force, you must incur vast expense, and very possibly to no purpose. If you govern with them, you run the risk of still worse things, inasmuch as you may find, that you are committed to a policy which will produce the destruction of the bulk of the Native population, at the hands of a small body of slave holding White planters, governing the Islands in the name of the British Crown.

in seconding the Amendment of his hon. Friend, said, he would confine himself to two points. In the first place, there had been no such cession as the Resolution of the hon. Member for Lambeth asserted; so that if they adopted that Resolution they would be affirming what was distinctly contrary to the fact. The Resolution declared that there had been a unanimous request on the part of the Chiefs, Native population, and White residents of Fiji, for annexation to this country. That the Whites desired annexation he had no doubt; but there was no semblance of a request from the Natives, except so far as the Chiefs affected to act for them. And, further, it seemed very doubtful whether the Chiefs themselves clearly understood what was conveyed by the cession of their territory. The form of an instrument could be found, but it was executed by Mr. Thurston. Well, who was Mr. Thurston? Before he was Minister he was Her Majesty's Consul, and an instrument from one who had recently ceased to be our agent and which made a cession of territory to us would not be of much more validity if tried by the law of common sense than an analogous deed would be if tried by a Court of Law. The Commissioners stated how far the Chiefs understood the cession. The Commissioners say—"We have taken the greatest pains to insure our obtaining a real record of the actual wishes of the Chiefs and people, and we consider the above-named document is as accurate a representation of that wish as can possibly be obtained." But then the Commissioners go on to admit that the Chiefs had not sufficient intelligence really to know what was meant. The record referred to was styled "a paper showing the express wish of Cakobau and the other Chiefs as to annexation to Great Britain." But the Commissioners, in fact, did not ascertain anything from the Chiefs, but took it all from Mr. Thurston, by whom, and not by the Chiefs, the paper was signed. The whole of this cession on the part of the Chiefs was, in truth, something that they did not understand, nor did they know the effect that the change would have upon them. As to the ordinary Natives, there was not even this miserable pretence of assent. He (Sir Francis Goldsmid) could not, therefore, as an honourable man vote for this. Resolution, which asserted that there was an unanimous cession, and which assertion was made without any proof of it in the printed documents. If it was wished to do a high-handed thing, and to take a territory which was supposed to be valuable, let it be done; but, at all events, let them not add something like meanness to high-handedness, by pre tending that that was a cession which, in fact, would be a capture by force. The hon. Member for Lambeth had pointed out the advantages of these Islands as a coaling station and as cotton growing territory. That might make it more desirable for England to possess it; but it did not add any strength to those pretences which the hon. Member thought lit to dignify by the name of cession. In the second place, he (Sir Francis Goldsmid) would ask whether the hon. Member was not struck by the incongruity between what was now proposed to be done and what was taken for granted in the Gold Coast debate. It was then admitted that slavery could not be allowed to exist in any part of the British Dominions; and this was given as a reason for not annexing the territory on the Gold Coast, and for being satisfied with establishing a Protectorate. Now, a Protectorate had also been proposed for Fiji; but Lord Kimberley in a Despatch pointed out in the strongest terms, that a Protectorate would not do here, and that, by setting one up, we we should make ourselves responsible for the acts of the Native Government without having the right to control them. The same objections were made in the debate on the Gold Coast, but were overruled, because it was said that we had in that case entered into engagepments from which we could not retreat. In the present case, however, where we had at present entered into no entangling engagements, the House was asked now to enter into them; and when once that had been done, the Government could not afterwards retreat. Why should we do here what we were unwilling to do there? The only reason seemed to be that the advantages of slavery were heightened and diversified in the present case by the charms of cannibalism. The course proposed was not only un-wise, but almost grotesque, and he should, therefore, second, with the ut-most confidence, the Amendment of the hon. Member for Chelsea.

I was in hopes that we should have heard at the stage of the discussion which we have now reached the opinions and views of Her Majesty's Government. It is my own conviction that it would have been well if the Government had at an earlier period themselves brought this subject before the House. It was duo to the Government, and due to the House, that they should do so if they contemplate during the Recess any step of a nature which may commit this country with regard to its future policy. But that is a question for the Government, and not for me to judge of. All that I have to say is that I have no desire to take the responsibility out of their hands. I have every desire that they should have a clear stage open to them, without any pre-judgment of questions upon which they ought to be better informed than we can be. I shall hold them entirely and absolutely responsible for the steps they may take in regard to this very important question. I will not attempt to forecast this policy of the Government, an explanation of which in this House has not boon conceded to us; but I will state very briefly the position in which I stand with regard to the Motion now before us, for which the Government are not responsible, and with which we are obliged to deal. The hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. M'Arthur) requires me to concur with him in stating—

"That this House is gratified to learn that Her Majesty's Government have yielded to the unanimous request of the Chiefs, Native population, and White residents of Fiji, for annexation to this country, so far as to direct Sir Hercules Robinson to proceed to those Islands."

The limitation, so far as the Islands are concerned, maybe a very important one; but, on the other hand, it may be no limitation at all. Sir Hercules Robinson may go with instructions to say—"You must make the best of it. Get rid of as many difficulties as you can. But the extension of the British Empire, so limited as it is in territory and population, and with the enormous surplus power of governing it which we feel ourselves to possess—the extension of that Empire is of such vital importance that you must not miss an opportunity of making some addition to the scanty share of the surface of the earth that we possess." That may possibly be the substance of the instructions given to Sir Hercules Robinson. But I treat this as a Motion in favour of annexation, committing this House to annexation, and committing it, not at the request of the Government, and without any concurrence on their part, but by a voluntary and gratuitous act of our own, by our rushing in to assume a responsibility which they have not sought to impose upon us. I object altogether to such a mode of proceeding on the part of my hon. Friend as a private Member. The Government have an entire right to make known their counsels to us, if they please, and either to make us parties to them, or to give us an opportunity of rejecting them; but I altogether object to a person like my hon. Friend, who is a private Member, relentlessly determining that we shall become sharers in the responsibility of the Government—nay, more, that we should direct them in their course, even without their own request. My hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth talkes of the "unanimous request" of the inhabitants of Fiji for annexation. No such "unanimous request" exists. From the speech of my hon. Friend who has just spoken it appears to me a mockery to speak of unanimity among the inhabitants of Fiji on this subject. These is a power of gilding facts, and especially facts at a distance, and of transmuting them by the magic art of eloquence, which my hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth evidently possesses in a remarkable degree; but to a plain, prosaic understanding I find nothing in these Papers which partakes at all of the nature of an "unanimous request." Then my hon. Friend administers to me this most severe demand—that I am to declare that I am gratified with this "unanimous request," which does not exist. But I have a great difficulty in doing so. I am not "gratified to learn." I am vexed "to learn." This step appears to me a most unwise proceeding, and if it is an unwise proceeding, I cannot profess to feel any gratification at all. I have looked at this Report and I wish I could com mend it. It is sufficiently long, is rather meagre, and I must say it is one of the most chaotic public documents I ever read in my life. Even this Report, if I read it aright, does not contain the terms on which annexation of these Islands should be made. It is said that if we do not annex them there will be very awkward consequences to the people on the spot, ruin to the English planters, and confusion to the Native Government. These are rather serious facts; but, assuming that the facts are as thus stated, there are no reasons at all why we should annex, unless the Commissioners had shown us a state of facts in which we can proceed safely and wisely, and charge the British people with the great responsibility which it is proposed to lay upon them. There is not a single point in the Report of those Commissioners on which they have made a satisfactory answer. And for the truth of that I may refer to the speeches of the Mover and Seconder of the Motion, but much more naturally to the speeches of my hon. Friends the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment. We are encountered at the threshold with a controversy with the United States. We are to annex these Islands, and to take upon ourselves the conduct of that controversy in respect of a very large sum. That sum must be dealt with on the principles of international right, and I my-self have had some experience in discussing such a question with the United States. I own I am not very greatly attracted by this first vision which meets me on the very threshold of the subject. With regard to the debt, the Commissioners were instructed to obtain for us most satisfactory information, and the reply is that the White residents have declared, more or less formally at different places, their willingness to acknowledge their responsibility for it, as well as for the expenses of the future Government. "More or less formally declared!" I think when dominion has been assumed, and when these acknowledgments come to be examined and tested as to their value, we shall then find that they have less formally, and not more formally, admitted that they have recognized this responsibility. It is quite plain that if anything is to be done in regard to this debt, if we are to make them really responsible, the acknowledgment ought to be more formal and not less formal. And then there is the difficulty of getting a recognition from the Chiefs, because they cannot understand what they have to recognize. This, I must say, is an extraordinary case. Here is a country in which the Commissioners announce, as my hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea correctly stated, that there is a distinction between serfdom and slavery, and that is a distinction which is unknown to the British Constitution. The distinction between slavery and serfdom is sometimes a very important distinction indeed. It is an important practical distinction in a case like the serfdom which prevailed in. Russia until, to his everlasting honour, the present Emperor of Russia abolished it by one of the noblest legislative acts in the world. But the Commissioners, if I recollect right, say that it is an undefined serfdom which exists in Fiji. I think that undefined serfdom is only another name for slavery. Well, we are to annex Fiji and become Sovereigns of those 72 Islands with this un-defined serfdom, which I contend to be slavery, and the philanthropists of the country are to hug themselves with the idea that that is the most delightful thing in the world, because all we have to do is to put down slavery in that country. But we are to go in upon the recommendations of the Commissioners, who, instead of saying that slavery is to be put down, tell us distinctly that it is to be maintained and allowed, and left to take its own course. We are to wink at it; we are to know and allow it to exist, and allow those interested in it to use every means in their power to maintain it, and allow it to exist upon this basis—that this slavery which we are to go in and recognize is in these Islands the foundation of social order. If you accept the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth, it will bind you to place the Crown of England in relation of sovereignty over a savage race, among whom slavery exists, and with respect to whom our own Commissioners inform us that that slavery is the basis of social order. Then we are to buy them over. Their Chiefs—there is a very large number of them—are to become salaried officers of the British Government; and we are to enter, after all the warnings we have had in New Zealand, upon the same complicated questions of land tenure in Fiji, which in New Zealand cost us many wars and many millions of money, and which made us responsible for much that has occurred in that Colony which we have great cause to regret. We are to have reproduced in Fiji, first of all, the questions we had to deal with in New Zealand-namely, those between White purchasers and Native vendors. But if I understand this rather obscure Report, we are to have in Fiji what was not in New Zealand—that is different sets of Native rights to the same soil—rights of families who are the proprietors, together with certain rights of the Chiefs, but there is no single proprietorship. It is quite clear that there is a division of rights to the soil between the Chiefs and the people, so that we have complications of the most formidable kind to contend with, and what assistance does the Report give us? Then comes the case of the mountaineers, whose case is, I think, sufficiently set forth by my hon. Friend. I own I am astonished at the demand made by my hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth. My hon. Friend is a courageous man. When he last proposed the annexation of Fiji, he was so pleased with his speech, and with the impression it made, that he published a corrected report of it, and in that corrected report last year, or last year but one—I am not sure which—he made a triumphant reference to the case of the Gold Coast. He said—"Look at it! What can be more satisfactory?" He boasted of the firm, solid foundation of the peaceful relations and the freedom from entangling engagements on the Gold Coast; but before the ink was dry came the war upon the Gold Coast, from which we have happily—at any rate for a time—escaped. Well, are we really now to be driven on by such a passion of eagerness for augmented responsibility under the guidance of my hon. Friend, whom we cannot call to account for any defect? If the Government does it, we can call them to account; but my hon. Friend's proposal is one which may lead us into dangers which we can never settle effectually upon him, if under his unfortunate counsels we go wrong. We cannot move to expel him from the House merely because he loads us into all manner of international difficulties. He is not responsible, and I object to marching under the leadership of irresponsible persons. My hon. Friend points out to me a noose, and he says—"Will you be kind enough to put your head into that noose?" I object. By degrees, I believe, that noose will be tightened round the necks of those who have deliberately committed the acts of folly, to which my hon. Friend invites us. There ought to be most careful and deliberate examination of this subject by the responsible Government of the country on their responsibility. The embarrassments of British planters, and even the confusion of the Native Government, are not reasons why we should commit the British nation to engagements which are not well-defined, and with respect to which we do not see the way of working them out effectually. I see disagreeable and distorted phantoms stalking across the stage of this House before my eyes. I see new Votes in the Estimates—new Votes for future wars in Fiji—new Votes for future engagements—a reproduction in aggravated forms of all we have had to lament in New Zealand. And, Sir, believing that we are an Assembly of sane Gentlemen, against not one of whom a writ de lunatico inquirendo can justly or ought reasonably to be taken out, I say upon that basis that I will urge the claims of prudence against the real, but at the same time, I think, sadly deluded, philanthropy of my hon. Friend, and I distinctly decline to utter the gross untruth of which I should be guilty if I were to say that I would be gratified with stops virtually amounting to the premature annexation of Fiji.

said, there was one portion of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman in which he cordially agreed, and it was that in which he recommended the hon. Member for Lambeth not to persevere with his Motion. He quite agreed with the right hon. Gentleman that the responsibility for the annexation of the Fiji Islands or otherwise should properly attach to Her Majesty's Government, and he certainly did not seek to throw any portion of that responsibility from the shoulders of Her Majesty's Government to those of the House of Commons. He could not so heartily endorse some other portions of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. The right hon. Gentleman, following up what had fallen from the hon. Member for Chelsea, proceeded to argue that the institutions of Fiji were founded upon a system of domestic slavery. That was an expression we had heard before during the present Session. It was a red herring which had been previously drawn across the floor of the House of Commons. When he first saw the expression in the Amendment of the hon. Baronet, he anxiously re-read the Report of the Commissioners to see what he had on an attentive perusal failed to detect. He was bound to confess that he still failed to detect these words. It was quite true the Commissioners said—"

"The old position of the great body of Natives towards their Chiefs is one of undefined serfdom, moderated by certain customs. A Chief has food brought to him and to his followers, and has always been accustomed to exact contributions of mats, oil, &c, from those who look to him as their head."

He failed to see in these words "undefined serfdom," for they distinctly stated in what the serfdom consisted. There was no reference made to personal servitude. The right hon. Gentleman would see that it bore a close resemblance to local taxation paid in kind. The next sentence confirmed that view of the case, for the Report went on to say—

"These contributions, which are necessarily vexatious because uncertain and arbitrary, have been and are still made at the present time, and are greatly valued by the Chiefs as, perhaps, the greatest proof of superiority they can show."

Now, if the greatest proof of superiority was that certain payments in kind were made to the Chiefs by those who looked up to them, that answered the objection of the right hon. Gentleman. No doubt, the Commissioners said that they found the Chiefs on this subject by no means open to argument in the direction they contemplated, and that some time might be required before the Chiefs could view matters in a practical light; and he admitted he was far from seeing a termination to the system which had been sketched by the right hon. Gentleman and others. He objected to personal service in any shape or form, though if there was any form of servitude less open to objection it was one in the shape of payments. But the matter might be cut short by saying that, under no circumstances, would Her Majesty's Government consent to administer the affairs of any territory in which domestic slavery in any shape or form was recognized by the law. A great deal had been said with regard to the financial position of Fiji. It was perfectly true that the financial arrangements of the present Ministry of Fiji had not been particularly satisfactory, and that the debt was now estimated at "£87,000. He was not concerned, at present, to defend either the action or the individual character or capacity of the members of the Fiji Ministry. He was afraid those gentlemen could not, perhaps, lay claim to any very great moderation, and he could not say that their past history was any guarantee of their capacity for the administration of the Government. But with regard to the question of the acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of the cession of the Fiji Islands upon the terms suggested by Commodore Goodenough and Mr. Layard, he would say at once that it was out of the question. The Commissioners, in the first place, sought to commit us, without further inquiry or investigation, to the acceptance of the debt, which was estimated at £87,000, but we had no guarantee that it might not exceed that amount. The Government would never think of entering blindfold into an arrangement of that kind, which would commit them to an unknown liability. But there were still more formidable objections in another portion of the Report. If the House would turn to page 20 they would see some conditions attached to the cession of a nature far more serious than any financial considerations. In Article 9 this extraordinary paragraph occurred—

"Every native executive officer to draw the aforesaid allowances contingent upon the actual performance, in respect to Fijians, of the duties confided to him. Should any high native officer be removed from his post, his place to he filled by the next man of his family entitled to succeed him by Fijian law or customs."

Such a condition would be scouted as impossible. The next Article said—

"The Government of Her Britannic Majesty to concede and preserve to the Chiefs and people of Fiji, under any form of British Government, an equitable share in the Councils of State, and, in the event of Fiji becoming a Crown Colony, to appoint not less than four Fijian Chiefs to seats in the Executive Council."

The only possible form of government for Fiji, if annexed, would be that of a Crown Colony. It had been already mentioned that Sir Hercules Robinson had been despatched by Her Majesty's Government personally to conduct an investigation into the proposal of the Fiji Government. Sir Hercules Robinson, as the House was well aware, was a gentleman eminently qualified to conduct an inquiry of that description. It was felt by the Government that some officer of higher rank and consequently greater authority than the Commissioners would be in a position which would enable him to approach this question with a greater chance of arriving at a satisfactory settlement. Sir Hercules Robinson, though acting under instructions from the Secretary of State, would be required to exercise his own discretion with regard to a great number of details. Without waiting for his Report, the Government had determined that in the event of all the difficulties in the way being overcome, the cession must be a purely, or at any rate, a virtually unconditional one. Notwithstanding the fact that a so-called responsible Government had been for some time in existence in Fiji, he could not hesitate in recommending the House of Commons to approve the policy of the Government if it should be found necessary to adopt the more original system of a Crown Colony. An idea had prevailed with some that an exact pattern of the British Constitution would be suitable to every description of population. That idea had been taken up by these persons without waiting to inquire whether the nucleus existed round which the forms of Constitutional Government might grow. But the House would agree with him that if a cession should be finally decided on the only form in which the Government of Fiji could be carried on was that of a Crown Colony. A good deal had been said about the difficulties attending the ownership and occupation of land, and this was among the first subjects that would require the anxious attention of the Government. It must receive prompt attention, and no claims would be recognized without the fullest inquiry. There was one circumstance which would call forth the hearty approbation of Members on both sides of the the House, and that was the proffered co-operation of New Zealand and New South Wales in any arrangement which the Government might see their way to adopt. He did not wish to be thought to attach undue importance to the acquisition of these Islands, nor to the sovereignty of Her Majesty in those seas. He did not advocate a policy of annexation, and by annexation he meant the acquisition of territory contrary to the wishes of its inhabitants, and without due regard to the circumstances of the communities and the desirability of the acquisition in itself. He quite agreed with the right hon. Member for Greenwich in deprecating the idea that because a country was badly governed and might appear to be ungovernable, or because certain practices might prevail there which we might disapprove, we were therefore to rush in and take possession of it. But he must enter a protest against a doctrino which found favour in certain quarters, according to which all annexations or additions to British dominions would be sternly discouraged. He did not admit that the colonizing mission of Great Britain had come to a close. He ventured to hope not only that we should not abandon our Colonies, but that we should not abandon colonization, for such abandonment had usually been, if he read history aright, the precursor of a period of national decay. He did not for one moment admit that our Colonies were to be regarded merely as a source of weakness and a danger in time of war, or that they involved us in serious responsibility without adequate return to the Home Government. He did not deny the very serious and grave responsibility which attached to the possession of colonial Empire; the Government were fully alive to the responsibility which its retention involved, and they were by no means disposed lightly to regard the addition it made to their labours. He must demur to the idea, which found favour in many high quarters, that our Colonies entailed upon us all these responsibilities without giving to us any sufficient return. Although the retention of our Colonies, if we were unhappily engaged in war, might throw certain burdens on our resources, we must place as against them the fact that any Power which thought fit to engage in a life and death struggle with us, which he hoped might never be the case, would not have to reckon merely with the 30 odd millions of the British Isles, but with many other millions of the Anglo-Saxon race, who looked on the mother country with feelings of veneration and regard, and were by no means indisposed to accept the duties and obligations which attached to them as members of a great Colonial Empire. It had been asserted that there was a desire on the part of this country to be rid of the responsibilities of her Colonies; and therefore he should not be doing his duty if he did not avail himself of this, and, indeed, of every occasion, to repudiate on behalf of the Government any sympathy with what was called "the abandonment policy." The Government viewed the retention of our Colonial Empire as a subject of the greatest importance. He was happy to say it was no longer a question of retaining the allegiance of unwilling populations; he would say, without fear of contradiction, and without in any way underrating the loyalty of the British Islands themselves, Her Majesty had no more loyal subjects in any of her dominions than she had in the British Colonies. These Colonies were fully prepared to discharge their duty, whatever it might be, and to reciprocate the feelings of confidence with which they were regarded by the Home Government. He had no fault whatever to find with the suggestions of the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Charles Dilke), who, no more than the right hon. Member for Greenwich, wished to interfere with the policy of the Government, and only wished to impress upon them the necessity of caution and care. In reference to the question, whether annexation would be completed without further reference to Parliament—[Sir CHARLES DILKE: Previous to the actual cession]—he had aiready said no decision had been arrived at; indeed, the elements for forming a decision were still wanting; but if, in the opinion of the Government, annexation should be desirable, that annexation would be determined upon, on the responsibility of the Government, without seeking to throw on the shoulders of Parliament any portion of that responsibility. He hoped, under these circumstances, the hon. Member for Lambeth would be satisfied with the discussion which had arisen, and would not press his Motion to a division, and that the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea would be satisfied with the assurance that the utmost caution and care would be observed by the Government, and would consent to withdraw his Amendment.

thought that in the Motion and Amendment before the House, and in the speeches delivered in support of each, the House would be able to perceive a fair representation of the two schools of thought which existed upon the general question of the annexation, or acquisition by England of new territory. The one school—represented by the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. M'Arthur)—looked mainly to the advantages to be derived from such acquisition in the way of increased trade, extended commerce, the development of the resources of the annexed country, and the consolidation of our Colonial Empire. The other school—represented by the hon. Baronet (Sir Charles Dilke) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich—looked rather to the disadvantages, and were disposed to magnify the difficulties which stood in the way of annexation. They brought into view the probable expense to the British tax-payer, the possible complications with Native tribes, and the undesirability of increasing our responsibilities and creating materials for possible trouble here-after. It was impossible, however, to lay down any general rule by which the British Government should be inflexibly bound; and in the present instance, considering the position which he (Mr. Knatchtghbull-Hugessen) had occupied under the late Government, he felt bound to express his satisfaction with what had fallen from the last speaker, and his opinion that, so far as he was able to judge, the Government had exercised a wise discretion, and might be trusted to proceed with the caution which was necessary. It must not be forgotten by hon. Gentlemen on his (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen's) side of the House that the late Government sent out the Commissioners whose Report had been scrutinized, and that Lord Kimberley, in his letter of instructions to them, dated August 1.5th, 1873, pointed out only four possible modes of action for the British Government, three of which were repudiated by this Report—namely, the investing the British Consul with magisterial powers, recognizing the Government of Cakobau, which had confessedly failed, and the establishment of a Protectorate. There remained, then, only annexation, unless we were prepared to abandon altogether any interference with the affairs of Fiji. In considering this question, it must be remembered that the sending of Messrs. Goodenough and Layard to Fiji to make inquiries naturally raised expectations and hopes on the part of the people which it would not be fair and honourable to disappoint. Moreover, he felt bound to say that there had been a disposition to magnify the difficulties of acquisition. As to the statement that there had been no offer of a cession, he would call attention to a passage in the Report, on page 6, which stated that the Commissioners enclosed a Paper expressing the distinct wish of the Chiefs for annexation, and stating—

"They have full power and authority to make the cession: and, were we to add anything to this, we should say the lesser Chiefs and people are more anxious for annexation than the high Chiefs."

The Report also stated that the Commissioners—

"had taken the greatest pains to insure obtaining a real record of the actual wishes of the Chiefs and people, and we consider the above-named document is as accurate a representation of that wish as can possibly he obtained.'

This was also "the unanimous wish of the White settlers." The dangerous mountain tribes called the Kai Colos were confined to the mountains of Viti Levu only. In another part of the Report it was stated that those mountaineers only numbered about 7,000, that they were—

"scattered, had continual quarrels among themselves, and wove not in the least degree dangerous, though their depredations might be annoying."

This, therefore, was a very different state of things from that which we had to encounter in New Zealand. He was glad that his hon. Friend had made so explicit and satisfactory a declaration on the subject of slavery. The Government must know that no slavery in any shape was legal in British territory, nor would the House or the country permit such a state of things for one moment. If he had risen before his hon. Friend's speech, he should have expressed his confidence that the noble Lord at present at the head of the Colonial Department and the present Government would never have sanctioned the negotiation for any territory in which the continuance of domestic slavery was to form a part of the bargain. His hon. Friend had failed, though from mere omission probably, to notice the statement of the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea that one of the great slave markets was our Colony of Queensland. That state ment was incorrect. All the evidence was against it, and the authorities of the Colony did everything in their power to discountenance slavery in any form. He thoroughly endorsed the wisdom of the course that the Government proposed to pursue, and concurred with his hon. Friend opposite in believing that this matter was one with which the Executive Government ought to deal, and upon which the House of Commons had no responsibility whatever. It was a case in which Parliament must of necessity repose confidence in the Executive Government, and must not take the responsibility off their shoulders. Of course, however, he and other hon. Members who took this view held themselves perfectly free and open to criticize the action of the Government hereafter if they should see reason to disapprove it. The doctrine, too, of maintaining our colonial possessions infact was one upon which he had, during the throe years he was at the Colonial Office, insisted, he feared, usque ad nauseam, having always loudly protested against those who appeared to undervalue our Colonial Empire. As to increasing that Empire, he would only say that a country in the position of Great Britain could not avoid the responsibilities of that position, nor refuse addition to her territory from merely selfish considerations. Questions of this kind, however, must be dealt with according to their particular merits, and he believed that the present Government—or, indeed, any Government of British gentlemen—might be trusted to deal wisely, justly, and cautiously in those matters.

observed that the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down apparently possessed more faith in any Cabinet composed of English gentlemen than he did in his own Leader, who sat beside him; and his speech afforded only another proof that it was absolutely impossible for any two Gentlemen to rise upon the front opposition Bench without diametrically contradicting one another. The question before the House was not as to whether it was advisable to adopt a policy of abandonment, against which the hon. Member for York (Mr. J. Lowther) had so strongly protested, but whether we should give our sanction to a policy of annexation. That was a matter which demanded the most careful consideration. His hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth (Mr. M'Arthur) would probably excuse him if he designated him the patron saint of the Fiji Islander, and his hon. Friend appeared that evening not solely as an independent Member advocating the cause he had at heart, but as the confederate of Her Majesty's Ministers. This was a great question, and he was sorry that it had come on at the fag-end of the Session, when they were all exhausted, their energies having been expended at the beginning on the regulation of public-houses, and at the end on the regulation of public worship. However, the matter was too important to be passed over without some comment. The Islands proposed to be annexed were admirable as far as natural advantages went. Man only was vile in them; but it appeared to him that man there was very vile indeed. Altogether, the inhabitants numbered about 150,000, and until lately, they were the most horrible cannibals that existed on the face of the whole earth. Since this question had first come before them, he had obtained a book upon Fiji written by a Wesleyan missionary. The writer referred to one of the inhabitants who was in the habit of adding a stone for every fresh victim to a certain line of stones which indicated the number of men he had eaten. There were 172 stones in all; but as, no doubt, a great number of stones had been removed, this man had probably killed and eaten about 900 people. Another, again, had a line of stones which reached the number of 58 before he became a Christian. All this was, however, now changed, and of these 150,000, no less than 107,000 regularly attended a place of worship. It was gratifying to find that they had not yielded to the vices of civilization, and if he could prevent it, he would do his best to prevent their being further civilized. But in addition to the 150,000 people who attended church in such enormous proportions, there were 20,000 mountaineers, who retained their original practices, and there seemed to be some fear lest those 20,000 should come down from the mountains and eat the 150,000 Methodists. Therefore, they were called upon to agree to this annexation. In the Report it was stated that those 20,000 mountaineers were scattered, and it was recommended that they should be "visited by soldiers," sum moned to give in their allegiance, and that "teachers" should be sent among them. So that we were first to kill them and burn their villages, and then to send them teachers, in conformity, probably, with the old notion that the British Army should be regarded as one of the branches of the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge. In addition to the Natives, there were about 2,000 Europeans in the Islands, nearly all of whom were escaped convicts, and these were the pious founders of the new Crown Colony. These convicts had set up a Government which had been described by the Junior Lord of the Admiralty (Sir James Elphinstone) as "a set of the most unmitigated ruffians in the world." The Appendix to the Report, at page 59, told them—

"Worthless adventurers driven from other countries by their evil habits and other faults, have sought a refuge among these islands in numbers out of all proportion to the rest of the settlers, and by their example and influence too often lead their weaker minded neighbours in their footsteps."

They drink kava, which—

"Producing a partial paralysis of the muscular system, together with a lethargic state of the sensibility, without the excitement, coma, and following discomfort of drunkenness, has recommended it to many when alcohol cannot be got."

He begged to recommend this to the Home Secretary when he next meddled with Intoxicating Liquors Bills—

"Its taste has been compared to that of Gregory's Mixture combined with soapsuds, and its appearance to that of dirty dish water, &c. Of the presence of delirium tremens there is no lack of evidence."

But in addition to all that, Fiji had incurred a debt of .£80,000 within two years. There must surely be some great and good object to be gained by taking those people over. They were told the proper thing was a Crown Colony—a despotism tempered by the advice of the House of Commons. But what did they know about these people? They were in almost total ignorance respecting them. He had ascertained that the name of these Islands was pronounced in 15 different ways, and whereas the Prime Minister called them the Fiji Islands, he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) pronounced it Fee-gee. The hon. Member for Lambeth said this subject had been much discussed both in the House and in the Press; but his hon. Friend was wrong on that point. The question had been discussed only twice, and really the Press could not know much about it, whatever the papers might say. In fact, nobody knew anything about it but the hon. Member for Lambeth. His hon. Friend had talked about an unanimous request for annexation; but he thought that had been exploded. If it was really desirable to adopt this policy, was it not curious that the great boon of annexation should have been reserved for this country? Both Germany and the United States had had these Islands offered to them, and those nations were sharp enough to know what was a good bargain. They had refused, however, to accept them, and had left us to make the bad bargain. We made a bad bargain with reference to the Gold Coast. It had already cost us £1,000,000, and it would shortly cost us another if we did not speedily get rid of it. The Gold Coast should be a warning to us. There was an indescribable simplicity in the people of this country in mixing themselves up with such transactions. For himself, he actually shuddered when he heard of an adventurer or a geographer going hunting about the world and discovering a fresh island in some barbarous sea. That meant sooner or later the establishment of a Crown Colony, and the imposition of fresh taxes upon the people of England. Philanthropy had unfortunately been mixed up with this question. Now, he was of the same opinion as Mr. Albert Grant, who had lately left that House, very much to the regret of himself. He objected to unite business and philanthropy. He should like, therefore, to know whether the taking over of these Islands meant business or philanthropy? It was said annexation was necessary to put down the slave trade; but, in his opinion, they might put a stop to the slave trade without annexing the Islands. The case of New Zealand should be a warning to us. What occurred there? Simply because we did not clearly understand the titles to land in that country, we had been involved in a war which cost us £11,000,000. It would be cheaper to send ships to bring over or take elsewhere the 2,000 sufferers from delirium tremens and leave the Methodists and the cannibals to settle matters between themselves. But the Colonial Minister let the whole truth out when he said the moment English sovereignty was acknowledged, the value of land in the Islands would be—not doubled, but quadrupled for those in behalf of whom we were about to pledge our credit, and possibly our blood and treasure. Something had been said of the blessing of our rule and civilization to the Natives of Fiji. The blessing we conferred on Native tribes of any country we colonized was their extermination. If always ended so, except in the case of India. He had heard lately of a tribe of North American Indians. It was once a noble tribe, but was now almost extinct, for nothing remained but one old chief, two worn-out horses, and three gallons of whisky, and as when last seen the Chief was engaged in drinking the whisky it was believed that shortly nothing would be left. Did the hon. Member think that we were such excellent governors that our rule abroad must be perfect? Was the state of this country an absolute Paradise? He could not think so when we had a standing army of 1,000,000 paupers, and while our gaols were filled in the midst of our civilization. We talked of spreading our national religion abroad, but he would tell the House what our practice was. We raised about £30,000,000 a-year by encouraging people to drink, and we spent nearly that £30,000,000 in weapons, men, and war. Our gods might thus be said to be Bacchus and Mars—the God of Battles and the God of Bottles. But he would put the ease on rather lower, although, perhaps, stronger grounds. Had not this Parliament enough to do? What a Session they had had of it? How many harassed and worried classes, and individuals, and trades had they put right during the Session? During the last five months they had been engaged in legislating for enthusiastic Ritualists, plundering publicans, indiscreet Bishops, aggrieved Commissioners, and bonâ fide drunkards. Parliament had been overburdened with work, and he entreated it not to add to its anxiety by annexing the "King of the Cannibal Islands," and those interesting savages who had wound themselves round the heart and affections of his hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth.

said, that as no independent Member had supported the Motion of the hon. Member for Lambeth, he wished to say a few words on the subject before the House. His hon. Friend (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) had reminded the House that we had a standing army of 1,000,000 paupers; but how many would there be at this moment but for our Colonies, and the emigration which they had enabled us to carry out. We had the grandest Colonies in the world. He, for one, deprecated the tone in which our Colonies were sometimes spoken of by some of his hon. Friends on that side of the House; and he rejoiced that the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies had spoken in such a manly tone as to the colonial policy of the Government. So far from feeling the distrust in the Colonial Office which had been expressed that night, he would say, without making any invidious comparisons, that he felt the fullest and most implicit confidence in the wisdom, humanity, and patriotism of the noble Lord who presided over the Colonial Office. There never was a more general wish in a Colony than there was in Fiji that the British Government should take over the Colony. The Commissioners stated that the lessor Chiefs were even more anxious for annexation' than the great Chiefs. With regard to the debt, our Australian Colonies had expressed their willingness to take any reasonable share of it that might be allotted to them. The question was, whether these Islands were to have British rule and justice, or British lawlessness and civil war. The Islands were in a state of anarchy, and in the interests of civilization and humanity it was our duty to accept the cession. There was nothing like the "lust of territory" which had been spoken of. The people had invited us to rule over them, and if we failed to do so, some other Government would probably stop in. The French had taken possession of New Caledonia as a penal settlement, and it was a disgrace to us that we had allowed them to do so. The Secretary of State had refused to accept the cession unless it was made unconditionally, and Lord Carnarvon and the Government had done the only wise thing that could be done by sending Sir Hercules Robinson to inquire into the circumstances. We might get rid of all our difficulties by shirking our obvious duties; but it would be a case of absolute cowardice if the Government were to shirk herein the duty that was plainly and obviously before them If the Government were to allow the United States to obtain these Islands, because Great Britain refused to take them, they would be regarded with scorn and contempt by our Australian Colonies.

said, he was satisfied with the debate, and, as he had full confidence in the Government, he was willing to withdraw his Motion.

was un-willing to withdraw his Amendment until a division had been taken.

rose to move—

"That the Contract entered into between the Postmaster General and the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company for the conveyance of the East India, China, and Japan mails be approved."

The hon. Member said, he regretted having to propose a Motion which an hon. Member (Mr. Rathbone), who had the regard of every Member of that House, felt it his duty to oppose; but nevertheless he (Mr. Smith) hoped he should be able to persuade the House that the proposals of the Government in this matter were just, fair, and reasonable, and to the public advantage. This was not a new contract, but a proposal to modify an existing contract with a Company which had conveyed the mails between England and the East during the last six or seven years, and would continue to do so for a subsidy of £450,000 a-year until the 1st February, 1880. The contract was entered into in 1867, and was modified in 1870 at the instance of the noble Lord the Member for New Radnor (the Marquess of Hartington), who was then the Post-master General. The Government had up to that time been in a sort of partnership with that Company. It had undertaken to pay £400,000 a year, and to contribute a further sum up to £500,000, in order to make the dividend up to 6 per cent if it should not be earned by the Company in its ordinary commercial transactions. It was felt that there were great inconveniences in the association of the Government with a Company in a species of partnership, and a fixed subsidy of £450,000 a-year was consented to in lieu of the then existing arrangement. At that time the Suez Canal was scarcely open; but within the last three or four years there had been a practical transfer of the traffic in passengers and goods from the long sea voyage to the passage through the Canal. In 1873 the Company applied to the Government of the day for permission to pass their vessels through the Canal. They represented the inconvenience of landing their passengers and goods at Suez and embarking them again at Alexandria, and how their interest suffered by the continuance of the stringent provisions of the contract under which they worked. The Post Office expressed their willingness to accept a service which would effect a saving of 14 hours in the transit of mails viâ Brindisi to Bombay, Point de Galle, Hong Kong, and Japan, leaving the service from Bombay exactly as it was under the contract, and suggesting that a further 24 hours should be allowed for the service from Bombay to Southampton, and vice versâ. The Postmaster General required that an abatement should be made from the subsidy of £30,000 a year. The Peninsular and Oriental Company declined the proposal; but offered in return to convey the mails from England to the ports of Bombay, Calcutta, Shanghai, and Yokohama in 24 hours less time than they were bound by their existing arrangement to do. The Post Office would not accede to this proposal, and the reason why no alteration was effected under the late Government seemed to be mainly that the reduction of subsidy to which the Company was willing to submit was not sufficient. When he came to consider the matter, after entering upon his present office, he was inclined at first to take the same view. The Company seemed to have lost a large part of their revenue by the transfer of a portion of their business to other Companies and shipowners, and it was thought that their object was to regain that business by means of a change in the provisions of the mail contract. On making inquiries, however, it was found that the advantage to be gained by the Company would not be so great as had been supposed. In one respect, no doubt, there would be an advantage, inasmuch as the Company would not be obliged, as it seemed it had sometimes been, to land the mails at the port on one side of the Isthmus and pass the steamer as quickly as possible through the Canal, in order that, at the port on other side, she might take up the same mails. The present Government took the matter into consideration, and while he was as anxious as any one to save the public money wherever it was possible to do so, he submitted that the arrange ment which had been entered into was fair and reasonable. There was a subsisting engagement with the Company which would entitle them to come to the Government and say—" We are willing to make such and such terms to the public advantage provided certain conditions be relaxed in our favour." Well, he was of opinion that it would not be for the public benefit that the Company should be put into a position which would be hard on any contractor who endeavoured fairly and honestly to carry out his contract. If it were a new contract, he confessed he would desire to put it up to competition and to alter the terms; but we had now to consider the position in which we found ourselves, and under these circumstances, he submitted to the House that a fair proposal was made. An entirely new trade had sprung up within the last few years, owing, in a great measure, to the fact that the Peninsular and Oriental Company had been excluded by the terms of their contract from the profitable use of the Suez Canal. Those who objected to the contract—and their representations deserved the most serious consideration—had alleged that there was no gain in time, but an absolute loss in the proposal now submitted to the House. But those gentlemen lost sight of the fact that the Post Office under successive Administrations had thought it right and necessary to prescribe certain times of stoppage during the period of the voyage from England to the extreme East, a circumstance which had not been taken into account by the objectors to the new contract. Under different time-tables sanctioned by different Postmasters General for the last six years, there had been stoppages of 24 hours at Aden on the outward voyage, and 20 hours on the homeward, 28 hours at Point de Galle, six hours at Penang, and other stoppages of a similar character, amounting to the difference between the estimate made by hon. Gentlemen of the proper time for the service and the time in which it was to be performed, which would justify his statement that there would be an actual saving of 24 hours on the passage outwards to India and China, and of 40 hours on the passage to Australia. But if the House refused to sanction this proposal, there would be no acceleration of the mails beyond the extent which his right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Lyon Playfair) endeavoured to secure in Feb ruary last, and which was limited to 10 hours. We should lose the small sum which the Company undertook to surrender from their subsidy of £450,000, and also the great advantage of being able to exact the penalties for delays whether occasioned by stress of weather or any cause other than shipwreck. Under all the circumstances of the case, he did not hesitate to recommend the acceptance of the contract as one fully justified, and as tending largely to the advantage of the mercantile community.

after presenting a Petition from the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce praying the House not to approve the contract, moved, as an Amendment, that it be not approved this Session. He and those who agreed with him felt no want of confidence in the Secretary to the Treasury; they acknowledged his anxiety for the public purse and his desire for the promotion of trade. The hon. Gentleman had met the representations which had been addressed to him in a candid spirit, he had withdrawn one contract and accepted modifications in another, and the very fact that he had done so showed how necessary it was that when a question of such difficulty, of such wide bearings, and important consequences to the trade of the country was proposed, there should be no undue haste, but that ample time should be given for its consideration. The original contract was made on the 9th of November, 1867, before the Government had time to receive representations on the subject of the great improvidence which was being shown. It was made for 12 years at a period when the greatest improvements were being-effected in the construction of steamers, and when there was every prospect of the mails being carried with increased celerity. When the contract was made the main sources of revenue contemplated by the Company and the Government were the mails and the passengers. The quantity of goods carried was small, but the opening of the Suez Canal made an enormous difference in that respect. It was notorious to everyone acquainted with the shipping trade that if such a contract had to be made now, it would be made at enormously reduced rates. The Company had got largely overpaid for the work. ["No!"] Would the hon. Gentleman who said "No" stake his reputation on the assertion that if this contract were abrogated it would not be taken up at greatly reduced rates? He ventured to think that when the Company asked to be relieved from the stipulations in order to be enabled to compete with private companies, the Government were bound to see that the country should obtain such a reduction in the subsidy as would be equivalent to the relaxation they might grant. If they relaxed the stipulations without reducing the subsidy, the taxpayer would be unfairly burdened and the Company would have a surplus fund which it could use to suppress competition. The Government ought not to hurry through at the end of the Session without sufficient consideration a contract which, while it did not give the public the benefits to which it was entitled, would inflict a great injury on the shipping interest. As to the argument that different Postmasters General under different Governments had all taken the same course, it must be remembered that Postmasters General were often not selected for their great knowledge of mercantile affairs, and were naturally at the mercy of the permanent officials of the Department, whose bias had for years been far too much in 'favour of contractors, and far too little in favour of the public interest. He would illustrate the want of vigilance and care shown on behalf of the public by the case of the West India and Brazil contracts, in respect to which a new contract of a most improvident description was precipitately entered into. A practical man of business had told him that he would have been glad to carry out for £12,000 the service for which the Government had given £32,000. With regard to the manner in which the Peninsular and Oriental Company had done their work, he (Mr. Rathbone) maintained that they could have done it a great better if they had chosen, and that they ought to have gone faster considering the great improvements which had been made in connection with steamboats. They had been beaten in the most extraordinary way by private traders. The private trade were unable to see what were the full bearings of that contract until further time was given for its consideration; and the Government ought not to make a contract and tie it round their necks for another five years and a-half without more carefully going into the subject. Marseilles, Trieste, and similar places had become more than heretofore the centres of trade; and it was only by the enterprise of our active traders that so large a portion of the traffic through the Suez Canal had been retained for this country under great disadvantages. Those men very fairly said that before a contract was made which would enable a large monopoly greatly to injure, if not to ruin them, the Government ought to obtain for the country some commensurate advantage. He hoped the Government would withdraw the contract till next Session, or, at all events, that it would only be allowed to run till the 1st of March, in order to give time to the commercial interest to ascertain its true character and effect. He begged to move that the contract be not confirmed.

seconded the Amendment. He thought that if any change was to be made in the contract at all it ought to be one in the direction of a reduction of the subsidy. He complained that the conveyance of the mails to India by the Peninsular and Oriental Company took a much longer time than was necessary, and that time could be saved were another Company to be employed. He regarded it as a great misfortune to be tied down by this contract for another six years, because if it were not for such an arrangement, he believed they might even now do without a subsidy. He hoped the Government would not insist upon pressing through this new contract at that late period of the Session.

said, he thought that his hon. Friend who brought forward this Motion had not fully appreciated the subject really before the House, and it appeared to him the only course open to them was to accept that which had been recommended by the Secretary of the Treasury. In 1867 a contract was entered into with the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and they were to receive either £400,000 or £500,000 a-year, according to the amount of return they were able to get from the contract they had entered into. If they could obtain a fair return for their capital, they were to be contented by receiving £400,000. If not, they were to be able to draw an extra £100,000 a-year to make up for the deficiency. If they received 6 per cent for their money they were to be contented; if not they were to receive the supplementary sum. After having had the contract for three years they had not been able to get a sum sufficient to relieve the Government from paying the extra £100,000, and the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), the Postmaster General at the time, made an arrangement in the interests of the public, saying that as he had been compelled to pay £100,000 a-year under the contract, and as there was no prospect of the Government being relieved from paying it, he would make a variation in the contract—namely, that instead of remaining in partnership with the Peninsular and Oriental Company, to share their profits, he would give them a fixed sum of £450,000 a-year, and they should shift for themselves. The country accepted that arrangement, and had since been relieved from paying £50,000 a-year. Instead of there being correctness in the statement of his hon. Friend (Mr. Rathbone) that the subsidy alone was sufficient without either the carriage of the mails or passengers, and that the Company was greatly overpaid, he (Mr. Samuda) wished to point out that the Company had never paid more than 6 per cent from the time they entered into the contract in the year 1867, and that on the last occasion the dividend paid to the shareholders was only 5 per cent. The subsidy was £500,000 a-year, and the earnings of the Company, including the subsidy, varied from £1,500,000 to £2,000,000, and yet they were only able to pay their shareholders £170,000 a-year. It was therefore absurd to say that the subsidy would be sufficient to carry the mail service without cargo or passengers. He wished to call attention to another fact which appeared to be lost sight of—namely, that it was not proposed that any variation should be made in respect of the carriage of the important mails between this country and India. The only alteration suggested had reference to slow or water-borne traffic; but, whether as regarded the fast mails or the slow, the proposal made by the Company would confer a great advantage on the public. It should be borne in mind that the existing contract was one which must last for six years. What was asked was that while the really valuable portion of the service should be carried through Egypt, as it now was, permission should be given to carry the heavy portion of it through the Canal, instead of, as heretofore, by railway. Not a single passenger, however, being prevented from travelling overland if he thought fit to do so. The Company went further, they offered to accelerate the mails and to make concessions in the matter of fines. If they were deprived of the contract after serving the country for 25 years, the result would be that having received only 5 or 6 per cent for their expenditure their property would be depreciated in value to the extent of the dividends they had paid for over 20 years. He could not conceive that any fault could be found with the arrangement that had been made by the Government in this matter. It secured to the public many important advantages, and the Company had acted very disinterestedly in entering into the contract. Their vessels were of the highest character. Indeed, during the last five years they had only lost one vessel out of their entire fleet, and that under the most exceptional circumstances, and this, in his opinion, ought to have a great deal of weight in the view which the House was to take of this question. He certainly did hope the House would not be led away by the statements of those interested in rival trades, and who wished to keep everything in their own hands.

said, he had no interest or feeling either for or against the Peninsular and Oriental Company, or any other Steam Packet Company. His only anxiety was that that should be done which was best for the public service. This contract had been prepared with very insufficient attention, and better terms might have been made, as he believed, for the public. There were no fewer than 14 blunders in the contract as originally drafted in July last. They had been corrected; but it was mainly through the instrumentality of rival shipowners, whose interference in these matters had been so much deprecated, that their existence had been brought to the knowledge of the Treasury. There were some points in the amended contract that required attention. Among others, he found it was stated that "96 hours additional" were to be allowed from Bombay to Suez, and from Shanghai to Bombay. To what time were those 96 hours additional? and were they to count twice over on those two voyages? With regard to the acceleration of 24 hours, so far as the contract went, it would be an acceleration that would not involve any increase of the speed of the vessels, as the Company might gain the time by curtailing the stoppages at different ports. With regard to the acceleration of the hours in the delivery of letters to Australia, that appeared to be merely a voluntary statement on the part of the Company, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. Then it was said that the penalties had been increased. The object of increasing penalties was to ensure the fulfilment of the contract as entered into, and therefore it was essential that they should examine whether the increase of penalties in the amended contract was such as to give the desired assurance. He maintained that they were not. The present penalties applied to the several links in the whole route, and were cumulative. Under the new contract, however, the penalties were terminal, and they were not, in effect, any larger than they were at present. Even under the amended contract, there were some voyages in regard to which penalties were omitted. He was of opinion that when hon. Members talked of quadruple penalties being imposed on steamers not keeping time from England to Bombay and Bombay to Shanghai, it was all moonshine. The time allowed for the entire voyages was so ample, and the stoppages so entirely at the discretion of the Company, that, practically, the Company stood in no risk of incurring a penalty. The hon. Member who last spoke referred to the amount of the original contract of 1867 and to the reduction that had been made upon it. There was one thing that he showed effectually—namely, that that contract was a remarkably improvident one. It was an advantage that there would be no pre mium to pay under the second contract. Altogether there was a gain by the concession to the extent of £24,000 a-year at the outside, and the question was whether that was enough. The late Postmaster General and his Predecessor and the late Treasury were of opinion that it was not enough; and that opinion had at first been endorsed by the present Treasury, which, however, had given way to the remonstrances of the present Postmaster General, and said it had been greatly influenced by the fuller explanation given by the Company as to the cause of the reduction of their revenue, and the slight probability of any considerable increase resulting from the contemplated changes in their service. It was desirable that that fuller explanation should be laid before the House, and until that was done the House ought to pause before confirming this contract. The assumption as to the decrease in the profits of the Company did not appear to be based on sufficient data, and on the other hand sufficient allowance was not made for increased advantages which the Company enjoyed since the original contract was entered into. He believed that if the Government went into the market now they could get the service performed for one-half of the present amount—["No, no!"]—at any rate, for two-thirds. So far as the mails were concerned there was no advantage to the public in sending them through the Canal, but, on the contrary, disadvantage, if they looked only to the object of the subsidy—namely, the expediting the mails; while the advantages of the Company were very great indeed. By this arrangement the Company's steamers would gain a precedence in passing through the Canal over all their competitors in trade, and could be repaired and coaled in this country, instead of in the East, which would diminish their working expenses. He strongly urged the advisability of postponing the matter until next Session.

said, he did not know that it would be necessary for him, or agreeable to the House, that he should attempt to follow the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Dodson) through all the details of his statement. He very much regretted that the Postmaster General was not in his place, as he could reply more directly to the right hon. Gentleman's statements. The right hon. Gentleman had entered into some details of this contract, and had enlarged upon and criticized the 14 blunders which he said had been committed; but he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) must say that they had been very considerably exaggerated; and, with respect to the omissions to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, the reason why they took place was, that it was intended to make alterations in the contract. With regard to the number of hours in which the voyages were to be performed, there had been, in point of fact, an improvement made in the contract, and the Government had given attention to those matters to which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Liverpool (Mr. Rathbone) had referred. The right hon. Gentleman directed attention to various matters; but, in point of fact, the question which the House really had to consider was one relating to the contract. This was a contract by which Parliament was bound for five years. During that time the mail service was secured by agreement with a respectable and responsible Company. It was a question, no doubt, whether, if they were going to enter into a new contract at the present time, the Government could not obtain better terms; but this was beside the question, because the Government were bound by the existing contract. The position of the Company was this—that whereas it formerly relied on its ordinary trade, its passengers and cargo, to enable it to make its profit, the Company now found itself so hampered by its contract that it could not avail itself of the natural and more advantageous route which it would prefer to take. Although some of the Company's ships wont through the Canal, yet others were bound to go by way of Alexandria. The Company were told by hon. Gentlemen opposite, and those whom they represented, that the Company were asking for a favour to themselves, and that they ought to give the State a share in the advantage. The Company rejoined that they did not desire to take all the benefit, and that they were ready to give some advantage to the public. They were ready to undertake that the voyage, or a certain portion of it, should be made in a much shorter time than at present. They were also ready to undertake that the mail service outwards should be performed in 24 hours' less time. Lastly, they undertook to accept a reduction of something like £20,000 a-year from what they now received. There were, also, some small further sums of about £4,000 a-year which they were willing to give up. The Company, therefore, said—"Relieve us from the disadvantage that now presses upon us, and we will give you an accelerated service, and accept a reduction of £24,000 a-year in the amount now payable for the remainder of the term during which the contract has to run." It was difficult to see why the Government should refuse this offer. The owners of private steamers represented that this change would place them at a disadvantage, because the Company were thus the better enabled to compete with them. That was an argument which, it appeared to him, was difficult to maintain in that House. Another argument was, that the Government were asked to give the Company so much that they ought to get more from them in return. Looking at the matter from the point of view which he had endeavoured to lay before the House, he did not think they ought to look upon the Company's difficulty as the public opportunity. The terms on the whole were, in his opinion, the best which the country was likely to get; and, therefore, he hoped the House would assent to the decision at which the Government had arrived.

said: This contract should not be ratified by the House until its bearings on the general interests of commerce and of shipowners have been fully considered. The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Company is very highly subsidized by the State, and partly through that subsidy, but largely also by its own energy, has a magnificent fleet of vessels which have been an important means of keeping up our communication with Eastern countries. Principally and chiefly, in its relations to the public, it is a service for carrying mails speedily. Its vessels, in the light of cargo and passenger vessels, are incidental to that service, and have no claims to the consideration of the Government. Its subsidy is purely for mail transit, and is sufficient for that purpose. If it build largo vessels for cargo and passengers, care must be taken that the interests of these do not affect injuriously the mail service, for which alone the public pay £450,000 per annum. Now the Suez Canal has altered the conditions of cargo and passenger traffic. It may be, and is, an injury to this traffic, that they have to be sent by rail over the Isthmus of Suez, when, without disembarking they might pass through the Canal. If the steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Company desire to pass through the Canal, they have a right to do so, provided the mails are carried with the utmost possible celerity, and provided, also, the Company do not use a Government subsidy to injure the private shipping enterprise of the country, which in its aggregate is much more important to the interests of the nation, even than the noble fleet of the contracting Company. A deputation which came to me last week to remonstrate against this contract represented upwards of 1,000,000 of tons of steam shipping, while the tonnage of the Peninsular and Oriental Company is 122,000 tons. Now, there is, rightly or wrongly, much apprehension among shipowners trading to the East. They do not fear a fair and open competition with the Peninsular and Oriental Company, but they ask us not to allow our mail subsidy to be used for an unfair competition in regard to passengers and cargo. Mail steamers have the precedence of ordinary vessels in the Canal. Suppose that a fleet of 20 vessels are arranged in order to pass through the Canal and that a mail steamer arrives, by this precedence the 20 merchant vessels have to give way to the mail steamer. If that steamer, in addition to the mail, carries passengers and cargo, as it always does, of course this precedence gives an enormous mercantile advantage to the mail carrying vessel. Some of the largest shipowners from Liverpool and Glasgow assured me when I was Postmaster General, that this precedence would be injurious to them and would give such an unfair advantage to their vessels, in regard to merchandize in which speed is an object, as would render competition difficult. If these apprehensions are true, this would be an unfortunate result of our subsidy. Because its effect would be that in 1880, when the contract ends, you might no longer find a large and fine fleet of fast vessels to compete with the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and you might be forced to renew a contract which is now so onerous to the nation. My predecessor in the office of Postmaster General (Mr. Monsell) had foreseen this evil, and he stipulated as a condition of allowing the vessels of the Peninsular and Oriental Company to pass through the Canal, that they should drop £30,000 a-year out of their present heavy subsidy of £450,000 per annum. Subsequently, he thought that this was too small an abatement upon what was essentially a new contract, and he raised the demand to £50,000. This was the state of affairs when I entered the Post Office. I thought the sum of £50,000 named by my predecessor was a reasonable price for a very important concession to a Company, which admits that the loss which they have sustained by the Canal competition has exceeded. £300,000 a-year. The Treasury, how-ever, did not agree with me in asking £50,000, and thought that £60,000 should be demanded. On what grounds the present Government have consented to the small abatement of £20,000 I do not pretend to understand. It is clear that with their mail precedence the Peninsular and Oriental steamers can drive the competition of light cargoes out of their way, and they may regain their £300,000 loss. If they do, the country ought to have participated in their earnings, and should have put upon them a substantial handicap to prevent private ships from being wholly driven out of the race. It was in these circumstances that the contract of the 8th July was presented to us. Most fortunate was it that Parliament required to see and confirm this contract, for it was strangely imperfect, and has already been substituted by a second contract of the 1st August, issued last Saturday. After the remarks of the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Rathbone) I will simply remark that the first or abandoned contract left unregulated the whole of the mail service outward from England, and the whole of the homeward service—heavy and light—in the Shanghai, Calcutta and Point de Galle sections. The new contract, after we pointed out these strange omissions, does contain time regulations, but unsatisfactory ones. It, in fact, appoints the present time-table rules which are not a part of the old contract, but hitherto have been merely variable times fixed by the Postmaster General, and it makes them in the future fixed times by con tract. The disadvantages of the change will be understood, when I mention that the old contract fixed the times of voyages at 11 knots from Brindisi to Alexandria, and on other routes at 10 knots westward of Egypt, and 9½ knots eastward. All this is very moderate when we recollect that vessels from Liverpool to New York average 12 knots in a moderate passage. The new contract fixes no such speed, but, in fact, lessens it to under 9½ knots for the whole distance, by making the variable time-tables of the Post Office the fixed conditions of the contract. Now, these time-tables were more constructed in the convenience of the vessels as cargo and passenger ships than as mails, for they did not give uniform times of voyages to and fro, but allowed from 10 to 43 hours' difference in various routes so as to suit the requirements of mercantile adventure with which the Post Office had nothing to do. And this consideration to the Company, which had crept into the time-tables, is now made unchangeable by the new contract. It is true that, compared with the former time-tables, there is a saving of 24 hours to India; but much more than this could have been obtained by a proper application and reasonable construction of the old contract. The Khedive has lately entered into a Convention with England for hastening the transit across the Isthmus of Suez, and under this the 50 hours occupied by the heavy mail might have been largely reduced. It is quite clear that a proper use of the railway must gain, at least, two days over the Canal. By that route three days are required from Alexandria to Port Said, while 24 hours would be ample for the heavy mail from Southampton; as, in point of fact, 17 hours only are now given to the light mail from Brindisi, the actual time of transit being 10 hours. Take it as you like, the mail could be sent two days quicker by rail than it could be sent in the detour by the Canal. To speak generally, then, Her Majesty's mails are sacrificed for cargo and passengers. This is unjustifiable with the enormous sum of £430,000, which we are in the future to pay for them. The remission of £20,000, or £24,000, is nothing at all in comparison with the advantages which might have been derived by a better administration of the old contract. But what I complain of is, that the now contract stereotypes all the errors of administration into it, and renders it impossible till 1880 to obtain better terms for the public. Looking at the matter in its general relations, there are two views—one a departmental, and the other a national aspect. Let us first take the departmental one. We find, at the present moment, private merchant steamers making their runnings much quicker than the mail vessels; and it is certain that, if there were now no subsidy, we could get mails carried faster than the contract time, for the mails are lagging behind cargo. By this contract you aggravate the errors of a past administration, and you are content to take a low saving of £20,000, when in all probability, by their own showing, the change may gain to the Company at least ten times as much. Now, look at the national point of view. You are allowing this heavily subsidized Company to commit a crushing injustice to the unsubsidized mercantile navy trading to the East. With its mail privileges in the Canal and heavy subsidy, the Company can carry light and precious freights at great advantage over other steamship owners. The probable result will be that the latter will have to alter the fast ships, which they have constructed for the Canal traffic, and run slower ships for heavy cargo. And when your action results in this change, the year 1880 will be upon you, and you may have to renew your mail contract on its present exorbitant terms. The contract of 1867 was a bad one for the country, and now this new contract tends still further to clog the development of free trade in steam to the East, by intensifying the competition of an impolitic monopoly. The small saving of £20,000 to the Revenue is as nothing, compared with the present and prospective evils of a subsidized competition in a new route to the East. It was this consideration that induced the late Government, when I was Postmaster General, to demand some substantial reduction of the subsidy—our amount being £60,000, while the present Government is content with one-third. The policy of the Post Office for the future ought to be to have no highly subsidized mail contracts. We have before us an example to-day of the new contract for the West India mail service, which I had arranged before leaving office. Formerly, that was carried on at a loss of £110,000 per annum. The new contract is substantially at the price paid to the Post Office for the letters carried, and, after the first year or two, may result in a small gain, instead of loss. And, except at some out of the way small ports, this method of securing sea mails at the postage carried may readily be adopted for the future. Probably, it could be for the East, if we do not by this bad new contract drive competition out of the field by the year 1880. The mail subsidies of the Post Office have not promoted, but largely injured, the progress of navigation. Look at any of the modern improvements in steam vessels—iron ships, screw propellers, or compound engines. These have not arisen within the great subsidized Companies, but external to them. Subsidies promote conservatism in navigation—free competition leads to reforms and improvements. Now, why I particularly object to this contract is, that I fear it stands much in the way of the future and speedy abolition of the subsidy system in the Post Office. It intensifies the monopoly of a heavily subsidized Company, and tends to perpetuate itself by the pressure of an undue competition. When this contract was entered into, in 1867, the Suez Canal was rapidly in course of completion; and yet this Company, and the Government of the day, deliberately entered into arrangements for upwards of 10 years to go in the old way under a subsidy which is huge in amount. Now, the Company desire to adopt a route which they refused to believe in then, and drop their subsidy by a trivial sum in order that they may be allowed to travel on the same line as competing steamers which have arisen because that route was free from their formidable rival. I contend that this is unwise, departmentally and nationally, unless the terms of the subsidy are largely reduced. As this is not the case in the present contract, which is practically a now one, I will vote for the Amendment, which refuses to approve it during the present Session.

said that the Peninsular and Oriental Company offered to accelerate the the mails by 24 hours, and to give the public £24,000 a-year on the condition that they should have the same trading facilities as other companies. The request was one which he could not but consider as perfectly reasonable.

believed the question to be a very simple one; it really amounted to this—whether for 12 months at all events, and possibly for five years, the public should suffer a loss of £24,000 and the mails be delayed 24 hours, simply because some private companies might otherwise be interfered with. The question was precisely the same as that which had been brought forward last year in respect to the Transatlantic mail. He should vote for the Motion with the object of getting the mails delivered earlier.

said, that the question was really whether an entirely new trade should be thrown open to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and whether in carrying on that trade they should receive aid and subsidy from the Government. Under the present contract they might, if they liked, use either London or Liverpool instead of Southampton, and he did not, therefore, regard the compensation offered by the Company as anything like adequate to the advantage they would receive. He should vote for the Amendment.

said, he thought it would be better that the House should confirm the present contract. He was a Member of the Committee of 1864, which looked carefully into the question, and he also took part in the debate of 1868 when the original contract was adopted. What the House ought to appreciate was this, that when the contract was settled, there was not the smallest idea of the route through the Suez Canal being available for any purpose whatever. That, however, was now practically the sole route to the East, and therefore they had to deal with an entirely different state of circumstances. This fact ought to be taken into consideration, and although he regretted the original contract, yet as he had heard from the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary to the Treasury that a saving to the public of from £20,000 to £30,000 a-year would be effected, besides other advantages, he approved of the confirmation of the agreement at the present time.

in rising to move—

"That, having regard to the importance of the changes in the constitution of the Dublin University, and the period at which the draft of the proposed Queen's Letter has been laid upon the Table of this House, it is desirable that before they are finally sanctioned, a fuller opportunity should be afforded for their consideration than is possible during the present Session."

said, that the managing body of Trinity College had prepared the draft of a Letter to be submitted to Her Majesty for her approval, making certain changes in the constitution and system of the College. The proposed statute was, indeed, very fully discussed in the Senate of Dublin University, but it was not laid on the Table of that House until the 9th of July; and it was to be presumed that the object of laying it on the Table at all was to enable it to be properly discussed in that House. From the Answer given by the Government to a Question which he had put to them on that subject on the 23rd of April he had understood, as the public out-of-doors also understood, that that House as well as the Senate of the University would have a full opportunity of discussing that matter. The effect of the Bill introduced in a previous Session by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) for abolishing religious tests in the Dublin University had changed the whole relation of that University to the Crown and Parliament, and it would be unwise in the Government now to force on the issuing of that Letter without giving the House an opportunity of considering it. What they had to consider was whether the Queen's Letter would introduce such changes into the Dublin University as would make it a national institution. He contended that it would not, and that that result was not likely soon to be realized. No change would really make Dublin University a national University which did not provide in some way for Roman Catholics receiving education there such as they were willing to accept. There was no attempt whatever in the Queen's Letter to achieve that desirable object, and that was a sufficient reason to condemn it. He contended that this Letter ought to be delayed until full time was given for its consideration, and until those who were interested in it had had the opportunity of submitting their views in regard to its proposals. The question was one of the very greatest importance to Ireland, and he hoped the House what endorse what he had submitted.

seconded the Motion. He admitted that the subject dealt with by the Queen's Letter was a difficult one; but there was nothing insuperable connected with it, nor would it be impossible to grapple with it successfully if proper time were taken for consideration.

said, that no doubt the draft charter was only laid upon the Table in July; but there had been many opportunities afforded for the matter to have been brought under the consideration of the House if hon. Members were anxious to do so. Even on Saturday last at 2 o'clock, the hon. and learned Member had a fair opportunity of discussing the matter, but neither he nor the hon. Member for Tralee (the O'Donoghue) had availed himself of that opportunity. The hon. and learned Member for Limerick and the hon. Gentleman who seconded his Motion rather exaggerated the importance and purport of the document which would, if acted upon, simply and solely carry out the legislation of the last Session of the last Parliament. There was nothing in the proposed Queen's Letter which would in any way debar any hon. Member who looked at the question from a denominational point of view from bringing it forward next Session.

resumed: The hon. and learned Member for Limerick had himself admitted that the University of Dublin occupied a peculiar position—that under the terms of its original charter power was given to change its constitution in a much easier way than that of Oxford or Cambridge could be altered. The form of charter before the House had been adopted by the Senate of the University after full consideration of many plans which were submitted to them. Let them suppose this letter to be issued, what would be the result? Merely this—that a particular change would be made for the present. There was no necessary finality about it. If it were found that the new system did not work satisfactorily it could be altered at any future period. Considering therefore, that with regard to the abolition of tests, the Queen's Letter merely carried out recent legislation, and with regard to the constitution of the new Governing Body of the University, it might be altered next year if it was found not to work well, he thought the opportunities for its consideration were all that those most interested in the subject could desire.

supported the Motion in no spirit of hostility to an institution of which he was proud. He declined, however, to sacrifice the educational interests of Ireland to what he regarded as the selfish interests of a small and select Governing Body.

resumed: He would suggest that only that part of the Queen's Letter which would abolish tests should be acted upon, and that the residue of the new scheme should be reserved for future consideration.

said, he could not allow the debate to close without joining in the protest which had been made against the intended ratification of the proposed draft charter. He also protested against the argument of the Chief Secretary for Ireland, that the passing of the Appropriation Bill, introduced at the end of the Session, afforded a reasonable opportunity for the discussion of such an important question as this. That it was impossible to discuss it that evening was evident from the proceedings of the last quarter of an hour during which two attempts had been made to stifle discus sion, attempts which had been aided by Members of the Government who had retired from the House immediately before the last Count and had returned when it was unsuccessful. He was glad, however, to learn from the Chief Secretary that this draft charter had no character of finality about it—that, in fact, it settled nothing, and that it could not be urged as an argument against proposing further changes next year or the year after. Considering the character thus given to it by the Chief Secretary he hardly knew what was its object or why it should be pressed forward with such determined haste, but he wished to assure the House that it did nothing for the Catholics of Ireland; that it did not improve their condition in any appreciable way; and that no greater delusion could be entertained than the supposition that its adoption would in any way whatsoever, add to the national character of the University of Dublin.

remarked that the Queen's Letter would not prevent this subject being brought fully under the consideration of Parliament next Session. He should not approve of this scheme, which was imperfect, as a final measure of re-organization, but he regarded it as merely a basis for further reform. ["Divide!"] As it appeared that he was not to be heard he would move the adjournment of the debate.