asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he can inform the House if the 10th Hussars received the order to make forced marches on their return to India while suffering from cholera; and, if so, from whom the order proceeded, and what was the countervailing reason for increasing the pace at the risk of the health of the men?

I cannot yet say whether the 10th Hussars received the order to make forced marches on their return to India. If such an order was issued, it was, probably, not in spite of, but because of, cholera, it being of the first importance, and at almost any other risk, to remove cholera-stricken troops from the infected district.

As there appears to be some misapprehension as to the powers of commitment exercised by this House, it is right that I should state that, although the prisoner in custody would be released immediately upon the Prorogation of Parliament, his offence would not be purged by his imprisonment. If in another Session this House shall determine that the prisoner has not undergone adequate punishment for his offence, he would be liable to further imprisonment at the pleasure of the House.

Sir, after the information which you have communicated to the House, I think our course is tolerably clear. As but a few hours of the Session remain, it will be impossible this Session to deal with the principal offence with which Charles Grissell is charged. That, I think, must remain for a future decision, if in a future Session any proposal shall be made with regard to it. But the House has also to remember that he has been guilty of a second offence against the House, inasmuch as he has evaded, by his conduct, the execution of Mr. Speaker's Warrant for bringing him to the Bar of the House; and I think that the proper course for the House to take, under present circumstances, will be to agree to that which I am about to propose—namely—

"That Charles Edmund Grissell, having evaded, until the close of the Session, the execution of Mr. Speaker's Warrant for taking him into the custody of the Serjeant at Arms, be committed to Her Majesty's Gaol of Newgate; and that Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrants accordingly."

That will only be an imprisonment for a few hours; but, still, it marks the sense of the House as to the conduct of this gentleman. I move that Resolution.

It appears that, in the circumstances, there is scarcely any alternative but for us to take the course suggested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is certainly to be regretted that we should be driven to take this course, which is scarcely one conducive to the dignity of the proceedings of this House. It is, however, to a certain extent, satisfactory to learn that Mr. Grissell will not be purged of the offence he has committed by the short imprisonment he is about to undergo; but I cannot think that it is altogether a satisfactory or convenient course that we should be obliged to re-consider his case again at the beginning of a subsequent Session. There appears, however, to be no alternative course; and, therefore, I will give my cordial assent to the Motion.

said, the Committee had had considerable discussion upon this point yesterday, and he believed the feeling was in favour of not giving an additional salary to the Senior Master who was to undertake the duty, and he could see no reason for the additional salary; there would not be heavier duties to perform. It really was not the case that there would be only four Masters to perform the duties now performed by five. The truth was that the Courts of Queen's Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas, being amalgamated, the Masters of all would become Masters of the High Court of Justice; therefore, there would be 12 or 15 Masters, and under the section it would be within the power of the Lord Chancellor to recommend the appointment of an additional Master, should the duties become too heavy. He could not understand why the Senior Master, who, instead of performing his usual duties, was to perform the duties of Queen's Remembrancer, was to receive more than £1,500 a-year. To that he had a strong objection, and yesterday he quite understood it was not to be pressed. He felt compelled to take the sense of the Committee on this point.

appealed to the hon. Member not to do that, for the effect must be to stop the whole proceeding in Committee this Session.

said, if the hon. Member insisted upon contesting the point it must have the effect of stopping the Bill, which time only admitted of being taken with general assent. The clause which they had passed had reference to the salaries; and the proposal now was, whether or not additional salaries should be regulated by the Treasury? These were the words before the Committee; it was the regulating words, not additional salaries, they were now deciding.

said, it was a mistake to say the clause, as regarded these salaries, had been passed by the Committee.

said, if this Amendment was accepted a few words might be added which would remove all difficulty. If the words were passed as they were printed in red then the Committee might add a Proviso, that the amount fixed by the Lord Chancellor and the Treasury should not exceed the salary now payable to the Queen's Remembrancer. If the Amendment was passed he should move the addition of the Proviso, and hoped it might meet with general concurrence.

said, the payment of salaries to the Queen's Remembrancer was the very point upon which the Com- mittee broke down yesterday. He was opposed to this system of raising salaries. It would appear that lawyers, at a time when trade was bad and everyone, more orless, impoverished, thought they should continue to live in increasing prosperity and become richer as the rest of the community became poorer. It was agreed yesterday that it could not be shown that these duties were more responsible than those the same official discharged before, or that they took longer time, and as his whole time was already paid for there was no excuse for raising the salary. He certainly understood, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested the Amendment should be accepted, that it was not intended to press this increase of salary.

did not wish to delay the progress of the Bill, and if it would be more convenient to take a Division on Report as to the omission of the words after the word "office" he would do so; but, certainly, he must take a Division upon the point. The Bill, as his hon. Friend had said, was one to reduce expenses; but the clause granted an increase of salary to the oldest Master.

said, the person who held the office of Queen's Remembrancer received no salary at all under the Bill.

said, under the Bill he would receive £1,500 a-year.

was glad there was a probability of the Bill passing into law, and he intended to give the Attorney General all the support in his power. As to the clause in reference to the salary of Queen's Remembrancer, it was a well-established rule that when additional duties were imposed on any man in any official appointment then an increase of pay should be given. It was on this principle, for instance, that increased payment was given to County Court Judges, when their judicial duties were increased. He thought it was important that members of the Profession, who were invited to accept the position of Senior Master, should be well paid, as they ought to be men whose position and experience demanded it.

said, he was afraid he must move to report Progress. He understood that, by general consent, the Bill was to pass through Committee; and he reminded hon. Members that Government were under an obligation to afford opportunity for another discussion, and could not now consume the time. He must throw upon hon. Gentlemen opposite the responsibility of preventing the passage of a measure intended to produce a considerable saving in public expenditure.

made a last appeal to the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Monk) not to persist in his objection. The Bill would, undoubtedly, effect a great saving, and it was the outcome of careful inquiry by Committee. In giving this power to the Treasury not one shilling would be added to salaries unless they were deserved.

hoped that Progress would not be reported. It was absolutely necessary to pass the Bill. The Supreme Court of Judicature Act had amalgamated the Courts, and this Bill amalgamated the offices.

said, of course, he did not wish to stand out against the appeals made. He had made his protest, and the responsibility of the increase of salary must rest with others.

said, it was understood that next Session the Treasury would take up the question of fees, so that salaries might be substituted for them; but, for the present, it was thought advisable to leave the clause as it stood.

undertook to deal with the matter, with the view of doing away with the system, to which he saw much objection—payment by fees as well as salary.

said, he did not care whether the clause was struck out or amended in the sense of the Notice he had put upon the Paper; but he thought it was most undesirable, when a fixed salary was paid, and in some cases an increasing salary—increasing in such manner as the Lord Chancellor might recommend, with the subsequent sanction of the Treasury—it was most undesirable that the payment of fees to these officers should be continued. By all means, if the salaries ought to be increased, let it be done; but these fees ought to be paid into Her Majesty's Exchequer. He felt sure the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not have given his sanction to this clause, and that he would consent to the spirit of the Amendment, if not to the omission of the clause. He Moved, in page 8, line 16, to leave out "affect any liability to," and insert "be construed to permit."

thought it impossible to accept the Amendment in the present position of affairs; but the Government would promise to look into the matter between this and next Session, and make some arrangement by which the system of payment by fees should be done away with.

said, unless the liability to pay foes was kept up, the persons who owed fees to the Exchequer would be released from their liability.

thought it was understood that the clause was to be left out. His objection to the clause was that it gave power to the Lord Chancellor to fix the amount of the salaries—a power which the House ought to retain in its own hands. He thought he must move the omission of the clause.

explained, that every salary in the Public Service was first settled by the Treasury, and then the amount came before the House to be voted.

did not wish to hinder the progress of the Bill; but he did think that the fixing of a maximum was necessary against the extraordinary power assumed by the Treasury.

I rise, Sir, to call attention to the Treaty lately concluded with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and to endeavour to elicit from the Government some explanations with reference to that document. The Treaty contains 10 Articles, of which the 1st presents no features of special interest, and the 2nd only so far calls for remark as to oblige me to say in fairness that Lord Lytton has had the grace to do what another Governor General did not do—that is, to stipulate for the safety of those Natives who had assisted the British. Lord Ellenborough left his friends at Candahar to be destroyed—which was done in due course. The 3rd Article requires, however, more attention. It runs as follows:—

"His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Ameer will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions, the British Government will support the Ameer against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished."

Now, I want to know if I rightly understand that Article? Afghanistan marches not only with Khelat and Cashmere and Beluchistan, which are all within the Indian system, but with Kashgar, and Persia, and Bokhara, and the wandering Turkomans, and certain wild Tribes. Am I right in supposing that the Indian Government takes charge of the whole of the relations between Afghanistan and those States? If so, this Article opens a prospect of somewhat doubtful blessings. Within a very few years, if all Eastern experience is not to be falsified, we shall have a whole crop of new questions, and names will become familiar which are now known only to a few. Already those who interpret through the Press the views which are in favour at Simla tell us that we must turn Eastern Turkistan into an outwork of Cashmere, and assure us that we shall soon make better acquaintance with the "interesting inhabitants of Kaffiristan." I make no doubt of it, Sir, and, as a student of geography, I rejoice; but in the interests of the Indian taxpayer I had rather have deferred any close acquaintance with that attractive community. The House has a distinct right to a plain answer to a plain opiestion—Does this 3rd Article add to the already multifarious duties of the Indian Foreign Secretary the duty of keeping his eye on the relations between the Ameer of Afghanistan on the one hand, and Kashgar and Bokhara, and the Turkomans, and Persia, and Khelat, and Cashmere, and all and sundry the wild Tribes who do not acknowledge his Sovereignty—with the exception of those which, under a later Article, we take direct charge of—or, if this is not so, what does the 3rd Article mean? The 4th Article provides for the residence of a British Representative at Cabul, and for the deputing of British Agents to the Frontier, when external events seem to call for it; while the 5th provides that these Agents shall not interfere with the internal administration of the Ameer's Dominions. The Treaty is silent as to the interference of the British Representative at Cabul. He may interfere as much as his Government thinks fit. And, indeed, we are obviously intended by the draftsman of the Treaty to interfere a good deal, for the 4th Article must be read along with the 10th, in which we agree to pay £60,000 a-year for the support of the Ameer "in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority." Now, that must refer to his support against internal enemies; for, so far as I know, no foreign aggression on the Ameer has taken place. That this is the view which is taken by some of the warmest friends of the Government will be apparent to anyone who reads the interesting article on the Afghan Treaty in Blackwood for July. There I find the following remarks:—

"We have promised to support the Ameer against foreign aggression; but the Treaty makes no mention of aiding him against internal insurrection. That, however, goes without saying. A strong Administration and a peaceable country is the only basis on which the Government of India could safely manage the Ameer's foreign relations. And here the advantage of a British Resident in Cabul will be specially felt. His advice will assist the Ameer in introducing regular systems of justice and revenue into his Dominions. He will mediate between the pretensions of the semi-independent Chiefs and the rights of the Ameer's Sovereignty. He will use the influence of the Indian Government to counsel the Ameer to moderate measures when there is discontent among his subjects, and will strengthen his hands when it is necessary to use force to bring malcontents to a sense of their duty. The Treaty tacitly assumes that the Ameer will be guided in his administration by the counsel of the Resident; and as we are accordingly responsible for any evil consequences which may flow to him from following such advice, we are, of course, bound to assist him in making good his authority against all unlawful opposition on the part of his subjects. We may accordingly conclude that, though no support is specified in the Treaty, an obligation rests with the Government of India to protect Yakoob Khan against internal rebellion as well as foreign aggression, so long as he continues faithful to the spirit of the new alliance."

Now, is that the view of Her Majesty's Government, or if not, what is its view? If the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer says—"Yes, that is our view," good and well; we know for once what he means. If, however, he says it is not, perhaps he will allow me to ask him, as we say in Scotland, to "condescend on particulars." In paragraph 43 of the despatch of the Viceroy in Council, it is said that the British Envoy at Cabul will be strictly required to abstain from interference in internal affairs, and, doubtless, there are many everyday affairs in which he will not interfere. On the other hand, however, there are affairs in which he will unquestionably interfere. It is certainly not meant to put him in the position of the British Resident in Nepaul. That would be quite out of the question. He will inevitably become either the guide of the Ameer, or the rallying point of the Ameer's enemies. Then remember the state of Afghanistan as described in this very despatch. I want to know what attitude Her Majesty's Government would take if Yakoob Khan were driven from Cabul, as so many of his family have been, by a successful pretender raising the standard of revolt? I want to know what it would do if the Northern and North-Western Provinces, or some of them did the same—a highly probable contingency? The right hon. Gentleman may say Alors comme alors. But that is not a fair answer to one who is asking what interpretation he is to put upon a Treaty to which the Government has committed the honour of England. No one can say that it is; but it would be fair ereven to give that answer than to point to the despatches and say—"We have declared against interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan." My case is that with a British Representative at Cabul right hon. Gentlemen, or their successors, will be led on to interfering by forces which cannot be resisted. Another claim made for the Treaty by the writer in Blackwood is that it is the nearest approach that has been made to Lord Wellesley's system of subsidiary alliances in the present generation of Eastern statesmen. This, he says, he conceives

"To be a high compliment; for it was Lord Wellesley's policy which first laid the firm foundation of British empire in India and extended the aims of the Government in that country beyond the narrow groove to which the Court of Directors would fain have confined it."

Now, I confess I quite agree with the writer. The Treaty, as I read it, means that, or means nothing. The Ameer of Afghanistan appears to me to be put by it precisely in the position of Holkar or Scindia. He becomes a great vassal, nothing more. Perhaps, if this is not so, the right hon. Gentleman will explain what his position is. Is he an independent Prince? Surely not. There is nothing Lord Wellesley would have liked loss, by the way, than what has happened, for he wrote to Lord Ellen-borough—

"Your Lordship, I am satisfied, would reject Afghanistan and Cabul, with their rocks, sands, deserts, ice, and snow, even if Shah Shoojah had bequeathed them as a peace-offering to England."

In the despatch from the Secretary of State the stipulations about non-interference are called unambiguous. I have shown how some of the warmest friends of the Secretary of State interpret them. However anxious, I repeat, the present or any other Viceroy may be not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, he will not be able to help being dragged into doing so, if once we have a British Representative established at Cabul. It is vain to fight against the nature of things. Under the provision of the 9th Article of the Treaty we agree to restore all the territory which we now hold except Kurrum, Pisheen, and Sibi. I leave my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) to deal with the objections to holding Kurrum, as he has already put them forth very admirably in a pamphlet. But Sibi, what is the case for Sibi? Holding Sibi will not make it unnecessary to hold Dadur, which Dost Mahommed told Lord Auckland would be a good substitute for Gehenna. Against Pisheen all the same objections hold which held against Quetta. It is merely going one step further in a thoroughly mischievous policy—another illustration of the facilis decensus Averni. Speaking just two years ago, I said—

"If there was any intention to permanently occupy Quetta, he must protest against that course in the strongest possible way. It was undesirable for several reasons. In the first place, it was a triumph given to the most aggressive school of Indian politicians. In the second place, it would be very expensive. In the third place, it would add seriously to the duties, already very considerable, of our not too large Army. In the fourth place, what would be the advantage of 1,000 men in Quetta? Why, none whatever; for in the case of troubles arising we should only lay ourselves open to insult. If the occupation was to be permanent, they would have to increase that Force, and might have to send reinforcements across some of the very worst country in the East at the season of the year least adapted to European constitutions, as it was not likely that our enemies would choose the most favourable time for us to raise a disturbance. In the fifth place, as implying virtual annexation, it could not be agreeable to Khelat. In the sixth place, it excited the jealousies of the Afghans, and would increase the difficulties we already experienced with Afghanistan; and, lastly, it exposed the Viceroy to have his hands forced by the extreme party who, the first time that Russia made any forward move in Central Asia in the direction of Merv, would assuredly clamour for advance to Kandahar and ultimately to Herat, and we should not be allowed to stop at Quetta. They would urge the Government of India to go in for the whole Rawlinsonian policy, before which it faltered."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxvi. 691–2.]

I wish to call the attention of hon. Members to those words, "the whole Rawlinsonian policy;" they will see the importance of them before I have done. I wish, too, to point out that I would have nothing to say against occupying either Quetta, or Pisheen, or Candahar, if all North-Western Asia were filled up by a State which stood to our Indian Empire in the relation that the Macedon of Alexander the Great stood to the Empire of Darius. But that is not the case nor likely to be. What did the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer reply to me? He replied as follows:—

"As to the occupation of Quettah, if we are to regard that advance from a military point of view—a step in the nature of taking up a certain position to defend ourselves against an apprehended attack—then I should maintain the opinion that it would be a false move; but if our relations with the Government of Khelat are of such a character as to demand that we should take certain steps to improve and regulate those relations—if it is thought right and desirable that we should send an Envoy there, and that the Envoy should be accompanied by a sufficient escort to secure him an honourable reception, I do not see that such a course can be open to objection, or can be liable to the construction that in taking such a step Her Majesty's Government are doing anything that is inconsistent with the policy that has hitherto been pursued—the policy originated by Lord Northbrook, approved by my noble Friend Lord Salisbury, and continued by the present Viceroy, Lord Lytton. I gather from the language of the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) and the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) that they are not dissatisfied with the explanations of my noble Friend, if they could only feel sure that there was not something behind. They refer to some expressions used by my noble Friend, Lord Lytton, in which he speaks of the desirability of considering our Frontier policy as a whole, and treating it from an Imperial point of view, and they seem to assume that that policy is going to change its character, and pass from a policy of inactivity into one of activity. I do not admit that that is a fair construction of the language of my noble Friend's despatch."—[Ibid. 720.]

Then we shall be told that Kurrum, Sibi, and Pisheen are not annexed, they are only assigned—"Convey, the wise it call;" but Her Majesty's Government likes the word "assigned," and we will not quarrel about a word. I want to be informed, however, what "assigned" territory we have given back? It looks to me as if the word "assigned" had been used merely to evade the declarations against annexation in the Queen's Proclamation. Are not these assigned districts going to be another Cyprus, and shall we not have the same sort of questions about them if anyone cares to raise them? Under the provision of the same 9th Article we also retain the control of the Khyber and the Michnee Passes. Well, I can understand that the Government may reasonably expect some advantage from doing that; but one may buy gold too dear. Would it not have been better, if there was any question of our being attacked through the Khyber or Michnee Passes—a most violently improbable contingency—to have obtained possession of them as we did the other day? And, with regard to both Passes, I should like to know what advantage the Government expects to gain from holding them, at all commensurate with the expense and the increased invaliding which will result? Why, if we are really afraid of having to meet an invader coming through these Passes, would it not have sufficed to have strengthened the small forts at the mouth of them, and sealed them in that way? We could have seized Ali Musjid at any time. If it was necessary to do more, surely it was necessary to get up to a country over which our troops could communicate, without going back within our old Frontier. We have pushed beyond our old Frontier, but we have not reached a new Frontier. The three assigned districts and the Passes we hold are all isolated. They are assuredly not scientific. They are not even a Frontier. The military objections urged by General Hamley to what we have done in the Northern part of the Suleiman range are overwhelming. Another claim which the advocates of the Treaty make is, that it "relieves the Ameer of the entire responsibility of the troublesome Pathan country between India and Afghanistan proper." Doubtless, it relieves the Ameer not of the "entire responsibility," but of a considerable portion of it. But at whose expense does it do this? Why, at our expense! The idea probably was, that the Ameer, relieved of the obligation of looking after some of his troublesome neighbours in the East, would have more leisure to consolidate his power in the North—in the Provinces of Afghan-Turkistan. To act on that idea, however, was to engage in very telescopic politics. Who can say that the new Ameer, relieved of anxieties on the East, may not devote his leisure rather to the West than to the North—may pick quarrels with Persia rather than conciliate Afghan-Turkistan? We undertake a real and increasing burden upon a mere hypothesis—not to say on a mere fancy. Even Sir Henry Rawlinson admits that our new Frontier must bring us into contact with a large mountaineer population, comprising some of the wildest and most unruly Clans in the country. Well may he add, after giving a list of the barbarians whom we must now either fight or bribe, and warmly approving the policy which has brought us into relation with them—"Altogether, I do not pretend to look on the new Frontier arrangements as economical." I should think not. These are the principal questions which it occurs to me to ask about the Treaty; but there are other important questions which are not directly raised by anything within the four corners of that Paper. As, for example: I think we have a right to know what the war has cost in men killed, or dead of disease, or invalided, in money, and in beasts of burden; whether it is intended to reduce the Native Army to the proportion which it had before the war was thought of, or if not, what increased expense its larger numbers will throw on the Revenues of India? Then, we ought to be told what force it is intended to employ in holding our new acquisition, and in keeping open the Passes; whether it is intended to construct works for their protection, and, if so, at what approximate cost; and, generally, as the lawyers say, what has it all been about? The right hon. Gentleman took very good care not to tell us in December what were the objects of the war. It was a wise precaution; but now that the war is over, I ask him to tell the House of Commons what he wishes it to be supposed the objects were. The first object of the war, as defined in the 8th paragraph of the despatch of the 7th of July from the Viceroy in Council, was the exclusion of all foreign influence from Afghanistan. Have we succeeded? Sir Henry Rawlinson says that we must not relax our vigilance for a moment. The second was—

"Such a rectification of the Frontier as would suffice to render impossible for the future the exclusion of British influence from that State."

This war has proved that British influence could not be excluded—has proved, in fact, that the war itself was at the best a costly superfluity. Two aids to the understanding of anything the right hon. Gentleman may tell us, in addition to the Blackwood article, are at hand, and I may point them out. The one is the book by Dr. Bellew, who was one of the most important persons behind the scenes in all this Frontier policy; and the other is the article of Sir Henry Rawlinson in The Nineteenth Century for August. From the following passage will be seen what Dr. Bellew, writing in the middle of the war, thought his masters in India would like him to say:—

"How and where the war now begun is destined to terminate time will show. But it will be our own fault if, with the opportunity now before us, we do not settle the question of our Indian Frontier in this direction once and for all. It behoves us to remember, and the fact requires to be impressed on our minds, that in our invasion of Afghanistan now it is not the Ameer of Cabul we have to deal with alone, but with the fate and disposal of the entire territory over which we have recognized his rule, and which we have made for him what it is. We have now, on entering Afghanistan, to provide not only for its internal security and order, but we have also to provide for the safety of its frontiers against external aggression and intrigue. And the only way in which these objects of vital importance to the success of our enterprise, and of lasting benefit to the Empire, can be attained with any prospect of a satisfactory and stable result, is by our taking their arrangement, execution, and control directly into our own hands. With British garrisons at Cabul, Candahar, Herat, and Balkh, for which the existing Army of India, with but slight increment, is amply sufficient in ordinary times, Afghanistan will be pacified, and Russia, in the direction of Persia and Bokhara, be deprived of an object of ambition and field of intrigue."

Dr. Bellew thinks that all this could be done at a very moderate cost. Another, and a far higher military authority, Sir Henry Norman, has said that it would cost £3,000,000 a-year and require 30,000 men to hold a far less expanse of Afghan country, the article of Sir Henry Rawlinson in The Nineteenth Century is, I need not say, of the very first importance, for not only is Sir Henry Rawlinson an extremely able man, but he is in all these matters not merely the inspirer, but virtually the lord and master of the Government, the Party opposed to his views in the Indian Council having been utterly rejected and put outside. Anybody who knows the A B C of what has occurred since Lord Northbrook left India, knows that Sir Henry Rawlinson has most skilfully used, for his own far-reaching views, the desire of the Government to make a little political capital by what they foolishly thought would be a perfectly easy and cheap triumph over the non-showy and pacific policy of the Liberal Party, though, indeed, it was the policy of all Governments since the old Afghan War. What, then, does he say? He says this, amongst other things—

"An argument has been brought forward in influential quarters that the Afghan settlement must be held to have dissipated all danger; that alarms at the advance of Russia are now vain alarms; that even if Merv were taken, and Russia and Persia combined threatened the Afghan Border, the British-Indian Government, secure in Yakoob Khan's fidelity, and in his maintenance of the Frontier fortresses of Herat and Mymeneh especially, might laugh at the machinations of its enemies and defy their efforts to annoy us. There is much of fallacy, I believe, in this argument. The Afghan settlement is a very good settlement, as far as it goes; but it is not immaculate, it is not complete. To yield to us its full measure of defence, the Treaty must be supplemented by all legitimate precautions and supports. Persia must be detached from Russia, coûte que coûte. Russia herself must not be left in any uncertainty as to our intentions. She must be made to understand, while there is yet time for her to modify her aggressive preparations, that she will not be permitted unopposed to establish herself in strength upon the Afghan Frontier, either at Merv, or at Serakhs, or even at Abiverd, nor to re-commence intrigues against the British power in India. She might, indeed, be warned that, if necessary, we were prepared in self-defence to support the Turkomans—with whom she has no legitimate quarrel—with arms and money, or even to turn the tables on her by encouraging the efforts of the Uzbegs to recover their liberty."

Now, the first remark that occurs to me is this—The Russians, forsooth, are not to be permitted to establish themselves at Merv, or Serakhs, or even at Abiverd. Examine all the books of all the writers on International Law. In which will you find authority for so astounding a demand? And, observe, this is not the opinion merely of a private person. It is the opinion, signed with his name, of a man who, for all matters connected with Central Asian politics, is virtually a Member of the Cabinet, for he is the most influential Adviser of the Cabinet behind the scenes. And the Russian Government is sufficiently well-informed to know that he is speaking what, it is to be feared, will soon be the views of Her Majesty's Government. What have we to do with any one of these places? If this war had never occurred, a skilful and judicious Ambassador at St. Petersburg would, I doubt not, have succeeded in preventing the Russians coming to Merv for many a long day, not because we had any rights in Merv, but because he would have been able to show various good reasons against it, besides the fact that, to use the happy phrase of the Duke of Argyll, there were many Mervous persons both in England and India, and because it would probably lead to difficulties with the Afghans. But now, after this Afghan War, what shadow of a moral, to say nothing of a legal, right have we to object to the Russians going to Merv, when it suits them to do so? Is, then, the net result of the expenditure of a sum which it is admitted will amount to nearer £3,000,000 than £2,000,000, but which will assuredly, before all bills, directly and indirectly chargeable to the war, are paid, amount to more—of a considerable expenditure of human life, chiefly in the saddest and most inglorious way, through disease, and a quite hideous amount of animal suffering—this, and merely this, that the able man whose skilful piping has been the only interesting feature in the foolish dance that has been performed on the North-West Frontier can write in such a way, can tell us, in effect, that we are just as little able now to turn our attention away from the Frontier as we were before Lord Lytton went to India; that we must be ready at any moment to undertake obligations which will make this country responsible for the defence of all Asia, from the last outposts on the Assam Frontier to the Bosphorus, for that, and nothing less than that, is what it comes to? I say that Imperial dreams of that kind are well enough as a matter of pleasurable excitement; but that to attempt to carry them into effect is to strain the resources both of England and India to an intolerable extent; and the worst of it is that it is very doubtful whether we can draw back immediately—it will be too late to do so—and the most pacific statesmen now alive may be compelled at least to annex the whole of Afghanistan as a consequence of the fatal policy on which the present Government entered when they first began to make and meddle on the North-West Frontier. It is the cue of the right hon. Gentleman to discredit any predictions we may make about the future, by saying that we expected the conquest of Afghanistan to involve very extensive warlike operations. We did nothing of the kind. I myself, so far from doing so, asserted long before there was any question of war that "if we thought a warlike policy a right or wise one, we could occupy all Afghanistan, and hold it with the greatest ease. But what good would or could come to us from so doing—from annexing new expenses and responsibilities without any new advantage?" That is what we have said all along, and what we say now. We shall see whether our predictions are not as exactly and literally fulfilled in the future as they have been in the past. Hon. Gentlemen opposite thought the Ameer would yield without a war; we thought he would not do so. Hon. Gentlemen thought that there would be no annexation; there has been annexation. Hon. Gentlemen thought that they would, when once a satisfactory Treaty was made with Afghanistan, be able to forget that they ever had feared Russia; Sir Henry Rawlinson, their guide, philosopher, and friend, has now told them what they are to think upon that subject. I had hoped that the Viceroy's despatch might put the policy in a new light; but this is not so. The despatch is written with great ability, as how should it not be? Never since India was India has a Ruler who wrote so well himself had a Foreign Secretary who was at once a great poet and a great essayist. Still, the united genius of Lord Lytton and Mr. Lyall has not suc- ceeded in furnishing one now argument or illustration. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will be more fortunate; I fear not, however. I think I can guess what will happen. He will rise before the debate closes, and with that Nathaniel manner of his, will deny Dr. Bellew, the oracle of the Viceroy; will deny Sir Henry Rawlinson, the oracle of Lord Cranbrook; will deny the Blackwood writer, who addresses the forward section of the Party. Right hon. Gentlemen opposite would deny everything in earth or heaven, except, perhaps, since the Mansion House speech of the Prime Minister, the divine inspiration of the English land system. It will not do, however, this plan of winking hard at agents while they write one thing for one section, and another for another section of the public, while yet another and different account is given in Parliament. We may say to right hon. Gentlemen what was said elsewhere to some of their Colleagues—"You are beginning to be found out." The Afghan War, for which they have taken so much credit, will have to find its place with its brother impostures—the imposture of Cyprus, the imposture of Asia Minor, the imposture of the Balkan fortresses. The right hon. Gentleman may do his best, but he will not persuade the country, as assuredly he will not persuade himself, that it has not, at considerable expense, made us a little weaker in our hold in India, by enlarging our responsibilities; and a little weaker against Russia, by bringing us nearer the region where she, in the nature of things, must grow stronger; and further from our true strength—the sea. That is what has come of timorous fussiness assuming the garb of courage, and of neglecting the maxim which I long ago repeated in this House as perfectly applicable to our situation on the North-West Frontier of India—"Let him attack who will; the strong man waits." The hon. Gentleman concluded with his Motion for Papers.

, in seconding the Motion, reminded the House that he had a Motion on the Paper connected with this subject. The real and the serious difficulties of our situation had now arisen after the war. It would not be necessary for him to address the House at any length, because he had taken the trouble to put his views into the shape of a pamphlet, which he had had the honour of sending to most Members of the House who, he thought, were interested in the matter. He expressed his disappointment at the despatch from the Viceroy of India which had been laid on the Table. That despatch was a mere glorification of the past addressed to the British public, and an attempt to put the best face on what had been done. It did not deal with the real difficulties of the question of the Frontier in a military or scientific point of view. He had heard with regret that, in order to cut down the expenses of the war, the Government proposed to take a narrow, technical, and very inequitable view of the claims of those who had supplied them with the means of carriage on account of the enormous number of camels which had been lost in the campaign. As had been expected, they had had a triumph at the beginning of the second Afghan War, as they had at the beginning of the first Afghan War; but he submitted that the Government were not entitled to speak as those who put their armour off, when, in fact, their real difficulties were only commencing, and had yet to come. It was right and proper that the Government, the House, and the country should prepare to look those difficulties in the face. He would not criticize the Treaty made with Yakoob Khan in detail; but, broadly speaking, his objection to that Treaty was not so much as to its terms as to the difficulty of executing it, and the danger that attended its execution. It was extremely uncertain whether the Treaty would ever be executed at all. Yakoob Khan's interest was, perhaps, now much bound up with ours; but even supposing he was anxious to fulfil the Treaty, the real difficulty was as to his ability to do it. Yakoob Khan might be the Ruler of Cabul; but he was now in no sense the Ruler of Afghanistan, although he might hope to become so some day by our support and influence. It was just possible he might show himself to be superior to any Ruler that ever existed in Afghanistan, and might carry out the Treaty; but, according to all experience and all history, the chances were violently against such a happy consummation. As regarded the people of Afghanistan, they were most independent, and little likely to surrender their inde- pendence; and yet those were the people whom we hoped to bring under our rule. The Afghans were the same people as in Elphinstone's time; and it was almost impossible that they could be reconciled to us, and he looked forward to fresh complications and to further bloodshed in maintaining our rule. He pointed out that there were territories over which Afghanistan had a very weak control, and that it might be many years before the Ameer had established his power over those territories. He also reminded the House that one man who they had described as a Pretender was not to be looked upon in that light, because he was the son of a preceding Ruler, and might be considered as the legitimate successor. With regard to the neutral zone that existed between Afghanistan and the Russian Dominions, it would be to the general advantage if the latter Power could bring the unruly Turkoman Tribes that inhabited it into subjection. It was an error to suppose that Merv was to be regarded as the gate of India or of Afghanistan, from which it was separated by a great and difficult mountain range. As to the "scientific Frontier," about which so much had been said, he would like to know who were the competent men who were ready to support it? He believed there were none such; but that, on the contrary, there was high military authority for the belief that the new Frontier had landed us in very difficult country and among Tribes we should find it very hard indeed to deal with. His conviction was that it was the most unscientific Frontier it was possible to conceive, and entirely opposed to every military principle. He had prepared a little sketch, which he ventured to show the House as exhibiting the character of the Frontier. As he had not been brought up in the clays of science classes, he feared it was rather a rough piece of work; but from it hon. Members would see the position of the old Indus Frontier and the position of the new Frontier, which had involved us in these multiplied dangers. He contended that we had possessed ourselves of a long and unmanageable Frontier, intersected by three difficult Passes, between which no communication was possible. It was this absence of all lateral communication between the Passes which, in the opinion of the most eminent authorities, occa- sioned its chief difficulty. He had been told that communication was possible from peak to peak by means of the heliograph. But that was a small advantage. The opportunity of physical communication for troops was what they required. Another difficulty was the character of the people who inhabited this region. He could not speak of them from personal experience, because he had never seen the country, and he hoped he never should. But he might refer to the authority of Dr. Bellew, whose knowledge of the locality was greater than that of any other man. According to Dr. Bellew, we had taken possession of a cul-de-sac in the hills, whore we ran the risk of being hemmed in by our foes and cut off from our communications. In return for all these disadvantages we had gained absolutely nothing. A rectification of the Frontier meant, according to Dr. Bellew, the complete conquest of the tribes of Afghanistan. Our present position was one of the most difficult that could be conceived. It would not be possible to stop where we were, and the reduction of the Afghan Tribes would be a very stiff job indeed. They would fight in their fastnesses as they had never fought before. We were drawn into more immediate contact with the celebrated sect of the Afridis, whose prowess had been famous for centuries. Lord Cranbrook, in one of his despatches, had spoken of the success which had attended the management of what had been our Frontier hitherto; but such language was little better than a farce. The humiliations experienced in connection with that Frontier were the very reasons which were urged as a justification for its extension. We were now under the necessity of increasing our Frontier forces. It was a hornets' nest with which we had to deal, and we had invaded it and stirred up the hornets. The disturbances on the Frontier were such that, so far from withdrawing our garrisons, we had had to increase them. He could point to several expressions of opinion in the Indian Press which showed the unsettled state of the Frontier, and the fact that peace with Afghanistan did not necessarily mean peace with the Border Tribes. The Governor General of India, in a despatch that was among the Papers recently presented to Parliament, said that we should soon resume our payment and control of the Tribes; but, probably, it would be necessary to pay them long before we acquired any real control over them. With regard to the occupation of Quetta, he had never been wholly hostile to it, but had only hoped that the forward movement might be delayed as long as possible. There was, no doubt, great military authority in favour of the occupation of Quetta from a military point of view; but if we held that advanced post, it was conceded that we should inevitably incur a great expense in making a railway from the Indus to the mouth of the Bolan Pass. It would, however, be better to do so at once than, by deferring it, to make our Frontier inefficient. If the advanced post at Peshin was to be maintained, the Government ought to come forward and state the necessity of spending money on it. But supposing that done, then, being able to dominate Ghuzni and Cabul on one side, and Candahar and Herat on the other, it would be quite unnecessary for us to occupy the most regretable political position that would bring us into contact with all the Tribes in the neighbourhood. Had we been content to occupy Peshin, and to hold the Khyber Pass, our position would have been much better; but we had committed ourselves to a most expensive Frontier, and would probably be compelled to advance still further. As things were, we could not stop, and would have to incur yet greater military expense. In fact, an expression used by the Governor General himself had made it clear that he knew that the Frontier now occupied was not a scientific Frontier, and that we had taken up our position with a view to a further advance. His words were that the advantage of our position was that we could advance upon Cabul and Ghuzni whenever we chose to do so. But now that the Viceroy had occupied a position from which he could punish his enemies and protect his friends, it seemed to him that Afghanistan was only a protected and subsidized Kingdom, and that Yakoob Khan was no more than a Shah Soojah over again. In his opinion, no greater mistake could be made, and the Ruler of Afghanistan ought to have a certain independence of his own. As for the desirability of dominating Cabul and Ghuzni, they had to consider that the Passes leading from the Kurrum Valley were from 11,000 to 12,000 feet high, and that the idea of constant access through such Passes was a mistake and a delusion. The great misfortune of our present position was that we should not only dominate Cabul, but that we should be involved in all the petty wars of Afghanistan, and, in all probability, we could not stop without a great extension of our liabilities and expenses.

confessed that when he had heard the hon. Member express a desire to bring on a discussion on the subject he had had some little hope that in the dying days of the Session they were going to hear from him something like a death-bed repentance, and after the prophecies of the hon. Member had been so completely falsified he had expected to hear some admission of the fact. He feared, however, that the political opinions of the hon. Member were such that they could not change, no matter how much circumstances might alter. The hon. Member did not seem to think there was much in the fact of a Russian Embassy occupying Cabul, or of Russia dominating Afghanistan, or that those circumstances ought to make any difference whatever in our relations with the Ameer. Her Majesty's Government had acted on a totally different principle. He would ask the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs what was the object of the speech he had made? He supposed, in the first place, that the hon. Gentleman supposed he would damage Her Majesty's Government; but he could not think the hon. Gentleman had succeeded. But had the hon. Gentleman ever thought what the effect of his speech might be upon our relations with Afghanistan? We were now engaged in endeavouring to establish friendly relations with the Ruler of Afghanistan, and, at a time when the Ameer was endeavouring to meet them in every possible way, was it to be suggested to him by a Member of the House, who spoke with some authority, that we really were endeavouring to slip through the clauses of the Treaty, and that, whatever was said to the contrary, our real intention was to interfere with the internal administration of the country, and permanently to annex parts of his territory. All these things were very mischievous. It was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to carry out the spirit of the Treaty as well as its letter; and, so far as the Ameer was concerned, if his personal influence prevailed, he (Mr. E. Stanhope) believed the Treaty would be faithfully carried out. He had been asked what was the cost of the war, and he could only refer hon. Members to the speeches he had made in the House on several occasions. He had no reason whatever for supposing that the Estimate he had given would be exceeded, nor had he any other statement to make on the subject. Then, as regarded the future expenditure that would result from our obligations, he could not deny that the altered state of things would cost some money. We must make roads, and improve our communications on the North-West Frontier. We must, undoubtedly, maintain part of our Army at stations more advanced than they had hitherto been; but whether that would involve greater expenditure was a question which he did not desire to enter into now. Hon. Members were aware that a Commission was sitting at the present time in India to inquire into the whole subject of the distribution of our Army in British India. He thought the House would be satisfied to wait until their recommendations were received before he gave any opinion as to what the cost of the new arrangements would be. He was asked what was the object of the policy that had been pursued? That was summed up in a despatch from the Government of India as follows:—Firstly, the exclusion of all foreign influence from Afghanistan; and, secondly, such a rectification of our Afghan Frontier as would suffice to render impossible for the future the exclusion of British influence from that State. He would venture to say that both those objects had been, to a very material extent, attained at a comparatively small cost and a very moderate loss of life. Sir Henry Rawlinson had been quoted in the debate as a very great authority, and as having suggested the policy of the Government. That gentleman had not yet become a Member of the Cabinet; but no one could doubt that his opinion on any question with which he was acquainted was entitled to very great weight. And what did he say? He had said of the Treaty that—"On the satisfactory nature of the general principles involved in the Treaty there cannot be two opinions." But he added that the Treaty required to be supplemented, and by what? By keeping a strong position on the Frontier, ready for any emergency that might arise. He came next to the Treaty itself. The hon. Member for Elgin had called attention to the 3rd clause, by which they had obtained absolute control over the foreign policy of Afghanistan. The hon. Member had asked what that meant. That was fully explained in the despatch from India, in which the Governor General had said that—

"The Ameer undertook to conduct his relations with foreign Powers in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government."

Then the hon. Member had called attention to the clause by which they were entitled to place a British Resident at Cabul. He supposed that no one would revert to the dangers and the difficulty of placing an Envoy there that had been mentioned in December, for all those prognostications had been contradicted by subsequent facts. The Ameer had accepted a Resident, and had fixed his place of residence at Cabul, contrary to the expectations expressed at the time. Major Cavagnari, whose ready tact and growing friendship with the Ameer marked him as specially qualified, had been appointed to the post. He was received with every demonstration of cordiality, and was able to go about the city with perfect freedom, and found that he was well received not only by the Ameer but by the people. He could not agree with the hon. Member that the effect of the clause was to make a mere puppet of Yakoob Khan; nor could it be maintained that they had ever attempted or desired to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The utmost care had been taken to make Major Cavagnari not a Resident, such as we sent to feudatory Princes, but an Envoy; and particular care had been taken on that point, both in the Treaty itself and in the instructions which had been given to him. And if Article V. of the Treaty was not sufficiently clear, he would ask the House to consider for a moment what the Government of India said upon this matter at paragraph 43 of their despatch—namely, that they in no wise contemplated any system of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and that the British Envoy at Cabul would be strictly required to abstain from such interference, and they added that they hoped that the small subsidy would strengthen the hands of the Ameer in maintaining his authority. The territorial arrangements were very simple. In the first place, they restored Jellalabad and Candahar to the Ameer, a provision which had given great satisfaction to the Ameer, and had proved to him and to his people, as well as to our own subjects in India, that our desire was not to annex any portion of Afghanistan. He next came to the alterations in our Frontier. He would not enter into the questions connected with the old Frontier, for they had been discussed over and over again. It had often been said that the old Frontier had one very great advantage—namely, that it enabled us to avoid entanglement with the Hill Tribes. But did it do so? During 20 years we had had to undertake 19 expeditions against those Tribes, and we had employed in those expeditions 68,000 men; and we had also been engaged in many conflicts of a less serious character with the Hill Tribes; and while we had to encounter the very greatest difficulties when attacking them, they were able to attack us with corresponding ease. Well, we had now obtained a new Frontier. In arranging it the Government had to bear in mind not only the military considerations, to which so much prominence had been given, but the grave political requirements, the sanitary necessities, and the financial requirements of the case. With these considerations in their thoughts, and after taking the best advice at their disposal, the Government had determined upon the occupation of carefully-selected positions, which they believed would give them a strong Frontier, secure them the command of the routes into Afghanistan, and close those routes completely against anyone who should desire to enter them in a hostile spirit. The hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs objected to our occupying Quetta. Well, they knew quite well what the opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala, and of many other eminent men was with regard to the occupation of Quetta. Instead of our occupation of Quetta being distasteful to the Ameer, it was quite approved by him, because he found after the commencement of our occupation that the impediments to the progress of commerce through the Bolan Pass were removed. What did General Hamley say in reference to our occupation of Quetta—

"By occupying Quetta we practically close all passes to the Indus Valley which issue south of Dera Ismail Khan. Strategically, then, I hope, there remains no doubt of the immense advantage of holding Quetta, whether as a means of controlling Afghanistan, or of meeting such a formidable combination of enemies as I have contemplated."

He was sure that any Frontier they could have selected might have been equally criticized; but he believed the House would accept, and that the country would approve, of that which had been chosen as one determined upon after very careful consideration, and in accordance with the advice of the best military authorities. Then the hon. Member said—"There is no use in what you have done, because you have no lateral communication." Well, as a matter of fact, we had at present excellent lateral communication along our base, from which our reinforcements and supplies would certainly have to be drawn. It was also urged as an objection that we could not pacify the Hill Tribes. But had we ever tried to pacify them? Up to the present, our relations with the Tribes had consisted in raids upon the one side, and in burning villages upon the other. Our officers were never allowed to enter the Passes except for warlike purposes. He could not help thinking that in the altered condition of circumstances now we might hope for far better relations than those which he had just described, and he could not help deriving the greatest encouragement in this matter from observing the alteration which had taken place of recent years in the demeanour of the Tribes in the Bolan Pass. If he might do so, he should like to refer to some words of General Hamley, who said, in a lecture delivered last year—

"When, in the former war, our Forces moved on Candahar, the Tribes of the South were no loss hostile and mischievous to us than those of the North, and every march from the Bolan to the Kojak was marked by their depredations on our trains, by the slaughter of their conductors, by the murder of stray soldiers and numbers of defenceless camp followers. But a few years afterwards they were rendered thoroughly peaceable and friendly by vigorous handling and judicious management. At least one distinguished officer who took a leading part in the process still lives to tell us what the process was. It might be worth trying on other parts of the Frontier. However that may be, the result for us—and one well worth taking into account—is that, to all appearance, our trains march as safely now from the Indus to the Kojak as from London to Aldershot."

This testimony, he thought, was most encouraging to us in our dealings with the Hill Tribes. The Government believed that they had taken the most important step that had been taken for a very long time towards humanizing and civilizing these Tribes. They were about to establish a Commercial Treaty with Afghanistan, and he believed very strongly in the civilizing influence of commercial relations. If we succeeded in making other Passes anything like as secure as the Bolan Pass, we should encourage an enormous trade from Central Asia, a change that would have a greater civilizing influence than anything else that might be done. He did not, in fact, despair of a time when many of the Tribes to whom he had referred would be attached to us, instead of being our enemies, and when they would become as a quickset hedge to keep out not us, but our enemies. The hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs said that one result of the Treaty with the Ameer was to provoke Russia to make a fresh advance upon Merv. But this advance had been going on ever since 1872 or 1873. Even this year, long before the Treaty, four columns of Russians were advancing against the Turkomans, and in the direction of Merv. And the Government of this country would be able to contemplate the process with very different eyes now that our Frontier was so very much more secure. It should also be remembered that we had recently received the most solemn promises from Russia that it was not her intention to advance so far as Merv. But, after all, what was the general effect of the Treaty? Had it alienated the Ameer from us? Far from it, for the Ameer was now on the most friendly terms with us, and accepted the Treaty in the most cordial spirit. Had it alienated the people of Afghanistan? The hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) had said—

"You have inspired the people of that country with such a hatred towards you, that all the ground you fail to occupy will be the fortress of your foes."

The result had, however, gone to show—and the occupation of Candahar, undertaken for temporary purposes, afforded strong proof of it—that the people of Afghanistan, as a whole, had no unfriendly feelings towards us. The policy lately pursued had gained for this country a friendly, an independent, and a strong Afghanistan. British influence was paramount in that country; our Frontier was secure to a degree which had never before existed—at any rate, for many years past—and the Government were proud—as the country, in his opinion, would be proud—of the great results which had been accomplished mainly owing to the patient foresight and perseverance of Lord Lytton—results which it would not be possible for any politician, either in or out of the House, to minimize. Yet that policy had been attacked with a violence and a personality which, he was happy to say, was rare in the annals of political warfare. The Government believed that the result of that policy would be to maintain and strengthen our Indian Empire, and they would await without fear the verdict of the country.

Although it is impossible at this period of the Session to have anything like a complete or exhaustive debate on this question, I think the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs was perfectly justified in submitting the Treaty into which we have just entered to some examination. The policy of the Cabinet must be necessarily so influenced by the opinion of Parliament and the country, that it is extremely desirable that every possible means should be adopted to enable Parliament and the country to form a just opinion upon an important question of Indian policy such as this. I cannot think that the recent despatches sent by the Indian to the Home Government have afforded sufficient materials on which to form a correct opinion as to the nature of this policy. The House will recollect that in a famous despatch of Lord Cranbrook in November last the Secretary of State professed to give an account of the transactions which led to the breaking out of the war which has just been concluded; but in the course of the debates which occurred in the winter Session, I think it was shown that the despatch was more in the nature of an advocate's address than a historic summary of events which had taken place; and it was shown, also, that a good many of the inferences contained in the document were without foundation. As to the despatches which have been recently presented, I must say that those despatches—principally those of the Indian Government on the 7th July, and the Secretary of State on the 7th August—read less like State Papers of historical value than like a sort of antistrophic ode in which the British and Indian Governments, in alternate verses, sing the greatness, the magnanimity, the success, and the moderation of the deeds which have been achieved by the Indian Government. I therefore think, considering how important it is that the country should be able to form a moderate, calm, and accurate estimate of what has recently taken place in India, that the policy which has dictated the Treaty should be submitted to the kind of examination which it has received at the hands of the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs. I do not want to depreciate the complete success of the military operations undertaken by the Government of India to the extent to which they were directed. The scope of our operations was considerably less than was desired by many advocates of an Imperial policy; and, perhaps, our thanks are duo to the Indian Government for the moderation they exercised in thus limiting the scope of those operations. But what we have to consider is, whether the moderation which has marked the policy of the Indian Government up to the present time is likely to be maintained, or whether a policy has not been embarked upon which will necessarily lead us a great deal further than either the Government at home or the Indian Government at present desire to go. As I have already said, I do not dispute the success of our military operations. That, however, does not in the least preclude the various questions of the justice of this war, and the expediency of this war, and the value of the objects for which it was undertaken, and the value of the objects which have been gained, or the effect which it will have on the future policy of the Indian Government. I do not feel myself competent to speak at length upon the question of the Frontier which has been obtained; but I would remark that while a great many military authorities were dissatisfied with the North West Frontier as it existed before the war, they are also far from being satisfied with what has been attempted and accomplished by the Indian Government in the course and by the means of the war which has just been concluded. There is one very great authority whose name has already been mentioned in the course of this debate—General Hamley. General Hamley certainly does not approve of the military positions which have been taken up by the Indian Government, while he recommends the occution of Candahar, which has not been thought desirable by the Government. I should like to ask the Government upon what military authority they rely for the positions which they have actually taken up? As has been pointed out by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), they have not secured a line at all. The positions they have taken up are rather a series of detached positions, a series of cul-de-sacs which are totally incapable of communicating with each other, and which are exposed to the greatest possible extent to the operations of wild and warlike, and, as far as we know at present, hostile Tribes. The political position is one which seems to me even more grave and important than the military question, especially when regarded in the light of the present condition of Indian finance. The statement of the Government is that we have by this war and by this Treaty excluded foreign Powers from Afghanistan, established a paramount influence there, and, in fact, have obtained such control over the foreign relations of the Ruler of Afghanistan as justifies us in giving that unconditional guarantee which we have given him by this Treaty, What the Government rely upon for the accomplishment of their objects is the acquisition of certain positions by means of which, in case of the failure of the Ameer to execute his engagements, it will be able to put such pressure upon him as will make him conform to his engagements—that is to say, in the case I am contemplating, in the case of a failure of the Ameer to carry out his engagements, either through want of will or power to observe the conditions undertaken, the Government of India will be obliged to proceed to do that which in the late campaign it deliberately abstained, from political reasons, from doing; it will have to shatter completely the frail fabric of the power of Afghanistan. I believe it is altogether an illusion to suppose that, by any process short of complete annexation, it is possible to secure complete control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan. Such a policy as we are now pursuing might be possible if Afghanistan was a regularly-organized State under the control of a despotic Sovereign, or under a regular form of government. As far as we have been able to learn, no such state of things exists in Afghanistan. The Ameer is simply a most powerful Chief in Afghanistan among others whose power is not much inferior to his own. We need not name Wakhan, Balkh, Badakshan, Herat, and Candahar. In some of these districts rebellion exists. You cannot hold the Ameer responsible for the proceedings of the Rulers in these districts, unless you give him what you have not given him, and do not profess to give him by this Treaty—adequate control and power over these unruly Princes.

, resuming, said: What you have really done, I was saying, is to make yourselves responsible for the raids, feuds, and lawless proceedings of a variety of Chiefs on the Frontier of Afghanistan whose names you are scarcely acquainted with; and in appointing a British Resident at Cabul you have taken care that this responsibility shall not be nominal, but real. You will be expected to know what is going on within the Dominions of Afghanistan; and you will make yourselves more or less responsible to the Russian Government for everything that takes place within those Dominions. My hon. Friend (Mr. E. Stanhope) dwelt upon the functions which would naturally devolve upon the Residents. It was said they must not interfere in the internal affairs; but it was shown that the Residents could not help interfering. An hon. Member opposite thought it sufficient to reply that it was stipulated in the Treaty that the Residents were not to interfere in the internal affairs. Experience, however, is a much surer guide than any intentions of the Indian Government; and our experience of Residents, in all cases, has been that if the Resident is not to be reduced to the position of a mere nonentity, he must necessarily interfere, to a great extent, in the internal affairs of the country in which he is placed. At all events, you have secured that you shall have complete knowledge of the external proceedings and condition of Afghanistan, and you have thereby made yourselves responsible; and I cannot imagine any arrangement more fraught with danger, and possibly with complications, in that quarter where you most wish to avoid them—namely, the Russian quarter. It is altogether useless to disguise the magnitude of the step taken by this Treaty. We have advanced beyond the mountains which hitherto have been boundaries to us. These mountains were a good strategic frontier; they were a natural boundary. We have now advanced—our responsibilities have been advanced, the sphere of our operations has been advanced—beyond that natural boundary into a district where we find no natural boundary at all, and no possible limit to the extension of our responsibilities and relations, until that takes place which is so often spoken of—the meeting of the Sepoy and the Cossack. The concession made to the alarmists is not likely to satisfy them. It has only stimulated them. It has given them better grounds to press on for a further advance than they ever had before. My hon. Friend spoke of Sir Henry Rawlinson. What is his opinion of this Treaty? He says it is a very good settlement, as far as it goes; but it does not, in the least, absolve us from being on the same constant watch, and maintaining the same jealous attitude, with regard to Russia in Central Asia as before. The hon. Gentleman opposite just now said that the Russian advance in the direction of Merv had been preparing since 1872; but in this he is contradicted by Sir Henry Rawlinson, who says that the Russian advance on Merv is the necessary, the inevitable consequence of the great success we have obtained in Afghanistan. In the opinion of Sir Henry Rawlinson, we ought to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Persia, and support the Turkomans in their resistance to the Russian advance. Those are measures which show what, in the opinion of the ablest of the advocates of the policy which has dictated this Treaty, the Treaty is worth. What is his opinion as to the execution of the Treaty itself? Although he gives a sort of academic consent to the principles which have dictated the withdrawal from Candahar, he considers that that withdrawal ought never to be put in practice. Now, it is said that Sir Henry Rawlinson has never been authorized to express the views of the Indian Government; but we know that in time his views are those which are adopted by the Indian Government, and we are safer in the forecast which is to be learned from Sir Henry Rawlinson's views than that which is to be derived from the authorized statements of the Government. The hon. Gentleman has said that he will not discuss Quetta, because we have often had fights on that subject. But I beg to remind him that we have not fought over it at all. We received an assurance, two years ago, that the occupation of Quetta had been undertaken on purely local grounds, and was not a part of any fixed policy of advance. Now we find that it is to be maintained as a part of the strategical plan which the Government have had all through these operations. It is the same policy as that which induced them to occupy the Khyber Pass and the Kurrum Valley. Sir, all these have been advocated by Sir Henry Rawlinson for some time; and when we find that the Government have advanced so far, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they will go with Sir Henry Rawlinson and his disciples a good deal further. I do not know whether this policy is one which can now be reversed, or even can be restrained. I do not believe for a moment that Parliament, when contemplating the magnitude of the new departure, will approve of the Afghan War; and when the country is invited to believe that a chapter in Indian history has not only been opened but closed, I think it is their duty to say that that is a false and misleading view, and, so far from any chapter of history having been closed, a new volume has been opened. In the North West Frontier, a policy has been undertaken which is full of danger, is certain to be costly, and is fraught with every element of insecurity to the safety of our Asiatic relations on the North West Frontier of India.

I shall not enter at any great length into the question which has teen raised. My hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India has, I think, in one of the clearest and one of the best speeches it has ever been my pleasure to listen to in this House, explained the real position of affairs and the policy of the Government, and has given a complete answer to the observations of the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs and the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy. The noble Lord said he did not hear all the remarks of my hon. Friend. I am not surprised at that, for if he had heard the opening observations of my hon. Friend, he would, I think, have endeavoured to reply to them. My hon. Friend asked the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs a question which it might have been well if the noble Lord had answered. He asked what object or advantage they anticipated from the sort of speeches they had made on the present occasion? What is to be the advantage which is to be derived by the country from this kind of criticism and from this sort of discussion, which, as we know, will not be limited to the walls of this House? The main points in the mind of the noble Lord appeared to be to express a feeling of disappointment—first, at the success of the Government in spite of the prophecies so freely uttered against the possibility of such success; and, secondly, against the moderation of the Government. The noble Lord is disappointed not only that we succeeded in occupying important positions in Afghanistan, but that we had arrived at a settlement far short of that which he says other people had pressed upon us, and that we had endeavoured to put into shape and give effect to views which we always have professed, but which he says some people, believed more powerful than ourselves, are not satisfied with. I am very sorry that anybody should be disappointed, and I can sympathize with the noble Lord; but I really do think that unless he is prepared to suggest some correction of the line of policy which we have adopted, unless he is prepared to come forward and say—"If we were in power we would reverse that policy," I think he is not doing any service, but, on the contrary, is doing a disservice to the country, by merely suggesting all the points he can imagine, and all the difficulties that might be raised from the arrangements that have been made. The noble Lord entirely misrepresents several points in the Treaty. He misrepresents especially the position which we are about to assume—which we have, in fact, assumed—under the settlement with regard to the foreign affairs of Afghanistan. He speaks of our having made an unconditional engagement. The engagement we have entered into is not an unconditional one at all. It is an engagement which is dependent upon a most important condition. The condition is that the Ameer of Afghanistan agrees to conduct his relations with foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; that he will enter into no engagement with foreign States; that he will not take up arms with foreign States, except with the concurrence of the British Government. Upon these conditions, which place the whole of his foreign policy at our direction, we undertake to support him against any foreign enemy with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may think best for the purpose. That seems to me to be a bargain of a character which entirely recommends itself to good sense. What, after all, is the main thing that we have to consider? We have to consider the great importance of maintaining the peace and tranquillity not only of our Indian Empire, but the importance of maintaining proper State relations on our North-Western Frontier. We have not only to consider the question of an imaginary invasion from some great European Powers, but, what is more important, we have to consider what is the best way of maintaining that amount of peace and confidence on our North-Western Frontier which will give security not only to our own Borders, but may prevent a recurrence of those panics which from time to time have been started, and which have their effect all over India, not only in our own possessions, but among our feudatories in India. In dealing with those matters, we have to deal with the people of Afghanistan as an element which cannot be left out of consideration. We have always desired to treat them on the footing of an independent people, maintained, as far as possible, in a position of independence, and with whom we should cultivate friendly relations. But it is impossible not to see that the policy, which of late years has been pursued, has failed to secure that state of relations. It has been forced upon our attention that if matters were allowed to go on as they had been going on, we should find that Afghanistan would not remain an independent and friendly State, but that there was the greatest possible danger of her falling under the influence of a Power which might or might not be friendly to us, but which, at all events, we did not desire to see in the command of supreme influence in that country. It was because matters were taking that course that we found it necessary to adopt measures of a purely defensive character, in order to re-assert the influence which we thought the Indian Empire ought legitimately to have in Afghanistan. It was because the friendly Mission we proposed to send was refused, and because we had plain proof that a state of things existed which could no longer be allowed, that we found it necessary to take strong measures. It is all very well to say that this is a dangerous policy; but that policy was forced upon us. It was impossible to remain in the position in which we stood before our Mission was repulsed, and repulsed in a manner calculated to bring our power into contempt in India. Hon. Gentlemen and the noble Lord opposite apparently desire to put out of sight all the events which led to this war, and they mislead the House and the country with regard to the real state of affairs. What we say is this—We do not want to go into minute questions about military details, as to whether this or that is the best line of communication, or whether this or that post has particular advantages. The noble Lord asks us—"What military authorities did you consult in regard to this line of Frontier?" Well, it was arranged upon considerations that were not merely military, but that were political also. You had to consider what were the conditions, political as well as military, with which you had to deal. I say that the settlement arrived at, in a military sense, but still more in a political sense, is the one which, in the most careful judgment of those who are responsible for the government and the peace of India, is the best attainable under the circumstances. It is true that what has been said of the written stipulations in the Treaty may also be said of particular posts on the Frontier; but what we have to consider is not so much whether this particular Article or that strategical post has a talismanic effect, but it is the general effect produced by the policy that you pursue, and the way in which you are going to carry it into effect. I say that the general policy which we have laid down, and are prepared to support, is this—We desire to maintain the same relations with Afghanistan. We have always desired to maintain relations with her as a friendly country, as strong and independent as circumstances will permit. We will maintain those relations, and, at the same time, maintain an attitude which is one of strength, and which shows that we are determined to use that strength, if necessary. We believe, by maintaining that attitude, we shall give confidence to the people of Afghanistan, and that they will see that they are dealing with a Power which is not disposed to trifle with them, which has announced its objects simply and clearly, and which is prepared to maintain and support them; which, when it says that it does not interfere with their domestic affairs, is in earnest and sincere in so saying; which, when it says it desires to promote improved commercial relations, is prepared to take all the steps that may conduce to that policy; and which will be believed to be sincere when it guarantees the aid of British power in support of Afghanistan, if it should be attacked from without, on condition that Afghanistan submits to our guidance in its relations with foreign Powers. My belief is that one cause of the difficulty we have had of late years has been the impression in the minds of the Afghans that we were not sincere; and that, from the uncertainty of the language we held on some occasions, they believed that the undertakings which were given were not meant to have the full effect the Afghans desired to attribute to them; and when they found we were not prepared to support them, but explained away the engagements we had entered into, they said—"This is a Power we cannot rely upon. We must turn to another to support us." Now, whatever you may say of what is past, or however you may disagree with the policy adopted, you yourselves admit that the policy which has been adopted is one that cannot be reversed; if you do not, tell us how it ought to be reversed, and what your policy would be. But if you say it cannot be reversed, the success of it depends upon the conviction which ought to be impressed upon the minds of the Afghans and the people of India, that it is a policy which is adopted not by one Party alone, but by the Government of this country as a whole, and which will be maintained by the Government of this country, in whatever hands the reins of power may, from time to time, be placed; and if you succeed in impressing upon the Afghan Power that our policy is one which has been adopted deliberately and which will be pursued steadily, then I think you may expect to derive advantages which you will certainly not derive in any other way. Therefore, I would reply to the Question of the noble Lord by asking another Question, which is—Are we to understand, or are we not, that the Liberals, if they come into power, will reverse the policy which we have adopted? If they do not intend to do that, what earthly object do they expect to gain by endeavouring to suggest difficulties and put into our minds—and, what is of much more importance, into the minds of others at a distance—suggestions that our policy means something different from that which we say it means, which we know it means, and that which I believe the country is determined it shall mean?

As this is a subject of great importance which ought not, I think, to be considered in such a small House, I beg to call attention to the fact that there are not 40 Members present.