asked the Postmaster General, Whether his attention has been called to the defective state of the apparatus at Tiverton Junction for receiving letters from the mail train on the Great Western Railway, and the serious injury to letters consequent thereon—the mail bag having been damaged on the morning of the 5th of this month, and this being the third or fourth time a similar accident has occurred; and, whether any, and, if so, what remedy he proposes for the prevention of similar accidents for the future?

, in reply, said, that in order to prevent the damage referred to in the Question, the speed of the train would in future be considerably slackened as it approached the station, and other precautions would be taken.

asked the First Commissioner of Works, Whether any site in the Metropolis has yet been selected for the erection of Cleopatra's Needle; and, whether there is not likely to be some difficulty, as to land carriage, in placing it at any great distance from the side of the river?

, in reply, said, the obelisk referred to by the noble Lord was still at Alexandria. The vessel destined to carry it to England was in the harbour of that port, and he hoped that in a couple of months she would be on her voyage home. Four important sites had been suggested for the obelisk. One was on the Embankment, opposite the Northumberland Avenue. Another, also on the Embankment, by Whitehall Stairs, was near St. Stephen's Club. [Ironical cheers.] That, he might say, was not his suggestion. The third site was in the open space to the south of Westminster Palace, opposite Abingdon Street. The fourth was in the centre of Parliament Square, in the midst of those distinguished men who now adorned that place. Nothing, however, had yet been definitely settled with regard to the site. As to the second part of the Question, there would, he believed, be great difficulty and even risk in endeavouring to convey the obelisk, which was supposed to weigh between 200 and 250 tons, through the streets of London to a place distant from the river side.

asked the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, Whether, as the Metropolitan Board of Works have determined to abandon their Bill for the Prevention of Floods, any, and if any, what steps will be taken by the Board to render London secure from floods during the ensuing winter?

Sir, in answer to the Question of my hon. Friend, I beg to inform him that the Metropolitan Board of Works has no power to execute any works for rendering London secure from floods. It will rest with the local authorities to exercise the power which they possess under the Metropolis Local Management Acts and to give effect to the judgment of the High Court of Justice on the 12th inst., which has decided that the protection of the districts from the influence of the river is in the exclusive control of the Vestries and District Boards. I need hardly add that the Metropolitan Board will be always ready to assist with their advice any of the local authorities who may be desirous of availing themselves of the information collected by the Board in relation to this important subject.

asked the President of the Board of Trade, If he is aware that the barque "Bustonvale" was, on the 7th instant (June), compulsorily measured at Greenock for extra Tonnage Duty in consequence of carrying two spare spars on deck, in order to make the ship seaworthy in accordance with Lloyds' rules, and for which the master had to pay ten shillings for a Customs certificate, which tax will have to be paid on each occasion that he pays off his crew in a British port; and, if he will consider what measures may be adopted for the purpose of preventing the practice complained of?

Sir, the case of the Bustonvale has been brought to my notice. The duty of measuring spaces on deck occupied by cargo has lately been transferred to the Customs officers. I have been in communication with the Board of Customs on the subject generally, and one result is that the space occupied by five spare spars will not be included in tonnage measurement, but be taken as part of equipment. Another result is, that the fee for measuring deck cargoes is abolished.

asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If, seeing that the Russian Government has answered the intimation of Lord Derby relative to non-interference with the navigation of the Suez Canal in accordance with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, he would be good enough to state if he can yet inform the House of the nature of the replies or communications received from the Porte and the Khedive of Egypt; and, if it be correct that the Government of the Porte objects to, and declines to entertain, the intimation of Her Majesty's Government forbidding the exercise of belligerent rights in the Canal, what measures he intends adopting for the proper protection of the Canal and its approaches?

Sir, the answer of the Porte to the communication of Her Majesty's Government respecting the Suez Canal was received by Mr. Layard on the 21st. Therefore, we have not yet received it in full. The substance of it, as reported by telegraph, is as follows:—

"The Porte assents to the view of Her Majesty's Government relating to the free passage of the Canal for all neutral vessels. As regards hostilities in the Canal and its approaches, the Porte states that as the Canal is part of the Ottoman Empire, and has never been declared neutral, they cannot permit the access to it of enemies' ships. They state that they have taken measures to protect the two entrances from the approach of enemies' ships, hut that they reserve the rights of Turkey and her prerogatives as the territorial Power."

It will have been seen from the Papers laid before Parliament that the Russian Government have declared that they will not "bring Egypt within the radius of their military operations," and that they will "neither blockade nor interrupt, nor in any way menace the navigation of the Suez Canal." Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government do not feel it necessary to take any measures for the protection of the Canal, inasmuch as they rely upon the undertaking of the Russian Government that it will not be endangered.

asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether it is true that the gates on the north side of Oakly Enclosure in the New Forest have been locked, so as to prevent access by a much used road to the beautiful old woods known as Oakly and Berry Woods; and, whether such locking of gates is not contrary to the assurances given by the late Secretary to the Treasury?

, in reply, said, he had ascertained that the gates had been locked as stated in the Question; but that he had communicated with the Commissioners of Woods, and had reason to believe that the roads would be opened in a day or two. He did not think that the assurances given by the late Secretary to the Treasury on the subject applied to the locking of the gates in question; but he was ready to admit that they might very fairly be taken to mean that the public should not be deprived of the convenience afforded by the ancient paths and roads through the Forest.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether he is aware that another summons was, on the 19th instant, issued against Joseph Abel, of Faringdon, for the non-vaccination of his child Frederick Joseph Abel; whether it is not discretionary with the justices (under 30 and 31 Vie. c. 84, s. 31) to refuse to make the order; and, whether, under the circumstances of the numerous prosecutions and fines inflicted upon the defendant, and in deference to the opinion of the Local Government Board, he will advise the justices not to make the order?

, in reply, said, it was true another summons had been issued against the person in question. He should not wish to give any legal opinion as to the discretionary power of magistrates to refuse to issue such an order against a person for the non-vaccination of his children. The question was one which would more appropriately be put to the Attorney General.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If his attention has been called to the fact that the Assizes throughout England have been fixed a fortnight earlier than usual; that this will have the effect of clashing with the Quarter Sessions which must be held on a certain week as fixed by Act of Parliament; that in several counties the Quarter Sessions will have to be adjourned, the courts being occupied by the Judges and the Bar, and that many officers of the county will necessarily be in attendance at the Assizes; and, whether he can give any hopes that this inconvenient state of things will be altered in the future, particularly as it is presumed a gaol delivery will be made at the Assizes whatever the nature of the offences may be?

, in reply, said, he had been in communication with the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice on the subject, and that he hoped an arrangement would be made by which the inconvenience referred to would be obviated in future. If legislation was found to be necessary, it would be attended to without delay.

asked the right hon. Gentleman, Whether the Judges do not go circuit under a commission of general gaol delivery; and, whether he is aware in Montgomeryshire that the Lord Chief Baron has declined to try any prisoners committed at the Sessions?

, in reply, said, he was not aware that the Lord Chief Baron had come to any such decision. He would, however, make inquiry into the matter, and give the hon. Member the result.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he can give the House any information confirming or contradicting a statement of the correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" at Erzeroum, to the effect that in the recent battle near Delibaba Sir Arnold Kemball was in such a prominent position with the Turkish army as to have been mistaken for a General acting with their forces, and to have only escaped the pursuit of the Cossacks by the fleetness of his horse; and, whether the instructions given to Sir Arnold Kemball and any other British officers accompanying the belligerent armies on either side, are such as to prevent them from doing anything inconsistent with a strict observance of the spirit and letter of Her Majesty's Proclamation of neutrality?

Sir, no information has been received by Her Majesty's Government of the battle, the account of which is published in The Daily Telegraph, and which is reported to have taken place near Delibaba, and Her Majesty's Government, therefore, do not know what the position of Sir Arnold Kemball was on that occasion. With regard to the Instructions, about which the hon. Member asks me, given to Sir Arnold Kemball, I have to state that Instructions sent to Mr. Layard were to the effect that Sir Arnold Kemball was to follow the operations of the Turkish Forces, and that he was to report to Her Majesty's Government the result of those operations. With regard to the position he was to occupy, he was to follow his own discretion in any actions that might take place. With respect to the discharge of his duties generally, he was desired to discharge the duty of a delegate from a neutral Government to a belligerent army, and he was further desired, if he saw any excesses committed on the part of individual soldiers, to report those excesses to the Turkish Government immediately, and to do what he could to prevent them. I may also mention that similar Instructions have been given to the other officers that are following the Turkish Army.

asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether the attention of the Government has been directed to the Report, in May last, of the Select Committee of this House on the Turnpike Acts Continuance, in which the following sentence occurs:—

"Your Committee must repeat their conviction that, unless some law is speedily enacted for the better management of highways, great injustice will he done to many parishes in consequence of the liability thrown on them of repairing roads which were constructed for the purpose of through traffic. Many roads will undoubtedly fall out of repair, and through want of timely legislation, much expense, which might have been avoided, will eventually be incurred in restoring the condition of these roads;"

this being a repetition of language equally strong in the previous Reports of May, 1875 and 1876; and, whether the Government intend to introduce, and to endeavour to pass during this Session, any measure to remedy the evils described in the Report referred to?

, in reply, said, his attention had been directed to the recommendation referred to. He had brought the subject under the notice of the Government more than once, and they were anxious to legislate with respect to it, but they were not, as he had stated on a recent occasion, able to see their way to introduce a Bill dealing with it this Session.

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, If he can state the result of his inquiries into the case of Mr. J. A. Browne of Dublin?

Sir, during the tenure of office of the late Government, the Carriage department of the Dublin Metropolitan Police was re-organized, and Mr. J. A. Browne's services were dispensed with, under circumstances which appeared at the time to preclude him from receiving the usual grant of a retiring pension. Mr. Browne subsequently memorialized the Government for a re-consideration of his case, and last summer I undertook that it should be carefully investigated. Having had the benefit of the advice of the Irish Law Officers on the subject, I arrived at the conclusion that though Mr. Browne was open to serious blame for mismanagement and negligence during the later months of a long period of service, nothing was proved against him of a graver nature, such as would be necessary to justify the extreme course of depriving him altogether of his ordinary right to pension on abolition of office. I have, therefore, recommended the case to the favourable consideration of the Treasury, and I believe that their Lordships are disposed to award a modified pension to Mr. Browne under the powers vested in them by Parliament.

asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to act on the recommendation of the Commissioners of National Education in Ireland, by granting retiring pensions to the head teachers of Irish Model Schools?

No, Sir, the Government have not felt themselves able to comply with the recommendation of the Commissioners in favour of this particular class of National School teachers. The whole question of pensions is now under the consideration of the Government, and in accordance with the promise given to the hon. and learned Member for Kildare (Mr. Meldon), the matter will receive our best consideration.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If Her Majesty's Government, will, at an early date, appoint a Select Committee to inquire into questions at issue relating to the doubtful stability of H.M.S. "Inflexible?"

The Admiralty cannot consent to the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the stability of the Inflexible. They consider there is no doubt of her stability, and are prepared to accept to the fullest extent their responsibility for the ship.

, in the absence of the First Lord, asked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether he will lay upon the Table of the House the official documents from which extracts were read in Committee of the Whole House by the late First Lord of the Admiralty on Monday evening, together with all other Reports which the Construction Department may have made to the Board upon the stability of the "Inflexible," and ships of her class?

, in reply, said, that he intended to lay on the Table the Report of the Director of Naval Construction, dated July 4, 1873, which was quoted by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Goschen) in the recent debate on the Navy Estimates, together with other Correspondence and Reports bearing upon the question of the stability and efficiency of the Inflexible, and the Admiralty Minute stating the opinion of the Board thereon. He might take this opportunity of stating that there was at the Admiralty a floating model of this ship, and he had given instructions that if any hon. Member was desirous of seeing it, he should have every opportunity of inspecting it and of having such explanations given as he might think necessary, which bore upon the question of the stability of the ship.

wished to state, for the information of the House, that the model referred to had been inspected by himself. [Cries of "Order!"] He had beed invited to see the model, in consequence of the doubt raised as to the stability of the Inflexible. It was distinctly a model in which certain wooden material was placed that could not be removed; and it did not represent the dangerous condition of the ship. On the contrary, it represented a very different state of things.

asked the Secretary of State for War, If he has any objection to lay upon the Table of the House Copies of the Reports of the proceedings in the Courts Martial hold in the cases of Sergeant M'Carthy, Corporal Thomas Chambers, and John O'Brien, convicted for breaches of the Articles of War?

, in reply, said, that in accordance with the Articles of War, any person tried by court-martial, or anyone acting on his behalf, was entitled to have a copy of the proceedings, if applied for within three years. It was now, however, 10 years since the courts-martial in question were held, and he did not think it would be conducive to public policy that a Report of their proceedings should, after the lapse of so long a period, be laid on the Table of the House.

asked Mr. Attorney General, With reference to the statement of the Secretary of the Admiralty, that H.M.S. "Rifleman" had seized twenty slaves on board two British ships in the Red Sea, the "Koina" and the "Rokeby," and that he referred to the Law Officers of the Crown, the question "whether any or what punishment can be awarded to captains or owners of ships so sullying the British flag;" and, if he will inform the House whether British or International Law enables Government to punish officers or owners of British ships guilty of such offences in foreign waters, and if Government is prepared to put in force such powers as they have?

Sir, in answer to the Question of the hon. Gentleman, I beg to state that the statute 5 Geo. IV., c. 113, entitled "An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade," provides ample means for preventing owners or masters of British ships aiding in any way the Slave Trade, and the provisions of that statute contain very severe penalties; for instance, persons offending are liable to penal servitude for life. I have not received full information of the circumstances connected with the receiving on board the two vessels mentioned; but, certainly, if it should be brought to my attention officially that the officers or owners of British ships were guilty of violating the provisions of the statute to which 1 have referred, I should recommend the Government to institute proceedings against them.

asked the Postmaster General, Whether, considering the great distances between the presently existing telegraph stations in the county of Tipperary, he could open fresh postal telegraph stations at Cappawhite, and also at either Emly or Galbally?

, in reply, said, that the cost was the difficulty in this matter of opening stations at Cappawhite and Emly. He was sorry to say he could not hold out any hope of being able to make the extension at the expense of the Department.

asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether permission to retire on full pay has been refused to several field officers who are entitled to it, on the grounds that no funds are available for this purpose; and, whether any of these officers have been pronounced medically unfit for further service?

, in reply, said, officers in the Army had no right to retire on full pay unless sufficient funds were available. A limited sum was granted for the purpose, and unless vacancies occurred it was impossible for officers to retire on full pay. Two Majors had been reported as medically unfit for further service. One of these officers had just received full pay from the fund in consequence of a vacancy, and the other would also receive it when a vacancy occurred.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If Her Majesty's Government will, without delay, appoint a Select Committee to inquire into the system now in practice for ascertaining, first, what are the various classes or types of vessels which best meet the requirements of Her Majesty's Naval Service; and, secondly, what is the system in practice for obtaining the most efficient designs for such classes?

, in reply, said, that the Admiralty could not consent to the appointment of the Select Committee referred to.

moved, in pursuance of Notice, "That this House will immediately resolve itself into the Committee of Supply."

wished to know, as a matter of Order, whether the Motion could be put from the Chair, except with the unanimous and universal consent of the House?

The House is aware that in consequence of the count-out, the Committee of Supply on Friday night last became a lapsed Order. Therefore, the House cannot go into Committee of Supply to-day unless the Order is again set up. The proceeding is usual and reasonable, and no other Notice besides that which appears on the Paper to-day is necessary, according to the practice of the House.

said, that it was a new practice, which was only introduced in 1861 by Lord Palmerston, the usual course previously to that, according to Sir Erskine May, having been when Supply became a dropped Order on Friday, to set it up again for the following Thursday. It had not been adopted more than three or four times of late years, and in his opinion the Motion under discussion ought not to be regarded by the House as an ordinary Motion. In the course of last year, on June 26, Mr. Disraeli had formally moved that the House should resolve itself into a Committee of Supply, because there had been a count-out. The House ought to be jealous of any interference with old-established forms. Besides, private Members had an interest in keeping Friday; but if when a count-out occurred on that day, the Government took Monday as a matter of course, it would have no object in keeping a House on Friday. For what reason, then, was the old rule departed from on the present occasion?

said, that the fact that the Secretary of State for War last week had put down the Army Estimates for that evening was a sufficient reason for the course the Government had taken. A pledge had therefore been given by the Government to that effect, and hon. Members had come down to the House expecting, of course, that the arrangement would be carried out. It would, therefore, cause great inconvenience as well as trouble if that understanding were now departed from, simply owing to the accident of a count-out. He did not know whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Sir Colman O'Loghlen) was in his place on Friday evening; but the Government made every effort to keep a House, and were present in considerable numbers; but it was impossible to keep a House, and, great as was the inconvenience on Friday night to several hon. Members, it would be still greater that night if the course of Business were disturbed and the Vote3 could not be taken. The practice of the House for the past 16 years in this respect had been one which had met with universal approval, and had arisen from the necessity of advancing Public Business.

said, that the custom was for dropped Orders to be put down at the bottom of the list of Orders for the Day ensuing, and the Motion for going into Committeee of Supply ought to have been the last on the list. Sir Erskine May, however, had said that a Motion for Supply did not become a dropped Order — so that no question of the kind could occur. But in the year 1861 Lord Palmerston had connived at Supply being dropped by reason of a count-out, and had made a Motion like the one before the House, on the first day of the holidays. Of course, it would not be contended that all that Lord Palmerston had done was necessarily right. The Secretary of the Treasury had spoken of the uniform custom of the House for the last 16 years; but he himself had found no such uniformity. He had investigated the matter, and had found several instances of Supply and other Orders having been dropped by a count-out, and on those occasions the Government of the day had put them down again, not immediately, but after the lapse of a few days. He remembered, too, that Bills under the charge of the right hon. and learned Member for County Clare had been treated in that manner. It seemed, then, that with the exception of the one precedent created by Lord Palmerston—and that a precedent that ought not to be followed, inasmuch as it was a direct violation of the Rules of the House—the custom of the House was against the Government. Rules and precedents were made to restrict the action of the majority, and he did not desire to see any of them abandoned.

understood that the Notice of this Motion was not given in the usual way; but it was given after the Speaker left the Chair. He supposed that the Clerks at the Table knew the circumstances under which the Notice of the Motion was given; but he understood that the Speaker had left the Chair; and he wished to know under those circumstances whether, in the event of any objection being taken to the Motion, it would be proceeded with?

Before the House was counted out the Motion was perfectly in Order. If any objection is raised, I shall take the sense of the House in the usual way.

hoped the sense of the House would not be taken on the subject, for this simple reason—that Her Majesty's Government had made arrangements to enable hon. Members to bring on questions in which they were interested, and if the Motion was not agreed to the rights of private Members would be extinguished. He had himself come a considerable distance with a view of supporting the Motion of an hon. Member.

said, he imagined if the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) were carried it would still be competent for hon. Members to proceed with their Notices on the Question that the Speaker do leave the Chair. But he hoped the House would not be put to the trouble of dividing. It was quite possible, as the right hon. and learned Member for Clare and the noble Lord the Member for Westmeath had remarked, that the proceedings in the matter were a little awkward and not altogether consistent. But the House ought to recollect how this difficulty arose. It arose from the application of two arrangements, both made by the consent and for the convenience of the House. The first arrangement was that Supply should be the First Order on Friday to enable hon. Members to raise discussion; and the other was, as the House had lately decided, that the Sitting should be specially adapted to the business of Supply. If the Government had followed any other course than that which they had adopted, the House would have had very just reason to complain. As had been stated by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury, Notice was given last week that the Army Estimates should be proceeded with to-day; and if hon. Members found that in consequence of what had occurred on Friday night the Army Estimates would not be proceeded with, but that some Bill would be brought on which they had not expected, the House would have had much more reason to complain.

said, he had made no Motion on the subject; but had simply called attention to what had occurred. He hoped that the course which in this instance had been adopted by Her Majesty's Government would not become the ordinary practice.

, in rising to call attention to the Papers respecting the arrears of pay due by the Government of India to Officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers; and to move that they be referred to a Select Committee, said, that the case concerned the Department of the Secretary of State for India, but it related to Her Majesty's British troops, and as they knew of no one to whom they were responsible but the Secretary of State for War, there was no other to whom they could look for redress of grievances. It was so laid down in the Articles of War. The matter, though relating to a small body of men, 250 in number, really involved a matter which could not any longer be overlooked—namely, the broad principle whether Her Majesty's troops when ordered to India were not entitled to all the rights and privileges conferred on them by the Crown and recognized by Parliament. He held that they had hitherto been deprived of those privileges, and his object was to press their case upon the Government. On the 22nd of February, 1872, Lord Cardwell, among other reforms, brought before the House the subject of the re-organization to a great extent of the Artillery and Engineers. That was no new subject. For many years the slow course of promotion had attracted attention, and in 1867 the right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) moved for a Committee to inquire into the matter. On that Committee sat the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition. It was perfectly unanimous in its Report; but, on further consideration, there having been a change of Government, Lord Hampton considered the scheme recommended more expensive than he would like to present to the House, and he appointed a Committee at the War Office to consider the Report. Among the recommendations made by the Committee was that in future, on account of the changes which had occurred in the Artillery and Engineers, the first captains should be field officers. The thing was dropped, and in 1871 the question was brought before the House, and Lord Cardwell stated that a Commission had been ordered to go thoroughly into the whole question. In 1872 Lord Cardwell distinctly stated that the rank of field officers would be given to the first captains of the Artillery and Engineers. The question, however, was not then settled, and a considerable party was formed against the proposal, on the ground that it would interfere with the rights of officers of the Purchase Corps. On the 18th of June, 1872, an Address was moved and carried in the House of Lords, praying for a Commission to inquire into the alleged injustice to the Purchase Corps, and that the Royal Warrant should not be issued until the Commission had reported. In reply to that Address, Her Majesty stated that she was advised that the delay asked for in the issue of the Royal Warrant would be inexpedient. On the 28th the late General Sir Percy Herbert brought forward a Motion in the House of Commons to the effect that the matter should be re-considered. Lord Cardwell, in his reply, distinctly dwelt on the arrangement made with the India Office that field rank should be given to the first captains, and said that nothing should prevent him from carrying the scheme into effect. General Sir Percy Herbert did not get a Seconder. On the 5th of July, 1872, the Royal Warrant was issued granting the increase of pay and rank to these officers. On the 15th of August the Royal Warrant was published in India. Yet, after the decision of the House and after the publication of the Royal Warrant, it was not recognized in India, and the officers had received neither increase of pay nor rank. As soon as the Order was read in India the officers concerned had remonstrated by submitting their grievances through their commanding officers to the Commander-in-Chief, who considered they were justified in their application, and who forwarded the matter to the Government of India. The Government of India also thought these officers were entitled to have their grievances remedied, and it accordingly forwarded their application to the Secretary of State for India. The Secretary of State for India said, in his reply, that they were British officers; that the complaints should have gone through the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State for War; and, in the meantime, he asked the Government of India to give him further information. According to this decision two officers made their complaint, and after four years of constant applications forwarded through the proper channel, the latest answer they had got from the War Office was in July, 1876, to the effect that the Petition of regimental officers for increased Indian pay and allowances would be submitted to Parliament in due course. But, in point of fact, the officers never petitioned; they merely asked for what was due to them. Up to the present time, no step whatever had been taken in India to carry out the Warrant. Letters had not been replied to, and the officers were wholly at a loss to know on what ground they had not received what they were entitled to under the Royal Warrant. But although no reply had been given, several excuses had been made, both in that House and out of it. It had, indeed, been said that Royal Warrants had no effect in India. He had, however, taken the trouble to peruse all the General Orders issued in the Bengal Province since the British troops formed part of the Forces in India, and he could find no instance on record of any Royal Warrant affecting promotion and pay which had not been recognized in India, and recognized from the date of the Warrant. If the Royal Warrant signed by the Secretary of State had no effect in India, why were these officers not told so before? Prom year to year these officers could get no answer, and the Commander-in-Chief in India could get no answer to their applications on the subject. It was also stated that the officers of the British Army were entitled to British pay. If so, why was it that they never got it? The officers complaining, though raised to the rank of major, never received the pay of majors, they only received the pay of captains. He was not sufficiently skilled in constitutional law as to say whether it was correct or incorrect; but looking at the question from a plain, common-sense point of view, he was of opinion that these Royal Warrants were not concocted by the Secretary of State, but were the result of the united deliberations of the Cabinet; and since India had been held by England, there was no precedent whatever by which any officer, if he obtained substantial rank, did not receive the allowances of that rank as well as the British pay of that rank. Another reason assigned for the non-recognition of those officers was that the India Office had not been consulted in the matter; but from the evidence given before the Committee on East India Finance it showed that in the opinion of the Secretary of the Military Department for the time, in the opinion of Lord Cardwell, and of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, the India Office had been duly communicated with in reference to the changes effected in the military organization. He came next to a rather peculiar point. As the House were well aware, the Government of India, following a system which had been more or less prevalent in Europe a century ago, made special allowances to officers for the equipment of their regiments. The last instance of this was the old regimental-clothing colonel, who received allowances for clothing his regiment. The system was objected to by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, when the Royal Artillery was first sent out to India, and also on subsequent occasions, though it was approved of by Lord Panmure, Lord Ellenborough, and the Court of Directors. In 1859 and 1861 the Indian Government rather objected to it, on the ground that the stores sent to Bombay were said to be rotten. A Committee was then formed, of which Sir George Barker, who died early in India, was the Chairman, and that Committee reported against the system, but the Government of India considered it so essential on the ground of economy, that it was established throughout India. Lord Cardwell said that many officers made large sums of money out of these contracts and other matters; but the Duke of Argyll asked for further information with regard to them. An inquiry was instituted, and at the end of 18 months the result was that it appeared that, taking the whole of those contracts all round, able and experienced officers might make something like, 25 per cent out of them, but that officers who were new to Indian Service, or who happened to have particularly long marches, were likely to be losers. The Government of India, finding that to be the case, and being desirous of extending the system, went further into the matter, and the result was that a confidential Circular was sent round to the officers commanding the Artillery in India, asking them to carry on these contracts at a higher rate than they were then receiving, but they declined to have anything further to do with them. The Government of India then took legal advice on the matter, which was to the effect that they could not force these officers to have to do with these contracts, and that they would have to take them over into their own hands. In a final Report, however, the Government of India said that whether the officers had made any money out of the contracts or not they had carried out their part of the bargain, and the matter had nothing to do with the question of their pay. They further said that if the officers had made money, it could be no excuse for withholding the pay from them. Lord Salisbury, in 1874, agreed in this view; and in July of that year he (Colonel Jervis) was informed that a Warrant would be sent out on the subject of the pay. The Warrant was not published in India till January following, and was not to take effect till April. Memorials and confidential communications on the subject were forwarded from India, but none of them, he believed, ever reached the War Office. It had been stated that when Lord Cardwell had promoted them it had been on the understanding that no increase was necessary to the pay and emoluments of commanding officers of batteries, and that any increase allowed should be charged on the Indian revenue. Lord Cardwell afterwards said—

"that financial considerations ought not to be overlooked; but he must consider what was just and expedient for the British Army; and that could not be set aside because the conditions in India were different from others."

The Indian Government had admitted that the officers in India had to pay for fuel and travelling expenses, which in England were defrayed by the Government, and their pay was liable to income tax. His reason for bringing the subject forward was that British officers in India had no one to look to but the Secretary of State for War. These officers had been played with, the Secretary and Under Secretary of State being the battledores, and the officers the shuttlecocks, for the last five years; and sending them from the India Office to the War Office, and vice versâ, was a system of dealing with the Indian Army that was utterly pernicious and destructible of discipline and good feeling. This same kind of conduct was pursued by the India Office towards non-commissioned officers. In June, 1875, a letter, however, was written by the Commander in Chief, bringing the subject under the notice of the War Office and requesting a settlement; but so far as he could make out no reply was sent to that letter. They were told that it was under consideration. A second letter was sent by the Commander in Chief to the India Office, but with no better result. He had heard, indeed, from Mrs. Grundy that the India Office could hold no communication with the Commander in Chief on the matter; and that it had taken three weeks to find out what portion of the Secretary of State's Department had to communicate with the India Office. In the meantime, the Commander in Chief in India had declared that that the matter would be brought before Parliament. It never had been; and as the subject could no longer be allowed to remain in abeyance, he had no alternative but to take the duty on himself. If these men were wrong and were not entitled to anything, why not tell them so in the first instance, and not go on in suspense for five years and then leave them where they were? The course that had been pursued had had the effect of making the Commander in Chief look absurd in India, and discipline was interfered with in consequence. His Royal Highness was colonel of the Royal Artillery and of the Royal Engineers, and how could he meet the officers? He believed that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War would admit that these gentlemen were entitled to the money. As to Lord Salisbury, who had done so much to put an end to ill-feeling in other branches of our Indian Service, he believed he was utterly unacquainted with the real state of affairs, for he was not the man to take refuge behind the Council of India. And what, he would ask, would be the feelings of those officers if, after they had been officially informed that the question of their grievances would be brought before the House of Commons, the House were that evening to say they would not entertain it? Such a course could only serve to impress the whole Army in India with the idea that a man the moment he left this country was at the mercy of the India Office, and if such a case as the present were slurred over we might not find it so easy to find men again when we required their services. The hon. and gallant Gentleman concluded by moving for a Select Committee to inquire into the subject.

, on rising to second the Motion, said, that his hon. and gallant Friend had left very little for anybody to say on the subject; but he must express his astonishment at the manner in which these gallant officers had been treated, not the slightest attention having been paid to their remonstrances. An answer had not been received until 18 months after a letter had been written. These officers appeared to have done everything that officers were bound to do; their remonstrances had been couched in the most respectful terms, and he contended that they had not been well treated. A Committee ought to be appointed to inquire into the grievances, and if his hon. and gallant Friend pressed his Motion to a division he should certainly vote for it.

said, he would briefly state the reasons why the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India had, with the unanimous approval of his Council, declined to admit the validity of the claims now made. Lord Salisbury, as his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Jervis) truly remarked, had given considerable attention to the grievances of Indian officers, and had dealt with them fairly and liberally. Therefore the House might be assured it was not without strong grounds that his Lordship took the course he had taken in the matter. A great deal had been said about the pay of British officers. Now, British officers were liable to serve in any part of Her Majesty's dominions. Whatever part of those dominions they might be in, they were legally entitled to the British pay of their rank. It was not alleged that the officers referred to in the Motion had not received that pay. On the contrary, he would show that they had received a great deal more. As long as British officers were paid by the English Treasury they scarcely ever received anything more than the British pay of their rank. In Ceylon, in Hong Kong, and some places elsewhere they received small Colonial allowances; but in India, and in India alone, allowances were given which were in many cases three times, and in all cases twice as much as officers received in any other part of Her Majesty's dominions. The Indian Government had never hesitated to treat the officers thus liberally, on the understanding that they alone should have the control over the extra pay and extra allowances. The difference between England and India was as follows, taking the rupee at 1s. 9¼d.:—A lieutenant-colonel of Cavalry received £474 in England, and £1,673 in India; a lieutenant-colonel of Infantry, £365 in England, and £1,539 in India; a lieutenant-colonel of Artillery, £328 in England, and £1,109 in India; a captain of Artillery, £200 in England, and £466 in India; and so on. When the India Office gave their assent to a Royal Warrant, they were always very careful first to ascertain what additional charge should be imposed upon their military expenditure. In 1872 the India Office heard indirectly that there was an intention on the part of the War Office to make the promotions in rank which had been referred to; and in February, 1872, a letter was written by the Duke of Argyll to the War Office,, pointing out that the effect of the proposed promotion would be to increase the military expenditure of India if they carried Indian allowances. Lord Cardwell, in reply, said that the financial arrangements of India and the military allowances were controlled by the Secretary of State for India, and if he thought them too large he could reduce them. That circumstance alone showed that there was a perfect understanding between the two Secretaries of State upon the subject. If the claim now brought forward were forced on the Indian Government it would involve an increased charge of about £50,000 a-year on the revenues of India. The objection of the India Office to the proposal was two-fold. They thought the promotion was unnecessary; but as the question was a military one, they waived that objection. But they also had a financial objection, for the Royal Warrant, as originally proposed, was drawn in such a manner that it put the officers promoted in the same position as other majors of the Army. They feared that claims such as the present might be preferred, and accordingly the Royal Warrant was purposely altered to prevent them being made. The Indian Government having received a number of Petitions from these officers, who thought they were entitled to get the same pay as other majors, wrote to the Duke of Argyll suggesting the abolition of what was called the contract system, and an increase of the rate of pay of all the officers who had been recently promoted. The contract system, by which all captains of batteries were enabled to make considerable profits, was a bad system, and the Royal Artillery had always objected to it. The great majority of the first captains of Artillery in India were in receipt of these contract allowances, and Sir George Barker in 1860 had advised an equivalent in the shape of long pay. He put it at 300 rupees per month, but the Indian Government now estimated it at between 150 and 200. The Duke of Argyll, however, required accurate information before he decided on the amount to be given. This information arrived from India after the noble Duke had left office; and Lord Salisbury, who succeeded him, gave his assent to the increased expenditure as soon as the contract system was abolished, which took place on the 1st of April, 1875. This was done to remove a grievance and to get rid of an objectionable system; but now, after making this concession to the officers, and giving them increased pay, the Indian Government were asked to give this increased pay in addition to the contract allowances from the date of the Royal Warrant—in other words, the Royal Warrant issued in England must ipso facto carry with it Indian allowances and Indian pay. If that were once admitted, it would destroy the fundamental principle of Indian finance; and he was sure the Secretary for War would not desire such an alteration, which would also involve the English military authorities in great difficulties. His hon. and gallant Friend had wished the case to be referred to a Select Committee; but in doing so they would only follow up a foregone conclusion. The whole question, in fact, was whether they were dealing with arrears of pay, or with a demand for increased pay. Lord Salisbury having looked carefully into the facts, had come to the conclusion that this was a claim which could not be admitted. His Council, which included several military men, who were usually tender towards grievances, were unanimous in their opinion of it. The Indian Council, it should be remembered, had by Act of Parliament an absolute veto upon all expenditure, and he could not imagine that Parliament would take away from it that control and transfer it to the War Office. Certainly it was to be regretted that any of the officers should have made complaints for some time without being answered; but the Secretary of State was giving the matter his attention, and Papers would soon be on the Table of the House. The transaction had occurred before the present Government entered office, and their claims were a legacy which, however unpleasant it might be, would have to be settled. It was plain, nevertheless, that the charge ought not to be on the revenues of India, and the Duke of Argyll, had he anticipated them, would never have agreed to the Warrant. His hon. and gallant Friend had stated that the case was before Parliament; for his own part, he did not think so, though, no doubt, Parliament was the ultimate appeal. He was not sorry that appeal had been made, for it had given him an opportunity of mentioning the circumstances under which the Warrant had been issued; the conditions imposed by the Duke of Argyll, and the care he had taken to state distinctly that he did not intend to allow the charge to be placed on the Indian revenues. Under these circumstances, he must ask the House to negative the Motion; for if the question had concerned the finances of England, there would have been but one answer—namely, that of the English taxpayer: he believed, however, that the House would in like manner protect the taxpayers of India.

said, that according to Lord Cardwell, it was intended that the rank of major in the Artillery should carry the pay of major of the Line. Nothing could be clearer than that; but the fact was that there was a want of correspondence between the two offices, and the India Office had repudiated the increased pay. The noble Lord had referred to a letter in which the India Office had refused to sanction the increased pay; but these words oc- curred in another part of the same letter—

"It must, at the same time, be considered that what is just to the British Army cannot be set aside, because the peculiar arrangements of India render the change more expensive."

The noble Lord had endeavoured to prove that the two Offices had acted in concert to oppose the pay from the year 1872 to 1874; and he could demonstrate that the War Office could not possibly interfere. The fact was that up to 1875 there was no possibility of the War Office objecting. He believed that the War Office and the India Office were acting together now; but were they to take the answer of the noble Lord as final, or were they to expect to hear something from the Secretary of State for War; because, if the noble Lord spoke not only for the India Office, but also for the War Office, why did not Lord Cardwell speak not only for the War Office, but for the India Office, in 1872? The fact was that for two years they had been giving these officers a superior rank without any increase of pay, and the consequence was, that they had to maintain a superior position and to meet heavier expenses without a similar increase of income.

supported the Motion. He was in favour of the utmost economy being at all times exercised with regard to the finances of India; and at no previous period, not even when the finances of India were in great disorder after the Mutiny, was real economizing in the management of Indian expenditure more needed than at the present time, when new or additional taxes were about to be laid on the people of India in order to meet imprudent and unwise outlays; but, at the same time, he thought justice ought to be done, and that there were many openings both in the civil and military services for effecting these economies without resorting to the objectionable practice of withholding from individuals their fair and reasonable claims, and on this broad ground he considered every officer entitled to the remuneration which the custom of the service had entitled him. At all events, it was right that the interests of these officers should be protected at any cost. Injustice had already been done to the Artillery officers in that case — he cared not by what means or in what way—and a remedy ought to be found. When the Government saw fit, whether rightly or wrongly, to raise first captains to field rank they were bound to give them the pay of that rank. It had been stated by the noble Lord that Artillery officers had been already sufficiently remunerated in India by contract allowances. Well, he admitted that some Artillery officers had made money by contract allowances; but many who were careless did not cover the expenses they had incurred. But it was wrong to say that the officers alone benefited by these contracts, for the Government of India was far more benefited; the work done for the money paid under these contracts between the commanders of batteries and the State was far more cheaply, and, on the whole, as efficiently done than if the Government had retained the duty. Besides, the abolition of the contracts could have easily been ordered in 1872 as they had been since; it was, therefore, in the interests of the State that these contracts were kept up until 1875, and, being so kept up for the benefit of one party, there was no reason for keeping back the pay of majors until the Government found it convenient to undertake the work. Then, another reason might be urged, that though 58 battery officers were in receipts of profits from contracts with the Government to maintain batteries and houses in an efficient state out of the allowances, yet there were 28 battery commanders who had no such contract allowances, but who, holding the rank of major, were only paid as captains, being a course entirely at variance with all the precedents in India. On this ground he supported the Motion.

said, that this was a question which had been going on for several years, and, as had been admitted by his noble Friend, no answer had been given either by the Office of the Secretary of State for War, to which the officers looked, or by the India Office, who were to give the extra pay. That no answer should have been given was a great grievance in itself, and ought not to be tolerated by the House. It was a plain, straightforward question, and it was a mischievous and a miserable thing that a question of pay and allowances should be bandied about between two great Offices of State, the War Office and the India Office, and that neither of those two great Departments should have taken it up and settled the question. He had himself formed part of a deputation to his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War in relation to this subject; and, judging from his words, as well from the expression of his countenance, he certainly understood that he thought the officers had a very good case, and that he would be prepared fully to endorse what Lord Cardwell had stated in that House, when without any reservation he declared that it was necessary in the interests of the service that first captains of Artillery and Engineers should have the substantive rank of majors in the Army with the pay and emoluments of that rank. He therefore hoped the House would pause before they gave a vote adverse to the Motion of his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Jervis). A compromise had been arrived at in 1875 which now satisfied the officers, and it was only right that the claims of those who served as majors from 1872 to 1875 should be allowed. He looked to his right hon. Friend, in conjunction with the India Office, to do justice to these men.

said, that during the discussion he had been so frequently appealed to, that he thought it his duty to say something with reference to the question. It was quite true that when he first heard of this case, and especially when he received the deputation which had been alluded to by his hon. and gallant Friend, he thought a great deal,; of it—that it required further investigation, and so far as the War Office was concerned there had been no lack of energy in calling upon the India Office to say whether they would do what was required or not. The Secretary of State for India in Council had the power conferred upon him to say what they would pay out of the India finances in respect of the Army; and it was to them he had had to appeal, and to them they must look for a decision. At the same time, he ought to say that when he read the answer of Lord Salisbury, which he was sorry, through some misapprehension, was not on the Table of the House, he had come to the conclusion that, though there had been some confusion in the beginning of the case, there was an explicit understanding that if these majors were made, their promotion was not to entitle them to these additional allowances in India, entailing such a large expense. One fact which showed that that must have been the case was this—There was the arrangement of contract allowances to captains in India, on which it had been said some of them made a profit of 25 per cent. Captains of Horse Artillery in India received £605 independent of contract allowances, whereas majors at home had only £356 5s. 6d. Captains in India had nearly double what majors had at home, so that being made a major probably brought a man up to what he had as a captain in India. But there were others who had not these contract allowances; and the Duke of Argyll showed how entirely he considered the matter was in his own hands; as, in order to equalize the receipts of these two classes, he raised those who had not these beneficiary contracts from 30 rupees to 100 rupees per month. And these officers, who thus had their pay increased, were amongst the majors who were now asking for arrears. They were not, in fact, arrears of pay at all—they were allowances given in India at the discretion of the Indian Government. They were under the control of the Secretary of State for India in Council. After a full consideration of all the circumstances of the case, Lord Salisbury had, he believed, judiciously come to the conclusion that they were not bound to give these arrears. No doubt the intention of Lord Cardwell had been to put the majors in India on the same footing as majors of the Line; but when he consulted with the Secretary of State for India a difficulty arose which he did not foresee with reference to the charge on India, and an alteration was made in the Warrant accordingly, making it imperative on the Government of India not to pay those claims. The Duke of Argyll, in order to compensate those who had not contract allowances, added to their income 70 rupees per month; but though the majors were content to receive an increase of income of 70 rupees per month from the Secretary of State for India, they refused to accept any decrease of pay from the same authority, although that discretion was clearly given to him by the Act. Sir John Adye had gone fully into this matter, and was clearly of opinion that these majors were not entitled to have the full pay and allowances of majors in India; and that was acted upon from the beginning. It was a great pity there had not been more negotiation at first, and that everything had not been put in writing on a clear and accurate footing; but the Indian Government had acted throughout in good faith and honour in the matter with the War Office, and he could not but support his noble Friend the Under Secretary in the conclusion he had come to.

said, it was immaterial whether the late or the present Government were to be blamed for the lapse that had occurred with reference to this subject. This was a question of justice and truth, and it ought not to be decided on narrow technicalities. He would ask whether, when these officers were promoted to the rank of major, they were informed that they would not receive additional pay in the usual manner—namely, by a General Order of the Governor General in Council? [Mr. GATHORNE HARDY: There was a General Order issued in August.] It was not issued in the usual terms; and as there had been a misunderstanding on the subject, he thought as a point of honour they ought to do what these officers asked, and not, at any rate, allow their case to be bandied about between the two Offices without any notice being taken of the grievance under which they undoubtedly suffered. The refusal to pay what the officers believed they were entitled to, had created a great deal of dissatisfaction, and if the hon. and gallant Member opposite (Colonel Jervis) insisted on a division he should feel bound to vote with him.

said, the following were the words used by Lord Cardwell in introducing the Army Estimates in 1872:—

"We now propose to establish the rank of major in the Artillery with a pay and position similar to that of major in the Line."— [3 Hansard, ccix. 892.]

But no one in the House at the time, and no officer interested in the matter, could suppose for a moment that Lord Card-well had control over the revenues of India. The pay and allowances of the Army in India rested absolutely with the Indian Government, and when Lord Cardwell made the statement, he was perfectly acquainted with the fact. When the time came for the Warrant to be issued, Sir Thomas Pears pointed out the existence of the contract allowances, and showed that to give the Artillery majors the full pay of Line majors, in addition to those lucrative allowances, was to impose too great a burden upon the Indian taxpayers. It was to avoid this that a break was made in the rate of pay, and it was fixed at 14s. 6d. and 18s. 6d., with a command allowance of 1s. 6d. That allowed the Indian Government to make such an arrangement as they chose, and prevented them from being saddled with an expense altogether out of proportion to that which they were entitled to bear. As to those arrangements anyone who knew Lord Cardwell knew him to be a man who would not make any statement unless he was able to carry it out, and yet such a statement he would have made had he promised these officers additional pay in India. Sir Thomas Pears, whom the hon. and gallant Member (Colonel Jervis) had attacked, was a man of the highest honour and integrity, and there was nothing contradictory between his statement and that which his noble Friend had made in this House.

, in opposing the Motion, said, he had often heard that no interest was taken in Indian affairs, unless personal matters were involved. He confessed that when he compared the attendance that evening, when a question had been before the House affecting certain persons outside the House, who, however, had strong influence inside the House, with the attendance the other night when the Indian Budget was under discussion, and when the whole question of Indian finance was being debated, he was obliged to come to the conclusion that those who made this statement were right. The vote just given, if effect were given to it, would reverse the whole policy on which was founded the financial Government of India. He would yet trust that, in the end, the official statements would prevail over the impassioned appeal which had been made that evening. He should, therefore, again divide the House against the Motion.

, in rising to move the following Eesolution:—

"That, having regard to the fact that men of the First Class Army Reserve, when called out last autumn, appeared in a larger proportion than any other branch of Her Majesty's Forces, this House is of opinion that it would be expedient to allow at least five thousand men now in barracks, who are over thirty years of age and have had ten years service, to retire into that reserve,"

said, he was sorry that so long a period as three and a-half months had elapsed before an opportunity was afforded to the House of discussing the Army Estimates. He regretted this the more, because, in the first place, the matter could be discussed without anything of Party feeling; and in the second, because he thought the House was bound to inquire now how far the plan of Lord Cardwell had answered, and more especially, seeing the state of affairs in the East, and the existence of a war which might extend over Europe and even to our own shores, to consider what was the state of our military Forces. He gave the Secretary of State for War every credit for the loyalty with which he had endeavoured to carry out the plans of Lord Cardwell in re-organizing the Army; but, as the years of transition from the old to the new system had passed by, it was now both wise and expedient that the public should have a full and frank diagnosis of the condition of the Army. His object was to state certain facts in order to show that the existing condition of things was unsound, and then to ask some questions of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War as to the means to be taken in order to provide a remedy, and to which he hoped the Committee would get satisfactory answers, before any more money was voted. Rumour said that the Government contemplated asking for a vote of £5,000,000, and in about six weeks Parliament would have ceased to be sitting. Under these circumstances the interests of the nation demanded a full and careful investigation of, and an intelligent criticism upon, the condition of our military Forces. At the time of the reforms introduced by Lord Cardwell it was generally agreed that the condition of our military Forces was such that it was essential to the safety of the country that they should be put upon a sound footing; and that the cost of our Army was out of all proportion to the number of men that we could bring together in case of emergency. The remedy that was proposed was that in future, in time of peace, the Army should create and maintain a Reserve of young men who, in time of war, should rejoin the Army, and it was predicted that the country would receive its reward in having a thoroughly efficient Army and a diminishing military expenditure. So far, however, from the expenditure having decreased, it had increased, and was still increasing. Comparing the year 1874 with 1877, he said the Estimates in the former year were £14,485,700, while the Estimates for the present year amounted to £15,443,700; but there were Supplementary Estimates, which had been already voted, amounting to £140,000, making altogether £15,583,700, or an increase upon the year 1874 of £1,098,400. Last year the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War proposed to give an increase of pay to the extent of 2d. per day to a certain class of men in the Army, and he did so with a view, as he stated, to reduce the enormous amount of desertion which then prevailed. As a matter of fact, this had just worked the other way, and he (Mr. Holms) ventured at the time to express a different view as to the result of the proposal from that taken by the right hon. Gentleman; for he held that the effect of giving an increase of pay to one class of the men would be to increase desertion among those who would not come within the scope of the proposal. Its financial result was this—that in five years the additional charge would add £200,000 to the Estimates; in 10 years it would add £300,000; in 15 years, £400,000; while in 20 years and every year afterwards it would add £500,000 to the Estimates. Then, again, India this year was called upon to pay £260,000 more for her recruits than she paid last year, not because she was getting more, or a better article for the money; on the contrary, she was getting less, and a worse article. She was, under the existing system, always called upon to pay for our experiments and our failures. Well, he thought he had shown clearly, as he had said, that our military expenditure, both at home and in India, had greatly increased since 1874, and that it was still increasing. And now he would consider how was 1877 as compared with 1871 as regarded actual numbers. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War stated, in introducing the Army Estimates, that our Establishments were full, and he was perfectly right in saying so. But while that was so, the actual number they had now was 4,048 men fewer than they had throughout the year 1871. It was stated in the annual abstract that the average Force throughout that year of non-commissioned officers and men was 183,471, which, with 3,448 of the First Class Army Reserve brought the total up to 186,919. In the beginning of the present year, there were 181,875 non-commissioned officers and men and 6,062 of the First Class Army Reserve, making a total of 187,837. That would at first sight appear to be an increase; but a close examination of the Estimates for each year would show that this year 5,066 men were transferred from the permanent Staff of the Militia to the Regular Army. Thus in comparing the numbers they ought either to add these to 1874, or to subtract them from this year. If this was done, the result would be, as he had stated, to show that we had, at the present time, 4,048 fewer men than in 1871. Again, in 1870 and 1871 we had the enormous force of 64,000 men rated as old pensioners. This year they were asked to vote 68,234 of the same class, at an expense of £153,000 for them more than they had voted under that head in 1871. The right hon. Gentleman, in introducing the Army Enlistment Bill in 1876, said that his object in doing so was to induce a better class of men to enter the Army—a class which would greatly reduce desertion. Well, it had not had that effect; and, in fact, the condition of our soldiers at that moment was not creditable to the nation. He would compare the amount of military crime with that of civil crime, as between the years 1873 and 1875. They had recently had before them a measure of considerable interest— namely, the Prisons Bill; and in the course of the discussion to which it gave rise facts were stated which showed a satisfactory condition on the part of the people of this country—a moral advancement among its industrial population which was highly satisfactory. They were told, on the authority of the Government, that our prisons were far too numerous, and that it was possible to close at least 50 of them in England and Wales; and that this was due not so much to higher wages or the spread of education, but in no small degree to the prevalence of a kindlier system — a stretching out of the hand towards men to give them self-control and that self-respect, which, as his hon. Friend the Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor) had well said, was the foundation of all respect. They had, however, on the other hand, a system of treatment in the Army which they had a right to expect would have prevailed in the 16th or 17th centuries rather than at the present day. What were the facts? The proportion of crime, or what was included under that head, in the Army was infinitely greater than that of the civil community. The number of criminal convictions in the United Kingdom in the year 1870 was 18,400; while in 1875, with a great increase of population, the number had fallen to 15,580. The number of sentences by court-martial in 1870 was 6,900, or, as the Army was small then, the corrected number would be 7,600, while in 1875 the number had increased to 9,000, and that among 93,000 men. If they only had the same proportion as between the numbers of the Army and that of the civil population, they would have only 93 soldiers in prison instead of 2,060. He visited Millbank the other day, and there, within three-quarters of a mile of that House, he found 550 military prisoners, about 500 of whom, under a more common-sense system, would not he there at all. If there were 62 Bulgarian prisoners confined in a prison, questions would be asked in that House, and there would be a full attendance of hon. Members; but the existence of things at Millbank was regarded as a matter for no comment. The punishments in the Army had by no means decreased. In 1870 there were 1,616, in 1871 there were 1,032, and in 1876 there were 1,682 punishments inflicted. No fewer than 164,OOOminor punishments were inflicted upon soldiers in 1875. Those were the years when they were told that the condition of the soldier was improving; but, in his opinion, it was getting steadily worse. The truth was that the condition of the Army was such that no respectable young man would enter it, even if the pay were raised to 10s. a-day, and the conditions of the Service must be altered before they would be able to attract them to join. At the beginning of the Session the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Colonel Naghten) asked the Home Secretary, whether he was aware of the great number of criminal offences committed wherever large bodies of troops were stationed, and whether, if those offences were not diminished, it was the intention of the Home Office to send down an increased force of police at the cost of the Government? It used to be said by Sir Robert Peel and Lord Palmerston, when the number of military Forces was objected to, that they acted as police to preserve peace and order; but, in this case, the Government had been invited to send down police to keep the troops in order. They had received Returns as to the state of the Army in 1874 and 1875, and he thought that, as a Member of the House, he ought to be furnished with the fullest information as to its state in 1876. The all-important question connected with the Army, as showing what the hold was they had on the men, was the crime of desertion, and the test of desertion was the number of men branded as deserters by being advertized for by the War Office. In 1871 the number thus advertized for was 6,971, and in 1876, 7,610, as belonging to the Regular Army. The number in the Militia was, in 1871, 6,641, and in 1876, 11,469. Last year was the crowning year of desertion; for, while in 1871, 13,600 were regarded—and justly—as an enormous number of deserters, the aggregate number who deserted from the Army and the Militia was about 19,000. In a single month of last year—namely, October—the desertions were from the Army, 854, and from the Militia, 1,600, making a total of 2,454. The War Office was in despair, and these desertions were causing such deficiencies in the ranks that something desperate had to be done; the physical standard had to be lowered, and they were taking young men or old, long men or short. He warned the House not to be carried away with any idea whatever that the Army was improving—it was doing nothing of the kind; it was steadily sinking and subsiding from every point of view. During the quarter ending in March the deserters advertised for were—last year, 1,750, and this year, 2,020. As to crime in the Army, if it were regarded as a blot in 1871, it was greater and darker in 1877. The expense of dealing with these criminal offences was not inconsiderable. The sickness and mortality which were also regarded as too great in 1870 or 1871 had increased, but the increase was so small that he would say it was infinitesimal. He would next ask the House to look at a more serious question. The cardinal principle which was laid down in 1871 of having an annual Reserve of trained men had not been at all successful. All the discussions of that time centred upon the Reserve, and the Preamble of the Army Enlistment Bill recognized the same principle, while all the speakers in the debate insisted upon it, that it was essential to have sufficient time in order to create a Reserve. Captain Vivian, on the faith of actuarial calculations, was glad to be able to tell the British taxpayer what he might expect, and he told us, to a man and to a day, how we were to get these Reserve Forces. In seven years ending on the 12th of August this year we were to have 61,266 men; next year, 81,811; and in 1883, the 13th and final year of the scheme, 178,964, who were to be under the age of 31. These were actuarial calculations of what was necessary for the safety of the country; and our position was worse now than when they were made. The House would observe the exactness of these numbers and would remember that those men were to be under the age of 31 years. He would like to know how many of those 61,000 men would turn out on the 12th of August of this year? He had endeavoured every year to show that these anticipations could not be realized at the rate at which we were obtaining recruits; and he was told— "Only wait until 1877, when our plans will be matured, and then we will discuss it." Well, then, let them discuss the question that evening. Last year, the Secretary of State for War said the Reserve was not large, but he expected that this year it would be numbered by as many thousands as there were hundreds last year; and on that account he said last year it would be contrary to common sense to adopt the revolutionary system advocated by the hon. Member for Hackney, as it would throw everything into confusion just at the moment the new system was coming into operation. Was the right hon. Gentleman satisfied with the new system now that it was in operation? He might have had the wrong figures handed to him at the War Office; but it was astonishing he should have adhered to them.

I never said anything of the kind; if the hon. Member will look to what I have said, he will find I never anticipated more than about 7,000 or 8,000 men this year.

said, he would not attribute to the right hon. Gentleman anything he could not find in Hansard. On the 1st of January this year, there were 6,062 men in the First Class Reserve, and in 1871, there were 7,022, so that in six years, in place of an increase in the Reserve for which we had paid millions, there was a decrease of 960 men. The right hon. Gentleman said he could not depend upon more than 3,000 men being added this year, and His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, in his evidence before the Militia Committee (Question 7,843), said it was not probable the Reserve Force would reach 21,000 in the course of the next four years. Would the House be justified, if it recognized this condition of things without a protest? If a Birmingham manufacturer had undertaken to deliver 61,266 rifles by the 12th of August, 1877, and when the time came he had only 9,000 ready, but pointed to the capacity of his establishment and his stock of raw material, he would not be trusted in future; and the complaint against the War Office was, that it pointed to the raw material, instead of producing the manufactured article which had been promised and paid for. If the promise had been kept and we had 60,000 men living at their homes, the result might have been fewer men living in barracks by 30,000 or 40,000, and a reduction of the Estimates by £1,000,000 or £2,000,000. This was the central question, to which we were bound to look. Of the 3,889 men called out last year, only 1½ per cent failed to appear, and high eulogiums were passed upon their appearance by the Secretary for War, while none of them got into difficulties. That showed they were the sort of men they wanted, that they constituted the best and cheapest Force, and that the safety of the nation did not depend upon the number of men in barracks, but upon the number of trained men in the country. This was the direction in which we must look if we were to get rid of crime and desertion. If the safety of the nation was dependent upon the prospective Reserve in 1871, it was still more dependent upon it in 1877. The Secretary for War had made no sign for three years, and he could scarcely expect the House now to refrain from expressing an opinion. The result of all the endeavours to form a Reserve was, that it did not exist. He must now come to the quantity and quality of the raw material. And with regard to that, our condition was worse than it was in 1871; it was worse also in comparison with the other Armies of Europe, which had been improving, while ours had been retrograding. If the Government could not get recruits, they ought to take the House into their counsel. Superficial observers went to Aldershot and saw a handful of battalions, containing, as they were told, a number of recruits, and they were satisfied with the condition of the British Army; but they overlooked the fact that what they saw was but a handful, and forgot that the difficulty was what they did not see—those who were discharged as incorrigible, those who were playing hide and seek, and the raw recruits who were being manufactured into soldiers. In dealing with the quantity and the quality of the raw material from which our soldiers were manufactured, he would refer to the statement made on the part of the Government on the 9th of March, 1871, that the number of recruits which would be necessary annually to enable us to maintain our Army and the Reserve upon a proper footing was 32,449. But, looking at the number of recruits enlisted during the five years commencing in 1871, he found that instead of our having obtained 163,400 recruits in that period, as we ought to have done had the Government programme been carried out, we had only enlisted 97,600, being 65,800 short of the proper number Parliament and the nation had been led to expect. Yet, in view of these facts, we were told year after year that recruiting was in an excellent state, and that we were getting all the men we wanted. He denied the accuracy of that statement altogether. Instead of obtaining 32,500 recruits in 1876, we only enlisted 29,370, leaving us, in round numbers, 3,000 short. In our modern system, with respect to quality, it was absolutely necessary that a certain age in regard to recruits should be closely observed. The recruit was the raw material out of which the soldier was made; and all Europe was agreed that the life of a soldier—the fighting period of his career — only lasted 12 years—namely, from 20 to 32 years of age. The limit of age for enlistment had been fixed by the War Office Memorandum of 1873, at from 18 to 25, that for passing into the Reserve being fixed at 31. For two years that limit had been strictly adhered to, and no recruits were enlisted in the Infantry regiments above the age of 21, the average age of recruits up to April, 1875, being from 19 to 20. He would now proceed to lay before the House figures which would show them to what a pass recruiting had come. The War Office were now taking men as recruits who were 30 years of age—that was to say, within one year of the age which was the limit for their being passed into the Reserve. During the first five months of 1876 we obtained only 8,754 recruits; and in the five months following, when the limit of age was set aside, we obtained 10,000. Then the War Office lowered the standard from 5ft. 5in., at which it had remained since 1871, to 5ft. 4½in., and the result of both changes was to give us 29,370 recruits for the year. The consequence was, that recruits were taken at an age which rendered them practically useless for continued service; and he did not hesitate to say that there were 5,000, 6,000, or 8,000 of the numbers for the year who ought never to have been taken at all, and would never have been taken in any previous year. In January of the present year, the number of recruits obtained was 4,046; in February, the Order respecting the limit of age was again enforced, and the number fell at once to 2,600, and in March, to 1,719, showing that the number had steadily fallen month by month. In the meantime the recruiting sergeants for the Militia were all over the country, and enlisted 38,000 men for that Force in the year from among the agricultural labourers between 19 and 23 years of age, just the very men that were wanted for the Army. Ours was a military nation, and there would be no difficulty about obtaining proper recruits if the matter was properly gone about. Passing to another point, he would ask what was the condition of our Army organization at the present time? He regretted to say that, in his opinion, its condition was very unsound. Not one of the Army Corps in the country was complete. In not one case had the General who was to be at the head of the Corps, and who was to be responsible for everything, been appointed. A military man, whose opinion he had asked as to the condition of the Commissariat and Transport Service, which it would be remembered had so completely broken down in the Crimean War, had assured him that very few men, even among those connected with that department, knew much about it, so great was the muddle and confusion which prevailed. The facts he had stated, drawn from official sources, showed, he submitted, that the condition of the Army was worse at present than it had been in 1871, and, in particular, that the Reserve had utterly and signally failed. He had shown that during the last three years the expenditure had increased by over £1,000,000; that the number of men in the Regular Army and First Class Reserve was 4,048 fewer than in 1871; that the number of old pensioners —not fighting men—had increased by 4,016; that the number of men constantly in prison had increased in four years by 400; that the number of Army and Militia deserters advertized for had. increased since 1871 by 5,471; and that, beyond doubt, thousands of recruits had during the past year been taken who would certainly up to 1876 have have been rejected. It was, therefore, impossible for the War Office to declare that that which was black in 1871, and blacker in 1877, could be, as it was sometimes called, rose-colour. He hoped that the House would not vote one penny of the £11,000,000 that remained to be voted for the Army until the Secretary of State for War had clearly stated his opinion on the state of our Forces. He asked the Government whether they were satisfied with our present position with regard to the Army; secondly, did they intend to maintain and encourage the system inaugurated by their Predecessors of forming a Reserve of trained men under 31 years of age, or not; thirdly, if so, how and when they proposed to bring up the number of such Reserves; and, fourthly, if not, what was to be their military policy? His Motion would go in the right direction. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had said, on the 5th March, that—

"The Committee will be pleased to hear that recruits are coming into the Army in such numbers as, I believe, will enable us to fill up our Reserves more expeditiously."—[3 Hansard, cexxxii. 1408.]

If the Motion were carried the number would be but 14,000, which was within the limit of the Vote proposed. He hailed with satisfaction the Amendment that had been placed on the Paper to his Motion, to pass into the Reserve as many men who had served more than three, and less than six years, as could be conveniently spared from their regiments, in order to carry out the original intention of the Army Enlistment Act of 1870, if over 30 years of age. No doubt, the British Army had done great deeds, and won imperishable victories; but they were bound to remember that it was their duty to take care that they maintained their Army in future as their forefathers maintained it in the past. The destinies of the country were in their hands, and it was not only their duty to maintain the Army for the safety of the country, but to maintain it with a due regard to the social advancement that had been made by all classes, as a means of improving rather than of deteriorating their population. He would conclude by moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice, which he regarded as extremely moderate and practicable, inasmuch as he only asked the House to assent to what would be the beginning of a sound system.

said, he was surprised that after the excellent speech which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) had just made, he had concluded with so feeble a Motion. He could scarcely believe the hon. Gentleman to be serious in making that Motion, than which nothing more impotent could be conceived. The Motion, was, in fact, only a peg on which to hang the speech; but there was another Motion which the hon. Gentleman had been twice prevented from bringing before the House, which would have been a better peg for the purpose; because that Motion challenged the soundness of the whole military policy of the late, as well as the present, Secretary of State for War. That Motion raised a distinct issue as to the expediency of remodelling our Army on a new basis. That Motion would have been perfectly intelligible; but the object of the present Motion he (Colonel Alexander) confessed he was totally at a loss to understand. He would refer to a few practical difficulties which were, in his opinion, inseparable from the hon. Gentleman's proposal. The hon. Gentleman now proposed that the Secretary of State for War should transfer into the First Class Army Reserve a number of men not exceeding 5,000, who had completed a service of not more than 10 years with the colours. If these men were to be forced into the Reserve, it would be a monstrous injustice. On the other hand, if they were not to be forced into the Reserve, the hon. Gentleman would find it very difficult to persuade them to sacrifice themselves in order to gratify his fancy. Previous to 1847, enlistment was nominally for life, but practically for 21 years; and there were now in the Army men who had enlisted for life. He knew a man in his own battalion who had enlisted in 1844, and had now completed 33 years' service, and this man had a son serving in the same battalion who had nearly completed 11 years' service. In 1847 the Limited Enlistment Act was passed, under the provisions of which men were enlisted to serve for 10 years, with the option, if approved of by the commanding officers, of re-enlisting for another term of 11 years, in order to complete 21 years' service with the colours. That Act remained in force until the passing of the Short Service Act in 1870. The effect therefore of the hon. Gentleman's proposal would be to transfer into the First Class Army Reserve all men enlisted between the years 1857 and 1867. As he had said, it would be monstrously unjust to force into the Reserve those men who after 10 years' service had elected to serve 11 years longer under the colours. The hon. Gentleman might, perhaps, say that the men would volunteer for the Reserve; but he would certainly be disappointed in that expectation. His (Colonel Alexander's) own experience had satisfied him that they would not do so. After the First Class Army Reserve was initiated, it remained for several years at a merely nominal figure. It was supposed to consist of men who had completed 10 years' service with the colours, and officers were bound to ask their men at the expiration of that period whether they would enlist in the Reserve Force. The reply was almost invariably "No!" A fortiori, men who had enlisted for a further term of 11 years would not be persuaded to join the Reserve. Moreover, if men of this class could be obtained they would never amalgamate with the remainder of the Reserve, for they would be double their age. In his book the hon. Gentleman proposed three years' service with the colours and four with the Reserve, and that at the end of that time every man should pass into civil life. But now the hon. Gentleman proposed to pass into the Reserves men who had seen nearly double that amount of service. Again, the hon. Gentleman had spoken about raw recruits, and he was always lamenting the youth of the Army; but his present proposal would tend to make the Army still younger, and deprive it of the only element which steadied and leavened the great mass of youths of whom the Army was composed. The great value of these men was shown by the fact that even now 25 per cent of the recruits for the Line were allowed to be taken for long or 12 years' service. In his (Colonel Alexander's) opinion the only way to obtain a Reserve was by enlisting men, as we were now doing, for six years' service with the colours and six for the Reserve. Men enlisted for service with the colours only would never take kindly to the Reserve. The hon. Gentleman was impatient at the slow progress which the Reserve was making; but it should be remembered that Prussia, to which he referred by way of contrast, had been re-organizing its Army for 50 years. He thought, therefore, we should not be downhearted, because we had not succeeded in filling up our Reserves in six years. It was yet too soon to talk of the deficiency in the Reserves. As he felt quite sure that the element which the hon. Gentleman proposed to infuse into the Reserve would by no means strengthen it, and as the proposal would create the maximum of inconvenience to the Army, with no appreciable advantage to the Reserve, he hoped the House would decline to entertain it.

considered that a great deal of time was being wasted over a question which was not a very practical one. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) seemed to think that the Army was good for nothing, because of the number of boys it contained. Yet he now proposed to take away the few old soldiers and put them into this, as he appeared to think it, phantom Reserve. We insisted on a purely voluntary enlistment on short service, and we were trying to form a Reserve. Under those circumstances, the only way of getting men of sufficient age was by inducing men in considerable numbers to join the Army from the Militia, and that could only be done by doing what he thought the country would never consent to—namely, balloting for the Militia and keeping it up to its full strength. He hoped shortly to see a revision of the Ballot which he could not but admit in its present form was very objectionable. He would remind the House that in France and Germany no one was allowed to enter the Army until he was 20 years of age; but boys of 15 and 16, nominally 18 and 19 were taken in this country. The fact was, that before 20 every Englishman who was worth his salt had learned a trade, and would not enlist in the Army. To-morrow there would be a large parade at Aldershot of all the troops employed in the Manœuvres. A leading journal said it was a splendid Army, and no doubt the writer of that article was well acquainted with military affairs. He (General Shute) had, however, received a letter from a field officer, who stated that a commanding officer at Aldershot told him he had in his regiment 700 men under one year's service; colour-sergeants of two and three years' service; 300 or 400 recruits at drill, with no men fit to instruct them. The records and office work were frightful, and the regiment was now only a drilling establishment. Deserters went away in squads. Such was the result of short service, for which the present Secretary for War was not responsible. Everyone knew that we had sacrified a great deal for the Reserve. It was to be hoped that the Reserve was not altogether a myth, and they had had a proof last year that it was not so much of a myth as he and other hon. Members had imagined. He wished that, at all events, some inducement could be found to induce men and not boys to enlist, and that good recruits were more numerous; but all these details had much better be left to the Secretary for War instead of being discussed in the House.

said, that what struck him most in the speech of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms) was the conclusion, in which he had said a word or two on the Motion itself. He had said a good deal on the subject of prisons and prison labour, but nothing as to the means by which practical effect could be given to his proposition. It seemed to him (Sir Henry Havelock) that the hon. Member's object would be better accomplished by leaving out of his Motion all the words after "expedient," and by inserting these words—

"To pass into the Reserve as many men who have served more than three and less than six years, as can be conveniently spared from their regiments, in order to carry out the original intention of the Army Enlistment Act of 1870."

That was an Amendment of which he (Sir Henry Havelock) had himself given Notice, but which the Rules of the House prevented him from moving. The hon. Member appeared to have changed his views, and was evidently on the horns of a dilemma, for he now agreed that the young soldiers should be passed into the Reserve. He had further said in his book that "real short service had never been tried. That he (Sir Henry Havelock) granted at once; but he could not think it right to pass old soldiers into the Reserve, or to send home men who had received 13 or 14 years' continuous training while the younger men were kept in barracks. [Mr. HOLMS explained that he had not proposed to do so.] The question, however, came to this—Which of the two could best be spared? The young or the old soldier, or did the hon. Member intend them both to pass into the Reserve, in which case there would be no Army? He would venture to criticize one or two of the hon. Member's figures, and would remark that he had certainly not stated the whole case. The British Army, for instance, could not be said to be in a worse state now than in 1871, merely on the strength of the fact that at that time there were 183,000 men in the ranks, and only 3,448 in the Reserve, whereas both these branches were now diminished by about 2,000 men each. Nor was it true that we were now in a worse financial position, because the amount charged for pensions had increased by about £150,000. Surely the hon. Member did not suppose that any one had expected, by initiating in 1870 the formation of a Reserve, that the pension list would be wiped out by 1876? The pensions would necessarily require an increasing sum of money for several years to come. Again, it had been said that in 1874, 1,101 bad characters had been discharged, and that this number had been much larger in 1876—a statement which only meant that the Army machinery had been greatly improved. A "bad character" was simply a man who pursued a trade which the false sentiment of the House itself had done much to foster—namely, that of enlisting from time to time, and who had been at last detected. He was glad to have an opportunity of exposing the delusion which still clung to the word "branded." The hon. Member had spoken of 19,000 such men who had been branded, and had spoken as if it had been done as in former times, when it was done with a hot iron; but such was not the case, for after all, it only came to this—that they were marked "B C" by the perfectly harmless and painless operation of tattooing. As a result, it most certainly had the effect of preventing men enlisting over again. As for the number of these men, it had indeed slightly increased; but the 19,000 deserters of whom the hon. Member spoke represented the accumulation of many years. There was one point on which he was able to agree with the hon. Member, a point which deserved the serious attention of the Secretary for War—namely, that it was matter for regret that the Reserve which both sides of the House had long been endeavouring to form, had not assumed greater proportions. It seemed to be stationary, just as if right hon. Gentlemen had been rolling a stone up a hill, and it was constantly coming back on them. A remedy was required, and the Amendment which stood on the Paper in his name pointed to a remedy; and he hoped a fair trial would be given to it. The fact was, the proportion of exceedingly young men in the Army was so great, that the object of the Act of 1870 could not be accomplished. Lord Cardwell said that in 1883, or 12 years after the Reserve system was begun, he hoped, if his intention was carried into effect, we should have in the Reserve between 60,000 and 70,000 men. In that matter he feared the right hon. Gentleman opposite was not exercising the full powers given him by law, and that he was not resisting as he ought the military pressure put upon him. The Army we had now was one of the youngest Armies in Europe, the great difficulty of commanding officers being to maintain discipline and give anything like formation to those young soldiers. In the Aldershot Division at present the proportion was 35 per cent of men under 15 months' service; he believed he would be right in putting it at 12 months. About a fortnight ago His Royal Highness reviewed some 7,000 men, of whom no fewer than 5,000 were under one year's service. What would be the effect if, out of these regiments you were to take the men of 12 years' service? There would be nothing left to work upon. If the right hon. Gentleman would insist that the men who, after three or four years' service, desired it, should pass into the Reserve, we should soon have a considerable Force. But if we aimed at turning old soldiers into Reserves, we should never have a Reserve Force. One of the most difficult problems we had to solve was how to combine short service with the demands of India, and the sooner the right hon. Gentleman brought that question to an issue, the sooner the country would get something for its money. If the right hon. Gentleman would suggest to the Indian Government that the average service in India should be six years, and not for an indefinite time, he would do better for the Indian Government itself as well as for the Reserves. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Hackney had stated that we were no better off now than we were in 1874. But, in 1874, we had not anything like the Reserve we had at present, which, taking the Militia and Army Reserves together, amounted to some 38,000 men. The real economy would be found in passing men after three or four years' service into the Reserve, and then we should have in them a Force disposable for service in India as well as at home. If the events which occurred in India 20 years ago were to happen now, the 38,000 men we had in the Reserve would be quite available for India at six weeks' notice. There was another point to which he wished to refer, and that was the great objection which young soldiers, as well as old, entertained that their pay was not sufficient to keep them from a state of starvation. Many of the men who passed to the Reserve did not like to go back to their old regiment, and would rather go to another, because they considered their chances better, and he would therefore suggest that it should be made punishable for a man to re-enlist without declaring that he had served before; and if he made the declaration, that he should be allowed to serve in any regiment he liked. He shared in the opinion which had been expressed by his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney that the Reserve ought to become a reality. The Commander-in-Chief had stated, in his examination before the Committee, that he hoped before the end of four years there would be a Reserve of 21,000. He (Sir Henry Havelock) hoped that would be the case; but was of opinion that unless more active measures were taken, the Reserve would not reach that number.

said, that the hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down (Sir Henry Havelock) had connected the Indian with the English Service; but he would not enter into that subject, because it was not connected with the points which had been discussed by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms). He would, however, assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that he was quite alive to the importance of the subject, and that it was an object at which the War Office was aiming in common with the India Office, and he trusted they were advancing towards the point which the hon. and gallant Gentleman wished to see reached. With reference to the speech of the hon. Member for Hackney, he could not help thinking that it would have been much more appropriate if that hon. Member, instead of concluding as he had done with an impotent Motion, had moved for the impeachment of the late and present Secretary for War, and the complete reversal of our whole military system. The hon. Member had presented a very sad and dreadful view of the British Army—it was composed of the halt and blind, its physical quality had been altogether deteriorated, and it had more sickness and mortality prevailing now than at any former period. The hon. Member, in illustration, had used figures taken from sources which had been refuted over and over again; although he had documents quite at hand which were completely reliable, he went to the police and to The Hue and Cry for information as to the amount of desertions; but that afforded no test as to the true state of the case. There was a document on the Table which gave the official details of desertions, but he did not choose to refer to its details. In 1874, there were 5,582 desertions, but of that number 2,052 returned to the Army, and the total loss was 3,530. In 1875, there were 4,373 desertions, or more than 1,000 less; but 1,944 of those men rejoined the Army, and the net loss was 2,429; and in the year 1876, when there was an increased Force and a greater number of recruits than there ever was before in the history of the Army, the desertions were 4,878, as against 5,582 in 1876; but of those men 2,063 rejoined the Army, so that the actual net loss was 2,815. Now, when the hon. Member had that document in his hand, was it just or fair to go to The Sue and Cry, when the official figures showed that there had been a steady decrease from the year which he took as his normal year? [Mr. J. HOLMS: I took the year 1871, not 1874, as the normal year.] Certainly the hon. Member took 1874 as the normal year, for he said it would relieve him from all Party considerations, as that was the year when the present Government came into office. He (Mr. Hardy) had not the Returns before him for 1871, but he had for 1872; and in that year the net loss to the Army from desertions was 4,006, therefore it appeared that the further the hon. Member went into his figures the further he went from that position which in all fairness he ought to have placed before the House. With respect to 1871, again he had imposed on the House. In 1871 a Vote was taken by his Predecessor for 20,000 additional men. There were not now so many men in the Army by something like 6,000 men, and the hon. Gentleman was bound to inform the House of the particular circumstances which had occurred in 1870, yet he said not one word about the number of recruits in 1871. Then the hon. Member went into the question of pensions; but he had not adverted to the notorious fact that a great number of 21 years' men who had been enlisted for the Crimean War were just taking their pensions last year. The hon. Member made no allusion to the special circumstances that had occurred, and offered no explanation of the increase of pensions on that account. It was not fair that the House should be so misled. As to crime, the hon. Member had thought it proper to blacken the Army as steeped in crime out of all proportion to the civil population; but the hon. Member had not stated that there were offences in the Army which were peculiar to it, such as insubordination and offences to superior officers— offences which were not known in civil society. Now, though he was sorry to say that there was more crime in the Army than could be wished for, yet these men made capital soldiers in active service, and were as ready to do their duty to their country as others; and he did not think it was wise to make it appear that all the worst characters entered the Army; rather it should be shown to men that there was as good an opportunity of doing as well in the Army as in other positions of life. The hon. Member would prefer men who should be paid 10s. a-day; but he must say he did not believe in getting such men by a system of voluntary enlistment. The worst enemies of the Service were those who, like the hon. Member for Hackney, spoke as if men lost their character by entering the Army, and that there was no opportunity of getting on in the Service. He (Mr. Hardy) believed there never was a time when men received better treatment in the Army, or when officers paid more attention to the comfort, character, and condition of the men, or were more anxious that they should succeed. There was the greatest demand for good soldiers as non-commissioned officers. And with reference to crime he would remind the hon. Member for Hackney that Lord Shaftesbury two years ago when the Autumn Manœuvres took place in his neighbourhod, went to see them, and described their conduct as excellent. No offences were committed by them, and it could hardly be known that there was such a body of men in the district. Last year, again, when two Army Corps were mustered, no crimes were committed by those men. The neighbourhood was undisturbed; they were occupied in their military duties, and when released from them their conduct was exemplary; there was no marauding; the neighbourhood was absolutely surprised at the quietness, decorum, and order that prevailed. He had never stated, as the hon. Member seemed to imply, that the 2d. a-day of deferred pay would cure desertion; what he stated was that when a man had a considerable sum saved, he was less likely to desert, and he said so still. At any rate it could not affect the present state of things as it could hardly yet be said to be in operation. It was not on that account therefore that desertions were now so low. Desertion in 1876 was extremely low; nevertheless 30,000 men were recruited, and principally from a class which did not deserve the severe reprobation the hon. Member for Hackney had applied to them. With reference to lowering the standard, he believed very few had been enlisted over 30, or below the standard. The hon. and gallant Member for Brighton (General Shute) spoke of "young soldiers;" but he (Mr. Hardy) did not believe they would ever get anything but young soldiers in England. The hon. Member for Hackney asked if he (Mr. Hardy) was satisfied with the present system. He was satisfied with nothing so long as improvement could be made. But he believed, if they were to have Reserves, if they were to raise their Army to a point at which they might be satisfied, there was only one way to it—he meant by short service. On the other hand, he never would advocate the using up of all their best men, and then falling back on untried men. The hon. and gallant Baronet opposite (Sir Henry Havelock) spoke of what they should do to prevent desertion. It was pleasant to be praised by one so well able to judge of military matters, but that was exactly what he (Mr. Hardy) was doing. Early in the present year, finding the recruits coming in so numerously, he had directed letters to be written to all the regiments in which there were more than the proper number, directing the officers to offer to place those who had served three years in the Reserve, with the understanding that such men should be well conducted and have the means of gaining their own living. That was a most important thing, as nothing could be worse than to turn out men after three years' service who had nothing to fall back upon for a living. The Reserve pay was not a living, and unless a man had other means of gaining a livelihood you would do him harm rather than good, only tempt him to enlist again, and, in fact, to do much worse. Under that Circular 1,100 men, 746 of whom had fulfilled their first service, had been passed into the Reserve, which on the 1st of April numbered 7,310. He had always said that the formation of a Reserve would be a slow process, but this year he believed they would get from 5,000 to 6,000 men. That brought him to another point to which the hon. Member for Hackney had adverted. The hon. Member had again used the figures of Captain Vivian in that House, which certainly did not apply to the present system. Lord Cardwell, who instituted the present system, never dreamt of putting before the House such figures as those to which the hon. Member alluded. Nor had he (Mr. Hardy) himself ever pretended that they could get up to tens of thousands by this time. He had always said it would be a slow process. Last year the Reserves were coming in very slowly, but he said he thought they would come in in thousands this year, and he was justified in that remark, because the probability was that, as he had stated, they would have between 5,000 and 6,000. But he spoke with diffidence, because he knew that there were many circumstances which might interfere. There were the re - engagements in India, sickness, and many other possibilities. If soldiers were like chessmen, and could be moved at will into the Reserves, the case would be different; but there were circumstances in men's lives which would at times disappoint all calculations. He had always sought to avoid misleading the House by exaggerated expectations in regard to the Reserve, and Lord Cardwell had stated that the utmost they could obtain under that system would be 84,000 men. Then the hon. Member for Hackney, having disparaged the Reserve by comparing it with what he supposed it would be, but what it was never intended to be, went on to the Militia recruiting, and complained that they had got 38,000 men for the Militia last year. No commanding officer of Militia would echo that complaint. The men in these days knew perfectly well what they were enlisting for, whether it was for long or for short service, whether it was for any particular arm of the Service, and certainly whether it was for the Militia or for the Line. The fact was that those who enlisted for the Militia were a different class from those who enlisted for the Line, and although the Militia was an admirable school for the Line, it did not at all disturb enlistment for the Army. Those who went into the Militia knew it was a different service altogether, but it gave many of them a taste for soldiering; they found it more agreeable than they expected, and they passed into the Line. He could not, however, say that the Militia was to be relied upon as an auxiliary to the Reserve. Next, the hon. Member attacked the Commissariat. Up to that point he had been very diligent with his figures; but when he came to the Commissariat he described it as a combination of meddle and muddle, on no higher authority than a letter which he quoted from some one who knew nothing about it, and who wrote for information to someone who knew less, and he added that people in that department were so dissatisfied that they really could not tell him anything about it, and that, therefore, it was in a bad state, and could never come to any good. Now, he (Mr. Hardy) was far from saying himself that the Commissariat did not require improvement. He had made changes in regard to the Control department; he did not despair, if he was let alone, of yet making a better business of the Commissariat; and he hoped the hon. Member for Hackney would quote a correspondent next year who knew something about it, and who found it not nearly so bad as he had supposed it to be, and that, on the whole, the country got all that it could reasonably expect. He agreed with the hon. Member on the unhappy condition of things resulting from getting volunteers from regiments low down in the roster to fill up those which were at the top. Last year the House, with great wisdom, filled up the first 18 regiments to 820 men. But they must see that in the first year those regiments must be full of recruits. It would not be wise or just to send on service regiments which had many recruits in them; and, therefore, it would be necessary to get men from regiments which were lower on the roster. The men could be easily obtained by means of a bounty; and he trusted that those regiments would be better filled up as time went on, and that there would be men in them who had served longer. But in the case of regiments that had many young men it would be advisable to leave those young men with the depots at home, and fill up their places with older men. With respect to Army Reserve men and Militia Reserve men, he should be disposed to keep them for a second reinforcement rather than put them immediately into the first line. But that was a point which would have to be considered hereafter. It had been found necessary to divide recruiting for the Army into long and short service, and it was said that there would be no taste in the country for short service; but the fact had turned out exactly the reverse, because the proportion who enlisted for short service was much greater than that which enlisted for long service. He was sorry, to some extent, for that; because, with a view to those who remained, it was important to have a certain number of long-service men for the position of non-commissioned officers, and this disposition towards short service had interfered with the supply. Still, would it, he asked, be wise, under the difficulties in which they found themselves, to rush suddenly to another extreme, because, as had been pointed out, the hon. Member for Hackney had changed his front this year? They used to hear of men with one year's service; but if they had such a system as that, in what state would their regiments be, and how fit would they be for service? But, again, would it be desirable wholly to rely on three years' service? If the three years' service men had the means of supporting themselves in civil life, that might be desirable; but to cut down the six years to three years would be a most objectionable system. The new view of the hon. Member in regard to the Reserve was an extraordinary one. If they took those 10 years' men, as the hon. Member suggested, in three years they would be free from the Reserve, because 12 years was the outside period for which the hon. Member thought a man ought to be called upon to serve. The hon. Gentleman asked when and how they would form a Reserve? There was but one way, and that was the method they were adopting. He admitted it was a slower method than he could desire; but it was the only one—namely, by passing the men through the ranks of the Army. They must take those who wished to stay till the end of six years. As it stood, they would get some 12 years' men, and as three years' training in the Army was a very sufficient training, their nine years' men would prove effective. He did not despise the Militia Reserve, which he believed was one to which the country might look with very considerable confidence. He did not say it would be wise to place it at once into the front ranks; but after a few weeks' training it could be made fit to be put side by side with the soldiers of the Line. If that was so, they had practically at that moment a Reserve of 35,000 men available, and that was more than people looked forward to five or six years ago. The actual Reserve of men who had passed through the Army was this year beginning really to increase. If they got their 5,000 or 6,000 men this year—and it was really the first year in which the system had had a fair trial— they might calculate that they had fairly began; that it would go on, and yield them 5,000 or 6,000 annually. Though slow, it was safe; every man would be well trained, and fit to take his position beside the soldiers of the Line in any ranks or places to which they wished to send them. Had not this country gone through a very long military probation? It had not a vast force of Regular troops in its Service always ready to take the field; but it had trained a great number of men who, although they had not gone through the ranks, would be available for the service of the country at any moment. Moreover, it was to be borne in mind that in their Second Reserve they had some 24,000 who, though they might not be fit for active service in the field, yet would be quite available for garrison duty, and would prove a great stay to our Volunteers, who would also, he believed, do good service. He could not hesitate to express the opinion that, in addition to the 170,000 or 180,000 men we would have at our disposal, there would be 500,000 or 600,000 who, having passed through the Volunteer Service, would be able to render effective aid, if the country were put on its defence. He also expected that we should find young men to send abroad, for the military spirit which had been invoked by the Volunteers had produced such an effect that, so far from there being a difficulty in getting men to send abroad, his belief was that a greater number in proportion to the population would be ready to rush to the front than on any former occasion. He might be wrong, but that was his opinion, taking into account the military spirit which had been called forth in the country within the last 20 years. He must apologize to the House for having trespassed upon its time so long, and for the minuteness with which he had gone into the question. But he wished to part with all good will from the hon. Member for Hackney, of whom he had said some hard things, but who also had used some strong expressions with regard to him, which certainly were not undeserved if he had been guilty of all that had been laid to his charge. But, be they little or much deserved, he could assure the hon. Gentleman he would forgive him for all that had fallen from him in the course of his speech.

said, he was anxious that the House should get into Committee, and he would not, therefore, occupy much time. While generally concurring in the main object which the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) had in view, he must express his dissent from many of the assertions which he had made. His hon. Friend had said that the promises which had been held out at the time the Short Service Act was passed had not been fulfilled, and had called up the ghost of Captain Vivian's figures, which had been laid again and again, in support of the statement. Now, he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) was anxious, not only for the sake of Captain Vivian, but of the Government with which he was connected, to explain in what circumstances those figures had been quoted. His hon. Friend stated that the House of Commons was asked in 1870 to pass the Short Service Act, and that Captain Vivian had promised that in eight years after the institution of the system the Reserve would reach 81,811. These figures, however, had not been quoted as one of the conditions of the passing of the Bill, and, indeed, were not quoted until 1871, when the scheme of Army reform which had been propounded by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho), and which had been examined by the actuaries of the War Office, was under consideration, and found to be utterly impracticable. It was then, in contrast with the noble Lord's proposal, that Captain Vivian stated what, under certain circumstances, would be the result of the Short Service Act. But those particular circumstances had never come into existence, and the proportion of short service men, which Captain Vivian's statement pre-supposed, and which he expressly quoted as the basis of his calculations, had never yet been enlisted. And lest it should be thought, after all that had been said by his hon. Friend, that there was now, after all, no Reserve in the country, it might be well to state the fact that in 1870, 2,400 men—in round numbers— were enlisted for short service; in 1871, 9,000; in 1872, 10,000; in 1873, nearly 10,000; in 1874, nearly 13,000; and in 1875, 13,000; making, in all, up to the close of 1875—the latest year for which we had an official Return—57,693. So that he presumed they must have at that moment at least 70,000 or 80,000 men serving in the Army, all of whom—subject to the usual casualties—would pass into the Reserve. Those were important facts which the hon. Member seemed to have overlooked. No one could deny that the formation of a complete system of Reserves required time; but he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) trusted the right hon. Gentleman and his military advisers would strive to accomplish the task as soon as possible.

said, he stood up in defence of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms), who deserved great credit for the attention with which he studied the condition of the British Army, and urged the importance of rendering it in all respects an efficient Force. With regard to the Reserve, the hon. Member for Hackney referred to the German system, and indicated how well it worked. No doubt, the German system was based on compulsory, as well as universal liability for some military service, by all the fit youths of the country; but as compulsion was impossible in the present state of feeling in this country, there was no reason why the views of the hon. Member for Hackney in favour of an extension of our short service system should not be favourably considered, and, if deemed suitable for our Army, extended to a far greater extent than hitherto applied. He agreed that if the principle that short service and an effective Reserve growing out of it was the best thing for the Army and for this country, then, to his mind, the number of old soldiers comprised in it was perfectly alarming, assuming the German system and the present short service of this country to be sound in principle. This was the essence of the opinion avowed by the hon. Member for Hackney, and it was a question of the gravest importance, deserving of the fullest investigation. It had never been properly inquired into by either of the Commissioners on recruiting, though it well merited the serious attention of a Select Committee of this House. He therefore cordially and heartily supported the hon. Member in his earnest endeavour to induce the House of Commons to take up this question of the highest national importance.