asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether it is, as reported, true that an attempt which nearly proved successful has been lately made by some of the boys from the training ship "Lion" to sink Her Majesty's Ironclad "Caledonia," lying off Devonport, on board which ship they were temporarily berthed; if so, if he would explain to the House under what circumstances the act was committed; if not, what caused the ship to be in a sinking condition; if the boys have been in a state of insubordination on board the ship; and whether, seeing that more than one training-ship has been recently wilfully destroyed, it is not possible to find accommodation for them in hulks without risking the destruction of iron-clad ships which form part of the effective naval forces of the country?

Sir, I am happy to be able to inform the hon. Gentleman, in answer to the first part of his Question, that no attempt was made by any boys from the training ship Lion to sink the Caledonia, and no insubordination has been manifested by these boys. A certain amount of water came into the ship through an act of inadvertence on the part of an able seaman who had charge of the tank-room, and who turned the wrong lever. The water was soon pumped out, the ship was never in a sinking condition, and no damage was done. With respect to the second part, the Caledonia is placed upon the list of harbour ships, and does not form part of the naval forces of the country available for service.

asked the Secretary of State for War, If the lately granted increase of pay to acting non-commissioned officers in the Royal Artillery has been suddenly stopped without any explanation; and, also if the recruitment of gunners for that regiment is in a satisfactory condition?

, in reply, said, the lately granted increase of pay referred to had not been stopped, but it had been suspended in order that the number of those entitled to it might be apportioned to each battery. The recruiting had been in a very unsatisfactory condition with respect to gunners in the Royal Artillery. They were now nearly 1,500 deficient, and he had taken steps to obtain, if possible, recruits from the Militia. He was happy to say that at present the recruiting was in a better condition than it was before.

asked the Under Secretary for the Colonies, Whether it is true, as stated in the "Times" of Tuesday last, that all, or all but one, of the Fenian prisoners undergoing sentence in Western Australia made good their escape from that colony on Easter Monday in an American whaler?

The report, Sir, to which the hon. Gentleman refers is substantially correct. I may state for the information of the House that there were in all 10 military convicts in Western Australia. Of these, two were out on ticket of leave, leaving eight in prison; and of those six have effected their escape. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman wishes to know the names of the persons who have escaped. ["Yes, yes!"] They are Robert Cranston, Thomas Darragh, James Wilson, Michael Harrington, Thomas Hassett, and Martin Hogan.

asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the meeting of the Suez Canal Company which he stated in April would be held in the course of May, has been held; and, whether the arrangements referred to by him on the 5th day of May as proposed by Colonel Stokes and M. Lesseps, or any other arrangements for the representation of this Country in the administration of the Company have been decided upon; and, if so, whether he will state to the House the nature of those arrangements?

, in reply, said, he had understood that the Suez Canal Company would hold a meeting in May, but a meeting had not yet been held. It appeared, however, that a meeting had been called for the 14th of June, and that subsequently M. Lesseps had given notice for a special meeting on the 27th of June, for the purpose of considering proposals that had to be made, He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) proposed, on Monday next, to ask for leave to bring in a Bill to make provisions with respect to the shares in the capital of the Suez Canal Company, and he hoped to be in a condition to say then, or at least before that Bill was read a second time, what would be the arrangements for the representation of this country in the administration of the Company.

asked, Whether the Government were in a position to state what arrangements were to be made with regard to the proposed surtax?

, in reply, said, he hoped they would be able to lay upon the Table the correspondence on the subject both of the surtax and of representation.

I wish, Sir, to put a Question to the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury in reference to the recent negotiations in Turkish Affairs, of which I have given the right hon. Gentleman private Notice; and perhaps the House would allow me in explanation of the Question to say a very few words. It will, no doubt, be in the recollection of the House that before the Whitsun holidays it was stated in this and in the other House of Parliament that the Note known as the Berlin Memorandum had not been presented to the Turkish Government, and that there was reason to suppose it would not be presented. I understand that up to the present time that Note has not been presented, and it may perhaps not be unreasonable now to presume that there exists no intention on the part of the three Powers to present it. I believe that in "another place" the Earl of Derby stated that the proposals of those Powers not having been formally communicated to the Porte the document in question could not be considered as a public document, and that he would therefore be unable to lay it upon the Table of the House. Now, I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, now that this chapter in the negotiations is apparently con- cluded, that is still the opinion of Her Majesty's Government; or whether they are of opinion that the time has now arrived when it would be in their power, and might not be inopportune, to lay upon the Table some Papers and afford the House some opportunity of forming an opinion as to the course which has hitherto been pursued by the Government with regard to these negotiations. I do not forget that on a former occasion the right hon. Gentleman stated that the position of affairs was critical, and I am sure that I have no desire to press the Government for any explanations which might cause them any embarrassment in the present condition of affairs; but, at the same time, it seems to me that Her Majesty's Government might be willing, and possibly anxious, to afford to the House some opportunity of becoming aware of the course which they have hitherto pursued, and of giving them some explanation as to their policy and as to the state of our relations upon this subject with the other Powers of Europe. I do not believe there exists in the country any distrust of the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government; but, at the same time, I think we must feel that, at a moment when it has been considered necessary by Her Majesty's Government to make a considerable demonstration of the naval power of this country in support of the policy of the Government, we are in a state of somewhat unusual uncertainty, not only as to the details, but also as to the main scope and aim of the policy which is being pursued by Her Majesty's Government. With these few words of explanation, therefore, I wish to put the Question to Her Majesty's Government, Whether it is their intention to lay upon the Table of the House any Papers in relation to the recent negotiations on Turkish affairs?

Mr. Speaker, I think it is quite natural that the noble Lord should have made this inquiry of Her Majesty's Government, and that it is one which is perfectly consistent with his duty as Leader of the Opposition. I can assure him that as far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, they have no wish to exercise any unnecessary reserve towards the House, nor are there any documents which they have sanctioned that they would object to place upon the Table of the House. But there are interests superior even to the natural and justifiable curiosity of Parliament, and even to the feelings of a Ministry; and when those interests take the form of the maintenance of peace—the maintenance of honourable peace—I am sure the House will not unnecessarily press the Government on the matter. At the same time, I am perfectly ready to give such information as I can to the noble Lord. It is very true that when I last addressed the House in reference to the Berlin Memorandum, I informed the House that that Memorandum had not been presented to the Porte, and I expressed a hope that it might not be presented. I believe I am quite authorized in now saying that the Berlin Memorandum has been withdrawn. It has been notified to us that its consideration is adjourned sine die. No doubt the remarkable events which have occurred at Constantinople would in a great measure account for that withdrawal, because already the Porte—although that Note has not been presented—has made suggestions which have anticipated more than one important point expressed in the Memorandum. And I think that when I refer to the fact that the Porte itself has spontaneously offered an armistice, that alone might be a sufficient reason for a considerable pause in the presentation of that document, even if that which I look upon as a more satisfactory result than the postponement of its presentation had not occurred. At the same time, I wish to remark that although we felt it to be our duty not to give our sanction to that diplomatic instrument, that notification on the part of Her Majesty's Government was received in no unfriendly spirit by any of the Powers that we had to address. Quite the contrary. Great regret was expressed as to the course which we felt it our duty to take, and a lively desire was also expressed that we should reconsider our decision on a step which they believed to be important to the interests of Europe. At this moment I think I am justified in saying that there is more than one point on which Her Majesty's Government are acting with the other Great Powers, and acting, I hope, successfully. We have concurred entirely with the other Powers, or rather the other Powers may be said to have concurred entirely with us; but, at any rate, there is a complete understanding between us and the other Great Powers that there should no undue pressure put upon the new Sovereign of Turkey; that he and his counsellors should have time to mature their measures and the policy which they mean to pursue. Then, again—which I look upon as not of less importance—we have added our representations to those certainly of Austria and Russia, and I believe also of France, and I have little doubt that at this moment the representations of all the Great Powers are made to impress Servia with the importance of a temperate conduct on her part. I hope we have impressed those counsels of moderation on Servia not unsuccessfully. There is a third point on which all the Great Powers have agreed to act, if not simultaneously, yet unanimously—namely, as to the recognition of the new Sultan. In our opinion, it was a matter of great importance that that recognition should be accorded without waiting for those delays which, under the circumstances, the usual diplomatic etiquette must have produced, because on that immediate recognition the Ambassador of the Queen can exercise his privilege of personal audience and conference with the Sultan. I believe the credentials of Sir Henry Elliot have been received from Her Majesty, and will be despatched to him this evening. I may also mention, with regard to the recognition of the Sultan, that that recognition has not been confined merely to the Great Powers of Europe, but I may say there certainly has been a general feeling of adhesion from all sections, creeds, and races among the subjects of the Porte. I think it is very important that the heads of all the Christian communities have personally congratulated, or have requested permission personally to congratulate, the Sultan on his accession to the Throne, and to express their confidence in the policy which he will pursue. I do not, of course, wish to exaggerate the importance of such an incident, but I think it may have a beneficial influence over the insurgents, and will certainly not diminish but rather increase the effect of the counsels which I hope all the Great Powers of Europe are giving the insurgents to avail themselves of the opportunity which now seems to be offered of insuring the pacification of Europe. There is one other point on which I wish to remark. It is not my habit, and I hope it never will be, to trouble the House with anything which is personal to myself; but, as in the present case that personal reference is mixed up with high considerations of policy, therefore I trust the House will pardon it. I understand that there appeared in the journals of Vienna yesterday a letter bearing my signature, which commented freely upon the present political situation of Europe, dilated on the intentions and the policy of England, and spoke with unpardonable disrespect of a Great Power which is an ally of our Sovereign. I therefore only wish to take this the earliest and most public opportunity—inasmuch as that letter has been reproduced in some English journals—of announcing that the letter is a forgery.

The right hon. Gentleman not having definitely stated it, I wish to ask, whether the Government anticipate that they will be able to lay on the Table the Papers relating to the recent negotiations?

I was remiss, perhaps, upon the point, as I wished it to be inferred from my observations that I should imagine that eventually there would be no objection to lay on the Table, with hardly any omission, all the Papers relating to these transactions. But I think at this moment that, the Papers to which the noble Lord refers being necessarily of a controversial character, and it being our desire to maintain as much as possible a complete good understanding with the Powers which are virtually acting in concert, the appearance of those Papers should at least to delayed.

, in rising to move for a Select Committee to inquire into the Petition of Charles Frederic Henwood, naval architect, of 110, Cannon Street, in the City of London, said, he thought the evidence he should adduce would reveal a state of things which demanded inquiry. In his Petition the petitioner stated that he

"Is by profession a naval architect and practical shipbuilder, and was trained under his father, an eminent naval architect and master shipbuilder in Her Majesty's Service; and has been concerned in the construction of upwards of 70,000 tons of shipping, comprising wooden and iron armour-clad ships of war for the Admiralty and for foreign Governments; and has held the responsible position of chief constructor and manager of an extensive shipbuilding establishment; and all the vessels designed and built under your petitioner fulfilled their estimated results, whereby his reputation as a naval architect and practical shipbuilder was established, and he was well known and acknowledged by the profession and the public Press as an eminent constructor and shipbuilder. That in the years of 1866 and 1867 your petitioner invented plans whereby the obsolete but sound and strong line-of-battle ships might efficiently, promptly, and economically be converted into armour-plated, sea-going turret ships, to supply an urgent and temporary demand for increasing the number and power of the iron-clad Navy; and thereby also effect a saving of several millions sterling in the naval expenditure of the country, which plans received the approval of eminent naval officers and of Mr. Isaac Watts, C.B., formerly Chief Constructor of Her Majesty's Navy, the designer of the Warrior, Achilles, and Agincourt, and of most of the line-of-battle ships proposed for conversion. That your petitioner's plans were rejected by the Board of Admiralty as being unsuitable for Her Majesty's Service; but your petitioner was not informed, and did not at that time know, of any other alleged reason or cause for such rejection. That your petitioner has now in his possession official copies of the Admiralty Minutes and the Reports of the then professional officers of the Admiralty, made concerning your petitioner's plans furnished to him by the Solicitor of the Admiralty."

He (Colonel Beresford) was prepared to show that the designs of the petitioner were rejected because the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed) then Chief Constructor of the Navy, together with Mr. Barnaby, the present Chief Constructor, had evidently determined that no designs except their own should be acted upon, and there was no doubt Mr. Henwood's professional prospects had seriously suffered in consequence.

rose to Order. He hoped the hon. and gallant Member would speak up, as he could not be heard on that (the Opposition) side of the House. As far as he could understand, the hon. and gallant Member was making serious aspersions on his (Mr. Reed's) character.

said, he was speaking as loud as he could. Had his views been honestly carried out, Mr. Henwood believed the necessary improvement in the state of things would have been effected at an expenditure of one-third less than was actually incurred. The petitioner went on to say that—

"From such Reports and other official documents your petitioner finds that the designs for ships represented to the Board of Admiralty as those of your petitioner were not the designs or plans proposed by your petitioner, but were in fact altered and thereby made absurd and ridiculous, and such as no experienced constructor (in his senses) would have put forward. And your petitioner agrees with the officially expressed opinion given in these Reports that such ships erroneously alleged to be those prepared by your petitioner, would, if adopted, 'have led to wholesale loss and disaster' in Her Majesty's Navy, as subsequently happened by the capsizing of the ill-fated Captain. That your petitioner finds that greater quantities and heavier weights were wrongly substituted for his own; in fact, greater quantities and heavier weights than were adopted in and for similar sized ships for Her Majesty's Service, in consequence of which overloading by increased and unnecessary weights the freeboard of the ships, as proposed by your petitioner, was greatly reduced, and the stability dangerously diminished, as similarly took place in the construction of the Captain. That the freeboard of the design submitted by your petitioner in 1866, embodying a patent invention, No. 472, 1866, of the well-known eminent engineer, Mr. Robert Napier, of Glasgow, was 11 feet in height above the water, which design was for one of the medium-sized line-of-battle ships, but in the following year (1867) your petitioner sent in a design for one of the larger ships, the Duncan, and in this design, finding that the necessary stability could be obtained with a freeboard of 4ft. 5½in., he dispensed with the patent plan of Mr. Napier. That the stability of the Duncan, as designed and proposed by your petitioner was at the least 11,232 'foot tons'(meaning moment of stability), with a freeboard of 4ft. 5½in. That the design represented to the Admiralty as that proposed by your petitioner for the Duncan had a freeboard of 3ft. 6in., with a stability of only 7,222 'foot tons,' such being practically as dangerous a ship as the Captain. That the stability of the Captain, as completed and sent to sea with a freeboard of 6ft. 4½in., was not more than 7,100 'foot tons,' although had that ship been built as designed she would not have capsized, inasmuch as she would have been possessed of 60 per cent greater stability than as actually constructed. That it has been publicly urged as against your petitioner's plans that if the Captain, with 6ft. 4½in. of freeboard, was a dangerous ship, the Duncan, with only 4ft. 5½in. of freeboard, was a much more dangerous ship, the other facts being suppressed—viz., that the Duncan had 9ft. greater breadth of beam than the Captain, and that the stability of the Duncan, as designed and proposed by your petitioner, was just 60 per cent greater than that of the Captain as constructed and sent to sea. That your petitioner further finds in these Reports groundless allegations, from what cause he knows not, against his professional ability and character—viz., 'that it was impossible to attach any confidence to the judgments or calculations of your petitioner,' and further, 'that it would be madness to undertake the conversion in accordance with Henwood's plans,' meaning the plans with 3ft. 6in. of freeboard, and 7,222 'foot tons' stability; and that 'these plans' 'had no weight whatever from the known antecedents of their author,' thus insinuating that your petitioner's antecedents were so bad as to render any plans of his worthless."

[The hon. and gallant Member here read the opinion of Mr. Isaac Watts, formerly Chief Constructor of the Navy, as to the competency of the petitioner as a naval architect. Mr. Isaac Watts' testimony was of a most complimentary character. He also read a number of documents, including certain recommendations sent to the Institute of Naval Architects, of which the hon. Member for Pembroke was the then Secretary, to prove that Mr. Henwood was a gentleman of high reputation and eminence as a shipbuilder.] The hon. and gallant Member then continued:—Since he (Colonel Beresford) had taken up the case, all persons connected with the shipping interest with whom he had conversed said with one voice that Mr. Henwood was a man of integrity and honour; but the result of this misrepresentation was that the Board of Admiralty, to whom Mr. Henwood was favourably known, was misled, and induced to believe that his plans were "so faulty and ill-considered" that no satisfactory conversion of ships could be made on the plans he had suggested. The petitioner then stated—

"That in consequence of the adoption of figures and calculations alleged to have been submitted by your petitioner, but which were never submitted by your petitioner, which he is in a position to prove by official documents, the reputation of your petitioner as a naval architect was, and still is, seriously injured in the eyes of foreign Governments, shipowners, and others, who previously to the Reports upon your petitioner's plans had the greatest confidence in his ability, whereby your petitioner has suffered most seriously; and further, that in consequence of the said Reports comparisons have been made officially and otherwise with your petitioner's designs and that of the Captain, with which your petitioner had had nothing whatever to do; and, finally, that your petitioner still continues in the belief, confirmed by the disaster which happened to the Captain, that your petitioner's designs were sound, and that had his figures been used conclusions so ridiculous and unfeasible could not have been arrived at."

The petitioner then asked the Admiralty for an inquiry, and quoted the case of Mr. G. H. Bovill, in 1853. That case was, briefly, that Mr. Bovill, having constructed some improved machinery, the officials connected with the Department for which it was intended, so damaged that machinery by putting stones and rubbish into it, that it was rejected. Mr. Bovill was fortunate in having in the House a brother who was a lawyer of great eminence, and who afterwards became a Judge, and, on his Motion, a Committee was granted, and the result was that the master miller was discharged, and two subordinates were reprimanded. The reference to that case was, perhaps, fortunate; at any rate, in this one all inquiry was refused. He would impress upon the House that in the Petition, and in discussing the case, it was necessary to remember that the indictment was not so much against Sir Spencer Robinson, as he was a non-professional man, and obliged to accept the Reports made to him. The petitioner wound up by stating—

"That your Petitioner, by reason of the matters herein alleged, all of which he is prepared to prove by official documentary evidence, has suffered, and still suffers, great prejudice and injury in his reputation and profession, and consequent loss of practice.

"That your Petitioner's sole means of livelihood is his professional character and reputation, which in the manner aforesaid have been wrongfully assailed, prejudiced and injured.

"And your Petitioner prays that your honourable House will be graciously pleased to cause a full and impartial investigation to be made into the matters hereinbefore alleged, in order that your Petitioner may have an opportunity of establishing the truth of the same, and that justice may be done, and your Petitioner relieved from the prejudice which has been created against him by the reason of the aforesaid circumstances."

The hon. and gallant Gentleman concluded by moving for a Select Committee.

, in seconding the Motion, confessed he knew nothing of Mr. Henwood or of his case. He felt, however, that the right of Petition to that House was one which ought not to be tampered with, and that when a question arose between a powerless individual and a powerful Government or Party, it was the duty of independent Members, however unpopular the course might be, to vindicate that right. In this case, here was a Petition presented in the exercise of that right, making a distinct charge of wrong against certain officials connected with the Admiralty, and claiming a distinct inquiry. The House, he might add, had received the Petition and ordered it to be printed. The charge was, that those officials had purposely misrepresented certain calculations and plans at a critical period of our naval history. If true, it was a grave charge indeed; if untrue, in his opinion, Mr. Henwood not only deserved severe censure, but ought to be punished for making accusations of so false and scandalous a nature. The House itself had a right to demand that the First Lord of the Admiralty should vindicate his Department by a full inquiry. The right hon. Gentleman ought to be sans peur, sans reproche, and on this occasion show that he was sans peur by consenting to this inquiry, and he would then also be sans reproche.

said, he had not risen at the moment because he thought the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed), who had been personally alluded to, might have deemed it right to address some observations to the House in reply to the remarks of his hon. and gallant Friend behind him. As, however, the hon. Gentleman had not done so, he (Mr. Hunt) wished to state himself his views on the subject. The circumstances to which the attention of the House had been called were briefly these—In 1866, it being the desire of the Admiralty to convert some of our old men-of-war into more modern instruments of war as ironclads, Mr. Henwood sent in proposals and plans for that purpose. Those proposals were seriously entertained, and had considerable attention given to them. It was the duty of the then Controllers of the Navy, Messrs. Reed, Barnaby, and Sir Spencer Robinson, to consider those plans and to make Reports upon them, and they reported upon them accordingly to the Department. Now, those Reports were always confidential Reports, and it was desirable that they should always remain so, for proposals submitted to the Board were frequently very numerous, and it was important that they should be investigated and reported upon freely without fear of consequences. The petitioner stated in his Petition that copies of the Reports in question were furnished to him by the Solicitor to the Admiralty, and he (Mr. Hunt) had no means of contradicting the statement, as that Gentleman (Mr. Bristow) was now dead. He, however, thought it to be a very strong statement, and had therefore directed search to be made in that department, and it was only right to say that no trace could be found of any such document having been furnished. It was impossible for him to say the statement was not true, but it certainly was an extraordinary one. He was of opinion that it must have got out through the inquiry made into the loss of the Captain; but whether so or not, it would be very unfortunate if these Reports were ever allowed to be made public. His hon. and gallant Friend, in dealing with the case, had entered into a great deal of technical matter, of which he (Mr. Hunt) made no complaint; but the main charge was, that Mr. Henwood had submitted certain designs to the officers of the Admiralty, and that they had reported on plans which were not his, and had thus deceived the Board. But what was the nature of the passage from the Blue Book which he had quoted in support of the charge? It was to the effect that the quantities and weights rested upon by Mr. Henwood were not those which their experience told them ought to be estimated, for they supplied those weights and quantities which alone would give the plans any value. That was the answer to the charge. Mr. Henwood said that certain quantities and weights should form the basis of the calculation, and the Controllers said that, according to Mr. Henwood's own plans, those quantities and weights would not suffice. They therefore put before the Admiralty the quantities and weights which would be necessary if his plans were adopted. It had been alleged that these weights and quantities had been put forward by Mr. Henwood. But that was a mistake, as was clearly shown by a printed Minute on the subject issued by the Admiralty, and which he (Mr. Hunt) held in his hand. To it was appended a note by the gentleman who made the calculations, explaining that the investigation had been made independently of the weights and quantities given by Mr. Henwood, his plans only being followed. Thus, in point of fact, the officials in the Constructor's Department adopted the weights and quantities which they thought ought to be taken instead of those proposed by Mr. Henwood. They represented that, with those weights, the immersion of the ship would be greater than Mr. Henwood thought it would be, and they advised the Admiralty not to adopt his plan. This was the main matter complained of by Mr. Henwood. With respect to the question of freeboard, Mr. Henwood had himself altered his proposals. First, he proposed a freeboard of 3ft. 6in., and subsequently freeboards of 4ft. 4in., 4ft. 5in., 4ft. 3½in., and 4ft. 6in. The last freeboard proposed by Mr. Henwood was, he thought, one of 4ft. At different times he had also proposed different weights. He (Mr. Hunt) confessed that he was perfectly satisfied with the explanations furnished to him by the heads of departments in the Admiralty, and for that reason he saw no public grounds for the appointment of a Select Committee. He had great faith in the present head of the department, who had joined in the representations made to the Admiralty, as well as in those with whom he was associated. He therefore saw no reason whatever, on public grounds, for inquiry into a matter which had been conclusively settled, but if the hon. Member for Pembroke thought that such an inquiry was necessary to vindicate his character he would not oppose it, though he must add that it was not at all required, and he trusted that if the hon. Member took the same view his hon. and gallant Friend would withdraw his Motion.

thought the First Lord had exercised a wise discretion in opposing the Motion. He had listened with great attention to the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark (Colonel Beresford), and he submitted to the House that no case whatever had been made out to justify their interference. Nay, he would even go further, and say that in his opinion Mr. Henwood had no substantial grievance of which any Court or public Assembly could take cognizance. It was perfectly true that these designs, which on the face of them did not appear very likely, were disapproved and condemned unanimously by the officers of the Admiralty, but successive Governments had upheld the action of those officers; and the question which the House had to consider was not whether the officers acted wisely, but whether the House itself was prepared to act as a sort of Court of Review in a matter of this character. The House was not an Assembly of naval architects, and was not in a position to investigate a question of the kind. Inventors must expect their designs to be criticized, and if every critic was to be brought before the House of Commons, or before a Court of Law, the House and the Courts of Law in this country would have very little time to attend to anything else. The hon. and gallant Member for Southwark kept out of view altogether the fact that Mr. Henwood had endeavoured to vindicate his reputation elsewhere, he having first taken legal proceedings against the Admiralty printer and against the hon. Member for Pembroke. The Courts of Law, however, would not entertain the matter, and now Mr. Henwood asked the House of Commons to waste its time in making an inquiry. Mr. Henwood in the first page of his pamphlet accused his (Mr. Baxter's) gallant friend Sir Spencer Robinson and his hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed) not merely of making mistakes, but of dishonesty and corruption. What the Motion really demanded was, that that House should declare its conviction that it was true; but did any hon. Member of that House for a moment believe charges of that sort? He hoped his hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke would not think it worth his while to take any further notice of a pamphlet which was one of the most bombastic, foolish, and offensive documents he ever read.

said, he rose for the purpose of confirming the statement of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Baxter), and to express his regret that the subject had been brought before the House. He hoped the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark would withdraw the Motion, for in his opinion, the character of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Pembroke did not require vindication.

said, the pamphlet which had been referred to was undoubt- edly one of the most offensive and scurrilous documents ever published about public men. For that reason he had never taken any notice of it. The officials at the Admiralty, as guardians of the public interests, altered Mr. Henwood's weights, not improperly, but properly. They did their duty in accordance with their sense of responsibility, and he did not think a single Member of the House believed that the officers of the Admiralty improperly altered figures in documents. The case, in short, was entirely unworthy of that Assembly, and for that reason he would not take up their time. It was stated in the Petition that Mr. Watts, the former Chief Constructor of the Navy, spoke strongly in favour of Mr. Henwood's plan. It appeared, however, on inquiry, that Mr. Watts had only expressed a general opinion and had made no calculations. Consequently, that gentleman's opinion was as unsubstantial as that of any other person. His own reputation he felt, did not need the vindication of a Select Committee, and the reputation of the officers at the Admiralty stood quite as little in need of such investigation to prove that they had acted correctly.

only wished to add that he recollected being present at a former discussion upon the question, when the same allegations were made, and when the noble Lord the present First Commissioner of Works, then the Secretary to the Admiralty (Lord Henry Lennox) gave precisely the same satisfactory statement and reply as that which had now been put before him by the First Lord of the Admiralty. The calculations as to weight and quantities sent in by Mr. Henwood had, of course, to be submitted to proof by professional officers, and in their judgment they were found deficient in strength. When the defects were remedied the ship was found to be too much immersed, and hence the conclusions they arrived at that the proposal was bad; but that was a very different thing from altering and falsifying Henwood's figures, but of submitting them with what they thought indispensable corrections, and he did not think that the House was called upon to judge whether the professional advisers of the Department were right or wrong in the advice they gave to the Admiralty on this head. To do so would be to take away the responsibilities of public officers and public Departments, and lead to great mischief. He could not help thinking that if the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark had been better advised he never would have been induced to bring forward a motion which he (Mr. Samuda) hoped, after the explanation made, would be withdrawn.

said, he would, by leave, withdraw the Motion. ["No, no!"]

, in rising to call the attention of the House to the corporations of Yarmouth and Brading, in the Isle of Wight, said, he did so with the view of correcting some exaggerated and incorrect statements made with respect to these corporations by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke), in a speech which he recently made on unreformed corporations. The hon. Baronet had asserted that the town hall of Brading had an area of only 8 feet by 10 feet, and that the whole of the corporation funds were expended upon dinners. The real facts of the case, however, were that the town hall measured 30 feet by 15 feet, and that the expenses of the corporation only amounted to £9 13s., of which sum only £5 10s. was spent upon an annual dinner, the remainder of the funds of the corporation being expended in an unexceptionable manner. The hon. Baronet's statements with regard to Yarmouth were also altogether without foundation, and were indignantly denied by the corporation. The annual income of that borough, which amounted to £237, was applied to the repayment of a large debt which had been incurred for the construction of a breakwater, a large quay, and a pier, and it would be 200 years before the principal was paid off. Instead, therefore, of the members of the corporation embezzling or misappropriating monies which they held in trust for the public, the interest of the debt absorbed the whole of the available income from all sources, as was shown by Returns which had been made to the House since the speech of the hon. Baronet had been delivered. The actual expenses of the corporation did not exceed £15 per annum, and although there was an annual dinner, it cost the corporation nothing, the mayor having the privilege of paying for it himself. He trusted that he had clearly shown that the observations of the hon. Baronet with regard to these boroughs were not justified by the facts, and that the members of these ancient and loyal corporations were not guilty of the charges that had been brought against them. He also trusted that other corporations might be able to disprove some of the charges which had been made against them by the hon. Baronet in his recent speech to the House.

humorously complained of what he described as a "ferocious attack" which the hon. Baronet made upon an hon. Member who carried the Yarmouth bridge scheme—he (Mr. Clifford) being himself that hon. Member. It was very ungrateful in people to find fault with that bridge, seeing that it saved them a walk of several miles, and was otherwise a thing of great public advantage. He merely wished to corroborate the statements of the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight with reference to the proper disposal of the funds of the corporations in question, the members of which had been charged by the hon. Baronet with what amounted to little short of embezzlement.

was sorry that the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight had thought fit to bring the question before the House of Commons, instead of advising the members of the two corporations in whose interest he had spoken to rebut by evidence, if possible, before the Royal Commission which had been appointed the statements he made when moving for the appointment of the Commission in question. The Members of the Commission were, for the most part, Conservatives, and therefore presumably would have a due regard for the rights of property and the interests of ancient corporations, so that Yarmouth and Brading would probably have been safe in their hands. Matters affecting these corporations were important in and to the localities concerned, but the House could not be ex- pected to give much time or attention to them. He had, therefore, embodied his statement on the subject in a written document, which he intended to lay before the Commission, and it would then be competent for the corporations of Yarmouth and Brading to bring rebutting evidence. Briefly, his statement would contain stronger allegations as to the way in which the corporations in question conducted their business than he was in a position to make when moving for the Commission. The hon. Member for the Isle of Wight, while defending Yarmouth, had entered at some length upon a defence of the corporation of Brading, but nothing had been said as to the disposal of the corporate funds or the management of the corporate business, save what was, in his view, perfectly easy of disproof. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) denied they paid all the expenses of the town. The town hall had certainly been rebuilt, but it was still ridiculously small, and there was no evidence to show what had become of the revenues of £500 or £600 received during the last eight years. [Mr. Baillie Cochrane reminded the hon. Baronet that they had built a new town hall.] They had, however, got into debt. He also denied that he had said that any portion of the revenue of Yarmouth was embezzled, although he was ready to allow that persons with very tender consciences might think that his words were liable to that construction. What he had said was that a large sum of money seemed to have mysteriously disappeared every year, and he now repeated that statement. The evidence he intended to lay before the Commission would prove that the corporate officers were elected by private meetings; that the members of the Court Leet were cautioned on election not to make public statements as to the business that might come before them; that no authentic evidence was forthcoming as to the way in which the corporate funds were expended. The borough accounts were never seen, except by the members of the corporation, until they were presented to that House on the Motion of an hon. Member, and it was incorrect to say that they had annually audited and published their accounts. All the unreformed corporations printed their accounts for the use of the members, but in Yarmouth he had been unable to obtain a copy. The accounts might be audited by a member of the corporation, but certainly there was no public audit. But he was now forced, in consequence of the defence offered by the hon. Member, to make a more serious charge against the corporation of Yarmouth, which was that their accounts were fictitious. The accounts contained in the Return ordered by the House represented that during the last six years they had spent about £700 upon repairs of the harbour, and £146 in 1875 on new works, improvements, and maintenance. He had the evidence of persons well acquainted with Yarmouth harbour, and they declared that in the year 1875 nothing was done to the harbour beyond placing 100 tons of rough stone on the breakwater—thecost of which was £26. That was the only set-off he could find to the £146. The breakwater cost originally £560, and yet the corporation made out that they had spent £120 per year on an average of six years. Considering the defective condition of the breakwater, that, on the face of it, appeared to be a monstrous expenditure. Evidence would be forthcoming before the Commission to prove these facts, and, he believed he should be able to show the Commissioners a very much worse state of things than any one would gather from the remarks of the hon. Member. As, however, that evidence would involve points of detail which could not conveniently be discussed in the House, he could only again express his regret that the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight had raised the question in its present form, instead of bringing it in some shape before the Royal Commission.

—who had given Notice of his intention to move—

"That in the circumstances of the Country, it is necessary that sufficient provision should be made for two classes of soldiers, viz., men to enter the reserve after a short service at home, and long term men for general service including India,"

said, that the Rules of the House would not allow him to move his Resolution, but he wished again to refer to the subject in the hope that he might receive a satisfactory answer from the Secretary of State for War. The right hon. Gentle- man told him on a former occasion that he (Sir George Campbell) had brought the question forward several times before, and he confessed that he had done so, for the reason that he could not get any answer to his question from the right hon. Gentleman. He was satisfied from the inquiries that he had made that the present made of enlisting men for the Service was not successful. The right hon. Gentleman formerly said the subject was under consideration; and he (Sir George Campbell) hoped that some satisfactory conclusion had by this time been arrived at. The present made of recruiting was not successful, and was not likely to be successful, either for the purpose of obtaining an efficient Home Army and Reserve or for providing an efficient Army for India and the Colonies. The Home Army was not, either in regard to number or quality, what the country would wish to see it. Next year the short-service men would begin to go out of the Army, and there would then be a double flow from its ranks with an increased demand for men, and he did not see where the supply was to come from. He was told, and he believed truly, that they would not get a sufficient flow of men into the Home service, and thence into the Reserve, if they were liable to be sent to India. That point deserved the careful consideration of the Government. Another question was, whether the present system would supply a sufficient number of men to answer the requirements of the Indian Army. He was of opinion that it would not. He thought he was, under the circumstances, right in saying that the service of each individual soldier in India under the six years' enlistment system would not, on an average, exceed three years, which was not by any means a sufficient time to acclimatize him or to supply the wants of our Indian Empire. The fact was, that the six years' system was, he believed, good neither for the Home nor for the Indian Army, and that, besides men for Home service, sufficient inducements must be held out to men who were willing to make the Army their profession, which it was abundantly proved by official documents, were not now offered. A supply of long-service men was necessary for the purposes of India, and he thought India both ought and could bear the expenses which might be required in consequence. He hoped, there- fore, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War would be able to inform the House that he was prepared to carry out that which was set forth in his own Regulations, which directed that one-half of those who were recruited for the Army should be long-service men, and to explain how it was that he proposed to obtain long-service men for India. He (Sir George Campbell) had found the system the right hon. Gentleman was so anxious to recommend was neither more nor less than that already set forth in the Army Regulations, although he regretted to say they were not acted on, and that they were practically a dead letter. He had questioned his constituents as to whether they would be able to get artizans and men of that class, to join the Army under the existing system, and they always replied in the negative; but it might be possible to do so if men might enlist for Home service only.

said, he was not at all surprised that the hon. Gentleman should have reverted to the subject of his remarks, for it was one of great interest. He himself had already informed the hon. Gentleman that he was quite aware that it was extremely desirable that there should be a longer service in India than could generally be procured from short-service men. It was a subject which was under discussion between the War and India Offices, but he did not think he should be justified in stating at present what were the propositions which he had made with respect to it to the latter Department, although they were such as would, he believed, secure an adequate service of men who went to India. The object sought, he thought, would be obtained by the following provision—that those men who had already enlisted would not, of course, be held to any bargain but that into which they had entered, but there might be a system under which no man should serve less than five years in India, and as a general rule not more than eight; for medical evidence was emphatic on the point that that was as long as a man ought to be kept there if he were to be fit for the Reserve when he returned to this country. The hon. Gentleman, as an outsider, thought he saw more of the game than those who were immediately mixed up in it, and, indeed, almost everybody was ready to furnish him with a plan to make an Army; but he could not see how a long-service Army for India was to be provided from a short-service Army for England. He believed the connection between the Army in England and the Army in India was essential to the character of both, and assisted mainly in keeping up the glorious associations of the Service, in which sentiment was found to have very great effect. The hon. Gentleman had spoken of the Army of boys they were getting, and he (Mr. Hardy) could only say he was extremely glad to get them. He should be very glad to get a superior class of men, but he could not get them by compulsion; he could only get them by their volunteering, and they did not volunteer, and he was afraid they would not get very much for the Army except from the class which did usually volunteer. They might call them boys; but, looking back to the description given by the Duke of Wellington, they would find that they were no worse, at all events, than those the noble Duke described. Indeed, they were much better, if reference was made to the Duke's letter to Earl Bathurst. But having, in the discussion of the Estimates, arrived at the Vote for matériel, it was, perhaps, a little incongruous that they should revert again to the men. He could only assure the hon. Gentleman, who was as sensitive on this question as he himself was, that, having taken great pains to arrive at a proper conclusion with reference to India in this matter by a system of longer service, he had submitted to his noble Friend a plan which he trusted would be satisfactory. He was, however, not prepared to give up the Reserves, but he was about to test them almost immediately, though he could not say with what result. Surely he could not give them up without testing them, and he would do it in perfect fairness, not with the view of bolstering up a system which was not his, but to bring it to the test of real efficiency; and if he found it fail, he would be prepared to act accordingly, for his object was to have an efficient Army.

pointed out that the last Medical Reports had omitted to state the number of men in the regiments quartered in India who, owing to youth, and debility arising from youth, were unable to do duty with their regiments in the hotter stations. In all former Reports these statistics had been given. It must be remembered that we were the only nation in Europe which was obliged to maintain a comparatively large Force on a war footing—namely, our Army in India. It was admitted that for the safety of our Indian Empire every man in the Army in India ought to be prepared to take the field at any moment. That could not be said to be the case, if a large proportion of the rank and file were so young and weak as to be unable to perform the ordinary duty of peace time, and if it was necessary to send them to be nursed in Hill stations. The Report of 1872—the last which had been issued containing this information—showed what a large proportion of some regiments were, for the above causes, absent from their ordinary duty in Hill stations. He trusted that future Reports would give fuller information on this important point, as from it alone could a fair opinion be formed upon the efficiency of our regiments, which, under the short-service system, were necessarily composed of very young soldiers. With regard to short service, he feared they did not sufficiently consider to what a large extent the duties of the Army lay in India and the Colonies. The class from which the Army was drawn, like all mercenary armies raised without conscription, was the poorest class. In Germany and in the French Army there were very few who had not got something, owing to the great division of property; but in our Army the possession of any property, if anything at all, was quite infinitesimal in amount. Their Armies were very rarely called to distant countries, and their Reserves would never be sent out of Europe; whereas the duty of our Armies lying in distant countries and often in pestilential climates, our Reserves would be called out for foreign service and for long periods. The result therefore of calling out a large Reserve of such men as had been in our Army would be to ruin them. The working classes were most improvident, and it would be a most serious thing to call out 10,000 of them for service in India at a short notice. He hoped that the Secretary for War would carefully consider the responsibility which would devolve upon him calling out a large number of men from civil life. He was very glad the right hon. Gentleman, sensible of all the difficulties of the case, was taking into his careful consideration what was required for the Army in India as well as at home and in the colonies.

said, that we chiefly wanted a short-service system so as to get Reserves. He thought that six years' service was too long for an Army with Reserves, and that the term might be shortened to two or three years. His own opinion was, that in ordinary cases when they sent men to India they must give up all idea of getting them into the Reserve. Men out there should have the option of completing a long service of 15 or 20 years.

said, according to all the evidence on the subject it was not at all desirable, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Galway seemed to think, that the soldier should remain in India more than nine or ten years at the outside, for if he were to remain longer he would come back an exhausted man, not fit for the Reserve or anything else. What we ought to aim at was to keep the soldier in India such a time as to give us a sufficient service there and to bring him back a useful member of society. His hon. Friend who had brought forward the subject (Sir George Campbell) had misunderstood the present rules with regard to long and short service. His hon. Friend did not understand that there should be a certain proportion of long-service and short-service men in each regiment, the long-service men being intended to act as non-commissioned officers and in other capacities. The reason why so few men had been taken for long-service of late was that there had been no short-service until a few years ago, and it was necessary to enlist for short-service in order to bring the two classes of men to something like a level. What his hon. Friend really proposed was that we should have a separate Army for India. But any one who had to apply principles and theories to such a complicated machine as the British Army must know that there would be the greatest difficulty in altering the constitution of regiments in the way which his hon. Friend's plan would necessitate. For his own part, he would be sorry for the Secretary of State who had to divide the British Army into long-service and short-service regiments, the latter only for this country. Another objection was, that if our Reserve was to be of any use it should have some experience of India. His hon. Friend had spoken of his interview with his constituents, and had given their opinion as to recruiting; but it should be remembered that his countrymen in the country districts of Scotland were too canny to enlist in the Army in any great numbers. There was a great reluctance amongst the agricultural part of the community to enlist, but he did not think it had anything to do with the long or short-service question. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that the matter was before the Secretary of State for India at present. He was sure it would be satisfactory to the House if some arrangement, such as was indicated in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War in introducing the Army Estimates, could be come to, whereby a man enlisted for short service might be allowed to extend his service in India, while securing to us the benefit of his presence in the Reserve when he returned to his own country.

said, the Committee would remember that he had on various occasions called attention to the question of the Martini-Henry rifle, believing that it was not the best weapon with which to furnish our Army. The difficulties of repairing the complicated lock in case of accident were so great that in actual service it would be perfectly impossible to overcome them. In 1871 he asked for a Committee to inquire especially into the construction of the lock, but a Committee was refused, though not by a very large majority. He admitted that a very competent Committee had chosen this arm, as in their opinion the best that could be procured; but he was fortified by the opinion of some of the best military authorities, that the lock was so complicated that in case of emergency it would fail, and of course the weapon would become perfectly useless. Since the present Government came into office he had to ask questions of his noble Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance, and had got some very curious statements from him. His noble Friend would not deny that the arm, at least as far as the lock was concerned, had been almost reconstructed since it was introduced into the Service. He contended that we ought never to have been called upon to expend such enormous sums to remedy the serious defects in the lock. His noble Friend had spoken of the amount as inconsiderable—3s. at one time and 3s. at another; but £75,000 was a very large sum to expend on each separate improvement. Independent Members in this House could not give the names of the various officers whom they had consulted; but there was hardly one who could not tell them that the present action of the Snider-Enfield was superior to that of the Martini-Henry. There were many persons who said that at Wimbledon and elsewhere the Martini-Henry shot admirably. He was not going to dispute it; but at Wimbledon and elsewhere there was always a man at hand to put the lock into repair at a moment's notice. But in a campaign in India or somewhere else, could a common soldier take the lock to pieces and put in a new spring if the old one got bad? With the rarest exceptions, every one who tried this rifle found some fault more or less. It went off when it was not asked to go off. It was true that attempts had been made to remedy its defects. Those attempts had been very costly. He believed this weapon would absolutely fail if it came to the practical test of war. At Perak it was reported on unfavourably, and it was said, that after being fired a certain number of times it became too hot to hold, and the cartridges got jammed. Moreover, it was 4 inches shorter than any weapon used by Continental regiments, and that, he ventured to say, was a very great drawback. If you crossed bayonets—and that was done in the late war between France and Germany—what an advantage it would be to you to have a bayonet longer than that of your foe. The drawback could not be remedied by having a longer bayonet, for in that same war the elongated bayonet or sword bayonet was found to be practically useless, and was discarded. If the Secretary of State for War would only have an ordinary soldier up before him and ask him to repair the spring he would then find how useless the weapon was, and at what a disadvantage the British soldier would be placed in time of war. He believed the old Snider-Enfield rifle was a far better weapon than the Martini-Henry rifle, and that it would be utterly impossible to repair the latter weapon when on service. With the view of affording the right hon. Gentleman an opportunity of giving the Committee an explanation on this subject, he would move the reduction of the Vote by £85,000.

supported the Amendment. He believed that after all the alterations and modifications which had been made, the great defect still existed—namely, that the weapon was so complex that in anything like a real campaign it would be unserviceable in the course of three months. The complicated character of the lock was so great that when it got out of order it was so difficult to repair it that it was almost certain in serious warfare to become useless. This, in combination with its shortness, were serious defects, and in a bayonet encounter would probably cause demoralization among the troops who were armed with it. They had had constant chopping and changing in that matter, and he did not see why they should be in so great a hurry. It was all very well to try experiments, but they ought to arrive at some definite conclusion as to what was the best rifle before they went on manufacturing it in any large quantity. As to rifles with the Whitworth barrel, he had fired 100 rounds with them in less than four minutes. The Snider was good for 800 yards. That being so, he thought until they had got something better that they could rely on, they might have kept it.

said, that the present Government was not responsible for the introduction of the Martini-Henry rifle, which had been taken up in a great hurry-scurry by a former Government. He had hoped that they would have had 750,000 Snider rifles stored in the arsenals, in excess of those in use, before they made any change of their weapon; but he well remembered that in that House speaker after speaker had put pressure on the War Office to induce it to adopt that change in the kind of arm which was now considered to be defective. It had been so frequently represented that the country was in danger with only the Snider in use; until the Martini-Henry rifle was adopted the means of offence and defence were wanting, and these would be put in perfect order, and the nation saved by the Martini-Henry rifle being forthwith manufactured in hundreds of thousands. This was all asserted at the very time the Germans were then fighting the French successfully with a weapon far inferior to our Snider rifle; but nevertheless we were not content, and nothing but the cry for the destruction of all the efficient and expensive machinery set up at the Enfield factory to manufacture the Snider was heard of, and new machinery to make the Martini-Henry introduced. That was ordered and intended to be completed in a short time, whereas he believed it occupied the factory two years to got all the works in order for the new and greatly lauded arm, and now that the work was going on the arm was condemned. However, the important point now was to try and satisfy the Army as to the completeness of the weapon that was put into its hands; and he urged on the Secretary of State the necessity of satisfying the soldier's mind in that respect.

observed, that that was not a question of going back to the Snider, but simply of having a new rifle. He considered that it would be a great mistake to spend £1,500,000 on a new rifle when they had such an excellent weapon in the Martini-Henry, which at 600 yards was 40 or 50 per cent quicker than the Snider. Although, the lock of the Martini-Henry was somewhat complicated but a very small percentage of those rifles went out of order. An American Committee sat a few years ago to consider the subject, and their decision was that they would adhere to the breechloader until they got a magazine rifle. They were confident that ultimately such a weapon would be invented; and as that was not impossible, it would be foolish in us to enter upon a large expenditure for new breechloaders, which might ultimately be suspended for a superior weapon. Experiments showed that at a range of 1,000 yards the Snider had no chance against the Martini-Henry. They could not get beyond the present calibre of the Martini-Henry on account of the men's shoulders. During the late Franco-German War the Germans impressed their men who had to meet troops armed with the Chassepôt with the necessity of coming to close quarters. The moment, however, the war was over, the Germans obtained a long-range rifle, which showed that they believed such a weapon was useful. His general opinion was that the Martini-Henry was a very good weapon, and that no Army at the present moment had a better one.

said, that the responsibility of the Government in connection with the Martini-Henry arm was not for its introduction, but for its continuation; for when they came into office in 1874 they found that 104,000 rifles had been manufactured at a cost of something like £460,000, besides those in course of manufacture. A great deal had been said about hurry and scurry in the adoption of the Martini-Henry, but the fact was that no other weapon had ever had a longer trial. The history of the weapon went back as far as 1866, when General Peel, then Secretary for War, issued a notice to inventors stating that it was in contemplation to choose a breech loading rifle, and asking them to send in rifles for competition. One hundred inventors sent in various rifles, and the Martini-Henry was the one chosen. The Committee that reported upon that weapon was formed, not of Artillery officers only, as had been supposed, but of five or six Infantry officers and civilians, and one Artillery officer as Secretary. Their Report approved of the Martini-Henry, as far as it went. That approval was endorsed by the Council of Ordnance, and another Committee was formed, his noble Friend the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) being an active Member of it. That Committee, confirming the opinion of the preceding one, declared that the Martini-Henry, so far as shooting qualities were concerned, was equal, if not superior, to any rifle in Europe. He did not think that opinion could be gainsaid. In the matter of lightness, accuracy, and cost he believed the Martini-Henry was unequalled. The Mauser, which was the German rifle, had been referred to as cheap, but he happened to know that it cost about £3 1s., while the Martini-Henry could be manufactured for about £2 13s. The latter, therefore, was not the costly weapon which the hon. Member for Birmingham supposed it to be, and so far as he (Lord Eustace Cecil) was aware, none of the regiments into whose hands it had been put had ever denied that it was one of the best weapons they had ever shot with. It was perfectly true that the Martini-Henry rifle was 4½ inches shorter than any other in Europe, but the question of length had received very serious consideration. The bayonet invented by his noble Friend (Lord Elcho) was thought of, but abandoned on account of its weight and cost. Then the Irish Constabulary bayonet was adopted to a certain extent. The bayonet finally approved for the rank and file was an elongated one, which made the Martini-Henry arm about an inch and a half longer than the Mauser and of about the same length as the Chassepôt, to the best of his recollection. At any rate, the Martini-Henry rifle mounted with the elongated bayonet was practically as long as any similar weapon in Europe. Of course, objection might be taken to the length of the bayonet, but that was a question which the military authorities were the best able to decide. Whatever opinions might be entertained on that point, the fact remained that one of the principal objections made to the Martini-Henry rifle, that of its shortness, fell to the ground. The question of balance was not one, he thought, on which any difficulty would arise. The hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter Barttelot), although admitting that the barrel of the Martini-Henry was good, took exception to the lock; and, indeed, it was only that part of the rifle which might be said to be seriously called in question. The great objection to the lock was that it was complicated, and that it required an expert not only to put it together, but to keep it in order. Well, the expert was there in the person of the armourer-sergeant, who ought certainly to be able to put the lock into proper order. But the Martini-Henry was not the only arm which was liable to become unserviceable. On the very morning of the battle of Inkermann a brother officer of his, being on picket duty, found that the nipples of the muskets of his company had got stopped up in consequence of dampness during the night. He immediately marched them to head-quarters, had the nipples put in order, and then marched back to help in the accomplishment of that great feat of valour, which had conferred so much glory on English arms. If he had not adopted that sensible course, and had not had the aid of an armourer-sergeant to put the nipples into order, his company would have been disabled on that critical occasion, and very serious consequences might have ensued. Even if they were to go back to the old Brown Bess it would be necessary that there should be some one to look after the arms and keep them in order. He thought, however, it behoved those who said the Martini-Henry rifle was an excellent weapon to look after it a little more closely than they had done. It had come to his knowledge—he would not say that it had not received fair play, for that was a strong term—but it had come to his knowledge that it had been allowed to get rusty and out of order, the result being that when people put it to any sudden test or trial they found that it did not work with that perfection that they might expect. There was no finality in these weapons; but although they had not arrived at perfection or finality, he thought it would be most unsatisfactory and most expensive to be changing their weapon every three or four years before they put it to the test of active warfare. Had they put the Martini-Henry to the test of active warfare? They had one report from Perak, which stated that after a certain time the weapon got hot and out of order, and that the men had to throw it away; but since then they had reports of the campaign, and not a single fault was found with the rifle. There had been a solitary report, and that was all. Do not let the Committee suppose—and he hoped the country would not suppose—that the Martini-Henry was the only gun in which defects had been found. The hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Muntz) spoke of the Snider as being a superior weapon. [Mr. Muntz had only said that until they got something better they might have kept it.] Before the Snider was adopted finally defects were discovered, quantities had to be returned to the stores, and reports which he had before him showed numerous defects which had been found out. Indeed, no rifle when first introduced was entirely satisfactory. There was no doubt the Martini-Henry had been put to wonderful trials, and it must be allowed that it had come out very fairly. It was not perfectly understood at present, but when it was he believed it would be appreciated. In the spiral action it was not singular, and as to the alleged great recoil of which they at first heard a great deal now nothing was said about it. He did not view the Martini-Henry as a final weapon; but he believed, as it stood, it was as good a rifle as they could possibly wish for. They had cured a great many defects. It was the best shooting rifle in Europe, and the lock, whatever might be its disadvantages, if properly taken care of, would work well.

said, his noble Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance having done him the honour to refer to him as having been on the Committee who sat on the Martini-Henry rifle, he hoped he would be permitted to say a word on the subject. Although a Member of that Committee, he had nothing to do with the selection of that arm as the rifle for the British Army. That was done by the first Committee, for there were two, and he was a Member of the second only, which had to consider the Reports from regiments to which the Martini-Henry rifle had been issued on trial. A question having been raised as to the efficiency of the breech action, he felt that it was necessary to have an experienced mechanical engineer appointed a member of the Committee. This was done, and he was bound to say that the evidence given by gentlemen most eminent in their profession of engineers, respecting the Martini-Henry rifle, was that it was a most efficient weapon; and that the spiral spring principle in another weapon was mechanically sound and reliable. Then, as regarded the shooting of the Martini-Henry rifle, it had been shown that it was an infinitely superior weapon to any foreign rifle. He did not know what was meant by saying that it was a delicate weapon. The Committee subjected it to a harder trial than it would ever get in the field, and the gun withstood it. He was, therefore, not alarmed at the gun being called a delicate weapon; but he was alarmed at hearing from the noble Lord that they must look to an improved class of soldier, who would be more fit to handle delicate weapons. As regarded finality, of course nothing was final; and although there might be better rifles hereafter, at present this was, as regarded range and accuracy, the best military arm in Europe. In Switzerland he found that something like 700,000 shots had been fired from the Martini rifle at the Tir Federal without accident; but the Swiss were not armed with the Martini rifle, but with a different weapon. It was, indeed, at one time a "toss up" whether they were to adopt it or the "Wetzler," a repeating rifle, but the latter was chosen. It had always been, he might add, a matter of great surprise to him that the first Committee should have rejected all repeating rifles in favour of breech-loaders, because it was manifest that troops armed with repeaters would occupy relatively the same position towards those which happened to be armed with breech-loaders that the latter would hold in reference to those who had only muzzle-loaders. The Swiss repeating rifle had a magazine containing 11 cartridges, and it shot with accuracy and at long ranges; but he had seen an American rifle—Green's—which had the advantage that it could be used either as a repeater or a single barrel. It was, in his opinion, one of the best rifles which had been brought under his notice, and in cases in which, rapid firing at close quarters was desirable, it would be very serviceable. It appeared to him, therefore, that those who were responsible for the arming of our troops would be wanting in their duty if they were to decline to give due consideration to the merits of such weapons. As to the Martini-Henry, there had at one time been an organized set made against it by some disappointed inventor; and it was very certain that, whatever rifle was adopted, it would encounter the like opposition. Allusion had been made to a sword-bayonet which bore his name. Now, he did not himself stand up in this House as a disappointed inventor—he did not claim to be an inventor. When he went on the Committee there were a rifle and a bayonet submitted to them. The Committee succeeded in getting the rifle reduced a pound in weight, and the Committee that sat previously on the subject had reduced it in their time also in weight, so that the weapon was considerably lightened and rendered more manageable. But as to the bayonet which the first Committee adopted, it was simply the old straight sword bayonet with a saw at the back, which, while it was not peculiarly adapted to be a thrusting, was a most inefficient cutting instrument. Now, what was wanted in the Army was a weapon that would cut wood readily. There were endless occasions when a soldier would find the advantage of such a weapon—in cutting wood for fuel, for making gabions, fascines, and abattis, in cutting his way through jungle, hedges, or other obstacles. Formidable though a bayonet looked at the end of a rifle, and much as was heard of bayonet charges, still bayonet wounds were almost unknown, the whole percentage of killed and wounded by cold steel, including swords, in the Franco-German War having been only 2 per cent. He therefore went to Mr. Wilkinson, of Pall Mall, the best sword cutter in Europe, and with the help of Mr. Latham, his partner, a form of sword bayonet was devised which, while most formidable as a thrusting weapon, was, as a cutting instrument, as powerful as any woodman's bill, being formed on the principle of the famous Ghoorka knife. Lord Sandhurst, when it was shown to him, in a letter which he wrote to the Committee, described it as supplying a want which had been long felt in the Army. Well, the Committee, having deliberated, adopted that form of weapon, and it having been begun to be manufactured and issued by the Government, he should like to know why its issue had suddenly been stopped in deference to the report of a departmental Committee of whom the name of a single Member was unknown to the country? Rumour said that the reason why the issue had been stopped was that the bayonet was one which fixed at the, end of the rifle would not look well in Pall Mall in the hands of a sentry! At least, no better reason had been given. If the objection to the adoption of this bayonet was not a question of appearance or weight, it must be a question of expense—the matter of a shilling or two—and surely this nation was not so poor that it could not give its small Army the best weapon that could be obtained.

said, his noble Friend was wrong in supposing that his services were not valued, even though the sword bayonet which he proposed had not been adopted for the Army. He had never before to-night heard it alleged as a reason for giving up the sword bayonet that it would not make a good appearance in Pall Mall. Again, his noble Friend was wrong in supposing that the expense would be very small. The ordinary bayonet which was now proposed, of a lengthened pattern, would, with its scabbard, cost 4s. 1½d.;whereas the sword bayonet, with its scabbard, would cost 15s.6d. Rich as the country was, we could hardly be expected to pay so large a sum except for something of superlative excellence. The ordinary bayonet, he might remark, was 10 ounces lighter than the proposed sword bayonet. He need not detain the House with any observations concerning the rifle itself. Our forces were, he believed, armed at the present time with a weapon which was well calculated to meet any one of a different kind in the hands of any enemy whom we were likely to encounter; and although there might be some defects in it, those defects had been remedied by the mechanical ingenuity of our gunsmiths in such a manner as to prevent their recurrence. At all events, until we saw the superiority of some weapon of a totally different kind, we had better content ourselves with that which we already possessed.

said, that after the remarks of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, he would not put the Committee to the trouble of dividing. It was because he believed that the lock of the weapon was defective that he had thought it right to bring the matter before the House.

wished to know how many breech-loading rifles there were in the country?

, in reply, said, that the number of Sniders in use for the Land Forces was 323,484, and the number of Martini-Henrys 93,020, making a total of 416,504 breech-loading arms. The total number of breech-loading arms now in use, or which would probably be in store on March 31, 1877, would, it was hoped, amount to 891,061. Too much stress had been laid on his remarks about the educated soldier. All he meant to say was, that a man should be able to take care of his arms.

said, as far as the interests of his constituents were concerned, it would be to their advantage to see the Army provided with the worst possible weapon, because they would have to manufacture a greater number of them. The present weapon, on its introduction four years ago, was eulogized and stated to be perfection, but now 20 defects in it, some of which were not yet remedied, had been admitted.

, who had given Notice of a Motion to omit the sum of £17,000 for the re-construction of Knightsbridge Barracks, said, if it were merely a question of taste he should not have troubled the Committee on the subject, but there was the matter of convenience to be considered. There were many disadvantages attending the retention of the present site, which he had always contended was inadequate; indeed, it had been officially reported as such for the purposes of barracks, and, if so, after the road had been widened, as was proposed, it would be still more inadequate and inconvenient. As a question of convenience, therefore, as well as of good taste, he would recommend to the favourable consideration of the Secretary for War the proposal of Sir Henry Cole to erect anew barrack 100 feet back from the site of the present building, and to allow the ground which they occupied to revert to the Park in the shape of an ornamental garden. With reference to the suggestion, he believed that the best authorities were of opinion that more commodious barracks might be erected to the north of the present buildings. It had often been urged that the barracks occupied by the Household troops ought to remain in Hyde Park, because it might be necessary to employ those troops against mobs of people who had gathered in the Park for unlawful purposes. There were two answers to this argument—an argument which he utterly rejected. In the first place, they could have no object in doing so, now that the question of holding meetings there was settled; and if disorderly mobs were to gather at all, it was surely much better that they should assemble in the Parks than they should choose the neighbourhood of, say, the Houses of Parliament, or the thickly-populated districts of the metropolis; and, in the second place, if it become necessary to deal with such persons, the soldiers to be employed for the purpose should not be the Household troops, who were stationed constantly in London, but men drawn from distant garrisons for the special purpose. The last time they were employed against the people was at the funeral of Queen Caroline. Several people were then killed, and the Life Guards were long known as "the Piccadilly butchers." Troops living on the spot ought not to be so employed. The Duke of Wellington did not rely on the Household troops in 1848, and there was abundance of cavalry and infantry at Colchester and at Aldershot within an hour's rail of the metropolis. With regard to the sanitary part of the question, there was sufficient evidence on the Table of the House, in the Reports of Professor Parkes of the Royal Commission of 1863, and of the Sanitary Commission of 1861, all of which were overwhelmingly strong in favour of separating the horses and the men, and unanimous in affirming that the health of both would be improved thereby. All the evidence given before those bodies showed that it was injurious to the health of the horses to have anything except the stable roof between them and the outer air, while it was still more injurious to the health of the men to have them lodged over the horses, as their rooms were saturated with the odour of the stables. They also reported that the site of the barracks had been shown to be inconvenient; and, further, that a convenient one could without difficulty be found. The conclusion which he had come to was that in the absence of an overwhelming necessity, it would be very wrong to erect new barracks on the old site, and therefore he must ask the right hon. Gentleman at the eleventh hour to re-consider the matter and adopt the suggestion referred to; for if he did that he would give satisfaction to the people of London, and especially to the people residing at Knightsbridge. He now left the issue in the hands of the Committee, being conscious that he had left nothing undone to press what he considered an important matter on their attention.

, in seconding the Motion, said that, though it would be in vain to hope to resist the Vote, yet, if hon. Members were willing to listen to facts, he would show that the new barracks ought not to be erected on the present site. When the barracks were first erected in 1780 at the time of the "Lord George Gordon Riots," the site was nothing but green fields, and Knightsbridge a small village. Now, they were an unsightly excrescence on one of the noblest suburbs of the metropolis, and he submitted that, if they wanted a good approach to the metropolis from the West of England, they must pull down the present barracks and leave the space vacant for the erection of good houses. So long as the barracks remained in their present position, no contractor could be found to undertake the erection of a single good house in the place of the mean and disreputable edifices which now existed. This he said, fully admitting that he had nothing whatever to allege against the soldiers who inhabited the barracks. He had hardly ever seen one of them drunk, nor had he ever seen a soldier enter a public-house in the neighbourhood. He insisted that if the barracks did not already exist there, the Secretary for War would not obtain a single shilling for their erection at Knightsbridge. It could not be asserted that no other site for them could be found, because several had been pointed out, and if all who had the improvement of London at heart voted for their removal, one of them would soon be chosen. Nor could it be said that these barracks were necessary for strategic purposes, because there had been, happily, no collision between the military and the populace of London for the last 90 or 100 years, and the difference of time in the arrival of troops from Chelsea or from Hyde Park could not be more than five or ten minutes. That delay would not endanger the peace of London, and there was, therefore, no necessity for retaining the barracks where they were.

said, he did not think the House of Commons the place where such details as he had listened to regarding this question should be discussed. It was one to be decided alone by military authorities, and not by hon. Members of that House, most of whom knew nothing of Cavalry, or the mode in which Cavalry regiments should be accommodated. He thought the site at Knightsbridge a most valuable one, and sincerely hoped it would be retained. Our Household Cavalry were kept down to a low point, and it might happen that they would only be able, when wanted, to mount 200 horses. Every one knew the importance of not irritating the mob by a display of force, and the advantage of these barracks was that the authorities could quietly and unobtrusively concentrate in them, not only one or two battalions of Infantry, but a large force of police, who could act with the Cavalry in case of necessity. The removal of the barracks to a more northern portion of the Park has been suggusted, but a road must be made, and there would be waggon loads of manure to carry from the stables. He would, however, recommend a still larger expenditure than the War Office now proposed, so as to bring the riding school nearer the men and horses. It was said that it was undesirable for sanitary reasons that the men should not sleep over their horses, and the opinion of medical men had been quoted. He did not care what medical men said, but let them ask the opinion of commanding officers of Cavalry regiments. There would be a great deal more disease through men getting wet in going to and from their stables. When he was at Shorncliffe his men were half-a-mile from their stables, and they were always getting cold and being laid up from having to go and look after their horses in the rain. Where did their grooms in London sleep but in rooms over their horses? and the Cavalry stables were much cleaner and better ventilated than private stables. It was far better that the stables should be under the barrack rooms than at a distance from them.

said, that this was more or less a question of economy; the War Office would be called upon to pay a large sum of money for any other site. To remove the present barracks, and build a new one would also entail large expenses which, he believed, the country might not be disposed to pay. He believed that the Government would be glad to provide new officers' houses further to the west if they were not afraid of the expense, which would amount to about £15,000. To place barracks on the right side of the road going westwards would simply ruin the appearance of the Park, and spoil the grass-plat there, without deriving any material advantage from such a position.

called attention to the disgraceful state of the huts connected with the Beggar's Bush Barracks in Dublin, which, he said, were entirely worn out, and expressed a hope that the Secretary for War would order them to be pulled down as soon as possible. They called for improvement quite as much as the barracks under consideration.

supported the Amendment, contending that the elevation of the new barracks, as shown by the model exhibited in the Tea Room, was not such as would add to the beauty of that part of London in which it was proposed they should be erected, while the site was a bad one so far, as furnishing those conveniences which barracks ought to possess. He also objected to the argument that it was desirable to have troops near Hyde Park, as it were to overawe the people who might assemble there for objects which might be perfectly legitimate, observing that those who were bent on mischief would not be likely to meet in the vicinity of barracks. He suggested that a better site than that at Knightsbridge might be found near Chelsea Hospital, and that another and more healthy place might be provided for the boys by whom the schools there were occupied.

excused himself, on the ground that the subject had been repeatedly discussed, from entering into it at any length. He denied that he had ever made use of the argument that it was desirable to keep troops in the neighbourhood of Hyde Park, for the purpose of acting against the people. So long as the meetings held there were confined to proper objects, and properly conducted, there was no wish on the part of the Government to interfere with them at all. But it was very expedient that there should be an open space in the immediate vicinity of Cavalry Barracks in order that the troops upon an emergency might be able to move in every direction without passing through narrow streets. As to removing the barracks to Chelsea, he hoped the Committee would not think he was wrong in not spending more money than he could avoid in dealing with the question, seeing that he had at hand a site which he was informed would furnish all that was requisite for Calvary barracks, and that he was assured on the best authority that the health of the men would not suffer from sleeping over the stables. Indeed, in the most recently erected barracks—those at Colchester—where there were no other considerations at work than the advantage of the troops—the men's quarters were placed over the stables. With regard to Sir Henry Cole, when it was suggested to him that his scheme was costly, he pointed out that that was no affair of his, but to beautify London. It might be very well to propose plans admirable for their aesthetic qualities; but, at the same time, they must not be unmindful of economy. The duty of the Secretary of State, however, was not to beautify London; and as to æsthetic qualities, they were matters about which tastes very much dif- fered. It was therefore his duty to keep economy in view, while at the same time he had to take care that nothing should be done offensive to the neighbourhoods where the barracks were. Even on that score the elevation of the new barracks would, he believed, bear favourable comparison with any of those magnificent houses to which the hon. and learned Member for Marylebone had referred. If the House of Commons wished to put him in possession of enormous sums for that purpose that would be an affair for them to consider. There was, however, no site which he could find which for various reasons was so advantageous as that at Knightsbridge, and he hoped the Committee would agree to the Vote without further discussion.

thought that although it might be no part of the duty of his right hon. Friend to beautify London, he should take care that barracks were not erected which would be a disfigurement to the Metropolis. He should vote for the Knightsbridge site as, in his opinion, the best; but then he should like to have an understanding with the right hon. Gentleman that he would not bind himself by any contract, until the public had been enabled to judge of the probable effect of the new buildings by means of a model on a sufficient scale.

thought the situation of the barracks at Knightsbridge most excellent, and it would be folly to throw away money in buying another site. He should certainly vote against the Amendment.

wished to call the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to the state of the question with reference to the Moncrieff system of gun carriages; and to ask, whether it was now carried out on the mechanical principle on which it was first introduced, or on the hydraulic principle Major Moncrieff proposed at a later period?

said, that Major Moncrieff last year made his final settlement with the War Office, and a Vote was taken to complete the payments due to him. Since that period Major Moncrieff had applied himself to utilizing the hydraulic principle in working heavy guns; but with that the War Office had nothing to do. They were, however, seeing what could be done in applying hydraulic apparatus to the working of the larger guns.

observed, that the Moncrieff system had, in the estimation of a great number of persons out-of-doors, been somewhat suddenly dropped by the Government without any adequate reason having been given for doing so. He thought it would have been more satisfactory had the Government brought the invention forward a little, in order to ascertain exactly what its merits were.

said, the right hon. Gentleman had not answered his question. What he wished to know was, whether the Government intended mounting guns which should disappear when fired; and, if so, whether they would do it on the hydraulic principle?

said, there were two systems of Major Moncrieff, one the counter-weight system, the other the hydraulo-pneumatic system; the former they had adopted, the latter had been reported against, and they had not used it.

asked for some explanation as to the proposed expenditure of £3,000 in the repair of Knightsbridge Barracks, and as to the amount to be spent upon the huts at Shorncliffe? He also wished to know, what benefit would be derived from the proposed reclaiming of part of the Long Valley at Aldershot?

said, the matter of the huts would require great consideration; but, in the meantime, it was necessary to make the proposed expenditure at Shorncliffe. The Horse Guards would be quartered, some at Regent's Park, Knightsbridge, and Hampton Court, during the rebuilding of the Knightsbridge Barracks.

said, he presumed, from the age for officers entering the Cavalry being extended to 22 years, there was great difficulty in getting a sufficient number to join the Service, which accounted for there being four, five, and six vacancies in most of the different Cavalry regiments. The question was, whether or not the examinations were carried too far, and the most useful, proper, and important class of men deterred thereby from entering the Service. In the old days there never was any difficulty experienced in obtaining officers for the Cavalry; whereas, at the present time, as he had said, nearly every regiment was short of its complement, and he attributed that circumstance to the stringency and uncertainty of the examinations, and to the fact that unless a young man happened to be one of the fortunate few at the head of the list, he stood no chance of obtaining a commission before he had passed the limit of age. His own son, who had passed through the examination successfully, had come out 28th out of 520 young men examined, but had he gone up at the next examination the same number of marks would have placed him sixth on the list; and it was quite possible that a man who was able to pass a very fair examination might find himself hopelessly low in the list because a number of cleverer men than himself happened to go up at the same time. It was not good for the country that any special class should be excluded from the Army, and under the present system men who could afford to keep themselves were, as he had said, prevented from taking that step. He also thought that some concession should be made to the Artillery and Engineer officers, who were compelled to spend two and a-half years at Woolwich without pay, after they had passed an examination that would qualify them for officers in the Line. That regulation was the means of also keeping young men from joining the two corps he had named.

said, the two questions were intimately connected with the abolition of Purchase without first providing a proper substitute. He never defended the Purchase system, but he believed that it did a great deal of good. When Purchase existed it did not apply to the Artillery, and the two years' attendance at the Woolwich Academy was rewarded with a commission; but now the number at Woolwich Academy had fallen off. Both Austria and Germany, and he believed France also, had been trying to get officers in the Reserve who were not strictly professional men, but who in time of war would increase the number of officers in the Army. He suggested whether some arrangement might not be made by which young men of fortune could enter the Army for five or six years, without displacing the professional officers.

did not think we could have too high a standard of qualifying examination for military officers, but he greatly objected to competitive examination, because he did not believe in unnatural forcing. It deprived us of the services of excellent young men who were slow as regarded intellectual development, but who in after life turned out most able. As far as he was concerned, he preferred his subalterns coming from a public school than from a crammer. One great grievance complained of, and which caused many young men to leave the Army was this most unjust practice, that young men who could not get into the Cavalry directly in the first instance, got into it through the Militia, and were put over the heads of men of nominally inferior rank, though of superior qualifications.

said, that in the opinion of one of the ablest of those who prepared young men for the Army and for Woolwich the system for the examination of cadets for the Army was the worst that the Government could adopt, and that it had the unfortunate effect of excluding from the Army men of practical knowledge and experience. He hoped the Government would not adopt the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member for Galway to have professional and non-professional officers, as such a system must prove fatal to the efficiency of the Army.

hoped that the Cavalry grievance mentioned by the hon. and gallant Member for Brighton would be done away with—that there would be no such thing as sub-lieutenants, but first and second lieutenants, or at all events lieutenants only. Under the present arrangements, an inexperienced man from the Militia would have no chance of being placed over the head of a Cavalry officer who understood his business. If any man from the Militia entered the Cavalry, he must have arrived at a certain point of efficiency before he was placed above a junior officer. With, respect to the question of examination for the Cavalry, the age of candidates had been raised from 20 to 22, which was formerly the age, as on account of the expense of being in the Cavalry there were not so many candidates. He had made another change in the made of calling on candidates to compete for commissions. Hitherto the Infantry and Cavalry commissions had been put together, but he now divided them into Cavalry and Infantry commissions, so that those who were prepared for Cavalry commissions and who attained a certain point of efficiency would have an opportunity of getting commissions if those who were before them did not choose to take them. In reply to CAPTAIN NOLAN,

stated that, excluding the officers who had passed the final examination at the Staff College last December, and who had not yet gone through the course of instruction in different branches of the Service, the number who were eligible for appointments to the Staff was 247. Of these there were officers who had retired, 42; died, 13; disqualified for cribbing, 1; in India, 7; declined appointments offered, 8; still subalterns, 15; unemployed on the Staff of the Royal Artillery, 5; unemployed on the Staff of the Royal Engineers, 1; and unemployed on the Staff of the Royal Marines, 3; making together 95. The other 152 officers had been appointed to the Staff from the Staff College, and some of them had been employed twice. He did not think it could be said therefore that they had experienced any want of employment.

remarked that a great many young men were deterred from joining Cavalry regiments by reason of the great expense which they would have to incur, and which was unnecessary and uncalled for.

hoped that the Secretary of State for War would consider the expediency of restoring the rank of cornet and ensign in the Army, instead of that of second lieutenant.

said, that he was not aware that there had been any delay in the distribution of medals, and that he would inquire into the matter.

asked why the salary of the Assistant Military Secretary had been raised, and why there was so large an increase in the department of the Financial Secretary?

replied, that the pay of the Assistant Military Secretary had been increased on account of the increased work he had had to do.

asked the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War, If he could give the Committee any information with regard to the result in the recent changes in the pay of the troops? How was recruiting progressing, and had the deferred pay had the result anticipated? He had heard that the Artillery were 1,900 men short, and that the Guards were short of men also by 450.

replied, that the Artillery was bad enough, but not so bad as the noble Lord had represented. They were short of 1,450 gunners, but the superfluity of drivers reduced the actual deficiency to 1,150. With respect to recruiting he had no complaint to make, but he was much pressed by the extraordinary number of discharges. Those who enlisted after the Crimean War were leaving in large numbers, but the recruiting was very good.

With regard to the department of the Financial Secretary?

said, it arose mainly on account of the increment and an adjustment in salaries.

trusted the Secretary of War would take into consideration the case of the chaplains.

complained that there was a new charge of £1,000 for a Chaplain-general.

said, it was the pension of Mr. Greig.

complained that many men who had served for many years in the Army meritoriously had not those pensions paid to them to which they were entitled.

also referred to cases of a similar nature, and asked why pensions to soldiers of 18 years service were not awarded according to the terms of the Royal Warrant of 1870?

said, the subject of pensions was under the consideration of the Government, and he hoped it would be arranged satisfactorily in a short time.

said, that these tonnage bounties were additions to the pay of the naval officers employed on the East Coast of Africa for the capture of slave dhows. They were entitled to the bounties if no slaves were on board the captured dhows, and he believed that dhows were occasionally seized which were engaged in lawful traffic.

said, that all captures had to be regularly condemned by a Prize Court, and when that Court issued its orders, the Treasury had no option but to find the money. These bounties were paid under the provisions of an Act of Parliament, and if the hon. Member was dissatisfied, the proper course for him would be to bring in an amending Bill.

said, that it was not found expedient to give the Legations abroad a general power to send home distressed British subjects. They were not always the most deserving persons, and such a power might lead to considerable and embarrassing charges. Occasions, however, did arise when it was right to undertake such duties.

having given Notice of a Motion to reject the Bill,

explained that the Act of 1872, which was brought in for the same purpose, was rendered useless by an Amendment which Mr. Auberon Herbert succeeded in passing by a majority of 5 in a thin House, and which made the penalties so small that the Act had ever since been worthless for the purpose for which it was intended. The present Bill merely proposed to give protection to wild fowl during the breeding season.

said, he was on the Committee to which the subject had been referred, and he would express his opinion that the Bill ought to be allowed to pass.

said, that the Bill would have the effect of rendering municipal elections political, while at present they were non-political. He should, therefore, move the Adjournment of the Debate.

moved the Adjournment of the House, urging that it was most unfair that it should be proceeded with now, when it was understood that the Bill was not to come on, and most of its opponents were absent in consequence.

said, he had voted for the Adjournment of the Debate because he felt that there was a great diversity of opinion on the Bill; but the House having expressed itself upon that point, he did not feel that he ought to interfere further with the discussion of the Bill at that stage.

said, that the Bill involved a most serious and impor- tant change in the conduct of municipal elections, and required hours for its thorough discussion. That being so, he thought it most improper that an attempt should now be made to force on the discussion of the Bill, when, contrary to what had been the expectation, it was called on only fifteen seconds before half-past 12 o'clock, after which, by the Rule of the House, unopposed Business could not be taken.

said, that justice had not been done to hon. Members on his side of the House in pressing on this discussion at so late an hour, and he therefore moved the Adjournment of the Debate.

said, that perhaps after what had occurred it would be better to adjourn, and he, therefore, assented to the Motion.