said, he wished to make a few remarks before the Bill passed, in order to point out the unjust mode in which many persons would be affected by the measure. He believed there was not an instance in the records of the Statutes passed by the House of the riparian owners being saddled with the expense of works necessary to prevent floods. Even the Bill just introduced by the Government—the Rivers Conservancy Bill—went upon the old lines; but the Metropolitan Board of Works, in the present Bill, desired to take that part of the Thames which passed through the Metropolis out of the hands of the Conservancy Board. For his own part, he failed to see why the Committee upon this Bill should have reported in favour of the riparian owners, being differently dealt with under this Bill from riparian owners in other localities. They must have known then that in the Metropolis the riparian owners were already mulcted in very large general rates. As a riparian owner himself, he contributed largely towards the funds of the Metropolitan Board of Works, and he thought it unfair that he should be saddled with additional expense by the present Bill. He wished to remind the House that in 1877 a Committee sat on a Bill similar to the present, and by a decided majority—he believed by 4 to 2—they threw out the measure. Last year the hon. and gallant Member the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works (Sir James M'Garel-Hogg) made several efforts to bring in a Bill. He failed; and now what was it that he did?

wished to point out to the hon. and gallant Member that if he had any opposition to offer to the Bill the Motion for the third reading must be deferred.

said, it would be useless for him to oppose the third reading, and he was not going to do so; but he wished simply to explain to the House the reasons which had induced him to resist its progress. He was of opinion that it involved unjust legislation, and he looked upon it as having been introduced by an irresponsible Board.

asked the Secretaty of State for the Home Department, When the Reports of the Inspectors of Mines are likely to be printed and placed in the hands of Members?

, in reply, said, they ought to be on the Table either that night or on Monday.

asked the Secretary of State for War, When he proposes to lay upon the Table of the House, Copies of Lord Chelmsford's Despatches of the 8th, 12th, 14th, and 28th of February, the 2nd, 20th, and 25th of March, and of the 5th (from Colonel Bellairs), 10th, and 14th April 1879; and, whether, in future, by laying upon the Table of the House on the day they are published, pro formâ, Copies of the "London Gazette" containing Despatches from the seat of war, he could arrange that Members might receive such supplements on the following morning as a Parliamentary paper delivered from the Vote Office?

Sir, the despatches referred to have all received the widest possible circulation through the morning papers on the morning following their publication in The Gazette, but they can be included in Correspondence about to be given. With regard to laying upon the Table of the House, pro formâ, copies of The Gazette on the day on which they are published, the objections would appear to be—1, that we should incur extra cost, amounting to £10 to £20 each issue; 2, that we should add little or nothing to the publication of the news; 3, that either the same Papers would have to be printed twice over under different Parliamentary numbers, or else gaps would have to be left in Blue Books which would, otherwise, contain a complete and connected narrative. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that, unless there is a more general feeling than I am at present aware in favour of such a proposal, it would be unnecessary to alter the existing practice.

said, it was only by the despatches being laid on the Table that Parliament could have any official knowledge of them.

asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is true that an application has been made to the Indian Government for re-inforcements to be sent to South Africa, and that the application has been declined in consequence of the Government of India having expressed a desire to retain the extra forces which were detained in India on the outbreak of the Afghan War?

I am not aware, Sir, of anything which can give the slightest foundation for the report.

, in rising to call attention to the reply of the Governor General of India to a deputation of the British Indian Association, which petitioned against the financial measures of the Government, and to the treatment of the Vernacular Press; also to the Vernacular Press of India, as instanced in the case of the Native journal, the "Shome Prokash," for adverse comments upon the Government policy in Afghanistan; and to move—

"That this House regrets that Lord Lytton and his advisers have shown such unwise disrespect for the sentiments of a vast population, which is at the same time deprived of all constitutional representation, and subject to a harsh and grinding taxation of the most oppressive kind,"

said, that as the concluding clause of his Amendment implied a censure upon the Government, and as they had engaged to reduce their Expenditure in India, he would withdraw that portion of it. India, as hon. Members were aware, had not the advantage of Constitutional representation, and the Viceroy ought, therefore, to be doubly careful so to answer deputations as not to discourage them from laying their complaints at the foot of the Throne. Now, the Association he had mentioned included the most respectable members of the mercantile community of Bengal, many of the largest landowners, and the most prominent Native members of the Indian Bar. Its distinguished loyalty had been commended by successive Governors General. Yet, he was sorry to say, the reply of Lord Lytton to the Memorial of that respectable Association conveyed censure in the most biting terms, and on more than one point seemed to impugn the veracity of the deputation. The Memorial was a protest against the financial measures of the Government with regard to Afghanistan and the diminution of the cotton duties; and the Viceroy, in reply, made many injurious reflections on the personal character and status of the members of the deputation, even reminding those of them who were rich that they owed their wealth to the action of the Government. The Viceroy was acting entirely on his own initiative, and by his own power without any active support from his Council. He told the deputation their statements were in noto- rious opposition to the facts. When they pointed to the heavy distress and recent severe Famines, as an argument in support of their protest, the Viceroy appeared most injudiciously to imagine this reference was intended as an attack upon the Indian Government. The language in which he rebuked the deputation was most unbecoming in a Viceroy. Sneer after sneer, and offence after offence, were showered upon the heads of the deputation. Another portion of his Resolution referred to the interference with the Native Press of India. He referred to what he called the hostility with which the present Administration of India regarded the expression of opinion amongst the Natives of India. On the 18th of March there appeared in the official media of India a notice that the printer and publisher of a leading Native paper had been ordered to enter into a joint and special bond in the sum of 1,000 rupees for having published on the 24th of February a letter containing remarks and suggestions which were likely to excite disaffection to the Government and antipathy to the English race. On referring to the letter he found that it was no more than a criticism—from the point of view of a hostile critic, doubtless—on the Government neglect of Indian feeling, and what, in the view of the writer, were the drawbacks of the Government policy in Afghanistan. Hardly were the printer and publisher of the paper published in the Vernacular ordered to enter into these penal bonds than the Deccan Star, another Native journal, but printed in English, published a translation of this identical letter without incurring any penalty. The pettiness, the absurdity, the mischievousness, the foolish, hysterical, petty tyranny of a Government could hardly further go. If the Indian Government persisted in this course of conduct, they would establish an oppressive and grinding tyranny equal to anything that existed in Russia. The distinctions drawn between Native newspapers printed in the Vernacular and papers printed in English were not only offensive in themselves, but tended to impress the Indian people with the notion that, as subjects of the Queen, they were denied the rights which were enjoyed by Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Irishmen residing in the same country. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice.

, in seconding the Motion, observed, that it was difficult to exaggerate the painful impression which had been produced in India by the answer of the Governor General to the deputation of the British Indian Association. The Motion had his entire sympathy; and if the hon. Member pressed it to a division, he should have his support.

said, he thought the House would regret that the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell) had felt it his duty to interpose in the middle of a very important debate on the finances of India the discussion of a question which, although it might be important, might, at any rate, have been deferred to a later day. The hon. Gentleman, at a single day's Notice, and when hon. Members had not any official Papers before them to enable them to come to a proper conclusion on the subject, had moved a Vote of Censure on the Governor General of India. It was, therefore, his duty to the Governor General that he should say a few words in explanation. He might, however, state that he had no official information on the two points to which the hon. Member had referred, and only knew what he had been able to discover regarding them from the newspapers. With respect to the answer given by Lord Lytton to the deputation from the British Indian Association, which presented a Memorial to him, any hon. Member who chose to refer to the newspapers could read that Memorial and form an opinion upon it himself; and he thought that anyone who read impartially the account given of the proceedings on that occasion would admit that the Memorial was not only full of grave misrepresentations, but also of imputations against the motives of the Government of India. The Viceroy, addressing the deputation in those circumstances, said—

"You have attributed to the Government of India views which it has publicly repudiated; you have imputed to the Parliament of England and the Ministers of the Crown satisfied acquiescence in a state of things which they have distinctly condemned; and you have ignored the duty, at all times incumbent on Her Majesty's Indian Administration, to act in honest accordance with the principles laid down for the guidance of its action by the authority from which its own is derived. As the Representative of the Sovereign of India, I regret that such language should have been held to me by the representatives of some of Her Majesty's most favoured Indian subjects; and as the responsible guardian of the general interests of the people of India, I notice with disappointment and surprise that you, who represent to some extent the wealthiest class in India, while deprecating forms of taxation such as the Bengal Land Cesses, which fall mainly on your own class, have not shrunk from advocating and urging on my adoption other forms of taxation which fall almost exclusively on the great body of the poor."

That was a perfectly accurate and just statement of what had been put before Lord Lytton. With regard to the Vernacular Press, be did not understand the hon. Member for Dungarvan to deny that what the Government of India had done was entirely legal. The hon. Member seemed rather to condemn the policy of the Vernacular Press Act. That was a question on which there was considerable discussion in the House last year. The Act was now in force, and under it proceedings were taken against the newspaper to which the hon. Member had alluded. The hon. Member had omitted, in giving his quotations from the article which appeared in that newspaper, the most offensive passage, and the one which brought it under the operation of the Statute. He would not lend notoriety to the passage in question by reading it to the House; but anybody who fairly took the article as a whole would acknowledge that the Indian Government were perfectly justified in the action they had taken in the matter. The hon. Member suggested that the Act had been used to suppress fair criticism upon the Government, but that notion could not for an instant be supported. Speaking in reference to the Act at a meeting of the Indian Legislative Council on the 16th of October last, Sir Alexander Arbuthnot said—

"The Act has so far justified, and, indeed, has more than justified, the hope which I ventured to express when it was passed, that the mere existence of this law would in a great measure suffice to suppress the mischief against which it is aimed, and that the actual enforcement of its provisions would be a thing of very rare occurrence. As a matter of fact, seditious and disloyal writing—writing calculated to inflame the minds of the masses and to bring the Government into contempt—has been entirely stopped. At the same time, there has been no interference with the legitimate expression of opinion. The liberty of the Press has not been in any way restricted."

The only case in which the Act had been put in force was that to which the hon. Member referred. He had made these remarks solely in justice to the Viceroy, who had been attacked at a moment's notice, and he hoped that the House would now pass to the important Business which stood before it.

wished to remind the House that the subject-matter of his Motion was a month ago placed on the Paper anent the Motion for going into Committee of Supply, and to explain that he had merely changed its position, as a matter of convenience, from Committee of Supply generally to Committee of Supply on a subject to which the Resolution was germane.

, in rising to call attention to the way in which the Netterville Trust property had been managed for the last 18 years by the Trustees, especially with regard to the Louth Institution, said, his object was to secure an inquiry into the subject. The late Lord Netterville, by his will, left some fee-simple property and a large funded property for a particular purpose, and the executors proved the will in 1832, one of the things inserted in it being that there should be a school established; and a subsequent codicil showed that Lord Netterville was most anxious that this school should be established. The property which was bequeathed to the Louth Institution consisted of 52 acres of fee-simple land, and some £10,000 or £12,000 of funded property. The Trustees thought that, in order to get the school thoroughly established, they could not do better than incorporate it with the National system, as far as weekdays were concerned, and a Sunday-school was also to be established. The school was carried out to the satisfaction of the people in the surrounding district from 1836, when it became one of the National Board, to the year 1866, when Mr. Gradwell became an acting Trustee for the property. He lived on the spot, and it was thought he would be better able to carry out the bequests of the trust than other persons could. Well, they found Mr. Gradwell, a very short time after he was named as an active Trustee, in connection with the other Trustees, bringing forward a scheme before the Master of the Rolls in Ireland to sell a portion of the trust property, which, according to the will and codicil of Lord Netterville, was to remain for ever unsold, in order to benefit the widows and orphans. The scheme having been put before the Court, an order was granted in 1864 to carry out everything in the scheme, and a portion of land was to be sold, in direct opposition to the will of Lord Netterville. The order also gave power to the Trustees to grant leases to the tenants for 31 years; but the Trustees did not inform the occupiers of the land that these leases could be granted, and they were thoroughly in ignorance of this provision in the order; but Mr. Gradwell availed himself of the opportunity of selling to himself this trust land. He (Mr. Kirk) had a thorough knowledge of this land, because he had walked over it and seen what it was. The scheme put before the Court was a fair one to look at, saying that 30 years' purchase was to be paid for the land, and no doubt that was a long period; but when they considered that the land was inside Mr. Gradwell's own demesne, he might well have been willing to give 100 years' purchase in order to get possession of it. He bought 12 acres, for which he paid £1 an acre, which, at 30 years' purchase, amounted to £360. The land was covered with large trees, and it could be proved that Mr. Gradwell had already cut down more trees than would pay the purchase money, and there were as many trees still standing as would pay the purchase money over again. He, therefore, thought the object of the trust had been grossly violated, and three times the money would have been obtained if the land had been sold to any- body else. Then, in this section, there were two or three other provisions. One was, that the school-house was to be turned into a chapel, Mr. Gradwell thinking that it was necessary for the inmates of the institution to have a chapel. But there was this fact to be borne in mind. Some time before Mr. Gradwell had had a quarrel with the parish priest, and he refused to go to his church; and as it was very inconvenient for him to go many miles to another church, he was very anxious that he should have a chapel close to his own house. The Bishop at first refused to allow the private chapel; but he subsequently said he would make a compromise, remarking that for a number of years Mr. Gradwell had paid no dues to the priest, but he would allow the chapel provided he consented to pay dues. Mr. Gradwell assented, and the chapel was fitted very comfortably indeed. There was a large fire in it on Sunday, and Mr. Gradwell took the first seat beside the fire for himself and his family. This showed how anxious he was about the inmates of the institution, who were poor widows, and they had to remain in the background. Another portion of the scheme was that a school-house was to be fitted up, and the school removed thereto. After some time, the attention of the public was drawn to the fact of the school not being established, and the Commissioner of Charitable Bequests was written to, and he replied that the order had been given for the establishment of the school. Consequently, Mr. Gradwell had misled the Court of Chancery by stating that the school was established in 1864. When he (Mr. Kirk) examined it, there was no roof nor ceiling, and so it remained until a few years ago, when it was taken down for the erection of a new place. In 1864, Mr. Gradwell purchased for £360 the deer park, which, if the inquiry were granted, would be shown to have been worth six times the amount. Then he was anxious to have another portion of this property—at least, so it was asserted in the newspapers, and by an hon. Member who brought forward the case not very long ago. This being the case, he picked a quarrel with an industrious, hardworking, and independent man; and one of the great things which he brought forward as objectionable with regard to this tenant was, that he had expended too much money on the property. There was also another matter. There was a piece of antiquity which had been disturbed by the Royal Irish Academy. He (Mr. Kirk) regretted that the Bill of the hon. Baronet the Member for Maidstone (Sir John Lubbock) for the protection of ancient monuments was not pushed forward with more vigour, so as to protect such antiquities; and no one would condemn the tenant more than he would for disturbing a single stone of an ancient monument. Well, that antiquity in question—a moat—was disturbed and excavated, and the Trustees permitted it to be done, and did not replace the stones and put pressure on the Royal Irish Academy to put the stones in the same position again. They allowed them to be taken away, for a number of years, from the field where they lay loose around. Mr. Gradwell picked a quarrel with the tenant, on the ground of having taken stones away, and said he would eject him. There had been happy relations in that district between landlords and tenants, and the people were sorry to see that those happy relations could be disturbed by such a miserable quarrel, and they called on a few hon. Members of the House to go down and try to settle it. The hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) and himself (Mr. Kirk) went down, and were met, in a tenant's house, by the acting Trustee, who seemed to a great extent to come to their views. The tenant was anxious for a lease, and said he would even pay an increase of rent, and the acting Trustee solemnly told them that it was the determination of the Trustees that no lease should be granted; but he had at the time in his pocket a letter from one of the Trustees in favour of the tenants having a lease. They tried to settle the case, and thought they had done so, conditions being drawn up; but the persons who did not comply with those conditions were Mr. Gradwell and the Trustees, who imposed new conditions, and the man was evicted. The tenants had been persecuted for five years, and harassed and mulcted in law costs, and the end of it was that he left his holding on a cold winter's day, with frost and snow on the ground. The tenant put in his claim before the County Court Judge for the county of Meath for compensation, under the Land Act of 1870, for disturbance, and also for the value of the buildings which he had erected. There was not one single stone on another in regard to buildings when he came into possession. The tenant stated that he had expended upon the buildings £1,860. As a set-off to this amount, Mr. Gradwell put forward an item of £150 far deterioration of the property. Mr. Gradwell wanted to compromise the matter on the land being given up to him, and he offered to let the tenant certain property for £15 a-year. He wanted to deduct for the deterioration of the property by the buildings, and, on the other side, to let certain property at £15 a-year for the expenditure of the tenant. By the will of the late Lord Netterville, it was clearly laid down that there was to be a Sunday school in the old castle, and the Gothic room was to be laid out specially for the children of the neighbourhood. A school was to be kept up, and a master employed at a certain sum to educate the orphan children, and also the children of the neighbourhood. Mr. Gradwell got rid of the schoolmaster, and of everything in connection with the school, and now he had a matron who was, he said, qualified to teach the orphans and other children. He (Mr. Kirk) had no fault to find with her, as the matron of the establishment; but certainly she was not competent to instruct the children. This also was a violation of the will of Lord Netterville. There was no school at all, and had not been one since 1864. He thought, also, there must be some truth in what he understood was stated by reliable persons in the neighbourhood, as to the neglect of some of the inmates, and therefore he was anxious for the inquiry, which might have the effect of clearing Mr. Gradwell of these charges. When he (Mr. Kirk) visited the institution, in 1876, he found it in a deplorable state. In the dormitory the children were lying literally on rags. A garden had been kept up for the benefit of the inmates, but he found the garden turned into a place for a man to keep a horse in, and a very small piece of ground set apart for the inmates to walk up and down. This, again, was, he thought, a violation of the trust. The people of the district had risen up against the acting Trustee, because they believed he had done a great many injustices, and an inquiry was absolutely necessary. He considered that he had made out a clear case for inquiry into the matter in regard to a good, honest, and hard-working tenant; and if such an inquiry were granted, he believed such a case would be made out as would guarantee the proper working of the institution in the future. The case had been before the country for a long period, and had caused greater excitement and disturbance in Louth and Meath than anything that had occurred for a long time. If the Attorney General for Ireland thought the present was not a proper time for the granting of the inquiry, he would bring forward the matter again.

thought the course taken by the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Kirk) was scarcely one that would commend itself to the House on the ground of expediency. The Notice had appeared on the Paper for the first time the day before, and he thought that where such a matter was brought forward Notice should be given in a clear and specific manner, so that the gentleman whose conduct was impugned might have an opportunity of applying to his friends, or any officials he thought proper, and acquaint them with the subject; but it was obvious that the first and only Notice of such a matter, dealing as it did with the administration of a private institution, and impugning the conduct of a certain Trustee, should have been given previously to the day before that on which it was brought on; and he had himself, in a private conversation, intimated to the hon. Member the inconvenience which would result from bringing such a subject before the House without specific Notice being given to the parties principally interested. Another inconvenience of such a course was that the matter was practically under adjudication in Ireland at the present time. He was aware that the hon. Member for Louth was accurate in saying that the exact point which he had brought forward was not sub judice; but, practically, it was so, for the matter connected with the charity were indirectly involved in the case, which was tried before the County Court Judge on the 7th or 8th of the present month, and, after a hearing, was adjourned till the 4th of July. Was there, he asked, any reason why resort should be made to that House as a final Court to hear all the abuses which might be connected with the case? Had any case been made out by the hon. Member? He himself (the Attorney General for Ireland) knew nothing of the case except what he had read in the newspapers; and it appeared that the case referred entirely to the Netterville Trust property, which was private charity, and the ordinary Courts of the country were fully open, and had been open since the constitution of the charity, to anyone who thought there was a grievance; and there was nothing at all to prevent any person taking the case to the Court to have it decided, and if there was anything against any of the gentlemen connected with the affair—if any of them had violated the trust—redress could be had before the ordinary tribunals of the country. But that was not the sole resource open to them. There was a body in Ireland called the Board of Charitable Donations and Bequests, which attended very closely and jealously to all complaints made against charitable estates, and, if necessary, directed the attention of the Attorney General to the subject. It was obvious that what the hon. Member had referred to were matters of detail, possibly important details. He had referred over and over again to the circumstances that the will of the late Lord Netterville had been violated, and had referred to certain provisions; but, surely, these wore matters which should be taken to the Law Courts, and not brought to the House of Commons. He held that it was to the last extent inconvenient, unless in a case of supreme necessity, that such eases should be brought before the House of Commons before they had been submitted to the ordinary tribunals of the country. He noticed that a document was read by the hon. Member, the appearance of which was very much like a brief; and he would have thought that that might have suggested to the hon. Member that it would have been far more proper to have addressed his arguments to the ordinary Courts of the country than to the House of Commons. The hon. Member had expressed the hope that the Attorney General would look into the matter; but his Motion was really to bring the whole of the matters connected with the charity and its administration during the last 18 years before the House. As far as he knew, no inquiry had yet been instituted in connection with the general case, nor had any application been made to the Commissioners of Charitable Donations and Bequests, while he was sure it had not been brought before the notice of the Attorney General in his official capacity in any shape; and, therefore, he did not think it was reasonable to bring the matter before the House. Under these circumstances, he thought the hon. Member would have acted more reasonably had he accepted the suggestions made to him before he rose to address the House.

said, primâ facie, it seemed inconvenient to bring such a question before the House, and not to take it before the Courts of the country, or to bring it on without giving notice to the parties whoso conduct was impugned. But the fact was that it had not been brought forward until the people of the district had, as they thought, exhausted every form of redress known to the law in Ireland. They subscribed money to bring the matter into the Court of Chancery, where it was decided that they had no locus standi. They were put out of court, and had to pay the whole of the expenses of the application. That would show the Attorney General that the House of Commons had not been hastily appealed to in the matter. With regard to the notice to the parties concerned, there was no matter more notorious in that part of Ireland than that the junior Member for Louth had pledged himself on the subject, and it was well known to Mr. Gradwell and all concerned that he came over to carry out that pledge. He knew that Mr. Gradwell and his friends felt that that would lead up to a real and earnest inquiry into the abuses which existed, and were not at all taken by surprise. If it was said that the matter was a purely local and petty one, he contended that no matter was purely trivial which caused such excitement as that had caused in Louth and Meath. The case had been for three or four months the cause of great exasperation and considerable mischief; and he could pledge his word to the House that, from letters which had reached him, the ease had caused the most intense alarm and exasperation. Here was a ease of a public charity, the conduct of which was gravely impugned. The people in the neighbourhood had exhausted all the forms of law, and, in doing so, had been mulcted in costs in endeavouring to bring it to the light. Surely, in such a case, it was right for the people's Representative to make good the claim of the people, not for punishment, but simply for inquiry. When the eviction took place, the scone that was witnessed was unparalleled for 150 years. From all quarters the farmers sent in their carts to assist in drawing off the wood which was the property of the tenant, and testified their sympathy in other ways; while Colonel Maguire, magistrate of the county, took the, apparently, dying man into his own room, and tended him. The case disturbed the social relations, in two large counties, between landlord and tenant, and between the magistracy and the people, and that in connection with a public charity. He deprecated that there should be a Dotheboys Hall in Louth, while there was a sum of £3,000 accumulating, which should be spent for the benefit of the children concerned. The tenant to whom reference was made was a most respected and upright man; and, in the interests of the people of Ireland generally, he contended that the inquiry asked for should be granted.

said, the Notice contained a charge against the Trustees of having mismanaged the trust estates for the last 18 years. He was personally acquainted with two out of the three Trustees, and he believed those two gentlemen to be incapable of any act of misconduct or neglect in reference to the property confided to them. He did not say the House was not competent to inquire into such a matter; but it was certainly a novel course to take. The hon. and learned Member for Louth (Mr. Sullivan) said the parties had appealed to the Court of Chancery, and everyone knew that the Court of Chancery had power to investigate the affairs of that and every other charity. In fact, that Court was essentially the tribunal to deal with such matters, and if good grounds for an investigation were made out an investigation would be granted. Then, again, they had in Ireland the Board of Charitable Bequests, which had power to investigate the cases of charities misapplied, withheld, or concealed; and if this Mr. Gradwell, being a Trustee, became the purchaser of the trust property at a gross undervalue that had only to be stated to the Court of Chancery for an investigation to be granted. As to eviction by Mr. Gradwell of a tenant on the estate, he believed that was still sub judice; the County Court Judge had not announced his decision; and if it was found that it was a case which the law did not reach, then let them bring it forward in Parliament. But do not let them trammel it with a charge of misapplication of trust, which could be duly dealt with by the ordinary tribunals of the country.

said, he could not share the view of the hon. and learned Member for King's County (Mr. Serjeant Sherlock), that the House should not enter into the merits of the case, but should leave them to the ordinary tribunals of the country. He had heard the arguments used in 1870, that the House should not intervene between the tenants and the ordinary tribunals; and he trusted that the hon. and learned Member for King's County would enunciate these principles to his constituents at the next Election. The hon. and learned Member had shown a deplorable ignorance of the merits of the case, because he had stated that the people of the district appealed to the Court of Chancery with reference to what he (Mr. Callan) would call a sale by the Trustee to himself of trust property. There was no such appeal; no appeal was made on that point. They applied to the Court of Chancery on a point which concerned themselves—namely, the school of the widows' house. Early in the present century—40 years ago, and more—the late Lord Netterville made a bequest of a charitable character, in which he gave his own residence as a widows' house. Trustees were appointed to carry out that bequest, until an English adventurer—he used the word advisedly, but not in the sense of being an impecunious adventurer—an English monied adventurer—came to Ireland in the Famine years, and when property was selling at four, five, or ten years' purchase, he purchased property there. Mr. Gradwell became the Trustee of this property. He was bound to make to the Court of Chancery a true statement of the purchase he had made. Even professional men were viewed with great suspicion when they purchased in the Landed Estates Court. But Mr. Gradwell was the sole acting Trustee, and he concealed the fact from the tenants that they could purchase their holdings, or take leases of 31 or 41 years. In 1864 he proposed to the Court, without the knowledge of the tenants or the surrounding gentry, to become the purchaser of 12 acres of a deer park. There were upwards of 1,000 trees in it. Mr. Gradwell bought this land for £360. If it had been put up at Drogheda at the time it would have fetched £1,800. Was not this House the proper place to bring forward such a flagrant case? Those 12 acres were an historical spot. They overhung the scene of the battle of the Boyne. He had nothing to say as to the eviction of Mr. Elcock, except that he believed there were some faults on both sides. The bit of a farm from which he was evicted was opposite the entrance gate of the magnificent mansion of which Mr. Gradwell became the owner in the depressed times, and Elcock had the effrontery to build a haystack opposite the entrance gate to Mr. Gradwell's castle. This came between the wind and his nobility. He ordered it to be removed. Mr. Elcock sent back a rude message, and the reply was a notice to quit. But these were small matters which were to be dealt with at the Meath Sessions in July. After such charges had been made, he thought it was incumbent on the Attorney General and Chief Secretary to put the Charitable Bequests Commission in motion, and have an inquiry. What would be thought of it in Ireland, if there was no inquiry after such charges had been made as he (Mr. Callan) made now, undertaking to prove every iota of what he had stated as to Mr. Gradwell and his dealings with the trust property.

said, he thought that great exception could be taken to the manner in which this question had been brought forward. He did not refer to the fact that it had, so to say, nicked in in the middle of a debate on another subject, for he had always contended for the undoubted right of private Members to avail themselves of their legitimate privileges, and especially now that from various causes the opportunities they possessed of raising discussions had become somewhat diminished, he felt more than ever that Members were acting strictly in accordance with what was their right in retaining their places upon the Notice Paper; but he did not think that a Notice, given in yesterday in the vague terms in which this appeared, could be regarded as sufficient. He (Mr. J. Lowther) never, until the Notice appeared, heard of any of the places referred to, and had never, until now, had the good fortune to hear of the gentleman who had been spoken of in such scathing terms. At one part of the debate He was likened to Mr. Squeers, further on he was called an adventurer, and latterly he appeared as a fraudulent Trustee, and he did not know what he might not become by the time the debate terminated. He was asked to commit the Government to grant an inquiry; but, so far as he had been able to gather, he had heard nothing to justify him in assuming that this gentleman had done anything wrong. He might have committed every thing that had been alleged against him, but he had had no such circumstances brought to his knowledge, and there had been no time to obtain information which would justify him in forming a judgment on the matter; and it was contrary to the usage of this House to bring forward serious charges of a personal nature—charges of direct fraud and malpractice—without those who were appealed to, to express an opinion or announce their intention of adopting an unusual course of action, having the slightest opportunity of making themselves acquainted with the subject. He hoped, therefore, that the House would not continue the discussion, which could not possibly lead to any useful result, but might be the means of doing considerable harm, because the persons whose conduct was impugned had had no means of communicating their defence.

said, that the Chief Secretary and the Attorney General had done their best to stifle the discussion; and in the very remarkable speech that had just been heard from the Chief Secretary—not, indeed, remarkable for him, but remarkable for a Gentleman in his position—he stated that he had never heard anything of a question that had resounded throughout the length and breadth of the country of which he was supposed to be the Governmental Representative in this House. When the Chief Secretary coolly told them that he had never heard of these places, and never heard of the name of Mr. Gradwell, he was driven to the conclusion that the right hon. Gentleman must think that the responsible affairs of his government were entirely beneath his notice. If there was one question that had attracted greater public attention in Ireland than another during the last three or four years in the newspapers and in the Courts of the country, publicly and open, and everybody to hear and see, it was this case of Mr. Elcock and the Trustees of the Netterville charities. He was thoroughly surprised that the Chief Secretary, who might be supposed to take some little interest in Irish questions, declared that he had never heard of these places or of the parties in this question. The Chief Secretary also said he had heard nothing which sustained the charges brought against Mr. Gradwell. It was usually supposed that neither a trustee nor an agent could be the purchaser of property of which he was the trustee or agent. Mr. Gradwell, who was both agent and trustee, had the audacity to sell to himself a portion of this property, and there was considerable doubt about its confirmation, and the Courts of Dublin refused for some time to sanction the purchase. It was only on the promise of Mr. Gradwell that he would set up certain schools and afford certain advantages to the charity that the sale was effected. He (Mr. Parnell) was disposed to think that even now if the matter could be brought before the Courts the sale would be set aside. But the people who were interested were very poor; they were humble tenant farmers, and their efforts to set things right had come to grief for want of means. Besides, the laws governing trust property in Ireland were so imperfect that it was difficult for people to get justice done. He (Mr. Parnell) thought sufficient Notice had been given, and he thought the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Kirk) would have been violating his duty if he refrained from taking advantage of the opportunity of bringing the case before the House, because at this period of the Session the opportunities of private Members were very few. Mr. Gradwell had had plenty of notice. He had had two or three months' public notice, and could long since have instructed some Member to defend—if, indeed, he could get a Member of the House to defend his conduct—which he (Mr. Parnell) very much doubted. It appeared to him that nothing would have pleased the Chief Secretary or the Attorney General more than the statement that there were not sufficient grounds or sufficient motives for the action which was taken. They were told that they had no right to bring this subject forward, because it was a 'trumpery case, and one which the House could not listen to; but those whom he represented did not consider it a trumpery case. The people of the country had publicly sympathized with Mr. Elcock in the most emphatic manner. His neighbours were encouraging and receiving him, and two officers of Her Majesty's Army had given him the shelter in which he stood so much in need of. If any person was banished for being wrong it should not be Mr. Elcock; and if he suffered for removing any of these stones, so should Mr. Grad-well. The question was one of 30 years' standing, and now it was attempted to be set up as an excuse for removing Mr. Elcock from his holding. The Archaeological Society of Dublin allowed him to remove stones for building purposes, and it was impossible that he could restore the moat to its former condition under his agreement. If that was to be done, according to the reading of Mr. Gradwell, an agreement was entered into to refer the matter to arbitrament of the law, but that was not carried out. Mr. Elcock therefore proceeded in his old manner, and, but for the charity of his neighbours, he would have lost property to the extent of many thousands of pounds. The law had since removed him from his holding, and the only question was the amount of compensation he was to get for his permanent improvements, and nothing had been said against his claim in that direction. The whole thing resolved itself into this—that the Trustee, instead of recognizing his position as a Trustee, had mismanaged affairs, and there seemed no possibility for the people of the locality to get redress. Their only redress was to come to the House and ask of the Government officials to take an interest in their case. He hoped the Chief Secretary would be better informed upon the subject after the Whitsun Recess than he was tonight, and that in the interim he would devote his attention to this very important Irish question. He assured him that in doing so his time would not be thrown away. It was a case of life and death with Mr. Elcock. That gentleman was in a dying state in consequence of these troubles, and if the result of this Motion were to direct the attention of the Law Officers of the Crown to this iniquitous and scandalous case, the Chief Secretary might put some machinery in motion by which justice might be done to Mr. Elcock, and which would remove the property from the scandal and reproach under which it now existed.

was sorry that the hon. Member for Meath had attacked the Royal Irish Academy, an institution of which every Irishman ought to feel proud. The hon. Member alleged that the Academy had commenced this work of destruction, whereas their chief object was to preserve and maintain all the ancient monuments illustrative of the history of the country.

said, it was very evident, so far as the time of the House was concerned, that the Government proposed, and the Irish Members disposed, for both that night and last night they had occupied the time in discussing their own questions, instead of Indian finance. He hoped the Government would give ample opportunity for the subject to be fully discussed. He might say, at the outset, that he did not intend to move the Amendment which stood in his name, and which was to this effect—

"That this House regards with apprehension the state of the Finances of India, and is of opinion that they are not sufficiently controlled. Her Majesty's Government having disregarded the letter and provisions of the Acts for the better government of India on that subject."

The hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) had given Notice of a Motion for a future day I which involved very much the same principle, and as a great Constitutional question was at stake, it was better in the hon. and learned Member's hands than in his. He did not propose to enter on the question of the loans, because he understood that the Resolution with regard to the loans would only be passed pro formâ, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had promised a day upon which the subject would be fully discussed. He must heartily congratulate the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope) on the clear and able way in which he had made his Financial Statement He concurred very much in what he had said, and welcomed the improvement in the general policy of the Government. His only objection to the speech of his hon. Friend was that it seemed to be somewhat too sanguine and rose-coloured, and that it exaggerated in some measure the good points in the finances of India, while it minimized the bad ones. Though the speech had charmed his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), so that, beginning by cursing he remained to bless, he, for his part, did not think there was much in the speech which was a surprise to those of them who had studied the subject. The Under Secretary had taken great credit for the reductions of Expenditure which were to be effected; but of what did they consist? With regard to the Civil Services, they cost some £12,000,000 or £13,000,000 a-year, and the general result of the economy that was to be exercised was not to reduce the expenditure all at once, but it was to take place a little at a time, so that some time or other a saving of £250,000 was expected. Though he was thankful for small mercies, he did not think that would be likely to create a revolution in the state of the finances. With regard to the Military Department, which involved an expenditure of some £17,000,000 or £18,000,000, the hon. Gentleman told them how difficult it was to reduce the expenditure, and stated there was to be a Committee of Inquiry. But an inquiry might suggest changes which would cost money, and might mean increase of expenditure as well as reduction, so that they must consider the reduction of Army expenditure as a thing which might or might not be in the future. The one item in which there was a substantial reduction was in public works. That was a very easy remedy; but it meant cutting down those works which went to the improvement of the country. He did not think this change by any means all improvement, for it would result in the stoppage of many very useful and necessary works. Practically, deducting the military works and works which must go on, they were going to cut down by one-half the expenditure upon ordinary public works. Already it was a reproach to the Government that they had carried their reductions in that Department too far. He was told that it was distressing in Madras to see the extent to which works had been stopped. Even the roads and tanks were not being repaired. There was also, they were told, to be a saving in regard to the extraordinary public works, although the matter was at present before a Committee upstairs. He very much regretted that the hon. Gentleman had anticipated the decision of the. Committee, and, for his part, he did not at all approve of the proposal to limit the extraordinary public works to £2,500,000. If they were to carry out remunerative public works, and such works were really before them, he thought they had far better spend £10,000,000 at once, than go on letting out money in slow and wasting driblets; and, on the other hand, if they had not such works, there was no reason to spend £2,500,000 or any other particular sum. He thought the Government were right to take measures to reduce expenditure where they could; but the fact was that they had entered into such dangerous and expensive political complications on the Frontier of India as to create a deficit, and they were obliged, if he might so express it, to starve the most necessary works and the most necessary part of the administration. He must protest against the airy way in which the Under Secretary had spoken of the "late war" as a matter which had been settled for £2,000,000, and which was something in the nature of a bagatelle. He must protest against the idea that, because the Government had got hold of an Afghan who was willing to make terms with them, they had brought the political difficulty to an end. So far from that being the case, he believed that the present negotiations would be found to be only the beginning of further troubles and of further expenses. They were treating not so much with the de facto Ameer of Afghanistan as with a man who hoped by their aid to become so, and they might find that they had a second Shah Soojah on their hands. There could be no doubt that a crisis had been arrived at in Indian finance, and it was necessary to do something in order to get matters out of their present lamentable condition. Not only did figures show that the finance of India was in an unsatisfactory state, but recent news from that country regarding disturbances in the Bombay Presidency was of an extremely serious character. He was not an alarmist, but the accounts which had come to hand of overt discontent and of open defiance were very grave; indeed, he might say, speaking with an experience of almost 40 years, they were assuming proportions which he had never known before. There could be no question that those disturbances were connected with the financial position of India, and with the position of some administrative matters in our great Eastern Dependency. He believed that the disturbances to which he referred were caused, in some degree, by taxation which was felt to be an injustice, and also, in some degree, by the stoppage of public works, which took away labour from people who would otherwise be employed. India having arrived at a situation of chronic deficits, he would ask the House coolly and deliberately to look at the situation. First, was there excessive taxation in that country? In his opinion, there had been some exaggeration in what had been said about heavy taxation in India. The real amount was about £40,000,000 when they cleared away the padding of the accounts, and that was derived from six great sources, some of which he maintained were not taxes at all. The first was the land revenue, which was really in the nature of reserved rent, and as landlords we had perhaps dealt hardly with the ryots of Bombay and some other districts. Then there was the opium revenue which was paid by the Chinese. Next came the Excise, a comparatively small amount obtained from noxious articles of consumption, and nobody would wish to see that reduced. Then there were the stamps, and the Customs re- venue, which was altogether inadequate to the size and resources of India. The only real considerable tax felt by the people was that on salt, which, unfortunately, occupied the position of the property tax in this country, in being raised to meet extra burdens. He regretted to find that the Under Secretary had fallen into the groove in which all the officials of the India Office ran—that of regarding the salt tax as the "horse of all work." The salt tax was in the nature of a poll tax; but there wore limits beyond which it could not be raised. He thought the Government had committed a grave error in imposing the additional £300,000 which was to be produced by the last increase of the salt duty; but He confidently hoped that now that money had been abandoned, the Government would see that they had reached the ultimate limit of that tax. The other sources of taxation would not yield much increase of Revenue, and the only alternative seemed to be local rates, locally administered, for local works. He sympathized very little with the British Association in Bengal; but they certainly had the strongest reason to complain of an unwarrantable breach of faith on the part of the Government of India in absorbing the additional rate which had been imposed on the land revenue in Bengal for a Famine Fund in the general administration and defence of the country. The Government had also thought it necessary to attempt additional direct taxation. They first tried an income tax; but that had been surrendered, and the infinitely worse scheme had been resorted to of a licence tax. The income tax had been abandoned in response to the cry of the rich and noisy, and its remission had only benefited rich people, whereas the licence tax contained all the worst features of the income tax, and, from a political point of view, was infinitely more dangerous. For every rich man who was relieved by the remission of the income tax a hundred poor persons were affected by the licence tax. Last year he ventured to predict that the imposition of this tax would lead to political disturbance, and his words had come true to a lamentable degree. But the Government had not only imposed a most unpopular tax, they had surrendered the cotton duties, of which no one in India had complained. Those duties, and the tax on sugar, had been surrendered in deference to Lancashire opinion in this country, or to the crotchets of the present Finance Minister of India. It might be right or wrong to remit the cotton duties; but when hon. Members considered the Motions placed on the Paper, and the speeches made on one side of the House and the other, as if the remission had taken place in the interest of the people of India, it was difficult for them, like the Roman augurs, to look at one another without smiling. He believed a well-founded irritation had been created and was felt largely in India upon this subject at the present moment. With regard to the whole subject of taxation, he thought India was not excessively taxed; but the rich were scarcely taxed at all. With regard to retrenchment, he very much agreed with Lord Northbrook in the extract read by the Under Secretary last night. No doubt, the work of retrenchment would require a firm hand: but the necessity for it was so urgent that he hoped the House would strengthen the hands of the Government now that they said they were prepared to deal with it. One advice he would give to Her Majesty's Government was that if they wished to set an example of economy to India they should begin at home. No doubt, over by far the greater part of the Home expenditure Her Majesty's Government had no control. The amount really spent at home was only some £275,000, not a large sum to work upon; but, nevertheless, something could be done. There wore some items not fixed by Act of Parliament, on which excessive extravagance on the part of the Government was shown. For instance, no fewer than eight holders of some of the highest posts at the India Office had been pensioned off, not under superannuation rules, but under what was called re-arrangement of Offices, the fact being that it was thought desirable to promote certain persons; others were dissatisfied, and so were allowed to retire on pensions varying from £733 6s. 8d. to £340. There was no reduction in the expenditure of the Office; on the contrary, there was an increase in the staff. He quite agreed with the Under Secretary that we could not safely reduce our Army in India, though, with short service, some radical re-arrangements might be necessary. He wished to express his entire concurrence in the measure the Government had announced for the reduction of the numbers of the Civil servants. By more largely employing Natives we should do more justice to them, and by employing fewer Europeans the flow of promotion would be improved in the upper ranks of the Service. He did not think, however, that the Natives would be very well satisfied if they were not paid as well as Europeans. When he was at the head of the Government of Bengal, he endeavoured to substitute cheap Native for dear European labour, thinking that he would secure the eternal gratitude of the Natives; but he was never so greatly or continually abused for anything he had done. They said that if they did the same work they ought to be paid at the same rate. With regard to the remission of the cotton duties, the Under Secretary of State for India had stated, in reply to a Question, that that remission was made with the knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's Government; but he subsequently said the sanction was conveyed in a confidential telegram of a private nature which could not be produced. He maintained that it was absolutely against the law that the sanction of Her Majesty's Government to an important financial measure should be convoyed in a private telegram. But this was not a single instance. On the question of that remission of the salt duties, the Under Secretary promised to produce the Correspondence; but he had never done so, for the simple reason that there was no Correspondence to produce, no Correspondence except, perhaps, some private telegrams. The result of the system was that there was no real check on the Viceroy. The Viceroy was assisted by a very able man—Sir John Strachey; but Sir John Strachey had his crochets and his imprudences. When acting with such a solid and sensible Viceroy as Lord Mayo, Sir John Strachey was a most valuable public servant; but when Sir John Strachey, audacious and impulsive as he was, was yoked to such a Viceroy as Lord Lytton, who was more audacious, impulsive, and imprudent than himself, the danger was one of considerable magnitude. Had the Rulers of the Mogul Empire been assisted by wise and prudent counsellors, the Great Mogul Empire might still be in exist- ence at this day; and if a man so hotheaded and indiscreet as Lord Lytton was allowed to govern India, and left uncontrolled to his own conceits and devices, it might happen that some 100 years hence some other Power might rule in India instead of the British Government.

said, he thoroughly agreed with what had been said as to the necessity for reducing the Indian Expenditure. He heartily approved of the Resolution proposed by the hon. Member for Hackey (Mr. Fawcett), but withdrawn; and He thought the course adopted by the Leaders of the Opposition with respect to that Resolution was open to observation, after the meeting at the house of the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs (the Marquess of Hartington), where it was understood that they agreed to support it as a Vote of Censure on the Government. The debate on the question before them showed that India was not to be made the shuttlecock of Party in that House, and that both sides were desirous of considering the best interests of India. He thought the Under Secretary of State for India had shown that the interests of India were to be considered in a much better way than they had been in former years. The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) objected to the policy of the Government with reference to Afghanistan; but he (Mr. Onslow) would venture to say that the opinion of the House, and of the great majority of this country, was that all the sums spent in the Afghan War had done great credit to Her Majesty's Government. India had been made a great deal safer than before. He believed there was no other policy open to Her Majesty's Government, and that this Afghan War was one of the greatest successes which the arms of this country had obtained in India or elsewhere. The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy also objected to the remission of cotton duties; but it was strange that the hon. Member was not in his place when that subject was discussed in the House. The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy said he took a serious view of the disturbances in the Deccan. We all deplored them; but at different times we had riots in different parts of India, and must always expect such riots. He did not, however, attach so much importance to those riots as the hon. Member; but if they were really dangerous, there was no man better able to cope with them than the present Governor of Bombay. The present Governor General had shown himself determined to carry out the honour and interests of India in a manner worthy of the name of the English name he bore. The Financial Minister in India, we must know, had an enormous difficulty. One of the largest items of Revenue was that from opium. One day it might be up and another day it might be down; and, therefore, the Financial Minister could not say how much he was to get from the opium revenue. A Famine might spring up at any time in any part of India, and that alone might upset the calculations of any Financial Minister, as it had upset the calculations for the year preceding this. At one time it might be a Famine, and at another a cyclone, that upset the calculations of the Financial Minister. Moreover, his calculations might be upset by an unexpected war, which might break out at any moment. The Financial Minister could not give even an approximate estimate of the loss which might occur in the course of the year by exchange. He (Mr. Onslow) hoped that we had seen the most disturbing elements pass away, and that the depreciation of silver would no longer be a bugbear in Indian finance. He thought He should be justified in saying that every Financial Minister since the Mutiny, with the exception of Sir Richard Temple, had been a Liberal. Unless the Financial Minister was backed up by the arm of the Viceroy, he had no more power in the Council than any ordinary Member. We should give greater power to the Financial Minister than he had at present. It was impossible for him to carry out his policy if he found every Member of the Council against him. But even though the reductions which had been promised by his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State were carried into effect, he had great doubts whether they could be accomplished within two or throe years. When the question came to be dealt with of employing Natives in the place of Europeans, it would be found that it involved great difficulties. The matter was not one merely of salary, but also of pension, and he did not think the Government would get the men they wanted if they were to give Europeans only the same pay for performing the same duties as Natives. As to Military expenditure, it had always been the object of the Viceroys of India to keep it down; but its reduction depended a great deal on the action of the Home Government, by whom the Viceroy had not often been consulted. In 1864 great reductions had been made; but such had been the increase of wages that the Military expenditure, instead of being diminished, had gone on increasing, and what had occurred in 1864 might occur in 1879. As to the proposed Committee, his opinion was that inquiry by a mere departmental Committee would do no practical good, and the Government ought, he thought, at once to take the bull by the horns and announce that they were prepared to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the whole Expenditure of India. He next came to the question of public works, on which he thought a good deal of money was wasted in India, owing to the fact that the House of Commons had run away with the idea that she was a very rich country. Sir Charles Trevelyan even had said that there would be no difficulty in carrying out such works so far as money was concerned, and Lord Halifax had endorsed that view. An unwholesome stimulus was thus given to the prosecution of public works in India; but Sir Charles Trevelyan had subsequently deemed tit to be his duty to inculcate the necessity of observing some moderation in carrying out those works. He hoped, therefore, that in future no works would be entered upon unless there was an assurance that they would be reproductive. It should not be forgotten, He might add, that largo sums had been spent on repairs, for hon. Members generally could scarcely be aware how soon works became deteriorated in the climate of India. He sincerely trusted that the objects of the Government would be realized in a few years, and that they would persevere in their endeavour to improve both the condition and the resources of India. It ought not to be very difficult by careful economy to make the Expenditure equal to the Revenue.

said, he was glad that the very able and elaborate statement of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope) had done two things; it had made it clear that the Government were going to turn their minds to a serious reduction of Expenditure in India, and, at the same time, it had done away with a great deal of the exaggerated uneasiness with respect to Indian affairs which had been fostered of late by reckless and sensational writing. There was every reason for uneasiness, but no reason for panic. Indeed, he had never known a moment when those who understood it did not view with uneasiness the condition of Indian finance. It was all a question of degree. The old Court of Directors lived in a state of chronic agony in regard to the Indian finances, and, consequently, were so timid about undertaking public works that they very often drew upon themselves the thunders of one of the greatest living orators. Hardly had the Queen's Government taken over the direct management of India than it found that the question of making the two ends meet was one of the gravest with which it had to deal; and it sent to Calcutta, as soon as the fires of the Mutiny had burnt out, the very ablest financier on whom it could lay its hands. Mr. Wilson did great things, but the years from his death to 1869 were no bed of roses for Indian financiers. Then came a period of which he (Mr. Grant Duff) was in a position to speak, that during which the Administration of India was directed by the Duke of Argyll, when the financial question occupied the attention of the authorities, both in England and India, morning, noon, and night, and to so much purpose that whereas the Expenditure of the year 1868–9 was over £52,000,000, that of the year 1871–2 was under £47,000,000. Part of that reduction was owing to the transfer of £700,000 a-year from the shoulders of the Imperial Government to the shoulders of the Provinces; but a good deal more than £4,000,000 was really bonâ fide reduction. He did not see why the same reduction was not possible now. The Expenditure to be reduced was much larger, and if the Government set about it with a will, he did not see why they might not make as large a reduction as that. If they made that reduction, all cause for serious uneasiness with regard to Indian finance would be removed. There was all the difference in the world between the wise uneasiness which came from knowing the difficulty of governing on European principles with an Asiatic Revenue, and the panic-stricken exaggerations to which the public had been lately treated. It might, perhaps, be asked why we should govern on European principles, seeing that we were recommended by some persons to stop our public works and to govern India after the manner of a Native Indian Administration? The best Native administrators would tell us that their countrymen did not want our ox-pensive Courts, our education, and all the rest of it. A small Revenue might be raised, but the people were not to be teased with taxation; and instead of spending our money on improving India, we might spend it in helping out the English Revenue, or on anything we pleased. If we were going to do no better than that, why were we in India at all? If we were not there to give the Natives of India what they could by no possibility have given themselves, except after thousands and thousands of years, we had better determine to leave them to their Native administrators, telegraphing to Lord Lytton to wind up the concern and come home. It was asked, why must we govern on European principles? Because we were Europeans, and because we could not help it. We were bound to govern India according to European principles, if we governed it at all; but to govern it upon European principles with an Asiatic Revenue was a difficult thing, and must from time to time laud us in serious complications. If Lord Northbrook, in 1874, had determined to treat the Bengal Famine as a Native administrator would have treated it, he would doubtless at first have done what He could to save the people; but, very early in the day, he would have come to the conclusion that circumstances were too strong for him, and, with folded hands, would have said—"It is the will of God." Now, in 1874, there happened to be no very exciting subject before the public, except the Bengal Famine, and it would have been as much as Lord Northbrook's head was worth if he had ventured to act in that manner. A year or two later came another great Famine, during which Lord Lytton's Government did all they possibly could for the saving of life at fearful expense to the State, though their efforts were, alas! very far, indeed, from being entirely successful. Most luckily for them, however, other subjects of a highly ex- citing kind occupied the attention of the public, or there would have been a shriek of indignation against the supposed inefficiency of our Indian Government. These two Famines, managed on European principles, cost quite £15,000,000, which would have remained in the Treasury of the Native administrator. The men who carried on the Administration of India passed their lives in endeavouring to steer a middle course between those who would have them improve the country quicker than the poverty of the population would permit, and those who would have them hang back, doing little or nothing. He thought that, considering the gigantic difficulties of the subject, they contrived to steer extremely well between the two. Was it true that in doing so they leaned too much to the side of rapid improvement? He did not think so. From time to time there was, no doubt, a movement in that direction, but the pendulum soon swung back. It might be suggested, however, that the very fact that the present Government was ready to make very large reductions proved that our Government of India was habitually extravagant. He did not think that such was the case. In point of fact, it merely proved that from time to time circumstances arose in which efficiency had to be sacrificed to the absolute necessity of economy—that, at least, was the case with nearly all the Civil expenditure that had been cut down, a great part of which was usually under the head of Public Works Ordinary—that was, works of comfort and convenience. He had no reason to believe that the present Government had been more extravagant in its conduct of the internal affairs of India than other Governments. He thought that it was right to take the course it did in the vexed question of the cotton duties, and two years ago urged it to take a somewhat similar course, even at the risk of a small deficit, while he thoroughly approved all that it had done in relation to salt. The case which he thought could not only legitimately be made against Her Majesty's Government, but which it was their bound en duty to make, was this—That Indian Revenues improving but slowly and containing some very uncertain elements, and Indian Expenditure requiring to be kept down with the most watchful care, they had quite gratuitously adopted a course of external policy which would eventually lead India into the greatest possible financial embarrassment. In order to mate good the foundation of that case, it was only necessary to look at the largest feeders of our Revenue—land, opium, salt, stamps, Customs. Well, then, in the nature of things the land revenue, if it did not increase quite as slowly as was sometimes said, would not rise very much for a considerable time. He saw that, in 1877–8, it appeared as positively a little smaller than in the actual or completed accounts of 1867–8. That must arise, he supposed, from the disturbance caused by the late Famine in Southern India. Still, He apprehended that the Government did not anticipate any great or sudden improvement in its receipts from land. Then there was opium. He had never shared the pessimist view about opium. He had never expected that our revenue from that source would be suddenly cut off. They knew, however, that it was menaced from two sides. There was a party in China which wished to manufacture on a greatly increased scale the Native drug, for the express purpose of killing down our import of opium. It was possible that that party might succeed in overcoming the scruples of those of their countrymen who were in favour of maintaining the old severe laws against the growth of the poppy, and might likewise succeed in making as good opium as we could send from Bengal or Malwa. If that where so, then we might be beaten out of our best—indeed, for practical purposes, our only market, and the Government of India might have to look to taxation to compensate it; or, in other words, India might lose the most magnificent estate which was possessed by any nation in the world—an estate which more than paid the annual interest of her Debt. Again, there was a party in this country which was persuaded that the import of opium into China was wicked, and ardently desired to do away with it at one fell swoop without ever dreaming of compensating India for the loss of India's magnificent estate. If that party over succeeded, the same result would follow—India would have to raise an additional taxation of £6,000,000 or £7,000,000 a-year. He did not think that that Party would ever succeed in inflicting on India so terrible, so utterly ruinous an injustice; but he could quite conceive that the British Govern- ment might, in the interest of our and her general policy, prevail upon India to diminish her import of opium into China by, say, 1,000 chests every year, until it ceased altogether; and the ultimate result of that to India would be, doubtless, not so embarrassing, but, nevertheless, decidedly embarrassing. The stability of the opium revenue depended upon causes of which we knew so little that no financiers, however sanguine, could possibly be comfortable about it. "Threatened folk live long," he might say, but that was all his comfort. Then came the salt tax. He was not one of those who took a strong view against it, though it had no doubt some disadvantages, yet some of them had been done away with under the Administration of Lord Lytton. He supposed there was no one who had studied Indian finance who did not feel that although the direct mischief arising from the salt tax in restricting the supply of salt to the population had been sometimes exaggerated, it had, nevertheless, in some districts very bad direct effects; while about its indirect evils all over the country in restricting manufactures there was really no kind of question. We must admit, he feared, against the salt tax nearly every thing that his right hon. Friend the Member for the University of Edinburgh (Mr. Lyon Playfair) would allege; but it was our third largest source of Revenue. Could we substitute anything for it? He confessed that a salt tax equalized from Cape Comorin to Peshawur seemed to him an inevitable, though most unsatisfactory and unscientific element of Indian Revenue for many years to come. It was, however, not likely that the revenue from it would much increase. One of the first things that had to be done, indeed, was the reduction of the duty in the Lower Provinces of Bengal. Then there were stamps, which brought in, in 1877–8, a little under £3,000,000 of net revenue. He supposed that that source of income would go on increasing with the increase of education and the advance of civilization, but not very quickly. Then there were Customs; but He trusted that export duties would soon disappear, that the Indian tariff would contain, before very long, as few articles as our own, and that Customs duties would eventually disappear. He thought, seeing there was little chance of any increase from them, that all Indian financiers should steadily keep in view the importance of getting rid of all Customs duties in India, both export and import. He hoped that the Government of India would save that country from the detestable spectre of Protection which had appeared in the Colonies. We should at least give our great Dependency the benefit of perfect freedom of exchange, which the unwisdom of our Colonies had denied to themselves, though, of course, that could not be done all at once. Even now, only about 3d. per head of the population was produced to Indian Revenues by the import duties. Was it worth contravening sound principles and inflicting endless inconvenience for so contemptible a result? He thought he had shown, without taking alarmist views, that our existing Indian income was likely to increase only very slowly, and it would probably be admitted that no great rise was at present to be looked for in Indian Revenue. The weight of authority seemed to be against all now taxes that had been discussed. It was unnecessary to show in detail how Indian Expenditure tended to increase. It required, at all times, the most anxious and sustained efforts on the part both of the Home authorities and of the authorities in India to prevent it becoming altogether intolerable. Every subordinate Civil official and Military officer who was good for anything thought first of efficiency. It was only those at the head of affairs who kept asking—"What will it cost?" If we had twice as much money as we had, we could spend it all to good purpose. These things being so, the present Government had had the folly to embark on a course of policy which had already cost India a great deal of money, and which would too probably lead, before very long, to far heavier expense than any of which those who commenced it even dreamed. He would be a bold man who would deny that, thanks to this impolitic and fatal interference with Afghanistan, we might in a very few years be obliged to annex the whole of that country, and to draw our next scientific Frontier beyond Herat. He would not try to revive the discussion on the Afghan War in its political aspect. He was looking at it for the moment merely in its financial aspect; and he affirmed that, even if there had not been political reasons which cried to Heaven against the course which the Government had taken since the retirement of Lord Northbrook, the financial calamities which would but too surely follow on their Frontier policy ought to have been quite enough to condemn it. Anyone who studied Indian history, and who knew the difficulties which the recent advance beyond the North-West Frontier would entail, would know that we should be led on and on by the force of circumstances, until very likely the most pacific Minister who over ruled in this country would, as he had said, be obliged to annex the whole of Afghanistan, thanks to what the present Government had clone. He was sure the right hon. Gentleman opposite knew well that this was so; but he comforted himself with that most unstatesmanlike reflection—"After me the deluge." Some people imagined that men's minds in India would now become calmer about the North-West Frontier. But they were much mistaken. Our North-West Frontier policy was to a great many Anglo-Indians the romance of India. It was the link which connected the land to which they had come with the busy Europe they had left. Dreams about the Russian spectre moving towards us across Central Asia were a relief from the intolerable dulness which often oppressed them. He would admit that the force of circumstances alone, now that it had been given its head, would prove too strong for all resolutions to advance no further. But that force was the weakest which was dragging us. We had, in Yakoob Khan, a new Shah Soojah on our shoulders, of whom we might well wish right hon. Gentlemen joy, if it was they only, and not all of us, who had to carry him. When we once stepped beyond our old Frontier, the curse came upon us—"Vestigia nulla retrosum." The burden which dive and Warren Hastings laid on the shoulders of their country—the necessity of conquering India—was heavy enough. In an evil hour, by changing the policy which for so long had been accepted by both political Parties, they had taken, even if there were no political reasons against it, one of the most imprudent financial steps ever taken by any Government. Was not the burthen of conquering and keeping India enough for a little Island in the Atlantic, that right hon. Gentlemen opposite must needs add to it the probable task of having to conquer Central Asia also? There were dangers before, behind, and around them, of which, alas! their financial dangers were not the worst. Were matters so perfectly peaceful in India that they could be sure that the Mutiny was the last of their serious internal troubles there? He thought it extremely fortunate that they had so able and active a man as Sir Richard Temple governing the Bombay Presidency at this moment. Recent telegrams told of dacoity prevailing to a great extent in the neighbourhood of Poonah; but they might depend upon it there was a great deal more than mere dacoity there. He went into that district, in which he had naturally a peculiar interest, four years ago, and even to the eye of a passing traveller it was perfectly clear that there was serious disaffection. Those telegrams revealed a state of things precisely similar to that which preceded the great rising of the 17th century; and, although, considering the superiority of our strength over that of the Mogul, he would not venture to say that history would repeat itself, He did say that we were not at the end of our insurrections, and that the breaking out of trouble in that corner of India at this particular moment ought to be a warning to those who dreamt dreams of the beginning of an era of peace for India. What, above all things, was wanted in India was what was wanted everywhere—a steady, well thought out, and continuous policy, not a policy of violent fluctuation or exaggeration on the one side or the other; but that we no longer possessed. Prom the days of Lord Ellen borough our policy had been to remain within the bounds of India, and make the best of the country. It might be said of India what was said by someone of life itself, that it was neither a blessing nor a curse, but a serious piece of business which it concerned our honour to carry through; but to carry it through without such a policy as he had just indicated was impossible. If we were now to be led away by such will-o'-the-wisps as had led us through the Passes of Afghanistan lately, then the whole story of England's connection with that great country from first to last would be nothing better than one magnificent blunder—a blunder full of interesting, noble, and heroic episodes, but none the less a blunder.

said, it could not, he thought, be denied that the financial position of India must, at the present moment, be a source of grave anxiety, both to those responsible for the Administration of India and to everyone in this country who bestowed the least consideration on the subject. It was not his intention, on the present occasion, to enter upon the question of the import duties levied on cotton goods. The House had more than once affirmed that those duties were alike unjust to Indian consumers and English manufacturers, and ought to be repealed, and he thought it would be scarcely respectful to the House to occupy its time by dwelling on this well-worn subject. No doubt, there had been heavy expenditure in India; no doubt, it was absolutely necessary for that expenditure to be curtailed, and he was glad to see that Her Majesty's Government were taking stringent measures in this direction. No doubt, also, the dreadful Famines which had prevailed had greatly impoverished the country; but, above and beyond these and other causes, there was a very large and a very deep question which was well worthy the attention of the House. He meant the pressing difficulty so long felt with reference to the extremely unsatisfactory state of the exchanges. He would not weary the House by dwelling at any great length on this most intricate and difficult subject, or by enlarging on the causes which had loci to the immense depreciation in silver, or of the increasing scarcity, and, consequently, enhanced value and appreciation of gold. Those causes were deep-seated, and, to a great extent, beyond our control; we had only, indeed, to call to mind the immense rise which took place in the value of all commodities in Spain within a very few years after the discovery of her gold mines in Peru to be convinced that we wore face to face with a very great problem, and a problem which must have a most important influence, not only on our fortunes, but on the fortunes of well nigh every country in the world. As stated by the Prime Minister in "another place," a short time ago, the production of gold throughout the whole world averaged about £9,000,000 a-year up to the time of the discovery of the Californian and Australian mines; but these great discoveries increased the supply about six- fold, to £36,000,000, and the same effect was produced—though not to the same extent—as was produced in Spain more than three centuries ago; an enormous rise took place in the price of all commodities, everything appeared to increase in value, because gold, the fixed standard by which everything was measured, became more plentiful, and in reality decreased in value; in like manner, it did not seem open to doubt that of late years the decreasing supply of gold, simultaneously with an increased demand from Germany, from France, and latterly from America, had been one main cause of the existing intense depression, and of the fall in prices of nearly all commodities, including silver and including labour. This fall had by no means been confined to this country, but had extended everywhere, East and West, North and South, to all countries; but it had had an especially disturbing influence here, not only because of our extended trade with all the silver-using countries where it was the standard of currency, and where, consequently, the exchange had been directly affected, but also because silver was the currency and the standard in our own Empire of India. In one portion of our Empire—England—gold was the standard, in another portion—India—silver; and there could be no doubt whatever that the fluctuations in the value of silver and also of gold had caused very great derangement to the trade of the two countries, and no man yet might say what would be the consequence, or what disasters the future might have in store for us, if some attempt was not made to remedy the mischief, and arrest the continuous fall. Well, what was to be done? Many plans had been suggested, more or less plausible. One of these was a gold currency for India, same as England; but it was estimated that for that purpose £100,000,000 of gold would be required. Where was this immense amount to be procured? It was pretty evident that the supplies of gold were barely sufficient to carry on the trade of the world under the existing gold currencies; and this plan might, therefore, be dismissed as quite impracticable. Another suggestion was a largely extended issue of paper money; but the experience of other countries was not encouraging, and the great depreciation so often witnessed in paper ought surely to be a beacon and a warning against any such course as this. Amongst other suggestions there had been that of a bi-metallic currency, such as prevailed in France tip to the time when she suspended the coinage of silver from fear of losing her supplies of gold, in consequence of the demonetization of silver in Germany. Much might be urged in favour of this plan, and it was by no means clear to his mind that it would not eventually have to be adopted by one or more nations to avoid general ruin. One thing was, at all events, clear—that when there was a bi-metallic currency in France these disastrous fluctuations in silver were prevented, because anyone, by taking silver to France, could have that silver coined and exchanged for gold in the proportion of 15½ to 1, and this kept the price of silver steady all over the world, and had practically the same effect as it was hoped would follow from the adoption of the bi-metallic currency now advocated. Many of our troubles, indeed, and the decline in our trade, seemed really to date from the period when France suspended the coinage of silver, and the advocates of bimetallism maintained that in adopting it we should be trying no rash or hazardous or dangerous experiment, but, in reality, only be reverting to the previously existing state of things. But it was said—"Oh! to talk of a bi-metallic currency is absurd and ridiculous. Why, every banker in London is against it. "Well," nearly all great measures in this country passed through three stages. They were pooh-poohed, and said to be absurd and ridiculous in the first stage. Then, in the next stage, after we had felt a few more turns of the screw, after a few more disasters had occurred, after a few more thousands had been ruined, it began to be doubted whether, after all, they were deserving of so much ridicule and contempt. Then came the third stage, when they were suddenly adopted, and they who had been loudest in their denunciations, were often the most anxious to take credit for their adoption. Bankers might, or might not, oppose this plan; but he had yet to learn what special knowledge was possessed by bankers as such—especially by London bankers—on such a question, more than by merchants and others of wide and extended commercial experience, accustomed to business in all parts of the world, and obliged to take large and comprehensive views on such subjects. Now, what were the real arguments against a bi-metallic currency? He had conversed with many persons of every shade of opinion, and, so far as he understood, the main and the chief objections wore that it would be a watering down, as it were, of the currency, which it was said would, in point of fact, be degenerated; and the fact of Germany resolving to adopt a gold currency same as our own, was cited to show that, by altering our currency, we should be taking a backward and retrograde step. This was all very well, but the experience of Germany did not offer much encouragement as an example. Few countries had suffered, and were yet suffering, more intense commercial depression, and the case was not analogous. Germany had no India; and if in a large portion of the German Empire silver had been the standard, and it had been impossible to change it, we might well believe that the great statesman who presided over her counsels would have shrank from establishing different standards in the same Empire. It was assumed, gratuitously assumed, that it was wished to restore silver by statute to the same value it formerly possessed when coined in France, in the proportion of 15½ to 1 of gold, and many arguments against any change were founded upon this assumption. But he, for one, never understood that this was intended. The question, indeed, was quite as much one of gold as silver. It was difficult to say precisely, in the present fluctuating value of silver, what ought to be fixed as its value in proportion to gold; but one great advantage expected from the adoption of a bi-metallic currency was the prevention of these disastrous fluctuations; and if it be said that no law could effect tins, the plain and obvious answer was that they were prevented when there was a bi-metallic currency in France; and it seemed certain that the same result would again follow its adoption by one or more great nations. It was also said we should lose our supply of gold. Well, if we were the only country which adopted a bi-metallic currency, there might be some force in this argument; but, by acting in conjunction with America and France, all fear of any such a contingency would be avoided. It was also said that all descriptions of property would be increased in value, that there would be great inflation, and that debtors would be able to discharge their liabilities more easily than at present. Well, it was at least open to doubt whether a little inflation would not, on the whole, be preferable to the intense depression we had so long experienced, or whether an increase in the value of property would be altogether objectionable; and as to debts being more easily discharged, we must remember that those debts were contracted whilst a bimetallic currency was actually in force; that it practically, in point of fact, prevailed up to 1873 or 1874, and that the present state of things was inflicting great hardship upon debtors. It would be easy to prove this from illustrations connected with trading and commercial interests; but take as an illustration the case of a person nominally the owner of landed estates which were heavily encumbered with charges for settlements, mortgages, and the like. Well, in the present unhappy state of agricultural depression, when it was difficult, if not impossible, to make both ends meet, when farms were vacant and rents reduced, such a person was not in a very enviable position; but mark the difference. They who received his money, they to whom his payments were made, so far from suffering any hardship, were really benefited by his misfortunes, because their mortgages having been granted, their settlements having been made under a totally different state of things, although the unfortunate debtor had now far less resources to fall back upon, far less money to pay with, they were receiving the same payments as before, the same number of sovereigns, and these sovereigns would now go a great deal further, and purchase more commodities; and they were, therefore, proportionately enriched at his expense. But those persons possessing fixed incomes were really the only persons who would even nominally suffer by the adoption of a bi-metalie currency; their incomes would not be affected, but remain the same as now, whilst the value of estates and, in fact, property of every description would be largely increased as sovereigns became of less value and possessed less purchasing power; but there was no real hardship in the case at all, for fixed incomes would have the same value as when they—or, at all events, the great bulk of them—were contracted for, the only difference being that they would no longer be swelled and increased at the expense of the unfortunate debtors; in fact, though no doubt partly, and perhaps largely, attributable to other causes, it seemed to his mind certain that the great depression throughout the world, in nearly every interest and every trade, was to a large extent due to the contraction of the currency caused by the demonetization of silver, and the degradation of that metal from its former position as a standard of currency to a mere commodity, such as iron, or tin, or lead; and, consequently, that the true remedy for our misfortunes, the true, plain, and direct way to revive our waning trade, to arrest the ruinous fall in property, and to restore general prosperity, was to restore silver to its former position as a partner with gold in the currency of the world; and he greatly feared all other plans would end in failure, and be found alike vain and useless. America at the present moment seemed most anxious to unite with European nations in taking action on this question, and if other European nations would do nothing without our adhesion, he thought we ought no longer to stand aloof. At the same time, it could not be denied that the issues involved in adopting a bi-metalic currency were momentous, incalculable, impossible to forecast with any approach to accuracy, and the risks of any error or false step most serious; and if Her Majesty's Government, therefore, should shrink from the responsibility of adopting it for this country, then a loan to India, as now proposed, seemed to him the next best course. No doubt, objections might be taken to any and every scheme which could be brought forward; and he quite agreed that the true course to be followed, and really the best remedy, was to reduce expenditure in India, to spend less money, so that India might be enabled to absorb a larger amount of silver, and, as he had already said, he was glad that the Government were now making great exertions to enforce economy; but even if the most economical arrangements conceivable were at once made, the benefits to be derived would not be felt for some time, and—

"Whilst the grass grows the horse starves."

Something must be done immediately, and without delay; and failing a resort to some modification of bi-metallism, to be once more adopted either generally or by one or more nations, a loan seemed to him the only immediate practical way of meeting the difficulty, and to some extent relieving the pressure. The right hon. Gentleman opposite the Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen), in a most interesting and able speech on this subject some three years ago, which sank deep into his mind, seemed to think that the best plan in reference to silver was to do nothing, but leave things to find their proper level by the operation of ordinary laws and natural causes; and, no doubt, this was generally the true and correct course. There were, however, exceptions to every rule, and all classes were now suffering so severely that if ever there was a time when a departure from ordinary rules was justified it was surely the present. It certainly could not be denied that these severe fluctuations in silver had tended in no small degree to produce the existing great depression in trade. On the one hand, the consumers of India, China, and all silver-using countries had not hitherto reaped the full advantage of the excessively low prices ruling, having, of course, in the long run to pay as much more for goods as would compensate for the loss on exchange, the value of these goods being regulated by the law of supply and demand; and, on the other hand, English manufacturers and English merchants, besides direct losses on the exchange, had reaped none of the advantages of an extended trade brought about by low prices and the opening out of new markets. The loss to the Government was indeed sufficiently serious, the loss to thousands of persons of limited incomes remitted from India was grievous in the extreme, but the loss to the trading community, to Lancashire in particular, and directly or indirectly to every manufacturer and every merchant, was frightful to contemplate. It was strangling the whole trade, and no greater boon could be conferred by any Minister upon the commercial classes, and, indeed, indirectly upon all classes, than to devise some means by which exchange could be raised. His hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State, said, last evening, that the Government had made up their minds to face the loss on exchange manfully; he did not, however, at all understand him to say that they would make no effort to mitigate that loss. He could assure him that the commercial classes had been looking forward with the greatest anxiety to some course being taken in this direction, and he earnestly hoped the Government would continue to give the matter their most serious attention.

Sir, the hon. Gentleman who has just addressed the House seems to have been more interested in the question of a bi-metallic currency than in the subject immediately before us to-night. As I wish to confine myself purely to this one question, I hope he will excuse me if I do not follow him through his long and able argument. I want to point out to the House as clearly as I can the present state of affairs in India in regard to this question of the currency, to put it to them whether it is possible to allow matters to remain as they are, and, finally, to consider what remedy can be applied to reduce the existing difficulties. I have first to submit a few propositions, which, I believe, can hardly be denied. The first is, that the rupee has a much higher value in India than in Europe. In other words, although the rupee is so very much depreciated when used as the means for the payment of debt in Europe, as long as it is confined to India it very nearly maintains its value, if it does not do so entirely. So that we have the singular phenomena that the same coin, circulating in two countries, has two entirely different values, one very much higher than the other. It is also true that there is no prospect of a considerable change in the direction of equalizing the two. I do not see any probability that the rupee will obtain the same value in England and in India. Of course, we know very well the causes that have produced the difference. The great fecundity of the silver mines; the resolution of almost every great Power in the world to employ gold instead of silver as its standard of value has, no doubt, greatly produced these effects. I cannot imagine that anyone can fairly see, in the state of affairs which now exists, any probability that there will be any considerable change. If there be, I should be glad to be informed of it; because, if there were any recuperative power in the matter itself, it would, no doubt, be infinitely better to leave it to that power than to make any attempt by strong or violent measures to set it right. For myself, it seems to me that the probability of silver recovering the position it held with regard to gold before recent changes and events is so very small that it would be vain indeed to calculate upon that as a remedy. The effect of all this as regards India is simply lamentable; because, though India is provided with a currency which seems tolerably well to answer its purposes for domestic use, yet, for the purpose of foreign payments, its currency is subject to most disastrous depreciation. That would be a great evil to any country, of course, that its currency should be depreciated. It is singular, because it does not often happen in history, that a currency serving very well for domestic purposes should be found to fall so very much below the mark when used for the purpose of paying debts due to foreign countries. If that is the case in other countries, how much more is it the case in India, which is bound by the most singular and indissoluble ties to England, the very existence of whose present state of Government, and whose condition altogether and entirely depends upon the fact of its being able to remit to England every year very large sums of money indeed? The effect of this is that a man gets a reasonable return for the money he employs in India; but that on the money exported to England he suffers most heavily, and gets a very small and uncertain return indeed. We know, from the accounts laid before us, that India by this means alone actually loses, and is deprived of, something like £3,000,000 yearly. This is a state of things which, if it is to be regarded as permanent, and one not likely to be speedily or immediately relieved, is one utterly intolerable to be contemplated if there be within our reach any means or power of amendment. I think the case is made out as clearly as can be that we should, if possible, avoid so terrible a calamity as that with which India is visited, through no fault of her own, which springs from the institutions which she has, which does not arise from the nature of things, but comes from institutions which are artificial, made by the will of man, and can be altered by the will of man. We are not justified, if there be any means that can possibly be devised by which this loss can be obviated, in sitting down quietly and acquiescing in it. It may be that the thing may be in some degree alleviated. But it is not as if it were a slight loss. The ground to be made up is so great that I cannot help thinking it is an excess of presumption and sanguineness to expect any change as likely to take place which will put India in a situation tolerable to any country, a situation where she can fairly pay her debts without being subjected to this enormous sacrifice. It is infinitely worse for India than for any other country, because she is placed in a situation in which no country was ever placed before—that her very existence, under her present Constitution and form of Government, depends entirely upon that which is procured for her by the payment of these sums of money. Therefore, I do think that a case is made out, if a case ever was made out, for seeking some remedy. What, then, shall we propose? The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down proposed a double standard. I deny, Sir, that there ever is such a thing as a double standard. To may have an alternative standard, but never a double one. Gold or silver, you may have them together; but one or the other is sure to gain the advantage. You do not really get a double standard; you get either, with the additional evil of uncertainty. Something or other makes an alteration, and suddenly deranges all your calculations by shifting you from one to the other. Therefore, I cannot regard that as any approach to a settlement. What happens? That when there is a shift people pay their debts in that coin which is the cheapest. How, then, a double standard can be any relief where you have a nation whose currency answers their purpose tolerably well in their own country, and utterly fails to answer it abroad, I cannot at all understand. The question is whether we cannot hit upon some other means. What appears to be wanted for India is a standard identical with that of the country with which it is so intimately bound up. As India is paying something like £20,000,000 a-year to us, it seems most extremely desirable that the money should be paid in the way in which it will go furthest. Therefore, I confess that it seems to me that the great object we should have in view, if it be possible to attain it, is that we should get a standard of value identical with that of England. Almost any sacrifice, considering the enormity of the sum lost, should be undergone in order to obtain that. It will be said that there is nothing easier, and that we have only to declare that we will have a gold currency. Purchase your gold, make it the standard, and reduce the silver to a mere token coinage, as in England. But where are we to get the money to purchase the gold? What possibility is there in a poor country like India, where we are doubting, even at the present time, whether she does not stand on the verge of bankruptcy, how is it possible to undertake anything of that sort? [Mr. JOHN BRIGHT: Buy it with the silver.] The right hon. Gentleman says "Buy it with the silver;" but the very misery of it is that we are ruined by silver already. However desirable it might be from the way in which Indian finance has been regulated, we must see that this is perfectly impossible. Are we, then, to give up the question in despair and do nothing else? Is there any other remedy? The hon. Gentleman who spoke last suggested a paper currency; but he put that on one side, because he said such a currency would not be relied upon—that there were no means of limiting it within the bounds admissible. But is that true? Is there no means of limiting a paper currency? What is the nature of it? What gives a currency its value? It is not because it is made of any particular material. The value of a currency depends on something altogether different. It depends upon two things. First, that it should be made legal tender, which is easily enough done; and then that some means should be adopted by which it shall be limited, so as not to exceed the sum that would be used if gold, for instance, had been employed. If you can do these two things, you have got a currency possessing all the qualities, so far as I know, of a thoroughly good gold currency, with the advantage that you have not to find the gold for doing it. That was the plan developed so many years ago by Mr. Ricardo. So far as I know, it has never been carried into effect; but it has never been refuted, and I have never seen, in the course of my reading, any serious objection urged against it. There is not the least doubt that a currency of that kind, of notes of legal tender sufficiently limited, will perform, all the duties of a gold currency, with the advantage that you save the wear and tear of the gold. I remember, at a period when I had the means of commanding much bettor information on the subject than I have now, making some sort of calculation as to what would be the effect here if, instead of a gold, we had a note currency, one pound notes for sovereigns, guarding that currency by Mr. Ricardo's proposition that if a person brought notes to the Bank he should always receive gold for them to their exact amount. Assisted by those who were much better qualified than I was to deal with this subject, I calculated that England would save something like £50,000,000 if she adopted the note currency. But English prejudices would not hear of that for a moment. As far as I know, the people may be quite right. The currency satisfies them extremely well, they are used to it, they can afford the luxury of it, just as they can afford the luxury of putting on any number of millions to our Debt; and, therefore, sound as I believe the principle to be, I do not for a moment wish to tamper with the present institution in England. But what possible objection can there be to trying such a thing in India, in the terrible state in which she is now, not as a mere matter of experiment, but in order really to save her from the bankruptcy with which she is imminently threatened? It would be perfectly easy, I think, to introduce notes into India, and to make the regulations that Mr. Ricardo suggested, that a person should receive gold for any notes he might bring in. We know, if there were any redundancy in the currency, that the process would go on until the redundancy ceased. But it would go no further, and then we should be possessed of a currency not so showy, not so expensive, but for all practical purposes quite as useful and as good as the currency in England or as the silver currency of India. I do not enter into the technical question how it is to be brought into working. The system can be reduced by experts to such a state that you would have a token currency of silver just as we have in England, and a legal tender up to a certain amount just as silver is here. There may be, and probably there are, very serious reasons and overwhelming objections to this scheme. Perhaps a person who, however unworthily, has held the Office of Chancellor of the Exchequer is not even prudent in broaching such a scheme. But I am so strongly impressed by the state in which India is, simply throwing away for her currency arrangements £3,000,000 yearly, that I think any suggestion of any kind, which has any plausibility, any semblance of practibility, that I felt it my duty to offer this suggestion. It may be shown that I have overlooked some principle or some condition which makes my idea valueless; but still I offer it, because I do not believe we can go on long in this way, draining these millions from India, where money comes like blood from the poverty of the people, and where we are put to our utmost shifts to make both ends meet, that we may not die by that most ignominious of deaths by which a great Empire can perish—bankruptcy. I have, at any rate, taken my life in my hand in offering this suggestion. I would not have done it if I had thought we could go on as we are; but I do not see why any country should pay this sum merely for the pleasure of keeping on a very bad currency.

In consequence of the withdrawal of the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), my hon. Friend (Mr. E. Stanhope) is prevented from addressing the House again. As, however, there are some observations which it is necessary to notice, I venture to detain the House for a few moments before we go to a Division. The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has dealt with the great loss which the fall in the price of silver has placed, during the past few years, on the Revenue of India, and he calculates that that fall has imposed a loss of something like £3,400,000 annually on the Revenue of India. But my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State explained that these figures only represented the loss by exchange, and did not mean that that sum is money in gold annually lost. He simply stated that that was the loss, applying to these figures exactly the same test as is applied to every other figure of the accounts—upon the number of rupees annually remitted to this country in order to make certain payments in gold in this country. There- fore, the loss is not in gold; but it should be put in this way—that the Indian Government, in consequence of losses by exchange, have now to remit something like £3,400,000, or three crores 40 lacs, upon all the gold payments in this country, the difference between the nominal price of the rupee as taken in the accounts—namely, two shillings, and its actual market price in this country. But still, making all allowances for that difference, the loss is so serious that if anyone could suggest any practical means by which this loss could be reduced the Government would gladly adopt it. But in all propositions involving a change in the currency, we have to consider two separate questions. First, we have to consider whether or not any alteration in the standard will be suited to the wants and conditions of the people of India; and, secondly, we have to take care that any remedy or alteration proposed will mitigate, and not aggravate, the present condition of things. It seems to me, and I speak with all diffidence on this subject, that the great object we should have in view is to raise, if possible, the price of silver in London, and not in India. I believe that the purchasing power of the rupee in India has not greatly fallen, and that was, indeed, one of the first propositions of the right hon. Gentleman. It seems to me self-evident that so long as there is a great demand in India for silver, and a small demand for it in England, so long must the purchasing power of silver in India be greater than it is in England. Possibly, some proposition might be made by which the value of silver might be raised in England. Undoubtedly, the sale of the Secretary of State's bills in London has a most depressing effect upon the silver market. How depressing that is I can well illustrate by some figures which I laid before the House some two or three years ago. In the year 1876, there was a very sudden fall in the price of silver. I believe that experts differ as to the actual amount of silver in circulation throughout the world; but I believe the lowest estimate puts the amount at £600,000,000 sterling. It is a curious illustration that I am about to give of the connection between cause and effect. Between January and July of that year, the Secretary of State for India succeeded in selling £2,700,000 of ru- pees. But the sale of those bills mainly, as I believe, reduced the price of silver as quoted in the London market by 11½ per cent! That very forcibly illustrates the extreme difficulty in which the Secretary of State for India was placed in getting rid, upon advantageous terms, of his drafts upon India. The proposition of the right hon. Gentleman is that we should issue notes in India to represent gold. The first criticism I make upon that is that no notes would have any value, unless they represent something; and although you may say they represent gold, unless the Government have the gold nobody will believe them. The second great objection I have to make is that if you once attempt to make silver a token currency, you involve yourselves in interminable difficulties with the occupiers of land. Then, what are you to do with the enormous amount of rupees in circulation in India, where, at present, there is no token currency, and the purchasing power of the rupee is exactly corresponding to the intrinsic value of the silver contained in it? Another objection is, that if you increase the currency of India by the printing press, by circulating notes, you must diminish the demand in India for silver; and as you diminish the demand for silver in India, so do you reduce the price of silver in London. Therefore, if we adopt the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman, it seems to me that it might have exactly the reverse effect of what we propose, and so far from increasing the price of silver in London, which is the main object of every remedy, it might do just the contrary. The silver market is undoubtedly in a state of excessive sensitiveness, and its extreme fluctuation shave undoubtedly been aggravated by the Bills which the Secretary of State has been forced to sell. I think no one who has looked into the Home charges can believe that any great reduction can be effected. If you apply the most drastic scheme of economy, it could not, for many years, seriously effect the Home charges of the Indian Government, because nearly all of them are connected with services which have been rendered, with money which has been borrowed, with materials which have been forwarded for the benefit of India. Therefore, it is impossible materially to reduce the sums payable in gold in this country unless the Indian Government repudiates its liabilities, which, of course, is impossible. Such being the position of affairs, the Secretary of State must find ways and means to meet this Home liability. Of course, primal facie, nothing can be more objectionable than getting out of his difficulties by constantly borrowing in this country, because there can be little doubt that one of the main causes of the present condition of things was the system, adopted some years ago, of always borrowing in London for the benefit of the Indian Government. Unfortunately, owing to the peculiar system of accounts adopted, all the liability for the railways was excluded from the capital expenditure, and it was not until a very short time back that this House and the public became aware how great a debt the Indian Government had in England. If, then, it be objectionable, permanently to increase the debt by borrowing in England, I think it may very fairly be asked why the Government ask leave to raise a loan of £5,000,000 in this country? My hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) made a very unjust criticism upon the proposal, when he called it a proposal to speculate in silver. Now, Sir, so far from the Secretary of State for India having any wish to speculate in silver, I am quite sure I am only expressing the wish of everybody in the Office, when I say that their wish is to have nothing whatever to do with silver. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State, from the exigencies of his position, is the largest seller of silver in the world, and he is obliged to force his silver on the market, whether it is wanted or not. Now, the silver market is like an individual—it has got a digestion, and it can assimilate a certain amount of food. But, if you overload its digestion, like an individual, also, it has a fit of indigestion, and then it cannot assimilate the amount that it could before. I think there are indications that the exchange will improve. I saw a statement, the other day, in the newspapers, and it has not been since contradicted, that there is a complete failure of the Italian silk crop, and that the French crop has been materially affected. In the year 1876 there was a similar failure in the silk crop, and the result, though the House will hardly believe so incredible a statement, is that it made the exchanges rise 20 per cent. If there be this failure of the European silk crop, there will be an increased demand for Eastern silk, and that cannot fail to engender an increased demand for silver, and a rise in the exchanges. Suppose, then, by a judicious use of this loan of £5,000,000, though I hope the Secretary of State for India will only find it necessary to use a part of it, we are able to raise the price of the rupee. It by no means follows, although you may increase the permanent liability of the Indian Government in England, that therefore you are causing a larger number of rupees to be remitted from there. If, through the use of this loan, silver rises a penny in the rupee, that is a gain of 4 per cent, and upon a payment of £15,000,000, taking the rupee at 2s., it is a gain of £600,000; while if the Indian Government were to spend the whole of this loan, which is most improbable, it will only add permanently to the annual liability of India the sum of £200,000. What we have to consider to-night is not so much the net amount of pounds sterling which have to be paid, as the number of rupees which the Indian Government will have to get to England to meet these payments. Of course, the House may say, although I can hardly believe it under the circumstances, that it does not think it desirable that the Secretary of State for India should have any borrowing powers. If it does that, it will have the effect of forcing him to get home an enormous amount of silver from India. I read only the other day a letter in The Economist, written by an Indian merchant, which expresses so well what the position of the Secretary of State for India is with regard to these Bills, that I will just read two sentences—

"Why does the Secretary of State for India push his bills down people's throats? The result is that the poor draftsmen are the victims of speculators and the puppets of Exchange bankers."

So far as I know, that is exactly correct. The number of purchasers of Indian bills is very small, and, therefore, they can drive by a combination the Secretary of State for India into a corner. It must be remembered that this matter of silver does not merely affect the Government of India. It affects also the whole of our Eastern trade. The depreciation in the value of silver need not necessarily injuriously affect those who trade to the countries where silver is the standard of value; but what is absolutely ruinous to the trade are these constant fluctuations up and down, because they render unstable the standard of value, which is the basis of calculation of the profits of the individual. I hope, if it was necessary to make out any case after the speech of my hon. Friend, that I have made out a case which will justify the House in giving its assent to this loan. The course of treatment which we are adopting very much resembles that course of medicine known as homoeopathy, which, by giving the patient infinitesimal doses of the poison from which he is suffering, finally ejects it from the system altogether. Perhaps I may be permitted also to say a few words with regard to Indian finance. Undoubtedly the Resolution withdrawn last night which commenced with these words, "This House views with apprehension the condition of Indian finance," did give expression to a feeling of inquietude which it would be very foolish of me to ignore. One may very fairly ask—"What is the cause of that uneasiness?" It is not caused, as was said last night, by the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing), by any falling off in the Indian Revenues. Figures show that the Revenue, under seven years of extraordinary pressure, remain firm. Eliminating all disturbing influences, the taxes, which, seven years ago, brought in a certain sum, bring in now a larger sum. Neither can it be found in an increase of the ordinary Expenditure. I can show that there is very little increase in the Civil and Military Expenditure. Excluding the war in Afghanistan, there was no considerable increase in the Military Expenditure, and what increase there is was due almost exclusively to changes at home, in consequence of alterations in the terms on which men are enlisted. If, then, these apprehensions were not on account either of a great diminution of income or a great increase in Expenditure, what is the cause of it? I think the cause is that our Government, from the time it came into Office up to the present time, has been subjected to an almost unparalleled pressure. I can illustrate how enormous the strain has been by giving one set of figures. The Expenditure over and above the ordinary Expenditure of India, for which the Indian Government have had during the past seven years to find Ways and Means, taking the rupee at the ordinary rate of 2s., amounts to the enormous sum of upwards of £57,000,000. The items are £2,600,000 for the war in Afghanistan. That is an expenditure for which, no doubt, Her Majesty's Government are responsible, and they are quite ready to defend their action. The other items are £16,000,000 incurred on behalf of Famines, £28,700,000 incurred for Public Works, which, whether the system is right or wrong, is a system that was in existence when we came into Office, and £9,700,000 loss by exchange. I arrive at this last item by taking the average loss on exchange to India during the seven preceding years, and during the seven years we have been in Office, and the sum lost in the last seven years exceeds that lost in the first period by £2,700,000. Now, how has that £57,000,000 of exceptional Expenditure been mot? It is very frequently said that the India Office takes a very optimistic view of Indian finance; but I think I may say in regard to myself and my hon. Friend that no figure or fact ever set by us before the House has been disputed. Nor do I think that even in my most sanguine mood I should ever have ventured to predict that India, during seven years of such extraordinary depreciation, would be able to meet so large a proportion of the charges out of her ordinary Revenue. Now, how has this amount been met? In three ways. By loans, by the reduction of cash balances, and by payments out of ordinary Revenue. The increase in loans during this seven years has been £33,400,000. There has been a decrease in the cash balances of £8,000,000, but, of that, £4,000,000 to municipalities; so that that makes a total, with the loans, of £37,400,000. Therefore, during these seven years of extraordinary depression, the Revenues of India have found very nearly £20,000,000 to meet the extraordinary charges. From these figures we may draw one very safe conclusion. If you could altogether eliminate from consideration these abnormal charges, no doubt the prospects of Indian finance would be most flourishing. If, on the other hand, every seven years these enormous charges are to be im- posed upon the Indian Revenues, and we are to be required to find Ways and Means to the amount of £57,000,000 over and above the ordinary Expenditure, no words used in this House are sufficiently gloomy to depict the prospects of Indian finance. But I believe the right and correct view is that although these difficulties will from time to time occur, it is almost impossible for them to occur again simultaneously, as they have done. If we can only reduce our Expenditure, so as to increase that great margin between Expenditure and income which I have already mentioned, and if we are only fortunate enough in the future to have our one difficulty at a time to deal with, I believe, by thrifty and judicious administration of Indian finances, we can so increase the present margin between Revenue and Expenditure, that in a very short time those who now use such strong and gloomy language concerning the state of our finance will be the first to laugh at their own fears.

said, the arrangement was that the debate should be taken on the Motion that Mr. Speaker do leave the Chair, and that if it lasted more than two nights, that the Resolutions should be passed, and the debate resumed at another stage of the proceedings. He hoped the House would permit that arrangement to stand, and the Vote for the loan to be taken now. The Government, of course, would feel bound, on the second reading of the Bill, for instance, if that were convenient, to put that stage of the Bill in such a position as would give full opportunities for further discussion.

, if he understood the Chancellor of the Exchequer rightly, believed what was of importance was to get through the first stage of the Loan Bill, and that the passing of the Budget Resolution was a matter of form of no practical importance. Unfortunately, they had not had two full nights' debate; and, under the circumstances, he thought the most convenient course would be that his debate should continue on a future night, but that the Government should be allowed at once to take the first stage of their Loan Bill. Otherwise, those who had already spoken would be able I to speak again; while, as to the Under Secretary of State for India, he was sure the House would do in his case what it had not unfrequently done before, and permit him again to address it on matters arising in the debate.

said, that, after the expression of the views entertained by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, which seemed to be generally shared by the House, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be prepared to adopt the course which he suggested. It would, therefore, be understood that the debate on going into Committee on the East India Accounts would be postponed to a future day, and that the Government should now be allowed to take the Resolution on the East India Loans Bill.

, said, it would be very convenient for hon. Members if the Under Secretary of State for India, when he came to reply, would explain more explicitly what was to be the nature of the Commission of Inquiry into the state of the Indian Army which he proposed to appoint. Some persons thought it was to be a Commission in India, others said it would be a mere departmental inquiry, while others indulged the hope that it was to be a Commission not merely to inquire into departmental questions, but into all questions of military organization. Without such an inquiry, indeed, any attempt to reduce military expenditure would be perfectly ineffectual.

wished to urge upon the right hon. Gentleman the extreme importance of resuming the debate at the earliest possible date. The attention of the whole mercantile world, both in England and in India, was fixed upon the very serious issues raised in regard to the silver question. It was of the utmost importance that this question of the bearing of the depreciation of silver upon the Revenues of India should be discussed at the earliest possible moment, in order that no hopes might be raised which afterwards were frustated by the impracticability of the schemes proposed. This question of silver must be argued out; and as he was the Chairman of the Committee which considered this question two years ago, and as he also represented this country at the Conference which inquired into the silver question in Paris last year, he certainly should consider it his duty not to shrink from stating his views.

said, that the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Sullivan), who had charge of the Bill had asserted that, unless he could move the second reading at an early day, he should move to discharge the Bill. He found that the hon. and learned Member had not put in an appearance, nor had he given any instructions on the subject. Under those circumstances, he (Mr. Callan) did not feel justified in moving that the Order be discharged; but he assured the House that if the Order was postponed until Monday, and the hon. and learned Member then did not move its discharge, he himself would do so.

said, that in the event of no day being fixed for the adjourned debate it became a dropped Order.

, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, it had been submitted to the Attorney General, and had received his sanction. With the exception of some clauses at the end, which had reference to a matter of procedure, the Bill proposed simply to extend the powers of the official Referees, by giving them the opportunity of doing work which at present they were unable to do, and to prevent their getting into difficulties by conflicts of jurisdiction.

did not know whether the Attorney General had given his careful attention to the Bill; but, for his part, he had considerable doubts as to the correctness of its principle. Instead of referring a matter to the Referee to decide, this Bill proposed to refer a case to him for decision once for all. He thought it was far preferable to adopt the procedure instituted by the Judicature Acts, and to send a matter to the Referee to report. He did not think it was at all an improvement to enable a Judge or the Court to refer a ease to the Referee for him to decide as arbitrator. That should only be done by consent of the parties, as at present.

thought the principle of the Bill was one which ought to be approved. It was at first the opinion that under the Judicature Acts a Referee could deal with the whole matter; but recent decisions had shown that that was not so, and that the Referee's power was very considerably defined and limited. For his part, where the parties to the action consented, and where the Court thought it right that the Referee should have full power to decide the whole matter, and how the costs should go, he could see no objection to such a rule. In his humble opinion, if such a provision were passed into law, it would render the Referees a great deal more useful than they were now, and would induce parties to go before them much more frequently than was at present the case. There were other provisions, with regard to giving bankers' notes in evidence, which he had not very carefully considered, and therefore he reserved to himself the right to consider these in Committee.

had not the least desire to ask the House to proceed with extraordinary haste; but he thought the hon. Gentleman was hardly acquainted with the objects of the Bill. It proposed no new costs and no new system of taxation, but simply proposed to legalize a system which had been in operation for 30 years, of taxing Provisional Orders and Bills of that description in the same way as if they were private Bills. The officer of the House in charge of these Bills had recently had occasion to consider the matter, and he came to the conclusion that there was some question as to its legality. As that officer was paid by salary and not by fees, it made no difference to him, and it was merely enacting the existing practice, because some doubts had arisen on the subject. It did not make any change in the existing practice, and did not impose any fresh costs.

said, if the Bill merely legalized an existing practice which had been pursued for so many years, it surely might be pursued a little longer. Why could not the hon. Gentleman allow the Bill to be postponed till after Witsuntide.