asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, before further progress is made with the Bankruptcy Bill, the Government will obtain and lay before Parliament a statement of the French Law of Bankruptcy, and the way in which it is administered in that country?

I have consulted the Lord Chancellor upon this subject, and I find that it will be impossible to delay the progress of the Government Bankruptcy Bill in its early stages whilst the information asked for is being obtained; but if the hon. and learned Baronet will move for it, I will do my best to obtain such information as he wants.

asked the Secretary of State for War, When it is his intention to carry out his promise of last Session that the fines for drunkenness stopped from militiamen should be credited to the stock purse or contingent fund of all militia regiments?

, in reply, said, that the Financial Secretary had had his attention directed to the subject, and before the next training he would issue an Order for appropriating the fines in the manner promised last Session.

asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If Her Majesty's Government have yet decided whether, by appointing Commissioners to receive certain revenues or otherwise, they propose to do anything to assist the Turkish Government to raise new loans; and, if so, whether anything has been arranged regarding the precedence of Russian and Roumanian claims for war indemnity, so as to avoid future complications on that score?

The question is one upon which Her Majesty's Government and the French Government have been consulting, and it is still under consideration.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to the case of Mr. Barr, a respectable farmer occupying 150 acres in Renfrewshire, who on Wednesday 19th February last was sentenced by Sheriff Cowan at Paisley to fourteen days' imprisonment with hard labour, without option of a fine, for killing a rabbit on land immediately adjoining his own farm; whether he will remit the sentence; and, whether it is proposed in the new Criminal Code to modify the Law so as to prevent the infliction of such sentences?

The circumstances of the case are not quite as they appear in the terms of the Question. Mr. Barr was charged before the Sheriff Substitute with a con- travention of the Night Poaching Act, and pleaded "guilty." No option was, therefore, left to the Sheriff Substitute except to pronounce sentence of incarceration, with hard labour. I may state, however, that the Home Secretary, having considered the whole facts of the case, has directed that Mr. Barr should be liberated. I do not know whether it is intended in the new Criminal Code to make any alteration in the punishment for such offences; but I may remind the hon. Member that it is not proposed to extend the provisions of that Code to Scotland.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is true, as recently stated in the "Pall Mall Gazette," that he has ordered the exclusion of the representatives of the Press from witnessing the flogging of criminals; and, if so, if he will state to the House what other provision he has made for ensuring to the public the advantage of whatever deterring character there may be in such punishments?

said, that perhaps the right hon. Gentleman would, at the same time, answer the following Question:—If his attention has been drawn to statements which appeared in the evening papers of the 25th instant, professing to give minute details of the execution of Peace; and, whether it is possible for him to prevent the attendance of reporters at executions, and thus to prevent the publication of details of a revolting character?

My attention has been called to the statements which appeared in the evening papers of the 25th instant, professing to give minute details of the execution of the unfortunate man Peace; and, having seen those statements, I am at a loss to see what public abvantage would be gained by the admission of reporters to witness the flogging of criminals. I take it that the proper course to follow is to see that all such, punishments are executed in the presence of certain official and responsible persons not connected with the gaol in order to see that they are properly applied. With this safeguard I think the public may rest content. As to the latter part of the hon. Member for Somersetshire's Question—which has reference to preventing the attendance of reporters at executions—I may say that the Sheriff has by statute the conduct of all those matters in the case of executions, and I have no power to interfere with his discretion.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is his intention to introduce a Bill, during the present Session, to give effect to the recommendations of the Select Committee on Police Superannuation, of April 1877?

, in reply, said, he should like to take that opportunity of paying his tribute to the Committee for their labours in this matter, and for the admirable Report which they had drawn up. He thought that they had come to a right conclusion that the amalgamation of the Forces for the purpose of a superannuation fund would not meet the justice of the case; and therefore he was inclined to view the latter part of the Report with favour. He could not promise, however, to introduce, at an early period of the Session, a measure on the subject.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any communication has been received relating to the unsatisfactory state of commercial relations between England and Portugal, such as is referred to in Mr. Morier's Despatch of May 15th 1878, at page 1, of Return No. 21 (Commercial), 1878, on the Portuguese Tariff; and, if so, whether he could present the same in time to admit of its being considered by Members before discussion of a Motion relating to the Wine Duties that stands in my name for 18th March?

It appears that in May last Mr. Morier, Her Majesty's Minister at Lisbon, stated that he would take an early opportunity of calling Lord Salisbury's attention to the unsatisfactory state of the commercial relations of the two countries; but it does not appear that any despatch has yet been received from Mr. Morier such as is referred to in the Question of the hon. Gentleman.

asked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether, as the navigation from the northern ports will be shortly opened, the Government contemplate imposing any restrictions upon the importation of hides and skins and any other animal products from Russia?

The Baltic will not be open before April. The Government have not thought it necessary at present to take any special precautions affecting the trade from Russia; but they have full powers under the Quarantine Act to do whatever may be found expedient for the protection of this country against plague, and will be prepared to exercise those powers should there be any danger of the disease approaching our shores.

asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, When the further Papers relating to the Zulu War, which the Government appear to consider essential to the discussion of the causes of that War, will be in the hands of Members?

I am informed that further Papers will be published the day after to-morrow, or certainly by Monday. I am sorry to say that these Papers will not include despatches entering into details of the military disaster, which I had hoped to receive before this date. They have not yet reached us.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If it is true that the Clerkenwell Board of Guardians have passed a resolution directing the removal to Ireland of "all removable Irish poor?"

Perhaps the lion. Gentleman will grant me permission to answer the Question. I have made inquiries of the Guardians of the Holborn Union, in which Clerkenwell is situate, and I find it is true that they have passed a resolution respecting certain paupers—four men and two women—who are to be removed to Ireland. They appear to be the only paupers who are to be removed; and I am told that in each case the paupers have expressed their willingness to go to Ireland, not only to the Board, but before the magistrate before whom the order for removal was signed. It was in consequence of the application of some of these Irish paupers that the Board has taken the resolution in question.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether it is true that the proposed Constitution for Bulgaria, while professing to grant "liberty of conscience and worship" to the various denominations not belonging to the Established Russo-Bulgarian Church, adds that such liberty must be always subject to the "Laws" which may be passed from time to time by the Legislative Assembly; and, whether any guarantee has been obtained against the eventual passing of "Laws" in regard to non-established worships calculated to render liberty of conscience more and more purely nominal?

The proposed Constitution of Bulgaria has not yet been received from Her Majesty's Consul in Bulgaria, and we have, therefore, no official knowledge of its provisions. I would remind the hon. Gentleman that Article 5 of the Treaty of Berlin lays down as the basis of the public law of Bulgaria that difference of religion shall not exclude any persons from the enjoyment of civil rights, and that freedom of all forms of worship is assured both to persons belonging to Bulgaria as well as to foreigners.

asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether, in the Supplementary Vote of Credit, the item of £33,000 includes any Votes for stationery for the Queen's Colleges in Ireland?

No, Sir; it does not.

asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the Sergeant Instructors of Volunteers appointed Sergeant Majors under Article 204 of Volunteer Regulations, 1863, and previous to the issue of the Volunteer Regulations of 1878, would when they retired be entitled to the pension as laid down for a Sergeant Major in the Royal Warrant dated the 6th of September 1876, and amended the 9th of July 1877?

, in reply, said, he was not prepared to give any positive answer at present to the hon. and gallant Member's Question, and hoped he would repeat it on a future occasion.

asked the Secretary of State for War, If he would state to the House the names of the Regiments and drafts and the strength of each with the number of horses, and of big and Gatling guns already embarked or under orders immediately to embark for South Africa?

I am afraid that I should unduly take up the time of the House if I gave these details. I may say that the total strength of the forces and drafts will be between 8,000 and 9,000 men, 1,800 horses, and about 225 waggons, six 9-pounder, eight 7-pounder guns, and four Gatlings. In a few days hence I shall be able to lay the embarkation Returns, which will give all the details required, on the Table of the House.

asked whether it was intended to take the Supplementary Estimates other than the Vote of Credit for the South African War to-night?

said, he should be very inconsistent with himself if he were to try and press forward the Supplementary Estimates without giving proper time for their examination. The Secretary to the Treasury was perfectly prepared to go on with them; but he quite saw the reasonableness of the objection made by the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Dillwyn), and he should, therefore, confine himself to proposing a Vote in connection with the Exchequer Bonds, which expired on the 16th of March, and a Vote of Credit in connection with South Africa.

I think, Sir, it would be for the convenience of the House that before you leave the Chair I should say a few words upon the two Votes which will be submitted in Committee. There is the Vote to renew the £2,750,000 of Exchequer Bonds, which fall in in the last weeks of March, and there is the Vote of Credit for the South African Services. With regard to the Bonds I need say but little. They belong to the finance of the year 1877–8. They were issued in that year to meet certain expenditure which had been voted, and it was hoped at one time that, in part at least, they would be discharged in the course of the present year. Circumstances, however, have been against us, and we have not been able to pay them off this year; and, therefore, it is necessary that we should take power to re-issue, or rather to issue, new Bonds in order to enable us to pay off these as they become due. With respect to the Vote of Credit, it is, of course, a new feature. As I explained just now, in answer to a Question of the hon. Member for Kendal (Mr. Whitwell), I last year warned the House that there might be a sum of, perhaps, £400,000 required for hostilities in South Africa. That did not refer at all to the Zulu War. It is well the House should bear in mind that the hostilities in South Africa are distinctly divisible into two periods—the period of what we may call the Transkei War, and the period of this unhappy conflict. The Transkei War was begun in August, 1877, and ended about July, 1878, and it was with reference to that that our Votes and my observations were made. No accounts were made up in time for the last Budget as to the expenditure up to March 31, 1878, as regards the Transkei War. We knew, by the drafts on the Treasury Chest, that there had been great expenditure; and I therefore warned the House that it was probable, before the expiration of this financial year, I should be obliged to present an excess Estimate. But that has not been found necessary, because the Army Votes were sufficient for the Services for which they were intended, and there were enough savings upon them to cover the amount. Well, then, there were further Supplementary Estimates taken of £300,000 for the Army, and about £40,000 for the Navy in August last. That was for the same war; and, as far as we at present know, that sum will be sufficient for the expenses incurred. With regard to the Zulu War, the expenditure properly chargeable to that contest may be said to have commenced in October last, when the first preparations appear to have been made. It is rather difficult to give full information as to what has been the actual expenditure occasioned by that war; but my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty will be able to tell the House when it gets into Committee on what grounds the Estimates have been framed, so far as they have been able to frame them. I may only add that, being myself aware that the Treasury chest has been heavily drawn upon, I have thought it right to put into the Vote a sum of £300,000 for contingencies over and above the more detailed Estimates to be presented by my right hon. Friends. The House will bear in mind that that expenditure in respect to a distant war is carried on through the Treasury chest, and that the way in which that is done is this—the Treasury chest has a fixed Fund of, I think, about £1,000,000, which ought always to be maintained, and out of that Fund either payments are directly made, or bills are drawn, and the fund is used to meet these drafts, and from time to time it is replenished out of the Votes for the Army Fund. The Military chest has been heavily drawn upon for South Africa, and we therefore are now obliged to replace that Fund again. With regard to the Vote of Credit, the amount we propose to take is £1,500,000, and the details relating to it will be found in the Papers submitted to the House. I shall be asked—and I may as well enter on the question briefly now—in what way I propose we should raise this £1,500,000? I desire to point out to the House that we are now at a period so nearly approaching the close of the financial year and the next Budget, that it is hardly convenient for us to enter upon new financial operations at this moment; and, therefore, I shall propose a temporary arrangement to carry us over the end of this year and the beginning of next. I hope it will be in my power to bring in the Budget very early in April, before Easter; and, in the meantime, I propose that this money, if voted, shall be raised by the issue of Exchequer Bonds. In mentioning Exchequer Bonds, I wish to say two or three words in regard to what appears to me to be rather a mistaken idea in many quarters as to the nature and amount of our floating Debt. I observe that in many influential organs of public opinion there is an impression that the floating Debt has of late years been increased to a very large and even dangerous extent. I think that in some respects the idea arises from a confusion between the terms floating Debt and unfunded Debt, and that there is evidently a disposition to think that all unfunded Debt is floating Debt, which is not the case. The objections to a large floating Debt are, of course, these—that the securities which properly constitute a floating Debt may be presented for redemption suddenly or at inconvenient times, and in such a manner as to somewhat embarrass the Exchequer, or that, in renewing them, it might be necessary to give a high rate of interest. Now, that is the case undoubtedly with what is properly called a floating Debt—that is to say, Exchequer Bills and Treasury Bills. There can be no doubt that those bills are liable to be so presented, and that if they were in excess they might occasion some embarrassment. On the other hand, it is not quite to the same extent the case with Exchequer Bonds, which run for certain periods — two, three, or four years— even if these bonds are in the hands of the public; but still less is it the case with regard to a great deal of the unfunded Debt which now exists, because that is not in the hands of the public at all. It is money advanced by the National Debt Commissioners, and which, in fact, is only advanced from one hand of the State to the other, and is not, and cannot be, liable to the objection to which Exchequer and Treasury Bills are supposed to be liable. Let us see how we stand. The present amount of unfunded Debt is about £24,661,000; that consists of £14,458,000 of Exchequer Bonds, £4,497,000 of Exchequer Bills, and £5,706,000 of Treasury Bills. But of the £14,458,000 of Bonds now in existence no less than £11,708,000 are in the hands of the hands of the National Debt Commissioners, so that even if we reckoned as part of the floating Debt the Exchequer Bonds in the hands of the Bank of England the unfunded Debt is really no more than £12,953,000. That is a sum which, though I do not say it is altogether insignificant, is by no means open to the charge of being extravagantly large. I have seen it stated that we ought to take steps, by funding or otherwise, to bring the floating Debt clown to within £15,000,000. There can be no doubt that a certain amount of floating Debt is a convenience to the public, and also an advantage to the Exchequer; because the public, as hon. Gentlemen connected with business are aware, are glad to get a certain amount of Treasury and Exchequer Bills, and they take them at a lower rate of interest than they would have to pay if the same money was raised by the issue of Consols. I therefore think that the alarm which has been expressed with regard to the supposed magnitude of the floating Debt of the country is somewhat exaggerated. Having said these few words respecting it, there is one other question that may probably be asked of me. I may be asked what effect these Votes will have upon our financial position? I have said that at this time of the year, and with the Budget so near at hand, I must speak with reserve, and I hope I shall not be called upon to go into minute and conjectural details. There are always difficulties in estimating the Revenue towards the close of the year, and these difficulties are likely to be as great this year as upon any other occasion. But, speaking generally, I think I may say that the Revenue may probably fall short of the estimated Expenditure by something under £1,000,000; and I am sorry to say that the Expenditure, including the Vote of Credit and the Supplementary Estimates, and without reference to the £2,700,000 of Bonds, will exceed what we may now expect to be the Revenue by something like £3,000,000. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that £2,000,000 of that amount has been already provided for. In August we obtained permission to issue £2,000,000 of Exchequer Bonds, and these will absorb £2,000,000 out of the £3,000,000. I cannot say the outturn will be as I have described. I have put the figures in what I think to be the most unfavourable light, and I think I am making a safe statement when I put the probable excess of Expenditure over Revenue at £1,000,000. Under these circumstances, it might be sufficient for mo to ask for £1,000,000 of Exchequer Bonds; but I desire to be on the safe side, and to guard against any contingencies that may arise from disappointment in the Revenue. It will, therefore, be my duty at a later time—in Committee of Ways and Means—to propose an issue of £1,500,000 of Exchequer Bonds to carry us through to the end of this year. Of course, if my anticipations are fulfilled, and we do not want this money, the power will not be exercised to the extent I have indicated. I may mention, with regard to the Vote of Credit, that it is proposed to take it for the remainder of the present financial year. The power will lapse on the 1st of April, and anything further which may be necessary will be found the subject of a Supplemental Estimate. With these remarks, I beg to move that you, Sir, do now leave the Chair.

I do not remember any instance of a Financial Statement of the importance of that which we have just listened to being made before the Whole House, such Statements having always heretofore being made in Committee of Ways and Means. But, Sir, I shall not press that objection; but there is one remark which I feel it absolutely right I should make to the House upon the Statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He has told us that he is taking the present course because we are approaching the end of the year, and he followed that with the remark that after the end of the financial year it would be his duty to place the Budget before the House. I wish to say to the House—and I hope the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be able to make a clear answer to my allegation—that according to all precedent, when our finance is in its present serious position, the Budget ought not to be postponed to the month of April. In every previous case when the finances have been in this position, the Government has come down to the House with the Budget either in February, or, at least, never later than the beginning of March; and considering the great effect which is produced on trade by the expectancy in which the country is kept when a Budget of such importance as this year's is delayed—to say nothing of other considerations my reticence as to which my right hon. Friend will appreciate — the Government ought not to delay it, not a mere week or two weeks, but, as it will turn out, for two months, from the commencement of the Session. The Budget ought to have been brought in within a week or two of the meeting of the House, as has been done under similar circumstances in previous years. My right hon. Friend, some years ago, published a valuable work, from which I have taken some facts which I will quote to the House. From that work it appears that Sir Robert Peel had a very serious deficit in 1842, and the Budget was produced on March 11. In 1845 great changes were necessary, and the Budget was produced on February 17. In 1847 it was necessary to raise a very large loan, amounting to something like £8,000,000, and the Budget was produced on February 27. In 1848 there was a very serious deficit, and the Budget was produced on February 18. In 1854 there were important financial operations rendered necessary by the possibility of war with Russia, and the Budget was produced on March 6. In 1860 there was a still more serious state of things, and the Budget was produced on February 10. The only very recent case of serious deficit was in 1867, at the time of the Abyssinian War, and the addition to taxation was made in the month of November. Those are all the cases since the time of Sir Robert Peel when there has been a deficit of serious magnitude, and in every case the Budget has been produced, not at the beginning of the financial year, but some time before the end of the previous financial year. I think I have shown to the House that the Chancellor of the Exchequer must explain why on the present occasion, when our financial position is so serious, the Budget is not brought in at once without waiting till the first week in April. And now let me sum up in a few sentences our present financial position. We concluded the year 1877–8 with a deficit of £2,750,000. We were told in the original Budget of 1878–9 that the new taxes would yield enough to give a surplus of from £710,000 to £1,210,000 to go in reduction of that debt, and that next year it would be entirely wiped out. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was allowed to amend his Budget in August. Instead of a surplus in 1878–9, he then estimated for a serious deficiency of £1,577,000, which, added to the deficit of the previous year, would compel us to begin 1879–80 with a deficit of £4,307,000, and he proposed no Ways and Means to meet it. We protested, but in vain. What is the case now? Last year we were charged with audacity in thinking that the Revenue Estimates were sanguine; but now we are told that they will fall short by something under £1,000,000. We are told that there is to be a deficit this year, exclusive of 1877–8, of at least £3,000,000, and that we shall not be safe unless we meet this to the extent of £3.500,000 by the issue of the Exchequer Bonds which the right hon. Gentleman now proposes; so that the years 1877–8 and 1878–9 are to close with an accumulated deficit of from£5,750,000 to £6,250,000. Has the House thoroughly appreciated the fact? I am not exaggerating, or giving a single figure which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not given himself. Here we are at the commencement of a Zulu war, with a falling Revenue, with almost a certainty that the financial position of next year is going to be serious even in comparison with this, with an accumulated deficit of £6,000,000, and yet we are going to delay the Budget till April. Sir, there has not been a more serious deficit since the first Reform Bill. Therefore, I say it is the duty of the Chancellor of the Exchequer not to postpone intro- during the Budget. I will not suggest, or even hint, at the measures that must be I taken by the Government; but I would urge that the Budget should be at once brought forward, in order that the commercial public may see what the effect of the Government finance will be. With regard to the other question of the unfunded Debt, it is a very inconvenient time to discuss it now. There are many points which, I allow, it might be very desirable to raise, but which cannot be well raised or discussed with you, Sir, in the Chair, and when, after asking a Question, it is out of our power to rise again. I think the Chancellor of the Exchequer has done good by showing the difference which exists between what is popularly called the floating Debt and the unfunded Debt; but when he speaks of the unfunded Debt as, being of no importance, and would appear to regard the transactions of the last year or two in that respect with perfect satisfaction, let me remind him of this one fact—that while he has been adding very largely indeed to the unfunded Debt in the hands of the public during the last few years, the Government brokers have been at work all the time, and, partly by their operations, and partly in another shape, the unfunded Debt— exclusive of the Terminable Annuities —has been very considerably decreased in each year. Whether it is wise to increase the unfunded Debt in years of emergency is a matter of opinion; but nothing can be more undesirable than, at the same time, to increase your unfunded Debt, and to reduce your funded Debt. I hope, when the proper opportunity comes round, the House will discuss these matters and the effect in this respect of the finance of the last few years. For the present, I will content myself with pointing out that we are about to start a fresh year with the most serious deficit that I remember, and yet we are to have no Budget for five or six weeks. That is, I venture to say, a state of things with which the House ought not to be satisfied.

, in rising to move—

"That the great difference which exists between our cannon and those which find favour with Foreign Powers calls for careful investigation, and that it would he unwise to further postpone experiments on such classes of breech loading guns as are now possessed by other Powers;"

said, he thought his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Galway (Major Nolan) had done good service by again, this Session, as in the previous one, bringing forward his Motion on the subject of breech-loading ordnance, and he should very much wish that his suggestion for instituting experiments on the subject of the relative merits of muzzle-loaders were adopted and carried into practice. On that account he should beg to second his Motion, in order that, when the time came for making the change from muzzle-loading to breech-loading pieces, at which the hon. and gallant Gentleman's remarks pointed, they might be in a position to make it with despatch and certainty. On the previous occasions when the change from muzzle-loaders to breech-loaders was carried out, the nation was hurried into a vast expense before the best and most suitable breech piece was perfected. Then, 11 years later, the change made from a breech-loader was equally hurried before the best kind of gun was ascertained; indeed, the nation escaped at great outlay in avoiding a brass rifled gun instead of the present iron and steel tube. He was sure that the noble Lord the Surveyor General of Ordnance would not fail to give the attention they deserved to the obviously intelligent and scientific recommendations of his hon. and gallant Friend, and that he would cause experiments to be carried out which would settle the question in which the country was so deeply interested—namely, as to the best kind of gun for the Army and the Navy. A nation like England ought to possess not only the best ships and army that could be formed or produced, but the best guns that scientific skill could devise. He trusted that what his hon. and gallant Friend had said as to the recently proposed 4-ton 6-inch gun would be borne in mind. It was a piece of ordnance perfectly well suited to the class of vessels which the present First Lord of the Admiralty had so wisely introduced into the Service. It was in every way so far superior to the gun of 64 cwt. with which the Isis was armed that it might be truly said, if adopted for that vessel of great speed, to double her power as a vessel of war. He would suggest to his hon. and gallant Friend to submit a programme of the experiments it was desirable to make, and to place a Resolution on the Paper of the House which would require the authorities to give their best attention to the subject. He was aware that the noble Lord was always willing to obtain information from hon. Members at either side of the House, and would not disregard the suggestions of his hon. and gallant Friend merely by reason of his not belonging to the Party of the present Government. What was required was not a hasty and sweeping, but a gradual change, so that the country might, after careful investigation, secure the best possible gun for the Army and the Navy.

said, he did not wish to oppose the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member (Major Nolan), which he had brought forward with much practical knowledge and ability. The advance of science had, he admitted, altered the position of the question very much from that which it occupied when, on the then perfectly sound recommendation of the Ordnance Committee, muzzle-loading guns were adopted for both Services. The system of breech-loading had then great disadvantages, while the muzzle-loading gun had the advantages of cheapness and simplicity, the latter being of considerable advantage to the Naval Service. The breech-loading gun had a considerable number of different pieces of various kinds to be attended to, and a slight derangement disabled the gun and was the cause of accidents. The present system of breech-loading was, however, a vast improvement on the old. It was simple, and had the advantage of securing to them a longer gun, with increased charge and accuracy. These reasons induced him to concur with the hon. and gallant Gentleman in desiring that the subject should undergo consideration, and that, if necessary, further experiments should be made. The appointment of a Scientific Commission would probably answer every purpose. He hoped, however, it would be done in a more permanent manner than was suggested by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He desired to see the Ordnance Select Committee re-established, which, consisting as it did of the ablest officers both of the Navy and Army, gave confidence to the Services in its inquiries and in its reports. He should prefer that, if re-established, it should be in such a manner as to insure the more frequent change of its members than formerly prevailed; either by the adoption of the five years' rule, or in any manner which the Secretary of State for War thought would introduce fresh blood into the Ordnance Select Committee. The fact of the noble Lord instituting such permanent Committee would give confidence and convey an assurance to the officers of both Services that the result of an impartial scientific investigation would be adopted.

said, that the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan) had rather sprung a mine upon him. He was not aware that the Motion would be brought on as it had been, as it was put down for the Army Estimates. He had, however, listened attentively to the able observations of the hon. and gallant Member; but while acknowledging their force, he must correct him on one point. He had represented his (Lord Eustace Cecil's) opinion as being in favour of muzzle-loaders. It was perfectly true that year after year he had defended the course taken by the Government, but for himself he had never expressed any opinion; and for the Government he could truly say that they were neutral in the matter, and that their great anxiety was to adopt that system which, on the whole, would be the best and most useful. The present Government found a certain system in use. That system was, after several years' inquiry, adopted by the Government who preceded them, and it was adopted at very great expense, after an expenditure of from £4,000,000 to £6,000,000 in experiments. It was supposed at that time—and he never heard any opinion to the contrary—that they had as good a gun as any in the world. No doubt, invention did not end there, and it was quite possible that a better gun on a different principle might be discovered; but that better gun did not seem at present to be forthcoming, and he would repeat that the country was now in possession of a good gun. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Galway had stated that other countries had got a better gun, and that they had adopted Messrs. Krupp's gun; but that was not, as he (Lord Eustace Cecil) showed on the 12th of March last, the case generally. No doubt, other Governments would keep their eyes open to see whether a better system could be discovered; but that was just what the War Department of this country were doing—they were watching for further improvements—and when found out, he ventured to assure the House that no time would be lost in testing any invention which promised to be of advantage to the country. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had suggested that he (Lord Eustace Cecil) should inform him of the names of the officers who advised him; but he really did not think that that was necessary, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman must be quite as, perhaps more, familiar with those names than he was. He knew the Director of Ordnance, and also the Head of the Gun Factory. They were all distinguished officers, very capable of dealing with the question. The Director of Ordnance had always said he was perfectly prepared to see introduced any improvement that could be carried out; he was neither a "muzzle-loader" nor a "breech-loader," but was anxious to obtain the best gun possible for the Service. However, there were very great difficulties in the way of making a sudden change. In gunnery, it was as true as in most other things— "the more haste, the worse speed." It was absolutely necessary that any new step should be taken with great caution, and that it should recommend itself not only to military, but also to naval opinion. He would not now follow the hon. and gallant Member in his remarks with regard to the accident on board the Thunderer, because at present the Papers bearing on the subject had not yet been presented to the House, and because it was impossible as yet to say what change in the present system, if any, naval opinion would recommend. It was quite possible that, in consequence of that accident, it might be thought necessary to introduce breech-loading guns into the turrets of their ships. It was not, however, for him to anticipate what might be done in that matter. All he could say about it was that he felt quite certain the Secretary of State for War would cordially co-operate with the First Lord of the Admiralty and naval opinion in this matter; and that if it should be found necessary to make any great change in their guns the Government would not shrink from doing it, but would do it cautiously, gradually, and, he hoped, thoroughly. He hoped the hon. and gallant Gentleman would not press the Government too hardly. Considerable stress was laid in some quarters on the Krupp system of breech-loading; but unless he was very much mistaken, there were other systems of breech-loading equal, if not superior, to it. The question would, no doubt, receive the fullest consideration from the Heavy Gun Committee now sitting, and further experiments would probably be made if necessary. Two of their officers had been invited by Herr Krupp to attend some new experiments in Germany, and possibly their Report might point to some new invention in the Krupp system worthy of imitation. He could assure hon. Members that every effort was being made to keep up with public opinion in these matters all over Europe. At the same time, he thought it only right to remind the House that experiments in gunnery were extremely costly, and if they allowed a particular inventor to have his gun tested, they must extend the same indulgence, if not to all foreign, certainly to native inventors. The present system of muzzle-loading was only adopted after an immense amount of money had been expended, and still the inventors, as a body, were not satisfied. They never were, to whatever length the experiments were carried. Not anticipating any discussion of this nature, he had not brought any Papers with him; and he was, therefore, unable to go into the subject as fully as he might have done. He could only, in conclusion, repeat his assurance that as soon as a better gun was forthcoming they would not fail to introduce it. It was a mistake to suppose that a prejudice existed against breech-loaders in official circles. Indeed, as the hon. and gallant Member was no doubt aware, breech-loaders were in use to a certain extent both in their fortresses and on board ship, therefore the two systems had been working pari passu. He did not think there had been any unfair detraction of the breech-loading system; on the contrary, he believed there had been every desire to give the breech-loading system a perfectly fair trial, and that civilians and officers of the Army and Navy were all animated by one wish, which was to secure the best gun for the country.

rose to call attention to the brigade depot system, and to move—

"That, in the opinion of this House, the Brigade Depôt system requires amendment, as it is costly, unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the requirements of home and foreign service."

said, he was not aware that these debates were coming on that evening, nor he was sure were a large number of officers in the House, or they would have been present. He agreed with the hon. and gallant Member (Major O'Beirne) that the cost of brigade depôts was very disproportionate to the results obtained. The hon. and gallant Gentleman suggested that the number of men in the battalions should be increased to 900. No doubt, they would then be of much more use for the purpose for which they were intended; but surely, if the number of men were increased, it was only reasonable to ask that the number of depôts should be reduced. The fact was that a mistake was made in establishing so many depôts, and all soldiers, if not all Members of Parliament, were agreed that, however good the design might have been, the territorial principle was not exactly adapted to the size of England, nor to their habits and institutions. The brigade depôt system, it was perfectly true, had failed entirely as regarded the localization of regiments. It could never have been otherwise, for as soon as the two regiments at a depôt centre were filled up, all the recruits were taken away for general service, and sent anywhere all over the country. Again, in some of these centres recruiting was actually at a standstill—had never, indeed, even begun; while in others a very large number of recruits were obtained. This showed that the system did not and could not work well everywhere. He did not quite agree with the hon. and gallant Member about the idleness of the officers. That depended a good deal upon the character of the commanding officer. He knew one depot where the objection was the other way, and the duties of the officers were discharged with 20 or 30 men in precisely the same manner as if there had been 900 men in barracks. No doubt that was going too far, and was a mistake of the commanding officer; but, on the other hand, where there were few men, the officers usually had very little to do. If the regiments were kept up to a sufficient strength of officers, he was not sure that it was not a good thing for a certain number of those officers to have a pleasant and an easy time as they might have at the depôts. His principle always had been, and he commended it to everybody else, to make the Service as pleasant as it could be, so long as it was combined with a careful discharge of duty. He believed it would be more carefully discharged if every facility were given to officers and men to be employed and amused. There was one little point he should like to bring to the notice of his right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley), in which he thought a good deal of expense might be saved, and that was in the case of recruits proceeding on foreign service. They were enlisted for foreign service at, let them suppose, Cardiff. If the homo battalion was serving in some remote part of the country, as Scotland, and the other battalion was abroad, it was thought necessary to send these recruits up to Scotland, and then to bring them down again to Southampton and Portsmouth to embark them for India. As he was not aware that this debate was coming on, he did not fortify himself by looking at the Returns, to which reference had been made, and he did not even know how many depôts had been established; but he hoped his right hon. and gallant Friend would think once, twice, and thrice before he began to carry out the system where it was not already in operation. In his opinion, the general feeling of officers of the Army would be decidedly in favour of the modification rather than the extension of this system of brigade depôts.

said, he, too, like the hon. and gallant Member (Colonel Arbuthnot), had come down to the House unprepared to give figures on these matters. He had no right to complain that the hon. and gallant Member (Major O'Beirne) had brought forward this Motion on the present occasion; but he feared he could not give him a full answer. But, inasmuch as he had had some rather intimate acquaintance with the subject, he hoped to be able to show the hon. and gallant Member why some of the objections he entertained were not altogether valid, and why they could not very easily or lightly depart from the system which had been some time settled. To begin with, the hon. and gallant Gentleman left out of sight, for purposes of argument, that the objects of the so-called brigade depôt system were not limited in their effect to the Army. Although the Army was now the primary consideration, its object as laid down by the late Secretary of State for War (Viscount Cardwell), was not only to form a training depot for every pair of battalions, one of which was on foreign service and the other on duty at home, but also to serve as storehouses for reserve stations where Militia recruits might train in all seasons of the year, and camping places for the Volunteers. He was not prepared to concede that these brigade depôts had wholly missed their original object. With regard to the disproportion between officers and men, at first sight he would be very much disposed to agree with the hon. and gallant Member. But it would be recollected that when they were considering the point, and obtained Returns from the authorities, they found the number of officers returned for duty at the depôts by no means disproportioned to the men. When it came to be reduced to a matter of actual fact, there was not in the majority of cases much incongruity. But in some cases there did appear to be an excessive number, and the Committee over which he had the honour to preside recommended that those officers should, as far as possible, be sent to rejoin their battalions. As regarded the number of men, there was nothing which, as Secretary of State for War, would rejoice him more than to see the depôts extended to the full size of 900 men; but this would mean a fine addition of 40,000 to the Army, and it was, therefore, hardly necessary to discuss it at the present moment. But, apart from this, if they had this large number of men tied up at these little depôts, they would be precisely undoing the object of late years, which had been, not to split regiments up apart from one another at country places, but to bring them together in large camps for better instruction, and in order to teach them the duties they must fulfil when they formed part of a large army. The number of the depôts was a subject on which he did not feel indisposed to speak, for he believed this was one of the very objections he, the late Colonel Anson, and others, had raised when the measure had been first proposed by Viscount Cardwell in that House. His opinion at that time had been that it would be far better not to split the men into such small detachments, but to have fewer and larger centres and more ground. From that opinion he had seen no reason to depart. But, on the other hand, he was bound to say that any alteration of these centres was not a thing to be lightly undertaken. If they called to mind the number of days and nights that had been spent in the discussion of this localization scheme, they would feel bound to admit that it was one thoroughly accepted on the part of the country, and that the money for it had been voted with open eyes. As to the disturbance of these centres, if it could be shown that, without expense, certain depôts could be reduced without any loss, either direct or indirect, to the country, that was an obvious matter of administration with which anyone would be prepared to deal. But, as a matter of fact, when Viscount Cranbrook acceded to Office, he found in almost all these places either the contracts so far advanced, or the depôts themselves so far proceeded with, that he scarcely had the power, without throwing away good money after bad, to alter the original system. Again, why should they turn back, after having gone half-way, in a scheme which was decided on by Parliament, for which Parliament had voted large sums of money, and when the purposes for which the money had been voted had been only half fulfilled? He confessed he would shrink from the responsibility of lightly asking Parliament to depart from the scheme. There might be small points of administration, here and there, which might be remedied; but if hon. Members looked upon these depôts as being so many men required for duty, they altogether failed of their purpose; they were depôts, and did not purport to be battalions. Perhaps, at another time, it might be his duty to touch on some points where he thought some remedy might still be required; but he was certainly not prepared to go as far as the hon. and gallant Member. The uneven number of recruits was always a difficulty in this country. It was impossible that centres of recruiting should coincide with the depôts; but the distances between the two were short. There could be no doubt that the depôts had served their original purpose of supplying more centres of recruiting than there had been before. He would mention one other point. One of the great complaints of late years had been that the stores were too much centralized. Now, it was quite evident in the late mobilization that the more they were making use of the storehouses at the depôts to distribute the stores, the better was the service of mobilization likely to be performed. He, therefore, could not see any reason for departing from this brigade-depôt system, at least, so far as the centres themselves were concerned.

thought the brigade depôts were exercising a very beneficial influence. They were more or less affecting the whole body of the Volunteer Forces. He hoped that brigade depôts would soon become the means of affording instruction to the Volunteers.

I desire, Sir, before you leave the Chair, to enter a protest on the part of independent Members against the course taken by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in making his Statement on the Motion that you do leave the Chair instead of in Committee of Supply. While, of course, I do not presume to say that the right hon. Gentleman was out of Order, yet the course he has taken is one which, in my recollection, is entirely unprecedented, and one which has exposed the House to a very considerable amount of inconvenience. The right hon. Gentleman has brought in what in effect is a third Budget for the present financial year. That, in itself, is most unexampled, and in consequence of the extraordinary step taken to-night it has been followed by a Motion on going into Committee, which has led to a discussion of matters entirely apart from the financial proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is quite clear, if the right hon. Gentleman had adopted the usual course in moving that you, Sir, do leave the Chair, without making any observations, then the Motion on going into Committee would have come forward in due course, and the right hon. Gentleman would then have made his Statement with the Chairman of Committees in the Chair. The discussion in that event would have proceeded in a regular and orderly manner; but, as it is, I am doubtful whether even on the Vote, which will be put from the Chair when we have resolved ourselves into Committee, I should not be precluded from making general observations which appear to me to have been called forth. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has taken a course to-night which I feel myself—and I believe I am not alone in that opinion—Is calculated to confuse the mind of the House. If the House of Commons is to possess any efficient control over the Expenditure and over the taxation of this country, it is quite clear that they ought to have a full Statement, in regard to the Expenditure and taxation, placed before them in an explicit and ample manner by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the occasion of his moving the Budget for the year. But he has not done so. The Chancellor of the Exchequer came down with a Budget at the usual time of the Session, and he gave the House to understand what would be the Expenditure of the financial year; and he laid before the House certain proposals as to the taxes he intended to levy during the year. We were supposed to base our judgment and opinion upon the Budget as stated. But what do we find? That the Estimates of the right hon. Gentleman prove in the course of a very few months to be utterly delusive. You find the right hon. Gentleman coining down to the House from time to time, no doubt with sincerity, but under the influence of a very large organ of hope, and in the most sanguine manner, anticipating that the Expenditure would be less, and the Revenue greater than it has subsequently proved. Thus, after the first Budget had been found to be delusive, and after the right hon. Gentleman had taken another unprecedented course, of laying upon the Table of the House a scheme embracing the ordinary and extraordinary Expenditure—a scheme alike confusing to the country and the House —he came down with a second Budget. The Government shirked new taxation, so the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to borrow, admitting that the Expenditure was getting beyond the sums that he had anticipated. Again, he had hopes for the future, which had not been realized. We have now a third Budget, and again we find that the Chancellor of the Exchequer comes down to the House and tells us that the Expenditure is greater than he had estimated, and that the taxes have not realized what he expected. The result of all is that he has landed us in a financial difficulty, which I do not hesitate to say is without example in recent years. The system of borrowing cannot go on for ever. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has put off the evil day as long as possible, and the time is fast approaching when he will have to impose additional taxes upon the country. What will be the inevitable effect of the Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in bringing his third Budget before the public? It will be this—that persons engaged in large mercantile operations—persons interested in tea, spirits, and tobacco—will go in for heavy operations in the anticipation of some additional taxation on one or other of these articles. Such operations will certainly cause men engaging in them very great inconvenience, and the passage of a large and unusual quantity of goods through the Customs will give to the Chancellor of the Exchequer a large amount of Revenue this year which does not belong to the year. Present appearances of Revenue will, of course, be improved; but next year will not present so favourable an aspect. Those connected, as I am, with the commerce of the country, have a right to complain of the Statement made to-night, and a right to assert that there should be no delay in laying before the House the Budget for the coming financial year. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) has shown that it has always been the custom, when there was a large deficiency, for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to come down immediately and state the facts of the case in Committee of Ways and Means. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer does what he now proposes, he will not only do serious injury to the commerce of the country, but he will be setting up another precedent which it is undesirable to pursue. I do not desire to occupy the House longer than necessary, but I have one remark to make which I could not well make in Committee. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that he intended to apply a sum of £400,000 to the military operations in South Africa, which had been provided by savings in other Departments of the State. Now, I wish to point out to the right hon. Gentleman that this is a clear case of a transfer of sums voted by this House for particular purposes to other purposes not contemplated by the House at the time the money was voted. I think it a most objectionable course, although a legal one, to be adopted. Let me put this to the right hon. Gentleman. It might have happened that if he had come down to the House for a Supplementary Vote for the expenses of the South African War, the policy and conduct of the Government with regard to that war might have been fairly challenged. The Government, by taking the course they had pursued, had prevented any consideration by the House of the transactions of an important part of the Imperial policy. They had escaped any challenge of their policy in consequence of the Treasury giving authority to the Army Department to transfer sums of money which had been voted out of the funds granted in this House under entirely different conditions to entirely different objects. That £400,000, so granted by this House, had been taken with the sanction of the Treasury to pay for the South African War. I say that the control of Parliament in such matters does seem very much like a farce. I am not prepared to say that under no circumstances ought such a transfer to be allowed; for I know that if a rule was laid down too stringently, there might be a certain amount of public disadvantage; but if this system is to be so largely adopted I contend that, whatever may be the inconvenience to the Departments, the House of Commons ought to be determined to put a stop to it. I wish it to be understood that £400,000, voted for certain specified purposes, has been expended in war, and this has been done without Parliament being consulted in the matter. I must apologize for intervening between the House and its going into Committee of Supply. I should certainly not have done so had not the right hon. Gentleman thought it right to depart from a practice of this House without the consent of the House.

said, he had been so much criticized for irregularity that he hardly knew whether he was justified in taking notice in Committee of observations which were made out of it; and, in fact, he doubted whether he should be justified in making any Statement except as to the particular Vote before the Committee. He also, with some hesitation, referred to the other questions which had been raised, and he hoped he was in Order in doing so. He did think, however, that he was consulting the convenience of the House in making the Statement he did. In the first place, there undoubtedly had been occasions— several occasions—on which Budgets had been brought forward earlier in the year than the present time. He did not know whether all the cases which had been mentioned were exactly in point, because the change made in 1854 in the date of the financial year affected some of them, though he did not wish to insist very much upon that. At the same time, he was quite sure that there were inconveniences, and always had been, in making a Budget Statement prematurely. That inconvenience had been very much increased of late by the change made in collecting the Revenue. The great charge of the Income Tax fell upon the third and fourth quarters of the year, and there was great difficulty in estimating with accuracy what the whole amount of the tax would be. Of course, there was a similar difficulty with other sources of taxation; but he referred especially to the Income Tax. He thought his right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Childers) would agree with him that though it might be inconvenient, and undoubtedly was inconvenient, to the public to have any delay occur in making the Financial Statement of the year known, yet that it would be almost more inconvenient that an imperfect Statement should be made prematurely, necessitating fresh arrangements afterwards. There was considerable difficulty, at the present time, in estimating, not merely the Revenue for next year, but the Expenditure also. This latter must depend very much upon what they might have to pay for the operations in South Africa; and at the present moment, and until they got the next fortnight's despatches, of course, it would be extremely difficult to know for what sum it would be necessary to make provision. Therefore, it would hardly be consistent with cer- tainty in taxation if they were to attempt to introduce a Budget at so early a date as the beginning of March. For these reasons, he had suggested that they should wait until the beginning of April for his financial propositions. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Childers) had rather exaggerated the position in which they stood. He said it was the gravest and the greatest since the time of the first Reform Bill. That, he thought, was a statement calculated to alarm the public mind quite unnecessarily.

said, that was not quite his statement. He said it was the most serious deficit since the first Reform Bill.

said, he did not agree with the right hon. Gentleman in that opinion; but he would not discuss that point for the present. However, if it had not been for the South African War the arrangements he had made last year would have been sufficient, and it would have been unnecessary for him to make any Financial Statement at all. He now had to propose a Vote for the renewal of those Bonds which were issued for the Service of the year 1877–8. He had hoped they might have been able to pay off a portion of these Bonds in the present year. They had not been able to do so, partly on account of the deficiency in the Revenue, partly on account of the greater demand for Expenditure; and he had, therefore, no other alternative but to make provision for meeting these Bonds when they fell due on the 16th, and the following days of March. He hoped the Committee would see that in making these propositions they were only carrying into effect the contemplated arrangements.

said, the right hon. Gentleman had just told them that it would not have been necessary for him to come down to the House and ask for power to make any alteration in the arrangements he proposed last year had it not been for the breaking out of the war in South Africa. That was a very important qualification, and bore very materially upon the plan of finance put before them in the month of August last. In that month the right hon. Gentleman contemplated an excess of Expenditure over Revenue for the current year of £1,556,000, and, adding to that the de- ficit which he would have to provide for of the Exchequer Bonds for Expenditure in connection with the Vote of Credit incurred in 1877–8, left him with a deficit of £4,306,000. The right hon. Gentleman said he proposed to spread that over the next two years, and, assuming that his Revenue for the next two years continued the same as in the current year, plus £600,000, the additional amount of the new 2d. on the Income Tax, and that his expenditure continued the same, minus the expenses incurred in connection with Turkish affairs, he hoped to be able in each of the two years to pay off, roughly speaking, £2,000,000 of Debt, and thus, in the two years, to wipe off the £4,000,000 odd of deficit. The right hon. Gentleman justified his action by saying that if this was not actually war expenditure it was next door to war expenditure, for it was the cost of averting war. If, however, the cost of averting war was to be treated as war expenditure, he did not know where they were to stop. In one sense, the whole cost of the Army and Navy was the cost of averting war, for they were intended to guard them—to protect them—against war. Unfortunately, this expenditure for averting war proved, in the case of Afghanistan at least, to be rather the cost of provoking war. It could not be doubted, indeed, that the policy pursued in regard to Turkey led to the Afghanistan War. Then the right hon. Gentleman, on the assumption that his Revenue and Expenditure would continue the same, spread his deficit over the two coming years. But he had been singularly unfortunate, because since that time he had had two fresh wars—the Afghanistan War and the Zulu War. He was not then going to discuss the policy of the Government, or to lay any blame upon the right hon. Gentleman; but the course he had taken did show the danger of spreading the so-called cost of averting a war over future years, and trusting that the future years would be so uneventful as to enable them to pay off such arrears. The right hon. Gentleman had certainly met with singular ill-fortune in having the Zulu War and the Afghanistan War come upon him. Besides this, the right hon. Gentleman had told them that he was about to propose a loan to India of £2,000,000 without interest. He would not stop to discuss whether that would not, in reality, be a gift; but, in any case, the money would have to be provided. Therefore, in addition to the deficit of £4,306,000, they had also to face a proposition for £1,500,000 for the Zulu War, something over £354,000 for the Supplementary Civil Service Estimates, and the prospect of a loan of £2,000,000, without interest, to India. The right hon. Gentleman had also told them what they must have all been exceedingly sorry to hear—that the Revenue was likely to fall short of the estimate by something not much less than £1,000,000. He was afraid, looking at the Revenue Returns, that that shortcoming would be, at all events, in great part upon the three most important heads of finance — Customs, Excise, and Stamps. At the close of the third quarter, the receipts from these three heads were £200,000 behind the receipts for the same period in the previous year. But, at the present time, according to the Return up to February 22, the falling off was £371,000; or, in other words, the falling off, during the last seven or eight weeks, had almost doubled. It must be remembered that the right hon. Gentleman, instead of calculating on a falling off, had reckoned on a considerable increase under two of these heads, for he had calculated on an increased Revenue from Customs of £531,000; from Excise, including the additional dog duty, of £136,000; and a decrease on Stamps of £26,000. Therefore, while he had reckoned on an increase by the 31st of March next of £641,000, he had instead, up to the present time, a decrease of £371,000. It was obvious that, unless these three important heads of Revenue much improved, the right hon. Gentleman would be £1,000,000 short of his calculations. He dared say that the Revenue would come in better, as it often had done before, just before the close of the financial year; but still the prospect wad, as these three important heads of Revenue were falling off with remarkable rapidity, that they would disappoint the expectations of the right hon. Gentleman; and the fact that this falling off had been recently so rapid did not promise well for the Income of the next year. He wished to call attention to one other point with regard to the new Sinking Fund, established in 1875. The right hon. Gentleman, by means of that Sinking Fund, paid off in the first year £280,150; in the second year, £624,780; and in the third year, £764,825, making a total paid off in the three years during which the Fund had been in operation of £1,669,755. But in the course of the same three years the Debt had been increased by a larger amount than the total amount paid off; therefore, while they had been paying off the Debt with one hand, they had been adding to it with the other. The money, in fact, by which it had been paid off had been borrowed for the purpose, or if not actually so borrowed, was withdrawn from Revenue, at the cost of leaving a corresponding amount of Expenditure to be met by borrowed money. The result was an increase in the Debt, funded and unfunded. The right hon. Gentleman estimated, in his Budget last April, that he would pay off in the current year, by means of that Sinking Fund, £684,747. He would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman whether he would not apply that money to meet part of his deficit, seeing that he must borrow so much the more if he were going to keep the Fund up. Of course, if the operation of the Sinking Fund were a continuous one, with a definite object to be attained in a definite time, it might be worth while not, even temporarily, to hinder its progress. But as this was not the case, and as the proposition simply was to provide so much surplus each year in order to pay off a certain amount of Debt, it seemed to him, when no such surplus was provided, an illusory and useless operation to continue it. Without expressing any definite opinion, he would merely suggest to the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it would not be a wise thing to suspend the action of the Sinking Fund for the current year, at all events until they saw what their prospects wore?

suggested to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he should put into the financial accounts every year a statement showing by whom these Exchequer Bonds and Bills were hold. He could tell him frankly that, by allowing the very large amount of unfunded Debt to exist without making the public acquainted with the way in which it was held, he had done himself much harm, as one of their ablest financiers, and lowered the national credit, because the public was not acquainted with the fact that these Bonds and Bills were at present mainly in the hands of the Commissioners of the National Debt and the Bank. They amounted to £14,500,000, leaving about £5,000,000 only in the form of Treasury Bills in the hands of the public. But, as nobody knew where they were, it was assumed that all were mainly in the hands of the public; and until they had heard the Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was generally assumed that this kind of indebtedness, known as the Floating Debt, must end in the issue of Consuls, and with this notion the rise in price had been checked of this kind of securities. If the right hon. Gentleman would publish the statement to which he had referred, it would do much to insure that steadiness in the Money Market which was so essential. With regard to the plea urged for delaying the Budget till after the close of the year, he very much regretted the assigned cause being the change that had taken place of late years in the mode of collecting the Revenue from the Income and Property Tax. Appeals of the strongest character were made to the late Chancellor of the Exchequer not to do it, but in vain; and then appeals were made to the late Prime Minister, but he did not feel himself justified in interfering to stop the unwise project of his Chancellor of the Exchequer. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman had, he thought, some right to urge that the mode of collecting this Revenue by which the larger portion of this tax was collected in the last quarter of the year, had placed them in their present position of being unable till the year closed of dealing with the Estimates for the year ensuing. He hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would deal with the deficiency in a bold and statesmanlike manner. Within one year this Floating Debt had increased by £7,000,000. It was not safe to allow of further increase, and it would be preferable to reduce the amount. He hoped, if necessary, he would ask not only for 1d. but 2d. more on the Income Tax, and that he would not any longer run the great danger of leaving this heavy burden of a dangerous kind of Debt hanging over them.

said, he should like to know how this money was to be raised. He hoped it would not be carried beyond next year, and that the matter would be dealt with in the Budget.

said, the money would be raised by Exchequer Bonds, which would only be current for a year; and when he brought in the Budget he would make a statement concerning the manner of providing for them.

said, he merely rose to protest against the Vote of this sum of money. Of course, he was aware that no protest of his would have the slightest effect; but he felt, on the other hand, that he would not be discharging the duty he owed to himself and his constituents if he did not protest against this most unjust and flagitious war. They had deliberately invaded a country inhabited by people who had done them no harm, and they had, for several years, deliberately prepared this invasion. It had been the policy of Her Majesty's Government to provoke this war, in order that it might annex portions of the territory of these Zulus. At the time of the annexation of the Transvaal this tendency of theirs was pointed out, and it was shown clearly, and proved, as far as anything could be proved, that if the Transvaal were annexed the next step, must be the annexation of a portion of the lands of the enemy. Of course, the Colonial Governor was carefully instructed as to his duties, as to how he was to get up this little war, and the name of humanity was put to shame by the proceedings of the Government. Then, after the way had been carefully prepared, and after excuses had been carefully got ready, troops were sent into the country, and these people were attacked. He knew that the disaster which had recently befallen the troops would compel the re-instatement of the military position; and, so far as that went, he supposed nobody would object to that. But he did not apprehend, from the temper he had recently seen displayed by the people of this country, that the Government would be satisfied with the recovery of the military position. On the contrary, he supposed the Government would proceed to carry out their original intentions with regard to attacking the country. Of course, it was now clear that the panic and the alarm sedulously got up when the news first arrived of the massacre of a battalion of the 24th, and that Natal was in danger, were utterly groundless, and that the Forces on the spot were perfectly capable of defending the Colony against any attack from the Zulus. The resistance of Lieutenants Bromhead and Chard, at the head of only 80 men, after they had had time to entrench themselves in a very slight and scanty manner, showed that the Zulus were perfectly incapable of conducting an offensive campaign against our troops. These enormous preparations, and the dispatch of these thousands of men, meant neither more nor less than a premeditated determination to annex that country, as the Transvaal had already been annexed. He supposed that there would be no quarter given to these savages, as, in accordance with their savage nature, they had given none; that the sword would go amongst thorn, and that their villages would be burned, as they had burned the villages of the unfortunate people in Afghanistan. These poor people had displayed instincts which, in other nations, were supposed to indicate heroism, for they had endeavoured to defend their country against the attacks of foreigners and strangers. He would not go through the form of dividing the House; but he would again protest against the application of this money to what he was sure would be a war of annexation and extermination.

said, he could not allow one charge brought by the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) against Her Majesty's troops to pass unanswered. The hon. Member had said that no doubt their troops in South Africa would have received orders that no quarter should be given; but that was very far from being the case, as would be seen from the examination of a document already published, but which had not, as yet, been laid upon the Table of the House. The document to which he (Sir John Hay) alluded was an order of the late Lieutenant Governor at the Cape, Sir Arthur Cunynghame, and it contained the most positive instructions, not only to British troops, but to the ordinary Native levies, both to give quarter, and, if possible, to make prisoners in battle, instead of the course suggested as likely to be pursued by the officers and men of Her Majesty's Army by the hon. Member who had just sat down. He (Sir John Hay) could not have imagined that any hon. Member would have expressed such an opinion at once to the House, the Committee, and the country. That suggestion was entirely unfounded, and one which it would be seen could not possibly be carried into effect. The hon. Member had further said that Her Majesty's Government had conceived this scheme of spoliation and war; but he (Sir John Hay) believed that the South African War had come upon them as a matter of great surprise. If the hon. Member would read the despatches and Blue Book, it would be found that there was not a single instance of any order from Her Majesty's Government to carry the war into the Zulu country. On the contrary, so far from there existing any desire to carry fire and sword into that country, the arbitration which had been held, under that distinguished Governor, Sir Bartle Frere, had resulted in the arrangement that a very considerable portion of territory, which had been in dispute, should be conveyed back to the Zulus. Pending the further opportunity of discussing the question of the war, he thought that the study of the publications he had referred to was desirable, as they certainly did not bear out the statements of the hon. Member for Meath.

said, he thought it undesirable that any debate should be taken upon the causes of the war at that moment; but he could not help expressing his surprise that a Vote of such enormous importance should be submitted to the House without any explanation or statement whatever on the part of the Government. The £1,500,000 just asked for was but for two months' expenses of a war which might attain a great magnitude. [THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: No, no!] It was for expenses up to the 31st of March; it was a Vote for beginning a war, the end of which they did not see. But whether the inception of the war were just or unjust, it was a fact, and must be carried to a conclusion —namely, the entire disarming of the Potentate with whom it was being waged. A great distinction was to be drawn between wars of such different characters as the late Kaffir War, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had called the Transkei War, and the present Zulu War. His impression and experience was, that when they had districts of savage and unruly tribes, wholly surrounded by British territory, the best course was to take them in hand, conquer, and bring them entirely under British control. In that view he considered that the Kaffir War might be a good job; and if the expense was not excessive, he might not object to the result, on the express condition that henceforward the Cape Colony should undertake the wars within its own borders, and that Kaffraria should be treated as part of the Cape Colony which should bear the cost of its own defence. On the other hand, the Zulu War was one of a totally different character. In that case they were not forced by circumstances to attempt the conquest of a bit of territory, but were undertaking the conquest of a great Kingdom upon the borders of our Colony, beyond which extended the whole Continent of Africa, with its enormous population. They were, consequently, brought face to face with the great question— were they to be forced to go on more and more into that great Dominion in Africa against their will, just as they were formerly forced to go into the great Dominion of India? He felt surprise and regret that it had been found necessary to employ only their finest regiments in the present somewhat ignoble war against savages, and that no assistance had been derived from the Indian Army. The Native Indian soldiers were, in his opinion, admirably well fitted for the kind of work now on hand in South Africa. If, instead of making an unfortunate demonstration at Malta and Cyprus, and allowing their Representative in India to entangle his troops in Afghanistan, Her Majesty's Government had been able to move a brigade or division of their best Indian troops into Africa, the war might have been carried on and concluded without that destruction of the power and sinew of the country, which he knew very well had resulted, and must result, from what he must call this ignoble war. He was not sanguine that the people at the Cape would be willing to undertake the responsibility of government with respect to the Zulus by consenting to federation when the war was over, for it was their opinion that they had already enough to do within their own borders. He did not think they would be willing to relieve us of the expense and responsibility of future wars in the interior of South Africa. They had a large Native population to deal with, whilst they were separated at present by British Colonies, and the Orange Free State, from places in which they had no concern. If the Cape Colony would not, the Colonies of Natal and the Transvaal could not undertake to deal in a fitting manner with the Native African population, especially now that they were supplied with arms from the Portuguese Coast—they were without the resources needful for the prosecution of great wars. But while these Colonies were not able to carry on war on their own account, they had, on the other hand, enormous temptations to get the British Government to carry it on for them. The present war would be enormously profitable to the people of Natal. Sir Arthur Cunynghame's Book showed this. He had seen lately that the carriage of 1 cwt. of goods from Durban to the capital of Natal had run up from 2s. 6d. to 15s. 6d. He noticed in the Estimate that there was only £200,000 for the cost of Naval transport, while £1,200,000 was devoted to the military charges, almost the whole of which would go into the pockets of the Colonists, who had the greatest inducements to promote war for the sake of the profit accruing to them. Another reason why the Colonists were inclined to war was, that they were habitually wont to carry it on in the form of a cattle raid; and during the first 10 days of the present Zulu War the troops were engaged in collecting many thousand head of cattle from the peaceful villages, which they afterwards divided among themselves in the name of loot. There was another important point about which he would say a few words, and that was the land system now prevailing in South Africa, which gave another and very strong inducement to the Colonies to engage in war. He asked hon. Members to compare the present Colonial land system with the wise policy pursued in the United States, where the lands were reserved in the power of the Government as a means of forming new Colonies. Of all the monopolists of land, he was quite sure that the South African Colonists were the greatest. And it was their habit not only to divide the whole land which they could appropriate, but to encroach upon the land of their neighbours. Hon. Members might observe that these Colonists had a habit of dealing in what they called farms; but the term had a very different meaning in South Africa to what it had here; for there a farm consisted of at least 6,000 acres—indeed, farms out there might reach a maximum of more than 20,000 acres. Such were the farms in the Transvaal, where every boy who attained the age of 16 years was entitled to one of 6,000 acres and upwards. Sir Arthur Cunynghame told them that the demand for farms was such that the authorities of the Transvaal were obliged to appropriate their neighbours land in order to distribute it among the rising population. The farms, of course, could not be cultivated by boys of 16, and the consequence was that they were sold for a song, and got into the hands of monopolists, who left none for new Colonists. He was not prepared to say that it might not be a wise and merciful policy to establish their rule over greater regions in South Africa; but that they should not leave it in the power of the Colonists to job away the land. He asked the other day a gentleman travelling who came from the Cape — "Why they did not get more Colonists in South Africa?" And the reply was—"The real fact is that we have no land to offer them; it has all been jobbed away." He (Sir George Campbell) impressed on Her Majesty's Government the advantage of carrying out the wise policy of the United States of reserving the land in the power of the Central Government, and not letting it fall into the hands of jobbing Colonists. By those means they might be able to settle a Colonial population, and so free themselves from the great burden of future wars. It appeared to him that if we must advance in South Africa, one of two policies must be followed— either the government of the country under a despotic system, like that of India, or the establishment of free Colonies, which might be capable of relieving the Home Government by taking upon themselves their own burdens. There was a good deal to be said in favour of the acquisition of land in South Africa. If this were fairly dealt with, it would become an admirable outlet for the younger sons and brothers of the upper and middle classes in this country, for whom it was sometimes difficult to make provision, and who were not prepared to do that which must be done by those who wished to succeed in America—namely, to work with their own hands. They might have the assistance of Native labour.

rose to Order. He could not see that the land question had anything to do with the Motion before the Committee.

would not trouble the Committee longer. When the hon. Member for Clitheroe (Mr. Assheton) called him to Order, he was just coming to the end of his speech. He implored Her Majesty's Government to look the question in the face, and feel that they had part in a great war—he would not add of conquest and annexation. He should be happy if the question were dealt with in a large and serious spirit, and the land question made the means of colonization and improvement, instead of jobbery and profit.

said, he would not attempt to follow the lion. Member who had just sat down (Sir George Campbell), as it required a much cleverer man than himself (Sir Henry Holland) to see any connection between the subjects introduced by the hon. Member and that before the Committee. The institutions of the United States of America on the land question had nothing whatever to do with the question under discussion; but in listening to the hon. Gentleman when he was showing us how to govern Zululand, he was struck with the truth of the old advice "to hatch your eggs before you nurse your chickens." He (Sir Henry Holland), however, rose to correct the statement of the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), who said that this country had annexed the Transvaal with a view to the subsequent annexation of Zululand. Nothing was more contrary than this to the view of the Government. The Transvaal was annexed because the Dutch were in constant collision with the Zulus, from which resulted danger to the peace, lives, and property of our Colonists. In April, 1877, after the annexation, we sent to Cetewayo to inform him that in the case of any aggression having been made on his territory we were prepared to have the whole question considered, and the question of disputed territory properly arbitrated upon. This proposition was agreed to, and very able and, experienced men were sent to examine thoroughly the question of disputed territory. An award was made, by which we were enabled to hand over to the Zulus a large portion of territory unfairly annexed by the Boers. He (Sir Henry Holland) had, therefore, the right to say that the observation of the hon. Member for Meath as to our reasons for the annexation of the Transvaal was certainly without foundation.

would be glad if Her Majesty's Government would state, by way of explanation, to the House what had become of that vast amount of warlike stores prepared last year in view of another war. Of the £3,000,000 voted last year, the sum of £987,500 was spent upon two items under this head. He wished to know why the shot and ammunition, the appliances and warlike stores were not available for the purposes of the war in South Africa? He thought the House was entitled to a statement, showing how the Supplies granted last year were disposed of, and trusted that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, or the noble Lord the Surveyor General of Ordnance (Lord Eustace Cecil), would favour them with an explanation.

said, that the hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down (Sir Alexander Gordon) had urged the Government to give an explanation of the expenditure of Supplies voted last year. He felt bound to support him in that request. He only wished to add, that he failed to see why the Government had not employed Indian troops in the South African War, as they had recently done in the Mediterranean and at Cyprus. Whether the policy of the Government was right or wrong was an important question; but the present was not the proper time for discussing it. It appeared to him that the House required much fuller particulars in order to be able to form a correct opinion of the war now being waged, and, therefore, that discussion should be delayed until such particulars had been received. He thought that the urgency of the case did not allow of contention in the matter of granting the money asked for; and his only reason for rising was to say that the agreement to the Vote by hon. Members on this side of the House must not be taken as an approval of the general policy of Her Majesty's Government in South Africa. So far as he was able to judge from the information before the House, he thought that Government were not justified in embarking in these wars. As to what fell from the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay), he wished to observe that the Zulus appeared to have been unfairly treated in the matter of their award. It had been agreed that the lands, about which the dispute arose, should be restored to them; but it appeared that, in direct opposition to this, we had allowed the Boers to remain in occupation of them.

quite agreed with the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), who had objected altogether to this Vote. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay) had stated that they were much indebted to Sir Bartle Frere for his services in South Africa; but in his (Mr. Macdonald's) opinion, they were only indebted to him for having incurred an expenditure which required this Vote of Credit to meet it. He considered that if Sir Bartle Frere had not been there, they should not now be embroiled in this war. He felt bound to enter his protest against it, and regretted exceedingly that the hon. Member for Meath did not press for a division in the matter. If he might be allowed to make the remark, in reply to the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), who had said that the Government should follow the example of America in the matter of public lands in South Africa, he should say that it would be a baneful day for England when she decided to enter upon such a course. How did they find it in that country? The poor had 160 acres each out West, if they chose to go and select 1he same and pay taxes upon it. The great Railroad Corporations of the United States had gone to the Legislature and got over 200,000,000 of acres by a system of jobbery unequalled in any country on the face of the earth. He hoped that, whatever might be done in the matter of public lands in Africa when acquired, at least one example would be avoided, and that was that of the United States. The disposal of those lands had been a greater scandal than any other public matter in that country.

said, that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed not quite to understand the Question which he had put to him. His Question was as to the amount of money in successive years which had been voted for war in Africa.

intimated that he had not understood the hon. Member's Question in that way.

entirely agreed with the words that had fallen from the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn); but still it seemed to him that hon. Members must decide for themselves whether this was or was not an unavoidable war. It was certain that during the last few years too much assistance had been rendered to Colonists by Her Majesty's Government. He held that the war was entirely unnecessary, as the Colonies in South Africa ought to defend themselves. He could not understand how the Votes that had been given had been spent or accounted for. In 1876–7, £170,000 was voted by this House for South Africa; in 1877–8, £208,000; in 1878–9, £428,000 —of course, that was connected with the affair in the Transvaal. Now, in 1879–80, a Vote was required for £642,000; so that it had gradually increased during the last few years from an almost nominal sum to the present amount of more than £500,000, to conduct a war in a Colony in which it was an acknowledged fact that a war was more expensive than in any other. They had derived no benefit from these wars. They had increased their territory, and that was all. They had little interest in things as they were; but now they hoped to improve the condition of the Natives, not by example of self-government, but by enjoining upon the neighbouring States the necessity of leaving the Natives out in their policy of annexation and aggrandizement, and by those means they hoped eventually to reach the centre of Africa. And, above all, the Government had been asked to commence the system of carrying the legions of India to protect their territories and extend their annexations over every barbarian tribe. He had listened with great attention to what had fallen from the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell); but he failed to hear him say that he hoped this war would prove of benefit to the Natives. He trusted that the matter would be ventilated thoroughly, and that before long they would be able to enter upon a minute discussion with reference to it, and that they would be supplied by Government with Returns of men and money that had been sent to Africa during the last 10 years. He feared, however, that they would find that they had received nothing in return.

said, that beyond question the Vote would be accepted by the House, although, no doubt, on a future occasion, the policy of the war would have to be fully discussed. It would be some time before they would be in possession of sufficiently full information to be able to discuss that question thoroughly in all its bearings. But he rose to call attention particularly to a question which occurred to him when the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer made his Statement before they went into Committee, and which was to be reserved until the discussion on the Vote. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that last Session a sum of £340,000 was voted for operations in South Africa, £40,000 of which would be required for the Navy. But, in addition to this £340,000, £400,000 had been previously spent— in fact, to a great extent, in the financial year 1877–8; and this the Chancellor of the Exchequer only knew by the drafts maturing on the Treasury Chest. The Chancellor of the Exchequer last August warned them that probably it would be found necessary to take a Vote to place this matter in a right position. He (Mr. Childers) wished to point out that thus a very large expenditure had been going on without any Supplementary Estimate, although subsequent expenditure of the same character had been the subject of an Estimate voted six months ago. He thought that no one would deny that such a financial arrangement was very unsatisfactory. He did not wish to blame the Government; but he thought that it was a bad precedent to take Votes in such a manner. What, however, he asked especially was this —as the £1,500,000 which they were now asked to vote was for the expenditure of the Zulu War, or South African transactions, beginning last October —was it expected that this sum would cover the entire expenditure up to 31st March, which had been incurred either in this country or in South Africa? In other words, whether the amount covered the total expenditure to 31st March; or only those drafts which had up to this time been presented against the Treasury Chest?

said, he had some real difficulty in answering the question. He thought it would be understood, with reference to last year, that, in the first place, the Government had had no information beforehand for the year ending 31st March, 1878. But inasmuch as an extraordinary expenditure had been going on, it was certain that, sooner or later, an amount would be required to adjust the account of the Treasury Chest from which sums had been drawn. But that amount could only be ascertained when the Government were in possession of full information. At the time he was speaking—at the beginning of August—it was thought that the amount required would be the £300,000 for the expenditure of the Army, and £40,000 for the Navy, and the Government anticipated a further charge for the year 1878–9. A saving had been effected on the several Votes in the Estimate; but what had been expended over the amount saved would require to be voted. He was unable to say what was the amount of actual expenditure; but the War Office had given the Government an approximate account of what had been spent since October, and they estimated the amount to 31st March at £1,000,000. The Admiralty, however, who were able to calculate with greater precision than the War Office authorities, had named £200,000 as the amount they would require. The Government had considered that another £300,000 would be sufficient—probably more than sufficient—to cover contingencies, and on that account they had now asked for a Vote of £1,500,000 to coverall outlay to 31st March next.

asked whether the Government had taken any steps to ascertain the actual expenditure going on in South Africa?

replied, that a financial officer had been sent out to take charge of the matter.

Sir, we find ourselves once again sitting in Committee of the Whole House to vote a war subsidy. I grievously fear that so long as the present occupants of the Treasury Bench retain their places they are determined the Temple of Janus shall not be closed. In the Reading Room of this House, a couple of years ago, Her Majesty's Ministers were kind enough to send up, for the convenience of the Members of the House of Commons, and to hang on the walls, maps of our latest acquisitions and our seats of war. We had maps of Cyprus and the harbours of Famagousta and Limasol, and all the rest of it. Then came the seat of war in Afghanistan, which covered all that remained of the wall; and the other day, when the clerks of the Intelligence Department came to fix up our newest seat of war, it was discovered that we had on hand so many seats of war, that there was no room for any more maps on the wall. Sir, if this sort of thing is to go on, where is it to end? I will tell you, at any rate, that it will not end so long as Her Majesty's Government can have money voted in this House on the excuse that, because we are involved in war, money must be voted to carry it on. It is always too late, or too soon to protest. For my part, I do emphatically protest against what seems to have become a System of plunging us into wars from which our consciences revolt, and then, because the butcher's bill is incurred, we are told that Government must needs have money, that it would be unpatriotic to refuse it. I object to being placed in any such predicament by the conduct of the Government. I know there are hon. Members round about me who will say—"We are as much opposed to this Zulu War as any man can be. We believe it to be an unjust war; but will vote for the money because the country is now engaged in the struggle." I can quite recognize that that is a ground which conscientious men of this House may take up; far be it from me to quarrel with them; but, for my part, I say my conscience recoils from having act, hand, or part in voting a sixpence for a war which I challenge any man in or out of this House to defend on the principles of public equity, if he will only suppose that it is Russia that is waging the war, and not England. I say that no man in this House will dare to apply to such a war the principles which you apply towards elsewhere. If this dusky savage, spear in hand, set forth to defend his home against the Frank, the Russian, or the German, English pens would trace his record of glory, and English poets would sing his fame. We have been reminded of the days of Pizarro, when men, savages perhaps, withstood the civilizing tyrant that came upon their shores. And when we stand in Pizarro's place in South Africa to-day, is no voice to be raised in England better worthy of being heard than mine to say—"I believe this to be an iniquitous and a wicked war. It is one in which I cannot sympathize. It is against all my convictions of right and wrong?" And at what an hour do we find ourselves so far gone in this onward march of aggression—this lust of territory, this greed of annexation? It is at the very moment that you have been contesting the right of a Christian Power to redress Christian wrongs in the East of Europe. You call Russia an aggressive Power, and treat us to homilies on the iniquity of her pushing her frontiers forward. Was ever hypocrisy so gigantic as yours? To call Russia aggressive, when you are reaching out your hands to grasp move territory in every region of the globe by every violation of right. You annex the Transvaal, and it is incontestible that you led this man to believe that you favoured his claims to this strip of land. The British authorities induced him to believe that they would recognize his claim; but no sooner had you annexed the Transvaal, than you turn round upon him in conduct which he calls—and I say justly calls—something very like perfidy. Now, that you are the Rulers of the Transvaal, you say he shall not have what you led him to expect. I wonder where slumbers the public morality of England? I look in vain in the public Press of this country for that voice which ought to speak out, when we read the Ultimatum—that impudent and insolent missive of Sir Bartle Frere. I know of nothing more audacious than the document which was sent to provoke this war; and now the land is agitated from end to end by the story of the terrible disaster in Zulu, and money is being sought here—not for defence of our South African Possessions, but in order to wage a war of vengeance on Cetewayo, and carry sword and flame into his territory. I pay my tribute—and it is all the more honest because it comes from me—to the gallantry and heroism of those soldiers who fell in support of their colours. They served their Queen and their colours well; but while I admire them, I more admire the men, savages though they be, who fell, with their feet on their native soil, defending themselves against invaders. My morality is not cribbed, cabined, and confined by geographical lines. I mete out to the savage the same measure of justice which I do to the more civilized races. Although a man is a savage, we ought not to deny him the degree of praise which is due to his patriotism, as praise was paid to Caractacus and Kosciusko. This Prince stood within his own territories, and he only did what Queen Elizabeth did in the case of the Spanish Armada, when it threatened English soil. He called his forces around him, as she did hers, and said—"I will make the invader bite the dust," and he did so. England, with the £1,500,000 you vote to-night, will doubtless succeed in a war of revenge upon this wretched Zulu Prince. £1,500,000! Why, if the Government had asked for £5,000,000, they would have got it. For my part, if I saw Cetewayo pushing his advantage so far as to invade the territories which do not belong to him, and to endanger the safety of peaceful settlers who are outside his own land, I could sympathize with your military movements; but in so far as he stands in the position of one who is resisting invasion, and is on his own soil, defending his own people and country, for my part I cannot avoid confessing— whatever consequences may follow from my avowing it—that I feel for the savage man, and say he ought to have from us the same admiration that the writers of history have taught us to pay to the men who resisted the Spanish invaders in Central America. I prize very highly the advantages of civilization, and the blessings of civil and religious liberty; but never shall a vote of mine be given to encourage unjust invasion and conquest on the pretext of pushing civilization, or to carry the Bible with the sword, so that rapacity may call its crimes the diffusion of Christianity. No, Sir; I will give no vote to extend this already swollen Empire at the cost of the liberty of these Natives, howsoever dark their skins may be. I protest here to-night against further annexation. I believe if the Representatives of Ireland, or the people of Ireland, had a voice in this question, they would say that the British Empire is wide enough, great enough, grand enough, powerful enough, and rich enough, without sending an Ultimatum to take a rood of ground from Cetewayo. We might leave this dusky savage to himself, and the British ensign would float as proudly from the turrets of Windsor Castle as it does now. Nay: much better and happier might we all be by giving up these aggressive enterprises and costly schemes of aggrandizement. While trade is languishing, and industries are perishing in our midst, and the cry of absolute destitution comes to us from the Midland Counties, £1,500,000 is being asked for from us in order to carry out this most iniquitous war. But all vainly I speak. To-night this money will be voted. I know that well; but I know what verdict will yet be passed on this episode of British history. When the present feeling of resentment has passed away—when passion has cooled, and reason returned—there will arise some Alison, or some Macaulay, or some Lecky, to trace this chapter. They will say it was a reproach to the British Parliament that it had not patriotism enough, orind ependence enough, to resist this application for money to spend in a war which is as unjust, as wicked, and as wanton, as that which George III. waged—thankGod, he waged in vain!—against the liberty-loving people of the American Colonies.

said, he had listened with a great deal of sympathy to the eloquent words which had fallen from the hon. and learned Member for Louth (Mr. Sullivan). He (Mr. Chamberlain) had studied the Papers which had been presented to the House with reference to the unfortunate war in which they found themselves engaged, and he must say that, as far as those Papers went—as far as the information went which had at present been afforded to Members of the House—he believed that nothing had been produced which justified the war. It appeared to be a war as iniquitous and as unjust as any with which this country had ever been engaged. He, however, felt they were bound, in fairness to the Government, and still more in fairness to those persons in authority who were incriminated in the proceedings, to wait until they had all the information which their friends considered necessary to their defence. They had been assured by the Government that there remained to be produced Papers of the greatest importance; and if he had rightly understood the answer of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Papers which were to be published on Monday would contain all that the Government considered to be essential to the proper consideration of the causes of the war. [Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I did not say so.] He had understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that there would be further Papers which would have reference to the disaster at Isandula; but that as regarded the causes of the war they should have Papers on Monday that would enable them to come to a right conclusion.

So far as I have them, the hon. Member will have all such Papers by Monday; but there may be other despatches on the way that may be of great importance.

said, all he wished to urge was this—That until the Government could tell them that they were in possession of all essential documents, it was undesirable to discuss this matter in detail; but as soon as they were in possession of those documents, unless the further documents which were to be produced threw an entirely new light upon the subject, he should be pre pared to condemn, as absolutely and as entirely as did his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Louth, the proceedings which, unfortunately, had led the country into war. In his comprehension that was the view of the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W Dilke), who had put a Resolution upon the Paper, which, as he understood, the hon. Baronet was determined to discuss as soon as the full information was before them. Under these circumstances, there only remained the question as to what was to be done with reference to the Vote they were asked to pass that night. It appeared to him that it was one of the misfortunes of all inequitable proceeding's, by whomsoever initiated, that while it was very easy to drag this country into war, or to allow it to drift into war, it was not easy to stand still after the mischief had been done. At the present time the result of the action in South Africa had been to place in danger a large number of British subjects, and possibly also the British troops who had been sent over to their assistance; and he did not see how, while holding the Government to their common responsibility in this matter, they could refuse them the resources which they believed to be necessary, not, as he understood, to prosecute a war of revenge, but in order to secure life and property in the Colony which was menaced. Under those circumstances he was prepared to support the Vote, while he reserved absolutely his opinion as to the causes of the war for discussion at another period. Now he was on the subject, he should like to ask a Question of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. When the right hon. Gentleman first introduced the Vote in the House, he understood him to say that the previous war in which they were engaged—the war in Transkei—had finished in July, 1878. He should like to know whether he correctly understood the right hon. Gentleman, and in what sense he meant to represent the war in Transkei as having been entirely concluded? As far as he (Mr. Chamberlain) could judge from the Papers presented to Parliament, he thought that war was only standing over until they had had time to deal with Cetewayo; and at the present moment he understood that one of the dangers with which the Colonies in South Africa were menaced was the possibility that Secoceni might take advantage of our being engaged with Cetewayo and might invade the Transvaal territory. There appeared no certainty whatever that they might not have two wars on their hands at the same time; and he did not understand the confidence with which the Chancellor of the Exchequer told them that the £400,000 which they voted last Session would be sufficient to pay the whole expenses of the war, which, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, had been concluded.

said, the war in the Transkei was concluded last July. That district was on the borders of Cape Colony, many hundreds of miles from the points at which their troops were now engaged, and still further from Secoceni's country. It was perfectly true that the war with Secoceni might, in a certain sense, be said to stand over; but as he believed this Chief to be but a vassal of Cetewayo's, it might be reasonably hoped that when the Zulu War was concluded little more would be heard of him.

understood that the £1,500,000, if voted at all, was voted for ever; and that it was not a Vote of Credit, detailed Estimates for which would be afterwards furnished. There appeared to be a great discrepancy between the charge for Naval transport and the Military charges; for while the sum of £200,000 only was asked for the former, the latter amounted to the enormous sum of £1,300,000. As the 8,000 or 9,000 men now being sent to the Cape could not arrive till the end of March, it was clear that hardly a farthing of military expense could be incurred on their account; and it appeared that by far the greater part of the £1,300,000 must have been expended in South Africa upon the small force now there. He must express a hope that the Head of the Department concerned would afford some idea of the mode in which the sum in question had been applied.

said, he had received no reply to his inquiry about the stores provided last year. He wished to know why the large amount of stores, prepared last year for a war which did not take place, were not now available for the war in which they were engaged? He must beg to have a reply from some Member of the Government.

said, with regard to the Question of the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), as to the amount for warlike stores voted last year, he must ask the Committee to consider the very difficult services their Army had to perform, and the stations which were in question when the Vote was granted. He was speaking without figures and from recollection; but the Committee was, perhaps, aware that undoubtedly a very large amount had been spent for warlike stores—torpedoes, heavy guns, field guns, and stores of that kind. Their present requirements, it must be borne in mind, were of a very special character. For instance, they had sent out guns of the very lightest class that could be manufactured; not 9 or 10-pounders, but guns mounted on special carriages. There were other matters connected with the transport which would also be of very special requirements. He would further remind the Committee that the troops were at great distances from each other in a very difficult country. Again, there were certain questions on which the Government had thought it wise to send out a financial officer to settle accounts, and endeavour to get an audit on the spot, which, although rough-and-ready, would be the best obtainable. Many of the advances which had been made, so far as his opinion went, came out of the Military Chest. His right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer had promised that a careful account should be rendered to Parliament; and he (Colonel Stanley) could say that he desired nothing more earnestly than that every information should be laid before the Committee concerning the items in question at the earliest opportunity.

said, he thought that, as the sum of £1,500,000 was going to be voted, some view should be taken of the position in which they stood. For the second time they had been brought into war, and asked to vote money for that war, while they were told, if any question was raised as regarded the propriety of voting the money, that their course was unpatriotic, and against the interests of the Colony and country, which were at stake. Such an answer was very unsatisfactory to the people, and was utterly inconsistent with, and opposed to, the Constitution of this country, no matter what might be found in black-letter books on the subject. That they should be hurried into war, and have no discretion left to them but to pay when asked, was a condition of things which could not last very long. Somebody must be fixed with the blame of the Zulu War. The organs of the Government among the Press had been saying for some time that Sir Bartle Frere was the cause of the war. If that was the case, he had committed a great crime, and it should not go unpunished. If the Government made out a case, and threw it upon his shoulders, he must bear the charge; if they did not try to prevent the war, the country would revenge itself upon the Government; but if, on the other hand, Sir Bartle Frere had been made the scapegoat, justly or unjustly, the matter would not be allowed to pass. He would, if nobody else did, place a Notice of impeachment of the Government on the Paper.

said, it had been stated that the Government were not to blame for this war. Then, if that was the case, and if Sir Bartle Frere was the cause of it, why did they not recall him? It was as clear as noon-day that either the Government at the Cape or at home were to blame for the war. It appeared to him that the hon. Baronet (Sir Henry Holland) was on the horns of a dilemma. He had also raised another point— namely, that arbitration was held, the result of which was in favour of the Zulu King. They decided, it would appear, that the King was perfectly in the right, but that the other party should keep the property. With regard to the mode of carrying on the war, they had recent experience of English warfare in Afghanistan, where the English troops massacred in cold blood a number of prisoners bound and unarmed. That was not, in his opinion, in accordance with the rules of civilized warfare; and he feared they might have further instances of this system in the present war.

inquired whether it would not be possible to have the casualties among the rank and file telegraphed in future, in the case of disaster, as well as of the officers?

said, that as long ago as last summer he had addressed a despatch to the Governors of the South African Colonies, requesting full information in the case of any casualties, and a fortnight ago he had repeated that request to Sir Bartle Frere. He would add one word with regard to what had passed that evening. He had listened to the speeches of several hon. Members, most of whom had said that they would not discuss the policy and causes of the war, and had then entered into an expression of opinion upon one or more points of the subject. There were, no doubt, great differences of opinion thereon; but it seemed to him that the right view had been expressed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), when he said that the present was not the time for discussion upon the causes of the war. He would, therefore, only say that he wished to enter his protest against such language as had been made use of by the hon. and learned Member for Louth, who had applied the words "wicked" and "audacious" to the Ultimatum sent to Cetewayo by Sir Bartle Frere. On behalf of Sir Bartle Frere, he must ask even those who were most disposed to blame him, at any rate to hear what he had to say for himself before they condemned him.

said, that if the war was wicked and impious, as he believed it to be, they ought to divide upon it. No Party combination ought to prevent them from expressing their opinion on the money Vote. What would be the use of expressing an opinion on the policy of a war after the money was voted?