Skip to main content

Commons Chamber

Volume 256: debated on Tuesday 31 August 1880

The text on this page has been created from Hansard archive content, it may contain typographical errors.

House Of Commons

Tuesday, 31st August, 1880.

The House met at Two of the clock.

MINUTES.]—SUPPLY— considered in CommitteeResolutions [August 30] reported.

WAYS AND MEANS— considered in CommitteeResolutions [August 30] reported.

PUBLIC BILLS— OrderedFirst Reading —Consolidated Fund (Appropriation)* .

CommitteeReport—Expiring Laws Continuance* [297].

CommitteeReportThird Reading —Mulkear Drainage District* [319], and passed.

Considered as amendedThird Reading—Assaults on Young Persons* [304]; Burials [321], and passed.

Controverted Elections

Mr. SPEAKER informed the House, that he had received from Mr. Justice Lush and Mr. Justice Manisty, two of the Judges selected, in pursuance of The Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868, for the Trial of Election Petitions, a Letter relating to the Election for

The City of Chester.

The Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868.

The Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879.

The Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1880.

To The Eight Honourable

The Speaker of the House of Commons.

Sir,

In our Supplementary Report with reference to the Election Petition for the Borough of Chester, dated the 3rd day of August instant, the name of Thomas Horabin was by an accidental oversight included in the list of persons by whom Voters were bribed or treated at the Parliamentary Election for the said Borough holden on the 1st day of April last. Our attention having now been called to the fact, We have to request that Thomas Horabin's name may be struck out of the list.

We have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servants,

ROBT. LUSH.Election Judges.
H. MANISTY.

28th August 1880.

And the said Letter was ordered to be entered in the Journals of this House.

Questions

Post Office—Open Competition—Female Clerks

asked the Postmaster General, Whether it is, as has been stated, proposed to introduce the system of open competition in the appointment of the female clerks employed in the Savings Bank and other Departments of the Post Office?

In reply to the Question of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, I am glad to be able to state that it has been decided to apply the system of open competition to the appointments to female clerkships in the Savings Bank and other Departments of the London, Dublin, and Edinburgh Post Offices. As the demand by women for employment is so great, I fear that the number of those who will compete for these appointments will, in all probability, so largely exceed the number to be disposed of that I am at the present time considering, in conjunction with the Civil Service Commissioners, whether some plan cannot be devised which will restrict the number of competitors within reasonable limits. Without pledging myself at the present moment to the adoption of any particular scheme, I think the object to which reference has just been made may be attained by confining the competition to those who have previously passed some public examination—such, for instance, as the University local examinations. The plan which has hitherto been adopted with regard to the appointments in the Savings Bank and Accountant General's Departments has been one of limited competition, three candidates being nominated for each appointment. When I took Office I found that a considerable number of ladies had been promised nominations by my Predecessor. As I was very reluctant to deprive these ladies of the promised opportunity of competing, I have kept them on my list; and I think it is only fair that they, and those whom I have myself nominated, should have a chance of competing before the system of open competition comes into operation. I will take care, however, that there shall be no unnecessary delay in bringing this system into working order, and due notice shall be given of the time when the first public examination will be held, and of the conditions which it will be necessary for the candidates to fulfil.

asked if facilities would be given for conducting a competitive examination at Dublin as well as in London, so that candidates would not be obliged to come to London?

That is a question which rather rests with the Civil Service Commissioners than myself; but I can assure the hon. Member that, as far as I am concerned, I will do everything in my power to give every person a fair chance of competing without subjecting them to the unnecessary trouble of travelling hundreds of miles to London.

Metropolis—Temple Bar Memorial

asked Mr. Attorney General, Whether he is aware that the Corporation of London are now preparing to erect, in the centre of one of the busiest parts of Fleet Street, an edifice to commemorate the site of Temple Bar; whether an information of intrusion under the Act 28 and 29 Vic. c. 104, will lie at the suit of the Attorney General against the Corporation of London in respect of this contemplated erection as causing an obstruction; and, whether he is prepared to exhibit such information?

in reply, said, he was not aware that the Corporation had the intention referred to until he saw the Notice of that Question. It was not a matter which would have officially come before him in any way. On the Question appearing upon the Paper, however, a representative of the Corporation com- municated with him; and stated that the Corporation intended to erect a refuge in the centre of the roadway where Temple Bar was formerly situated, and the effect would be that the roadway would form two roads 17 feet 2 inches wide, instead of one 40 feet in width. In the centre of the refuge there would be the memorial commemorating the existence of Temple Bar. The Corporation claimed their right legally to erect such a refuge and memorial, alleging that they had the permission of the Commissioners of Sewers and also that of the representatives of the Highways of the Strand district; while the Government, as represented by the Metropolitan Board of Works, also gave their permission. Under these circumstances, he did not consider it his duty to take any steps in the matter.

Criminal Law—Oaths And Affirmations—Quarter And Petty Sessions

asked Mr. Attorney General, Whether, in view of "The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854,"s. 20, and the 24 and 25 Vic. c. 66, it is not the duty of justices in Quarter or Petty Sessions to allow any person tendered as a witness in criminal or civil procedure, who shall be unwilling to take an oath and allege a conscientious objection, to give evidence on making the solemn affirmation or declaration provided by those statutes?

in reply, said, he thought he had answered the Question more than once. By the Acts mentioned in the Question, and by other statutes, if any person had a conscientious objection to take an oath, he was entitled to make an affirmation in the circumstances referred to, and the magistrates ought to allow him to make such affirmation.

Suez Canal Company

asked the Secretary to the Treasury, in reference to the 176,602 shares and 300 shares in the Suez Canal Company, mentioned in a Treasury Minute dated July 17th, 1876, In whose names the said several shares now stand on the register of shareholders of the said Company, whether each or any of the persons in whose names the said shares now stand has executed a declaration of the trusts on which they respectively hold the said shares; whether the statutes of the said Suez Canal Company recognize any trust in shares; whether the said shares are not subject in all respects to French Law; and, whether, in the event of any of the persons in whose names the said shares now stand dying, or becoming bankrupt or insolvent, the shares standing in such person's name would not be part of the general estate of the person so dying or becoming insolvent?

The Suez Canal shares do not stand in any names, being payable to bearer. A Director qualifies by the actual deposit at the offices of the Company of 100 shares, which cannot be withdrawn, except upon production of the document which he receives in return. In the case of the British Directors, these documents were handed over to, and are now in the possession of, the Treasury, which Department, therefore, has absolute hold over the shares, receives the dividends thereon, and, in the event of a change in the Directors, could withdraw the 100 shares in order to qualify the new Director. It was originally the intention of the Treasury that, in addition to the declaration of trust, a bond with sureties should be executed by each Director; but in the circumstances already mentioned, it was obviously unnecessary. The Suez Canal, not being situated in France, the shares are not subject to the law of France, in which country the Company is registered as a foreign Company. The 176,602 shares being payable to bearer, have been deposited in the Bank of England; and under the Act 39 & 40, Vie. c. 67, are vested in the Treasury, on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen, her Heirs and Successors, intrust for public purposes. In the event, therefore, of the demise of the Sovereign, these shares would pass to her Heirs and Successors in trust for public purposes.

Law And Justice—Mill Bank Prison

asked the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, If there is any intention to remove Millbank Prison, and to erect a new Mint upon the site, or to appropriate it as a public garden?

It is intended to close Millbank as a convict prison when the new convict prison now building at Wormwood Scrubbs, by convict labour, is finished; but it will be some years before such transfer can be made. The Directors have not made any proposal, for the Secretary of State's approval, regarding the disposal of Mill-bank when no longer required as a convict prison.

Treaty Of Berlin—Turkey—The Collective Note—Naval Demonstration In The Adriatic

asked the Secretary of State for India, If an Allied Naval Demonstration is to take place in the Adriatic; and, if so, if he will state the names of the Powers whose forces will be assembled for that purpose, the number of ships to be employed, the arrangements as to the command in chief, and the objects of the proposed demonstration?

My noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated yesterday in "another place" what has occurred in reference to the Montenegrin Frontier. In consequence of the failure of the Porte to carry into effect the agreement arrived at in April last, a Collective Note was presented by the Great Powers to the Porte, insisting either on the execution of that arrangement, or on the cession of the town and district of Dulcigno to the Prince of Montenegro. To that Collective Note two replies have been returned by the Porte, the one verbal, the other in writing. It is a question of some doubt whether the effect of those two replies is identical; and the joint answer of the Great Powers to it is now under consideration. The Powers have, however, decided to send a certain number of vessels to the port of Ragusa, which has been placed by the Austrian Government at their disposal, as being conveniently situated, and near to the sea coast which is proposed to be surrendered to Montenegro. In accordance with that decision, the Admiral of the Fleet has been ordered to proceed with the flag-ship and one other ironclad and a despatch boat to Ragusa; and similar orders have been given by the other five Great Powers to the officers commanding their Fleets. As to the details of the arrangements, or the instructions which it is proposed to give to the Admiral, it is, as the House will see, in present circumstances, impossible for me to enter into any detailed explanation. My noble Friend added that Papers on the subject would be laid on the Table before the end of the Session.

Would the noble Lord state what is the object of the proposed demonstration?

I think I could scarcely answer that Question without going into further details on the proposed action than I think it would be desirable to do.

South Africa—The Transvaal Boer Committee

asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether there is any copy at the Colonial Office of the letter which is stated by Messrs. Kenyon and Joubert, on page 46a of c. 2676, to have been addressed by the Transvaal Boer Committee to Mr. Gladstone a few weeks before May 10th, 1880; and, whether that letter, together with the reply, will be presented to Parliament?

The Colonial Office does not possess the first Paper referred to; but I shall be happy to give the second one.

Army Retirement—The Royal Warrant, 1878

asked the Secretary of State for War, If his attention has been called to the fact that, under the provisions of the Royal Warrant on Promotion, 1878, captains of twenty years' service having reached forty years of age have to retire, while in many cases captains who are junior to them in their regiments, and who benefit by their retirements, are of greater age; and, whether he does not think it would be more just to enforce retirement on account of age alone, instead of age and service?

The hon. and gallant Gentleman asks me an abstract Question, whether age or length of service ought, in my opinion, to determine the time of compulsory retirement. If he will do me the favour to refer to the system of retirement from the Navy which I established in 1870, he will see that I think age the better criterion. But I will not undertake to alter, after such short experience, the entire system of retirement from the Army where it depends on length of service.

Savings Banks (No 1) Bill

asked the Secretary to the Treasury, If he will state to the House, approximately, the amount of the annuity proposed to be created under the Savings Banks (No. 1) Bill, for the discharge of the deficiency of £3,565,000, assumed to exist in the funds of the Trustee Savings Banks, as shown in the Return, No. 200, of this Session; if he will also explain to the House the manner in which it is proposed to deal with the amount to be received by the National Debt Commissioners, so as to extinguish the deficiency; if he will state the present actuarial value of the annuity, assuming the rate of interest to be 3¼ per cent. whether it is proposed to deal with the Post Office Savings Bank Fund on the principles laid down in the Bill; and, whether any steps will be taken to provide for the deficiency of £1,264,000, shown on the Friendly Societies Account?

My right hon. Friend asks his Question on the assumption that the amount of the deficiency to be provided for under the Savings Banks (No. 1) Bill is £3,565,000, which is the amount of deficiency which existed on November 20, 1879, as shown by the Return, No. 200, of this Session. But the deficiency to be dealt with is that which will be ascertained to exist on the 20th of November next, by valuation in accordance with the Bill, plus the deficiency of interest on the year ending on the same date. Probably, however, the capital amount will not vary very materially from the amount on the 20th of November last; and, assuming that sum, the amount of the annuity, calculated at 3 ¼ per cent as directed in the Bill, which would be required to extinguish that amount in 28 years, may be stated at £80,000 per annum. The annuity to be added in respect of the deficiency of interest for the present year will probably require £1,600 or £1,700 a-year more. We may probably, therefore, state the whole annuity to be created at about £82,000. The National Debt Commissioners will deal with this annuity by investing it and placing it to the account. The accounts will be laid before Parliament yearly, showing the progress of the fund. The present actuarial value of the annuity, assuming the rate of interest to be 3¼ per cent. may be stated at about £1,500,000. This calculation may create misapprehension; and I would, therefore, point out that the Government propose to set aside such a sum yearly as, invested at 3¼ per cent. will produce in 28 years the amount deficient. The operation will not be complete, and the deficiency will not have been made good, until the close of the period for which the annuity is granted. The Government have not analyzed the state of the Post Office Savings Bank Fund upon the principle laid down in the Savings Bank Bill. If, in doing so, they find that satisfactory provision has not been made to prevent the occurrence of deficiency, they will take steps to make such provision. No steps are being taken at present to extinguish the deficiency shown on the Friendly Societies Account; but the Prime Minister alluded to it as a matter to be dealt with hereafter.

Afghanistan (Military Operations)—Latest Telegrams

asked the Secretary of State for India, Whether any further information has been received as to the advance of General Roberts?

I received several telegrams after the one I read yesterday, but they are all published in the newspapers. I have received no intelligence this morning.

India—Circulation Of Turkish Newspapers

I desire to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a Question of which I have not hitherto given public Notice, but of which I have given private Notice— namely, Whether his attention has been drawn to a letter of Musurus Bey, in the morning papers, asserting that the statement that the Ottoman Porte was endeavouring to incite the religious feel- ing of the Mussulman population in India against the British Power is totally devoid of foundation?

My attention has been called to the letter in question, and I have little doubt that that letter was written by Musurus Bey, the Turkish Charge d'Affaires, under orders from Constantinople, without immediate reference to, and probably without knowledge of, the statements which have been made in this House. I can only say I have nothing to add to what I have previously stated.

Treaty Of Washington — New-Foundland — The Fortune Bay Dispute

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Whether he would, before the Recess, lay on the Table the Papers relating to the Fortune Bay dispute?

in reply, said, that the Correspondence up to the present date on this matter would be laid on the Table as a matter of form, so as to enable the remainder of the Correspondence, if furnished during the vacation, to be presented before Parliament met again.

House Of Commons—Refreshments For Strangers

asked the First Commissioner of Works, If he could state what arrangements he proposed to make for providing a refreshment bar for strangers, so that the present bar could be used exclusively by Members?

apologised for his absence from the House on the previous day, and said he quite admitted the inconvenience of the limited accommodation of the present bar. The matter should receive his careful consideration, and he thought he could devise some remedy which would prove satisfactory for next Session.

Privilege—The Sheriffs Of London And York

presented a Petition signed by the Lord Mayor and the former Lord Mayors and Sheriffs and Aldermen of the City of York against trading by Crown servants, and in doing so, asked Whether the Corporation of York could not have been allowed the same privilege of presenting it at the Bar of the House as was now enjoyed by the younger Corporation of the City of London?

Before you answer that Question, Sir, I wish to ask whether the members of any other Corporation besides that of the City of London have the privilege of using, for social purposes, the dining-rooms of the House of Commons?

With regard to the Question of the hon. Member for Chelsea, I have to say that the Corporation of London and the Corporation of Dublin have the privilege of presenting Petitions at the Bar of this House, but that this privilege is limited to those two Corporations.

Refusal To Convey A Distressed British Subject From Callao To The Port Of Chimbote

asked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether he has received information of the refusal, in June last, of Captain D'Arcy, of H.M.S. "Shannon," to convey Mrs. Pennington, a distressed British subject, from Callao to the Port of Chimbote at the time of the threatened bombardment of the former place; whether it is true that Captain Medleycott, of the "Turquoise," also declined to receive on board a number of distressed British subjects who wished to be conveyed to a place of safety; whether he is aware that, at the same time, passages were given in both ships to several foreigners; and, whether he is able to explain why these ladies and gentlemen should have been taken on board British vessels of war, while the applications which H.M. Consul at Callao, made on behalf of British subjects, including several women and children, were refused?

in reply, said, no information had been received at the Admiralty on the matter; but a few days ago a representation was forwarded from the Foreign Office to the British Consul at Callao, directing attention to the subject, and requesting him to ask for an explanation from the commanding officer of the Shannon.

Railway Passenger Duty—Tramways

called the attention of Mr. Attorney General to the discrepancy between the two following descriptions of a Railway, given on the the part of the Board of Inland Revenue:— 1. By Mr. Melvile, Solicitor of Inland Revenue, in his evidence before the Railway Passenger Duty Committee, 1876:—

"A Railway means in this Act of Parliament (2 and 3 Will. 4, c. 120), and in all subsequent legislation, a proprietary Railway. It does not mean a Railroad laid along an ordinary highway; for instance, it does not include Tramways, as we know them now …It would seem by what I explained to the Committee before that the term Railroad embraces a Tramway just as well as what we commonly call a Railway, but it really only embraces a proprietary Railway.…Now I come to Section 50, which says 'The proprietor or company of proprietors of every Railway in Great Britain,' that led me to say, therefore, that the word Railway means a proprietary Railway; you could not apply that to a Tramway made upon a high road …;"
2. Through the Secretary of the Treasury, in this House, on the 23rd August, 1880:—
"Railway Passenger Duty is not levied on Tramways under the circumstances alluded to by my hon. friend (when they belong to Municipal Corporations), because the Board of Inland Revenue are advised that, not only on the particular ground stated (the limitation of the proprietorship of the Tramway Company to the rails), but as a general question of law, Tramway Companies are not liable to the Duty;"
and he asked Mr. Attorney General, If he will state what is the peculiarity in a Tramway, besides the separation of the property in the road from the property in the rails, which deprives it of the character of a Railway and exempts it from Railway Passenger Duty?

in reply, said, he believed that the view taken by the Board of Inland Revenue in charging the duty on railway passengers was that the Company so charged were the owners of the railway. That being so, it was necessary that there should be an actual ownership of the railway, in order to bring it within the scope of the Act. The Board were advised that in the case of tramways there was no such actual ownership, since the place where the rails were laid was the street or highway, and so the passengers conveyed upon such tramways did not come within the operation of the Act. He might add that the Prime Minister had already promised the Railway Passenger Duty Abolition Committee that the present state of the law should be considered by the Government, and that the Board of Inland Revenue had already been ordered to do so.

Orders Of The Day

Supply—Report

Resolutions [30th August] reported.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Resolutions be read a second time."

Navy—Ironclad Ships

Observations

in rising to call attention to the state of the ironclad ships of the Navy, said, that our Navy was not in a sufficient state of preparation, and not in the position in which the Navy of the first maritime Power in the world ought to be. He had in the last Parliament endeavoured to persuade the House and his right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith) that the present condition of the Navy was not in accordance with our position, and had his right hon. Friend remained in power he had hoped to have been able to convince him of the fact. The subject of a Naval Demonstration had been before the country, and the House ought to know the number and condition of our Ironclad Fleet. Had we a Fleet large enough for the protection of our trade and commerce? The question was opportune, as the Secretary to the Admiralty had recently been present at the great fete at Cherbourg, when he had made an excellent speech and had admirably represented this country. He hoped that the number of our ironclad ships would be increased, he would not say so as absolutely to secure our naval supremacy, but, at all events, to ensure our safety. He had hoped that there would have been greater progress made in building ships. It was said that we were not likely to go to war; and, therefore, might reduce our expenditure. But if we carried that argument out we should have no Fleet at all. If we were bound to afford any protection at all to our commerce we ought to do it efficiently. There were five great lines of communication which had to be protected, and which must be protected, not only against ironclads, but against privateers and smaller cruisers. One was to the East, through the Mediterranean, which carried £150,000,000 worth of goods in the year. The second was through the Atlantic, round the Cape of Good Hope, and into the Pacific, representing a commerce of £62,000,000 annually. A third was to the West Indies and Panama, with a commerce of £20,000,000; a fourth to Canada and North America generally, representing £110,000,000; and, lastly, to the Baltic and Northern Europe, withatradeof£80,000,000 a-year. Thus, there was a total of some £422,000,000 a-year of our commerce which had to be protected on these various lines of communication. The cost of our Navy represented an insurance to that commerce. He thought £10,000,000 a-year was not a heavy price for such an insurance, and he was going to ask the Government slightly to increase that insurance premium. Nominally, we had 62 ironclads, but of those only 30 were efficient, and we had only four in the Mediterranean. In 1870, according to the statement of the present Secretary of State for War, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, we had 40 ironclads actually ready, and eight nearly ready. That was a considerable number for those days. But now other Powers had considerable numbers of ironclads. The number of ironclads in the Navy List was 71; that was more than double the number of actually efficient ships. Russia had nine first and second class, and 20 third-class ships. Sweden had 14 ships; Denmark, six; Germany, seven first and second, and 10 third class; Holland had two first and second class, and 22 third class. Of the Mediterranean Powers, France had 22 first and second class and 37 third class; Spain five first and second class, and three third class; Italy, six first and second, and nine third class—Italy had four ironclads superior to almost any that we had; Austria had five first and second class, and seven third class; Turkey, six first and second class and 15 third class. Besides European Powers, China, Japan, and the South American States had ironclad fleets. He thought, in those circumstances, we ought to have more than 30 efficient ironclads. We had, besides, a number of wooden ships, which were rotten and not worth repairing. We had six home harbour defence ships; seven ships repairing and eight building. There were 41 ships in all to be deducted from the list of seagoing ships, so that there remained only 30 of these ships. In the Channel there wore four—the Achilles, the Agincourt, the Minotaur, and the Northumberland; in the Mediterranean there were six— the Monarch, the Rupert, the Temeraire, the Thunderer, the Alexandra, and the Invincible; in Chinese waters there were two —the Iron Duke and the Wivern; in the Pacific were the Shannon, and the Triumph; and in North American waters one—the Northampton. In the ironclad sea-going Reserve were the Audacious, the Belleisle, the Black Prince, the Devastation, the Dreadnought, the Glatton, the Hector, the Hercules, the Lord Warden, the Nelson, the Orion, the Penelope, the Superb, the Valiant, and the Warrior — 15 in all. The ironclads that were being repaired were the Bellerophon, the Defence, the Hotspur, the Swiftsure, the Repulse, and the Sultan. There were eight being built—the Agamemnon, the Ajax, the Collingwood, the Colossus, the Conqueror, the Majestic, the Polyphemus, and the Inflexible. The ironclads in reserve for harbour defence were the Cyclops, the Gorgon, the Hecate, the Hydra, the Prince Albert, and the Water-witch. Then there were the Scorpion, the Viper, and the Vixen at Bermuda; the Abyssinia and the Magdala at Bombay; and the Cerberus at Melbourne. He believed he had now stated the names of all the ships that could, by any conceivable arrangement, be got ready for use. The 14 ships to which he had already referred were quite useless. If it was granted that a Navy was necessary, we ought to have a sufficient number of ships to protect our commerce in case of war. At the present time, if a demonstration should turn into a war with a Power able to attack the lines of communication by which our trade was carried on, we did not possess sufficient ships to protect those lines. What he wished to urge upon the country was that, there being a necessity for 62 ironclads, 30 or 40 were insufficient. He believed that the Navy required an addition of, at least, 17 ironclads. This number of vessels could be built in two years, if the House should vote the necessary money, and the cost would not raise the Navy Estimates to the amount which was reached by the Army Estimates under normal conditions. The cost would amount to about £2,000,000 a-year for two years, and there would be no difficulty in building the ships, for at Liverpool, Newcastle, Belfast, and Hull there existed means which rendered it possible to built the whole of these 17 vessels at once. He trusted he had shown that 62 ships were necessary, and that, admitting that the repaired ships and the ships that were building were ready, 17 vessels would still be wanting to bring our Fleet up to the number recognized as absolutely necessary for the efficient service of the country.

said, that, although the House always listened with respect and interest to any observations of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman on the subject of the Navy, it would probably be of opinion that he had not chosen a good opportunity for the speech which he had just delivered. The proper occasion for such a statement, calling attention to the alleged deficiencies of our Fleet, and to the necessity of largely-increased expenditure was when the Naval Estimates were before the House, and before the programme of shipbuilding was agreed to. It was hardly necessary for him to remind the House that those Votes had been passed with the general approval of the House some weeks ago, and it would be impossible now for the Government to propose any change in them. He was perfectly aware that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was not a Member of this Parliament when the Navy Estimates were under discussion; and, consequently, they were unable to have the benefit of his advice in the discussions that took place; but he was in the previous Parliament, when the Estimates were brought in and explained by the late First Lord of the Admiralty, and then had the opportunity of explaining his views to the House. If he remembered rightly, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman seconded the Motion of Captain Bedford Pim, and then stated in full his views on the question, and called upon the House to put on record his views that the state of the Navy was unsatisfactory. The House, however, were so little impressed with the arguments of Captain Pim and the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, that Captain Pim was unwilling to divide the House, and the result was that the Motion on that occasion was withdrawn. On that occasion, the late First Lord of the Admiralty was able to show, conclusively, that the policy then recommended by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, of building a large number of ironclads was not a wise one. If he recollected rightly, on that occasion, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman recommended not the building of 17, but 30 ironclads, at a cost of no less than £15,000,000. In the interval that had elapsed he had become more moderate, and he now recommended the building of 17 ironclads. [Sir JOHN HAY: At once.] At any rate, they could not be built under three years. If the right hon. and gallant Member had waited until next Session his demands would probably have become even more reasonable than they now were. The right hon. Gentleman the late First Lord had no difficulty in showing, on the occasion referred to, the impolicy of any such ambitious programme of shipbuilding as that recommended by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. He observed that, in the continued advance of the science of shipbuilding, nothing could be more unwise than to rush headlong into the building of a large number; that if 20 years ago we had pursued this policy we should now be encumbered with a number of vessels which would already be obsolete, and that the same might be the case in the future. With what the late First Lord of the Admiralty then stated, he (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) entirely concurred. He would venture to point out to the right hon. and gallant Member, that it was less than 20 years since the first ironclad in the British Navy was completed—the Warrior was built in the year 1861; and he well recollected that there were many eminent authorities who thought we had then arrived at what was the most perfect type of war vessel, which, in no circumstances, could be improved upon. They recommended, in fact, that we should build 40 Warriors. He need hardly remind the House that the Warrior and her sister vessel the Black Prince had long ago been considered as obsolete and unfit to take their place in line-of-battle ships, though probably useful for other purposes; and if we had committed the folly of building 40 such vessels 20 years ago, we should for the same reasons have twice, during the interval, replaced them by an. equal number of more modern vessels. There was no greater reason for supposing that we had arrived at the perfection of an ironclad now in our latest types. On the contrary, he ventured to say that there never was greater uncertainty than at the present moment as to the future of shipbuilding, or greater difficulty as to what ships to lay down. The race between guns and armour had continued, and two further competing elements had been added—namely, torpedoes and speed; and it was by no means certain that we might not soon have to discard armour-plates of extreme thickness in favour of greater speed and torpedoes. He said, then, that nothing could be more unwise than to adopt the course recommended by the right hon. and gallant Member, and to rush at this moment into a great scheme of shipbuilding. The right hon. and gallant Member had stated that of 71 ironclads on the list only 32 were efficient. He entirely disputed his figures. There were at this moment 26 ironclads actually in commission, and in the First Reserve there were a larger number of vessels than at any former period that he could recollect. "We had, at this moment, in the First Reserve, seven vessels of the best class actually ready. We had four other vessels which were repairing; three of which—the Repulse, the Sultan, and the Swiftsure —would be complete next month; whilst the fourth —the Inflexible- —was expected to be finished by the end of the year. We had altogether 12 such ships to he added to the 26 in commission, making a total of 38. There were, besides, three vessels of the Cerberus type, and six small ironclads at Bermuda, which, were of some value, and six building in the Dockyards, two of which — the Ajax, the Agamemnon, would be complete by the end of next year. The same great advance in the science of shipbuilding made it more difficult than ever to measure the comparative strength of different Navies. We had to take into account not merely the numbers of vessels, but the strength and force of individual members. The right hon. and gallant Member, by adding up the ironclads of all kinds of different countries, had made a formidable list as compared with our own; but the force of this would be greatly diminished by considering the types of vessels. Again, we were not to suppose that, under any conceivable circumstances, the Fleets of all other countries would be found ranged against us, or that Russia was to combine with Turkey, and France with Germany, or the United States with all Europe. The true question was, whether the Navy of England, taken as a whole, was equal to meet such a combination as might reasonably be expected against it. He believed that, looked at in this way, there could be no doubt that our Navy maintained the same degree of superiority as it had in modern times. He might mention that there was very little activity in the building of ironclads at the present time in any other country in Europe than one—namely, France. In Germany there was little doing; in Russia still less. The right hon. and gallant Member had made minute comparison with the French Navy. He himself frequently deprecated the discussion in that House in detail of the comparative strength of the English and French Navies. He believed such discussions did not tend to improve the relations of the two countries, and rather tended to promote that rivalry in shipbuilding which it would be better to allay. The right hon. and gallant Member had stated that the French Government had been more active in shipbuilding during the last 10 years than we had. That was certainly not true of the first five years of the decade. In the years immediately following upon the German War there was very little done in the French Dockyards; money was stinted in every way, and there were constant complaints in the Assembly by the Minister that the Navy was perishing away. It was only within the last four years that there had been greater activity in the French Dockyards. At all events, the last Government must have been fully aware of this when they proposed the Estimates for the present year, which provided for the building of a smaller tonnage of ironclads than in any of the last 10 years—namely, 7,200 tons. He had himself expressed the opinion that that did not represent what should be the normal average amount of iron shipbuilding sufficient to maintain our ironclads; and he had also expressed his opinion that the delay in completing the ironclads actually in hand was not wise. In the changes they proposed in the Estimates of their Predecessors they had this in view; and they had promised to hasten on the completion of two of the most important vessels now building, and to advance their completion by more than a year. Their policy then was not to rush into any ill-advised scheme of re-construction, such as proposed by the right hon. and gallant Member; but to build steadily and regularly such an amount of tonnage as, on the average of years, appeared to be necessary to maintain the strength of the Navy; and, above all, having laid down a vessel, to complete it within a reasonable time, so as to test and realize its value, and not to run the risk of its becoming obsolete before it was completed. That was the policy developed in the Navy Estimates of the present year; and if the present Board of Admiralty were allowed to present the Estimates for next year, he hoped the House would then see that the same policy had been pursued.

said, he was glad to find the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty was able to renew the assurance which he gave the House not very long ago, to the effect that the present Reserve of ironclads was superior to anything which had existed within, his knowledge for a great many years. He thought that ought to be a satisfactory statement for the House and the country, and one which would re-assure his right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay). The difficulty which he had felt for some years was the difficulty referred to by the Secretary to the Admiralty—namely, what description of ship should be built which would be the most powerful, and, on the whole, the most useful for the Service. It was necessary to come to a decision; and that decision was come to according to their knowledge at the time. Asfar as ironclads were concerned, they had, practically, no knowledge whatever. They were dealing purely with theoretical knowledge. They had no experience at all that would enable them to design a ship which they knew would be the best in all circumstances. He, therefore, for his own part, could not urge the Board of Admiralty to pursue any different course from that stated by the hon. Gentleman. He agreed entirely in the policy of finishing ships as quickly as possible after the design had been finished. There was, no doubt, nothing more dangerous than keeping a ship on the stocks for a long time; because its armament, and possibly its armour, might change in the course of the three or four or five years during which it was building. Another important consideration was to have a Navy, which, for the time being, was capable of discharging the duties which devolved upon this country, of protecting its trade and commerce in different parts of the world. His right hon. and gallant Friend had spoken of the necessity of having 62 ironclads; but, for the purposes just mentioned, as many as 300 or 400 vessels were necessary, including fast cruisers and small vessels. For his part, he attached very great importance to the provision of a sufficient supply of fast cruisers. Fortunately or unfortunately, they were called upon to protect the lives and liberties of others than their own countrymen on the West Coast of Africa, on the East Coast of Africa, in the South Sea, and in other parts of the world, and it was necessary for them to have ships to enable them to discharge the duties which fell upon them. They had to consider what were the duties which the Navy of this country required, and what was the strength of that Navy. It was our plain duty to provide what strength it required. No doubt, they were falling a little behind, as compared with other countries; but, looking at the fact that they had now a larger Reserve of ironclads than they had ever had before, the position was one with which the country could not be altogether dissatisfied. At the same time, he strongly deprecated comparisons between the Navies of France, Russia, and Germany with our own country; and on that point, therefore, he cordially concurred with the views of the Secretary to the Admiralty.

said, the proposal of his right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) that the Navy should be reinforced by several ironclads, had been met by the objection, from the Secretary to the Admiralty, and the late First Lord, that the Board had not decided upon the proper type of ironclad. That was a most dangerous argument; for its logical conclusion was that, as they had not yet arrived at the type of a line-of-battle ship, they ought to build none at all. They could never arrive at finality in a matter of this kind. Comparison between this and foreign countries had been deprecated; but, as a matter of fact, such a comparison would be made outside the House. He believed the Admiralty said to their Naval Advisers —"Now, look here; we can only give you so much money for shipbuilding, and you must do the best you can with it; and if hon. Members draw comparisons between our Navy and the Navies of other Powers, we will take care of that, and quash the matter at once." That was the secret of the deprecating remarks made by the Secretary to the Navy, and his right hon. Friend. Sir Spencer Robinson, however, when untrammelled by Office, had stated that the Navy of this country was not in a satisfactory condition as compared with the Navies of other Powers; and, although the Admiralty had repudiated his views, he believed their responsible Naval Advisers entertained the same opinion as that officer. Intimately connected with the efficiency of the Navy was the question of its armament. He wished to know from the Government, whether they would give an impartial consideration to the question of the best ordnance for our ships of war, and institute an independent inquiry into the whole subject? He had asked that question before, and he now asked it again. Our entire system in regard to ordnance rested in the hands of a body of inventors. Call them what they would, they were nothing more nor less than that. Those gentlemen were as good men as they could possibly put in their places; and, no doubt, they had done their duty to the country efficiently; but, for all that, they must necessarily be a prejudiced body; and what he wanted to know— now that the late and the present Governments acknowledged that the system of providing guns for the Navy was not altogether satisfactory — was, whether the Government intended to investigate the matter by a thoroughly independent and impartial Committee? If they were to have an inquiry into the subject, the naval element ought to be fairly and fully represented in the Committee. The Ordnance Committees generally were largely composed of military men; and although naval men knew more of the practical use of their guns, they were either unrepresented, or only represented to a small extent on the Committee.

in reference to what had fallen from the right hon. and gallant Gentleman about guns, said, that it might be of interest to the House to learn that the Government had ordered a number of 6-inch guns for the Navy.

asked whether the cost would be thrown on the Army or the Navy Department?

The Royal Irish Constabulary— Pensions And Compassionate Allowances—Observations

called attention to the system of granting pensions and compassionate allowances in the Royal Irish Constabulary, complaining of the favour shown to superior officials, and of the injustice done to constables and sub-constables. He found that Sir John Wood, the Inspector General of the Constabulary, was in receipt of a pension of more than £1,000 a-year, although he had served only a short time in the Constabulary, and although, substantially, he was forced to retire in consequence of certain disclosures. In the summer of 1878, Dr. Le Clerc, the late Surgeon General of the Constabulary, was called to London by the then authorities of the Treasury, and received instruction, as he stated in his (Mr. Callan's) presence, that he was not, unless under most exceptional circumstances, to allow any constable to remain 30 years in the service. Now, an Irish constable was entitled to a pension after 30 years' service; and he (Mr. Callan) was glad that the noble Lord now representing the Treasury was no party to the attempt to deprive the Irish constable of his well-earned pension. The most remarkable case in connection with the subject was that of the late Constable Anderson, of Dungarvan, an inquest on whose body was held at Dublin. Fortunately there was no sectarian or party feeling in this case, Constable Anderson being what was called "a true blue Presbyterian," while he (Mr. Callan) and others who had taken up the case were Ultramontane Roman Catholics, simply wishing to save the constables and sub-constables from injustice. Constable Anderson being ill, was forced into hospital at Dublin, and died. A medical man gave evidence at the inquest that had he been left at home he would have lived; and the jury in their verdict said—""We condemn the system under which he was removed." The constable had seen 30 years' service in the Force, and was, therefore, entitled to a pension upon which he could have, in part at least, maintained himself, his wife, and six children. His sub-Inspector had reported of him that—

"He was well conducted, truthful, and intelligent—a man in whom the magistrates of the district placed implicit confidence."
This man, so highly praised, and entitled to a pension by which his wife and family would have been benefited, was killed, by being forced to go to Dublin, under a system which a Coroner's Jury condemned, and yet not one penny of compensation allowance had been given to his widow and family. Representations respecting the case of the widow and family were made by the County Inspector, the sub-Inspector, and the magistrates of the district; but the authorities refused to make any allowance beyond what they would have been compelled to grant under any circumstances. Why did they do so? Because the case was one which had brought the maladministration of the Irish Constabulary prominently before the public. He (Mr. Callan) had not voted against the Constabulary Vote. He regarded the Constabulary as a body whose discipline and good conduct reflected credit, not only on themselves, but on their country; and he was anxious that their grievances should be dealt with, and that the Government should look, not merely to the Report of the Inspector General, but to the constables and sub-constables themselves. He did not wish to raise a debate; but simply to ask the Chief Secretary to inquire for himself. If he would promise to do so he (Mr. Callan) would furnish him with memoranda of the grievances of the Force generally, and of the widow and family of Constable Anderson in particular.

could only say that if the hon. Member would supply the memoranda, as he promised, he (Mr. W. E. Forster) would carefully examine the subject. With regard to the case of the poor man specially mentioned by the hon. Member, he found that the power of the Government respecting allowances to widows had been put into operation only four times, and that the widows and children were those of men killed while on duty. At the same time, he distinctly promised to look into the case of the widow and family of Constable Anderson.

South Africa—The Transvaal

Observations

I have given Notice of a Motion relative to the salary of the High Commissioner of South East Africa (Sir George Colley); but I believe it will be more convenient to the House if this discussion is raised so as to cover the affairs of South Africa generally. My own remarks will be directed entirely to the policy of the retention of the Transvaal. I regret exceedingly that I could not bring the question forward earlier. It seemed, when Parliament met in February last, that the question of the retention of the Transvaal might be regarded as an open question. It was approached by the Leaders of the Opposition with open minds, and there seemed every prospect of discussing it with perfect freedom from any disposition to prejudge the decision. My noble Friend the then Leader of the Opposition made these remarks in the course of the debate upon the Address in Answer to the Speech from the Throne in relation to the condition of the Transvaal—

"Undoubtedly"—he said—"the chief difficulty in South Africa is the condition of the Transvaal, to which no reference has been made in Her Majesty's Speech …I am not going to state at this time my opinion as to the policy which ought to be pursued there. I will only say that it is perfectly clear now that the annexation of the Transvaal was a measure adopted by the Government and sanctioned by the House under wrong impressions and under incorrect information. We were informed that a large majority of the European settlers and inhabitants of the Transvaal were in favour of that annexation. It is now proved conclusively that a large majority, at all events, of the Boers are bitterly against it. We are now told that the annexation was rendered necessary because we could not permit the foreign policy of the Government of the Transvaal in their dealings with the Natives; but we have been ourselves compelled to adopt almost precisely the same line of policy which was adopted by the Boers; and, under these two circumstances, I say it ought not to be considered a settled question simply from the fact that the annexation had taken place. If it had been necessary for the peace of the community of South Africa that the Transvaal should devolve upon us, by all means let that be proved; but if, on the other hand, we find it would be more honourable to restore the Government, I say that no false sense of our dignity being involved in the question ought to stand in the way. Our true dignity would be best consulted by acknowledging that we have made a mistake, if, indeed, it is found that a mistake has been made."—[3 Hansard, ccl. 92.]
It is clear, then, from this that the noble Lord considered the retention of the Transvaal as an open question, to be discussed as if for the first time; and it is a great disadvantage that I cannot bring it forward now under those conditions which appeared to be so favourable then. As soon as Her Majesty's present Government entered into Office, acting upon the possession of what information I do not know, they came to a decision which they telegraphed to Pretoria and other parts of South Africa, and this, which was an open question, became a matter almost beyond the possibility of revocation. I feel my difficulty in view of this decision. I am not bringing any charge of inconsistency against the Government. I am simply placing this before the House, as, in the consideration of my case, I cannot but remember that the policy instituted by the late Government has been approved of, and continued by, the present Government; and hon. Members must feel how strong is my conviction of the impolicy of the retention of the Transvaal, when, in spite of these difficulties, I urge that it would be more wise, more dignified, more honourable, to renounce the authority we have assumed. I will not now go into the details of the annexation of the Transvaal. We all admit it was a mistake, this annexation. ["No, no!"] Then, if it was not a mistake, it must be branded by a stronger name. The hon. and learned Member for Bridport (Mr. Warton) has expressed his dissent; but I will wait for his reasons before I reply to his peculiar opinion. Not only here has it been acknowledged as a mistake, but also at the Cape and Natal there is the same conviction. This is the opinion even of those who were foremost in applauding the act when it was done, and, indeed, of the men who were vehement in urging that step before it was taken. There has been a revulsion of feeling in South Africa itself. I shall not, I say, trouble the House at length with the circumstances under which the occupation occurred; but there are two points in connection with it which have been recently brought to light to which I should like to refer. I remember, when this matter first came on for discussion, that a Member of great experience—he had sat in this House, I think, for 40 years—came to me more than once, and, in a grim spirit of humour, asked what had been given to President Burgers that he should become an advocate of annexation? I was then obliged to reply that I knew of no special motive influencing his conduct; but since that time it has been explained. It has come out, in the accounts, that President Burgers is to be the recipent of £500 a-year for the rest of his life, dating from the time of the annexation. This is known now, and was not known a few months since. Another important fact is this. It has been stated that at the time of the annexation the Boers of Pretoria were under the influence of great excitement, induced by the threat given by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, that if they did not consent to be annexed the Zulus would be turned upon them. Sir Theophilus Shepstone has denied that he used such a threat, and he has shown how he could not have done so; and I am led to suppose that, so far as the intention goes, he did not threaten the Boers with a Zulu invasion. But he has confessed that what he did say was, that the Zulus were massed on their borders, and that he had great difficulty in restraining them. Now, the difference between a threat and a warning is often extremely slight—often the same words may serve for one or the other, if expressed in a different tone. I have heard recently in this House an announcement that, if Business is delayed, there must be a Saturday Sitting, and it was interpreted by many as a threat when it was meant as a warning. Sir Theophilus Shepstone then gave this warning, and he expressed it in the Dutch language to a certain number of Boers, possibly not best qualified to appreciate nice distinctions. In their minds it was received as a threat, not as a warning. This explains the apparent concurrence of the Boers at the time which has always been difficult to understand, as it has been shown that a vast majority of the Boers immediately afterwards refused to accept the assumption of authority on the part of England. There is another view of the case which I desire to draw attention to. I have always thought that if at the time I could make those who heard me realize the character and extent of the Transvaal they would have been able to see the imprudence of annexing it. I feel now that if I could give anything like a notion of what the Transvaal is, even in its normal state, and not as it now is, disturbed by English occupation, the House would see the wisdom of renouncing the sovereignty of the territory. The Transvaal, as everyone knows, covers a very large extent of territory. A Dutch family occupying a farm will be miles away from their next neighbour. Scattered all over this wide extent of territory are some 30,000 or 40,000 people altogether; and if one could imagine these Islands forming the United Kingdom, inhabited by a population of that number, he would perceive how far off from each other the inhabitants would be, and would be able to gain some idea of the present condition of the Transvaal. He would see how feeble and weak the administration must be; and he would, perhaps, come to understand something of what the Transvaal is, and the difficulties we must have to contend with in taking upon ourselves the sovereignty of the country, and the government of a population so small and widely scattered, and with a political life so rudimentary in character. In such circumstances, what must the political and social condition of a people be who, in regard to political associations, have been accustomed to act but feebly together, and, for the most part, have assumed the character of separate and distinct families, relying upon themselves alone for the supply of their own wants, the regulation of their own industrial pursuits, and the carrying on of their own peaceful farming operations? Thus you have to deal with a large area, thinly populated, and very far off from the condition, social or political, which renders them fit to receive your administrative control. In effecting annexation, and in undertaking to apply our system of government to the Transvaal, we took upon ourselves an enormous and difficult undertaking, and loaded ourselves with responsibilities. It is clear that the country was not in a ripe condition for English administration, even if the people themselves were willing to accept the English rule. The political, social, and judicial ideas of the people of the country were not sufficiently advanced for our administration; and, therefore, on the mere ground of the insufficient settlement of the country, the policy we were adopting was most impolitic. I have enumerated some of the difficulties in the way of governing the territory, even if there did not exist that greatest of all difficulties, that the country is inhabited by a people who will not have your rule, and who utterly repel the suggestion that they should consent to give up their freedom and independence for British sovereignty. The civilization of the territory is in too rudimentary a state; there has not yet been established an organized life in it; and although moral ideas of great value may, and do, exist, each family constitutes a distinct centre from the rest; and the country, therefore, cannot be in a condition to live under such a highly developed government as that of England. Those facts constitute a strong a priori objection against Great Britain assuming the control of such a country. There remains the invincible repugnance of the Boers to foreign control. Of course, I shall be told by the responsible Representative of the Colonial Office that the Boers are toning down; that they are beginning to accept as inevitable that which they resisted as long as they believed they had any chance of independence; that they have no longer any hope of independence; and that, therefore, they will resign themselves to the necessities of their position, and will fall in with the views of the Government. We have heard statements of this character over and over again; but such statements have been falsified by indisputable evidence as often as they have been made. When we first annexed the Transvaal, and our sovereignty was proclaimed at Pretoria, we were told by Mr. Lowther that the Proclamation was received with submission, and even gladness, and that the whole transaction was one upon which the inhabitants of the Transvaal congratulated themselves. This notion, however, was very soon shown to be a delusion, for a deputation from the Transvaal came over to England to enlighten the people of this country and the Ministry of the day as to the true feelings of the people of the Transvaal in regard to the independence of the country. They came here without sufficient authority, and they went back in order to obtain credentials as respresenting the people of the Transvaal. Finally, they reappeared here with a Petition adverse to our rule, signed by some 6,600 burghers out of a total population of 8,000 burghers. At all events, it is clear that, as far as the feeling of the White inhabitants is concerned, you have 6,600 of them refusing to consent to annexation. That deputation was followed up by an assemblage in Pretoria in the spring of last year. A largo number of men attended the camp, and great anxiety was felt as to the result. Sir Bartle Frere, who was at that time High Commissioner, went up from the Cape. He saw the people, argued with them, and came away flattering himself that their objections would break down, and that they would recognize our rule. But no sooner was such an opinion expressed, than it was dispelled by a further remonstrance, even stronger than before; and, finally, in the winter of last year, there was another camp, in which no less than 6,300 armed Boers assembled together, and declared, in the most solemn way, once more that they would not consent to live peacefully under the sovereignty of England. That was a demonstration on their part so recently as December last. It is said that, inasmuch as the present Government have accepted the necessity of the retention of the Transvaal themselves, the Boers, in the course of time, would be induced to accept it. I answer that there is not much hope of that in South Africa. At the time of the General Election it was considered in the Transvaal that some of the speeches of the present Prime Minister, and of the leading Members of the Liberal Party, showed a disposition on their part to recognize the independence of the Transvaal. Up to the time of the new Ministry coming into Office there was reason to believe that they would be favourable to the views of the Boers. But there is no evidence that the Boers rested their hopes on the return of the Liberals to power, or kept up their spirit of resistance in the expectation of this event. In South Africa, as in India, and as on the European Continent, the weakness of the late Government in the support of the people of the United Kingdom was not understood, and the result of the Election was a surprise. As the Boers were not encouraged by hopes of Liberal action, so is there no evidence that they have been, discouraged by what has since happened. Early in the spring they sent their leaders to the Cape as a deputation to remonstrate against our proceedings, to stir up the affections of their Dutch friends, and to watch the progress of Confederation in the Cape Colony. With the singular trust they have always reposed in their leaders, who are men of their own order, they have waited to confer with those leaders before taking action. We have heard that these men have gone back from the Cape; but I have not heard of their arrival at Pretoria. There has been no assemblage of burghers yet to meet them on their return, and we are still in the dark as to the consequences when they come back. We have, therefore, no evidence either one way or the other, unless we take this as evidence—that Sir William Lan-yon has recently sent home a protest on the part of some loyal Boers against being overtaxed, as they are likely to be, because their neighbours have proved troublesome and unruly. But how many Boers signed this protest of loyalty to the English Crown? We have seen that 6,600 out of 8,000 signed the first protest, and that 6,300 assembled in the camp in December last. But this protest sent home by Sir William Lanyon, with the declaration I have mentioned, was only signed by 33 Boers—33 being thus the grand total of those who are contented to remain under the sovereignty of the Queen, with a fear, however, that they are likely to be overtaxed owing to the unruly conduct of their neighbours. It is quite true that another body in the Transvaal are willing to accept our government, and to remain under the Crown of England—namely, the English people who have gone there. But they are not very many in number. A Memorial received from them is said to have been signed by 900 burghers of Pretoria; but it is difficult to understand how that could be so, as there are only 600 burghers altogether in Pretoria, and they must have got the signatures of some of what may be called the vagrant class—men from the diggings, land jobbers, and others, who are ever haunting the border lands of civilization and to rush, like unclean birds, after their prey. These are the men who repose their trust and loyalty in the Bri- tish rule. But the mass of the people are extremely hostile to our rule. This is so well known that the Government has not dared to convene the Volksraad, which is the real original democratic Assembly of the people. A Legislative Council has, indeed, been established; but it is a curiosity in legislation. Every Member of it is nominated by the Executive Government, and holds office at the pleasure of that Executive. Every Member of it can be removed at a moment's notice, and every Member receives a salary for his services; and so the Council is, of course, an extremely loyal body. There is also a Legislative Assembly, every Member of which is nominated by the Government, and receives, I believe, an allowance, if not pay. Sir William Lanyon, writing on the subject of this Legislative Assembly, in which it appears that these nominated Members are in favour of Confederation, congratulates Her Majesty's Government on the existence of proof that in the Transvaal there is a feeling in favour of our rule. But the mass of the people are decidedly and unmistakably opposed to that rule. Let me place before the House one or two facts with respect to the nature of our occupation. In the first place, we keep an Army in South Africa at a cost, borne by this country, of something like £400,000 a-year. That is divided between Cape Colony, Natal, and the Transvaal. The total cost in 1879–80 was £660,000; in 1880–81 it is £440,000. But the cost of the Army in the Transvaal has been double as much as that to the Army in the other two Colonies put together; so that more than two-thirds, at least, of the sum total is spent in consequence of our annexation of the Transvaal. As to the number of the Forces maintained there, I am not in possession of a Return which gives the latest number of all the Forces of all arms in the Transvaal. A few months ago the number of soldiers in that Colony amounted to 4,000–4,000 to keep in order a male population of 8,000. During the last few days we have had a discussion as to the police force that is considered necessary in order to keep in order the population of a neighbouring Island. If it were necessary to maintain in Ireland a military or a semi-military force in anything approaching the force we find it necessary to keep up in the Transvaal, the number we should require would be, at least, 1,000,000. That would inadequately represent the military power we should require in order to restrain the people of Ireland, and to insure the allegiance of the people of that country to our rule. That fact alone will show the kind of hold we have upon the affections and loyalty of the people of the Transvaal, two years after annexation; and in the Transvaal you have only a very small section of the population, those who are British by birth, who are really loyal. Those who are engaged in the cultivation of the land and in the development of the resources, and who are the backbone of the population, are entirely opposed to our rule. Take another fact. When we first took possession of the Transvaal, we lent it £100,000 to meet pressing necessities. At any rate, it was stated to be a loan; but it does not appear to have been in any way the intention of the Government of the Transvaal to repay that money; and, indeed, they are, I believe, utterly unable to do so. In addition to this loan of £100,000, they have gone into debt since to the extent of £ 148,000, and every year there is a considerable deficit in the Exchequer compared with the ordinary Revenue of the Colony. What is the prospect, then, that is before us in regard to payment of the loan? I have here the Report upon the expenditure in South Africa, which refers specially to the Transvaal expenditure. It says—
"The expenditure is estimated at £114,500; but it must be remarked that the scale on which these charges are calculated is totally insufficient to secure the proper Administration of the Colony. In the first place, as the salaries paid by Merchants and Bankers are higher than those of the Civil Service, and as no prestige attaches, as in this country, to Government appointments, it is already difficult to secure the services of competent Officers, and no economy can therefore be expected in connection with the Civil establishments; indeed, as pointed out by Colonel Lanyon in his letter addressed to the High Commissioner on the 7th August last, an increase of the expenditure under this head would probably result in an increased revenue. There is hardly any Police Force; the Gaols, except at Pretoria, are in a bad condition; there is no hospital, and no lunatic asylum."
Then the Report goes on to state—
"It has been already stated that the whole territory is unsurveyed, and that the work of survey should be undertaken at an early date; but the most urgent need of the Colony is an improved system of communication. It hardly lies within the compass of this Report to discuss the question of the construction of a railway, whether to the Capo Colony through the Diamond Fields, to Natal, or, as projected by President Burgers, to Delagoa Bay. But it is almost imperative that some expenditure should take place upon the internal means of communication. The roads, although mere tracks formed by transport riders, are, it is true, from the nature of the soil and country, for the most part fairly passable; but there is not a single bridge in the Province, and, as the rivers are liable to sadden and violent floods, the danger and inconvenience suffered by travellers is very great, and the addition to the expenses of transport is considerable. It will probably also be thought that the Transvaal should undertake some adequate measures in future for the defence of her territory against the neighbouring tribes, and it seems, therefore, imperative that any improvements in the revenue should be devoted to the revision of the Civil and Judicial Establishments, the organization of an efficient Police Force for the preservation of order, and the establishment of a local Corps for the defence of the frontier. It is further of importance that considerable public works should be undertaken to provide for hospital accommodation, for the erection of a lunatic asylum, for the construction of bridges, and for the survey of the country. Should it be considered that such services might fairly be provided for by a loan, the necessary amount might be included in any sum to be raised to pay off the debt to the Standard Bank and other liabilities. No allusion has been made in this Report to the possibility of the Colony being enabled to pay to the Imperial Exchequer any contribution towards the very heavy cost of its military protection by British troops, because it cannot be anticipated that the financial condition of the Colony will at present admit of such an additional burden. Indeed, having regard to the excess of expenditure over revenue in past and current years, to the necessity for increased expenditure in the future, and to the difficulties and cost of collecting taxes in the native locations in the northern parts of the Province, there are, perhaps, hardly sufficient grounds for hoping that, with an improved system of taxation, including the contribution of a reasonable sum by the native residents, the income of the Transvaal will for some years to come be sufficient to meet the current expenses of good government, and to pay the interest, together with a moderate sinking fund, on the debt of the Colony, increased by the amount required for the execution of public works."
So that we have before us the fact that the Transvaal is not only in an actual state of debt, but that the prospect before us is one of a continually recurring deficiency. You have been compelled to introduce a more scientific and highly developed administration than would be sufficient to meet the wants and requirements of the inhabitants of the Transvaal if they were governing themselves. You have this fact—that not only is the great mass of the inhabitants opposed to your rule, but that the Revenue of the country will not meet the Expenditure, and that year by year you must meet a growing deficiency, besides keeping an army of occupation there, the whole expenditure of which is thrown upon this country. You have the moral difficulty of forcing your rule upon a people who are unwilling to submit to it. And you have the pecuniary difficulty of having to pay large sums, year by year, for the control you exercise. As to the effect of our occupation of the Transvaal upon the rest of South Africa, the Free State, which is partly conterminous with the Transvaal, is inhabited by a people of the same race and with the same habits. They have most strenuously remonstrated against our occupation. The Volksraad of the Free State have met to consider the matter; and, despite the efforts of their prudent President, they passed a Resolution condemning the occupation of the Transvaal, and calling for its restitution by a majority of two to one. At the Cape itself, our occupation of the Transvaal has given rise to feelings of dissatisfaction and dislike, and even of disloyalty. It has seriously interfered with the happy results brought about by the administration of successive Governors; and a spirit absolutely unknown for many years past has been provoked, and is now active, in consequence of our hostile occupation of that territory. I have here a most formidable piece of evidence which shows the existence of that feeling. I hold in my hand a Memorial drawn and signed by 6,000 Dutch Boers, subjects of the Queen within the Cape Colony, addressed to the present Prime Minister, and begging him to complete the noble work he has accomplished in other directions by bringing about the restitution and freedom of the Transvaal. It is addressed to the Prime Minister, and it may be asked why it has not been handed to him, or forwarded to him. I may, perhaps, be permitted to explain how that came to pass. It was sent to me by a Member of the Legislative Assembly of the Cape, who wrote to me to the effect that when the report of Mr. Gladstone's speeches, delivered in Mid Lothian, and on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of his birthday, in which he condemned the annexation of the Transvaal in unmeasured terms, reached South Africa, many Dutch Cape Colonists requested him to write to the right hon. Gentleman thanking him for his noble utterances in the cause of justice. Circumstances prevented him from doing so for some time; and, when he was ready to do so, it was stated that a change of Ministry had taken place in England, and the information came to hand that Mr. Gladstone, now that he had succeeded to Office, had completely changed his mind with regard to the Transvaal, and had ceased to advocate in Office the undoing of high acts of injustice which he had before condemned when in Opposition. The signing of the address came, in consequence, to a dead stop, and many of those who had already signed expressed themselves so thoroughly and utterly disgusted that the gentleman who wrote to me did not feel himself at liberty to present the Memorial to the right hon. Gentleman. The Memorial itself was signed by 6,000 Dutch Boers, and its language is most applicable to what has been done in the Transvaal. It refers to what has been done in Ireland, and what has been done in England; it refers to the speeches of Mr. Gladstone in Mid Lothian and elsewhere. It reminds him of what he had said, and the Memorialists look forward to the confident hope that the time would arrive when, in Office, he would be able to do something for them. Now, that is a specimen of what has happened in the Cape Colony in consequence of the retention of the Transvaal. We have not only acquired a sovereignty over an unwilling people in the Transvaal; but we have stirred up heartburnings elsewhere. A large number of the people in the Cape Colony itself are discontented with our rule who were never discontented before; so that without the Transvaal, as well as within its limits, this retention, or forced occupation of the territory, is working mischief to the chances of Confederation in South Africa. It is confessed that the scheme of Confederation never had much of a chance; but, such as it was, it has been utterly ruined by the occupation of the Transvaal. These opinions have been expressed, over and over again, in the discussions which have taken place in Cape Colony. Mr. Sprigg, the Colonial Secretary; Mr. Merriman, one of the Leaders of the Opposition; Mr. Solomon, another Leader of the Opposition; Mr. Smith, Mr. Hofmeyr, and others, all agree that the annexation of the Transvaal makes it impossible for the Cape to come under any scheme of Confederation of which the Transvaal is to form a part. They refuse to have anything to do with the burden laid upon them of maintaining British rule in the Transvaal. Now, it may be said that I have left out the most material part of the question—that I have been speaking only of the Whites. True, I have been speaking, so far, only of the Whites. But a Black population is there; and what is to happen to them? It has been, said that our occupation is to be defended in consequence of the wrongs inflicted upon the Black population. Slavery, or something like it, has been inflicted upon the Black population. Even if this were true, I would submit the necessity of considering the price that has been paid for whatever benefits may have been conferred upon the Native population of the Transvaal. One of the consequences of our occupation of the Transvaal was the Zulu War. If you have secured better treatment, and a better life for the Natives of the Transvaal, what have you done for the Natives of Zululand? You have had, at least, some little penalty to pay in the Zulu War. Another part of the price you have had to pay has been in the alliance with the Swazis—the employment of the Swazis as your auxiliaries in war. If any of you know what the Swazis are you must feel that we have paid a very considerable price in having to use them as auxiliaries in our wars. If the Natives of any part of South Africa were entitled to our kindly feeling, it is hard upon them that we should have employed, in waging war upon them, these most savage and ferocious tribes. This fact alone throws a considerable doubt upon the reality of our sympathies. But, indeed, our object was not to free the Natives from wrong and oppression. We were told by Mr. Lowther, then Under Secretary, that we annexed the Transvaal simply for our own protection; and he was most eager to disclaim the imputation of philanthropy. It was an afterthought that we should occupy it for the protection of the Natives. What kind of freedom are we leaving to them? There is an important Paper in existence, to which I think sufficient attention has not been paid, on the condition of the Natives of the Transvaal. It is from Mr. H. C. Shepstone, the Secretary for Native Affairs. He says—
"15. The Basutos are naturally inclined to be peaceful and quiet, but in this district, owing to their having turned out the Boers, and there being no civilizing influence among them, and also to the fact of the jealousies existing between the tribes, they have lived in a constant state of turmoil and warfare up to the present time, and are, therefore, from education and habit, more quarrelsome and warlike and less amenable to control than their brethren living in the more settled districts.
"16. These remarks apply equally to the natives of the Waterberg district, and I fear that in these two districts where no taxes have hitherto been paid, though the different chiefs have expressed their willingness to pay taxes when the time comes, unless there is some show of force there will be difficulty in collecting if not positive refusal to pay the hut tax on the part of some of the more powerful chiefs.
"17. The Lydenburg District has a large native population, and in this district also no taxes have been collected, but there are no powerful chiefs in it with the exception of Sekukuni, whose submission may now shortly be expected; when this is accomplished, I do not anticipate there will be much difficulty in collecting the tax.
"18. At present it would be impossible to collect taxes in any of the above-mentioned districts, all the chiefs are anxiously watching the course of events as regards our proceedings against Sekukuni, and though they do not really think that he will be successful, yet there is a lingering sort of fear that he may be; and they consequently are in many instances afraid of the results of paying their taxes, and others would refuse, considering that if we were unable to subdue Sekukuni we would be unable to coerce them.
"19. In those portions of the Lydenburg and Wakkcrstroom districts which abut on the Swazi country there are large numbers of Swazis living, some as refugees, and others, the majority, as Swazi subjects, and disputing our right to the land.
"This land question is being constantly brought to my notice by the natives, who represent the hardships they are under by being obliged to live on farms under the control of the owner. In the Zoutpansberg district one of the largest Basuto chiefs, Makotu, in talking about land, claimed all he occupied as his own; and on my asking how that could be, as the Boers had taken the country and given it out in farms, he replied very true, but I drove them out and now occupy by right of conquest, as they did in the first instance. This question is one which I would urgently commend to your Excellency's immediate and earnest consideration, as it is one which will be very strongly represented when the taxes are called for, and intimately connected herewith is the settlement of the northern boundary line of the Transvaal. As your Excellency is aware, the boundary between this territory and the Bechuana Chief Sityele (Sechele) is also in an unsettled state, and it is important that this question, which has been so long in abeyance, should be settled at as early a date as possible."
Anybody who has studied that Paper with attention will see that we are threatened with the possibility, if not the probability, of a war against the Natives, in order to assert the authority which we say we have derived from the Boers, but which they declare the Boers never had over them. It was precisely the same difficulty out of which grew the Zulu War. The Zulus disputed the claim of the Boers to certain lands. "When we annexed the Transvaal, we insisted that we had taken over the rights of the Boers, and we made war really in the assertion of those rights. Just so here. The Natives you are so anxious to annex resist your authority, because they say they are not subject to the Boers. We are going to claim taxes from them, and to compel them to submit to our authority; and to effect this we may possibly, if not probably, have to go to war. I find, in the same book from which I have already quoted, that Sir Theophilus Shepstone and Administrator Lanyon contemplate the same contingency. The difficulties, therefore, in taking over the Transvaal, even from the point of view of the Natives, are enormous. We have been charged with the affairs of the Natives since they came within what we nominally call the Transvaal territory. They resent your authority, and they dispute your dominion. They have not paid taxes, and they refuse to pay taxes. All these troubles are prepared for us. In the Northern part of the Transvaal, where it appears that out of something like 800,000 Natives in the whole of the territory 600,000 at least live, they object to our sovereignty. I should have thought that the arguments which I adduced, first of all, as to the difficulty of ruling the Boers of the Transvaal from their unwillingness to submit to that rule, would have been sufficient to show the impolicy of the annexation. I have pointed out the difficulty of ruling a country where the inhabitants are so widely spread in small numbers over the territory. I have shown the difficulty of assuming a control over Natives who reject your authority. I think I have adduced enough to substantiate my proposition—that it would be wise and politic to withdraw from the Transvaal. I should like to add one word more, and it is simply in regard to the value which the independence of the Transvaal would have on the future development of South Africa. The real mischief of our occupation of the Transvaal has been the intrusion of what I believe to be an unwise factor in a difficult problem; the spirit of foolish interference with institutions which are not ours, because they do not come up to that standard of excellence we have laid down for ourselves, without having regard to the question whether within the district concerned the movement of life which is taking placeisone of growth and of improvement, or one of decay and of death. I believe it is the highest wisdom of a politician to wait with great tolerance of evil for a better state of things, where imperfection is only an incident of growth towards a better condition; and the imperfections existing in the Transvaal are imperfections of that nature. The Transvaal started—it had not advanced very far—in its political life. Its organization was imperfect, but it was moving in the right way. It was getting into a better condition; and nothing but this spirit of foolishness in high places which will not be content to let things grow from worse to better, but must interfere to introduce institutions unfitted for the time, the place, and the people—nothing but this spirit of foolishness in high places has retarded the development of the Transvaal. Our policy in the annexation of that country has been characterized throughout by the spirit I have been endeavouring to condemn; and it shows the unwisdom of not letting things alone when things are going on fairly well. In respect to the future condition of South Africa, the independence of the Transvaal was one of your most valuable auxiliaries. What is the prospect now? The Orange River Free State existed as one of the elements of future union; the Transvaal was another, and we had there two factors of the highest importance. About these two nuclei, political life would have gradually thickened and developed, and the time would have come when they would have united together in some federal union, and would have been ready to join our Colonies in a free partnership. How stands the matter now? If you occupy the Transvaal as a subject ter- ritory of your own, the prospect is, in the highest degree, dark and uncertain. Our occupation of the Transvaal has shown us that it is not a step towards the Confederation of South Africa. Confederation with a Province held in forced subjection is impossible. If, on the other hand, you had left the Transvaal alone it would have been occupying, as it were, the position of an advanced guard between you and barbarism, developing its life and its power from year to year. You had there a nucleus of political life which would have extended its influence right and left throughout the whole of South Africa, by means of which a valuable and real alliance between friendly States might have been effected. You have destroyed the whole of that prospect; and, instead of the promise of a future which was hopeful, you have now a promise that is full of doubt and uncertainty. And if I now appeal to the Government with little hope of success, it is not from any want of assurance on my part that the appeal I make is founded on reason and the highest principles and wisdom of statesmanship. Even now it would be wise to turn back from a false path to restore to the Transvaal its independence. It would not be difficult. Indeed, it might be done in a form that would secure advantages that were not in our possession at the time we annexed the Transvaal. It may be said that if we retire we would leave the Transvaal in a state of confusion and anarchy. Did that consideration prevent your retirement from Afghanistan? In Afghanistan you will certainly leave confusion and anarchy; because there the organization of the State depends on the predominance of some one individual; and until the competitors for that predominance have fought out their quarrel there must be confusion and anarchy. But in the Transvaal the case is very different. You have there the forms of Republican institutions. You may convoke the Volksraad and reconstitute the Government, with a Government so constituted that you can even come to terms as to its functions and its dealings with the Natives. I am satisfied of this—that it would be the highest wisdom, and the most profound statesmanship, to decide upon restoring the independence of the Transvaal. You could then re- found on sure basis, and even a surer basis, the political life of South Africa. You have broken up the relations of political life there, and it is now all in confusion. There is no one Province or Colony which is not at odds with its neighbour. If you restore the independence of the Transvaal you will at least have some prospect of being able to remove from yourselves difficulties in South Africa which will otherwise perplex you for many years, if not for many generations, yet to come.

recognized, in the able speech to which they had just listened, the consistency with which the hon. Member for Lis-keard (Mr. Courtney) adhered to the opinions which he had years ago expressed in the House. He (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) did not propose, and the hon. Gentleman himself had not attempted to go at any length into the question of the original annexation of the Transvaal; but he (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) confessed that he was astonished to hear him refer to that annexation as a specimen of the unwisdom of not letting things alone when they were going on well. Was the Transvaal really going on well when the annexation took place? The hon. Member told them they ought not to interfere with a state of growth and improvement, but rather with one of decay and death. Was the state of the Transvaal, at the time it was annexed to Her Majesty's dominions, a state of growth and improvement, or a state of decay and death? Its Government was absolutely bankrupt; it could not obtain enough money to pay its officials; it could collect no taxes; it was without credit; it was incapable of defending its own territory against the incursions of the Native Tribes. That was what the hon. Gentleman called a state of growth and improvement. But the practical question was this—The annexation had taken place, whether rightly or wrongly, and what were they to do now? The hon. Member, while he painted in far too dark colours the difficulties arising from that step, had almost ignored the evils that would result from its reversal. It would be impossible, if they withdrew from the Transvaal to-morrow, to establish again in that Province the old form of Government. Even the Boer Committee had never suggested that that could be done. They simply asked for independence of British rule. With regard to the Native population, in a country where there were 800,000 Blacks and perhaps 40,000 Whites, surely the interests of the Natives deserved very careful consideration on the part of the Government. In that country, since the assumption of authority by the Queen, the Native population had been perfectly quiet and contented under British rule, with the exception of Secocoeni and those associated with him; and since he had been subdued, the Native population had willingly paid taxes that had never previously been enforced against them. It was at least fair, then, to say that the Native population was contented under the existing state of things. The hon. Member said there were some few Boers who objected to the restoration of the independence of the Province. Surely the interests of those persons, however few they were in number, must be considered by those who had undertaken the obligation of protecting them. Neither could the interests of those who had settled in the Transvaal on the faith of its remaining British territory be disregarded. The class who, in the towns, conducted the whole commercial business of the Transvaal earnestly desired to remain subject to the British Crown. All these points had impressed themselves on his mind with great force when he was at the Colonial Office; and they appeared to him amply to justify the decision of the late Government, and of the present Government to retain authority over the Transvaal. If that were not done, he believed the result would be civil war between the Whites and the Native population, and that disasters would arise which would gradually extend over the whole of South Africa. He was convinced that the present Prime Minister never came to a wiser decision than that which he communicated to Mr. Joubert, when he wrote that he could not advise the Queen to relinquish her Sovereignty over the Transvaal; but that, consistently with its maintenance, he desired that the White population should enjoy the fullest liberty to manage their local affairs, and that that liberty might be best and most promptly conceded to the Transvaal as a member of a South African Confederation. That was the view which he (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) himself had taken in repeated despatches, and he had also endeavoured to impress it on the delegates of the Committee of Boers when they visited this country. He believed that view would eventually be accepted by the people of the Transvaal, and that they would settle down quietly under the present form of government, and in due time become loyal and attached subjects of the Queen. The hon. Member for Liskeard said there was no evidence of a growing feeling of content with the present state of things in that Province; but he entirely overlooked about the best evidence of it which could be given— namely, the difference between the Revenue Returns of the present year and those of the previous year. The Revenue of the first six months of this year was more than the whole of the ordinary receipts for 1879. It amounted to £76,583, including a considerable sum from the Native population. That Native taxation would, he believed, prove to be the key, so to speak, of the financial future of the country. The sum which he had named not only included the taxes of the current year, but also £18,000 of arrears which were mainly due to the political agitation of the previous year. Some £23,000 of Debt had been paid off since the beginning of the year; a large sum had been spent in the construction and maintenance of telegraphs; and no less than £5,000 had been paid over to a Sinking Fund. In fact, he could not easily conceive of a more hopeful financial future for the Transvaal than was foreshadowed by the Report for the last six months. And for this advance towards prosperity the hon. Member for Liskeard sought to substitute absolute chaos, by the withdrawal of Her Majesty's authority from the country. He would venture to express a hope that, in considering the future of the Transvaal, the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Kimberley) would not fail to recognize the extreme importance of pressing forward the railway to Delagoa Bay, which was felt to be of more importance to the future of the Province by the Boers and the settlers of English extraction than almost any other work which could be suggested. He had followed the hon. Member for Liskeard in discussing the circumstances of the Transvaal, because, although he was not him- self immediately responsible for its annexation, yet, for two years, he had to consider, under great difficulties, what should be the course of the Government with regard to it; and he felt now, whatever were the difficulties which existed at that time, the Government was amply justified in the decision they had taken to retain it. But his main object in addressing the House was a desire to ascertain the nature of the policy, so far as they were able to state it, which the Government intended to pursue, after the rebuff which the scheme of Confederation had no doubt received by the rejection of the proposal for a Conference by the Cape Parliament. He had read the debates on that proposal, and the views expressed by Sir Bartle Frere; and from them it would seem that the unfortunate result was mainly due to distrust of the future of Zululand and the Transvaal. Mr. Sprigg, the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, said, with reference to Zululand, that the question of its settlement raised considerable difficulty as to the union between Natal and that Colony; and that, in his opinion, advantage should be taken of the prostrate condition of the Zulus at the con-elusion of the war to establish a powerful and civilized Government amongst the people, which, no doubt, meant that Zululand should be annexed. He (Sir Michael Hicks - Beach) was convinced that it would have been impossible for either the late or the present Government to consent to any such annexation. The public opinion of the country was opposed to it, and would have refused to support any Government in the adoption of such a course. He felt bound to say that the action taken by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in conveying to Sir Bartle Frere the intention of Her Majesty's present Government to maintain the Sovereignty over the Transvaal, was as prompt and decided as it possibly could have been; but he feared that the announcement of that intention came somewhat too late to counteract the mischief which had been already done by some of his Colleagues. The hon. Member for Liskeard had alluded to the effect of the speeches delivered by the present Prime Minister in Mid Lothian with respect to South Africa, and there could be no doubt that the Members of that Parliament had not forgotten them. When this subject was last before the House of Commons, the Prime Minister said he was not aware that he had signified any opinion inconsistent with the policy pursued by the Government in retaining that territory. The right hon. Gentleman did not, perhaps, say that if called to power he would not retain that territory; but it was unfortunate that what he did say was not accompanied by some reference to the danger and impossibility of withdrawing from it. What the right hon. Gentleman did say was this—speaking at Dalkeith, on November 26, last year—

"The Transvaal, a country where we have chosen most unwisely—I am tempted to say insanely—to place ourselves in the strange predicament of the free subjects of a Monarchy going to coerce the free subjects of a Republic, and to compel them to accept a citizenship which they decline and refuse. But if that is to be done, it must be done by force. There is no strength to be added to your country by governing the Transvaal."
What was the interpretation put on that statement in South Africa? Mr. Hofmeyer, a Member of the Cape Parliament, said—
"It was most inopportune now to ask the Transvaal to send delegates to the Conference, when they had sent a deputation to Cape Town who, it was no secret, had been holding caucus meetings with Members of Parliament, influencing them to vote against the Conference, as its results might possibly be war and bloodshed in the Transvaal. It was an insult to the people of the Transvaal to ask them to join in a Conference, while they were telling us they would do nothing of the kind."
And more to the same effect. What happened was this—These words of the Prime Minister were generally interpreted throughout South Africa to mean that if the Liberal Party came into power he would advise the withdrawal of Her Majesty's Sovereignty from the Transvaal. He (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) believed that kept up the agitation which, but for encouragement of this kind, would have expired long ago. But the Prime Minister's were not the only speeches delivered by prominent Members of the Government. At the commencement of the first Session of 1880, in the debate on the Address in Answer to Her Majesty's Speech, the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India said—
"The annexation of the Transvaal was a measure adopted by the Government and sanctioned by the House under wrong impressions and under inaccurate information,"
That might be true; he (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) was not going into that question. The noble Marquess proceeded—
"If we find it would be more honourable to restore that Government, I say that no false sense of our dignity being involved in the question ought to stand in our way."
And
"Our true dignity would be best consulted by acknowledging that we made a mistake …and restoring the Government of the Transvaal."—[3 Hansard, ccl. 92.]
Again, not a word of the difficulty and impossibility of withdrawing. He (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) happened to know —he spoke from his own personal knowledge—that this speech of the noble Marquess was telegraphed to the Transvaal, and that it had the worst possible effect in promoting and sustaining the agitation which had been going on. This view was amply confirmed by the statements made in one of the latest dispatches from the Administrator, Sir Owen Lanyon, obviously an impartial witness on such a point. He would only express one hope as to the future. He regretted that the hon. Member for Liskeard had not brought his views forward in the form of a substantive Motion, so that the decision of the House might have been taken upon it; but he trusted that after the debate and the reply, which he had no doubt would be made to the hon. Member, confirming the declaration of the intention of the present Government to maintain the Queen's Sovereignty over the Transvaal, the hon. Member would feel that his best, his only, course in the future would be to use the influence he possessed in advising these poor, simple people to desist from vain attempts to obtain what they called their independence, and accept the inevitable. If the hon. Member did not adopt that course, he would incur a grave responsibility, and he would certainly postpone the day when that self-government could be granted, which both the late and present Government wished to give on the earliest possible occasion. Now that the proposal of a Conference had been rejected by the Cape Parliament, he wished to know what policy the Government intended to pursue with regard to South Africa in the future; and there was one point on which he hoped they would speak with no uncertain sound. On the 12th of June, 1879, he stated in a despatch to Sir Bartle Frere—
"It would be contrary to the true and permanent interest of South Africa itself that Her Majesty's subjects in that country should continue to rely upon Imperial troops for defence against Native attacks and insurrections; and hereafter Her Majesty's Forces will only be permanently stationed there as a garrison at or near Cape Town, for the defence of a naval station of great importance to the interests of the whole Empire."
He trusted that that view, which was universally accepted in this country, would be again impressed by Her Majesty's Government on the Cape Government and the Governments of South Africa generally, not only by words, but by action also. He had no reason to believe that it would be distasteful to the Government of the Cape Colony. The position of things now in South Africa was very different from anything which had existed in former years. The Cape Colony had all the privileges of self-government, and he believed the great majority of the people were quite ready to undertake the duty of self-defence. They had recently assumed fresh responsibilities in undertaking the government and control of additional Native territories. He had no doubt they would faithfully carry the burden of those liabilities. But he was sorry to see that, among the arguments used in the debate on Confederation by the opponents of the measure, the old view was put forward by more than one speaker, that Great Britain must defend a South African Confederation against Native attacks. It seemed to him that no policy could be more fatal than to give the power in these matters to a Colonial Government, and not to make them bear the responsibility of the exercise of that power. He felt convinced that his views in that respect were shared by Her Majesty's Government; and he only alluded to it now because he was anxious that so important a matter should not be unnoticed by the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Grant Duff)."With respect to the Transvaal, no doubt the case was somewhat different. There, if Confederation was found impossible for some time to come it would be necessary to retain Imperial troops. But the statement of the hon. Member for Liskeard, that the maintenance of those troops cost this country £400,000 a-year, he believed to be much exaggerated. He hoped, however, that in providing for the defence of that Province care would be taken to encourage a police force of Natives, and the enrolment of volunteers and border troops for the defence of the country— such a force, in fact, as existed in the Cape Colony—so that they might take the place of the Regular troops when they were recalled. With regard to Natal, he had read with satisfaction the statement of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that the power of self-government would not be given to that Colony until it was clear that the power of self-defence existed without reliance upon the aid of Imperial troops. He hoped that would be adhered to both in the Transvaal and Natal, and in any future case that might arise. The second point upon which he desired to insist was to express a hope that, in spite of the rebuff which had been received, Her Majesty's Government would not depart from the lines of the policy of union, or Confederation. The object of that policy might be achieved in more than one way. The rejection of the proposal for a Conference by no means gave such a check to it as was supposed by the hon. Member for Liskeard. It might be effectually promoted by the formation of a sort of South African Zollverein for Customs' duties by the establishment of a common postal and telegraphic system, or by identical arrangements for regulating the possession of arms; and he believed that if such objects as these were steadily pursued the result must be a complete union of Governments, which, however important it might be to this country as relieving it of responsibility in South Africa, would be infinitely more important to the prosperity and good government of South Africa itself. If the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed with the views which he had expressed as regarded the questions of self-defence, and union or Confederation; he confessed he hoped he would explain the reasons which had induced the Government to recall a Governor who was so exceptionally capable of carrying out those views as Sir Bartle Frere. There was no Colonial Governor who had done so much to promote the policy of self-defence in the Colonies as Sir Bartle Frere; and in the pursuit of Confederation the Government had admitted that his assistance would be of the greatest value. It was not Sir Bartle Frere's fault that the proposal for a Conference had fallen through. He (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) could understand the action of the Government if they had immediately recalled Sir Bartle Frere from South Africa, although, in his judgment, that would have been a most unwise course to have pursued. But he did not think, in the course which they had adopted, they were likely to obtain any of the credit which they might have expected from his recall, or any of the advantages which he should himself have anticipated if Sir Bartle Frere had been allowed to remain. The recall could not have been in consequence of any differences which had arisen between him and the Government in regard to his past action—as, surely, that was condoned by his retention in office when the present Administration acceded to power. Nor was it due to any want of ability or energy for the work he had in hand, because those qualities, on his part, were fully recognized. Nor did he understand that any difference had arisen between Sir Bartle Frere and the Government on any question of future policy except with regard to the small question of the confiscation of Moirosi's land; and he was quite sure that Sir Bartle Frere would readily have acceded to any wish of the Government on that matter. The Government had recognized his high merits and his distinguished services, and the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies admitted that there was no fear of a repetition of the policy which led to the Zulu War. He had stated that—
"Sir Bartle Frere was now in a position in which he could not, even if he wished it ever so much, commit similar errors to the Zulu War…ֵHe was practically the constitutional Ruler of South Africa, unable to take any important step except through the advice of his responsible Ministers."
He was, therefore, really at a loss to discover for what reason the Government had now decided to recall Sir Bartle Frere, and he trusted that they might be favoured with full explanations on this subject. He must, however, say that he did not think the Government had treated Sir Bartle Frere fairly, even while they retained him. For he certainly could not have been much aided in the promotion of Confederation by being, as it were, with a rope round his neck—a kind of intimation that he would be recalled when he had brought Confederation about, and, at the same time, deprived of that special allowance granted to him on his first appointment, which it was quite necessary for him to receive, and the withdrawal of which, as he himself said, must have been felt in the Colony as a distinct loss of valuable and legitimate influence to him in South Africa. Such conduct was not fair to Sir Bartle Frere, nor wise for the attainment of the object which the Government had in view. What, too, would be the position of the next Governor? Sir Hercules Robinson was an experienced and successful Governor; he was, doubtless, the best man to send. But he thought the new Governor would go to his post in circumstances not very favourable to him, as he could scarcely be welcome to the many warm friends of Sir Bartle Frere in the Colony, and, on the other hand, could expect but little, if any, support from the Cape opposition. He trusted, therefore, that his path might be made as smooth as possible by some explicit declaration, on the part of the Government, that, although they had obeyed the demands of hon. Members below the Gangway in recalling Sir Bartle Frere, they did not intend in the future to follow in South Africa the policy which those hon. Members had always recommended. In conclusion, he would add that he was perfectly satisfied with the general policy which was being pursued by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Kim-berley). If he might be allowed to say so, it proceeded on the exact lines which were followed when he (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) was at the Colonial Office, as might be proved by reference to the Despatches and Papers in that Office. There was but one other question to which he hoped he might allude—that was the payment of a certain sum of £3,800, expenses incurred by Sir Bartle Frere in his journey from Natal through the Transvaal. He hoped that when the noble Earl had fully examined into the circumstances of that expenditure, and obtained the necessary Treasury sanction, he would not be reluctant to authorize the proposal of a Vote for it in the House of Commons. The journey of Sir Bartle Frere was undertaken at the direct request of the Government of the day; and hon. Members, whatever they might think of his action in Natal, would admit that by his conduct in the Transvaal he prevented the outbreak of a civil war. He was confident that, however much Sir Bartle Frere's opponents might rejoice at his recall, they would be entirely superior to fining, in that illiberal manner, an old public servant, who had not spared his abilities or his private means in the service of his country, and who, if he had erred, had done so through over-readiness to take upon himself such responsibilities as most men in these days would be anxious to avoid.

The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) has made so many direct appeals to Her Majesty's Government that I am prepared to take part now, rather than as I intended, somewhat later. In this discussion various subjects have been raised. I think all the subjects connected with South Africa have been, more or less, raised in the course of the debate. I will begin with the subject the right hon. Gentleman was treating just before he sat down—namely, the case of Sir Bartle Frere. Now, the action of Her Majesty's Government with reference to Sir Bartle Frere has been so simple, and so obvious, that I have nothing to add to what has already been said from these Benches during the course of the Session. I can only re-state it. It would be trifling with the House if I were to attempt to show in detail that the action of Sir Bartle Frere, with reference to the Zulu War, had been very severely condemned by a great many Members of Her Majesty's present Administration. When, however, the present Government came into power, they found that, although the late Government had defended Sir Bartle Frere in debate, and, as far as voting went, they had defended him successfully, they had themselves, to a great extent, adopted the policy of the Opposition. They had not recalled Sir Bartle Frere from the Cape; but they had recalled him from the preeminent position he occupied at the commencement of the Zulu War, and put him in quite a different position. When the right hon. Baronet was in Downing Street, at the time of the debate in March, 1879, he said of Sir Bartle Frere with perfect accuracy —"Great as is his authority, greater than that of any other Governor in the Colonial Service." But when the present Administration came into power that would have been altogether an inaccurate statement of the position of Sir Bartle Frere. When we came into Office we found not one king in South Africa, but two kings in South Africa— Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Garnet Wolseley—two kings who by no means always agreed, either in their views, or in the manner of expressing those views. Further, we found that Sir Bartle Frere, so far from being able, as he was at the commencement of the Zulu War, to move great masses of Imperial troops, had only at his command a very small number of troops—about 800—doing the necessary garrsion duty at the Cape, and a trifling detachment—only a company, I believe—at the mouth of the St. John's River. We found, further, that the telegraph was in active operation, and, as the right hon. Gentleman has reminded me, I did say that it was impossible for Sir Bartle Frere to take any proceeding beyond the mere routine of his duties without the fullest opportunity being given to Her Majesty's Government to make known its will, and to insist upon that will being carried into effect. We further found that Sir Bartle Frere, far from being engaged in warlike operations, was chiefly occupied in one of the most peaceful courses in which it was possible for any man to be engaged. He was mainly engaged in attempting, by the usual influence in the hands of a Colonial Governor, to bring to maturity a plan of Confederation, to be initiated by a conference, the idea of which had sprung up at the Cape itself, and to effect which he had originally been sent out in 1877 before all this trouble began. Now, we had no very great confidence that this Confederation would be early effected. We always desired Confederation, but we thought the action of Lord Carnarvon was premature. We fully believed that Confederation would come one day; but, if we had been in power, we certainly should not have taken the precise way of arriving at it at the precise time Lord Carnarvon did. Still, we remembered the saying, that it is not right to quench the smoking flax, and we determined to run the painful risk of appearing inconsistent to some of our own best friends, rather than allow it to be said that by any hasty action on our part in recalling Sir Bartle Frere we had made Confederation, which would certainly be advantageous both to the Mother Country and to South Africa, impossible. Accordingly, my noble Friend the Secretary of State gave Sir Bartle Frere the very fullest assurances that could possibly be given, that he should have, while he remained at the Cape, the fullest support. I utterly deny that there is the smallest occasion for the phrase used by the right hon. Baronet, that Sir Bartle Frere acted with a rope round his neck. There is not a trace of any feeling of the kind to be found in the despatches. We gave him the fullest possible support until it was announced to him he was no longer desired to remain in South Africa. Well, what occurred? In the course of the summer a telegram was received saying that the proposal for Confederation which had sprung up at the Cape, and which contemplated that Confederation being inaugurated by a conference at the Cape, had come to an end. It had failed. Then we said to ourselves—"Most certainly if the despatches which will arrive some three weeks hence do not put a totally different complexion on the case, the time has come for Sir Bartle Frere to withdraw from the Cape Colony. The Prime Minister being several times questioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), utterly declined to make any definite statement until we should have these despatches in our hands. It was always possible there might be something in the despatches which might show, although the Confederation conference was not to take place, that still there might be some hope of effecting a Confederation of the South African Colonies. In the course of time the despatches came; but there was not the slightest trace or hint in these despatches of anything of the kind. It was prefectly clear from the despatches that although it was hoped and believed that some day the Confederation project would be revived, yet for a time Confederation was perfectly dead. We join in the hope that it may be revived again; but it is perfectly clear that the object for which Sir Bartle Frere was retained at the Cape was at an end. As soon as this information was received Her Majesty's Government acted upon it. They sent a telegram to Sir Bartle Frere, which was immediately placed in the hands of hon. Members. But I maintain that up to the very hour when that telegram was sent there was not the slightest foundation for the statement that Sir Bartle Frere did not receive from my noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Office, and from everyone connected with Her Majesty's Government the very fullest possible support he could have received. The right hon. Gentleman alluded to the withdrawal of Sir Bartle Frere's special allowance of £2,000 a-year. Well, with respect to that, I can only say that if the opinions of the right hon. Gentleman were the same when he was at the Colonial Office that they are now it is ten thousand pities that he did not take some means of putting those opinions upon paper. Of course, we were not cognizant of what private communications might have passed.

Then I maintain that by no possible interpretation can the public documents in the possession of the Government at the Colonial Office be strained into an agreement that this £2,000 a-year was received by Sir Bartle Frere for any other purpose than for the purpose of recompensing him for the expenses of travelling and other expenses he was put to when outside the limits of the Cape Colony. In the letter written by Lord Carnarvon's orders from the Colonial Office to the Treasury, and in the reply from the Treasury, there is not a hint of any other purpose or object than that purpose and object I have stated to the House. I am perfectly aware that some of Sir Bartle Frere's friends have maintained that that £2,000 a-year was given to Sir Bartle Frere for the purpose of adding to his state and dignity as Governor of the Cape; and it appears from one of his despatches sent to the Government, that that was his opinion. But what the foundation for it is I cannot imagine. There is no foundation for it in the public documents in charge of the Department. The right hon. Gentleman alluded to another matter—to a claim sent in by Sir Bartle Frere for a sum of from £3,000 to £4,000—£3,800, I believe, for the extra travelling expenses he was put to during his very long absence from the Government in connection with the affairs of Natal and Zululand. It has not been in our power to make any proposition to the House about that sum of £3,800 this year, because we have not yet received from Sir Bartle Frere accounts which make it possible to do so; but Sir Bartle Frere will soon be in this country, and when he is here he will be able to give us full information. When we have the information in our possession we have no doubt that the House will do whatever, under the circumstances, after a full and generous consideration of the whole matter, it may deem it right and proper to do. I should like now to answer a Question, which I shall not have another opportunity of answering, which was put to me last night, and in regard to which I said I would answer it to-day. It was a Question, and a very important one, put by my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell). My hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy asked me if I was able to state the cost to the Imperial Exchequer of the various wars which have been waged in South Africa during the latter part of the administration of Lord Beaconsfield. Now, I would warn the hon. Member and the House that I cannot give a perfectly complete and correct answer with regard to this, but I will give the very best answer I can. But the hon. Member and the House generally will pardon me if there be found some errors in my statement. The Zulu War, according to the figures presented by the late Administration, cost the Imperial Government, up to September 30th, 1879, £5,137,878. The Transkei War cost the Imperial Government, according to the same authority, £543,465. The war in Griqualand West cost the Imperial Government, according to the same authority, £220,000. I am not in a position to say exactly what the Secocoeni War cost.

I apprehend not; but I am unable to say. Another part of hon. Friend's Question was this —he asked what amount of repayment we had got, and what amount of repayment we expected? I think it would be unwise at present to state anything as to the amount of repayment we expect; but as to the amount of repayment we have got, I may say that there was received by our Predecessors £40,000 from the Cape Government. I can assure my hon. Friend that all we can wisely, justly, and properly do towards recovering any sums to which we may assume we have a thoroughly just and equitable title, we shall do; but, as he well knows, in all cases of this kind it is the strongest partner who generally pays. Another question raised by the right hon. Gentleman opposite has reference to the subject of Confederation. The right hon. Gentleman asks me what is the policy of the present Government in regard to Confederation, now that the immediate prospect of Confederation has broken down? To that, I reply that the present Government is as anxious for Confederation as any Government can be; but that it does not see its way to it at present. The desire for Confederation before Confederation itself can be effected must grow up and grow strong in the Colonies themselves. It is easy to take a horse to the water, but you cannot make him drink. I have no doubt—and I do not think that anyone who has given attention to the subject can have a doubt —that it would be of great benefit to this country if we could have Confederation in South Africa; but I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman opposite that, important as it would be to the interests of this country, it would be far more important to South Africa itself. But you cannot force that conviction upon South Africa yet; and the very fact of our attempting to force it would have precisely a contrary effect to that which we desire to produce, and would retard, rather than accelerate, ultimate Confederation. I agree entirely in all the right hon. Gentleman said with. regard to the importance of every one of these communities learning that they must defend themselves against Native outbreaks. All the Mother Country can do is to warn against illusions. The belief in the Mother Country coming to their aid in real difficulty seems ineradicable in certain minds in the Cape Colony; but none the less is it the duty of men on both sides of politics in this country to give those in the Cape Colony who have not yet realized the position distinctly to understand, what a considerable party there does seem to understand, that henceforward they must provide entirely for their own defence against all Native adversaries whatever. It is only just and fair to say that the most advanced and powerful of these communities—Cape Colony—has really been setting its shoulder to the wheel in earnest. There have been passed during the last few years some most excellent Acts by the Cape Parliament with a view to the defence of the Colony. It would be extremely unjust—and I would be the last person—to pass over the efforts they have been making in this direction. Unquestionably, Sir Bartle Frere has done very good service to the country in reference to the passing of these Acts. And that is not all. In addition to passing these Acts, the Cape Government has behaved extremely well in all that relates to the taking over of Griqualand West. It is a very important thing for the Mother Country that it should be left free from all responsibility connected with Griqualand West. The Cape Government is now responsible for the administration of that territory. In addition, I may say that ever since the present Secretary of State announced, and I think the late Secretary of State did also—or if he did not, he would have done so if he had had the opportunity— that if the Cape Colony, by pressing disarmament, prematurely brought on a Basuto War, it would have to fight it out with its own strength, the Cape Colony has shown itself perfectly prepared to do so. Since I came to the House a telegram has been put into my hand, giving us the latest accounts from Zululand, where, hon. Members may know, Mr. Sprigg, the Cape Prime Minister, is at the present moment. The accounts, on the whole, are very much better than those we have received during the last few weeks. A good deal has been said by the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) as to the number of troops we have in South Africa. It is, certainly, only right that I should make a statement on the subject. When I replied, a short time ago, to my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), I said there were between 5,000 and 6,000 men in South Africa. Of that number, about 800 were stationed at Cape Town, to protect the great Imperial Naval station. A small detachment at the mouth of the St. John's River was placed there for the purpose of protecting the Custom House, and preventing the importation of arms. The rest, when I spoke, were scattered about in Natal, and the Transvaal. Since I spoke, the state of things remains the same, with the exception that one regiment, hitherto quartered in the Transvaal, it is thought, under the advice of Sir George Colley, may be dispensed with. That regiment is, therefore, under orders to leave the Transvaal in October. These are the latest facts in regard to military matters in South Africa. Considering how lately these countries were the scene of wars and rumours of wars, the force will probably not be deemed excessive. And the plea which was found good at the other end of Africa will be accepted as sufficient:—

"Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt Moliri, et latè fines custode tueri."
We have been asked, What are the views of the Government with regard to Natal? In Natal, as will be seen from my noble Friend's despatch, which is on the Table of the House, the Government propose to allow the old form of government which existed before 1875 to come once more into vigour. Until Confederation takes place, it is difficult to imagine how responsible Government can possibly be accorded to that Colony. The reasons are put so well in a despatch from Sir Garnet Wolseley, that I will read it to the House. He says—
"I cannot see that the demand for responsible government in Natal is supported by any good reasons, and I trust that Her Majesty will not he advised to grant the request of the Legislative Council. The qualification required by law to entitle a man to vote at elections to the Legislative Council is so small that practically every man of European descent can hold a vote if he wishes. The total number of men entitled to vote now is 4,103, of whom 1,656 belong to the two boroughs of Durban and Maritzburg. The existing Council by whom this ponderous machinery of a Parliament with an Upper and Lower House has been elaborated, was elected by a total number of 997 voters, of whom 503 voted in the two boroughs above mentioned for the election of four Members, while the remaining 11 elective Members were returned by a total number of 494 voters. In a colony where the voters, or, in other words, the grown-up males of European descent, are only about 4,100, any attempt to create a Constitution on such a very narrow basis, in imitation of that which we possess in England, would be as futile as it would be dangerous. The whole White population of Natal does not amount to 22,300 souls, while the Kaffir population is said to be nearly 400,000; and I think that even were not the paucity of the White inhabitants and their inexperience in matters of government a sufficient reason of itself for mistrusting the establishment of responsible government here, the relation of those inhabitants to the immensely preponderant Black population places an insuperable obstacle in the way of the successful government of the Colony by the absolute voice of the minority of its people."
These observations seem to me to admit of no denial. We shall be extremely anxious to see the day when it will be possible to give Natal a responsible Government, but how that is to be effected until the process of Confederation in South Africa has become an established fact, no one has yet been astute enough to point out. Now, Sir, I come to the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney), and to the question he has so often raised in this House— namely, the question of the Transvaal. I think, before going further, it is only fair to say that the hon. Member has manifested a great deal of perseverance in the service of those persons whose cause he has taken up. But, when all is said, what does it come to? We are not here to-night to discuss the question whether the original annexation of the Transvaal under Lord Carnarvon was a politic or a righteous act. That question has gone before another and its proper tribunal—the tribunal of history—and that tribunal is one that does not usually give its final opinion during the lifetime of the actors in any transaction. But the question which we have to decide here this evening is whether the House of Commons, on the 31st of August, 1880, is willing that the Transvaal should cease to form part of the dominions of the Queen. Now, I do not think that the House of Commons is at all prepared to come to that conclusion. I am, myself, quite willing to go as far with the hon. Member as to say that, after giving the matter the best study in my power, my impression is that Sir The ophilus Shepstone acted prematurely, and that the annexation of the Transvaal, at the particular time, and in the particular way in which it took place, was an unfortunate act. But, having said that, I will go on to say that I firmly believe that if Sir The ophilus Shepstone had held his hand, and had not annexed the Transvaal, before very long the South African Republic would have fallen like a ripe fruit, and, however much any of us— and, certainly, I have been one of them— disliked the idea of having to take charge of the South African. Republic, I do believe that within a few months the cry for protection from the people of the Transvaal would have become so strong that it could not have been resisted by a civilized Government. Since the day when, according to the old story, our ancestors in this Kingdom exclaimed —"The barbarians drive us into the sea, and the sea drives us back to the barbarians," I do not believe any civilized community ever found itself in a more deplorable state than that South African Republic which, according to the hon. Member for Liskeard, was going from better to better. [Mr. COURTNEY: I said from worse to better.] I believe that it was going from indifferent to detestable. My hon. Friend has taken good care to blacken the character of President Burgers, although he was unable to say anything worse than that he accepted a pension at the hands of Her Majesty's Government. My hon. Friend felt confident that before this debate was over I should call President Burgers into the witness-box and see what he had to say; but I see that the time is going on rapidly, and that it will not be in my power to use all the extracts I had prepared. But I will use two of them. The first is part of a speech delivered by President Burgers just before the annexation—
"We should delude ourselves by entertaining the hope that matters would mend by-and-bye. It would be only self-deceit. I tell you openly that matters are as bad as they ever can be; they cannot be worse. These are bitter truths, and people may, perhaps, turn their backs on me. But then I shall have the consolation of having done my duty."
I pass over a number of other extracts; but there is one which I should like to read, and which gives a most pitiable and ludicrous idea of the miserable position to which this Transvaal Republic had come. President Burgers says—
"To-day a Bill for £1,100 was laid before me for signature, but I would have sooner cut off my right hand than sign that paper, for I have not the slightest ground to expect that when that Bill becomes due there will be a penny to pay it with."
Can anyone say that a State in such a deplorable condition that it could not calculate on meeting such a bill with the Zulu power threatening it on one side and Secocoeni unsubdued within what it claimed as its own borders, was likely to be long lived? Of course, I am perfectly aware of the facts which the hon. Member has laid before us. I know that a considerable portion of the Transvaal has been at all times opposed to Confederation, and that that party has been sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker. I believe it was somewhat weak about the time of the annexation; but it became strong immediately afterwards, and certainly increased for some time. But, of late, the strength of that party has been diminishing with every month that has passed over it. Although there is an anti-British party in the Transvaal, it must not be forgotten that there is also a pro-British party. The pro-British party is the party of the towns, and the anti-British party is the party of the farmers, who do not so much dislike the British Government as they dislike any Government at all. The hon. Member has said, and I go so far with him as to say, of the annexation — Fieri non debuit at the particular time and in the particular way in which it was done; though, as I have said, I believe it was in the fates that the South African Republic should, before long, become merged in the possessions of the British Crown. But, if ever there was an occasion on which it was right to complete the legal maxim, and say —Fieri non debuit, factum valet, this is the occasion. Not only has the annexation of the Transvaal been accepted by three different Secretaries of State, of very different characters and political tendencies, but it has been accepted and ratified by two Cabinets, which are so diverse that they may be said to represent almost every element which exists in British political life. You could not show, now, that things are getting worse in the Transvaal, or, doubtless, the contention of the Member would receive more consideration from the House. Already the right hon. Gentleman opposite has quoted facts and figures to show that, far from getting worse, they are getting better month by month. I will not go back upon the statements which he has quoted; but I will just read one or two statements which I have here, which show that this improvement is progressing; that it had begun already before Sir Garnet Wolseley left the country, and before the pre- sent Government came into Office, and that it is being constantly continued. In April of this year Sir Garnet Wolseley wrote to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach—
"Reports from all quarters of the Transvaal sustain the opinion that the people, being thoroughly tired of the uncertainty and the trouble attendant upon opposition to the Government, and seeing no hope of any successful issue from the dangerous measures in which they had been induced to place confidence, have determined to renounce all further disturbing action, and to return to the peaceful cares of their rural life, which was already beginning to suffer from the continuance of political irritation. The resolution of a part of the people to deny the trade of their produce to Englishmen failed utterly, and expired with conspicuous lack of vitality before the natural forces that were fated to overpower it. Taxes are being paid, and the Revenue of the country, so long disturbed and in part suspended, is flowing in steadily in its regular course. I believe that, with the check which has thus been imposed upon the organization of discontent, a foundation has been laid for the administration of affairs in the Transvaal, upon which there may be built with the aid of time a fabric of government in furtherance of the prosperity of the people, and in unison with their sympathies and their wishes."
Statements of the same character I could quote as having been made in the Legislative Assembly on the 7th of June, but time will not allow. That leads me to the statements quoted by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. In a despatch received from Sir Owen Lanyon at the beginning of this month, and dated the 26th of June, he reports as follows: —
"A considerable change for the better in the feelings of the population generally has taken place since the receipt of your Lordship's telegram announcing that Her Majesty's sovereignty over the Transvaal could not be abandoned. I have everywhere seen evidence of this during my journey to this place, and the landdrosts generally report to the same effect."
Now, against that the hon. Member has really nothing to set, except what he thinks ought to be, and is likely to be. I have quoted facts, while my hon. Friend has entirely depended on theory. My hon. Friend has quoted nothing that has come from the Transvaal itself. He has quoted what was said by delegates from the Transvaal who were sent to Cape Town.

I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. I quoted facts; the right hon. Gentleman has only quoted the impressions of interested witnesses.

A great many facts were likewise quoted by the right hon. Gentleman opposite which I will not re-quote, simply in order to save the time of the House. Will any responsible person, not thoroughly committed by his previous action, attempt to go back from the state of things which has been described by the right hon. Gentleman and by myself, to the former state of things just before the annexation? Compare the present position of the country with the language of President Burgers. I do not believe that any reasonable man would wish to go back, and he could not go back if he would. It would be utterly and hopelessly impossible to return from the present state of things to the old state of things without crossing a stream of blood over which I, for one, would be extremely sorry to pass. The right hon. Gentleman justly pointed to a feature in the Transvaal case which is not sufficiently remembered—namely, the enormous number of the Native population. It would be contrary to the fact to say that that Native population were well, or even tolerably, treated by the South African Republic. There is another point to which I wish to call attention in connection with the Transvaal, and it is the extremely important point raised by the right hon. Gentleman with regard to arrangements with Portugal, which might enable us to connect the Transvaal with the port of Lorenzo Marques and Delagoa Bay. I am perfectly convinced, with the right hon. Gentleman, that it would be a very important matter indeed for the Transvaal if we could succeed in getting that railway made under favourable conditions. The Treaty, which would have been the necessary preliminary to any serious consideration of such a project, was on the point of being ratified when a hitch occurred, and the matter is now hung up, I am afraid, till the Cortes meet next January. I hope it may then be arranged, and I hope so not only in the interests of the Transvaal, but in those of Portugal, to the prosperity of whose dominion in South Africa I think the proposed Treaty would largely contribute, and I am sure that every right-minded Englishman must desire the prosperity of our ancient ally who gained, at the dawn of modern history, such imperishable renown as well in connection with South Africa as with. India. One other matter in connection with the Transvaal. I should be extremely sorry that the idea should for a moment get abroad that we are not most anxious to give to the Transvaal, as soon as we can, as much local self-government as possible. That is the condition in which we are anxious to see every community placed which can govern itself. There are, of course, precisely the same difficulties that there are as regards Natal, although in a more aggravated form. As soon as these difficulties can be got over by Confederation, or in any other way, I sincerely trust that we shall be able to give local self-government to the Transvaal; but, in the existing state of affairs, no one who wishes well to that country, as a portion of Her Majesty's Dominions, will desire any Constitutional changes to be made. The hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. E. N. Fowler), before he went off to more agreeable occupations and to some well-earned rest, asked me to say a word about Moirosi's territory when I came to speak of South Africa. I comply with his wish by mentioning that a long debate with reference to the disposal of Moirosi's territory occurred in the Capo Parliament on the last day of June, and ended with the withdrawal of a Resolution which had been brought forward, upon a promise being given by Mr. Sprigg that a thorough inquiry should be made into the whole subject during the Recess by an officer who was unconnected with all former proceedings in that part of the country.

Motion made, and Question, "That the Debate be now adjourned,—[ Sir George Campbell,]—put, and agreed to.

Debate adjourned till this day.

And it being five minutes to Seven of the clock, the House suspended its Sitting.

The House resumed its Sitting at Nine of the clock.

Orders Of Tee Day

South Africa—The Transvaal

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [31st August], "That the Resolutions which were then reported from the Committee of Supply be read a second time."

Question again proposed, "That the said Resolutions be read a second time."

Debate resumed.

said, that after a good deal of watching he had been seriously puzzled by the policy of successive Governments in regard to South Africa. This was not a Party question, for there had been a continuity of policy, and from his point of view there had been too much continuity. He had some distrust of the permanent policy of the Colonial Office. Successive Secretaries of State and Under Secretaries—and this applied particularly to his right hon. Friend the present Under Secretary—had always come in with the best intentions; but, somehow, it appeared to him that in the course of time their action hardly corresponded with their intentions, and they acted in the high-handed manner which was, perhaps, in some degree necessary in dealing with these subjects. What he might term the permanent spirit of the Colonial Office was somewhat too favourable to the White as distinguished from the Black Colonists. He was, however, far from asserting that their countrymen in the Colonies were particularly wicked or aggressive. A large proportion were Scotchmen, and he always found that they treated the Natives fairly; and if they did not get too much law—if they did not get too much control over the Natives—they were amenable to reason. He thought the despatch of Sir Garnet Wolseley, dated February the 13th last, ought to be pondered and well-considered by the Colonial Office. He had paid a great deal of attention to the subject of the Native races. After a visit to America, he came back with a sanguine view of the prospects of the negro race. The negro, when tamed and civilized, became a respectable member of society of the Nonconformist religious type. In the great American Republic there were something like 4,000,000 of Blacks out of a population of 40,000,000. Yet the Americans had had enormous difficulty in governing the Coloured population. How much greater must be the difficulty in South Africa? There the proportion was at least 10 Blacks to one White. Could it be safe to intrust the government of that large Black population to so small a minority? Could they thus solve a problem which had proved so difficult in America? It seemed to him that there was great difficulty in granting a responsible Government in such circumstances. What was called a responsible Government, would, in effect, be an independent Government. The policy of the present and the late Government with regard to South Africa, as far as he (Sir George Campbell) could gather from the Blue Books, was to give independent government to each of the Colonies so far as its internal affairs were concerned; and to make over questions of their external relations to a Confederation of the Colonies. He thought that a very great step had been made by the Cape Colony towards doing justice to the Coloured races, and that the views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the Colony might possibly be justified. But in Natal and the Transvaal it seemed to him that independent government had been tried and had failed. In Natal, a few years ago, troubles and disturbances arose. There had been such injustice done to the Native races that the Government had found it necessary to interfere with a high hand, and Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent there and effected a great change. But when the Home Government had not interfered, the result had been that the constitution had been so far successful that the Colonial Government had been able to set the Home Government at defiance. It would appear from a despatch received from Sir Garnet Wolseley on the state of Natal, that the Natives had, in no sense, any direct representation in the administration of that Colony. In fact, the despatch showed that the Black population of Natal, amounting to 400,000, as against 21,000 Whites, was totally unrepresented. That system constituted the worst type of oligarchy which could be found in the whole world. The result, socially, was of the most painful and dangerous character. He believed the system would end in the practical enslavement of the Coloured population. He believed that the government of so large a number of Blacks by a small colony of Englishmen would be productive, not only of injustice to the Blacks, but of dangerous consequences to the British Empire. He thought the best course would be to establish a British dominion which should be responsible and independent of the Colonists, and administered by persons sent from England. He should like to give the Colony self-government as far as the White population was concerned, and to remove the rest of the Natal territory, which was principally inhabited by Natives, from the administration of White Colonists, and place it under special British administration. He thought it was now generally admitted that the circumstances of the annexation of the Transvaal were a mistake, and that the annexation was founded upon insufficient and erroneous information. But now that the enemies of the Transvaal had been conquered, and the fear of being overwhelmed by the Natives removed from the eyes of the White Colonists, it would, he admitted, be quite impossible to restore to the White inhabitants of the Transvaal the whole of the country which bore that name on the maps. These maps were, to a great extent, wrong, and included tracts of land which had never been under the rule of the White Colonists. As a matter of fact, the White Settlers had of late years receded from the limits they at one time reached. In the Transvaal, as well as in Natal, the jurisdiction of the White men might with advantage be limited to the country really colonized by them. He suggested that this should be done, and that then we should say to the Colonists—"We will put you inexactly the same position as that occupied by the Orange Free State; we will make you independent in your limited territory, and then you may consider whether in order to cope with hostile tribes or to meet other difficulties you will join a Confederation of the British Colonies under the British Crown." So much with regard to the internal government of these Colonies. With reference to the external government of the Colonies, he pointed out that even if they were confederated their expenses would be so great that he did not think they would care to take the responsibility of the management of their own affairs. The Government, indeed, had determined to hand over the responsibility of Confederation to the Cape Colony; but he doubted whether that Colony would undertake it. Coming now to the financial part of the subject before the House, he would call attention to the fact that the £2,000 that appeared upon the Votes by no means represented the real financial responsibility that was undertaken by this country. There was much expense incurred in connection with Natal that was not placed before the House. He referred to the late war at the Cape, which was undertaken by the Colonists in their own interests, but the British Government had to pay for it. English troops were sent out at the expense of the British Treasury, until there were at present in Natal and the Transvaal 5,000 regular soldiers, and yet we had to pay for the Colonial troops as well. Not a farthing of the expense incurred through them appeared among the Estimates. To disguise and conceal that expense in the general Military Estimates of the country was hardly a fair way of dealing with the House. The results, he might add, of our existing relations with the Colonists were that we in the end always had to pay the piper. Certainly the Government was told the Colony would pay for their own troops; and, in fact, they had promised to pay £40,000 a-month, but with the exception of paying a first instalment they had not paid a farthing. He was strongly convinced that the Government would not get another penny for the cost of that war out of the Colony, and if we ever became involved in another war we should be placed in the same condition. He did not think that we could satisfactorily get rid of our responsibilities in South Africa as we wished to do it. Africa was not like New Zealand, where there was an increasing White and a diminishing Native population. The circumstances in South Africa were totally different, for the Native population was constantly increasing, and his fear was that the Colonists might become involved with the Natives in some quarrel, and that the result would be that the Whites would be beaten. The Government could not, of course, allow the White Colonists to be driven out by the Natives; and the result would be that we should have to send over troops to their assistance, for which they would be unable to pay, and which would, therefore, have to be paid by the British taxpayers. If it was possible to get rid of the responsibility of our South African Colonies, his opinion was that it would be better to openly assume it ourselves. He would mark out clearly the limit of each Colony, and give it a separate Government; and then, if we could not get rid of our responsibility, his idea was that it would be the cheapest and best way out of the difficulty to take it directly upon our shoulders. It was in that view that he had submitted his views to the House; and he considered that if it was possible to carry out some such system as he had indicated, we might really be doing great benefits to humanity, and establish a dominion in South Africa of which we might be proud.

would, with the permission of the House, address himself, in the first place, to one or two of the many questions involved in a discussion upon the government of South Africa—a discussion which he regretted could not have been raised at an earlier period of the Session—upon which there was little, if any, difference of opinion. And, first, as to Natal. He believed it to be the opinion of most hon. Members upon both sides of the House that it would be, in the highest degree, inexpedient to grant responsible government to that Colony. He entirely concurred in the view taken by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Kimberley) in his despatch to Sir George P. Colley of the 27th May last, and believed those arguments to be unanswerable. He thought the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) was under some misapprehension as to the former Government of Natal. There never had been responsible government there, but only a representative government, which was something between a responsible government and a Crown Colony government. This representative government had not altogether worked well, because the Legislative Council, without having proper responsibility as an executive body, had been able, in many cases, to thwart the policy of the Colonial Government. But it would be difficult now to make any alteration in it which would give more power to the Government. Secondly, as to Confederation. He (Sir Henry Holland) would urge upon Her Majesty's Government to be patient, and not to put any further pressure upon the Colonies to pass any measure of Confederation. They all desired to see Confederation of the South African Colonies; but the movement in that direction must now come from the Colonies. They must themselves be convinced of the advantages that would arise to them from Confederation; and any pressure from the Home Government would only defeat the desired object, and tend to increase the not unnatural jealousy which the Colonists felt of interference in their affairs. They were proud of the great Dominion of Canada; proud of its strength and prosperity; but they must remember that that Dominion was not built up in a day; that the difficulties which had to be overcome were very great, as those who framed the North America Act of 1869 could testify; and that, even after it was formed and welded into one body, one of the Provinces—Nova Scotia—tried to get free again from the union. They must, therefore, wait patiently, holding themselves ready, however, to give every assistance, by advice or legislation, whichever might be desired. Turning now to other subjects which had been brought before the House, he (Sir Henry Holland) desired to say a few words with respect to the recall of Sir Bartle Frere. It would be in the recollection of some hon. Members that he (Sir Henry Holland) had felt it his duty, by speech and vote, to protest against the course pursued by the late Government in that matter. He held then, and still held, the opinion that Sir Bartle Frere, able and zealous as he was, had committed the gravest error that could be committed by a Colonial Governor, in plunging this country into war without the previous sanction or authority of the Home Government. The error in this case was the greater, because the war was, in his opinion, unnecessary and unjust. He would not, at that time, repeat the reasons upon which he founded that opinion, but would content himself with one observation. The main ground of justification for the war, which was advanced by Sir Bartle Frere, was that there was imminent danger of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus. That was always disputed by the Lieutenant Governor of Natal (Sir Henry Bulwer), who surely was in a better position to form an opinion upon the point than those at the Cape; and now, after full consideration of the question, and after any feeling upon the point must have sub- sided, they found Sir Henry Bulwer, in his despatch to the right hon. Baronet the late Secretary of State for the Colonies (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), of April 4th, 1880, distinctly stating that—

"So far as regards the chances of an invasion of Natal territory by the Zulus, I believed then, and I believe now, that such a movement had never so much as entered into the counsels of the Zulu King and Chiefs, and that it would have been entirely repugnant to the views of the greater portion of the Zulu nation."
And again—
"We not only did not anticipate the danger of an invasion by the Zulus, but considered that any overt act committed by us in the way of military demonstration would he a mistake, as being far more likely to bring about war and trouble than to prevent them."
But assuming even the war to have been just, the error of Sir Bartle Frere in engaging in it upon his own responsibility, and in the absence of any overwhelming emergency, was so grave, that in his (Sir Henry Holland's) opinion the gravest penalty-—namely, the recall of the Governor—should have been imposed. It was true that Sir Bartle Frere was severely censured; it was true that his power were materially limited: but it must be remembered that although by taking that course his power of doing more harm was lessened, his power of doing good was also greatly diminished, and his just influence in the Colony lessened, as it showed that he had not the full confidence of the Home Government. But the state of things was very different when Her Majesty's present Government came into power. The Zulu War was over; the Governor's powers had been limited for the future; the offence that he had committed had been condoned by Parliament, or, at all events, not deemed sufficient to necessitate his recall. The present Government were, under these circumstances, not bound to recall Sir Bartle Frere, although so many Members of it had denounced him in such strong terms. He (Sir Henry Holland) would go further, and say that they were bound not to recall him for his past conduct, but to retain him in his office, if they could have given him that full confidence which should exist between a Colonial Governor and the Home Government. But if they could not feel that confidence, it would have been more just, fair, and generous to Sir Bartle Frere to have recalled him at once. What was the course pursued? They retained him in office, on the ground that Confederation was all-important, and that he was the best man to carry out this scheme; but they kept open the question of his previous conduct in deference he (Sir Henry Holland) supposed, to the strong opinion of some Members of the Government, and to the pressure put upon them by hon. Members below the Gangway. The Prime Minister, by his speech of May 25th, deliberately suspended the sword over the head of this unfortunate Colonial Damocles. The Prims Minister after pointing out the importance of Confederation and of retaining Sir Bartle Frere for that purpose, said—
"When we can see our own way clearly in regard to the prosecution of that policy of Confederation, then it will he our duty to consider generally and at large our relations to Sir Bartle Frere, and to decide in regard to that great and able man, from whom we have differed so widely, whether we can leave him to be our Representative, and he responsible for his acts in the South African Colonics. That is not in the slightest degree prejudged…We have done and said nothing which tics us up to any particular judgment as to the continuance of Sir Bartle Frere in the office of Governor and Commissioner in South Africa, except so far as relates to the important course of proceeding which has been fixed and determined on with reference to the initiation of Confederation‖It will he our duty to make an impartial, dispassionate, and perfectly unprejudiced examination of that question when the time comes."—[3 Hansard, cclii. 462–3.]
That speech, being interpreted, meant—"If you do not carry out confederation or when that question is settled one way or the other, we shall consider your previous conduct, and consider if we can trust you." Holding the views that he (Sir Henry Holland) did of the general policy of Sir Bartle Frere, and especially of his conduct in the Zulu War, he could not be expected to regret that Sir Bartle Frere was no longer Governor; but he could not approve of the time and way in which Her Majesty's Government had recalled him. Passing on from that subject to that of the Transvaal, he had listened with great interest to the very able speech of the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney); but he was afraid he should fall very low in that hon. Gentleman's estimation, when he confessed that he was one of those who held that the annexation of that territory was necessary and justified. It had been said that they had not now to consider whether the annexation was, in the first instance, just or unjust, but only whether the territory should now be restored; but he could not quite agree in that view. If he thought that the original annexation was unjust, he should look far more closely into the special facts put forward to justify the retention of the territory, as an act of injustice could not too soon be redressed, nor ought they to be afraid to redress it. He would not now re-state the grounds of his opinion, as he had put them forward in former debates, and as, moreover, one of the principal reasons had been already stated, that evening by the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Grant Duff) and the late Secretary of State (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach). The Government of the Transvaal had, in spite of all the remonstrances, constantly encroached upon the Native tribes bordering on the Transvaal, and the Boers could not be altogether acquitted of sundry acts of barbarity towards the Natives, and of enslaving Native women and children, in addition to seizing and occupying Native land. Now, what was the position of the Government that thus raised up trouble and strife? It was, as had been stated, absolutely bankrupt, and unable to enforce the collection of taxes. It was distrusted by the people, and he (Sir Henry Holland) had read few more sad speeches than that speech of lamentation, and confession of weakness and incapacity, raised by the President of the Republic before the Volks-raad shortly before the annexation. The Government could not raise a force equal to cope with the victorious and advancing Natives; and if that state of things had been allowed to continue, it must have led to disastrous consequences, not only to the Transvaal, but to the whole of South Africa. He (Sir Henry Holland), for these reasons, thought the annexation justified; and the present state of things in the Transvaal strengthened that opinion. There was now increasing prosperity, and an increasing Revenue; the taxes were readily collected; the safety of the lives and property of the steady and peaceable Colonists was secured; and good laws were passed. He would observe, in passing, that he could not understand why the hon. Member for Liskeard should speak in such contemptuous terms of the debates in the Transvaal Legislative Coun- cil, and of the opinions of the Members. They were not all "official;" but there were "unofficial" Members of property and good standing in the Colony: and was it to be supposed, as the hon. Member seemed to suggest, that the opinions of those Members were warped by the fact that they received, as Members did in many Colonial Assemblies, their travelling expenses? Their views of the improvement of the Colony and of the change of feeling of the Colonists were fully supported by Sir Owen Lanyon in his recent despatches to the Secretary of State. He (Sir Henry Holland) did not anticipate any further great difficulties in the management of the Transvaal, now that the question of annexation had been absolutely and finally decided. He thought that there was greater difficulty in dealing with that part of South Africa, which belonged to Native Chiefs, and lay between the territories in the Transkei lately annexed to the Cape Colony, and the boundary of Natal. He was not an advocate for annexation of Native territory, and, indeed, had always opposed it; but he was bound to say that he feared that some difficulties might always arise, until all the territory in question had come under British rule. But the danger of such troubles and difficulties would be materially diminished if a wiser policy were adopted, and one more fair to the Native Chiefs, than that which had of late prevailed. Hitherto, the policy had been one of interference, promoted very much, as it appeared to him, by the Residents, who either went beyond their instructions, or whose instructions were unwisely framed. The expediency of having Residents established where they had no authority at all, had been doubted by some; but the inexpediency was, to his mind, quite certain, unless they confined themselves to watching the course of events and reporting thereon fully to their Governments, and to giving friendly advice to the Chiefs, taking great care, however, when tendering such advice, to make it quite clear, that if such advice was not followed, it would not be enforced by British authority. There always would be quarrels, and raids, and cattle stealing between these Native tribes. But they should not interfere in these local disputes; for if they did, they really made themselves parties to the quarrels, which, if continued, assumed then the character of an aggression upon British authority. What had happened over and over again was this. The Chief who got the worst in a quarrel applied to be put under British protection; and if his application was granted, the Colonial Government was of course, for the future, involved in all the trouble, and bound to take up his cause. That was all wrong, and they ought to let the Native tribes fight out their own quarrels. He (Sir Henry Holland) desired to call the attention of the House to the case of Pondoland, a case of great importance, which was now receiving the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and which very clearly illustrated the evils of the policy of interference which he so strongly condemned. The Pondos, up to 1877, had been on friendly relations with the British Government though they had disputes with neighbouring Tribes. One of those Tribes was the Bacas. It was admitted by Mr. Brownlee that "it did not appear that the Bacas were British subjects," and yet we find [C. 2484, p. 410] Mr. Oxland interfering in the dispute and siding with the Bacas. Owing to this interference, the continuance of the quarrel became, as it never ought to have become, an offence against British authority and a ground of complaint against the Pondos. Again, the Pondos made raids—justly or unjustly— against the Xesibes, an independent Tribe under a Chief, Jojo. He did not propose to discuss here"the question of the original settlement of this Tribe; but, according to Sir Henry Bulwer and according to Mr. Griffith [C. 2676, p. 57] the land held by the Tribe was at one time part of Pondoland, and under the paramount Chief Faku. Jojo had several times asked to be placed under British protection, as he was getting the worst in these quarrels; but his application was, for some time, wisely refused. The disputes were really only cattle stealing, and border disputes. But in 1878 he was taken under our protection. Why this change of policy? He (Sir Henry Holland) attributed it to the strong pressure of the Residents, not discouraged, as it ought to have been, by the Cape Government, and by the Governor. The raids were continued, and then they had to take up the quarrel as against persons under British protection, and as against British authority. Then the Chief Ma- gistrate telegraphed—"We must fight;" then Mr. Brownlee writes,—
"The Pondos will see that they will not be permitted to act arbitrarily and unjustly to other Tribes;"
and later on
"We are bound to grant redress to the Xesibes —this is a condition of their subjection to us, and nothing has tended so much to lower us in Native estimation as the manner in which we have submitted to the Pondos."
That was the spirit in which the Residents had interfered, and of which he (Sir Henry Holland) complained. Then arose an exaggerated fear of the Pondos raiding into Natal, an alarm be it observed not felt by Natal, but, as was the case in the Zulu War, raised by Sir Bartle Frere from the Cape. Sir Bartle Frere pressed Sir Garnet Wolseley to send some troops to the frontier to overawe the Pondos. That, he (Sir Henry Holland) ventured to think would have been a most unwise step to take; and the refusal of Sir Garnet Wolseley was, in his judgment, wisely given. Sir Garnet Wolseley admitted the raiding and disputes, but he said—
"To compel restitution of stolen cattle, and compensation, is purely a police duty, and not one upon which Her Majesty's forces should be employed;"
and he added that he was—
"Anxious to keep Her Majesty's forces aloof from small tribal disputes."
A very similar caution was given subsequently by the Earl of Kimberley in his Despatch of May 27th to Sir Bartle Frere upon that very case of Pondoland. He said: —
"The disputes between the tribes in Pondoland seem to me mainly cattle-stealing affairs, which should be treated as police matters…I see no reason why they should not be dealt with by the Colonial Magistrates and police, and you should discourage any expectation that Her Majesty's troops will be employed in redressing such local disorders."
However, a more exaggerated view of these Pondoland raids prevailed at the Cape; and then came the final steps; the sure end of all this interference. First, in 1878, part of Pondoland, at the mouth of the St. John's River was made British territory; then followed the deposition of the Paramount Chief; and lastly came in Sir Bartle Frere, with his three propositions as to the mode of dealing with Pondoland: either to leave it altogether to itself—which he (Sir Bartle Frere) rejected as out of the question—or to turn it into a Crown Colony; or—
"To give the Cape Government power to take all necessary steps for supporting the authority of the Crown in, and for legislating in the Colonial Parliament for Pondoland, and other Coast districts."
That was the course he advocated; and that practically amounted to suppression and annexation, if not immediately, certainly within a few years. He (Sir Henry Holland) had referred in some detail to this case, as it showed the mischief and danger arising from over interference in Tribal disputes; and he would only add that Sir Henry Bulwer in speaking of it said:—"Whatever difficulties we have are of our own creation;" and again, "If a blow is struck it will be our own fault." He ought not, however, to leave this part of the case without referring to the Treaty of 1844, made with Faku, then Paramount Chief, upon which Sir Bartle Frere relied in his dealings with Pondoland; but upon which he (Sir Henry Holland) thought Sir Bartle Frere had wrongly relied. In one despatch Sir Bartle Frere said that that Treaty
"gave a general Sovereign authority as controlling the Chief in his external relations, but leaving him at liberty to govern his own people in his own way, within his own territory."
But the only clause relating to external relations was the 10th, and certainly gave no such Sovereign authority. It only stated that the Chief
"Wishing to live in peace gives his word and promise that he will, as far as possible, avoid making war on any of the surrounding tribes, and will endeavour to settle disputes in a peaceful manner, and in case of violation of his just rights he will call on the Colonial Government to mediate."
In another place Sir Bartle Frere said—
"The Pondos bound themselves to a position of subordination to the British Government."
Now, that was exactly contrary to the words and spirit of the whole Treaty, which, throughout, treats Faku on equal terms, and as a Paramount Chief. While fully admitting the difficulties of the case, he (Sir Henry Holland) ventured to suggest to the Government that their policy with regard to the Native Tribes should be mainly guided by the four following principles: — First, to discontinue interference in these Native disputes and raids, unless they attained such a height as to endanger the peace of the Colonies, or unless there was actual premeditated attack on British territory or British subjects. Border forays and disputes should not be treated as outrages which required to be resented as serious aggressions upon British territory; secondly, not to take Native Chiefs and Tribes under British protection merely to prevent their absorption by stronger Tribes, or because they were unfairly attacked by such Tribes. But if it should become necessary to give them such protection, then they should take care that the territory of such protected Natives was clearly defined and made known to the neighbouring Tribes, as constant difficulty had arisen from the want of such definition. It might well happen that raids might be made on territory not clearly recognized as under British protection. Such raids, though not intended, therefore, to be made in any hostile spirit to the protecting power, were liable to be treated as so made, and the attacking Natives were assumed to have been acting in defiance of our authority. Thirdly, not to allow annexation, unless a paramount necessity for such a step was clearly shown; and unless the Colony to which the annexation took place was prepared to undertake all the responsibility of keeping order, and defending the territory annexed. And, fourthly, when they had allowed annexation, then to give full and entire control over the territory to the Colonial Government, and not to interfere with their proceedings. That full control, free from interference by the Home Government, was asked for, and fairly asked for, by the Cape Government, when they were questioned if they would take the responsibility of governing certain Transkei territories, recently annexed to that Colony. That seemed a very simple matter, but it was not quite so simple in practice; and for the following reason: —There was a Society in this country-— the Aborigines Protection Society—composed of most excellent and zealous men; keenly alive to acts of injustice committed on Natives, and most anxious to secure impartial and fair treatment of Natives all over the world. But they were, not unnaturally, somewhat one sided in their views; they were too apt to accept as true all the stories with which they were furnished by correspondents abroad, stories frequently based upon imperfect information, and which broke down upon inquiry. Now, if laws apparently somewhat rigorous in their character—as, for instance, the Vagrancy Law—were passed, or if measures, such as the disarmament of the Basutos, were taken, that Society immediately put pressure upon the Home Government to interfere, and remonstrate against such laws and measures. The Government must be prepared to resist such pressure, unless, indeed, they were prepared to promise assistance, if troubles or difficulties arose from the adoption, by the Colonial Government, of their suggestions. That was practically out of the question; and he (Sir Henry Holland) contended that there should be no interference at all with the measures of the Colonial Government when once annexation had been sanctioned. He believed that if these four principles were acted upon, the troubles with which they had had to deal in South Africa would be much diminished. There were other points in connection with the government of South Africa upon which he should liked to have offered a few observations; but at that late period of the Session he would refrain from doing so.

said, that the recall of Sir Bartle Frere had been alluded to frequently in the course of the debate, and on that (the Liberal) side of the House, at least, his recall had given pretty general, if not universal, satisfaction. But the satisfaction of some hon. Members would have been greater had the recall taken place immediately after the accession to Office of the present Government. And it was argued on the other side of the House that the recall would have been more defensible then than it was now. But he did not himself find any fault with the course pursued. A Colonial Governor might be recalled because the Government condemned his proceedings; or because they considered him an unfit instrument to carry out their policy. Although he yielded to none in condemnation of the Zulu War, it had never appeared to him to have been the duty of the present Government to recall Sir Bartle Frere as a punishment for his action in regard to that War. When they came into power it had already been decided by the then existing Government and Parlia- ment, that Sir Bartle Frere ought not to be recalled; and to have suddenly reversed that decision, simply because there had been a change in the relative strength of political parties at home would have been to establish a precedent of evil influence in the government of the Colonies. The Government had, however, sufficient justification for recalling Sir Bartle Frere, upon the ground that he was not fitted to be the agent of their policy in South Africa. He was not a Governor of a supple type: he possessed in large measure the quality which friends call firmness and enemies obstinacy; Ministries and policies might change at home, but Sir Bartle Frere would not change with them. The spirit which inspired him to indite his vehement phillipics against Cetewayo, still breathed in his despatches respecting the Pondo tribe, the disarmament of the Basutos, and the appropriation of Moirosi's territory. The Papers laid before the House showed how wide was the divergence in the views of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and those of the Governor; how great was the estrangement of policy existing between them. To have promptly recalled Sir Bartle Frere would, therefore, have been the proper recourse of Lord Kimberley but for the question of Confederation. It was a critical moment in the history of that question; the recall of Sir Bartle Frere in May or June would have weakened the hands of the Cape Government in dealing with it, and left the Home Government open to the charge of helping to defeat a measure which they had pressed upon the colonists as one of first importance. Looking, therefore, at all the circumstances, he could not but think that the proper course had been adopted by Her Majesty's Government. With respect to the withdrawal of the allowance of £2,000 a-year, it appeared to him (Mr. Wodehouse) that that allowance was never meant to last throughout the entire term of Sir Bartle Frere's Administration; it was intended only that he should have it in the early years of his government, when he had to travel far and wide, and when his absences from Cape Town would be long and frequent. When Natal, the Transvaal, and Zululand had been taken from him, he had no longer to visit those distant Colonies, and as his travelling expenses within the Cape Colony were paid for by that Colony, the reasons for the allowance ceased. Notwithstanding the receipt of this £2,000 a year, intended to cover travelling expenses, Sir Bartle Frere had presented a bill for £3,800 spent in travelling. Evidently he had regarded the £2,000 a year, not as a travelling allowance, but as an increase of salary for special powers and responsibilities. Sir Bartle Frere had dwelt upon the immense difficulties and the bitterness of the prejudices and party spirit with which he had had to contend; but this was only the perennial condition of affairs in South Africa. Sir Bartle Frere also spoke of the heavy expenses imposed upon him by social duties; but he was not the first or only Governor expected to be hospitable. If the salary of the Governor of the Cape Colony was inadequate, it ought to be raised at the expense of the Colony; and until it were raised, the Governor ought to cut his coat according to his cloth. He hoped that the bill of £3,800 would be dealt with by the House in a generous spirit. But he doubted whether the records of the Colonial Office for many a long year contained any parallel case of such unsanctioned expenditure by a Colonial Governor. And now a few words upon Confederation, and two points intimately connected with it— namely, responsible government and the withdrawal of Imperial troops from South Africa. All the omens were against the accomplishment of confederation within any definite or measurable distance of time. Hon. Members who had read the recent debate in the Cape House of Assembly would have noticed how timid and faltering was the advocacy of Confederation by the very colonial Prime Minister who professed to stand or fall by it. He condemned the manner in which the question had been brought forward by Lord Carnarvon, and had not a word to say for the South Africa Confederation Act passed by Parliament in 1877. He assured the Cape Assembly that the Conference which he proposed would pledge them to nothing, and yet he failed to carry his proposal. Neither standing nor falling by Confederation, he ran away from his guns when he agreed to a Motion for the Previous Question. No doubt, the failure of the scheme had been attributed to the annexation of the Transvaal and the settlement of Zululand. The hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) believed the annexation of the Transvaal to have had a fatal effect on Confederation; and the hon. Member's Boer correspondents took credit to themselves for having done much to make the Conference a failure. Mr. Sprigg and other speakers in the Cape Assembly had blamed the recent settlement of Zululand, and represented it to be very prejudicial to Confederation. But, from his own knowledge of South Africa, he (Mr. Wodehouse) thought there was an undercurrent of insincerity running throughout that debate on Confederation. The truth was, Confederation had never found any genuine adhesion in the Cape Colony. The population of the Western Province, being exempt from Native difficulties and dangers, were naturally slow to bind themselves for better, for worse, to places where there were great masses of Natives. Even the ostensible friends of Confederation in the Cape Colony had always had some ulterior motive. An English Party in the Eastern Province hailed it as a stepping-stone to a separation from the Western Province; and a Dutch Party favoured it because they looked upon it as likely to fulfil their dream of "Africa for the Africanders," and prepare the way for a large independent South African Republic. The difficulties in the way of Confederation became apparent when they realized with what different aims and wishes the question was approached on this side and on that side of the ocean. We in England desired to relieve the British taxpayer from the burden of maintaining the internal defence of those Colonies, and, at the same time, we were anxious to secure the just treatment of the Natives. But while the Colonists claimed protection they demanded to be allowed to manage the Natives in their own way. Their idea was to have a maximum of independence in the management of their own affairs, with a minimum of responsibility for the consequences of their acts. As Mr. Sprigg, the Colonial Prime Minister, said, his policy was to be free from Imperial control, and if South Africa was to be governed successfully it was not to be governed from London. At the same time, he was certain to insist on the most generous terms as to the use of the money and the men of the Home Government. But surely government from London was a better thing, where the Natives of the Colony were restless and warlike and greatly outnumbered the European Settlers, than government by local politicians infected with every local passion and prejudice against the Natives, but comparatively secure from the consequences of their own errors in the protection of troops for which they did not pay. It was no easy matter to withdraw our troops from South Africa, as experience showed, for the upshot of all the pressure brought to bear by successive Secretaries of State had been absolutely nothing. Twenty-seven years ago the Duke of Newcastle was telling the Colonists they ought to undertake their own defence; and 13 years ago Lord Carnarvon called on the Cape Government to pay £40 for every infantry and £70 for every artillery soldier. Nevertheless, nothing had as yet been done in that direction. There were 5,000 troops now maintained in South Africa at the Imperial expense. As he feared that the prospect of withdrawing the troops was very remote, and as Confederation had just received a very heavy blow, he hoped the Government would be in no haste to extend the area of self-government in South Africa, and that they would be slow to part with the power of effective control in the administration of dependencies, whose internal defence continued to be an Imperial burden. Why was it that Ceylon, which never gave trouble, contributed a sum sufficient to pay for the entire military expenditure of the Island; while the Cape Colony, upon which we had lavished millions and millions, never contributed more than £10,000 a-year to the Imperial military expenditure? Because the Home Government retained full administrative control over the Government of Ceylon, and had parted with that control over the Cape Colony. He did not go so far as to say that responsible government should be withdrawn from the Cape Colony, but he hoped that we should proceed with extreme caution in Natal and the Transvaal; and if the Colonial Office required greater powers of control there, he trusted that Parliament would not refuse to grant such powers. He regretted that in Natal they were about to return to a Constitution of the worst kind; an half-and-half Constitution, in which the local politicians and Legislature had not the sense of responsibility induced by responsible Govern- ment, but in which they had sufficient power to thwart the policy of the Home Government. He had felt some doubts as to the expediency of retaining the Transvaal; but, upon the whole, he believed it to be the better policy not to abandon it. He would remind the hon. Member for Liskeard that the see- saw policy of undoing one day what they did the day before had been tried more than once in South Africa with questionable results. About half a century ago Lord Glenelg reversed an annexation of Transkeian territory. At a later date British sovereignty was proclaimed over the Orange River territories, and the sovereignty was subsequently withdrawn. But in those cases the reversal of policy led to so much embarrassment, and gave rise to so much ill-feeling, that the Government ought to be cautious before they added one more to the series of such measures. For his own part, he deprecated any hasty extension of the powers of self-government in the Transvaal. There were great elements of disorder there, and when things went wrong the mischief would have to be repaired at Imperial expense. Indeed, he hoped that, whether it were in the Transvaal or elsewhere in the British Dominions, the support of Parliament would never be wanting to the Home Government, not only when it called upon Colonists to bear their fair share of burdens, but also when it claimed full control of the administration of dependencies where there were grave elements of danger, and where the remedies in case of trouble had to be applied at Imperial cost. He believed the more that South African questions were looked into by hon. Members, the more fully would their complexity be appreciated; and the more would it be recognized that they were worthy to receive the attention of the best wisdom and statesmanship which could be found upon either side of the House.

said, the last two speakers had expressed approval of the recall of Sir Bartle Frere, who he considered had been treated in a way which was unjust to him as a man; while, in the treatment he had received, a wrong had been done not only to the Colony, but to the nation. He would, in touching upon this question, ask the House to remember the circumstances under which Sir Bartle Frere was appointed. The condition of things in South Africa was supposed to be one of great difficulty, and the Secretary of State for the time being had to look round for a man having the qualities necessary for the position of High Commissioner, and he selected the man who had shown he was able, courageous, and humane, and that his antecedents were such as promised well for his government in the difficult position in which he was to be placed. There was one point, however, that had not been touched upon, and that was the question of discretion. When His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales went to India Sir Bartle Frere was selected for the difficult post of his adviser; and when he was appointed his praises were naturally sung by those who appointed him; and in 1878 the present Chief Secretary for Ireland said, in a speech he then delivered, that in the Governor of the Colony of South Africa they had a man whom they could entirely trust for his motives, his sense, and his ability to deal with the most difficult case, and that it would be difficult to find another man with such a combination of feelings of justice and of firmness. That being so, it naturally occurred to anyone that, before condemning the action of Sir Bartle Frere in South Africa, hon. Members should consider whether he really possessed the qualities he was believed to possess, and for the exercise of which in India he had been twice thanked by Parliament, and whether a man who was possessed of all those qualities could have suddenly become, as it were, demented, and all those qualities have disappeared. Instead of condemning him, hon. Members would do well to consider whether they had not themselves taken a mistaken view of his conduct in that country. At the time of his appointment the Colonists were in a state of panic, a Defence Commission was appointed, there were demands for arms and troops, the Cape Frontier was in a blaze, and there were raids from Zululand. In consequence of the fear of the Zulus, Colonists were fleeing and taking refuge in the towns; and, as a general officer told him, the state of things was such that a White man in Natal who was not afraid of the Zulus was regarded as a curiosity. Cetewayo was supposed to be the Zulu of Zulus, and to be about to restore that country to the state it was in under its original founder Chaka. That was the state of things Sir Bartle Frere found when he went out there. He went out first to settle the question of the boundary between Zululand and the Transvaal, and he found an award given which he might confirm, nullify, or modify; and he modified it because he found it ignored some 80 or 90 settlers who were to be handed over to the Zulu Government without compensation for disturbance or security for the future. He modified that award to the extent of giving them the security which, as British subjects, they were entitled to. But, on inquiry, he found the state of things in that part of the country so intolerable, and the danger was considered so imminent that, after consultation with those in authority on the spot, with Sir The ophilus Shepstone, Sir Henry Bulwer, Lord Chelmsford, and with Admiral Sullivan, he came to the conclusion that it was necessary that state of things, if possible, should be grasped, that the state of imminent danger to the Colonies should cease; and he thereupon drew up terms that were submitted to the Zulu King. He confessed it was with extreme surprise he heard the despatch of Sir Henry Bulwer referred to by the hon. Member for Midhurst, in which Sir Henry Bulwer said that, after full deliberation, he had come to the conclusion that there was no necessity for the action taken at the time by Sir Bartle Frere, especially when the same Sir Henry Bulwer had given his consent to the action taken by Sir Bartle Frere as completely as it was given by Lord Chelmsford, Admiral Sullivan, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone.

What Sir Henry Bulwer said was, that there was no chance of the invasion of Natal by the Zulus.

said, whether there was a danger of invasion or not, Sir Henry Bulwer concurred at that time in thinking that something must be done to disperse the thunder-cloud of the Zulu Army, and that it was a case for active as distinguished from passive defence. He knew for an absolute fact that Sir Henry Bulwer was acquainted with the terms offered to Cetywayo, and corrected them himself, having them in his possession for 24 hours before they were sent. He would read the words of Sir Henry Bulwer himself, as they appeared in a despatch written December 16, 1878, when the terms in question were being discussed. It would be remembered that 30 days were given for Cetywayo's answer, and that the Army crossed the Tugela on January 20. The passage ran as follows:—

"The High Commissioner has judged it to he necessary, for reasons of the greatest moment to the welfare of this portion of South Africa, to place the condition of affairs in the Zulu country and our relations with the Zulu King and people on a more satisfactory basis than they now are. I concur with his Excellency's judgment on this point, as also on the conditions he has laid down, which have been communicated to the Zulu King, and which are conditions for the better government of the Zulu people and for their greater advantage, and are essential for securing peace in this part of South Africa."
He (Lord Elcho) failed to see how Sir Henry Bulwer could reconcile the two despatches. Sir Bartle Frere, receiving no answer to his demands, put the matter in the hands of the military authorities in order to obtain redress, the points at issue being the dispersion of the Zulu Army, and compensation for the murder of certain British subjects. The question now to be considered was whether his course was necessary and justifiable. He believed, as all the authorities did, that it was necessary, in support of which view he might quote a statement given to him by a gentleman who had greatly distinguished himself in the campaign, and who had had an interview with Cetywayo. The Zulu King being asked who formed the war party among his people, answered—
"The whole nation; all the young men were determined on war; and he himself would have been killed if he had not fought."
In reference to the small German settlement at Luneberg, where the Zulus had never been, and which had been saved by a detachment of British troops, Cetywayo, in answer to a question as to what he would have done if the settlers had stayed, replied that "his people would have killed them." According to the very good authority of the same gentleman—
"The war was looked upon by all the Colonists as certain and inevitable long before Sir Bartle Frere appeared on the scene. The Colonists lived in chronic fear."
So much for the necessity of the war. Was it justifiable? He might possibly argue that whatever was necessary was justifiable; but, at any rate, judged by a European standard, it certainly was justifiable. In. Europe, when one country threatened and imminently endangered another by armed force, the country threatened was justified by all International Law in sending in a demand for the dispersion of that military force. He held, therefore, after looking at all the circumstances of the case, that the course taken by Sir Bartle Frere was completely justifiable. It was not for him to criticize the military operations; but he believed that the force that was annihilated at Isandlana ought, properly handled, to have sufficed for the protection of the camp. However, if that disaster had never occurred, and if the war had come to an end with little or no expenditure of men or money, Sir Bartle Frere, instead of being disgraced, would have received a Peerage and the thanks of both Houses of Parliament—["No, no!"]—and those who were now so loud in his detraction might have been sulky, but they would have been silent. That was his firm conviction; but, as things turned out, they had resulted in Sir Bartle Frere's recall. He had also been virulently attacked in this country from many different quarters. He had been attacked by the Aborigines Protection Society, by Members representing the Peace Society, by his hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), and by a right hon. Gentleman to whom he should presently refer. In all tragic events there was an element of the comic, and he thought the action of the Aborigines Society was especially comic in this matter. Why had that Society attacked him?' Because he had endeavoured to protect not only the Colonists, but the people of Zululand from the tyrannies which they suffered from the Zulu King and from the military system under which they suffered so much oppression. He observed that the Mayor of Pietermaritzburg had expressed his regret that, owing to the prevalence of Party spirit in England, he had heard not one word of sympathy for the wrongs of the Zulu people, although great sympathy had been expressed for their King. He should have thought that the Peace Society would, of all others, have backed up Sir Bartle Frere, whose object was to break up the military organization of the Zulu King. He should have thought that gentlemen who were almost ready to shoulder a musket on behalf of peace principles would have applied these principles in that case, and sympathized heartily with a people who suffered so greatly from the military spirit. Then there was his hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, who had throughout been bitterly opposed to Sir Bartle Frere, and to whose action, he believed, it was in great measure owing that he had been recalled. Why, Sir Bartle Frere and the hon. Baronet were fellow-labourers in the same field. The one struggled for local option in England with a view to restrict the consumption of spirits, and Sir Bartle Frere had done all he could to limit the use of spirits among the Natives in South Africa. But the most astounding thing of all was the speech of a right hon. Gentleman to whom he should refer when confronted with another speech of the same right hon. Gentleman. He referred to the present Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (Mr. W. E. Forster). On the 4th of August, 1879, that right hon. Gentleman had blamed the Government for sending out Sir Bartle Frere, and said that, instead of sending out a man to make war, we should have sent one out to prevent it. On the 26th of July, 1878, within 12 months of that speech, the same right hon. Gentleman spoke, as he (Lord Elcho) had already, in the highest terms, of the ability and justice of Sir Bartle Frere. It should, however, in justice to Sir BartleFrere, beremembered that, although formerly he had been sent out to bring about Confederation in South Africa, he was, in the terms of his commission, commanded to take all measures that might be justly taken to prevent the irruption of hostile tribes upon the Colonial territory, so that he had no other course to follow than that which he adopted. With regard to Sir Bartle Frere's recall, if Confederation were necessary and he was the man most fitted to bring it about, he was so still, and should not be recalled unless the policy of Confederation had been entirely abandoned by Her Majesty's Government. The failure of the Confederation scheme was in no way owing to Sir Bartle Frere. He did not believe that the reasons alleged for his recall were the true reasons. He should like to know if the Government were really in favour of disarmament or not. He did not see why the Natives should be treated in a different way on such a question from the way in which we should be treated in this country. There was only one more point with reference to Sir Bartle Frere's recall to which he would draw the attention of the House. In his opening remarks he said he believed the treatment of Sir Bartle Frere was a wrong done not only to the Colony, but also to the nation. A country like this, with great Dependencies in different parts of the world, required that those who undertook responsible duties for it should not be afraid of responsibility. Persons who undertook the discharge of such duties in a Colony were sent out with plenary powers, and consulted on the spot those who must surely know better about such matters than those who were sitting in safety on the banks of the Thames. If public servants were to be treated as Sir Bartle Frere had been treated it would be a bad thing for the State. That, unfortunately, was not the first instance of the kind, for Sir Henry Layard and Sir Henry Elliot had like attacks made on them, and every Consul had been more or less persecuted and his statements disbelieved with a view to Party purposes, or to stab the Government of the time. He, for one, would enter his protest against that mode of treating public servants. It was only on public grounds pure and simple that he had ventured to address the House on this question to-night. He apologized for having done so at so much length. He thanked them for having listened to him so patiently—that was to say, there were a great many Members on the Ministerial side of the House who were hostile to Sir Bartle Frere—and his object had been to do what he believed to be an act of justice to Sir Bartle Frere. He had no personal acquaintance whatever with Sir Bartle Frere. Sir Bartle Frere, he ventured to think, judging by his public acts, possessed all the qualities that they required in a man sent out to govern a Colony such as South Africa; and, instead of being recalled, they should have taken pride in such a public servant. He might conclude with the words of one who knew Sir Bartle Frere, who had known him in the late war, and who had an opportunity of seeing and judging of him. Sir Evelyn Wood said it was impossible for anyone to be associated with Sir Bartle Frere without being impressed by his intellect and humanity; and our sons would find that the prosperity of South Africa made a grand recompense for all our losses, and was a justification of the policy which inaugurated civilized rule in place of a distracted and barbarous despotism.

remarked, that the debate had extended over a wide range of different subjects, and the variety of these subjects illustrated at once the diversity and extent of our South African Dominions, and the difficulties we had brought upon ourselves by the extensions of territory which the Government of this country had been forced to accept. The first point to which attention was called was the annexation of the Transvaal; and he might say that the Government had no reason to complain of the very temperate and very instructive statement made in reference to that question by his hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney). On the contrary, he could assure him that they had very great sympathy with his object, and with the statement he had made. He was prepared, on behalf of the Government, to accept a great number of the facts which his hon. Friend laid before the House. He was prepared to accept many of the conclusions that he drew from those facts, and he only wished he could accept the whole of them. He thought there was not a single Member of the Government who did not regret the annexation of the Transvaal and the time and the way in which it took place. The House of Commons acted under insufficient, inaccurate information when it approved the transfer, inasmuch as the general belief was that the vast majority of the inhabitants were in favour of it, and subsequent circumstances proved conclusively it was not so. He might go further, and say the Members of the Government would wish it were possible they could recommend that this country should be now relieved of the responsibility of that act. He was quite sure that neither the Prime Minister nor the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India would withdraw anything which they had said on the subject in their speeches. It was alleged, however, by the late Secretary of State for the Colonies that those speeches had been a cause of agitation; that they had done something to inflame the agitation in the Transvaal, and had rendered impossible the Confederation which they all admitted to be de- sirable. Now, in neither of those speeches was there a word which committed the Prime Minister or his noble Friend to the renunciation of the Transvaal. All that the Prime Minister did in his speech was to condemn, in emphatic terms, the annexation and the mode in which it was carried out; and his noble Friend went a little further, declaring that the time had come when the whole subject would have to be re-considered, and that he hoped no false dignity would prevent us, if it was found to be desirable, from reconsidering the decision which had been arrived at. Now, he did not believe that speeches of that kind had any effect in promoting the hostility of the Boers or in continuing the agitation. They had evidence before them that the hostility of the Boers to that annexation would have been declared whether those speeches had been made or not. But he regretted that the late Secretary of State for the Colonies had thought it right to indulge in recrimination of that sort, and had endeavoured to fix on the Government a responsibility which did not belong to it. When the speech of his noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington) was made, the late Chancellor of the Exchequer did not take that view of its dangerous character which now seemed to be entertained by the late Colonial Secretary. Not only so, but the late Chancellor of the Exchequer used in his speech in that House language of much the same character as that to which the late Colonial Secretary now took exception; because, after stating that the annexation of the Transvaal was effected by a single British officer with a handful of policemen, that right hon. Gentleman said—"It is a most important matter, and it will require full consideration."If, then, the statement of his noble Friend that the matter required full consideration was a cause of agitation in South Africa, á fortiori the same statement from the lips of the then Leader of the House of Commons was still more calculated to have that effect. He might strengthen his argument by a reference to a despatch from Sir Garnet Wolseley, in which he appealed to the late Government to give him information as to what were their views respecting the annexation of the Transvaal.

said, that despatch was written after the speech of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India had arrived in the Transvaal, and on account of the agitation which was created by that speech.

said, the late Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that the then Government would give it full consideration; and, on receipt of that statement, Sir Garnet Wolseley doubtless found it requisite to address that inquiry to the late Government, and they declared that they adhered to the annexation. It was not necessary, however, to pursue that line of recrimination. The late Government decided to retain the Transvaal. When the present Government came into Office they considered the whole question most carefully. The hon. Member for Lis-keard thought they came to their conclusion rather rapidly. An immediate decision was, however, absolutely necessary. The Cape Parliament was about to meet, and it was then obvious that if the matter was left open serious evil might result. But they did not come to their decision without a most careful examination of the documents before them; and the conclusion at which they arrived, after some hesitation and regret, but finally with no doubt whatever, was that, whatever they might think of the original act of annexation, they could not safely or wisely abandon the territory. But, after all, the point at the present moment was whether they had reason to hope that the condition of the territory they had thus acquired would be improved in their hands. The hon. Member for Liskeard painted its present condition in too dark colours. He told them of the enormous Army requisite to keep the territory in order; but he omitted altogether an important element in his calculation of the population. There were only 40,000 White Settlers; but there were 800,000 Blacks to be kept in order with a force of 3,000 or 4,000 men, which was soon to be reduced by another regiment. Under our rule the Revenue appeared everywhere to be collected with the greatest regularity and order, which would hardly be the case if the intense hostility which the hon. Member supposed really existed. The unanimous opinion of the officials and the landroosts who travelled through the country apparently was that there was less agitation and less hostility than had been previously experienced. The next point was the question of the restoration of the old Constitution of Natal, as to which the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) asked for a distinct statement of the views of the Government. It was the intention of the Government to revert to the Constitution in existence in Natal before the Constitution granted by Sir Garnet Wolseley. It was going back to elected Representatives in place of non-elected Representatives. As regarded the great question of Confederation, he agreed with what was said by the hon. Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland), that, at the present time, this question ought not to be pressed on the Colony. At the same time, he agreed also with the late Secretary of State for the Colonies that they need not consider the decision of the Cape Parliament as the death-blow to the policy of Confederation. Whenever that question came up again the Government would feel it desirable, in the interests of the Colony, and also of this country, to support, though, at the same time, they would not attempt to enforce it on unwilling Colonies. Perhaps the most important question of all, however, was the position of the Government with respect to the supersession of Sir Bartle Frere. He did not suppose anyone expected him to follow the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) into the history of the Zulu War, upon which the opinion, not merely of the present, but of the late Government, and the whole of the people of this country, as represented in the Press and public meetings, had been almost unanimously expressed. It appeared to him that, by this almost unanimous verdict, Sir Bartle Frere had been found guilty of leading this country into an unjust and unnecessary war without the authority or sanction of the Government at home, and with most inadequate preparation. That was, of course, an error of judgment; but it was the most serious and the gravest error of judgment that could be brought home to any person in his position. He agreed that the Government would have been fully justified in recalling Sir Bartle Prere immediately upon entering Office, and he thought it was a natural question— why they did not do so? He could only say that the conclusion at which they arrived was arrived at under a sense of the greatest responsibility. As the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies had pointed out, Sir Bartle Frere had been superseded, to a large extent, by the late Government; and, latterly, he had been advised daily, by telegraph, how to act by the Home Government in matters of great delicacy and difficulty, and there was no doubt he would loyally carry out the instructions given to him. Under such circumstances, it was neither likely nor probable that he could do great harm, while his influence at the Cape might enable him to do great good. His very faults had given him an influence with the Colonists not to be expected from anyone else. The present Government thought that they should not do anything to destroy the chances of Confederation being arrived at, and the Government had no reason to doubt his zeal and ability and the earnestness which he brought to the discharge of his duties; but the result had been that the scheme of Confederation had been shelved sine die. There could be no doubt that the differences between the present Government and Sir Bartle Frere were not confined to the Zulu War. It had been stated in the course of the debate that it was an injustice to recall Sir Bartle Frere; but the answer to that had been given by the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Wodehouse). There had been a divergence all along between the policy of the Government and Sir Bartle Frere, and a full account of that divergence might be found in the Blue Books; and, when there had been a complete change of policy with the change of Government, it would have been unfair to have asked him to carry through a policy with which he had no sympathy. That divergence of opinion was also apparent in the despatches with regard to Pondoland. The circumstances were an exact parallel to those which led up to the Zulu War, and they might have been engaged there in another war had it not been for the good sense of Sir Garnet Wolseley, who refused to allow troops to be sent into Pondoland without consulting the Government at home. The Home Government was of the same opinion as Sir Garnet Wolseley, that nothing could be more injudicious than the making of intertribal squabbles an occasion for international war. Then, as to the disarmament of the Basutos. No more imprudent thing at a more imprudent time could have been suggested than the disarmament of the loyal Basutos—men who had been loyal for 40 years, and who had just used those arms, which Sir Bartle Frere wished to take from them, in our behalf. It was true Sir Bartle Frere spoke slightingly of their loyalty; but their loyalty was highly spoken of by Mr. Griffith, an able magistrate and an experienced administrator, and also by competent authorities in the district. Sir Bartle Frere told them, in one of those literary performances in which he defended his policy, that the disarmament of the Basutos was really a compliment to them, and, as civilized men were not armed, it was a compliment to the Basutos to disarm them; but Sir Bartle Frere forgot to mention that, while he was so anxious to disarm the Basutos, he made no proposal to disarm the Colonists. The question was one which might at any moment give rise to anxiety. All the Government could do was to follow the lines which had been traced by their Predecessors in Office, and which had subsequently been followed by Lord Kimberley—namely, to warn the Colonists against too hasty action, and to impress upon them the consideration that in the event of difficulties arising in consequence of any precipitate action on their part they would be expected to provide for their own defence, and that British money and British troops would not be forthcoming in the future. The Cape Government was not entirely subject to control; but from the tone of their latest despatches there was reason to believe that they would not rush inconsiderately into a conflict with the Basuto people. Well, it was evident that so long as Sir Bartle Frere was more Colonial than the Colonists themselves, it was inconvenient to retain him as the Eepre-sentative of Her Majesty's Government at the Cape. As regarded the Basuto question, the Government disagreed with the policy he had pursued, on the grounds alike of expediency and of justice; and with such a divergence between the Government and its Agent it was impossible for harmonious action to continue. Under these circumstances, the situation might be said to have become intolerable. After hopes of a Confederation had been abandoned, the Government had no alternative but to replace Sir Bartle Frere by a Governor whose views were more in harmony with their own. One word he might say as to the general policy of the Government in South Africa. Sir Bartle Frere's view was that by peaceful means or by force the Native populations should, in their own interests, be subordinated to the White man. The policy of the Government, on the contrary, was one of abstention from interference in the domestic affairs of neighbouring tribes and races, except when the peace of the Frontier was concerned; and Lord Kimberley strongly urged that border forays should, as far as possible, be treated as questions of police, instead of as constituting an outrage upon British territory. It was said that Sir Bartle Frere was extremely popular with the Colonists. That was, no doubt, true; but, inasmuch as he identified himself with Colonial opinion, it was not to be wondered at. Her Majesty's Government frankly recognized the enterprizing spirit of the Colonists; but they could not conceal from themselves the fact that that enterprizing spirit might sometimes be inconsiderate in dealing with the Native population. It was a most difficult problem which was presented by the South African Colonies, where there was an enormous Native population surrounding a small White element, composed largely of Dutch Settlers. It could not be said that hitherto England had shown any want of patience or generosity in dealing with the Colonists. England had spent millions of money and thousands of lives in South African wars. As we had made such great sacrifices we might fairly claim to exercise a moderating influence in the South African Colonies; and even if the policy of the Government was less thorough and drastic than that which sometimes commended itself to the Colonists themselves, he did not hesitate to claim their co-operation in the fulfilment of the object which both they and the Government had at heart—namely, the good government of this great Dependency, towards whose population, Coloured and White alike, we had undertaken such heavy responsibilities.

said, that at that late hour of that long discussion he should appeal to the House to listen to him, as being the only defender of the conduct of Sir Bartle Frere on that side of the House who could speak as an old personal friend. He had anticipated strong words of censure such as had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain); but he had entirely failed to hear from that Member of the Cabinet any proof of the truth of the assertions which that right hon. Gentleman had brought against Sir Bartle Frere. He (Sir George Balfour) had had the pleasure and honour of knowing Sir Bartle Frere for many years, both in the Council of India and elsewhere, and he knew how highly Sir Bartle Frere had been appreciated by statesmen of all kinds. Twice had he received the thanks of Parliament for his great services; but those noble recognitions were cast to the winds by a Liberal Government. Therefore, he regretted to find the Liberal Party treating this distinguished statesman in the way they had done. If there were one charge which he would bring against the Liberal Party, it was that they never properly recognized the services of public servants. The way the President of the Board of Trade had denounced the conduct of that able officer in the case of the Zulu War was an illustration of the indifference felt by Liberals to one whose character was dear to the country; and the hon. Baronet opposite the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland) had also referred to that distinguished servant, but in much more moderate language than that used by the President of the Board of Trade. In support of these remarks, the hon. Baronet had quoted a letter from Sir Henry Bulwer dated 10th March last; but there was another letter on record from Sir Henry Bulwer, to which, if hon. Gentlemen would refer, they would find that the results of the Zulu War were stated very differently from what appeared in the quoted letter of the 10th March. The President of the Board of Trade had said that what ought to have been done was, that the Zulu King should have been left at the head of the Zulu nation; but Sir Henry Bulwer stated that such a course was ominous for the future safety of the Colony, and that, as the Zulu power had been bent and not broken, the King would have lost no time in reestablishing his great military power and organization. Such a course would have been, according to Sir Henry Bulwer, very dangerous and quite opposed to any settlement of the Zulu question, and would have been one which would have entailed the greatest danger, both present and future. By the abolition of the Zulu dynasty and Monarchy, it might be said that the possibility of that danger taking place was at least removed; so that, in point of fact, they had this Sir Henry Bulwer quoted as a very high authority, stating that great and useful results had followed from Sir Bartle Frere's policy in regard to that war. He contended that it was impolitic in the extreme to act as the Government had done towards Sir Bartle Frere, on the plea that he had not waited for orders from England before taking action against the Zulus. This recall was a great blow to independence of thought and action, so essentially needed on the part of the rulers of the many Colonies. Even at present, it was very difficult to get a man who was both able and willing to exercise that independent thought so essential for the good of, and to undertake the administration of, such countries; and, therefore, the Government ought to have calmly reflected on the evil that would result to good government before they took such a step as recalling that able officer, Sir Bartle Frere. At any rate, they ought not to have done so without a previous warning as to the views and intentions of the present Government, and as to Sir Bartle Frere's readiness, or otherwise, to carry them into effect. The hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst had set forth a strong argument, showing that they had acted with unfairness towards those barbarous tribes in South Africa. But that plea had a wide application, and was spread over a long period of time. He (Sir George Balfour) would remind the House that the present Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Kimberley) was the man who first sanctioned any interference with the freedom of action of the Zulu nation and King. In 1872 that Nobleman permitted the Government of Natal to send officers into Zululand not only to crown the King, but to bind him by obligations of an onerous and grave character. For instance, he sanctioned the order that that King should no longer be allowed to put to death those whom he chose; but that he was to report to the Natal Government every case in which he desired to put a subject to death. What was the result of that? In less than four years after that condition was imposed by the present Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Natal Government found that the Zulu King had gone back to the cruel and barbarous way of putting numbers of his people to death. He was found killing young men and young women of his Kingdom because they chose to marry. These murders were so much opposed to his Coronation promises that the result was that Sir Henry Bulwer himself sent to the King to remind him of his Coronation Oath, in which he had promised not to kill his people. What was the King's reply? He said—"Why should the Government of Natal come to me; am I not governor of my own country, and can I not administer my own laws, and kill those that I choose?" Such was the result of the first interference sanctioned by the present Secretary of State. The second was with regard to the repeated raids from Zululand on territories belonging to England, or in connection with us. He observed that the President of the Board of Trade carefully abstained from making any reference to the many Zulu raids that were made before Sir Bartle Frere had incurred any responsibilities. So threatening and dangerous were these raids that Sir Henry Bulwer, of his own accord, interfered with regard to them. He sent several messages to the Zulu King of remonstrance, and that he forbade him to do so, and demanded redress. Yet the King took no notice of the appeals, and the raids continued to take place on the borders of the Tugela, until a body of our troops was sent up to protect the country. All that happened before Sir Bartle Frere arrived in Natal. This precautionary measure was a virtual act of war, as Sir Henry Bulwer himself admitted, and done before Sir Bartle Frere had at all moved in these local affairs. Again, when, in September, 1878, Sir Bartle Frere arrived in Natal, he found the country practically in a state of war. Only 12 days before his arrival the Zulu King had sent a large force on to the banks of the Tugela, and all the reports led to the belief that he was determined to carry arms into Natal and the Transvaal. Then, again, with regard to the Boer question about the land in dispute between the Zulu King and the Transvaal, the entire responsibility for the prompt and fair settlement of those differences was entirely thrown upon Sir Bartle Frere. For many years the discussion had been going on about these disputed territories. Even in the former administration of the present Secretary of State for the Colonies, the claims and demands of the Boers and Zulu King had been fully made known to him; but he had never tried, as far as could be learned from the Correspondence, to bring these dangerous differences to an end. But Sir Bartle Frere, when ordered to bring them to a close, even though the agents selected to inquire into the claims were not chosen by himself, yet did not hesitate to go into the Border disputes, and, after careful consideration, awarded to Zululand only parts of the vast territory in dispute. That decision was concurred in by the Lieutenant Governor of Natal, and so much approved that he claimed the right to send the decision to the Zulu King. Sir Bartle Frere had in that matter shown himself anxious to do justice, and the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) had proved that his action had been approved by the Secretary of State for the Colonies of the late Government. He did not mean to say that the action of Sir Bartle Frere was perfect, or free from all criticism; but considering the great affairs he had to control, direct, and attend to, the points on which differences of opinion might be raised were few in number and unimportant, so far as his own responsibilities for their initiation were involved. This, at least, could be justly said of Sir Bartle Frere's administration—that there never was a time when the Cape and the East African Colonists had had the services of so able and such an efficient Administrator as he had been. It should be remembered that one great and useful result had been attained in the Cape Colony. They only now had 5,000 Infantry stationed in South Africa, and of those 4,500 were in Natal and in the Transvaal, and only 500 in garrison at Cape Town. Never before was the force at Cape Town so low. They should also bear in mind what had fallen from the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Grant Duff) with regard to the useful and important services rendered by Sir Bartle Frere in regard to the police and local forces raised or in course of formation throughout all the divisions of South Africa, and he thought that all would agree that the country had been well and wisely administered by Sir Bartle Frere. He would ever maintain that the people of this country would have been saved that yearly great expenditure for wars and military forces if the administration of South Africa under Sir Bartle Frere as the High Commissioner had been left. He contended that Sir Bartle Frere had shown himself an excellent Administrator, a man capable of assuming responsibilities and of acting with that sound judgment most useful to the Parliamentary Government of this country. Unhappily, there were signs of hostility to Sir Bartle Frere on the part of those who ought to have been friendly. He regretted exceedingly that the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) had shown himself so hostile to Sir Bartle Frere, as he should have thought there was no man whom the hon. Baronet would more admire for protecting the Natives against the curse of strong drinks. Now that midnight had passed, he would not detain the House longer; but he thought it necessary to say a few words on behalf of one who had shown himself to be so useful a public servant.

said, that there were one or two remarks in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade that were most satisfactory. As regarded the question of Pondoland and its population, he was glad to hear that the Government were settled in their views of that matter, and approved of the action about to be taken by Sir Bartle Frere. He understood that the hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland) had brought that subject before the House. He was not present at that time; but he had no doubt that the hon. Baronet had treated the subject much more fully and effectually than he (Mr. Justin M'Carthy) could have done. If no one else had gone into the subject it was his (Mr. Justin M'Carthy's) intention to have done so. There were other passages of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade with which he could not so cordially sympathize. He confessed that he failed to see either logic or justice in the action of the Government with regard to Sir Bartle Frere. He must say that he agreed with the late Secretary of State for the Colonies (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) in thinking that the course the Government intended to pursue ought to have been distinct and clear when they came into Office, and that they ought to have recalled Sir Bartle Frere then, or not at all. It seemed to him to be idle to talk about allowing Sir Bartle Frere to retain office, in order that he might pursue the South African Confederation scheme. The only reason of the Government for recalling him was, it now appeared, that he had shown himself incapable of carrying out that scheme successfully. But everyone knew perfectly well that when the present Government were in Opposition they never talked about the accomplishment of that scheme being a reason for retaining him in Office, or sending him out of it. It was the unanimous opinion of the then Opposition that Sir Bartle Frere ought to be recalled, and that opinion ought to have been expressed in action when the Government came into Office. While the Liberal Party were in Opposition there was no talk about a compromise, by which Sir Bartle Frere was to be permitted to remain in office in order to carry out the Confederation scheme. Another point on which he could not agree with the right hon. Gentleman was, as regarded the occupation of the Transvaal territories. He held that if the Liberals thought that that occupation was unjust as they said it was at the time, and opposed to the principles both of statesmanship and morals, they ought not to have any further consideration about the matter, but withdraw at once from that awkward and indefensible position. As soon as they were in a condition to dictate a policy, they ought to have done the same as they had done with regard to Afghanistan and Abyssinia—namely, when they found that a territory had been invaded wrongly, to withdraw from a wrongful occupation. He found fault with the Government for not having been, in those few instances, fairly true to their principles and policy. He believed that the Liberal Party would never be thoroughly strong until they set the example of standing in Office by the very principles that they avowed and maintained in Opposition. It was, as regarded him, and those who thought with him, a matter of personal indiffer.- ence. Neither he nor any of his Party would ever be in Office on one side of politics or the other; but, nevertheless, he did not feel so strong an interest in the fortunes and future of the Liberal Party as to lament any evidence on their part of a lack of fidelity to principle. There should be nothing of inconsistency in the action of that Party; and, therefore, he regretted to see a distinct and palpable difference between the policy of the Liberals in Office on that South African Question, and that which all the House knew to have been their policy when they occupied the Opposition Benches.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolutions read a second time.

First Resolution agreed to.

Resolution 2.

said, the Amendment he was about to move meant the cutting off of the salary of the High Commissioner of South Eastern Africa, thus raising the question of retaining authority in the Transvaal, and the withdrawal of Sir George Colley. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade had apologized for the continuance of British control in the Transvaal on the ground of necessity. But he (Mr. Courtney) was quite unable to understand why the matter should not have been allowed to remain an open question, as they were not bound to take any immediate action with regard to it. Although the House had been informed that the inhabitants of the Transvaal were becoming more and more reconciled to the authority of the Crown, he had not been able to find any facts in support of that statement. No doubt, Sir Owen Lanyon had reported that there was a tendency in the direction of contentment; but such opinions had been over and over again expressed, and there was nothing to show, even if the statement could be verified, which it had not been, anything more than a certain acquiescence in the authority of the Crown. He believed, in raising these questions, he was pursuing in the best way what was the desire, not only of himself, but of every other hon. Member of the House—namely, a union of States in South Africa; and he believed that in attacking the assumption of authority in the Transvaal he was striking at the part of our rule which hindered that union. He did not like the word "Confederation" as applied to the condition of things which he desired to see established, but would prefer the appellation of United States of South Africa in the sense of their coming together by their own act, rather than being forced by any act of ours, which, in his opinion, would tend more to hinder than advance the object in view. He believed that the States of South Africa, if left to themselves, and thrown upon their own responsibility, would form a union that would be far more lasting, efficient, and worthy of respect than any which we could force upon them. That opinion was founded upon mature consideration, and was also the opinion of eminent and practical men, and, in pursuance of the policy he had indicated, he held that we ought not to retain possession of the Transvaal.

Amendment proposed, to leave out"£24,319,"in order to insert"£22,319,"—( Mr. Courtney,)—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That '£24,319' stand part of the said Resolution."

said, he understood the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) to say that having listened to the figures quoted with reference to the Revenue of the Transvaal, he did not understand whether they were actual receipts or estimates, and, in reply, wished to say that the figures in question were taken from the report of a speech made by the Administrator to the Council on the 11th June last. They represented actual receipts, and were not estimates at all. With reference to a point in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, he had ventured to say that there was no proof whatever of divergence of opinion in matters relating to South Africa between Sir Bartle Frere and the present Government since they came into Office, with the single exception of the question of the disposal of the land formerly occupied by Moirosi and his tribe, and to this view he adhered, in spite of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman as to the disarming of the Basutos. Sir Bartle Frere was not responsible for this; but had, on the contrary, exercised his influence with his Ministers in endeavouring to secure that the disarmament should be conducted with all possible consideration, for the feelings of the tribe.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 113; Noes 32: Majority 81.—(Div. List, No. 158.)

Second Resolution agreed to.

Subsequent Resolution agreed to.

Burials Bill—Lords—Bill 321

( Mr. Osborne Morgan.)

Consideration

Order for Consideration, as amended, read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now taken into Consideration."—( Mr. Osborne Morgan.)

said, that the attitude of the independent Liberal Party had not in any way been affected by what had taken place on Saturday last. It might be said that the true policy for a considerable number of Liberals in that House would be to minimize that Bill, and to leave some means open which would allow the matter to be re-considered when there was more time at their disposal, and not at the very last moment of the Session, when measures must be swallowed wholesale by hon. Members on pain of being considered Obstructionists. It might be claimed, he thought, that the intention of independent Members was to make the Bill as good as possible; and as there was a considerable muster on that side of the House he did not expect the Government would vote upon the two Amendments on the Paper in the names of the two hon. Members on the Liberal side, as they had done last Saturday. He did not think the proceedings of that day were satisfactory for many reasons. The policy of the Government on that occasion was simply that of using no argument whatever, and, so to speak, putting a pistol at the heads of hon. Members, telling them to pass this Bill, or stand convicted before the country of being opposed to Liberal legislation. At least, he thought the speech of the right hon. and learned Gentleman in charge of the Bill could be regarded in no other light. He simply said—"Will you have the Bill or not, If so, you must not argue, you must not discuss, you must not object, you must take what we choose to give, and make the House of Commons into a registering machine at the caprice of the Government and the House of Lords." Under those circumstances, he thought that a certain number of Members of the Liberal Party would have been justified in opposing the further progress of the Bill; but he thought there would be manifested a truly Christian spirit on that side of the House if they allowed the Bill to pass, and simply state that it re-enacted, in an exceedingly offensive manner, certain civil and social penalties which had been heretofore borne by a large class of the community, and which would now fall upon a much smaller class which could not make itself heard; he thought those on that side of the House would be showing a just and generous spirit in rejoicing that their Nonconformist friends had fought so vigorous a battle on behalf of men whose opinions they did not share, and even regarded with dislike. He did hope that Nonconformists would remain firm, and would not allow themselves to be led away from advocating those principles which had been so ably advocated during that debate. If they did so, he should have no fears with regard to the matter. For those reasons, although the Bill rivetted the fetters more strongly on some of their fellow-citizens, he believed that those citizens would have the support of the Nonconformists in their legitimate grievances; and, that being so, he considered it his duty to vote for the third reading of that Bill.

said, that although the object that the hon. Member had in view was different from his own, and those who thought with him, still he could not help observing that the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Ashton Dilke) appeared to think exactly as many hon. Members on that side did—namely, that the Bill, in common with some other legislation of the Government, had been forced upon the House, and, in fact, pitchforked upon them. They were not to discuss, nor to divide upon any matter, but to take what the Government chose to give them. He thought they had almost enough of that last Saturday. That Sitting commenced at 12 o'clock, and the consideration of that Bill continued until 10 o'clock at night. Such a Sitting ought not to have taken place on a Bill of that importance. Perhaps hon. Gentlemen opposite did not agree with him; but, in his opinion, it was not right that that Bill should be then considered, but at another Sitting. That consideration ought not to be taken when they were too weary to enter into a fair discussion of it. If they did enter into a discussion of it, then they would probably have a repetition of what had occurred on Saturday, when two of the Ministry, the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Judge Advocate General, were unable to understand each other. He did think it was rather too much to ask that House to consider important Amendments on the Report of such a Bill at live minutes past 1 in the morning. He had no wish to place any obstruction in the way of the measure. He would not say that he wished it to pass; but he looked upon any opposition to that as hopeless, and, therefore, he was anxious to do nothing to prevent its passing. But there was something due to the dignity of that House, and to the country, whose Representatives they were, and they were bound to consider those great questions calmly and deliberately; and he must say that the House, having been occupied with the consideration of that Bill during 10 hours on Saturday, they ought not to be asked to re-consider it at that time of night. He begged, therefore, to move the adjournment of the debate.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—( Earl Percy.)

said, that the House must be aware that he would not impute to the noble Earl (Earl Percy) the slightest desire to obstruct the passage of the Bill. He was quite sure, however, that the House would see that that Bill, having reached the stage that it had in that House, and having been passed by the House of Lords, any Motion of delay must take the form of mere obstruction to the passing of the measure. He accepted fully the assurance of the noble Earl, that his only object was that the discussion should take place at a convenient time. In reply, he could only say this —that it was the wish of the Govern- ment to consult the convenience of the House; and he believed, so far as he was aware, that it was the desire of the majority to proceed with the Bill. He believed that it would be more to the convenience of hon. Members that the Bill should be taken then, as many hon. Gentlemen were staying in town waiting for the Bill to be disposed of. He wished it, however, to be distinctly understood that the Government had not the slightest intention of pressing upon the House the consideration of a measure of so much importance at that hour of the morning. He might observe that ample time had already been given for the discussion of the principle of the measure, so that they were quite justified in proceeding then with it, if they thought proper. Nothing could be clearer than the explanation of his right hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Osborne Morgan), that that Bill was in the nature of a compromise. The hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Ashton Dilke), and those who thought with him, wished that the Bill should be repudiated, and thought that they had better wait until they were able to pass a more original measure; but they must bear in mind that the Bill then before them had been accepted by the House of Lords, and the dignitaries of the Church, and, he believed, was not unacceptable to the Church of England generally. It was for the House to consider whether it were wise to risk a conflict by refusing what had been accepted as a satisfactory compromise by both Parties. He thought it was hardly fair to say that the Bill had been passed by a pistol being placed at their heads. It was a measure which, he believed, was accepted as a settlement of the question by the majority of that House; and he was, moreover, of opinion that that majority was willing to proceed with the consideration of it at that time.

said, that no one objected more to the compromise in that matter which had been alluded to by the noble Lord than he did, because it was a compromise in which it seemed to him that they were giving up everything that could be given up. He should not have much to say upon the question at that time, although he thought they had considerable grounds for complaint so far as the Government were concerned, and for this reason. That Bill, although it had come down from the other House about the month of June, they had not had an opportunity of discussing it practically until the time when the Appropriation Bill was brought in. It must appear to everybody in that House that considerable modifications had been introduced, whether rightly or wrongly he was not going to argue; and surely it could not be said that they were treating a matter, which the noble Lord himself candidly confessed to be one of great importance, in an altogether proper way. Amendments which had been put down had to be considered, and the Bill had to be sent up to the other House for reconsideration within three days of what was then openly proclaimed to be the end of the Session of Parliament. He could perfectly well understand the opinions of the Government in regard to that matter. They had, in fact, been told by the Prime Minister that that Bill had been passed by the House of Lords, and was intended to have been considered a long time ago. No doubt, the reason why it was not considered was that there were other measures which the Government thought of considerable importance, which opinion was, he believed, not shared by the House and the country, and they wished to force those measures upon the House before that Bill was taken; and so far had they carried that policy that it had been almost impossible to discuss even the question of Supply, which was the legitimate function of that House, because they were so anxious to press forward certain measures. He remembered some time ago, when the then Government asked for more of the time of the House for the consideration of their measures, that a great deal was said by the present Prime Minister about almost a conspiracy which the Government had entered into by which they had shut out the right of independent Members to take part in general discussion. They had then simply put down Supply for Mondays; and the present Government had extended the principle which the Prime Minister, when in Opposition, had so entirely condemned and abused. Having said that much, he would mention that it was not his intention to oppose a Bill at that stage, which the Government seemed determined to pass before the end of the Ses- sion. What the noble Lord the Leader of the House had said was true, that it was not the intention of the noble Lord the Member for North Northumberland (Earl Percy) to oppose that Bill simply for the sake of Obstruction; but he could, not agree with the noble Marquess that a great number of hon. Members had gone to considerable inconvenience for the purpose of discussing that Bill. However, he deeply regretted that that debate should be adjourned, although he did not in the least agree with the Bill, or with the way in which the Government had conducted it; but, as it had advanced to that stage, he thought it better that the discussion on it should be completed. He trusted, therefore, that the noble Lord would not press his Amendment; but that they might be allowed to go on.

said, that the noble Lord opposite had made an appeal to him to withdraw his Motion, on the ground that many hon. Members were remaining for the express purpose of being present at that stage of the discussion on the Bill who were anxious to get out of town. That appeared to him to be precisely a reason why he should urge upon the House the desirability of not proceeding with it when the majority of hon. Members had already left and many more were anxious to get away. At the same time, it was, no doubt, a disagreeable thing for an hon. Member of the House to stand against the general feeling; and although he would have felt it his duty to do so upon a matter of principle, this was not one of that character, and, therefore, he begged to ask leave to withdraw his Motion.

said, that as he was unable, in consequence of illness last week, to be present when the Bill was in Committee, he wished to say at this stage what he would have said then, when the Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. Illingworth) was before them. Civil and religious liberty he had always considered as the special watchword of the Liberal Party. For years they had contended for that principle, until, one by one, the disabilities of former times had been removed; and now, when it was supposed that religious equality was an established maxim of our legislation, it was not a little astonishing to find that maxim limited and qualified by a Bill brought in by a Liberal Government. The right of burial in the parish churchyard was a civil right established by the Common Law of England. The Bill proposed to remove the canonical conditions by which it had hitherto been fettered and restricted, and so to make it operative in its fullest and widest sense; but it did so only in favour of those of Her Majesty's subjects who professed the Christian religion. To non-Christians it said—"Bury your dead in the churchyard if you please; but you shall do so without the consolation of any religious Service, without any outward mark of respect for the departed, without the solace, which all men, Christians and non-Christians alike, for the most part, seek and require in time of sorrow." To Nonconformists it allowed the attendance of their own ministers, and the use by them of such religious Services as were most in harmony with their feelings and religious sentiments. To others, it denied such comfort altogether. Why, he asked, was the Bill so limited? Was it just or wise, or was it consistent with the principles of the Liberal Party and of a Liberal Government? He (Mr. Serjeant Simon) did not profess or assume to speak the sentiments of the religious body to which he belonged. He had, and he claimed, no authority to do so. He spoke for himself only. The Jews had their own cemeteries, and, so far as he knew, they had no desire to bury their dead in the parish churchyard. Yet it was possible, indeed it was by no means improbable, that a Jew residing in some remote part of the Kingdom, where there was no burial-place except the churchyard, might die there. Was he to be laid in the ground, and, to use a common phrase, "buried like a dog?" That was what the Bill proposed with regard to the Jews and other non-Christians. The Burial Service of the Jews was of the simplest character. It was purely Scriptural. Not one word did it contain which could offend the most sensitive Christian, or in which he could not heartily join. Indeed, one portion of it formed part of the Burial Service of the Church of England. Upon what ground, then, should the Jews be excluded from the benefit of the Bill? There were also other non-Christians who, as well as Jews, were treated in the same way. Such persons, although not of the Christian faith, had their forms of burial, and their means of comfort in affliction; and they desired to pay, and did, no doubt, pay due reverence to their dead. They knew what grief was, and they felt it the same as other men. Why should they be visited with insult and indignity in the hour of trial? To admit a right, and then surround it with every circumstance of humiliation, so as to make the exercise of it offensive and intolerable, was a mockery and an insult, and not to be justified by any consideration whatever. The Bill before the House he regarded as a piece of retrograde legislation. While it relieved some from disability, as regarded the Jews and other non-Christians, it re-enacted and positively riveted disability on account of religion. It ignored, and even reversed, the principles which the Liberal Party had been accustomed to uphold, and for which they had contended with success. As it gave relief to his Nonconformist fellow-subjects, he would not imperil the Bill. On the contrary, he would, for their sakes, support it, as he had always done every measure intending to benefit them, or in which they were interested. But, speaking for himself, as an Englishman and a Liberal, he was bound to say that the Bill was to him a great disappointment, and he had felt it his duty not to allow it to leave the House without his protest.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question put, and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, considered.

(Act to apply only to parish, &c. where no un-consecrated burial ground for parishioners.)

"The foregoing sections of this Act shall only apply to the churchyard or graveyard in any parish or ecclesiastical district where there is is no unconsecrated burial ground or cemetery in which the parishioners or inhabitants have rights of burial, and shall cease and determine in respect of any such parish or ecclesiastical district so soon as such unconsecrated burial ground or cemetery has been provided by private gift within one mile of the aforesaid churchyard or graveyard, and that an endowment shall have been provided by private gift for the maintenance of such unconsecrated burial ground or cemetery such as, together with the fees authorised to be charged, shall by the President of the Local Government Board be certified as sufficient: Provided always, That no such cer- tificate may be given in reference to any endowment which may be offered after the thirtieth day of June one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one."

The objections which the right hon. Gentleman the Judge Advocate General had raised at the Committee stage to the similar clause of Lord Edgcumbe's had, he believed, been removed. There was a modification of the clause in regard to defining the distance of the new ground from the old churchyard, which was to be within a mile. It would also be observed that he proposed that the ground must be given privately, and not bought out of any rate; and it must be accompanied by some such endowment as the President of the Local Government Board might consider sufficient to keep the ground in order. He had tried to meet his right hon. Friend's objections, and he believed that many people in the country would be gratified if the clause were accepted. At the same time, if the right hon. Gentleman was not disposed to accept it, he did not propose to divide the House upon it.

Clause (Act to apply only to parish, &c, where no unconsecrated burial ground for parishioners),—( Mr. Beresford Hope,)— brought up, and read the first time: —

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Clause be read a second time."

said, he observed that the President of the Local Government Board was to certify whether a cemetery was a proper one or not. He was afraid that that right hon. Gentleman would scarcely survive such a process, which would end in his being torn in pieces by contending factions. He could not accept the clause.

Question put, and negatived.

Preamble.

moved that in the Preamble the words "Channel Islands" be added. He proposed to extend the Bill to those Islands.

Amendment proposed, in page 1, line 2, after "England" to insert "and the Channel Islands."—( Mr. Osborne Morgan.)

asked whether that was not rather an unusual course, as those Islands were almost entirely independent of such Acts. Per- haps the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary could explain the matter to them.

said, his right hon. Friend seemed anxious about that matter. He was unable to say distinctly what the effect of making the Bill applicable to the Channel Islands would be, but he would take the responsibility of that.

said, that under those circumstances he should have nothing more to say upon the question.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 1 (After passing of Act, notice may be given that burial will take place in churchyard or graveyard without the rights of Church of England).

On the Motion of Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN, Amendment made in page 1, lines 14 and 15, by leaving out the words "in which the parishioners or inhabitants have rights of burial."

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 3 (Time of burial to be stated, subject to variation).

begged to move, in page 2, line 37, to leave out "or" to "following" in line 39. He would not detain the House, but simply say that a large minority voted for that Amendment in Committee. On that account he submitted the Amendment again, and would state the grievance that it proposed to remedy. That was that on 54 days of the year, except by consent of the Rector, Vicar, or Incumbent, no poor person could be buried. Therefore, it might happen that those attending the funerals of these poor people might have to forfeit a day's wage, at any rate, when they were of the wage-earning class. There was nothing to excite religious prejudice, or ought to induce hon. Gentlemen opposite to vote against it. The question was, would they refuse a privilege to the poor by the way that clause was worded? There were only two arguments urged against the Amendment. One was that of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Everyone listened with respect and pleasure to what fell from the right hon. Gentleman; but he must say that what he had said seemed rather to be in favour of the Amendment than for its rejection. The first argument was that the carrying the Amendment might irritate the clergyman of the parish; but it should be remembered that in Ireland, where religious feeling ran high, the Roman Catholic population had been buried in the Protestant yards on those days without any difficulty or irritation having arisen. Another argument that had been used was with reference to the Nonconformist clergy. It had been stated that they were not in favour of Sunday funerals, because it would increase their labour. He would say, in regard to that, that it would be purely voluntary on their part, and that if they did not wish to take part or officiate in such services they need not do so. It had been also urged by the right hon. Gentleman that drunkenness would probably prevail at Sunday funerals. He was sorry to disagree with that; but he did not think that drunkenness was more likely to occur in connection with Sunday funerals than with those held on any other day. The right hon. Gentleman the Judge Advocate General had said that Sunday funerals were not often held, so far as his experience went. He (Mr. Bradlaugh) would say, from his knowledge of the working classes, that in a great many cases they were obliged to have recourse to funerals on that day. When a poor man died, it was not at all unusual for the poor people of the district to wish to attend the funeral, and they were unable to do so without loss unless it was held on Sunday. He felt sure that no impropriety would be likely to occur from Sunday funerals; and he, therefore, hoped that the House would assent to the Amendment which he then begged to move.

Amendment proposed, in page 2, line 34, to leave out from the first word "or," to the word "following," in line 35.— ( Mr. Bradlaugh.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."

said, the question with regard to Sunday funerals had been fully discussed last Saturday. He had Spent a great part of his life in a rural parish, and had never seen a Sunday funeral conducted there. Moreover, during the 10 years he had devoted to this question, he had received thousands of letters from persons in all parts of the country, many of them expressing opinions against Sunday funerals being permitted, while he had not had one single letter in favour of allowing them to take place. The hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) said the Nonconformists were placed in a worse position than the members of other Bodies; but he reminded the hon. Member that under the law, as it stood at present, a clergyman of the Church of England could refuse to bury on Sunday; and, therefore, as a matter of fact, the Bill gave to the Nonconformists an advantage which the Churchman did not possess. Sunday, in many country parishes, was occupied by the religious services of the Church; but, if the Amendment were carried, it would be treated like any other day of the week. The Amendment could not be accepted; but he should propose, if it were not carried, to exclude cemeteries altogether from the operation of the Sunday clause.

said, he should support the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton, on the ground that it only claimed to place the working man who was a Nonconformist in the same position as the working man who was a member of the Church of England. He could not agree with the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the Judge Advocate General who sought to establish an inconsistency, inasmuch as he proposed to allow Sunday funerals in cemeteries, while he denied them to the people who had only the churchyard for the purpose of burial. He felt that the House could not agree to such an inconsistency. With regard to the statement that Sunday funerals would promote drunkenness, he apprehended that when in the interest of sobriety public-houses were closed altogether on Sundays, it would be better that they should take place on Sunday than on any other day in the week. But this was a question particularly affecting the working people who were remarkable for their sympathy with their neighbours and fellow-workmen, and when one of their number died, there was on the part of his fellows a widespread desire to follow his remains to the grave. Now, it was well-known that Sunday was the only day on which they could do this, without sacrificing a day's wages, and, under those circumstances, he thought they would only be doing a humane and kindly act by giving facilities for the burial of the poor which would allow their neighbours and relations to pay the last mark of respect to their departed friends without, at the same time, wronging their families by sacrificing their day's wages. There was one point mentioned by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Judge Advocate General—namely, that out of the large number of communications received by him regarding this Bill not one had been in favour of Sunday burials. But the obvious answer to that was that the class most interested and affected by the disability in question was not that which would be likely to spend their time in the writing of letters to the Lord Chancellor, or the Judge Advocate General; and, therefore, the fact mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman was no proof that Sunday burial was not desired by that class. It could not then be used as an argument against the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton. He trusted the Amendment would be agreed to, because it would make the Bill an act of justice to the people in the matter of funerals.

said, a churchman had not the right to burial on Sunday, and, therefore, the Nonconformists could not complain if, at all events, they were put upon the came footing. He felt sure that, among the letters received by the right hon. Gentleman, there were many from persons belonging to the classes indicated by the hon. Member who had just spoken, and if the matter had really been felt of importance to them, they would certainly have mentioned it among their grievances.

said, in opposing this Amendment, the right hon. Gentleman the Judge Advocate General, had brought out a whole armoury of rusty weapons. They had just heard, for the first time, that a clergyman might exercise the right of refusing funerals on Sunday. But that was only a virtual power in the hands of the clergy, and was never exercised. Therefore, for the purposes of the present measure, it had no practical value. He was sure that every Member of that House would be supremely anxious that no real offence should be given to the clergy, and held that the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), that no burials should take place on Sunday during the usual time of Divine Service, and the half hours immediately before and after such service, fully met the case. That would apply equally to the funerals of Dissenters and Churchmen, and he thought the Government would act wisely in assenting to it. The hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Ashton Dilke) had intimated that he did not propose to raise the question debated under the 6th clause of the Bill. And he thought in so restricting himself he had acted wisely, because the division taken on the question showed that there was something like a balance of opinion among the Liberal Party, and it would not, therefore, be right to press the Government to make the change proposed. But the question now before the House stood on a very different footing, and he pressed its consideration on the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster, the convictions and instincts of whose mind were clearly in favour of the Amendment now being pressed on the Government by hon. Members on that side of the House. He thought he could almost promise that if that feeling were manifested there would be an almost unanimous desire for compromise, and he hoped that the Government would act in the same spirit with regard to this question as had characterized their other acts during the Session.

said, his experience of Wales, with reference to the absence of Sunday burials, was the same as that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan). The hon. Member for Pembrokeshire (Mr. W. Davies), had, however, testified that the custom of Sunday burial existed in his county. But the House must remember that they were not now legislating for Wales only but for the whole of the Kingdom. It had, moreover, been shown that Sunday burials were very frequent in the North of England, and it would, therefore, be a great grievance to deprive the people of burying their dead on Sunday, especially, as the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) had pointed out, it would cost them a day's wages. He felt strongly that great allowance should be made for the feelings of the clergy in regard to this subject, and would be sorry that anything should be done calculated needlessly, to wound their susceptibilities. Therefore, he cor- dially agreed with the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), and regretted to be compelled to differ on this point with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Denbighshire. He took that opportunity of expressing his deep sense of the valuable services rendered by his right hon. Friend in advancing this measure, and it was to his courage and perseverance during the last 10 years, that they owed the victory they were about to win. He had a strong conviction that the passing of this Bill would be far more to the advantage than the detriment of the Church of England, as freeing it from the continual scandals arising under the recent law in all parts of the country, which had awakened even bitter hostility against her. He trusted this would be the closing of all controversy on the subject, and concluded by saying that if his right hon. Friend had been foremost in promoting this settlement the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Beresford Hope), had been the most effectual instrument in preventing it up to the present time. Ten years hence he should like to have the opportunity of ashing him whether the alarm he had felt with regard to the passing of this measure had been realized.

said, that if the Amendment then before the House was negatived, his hon. and gallant Friend behind him had an alternative Amendment, which he believed he would move.

said, he was sorry to trouble the House, but the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil(Mr. Richard) had made a statement to which he must refer. The hon. Member had said that a Dissenter, except on Sunday, Good Friday, or Christmas Day, should give notice of the time the funeral was to take place. But in the 36th line it said—"And it shall take place at the hour so appointed." The effect would be that upon ordinary days they would be able to dictate to the clergyman as to the hour at which the service should take place. ["No, no!"] He believed he was strictly stating the facts of the case. It had been said, also, that Dissenters were not on a footing of equality with regard to the Sunday funerals. The only foundation for such a statement was that it was supposed that the clergyman had no option under ordinary circumstances of refusing to bury on any day that the relatives might appoint. But, in truth, he had already this right with regard to Members of the Church of England, and therefore, hon. Members would see that that inequality between Churchmen and Dissenters was really founded on an absolute misconception of the state of the case. The hon. Member seemed to desire that the Dissenters should have greater powers with regard to burials in churchyards than were granted under that Bill. If so, Dissenters would positively be in a position of superiority to Church people. He fully recognized what had been expressed by the hon. Member—that the Bill was distasteful to the clergy. Representing, as he did, many of the clergy, he would say that there could be no doubt that it was distasteful to them. But it seemed to him that what was suggested would make what was already distasteful almost intolerable to them.

said, that the noble Lord the Leader of the House had complained because his hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. Ashton Dilke) had said that that Bill had been passed by a pistol being put at their heads. That certainly was the case. Hon. Gentlemen opposite represented the pistols, and as many Gentlemen as there were on that side so many pistols were there. The numbers taken at the Division in Committee were 103 to 100. He had looked at the Division List, and had found, that of those who had voted for the Amendment, 99 were Liberals, and one a Conservative. Of those who voted against the Amendment, there were 61 Conservative pistols, and 42 Liberals. Of those Liberals, 20 were Members of the Liberal Party, and, consequently, there were only 22 independent Liberals against, together with 61 Conservatives. Therefore, he thought it must be admitted that that clause was entirely passed in its present form by the aid of the Conservatives. There were only two practical objections that had been raised against the present Amendment— one by the Judge Advocate General, and the other by the late Home Secretary (Sir E. Assheton Cross). The Judge Advocate General had said that at present there was no inequality between Dissenters and Churchmen, because the clergy had a right to refuse to allow a Churchman to be buried on a Sunday. The right hon. Gentleman had referred to the remarks of the Lord Chancellor with regard to that inequality. He thought they had had a good deal too much of the Lord Chancellor in that Bill. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had put the matter fairly when he said that they were obtaining a good deal from the clergy, and that they ought to yield on that one point of inequality on Sunday. The right hon. Gentleman the late Home Secretary had also stated the case reasonably when he said that the object of the clause in its present shape was to maintain decency and order. But he would ask whether it was a fact that, if the funerals of Dissenters were allowed in churchyards on a Sunday, decency and order would be violated? If so, that was an insult to the whole body. He entirely agreed with the hon. Gentleman, who had stated that, if the clause of the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) were proposed, they ought to accept it. He really did think that that inequality and injustice might fairly be removed, and that, so far, at any rate, they might be allowed to escape from the thraldom of the Lord Chancellor.

said, that the Judge Advocate General had stated that he had received a number of communications against that Amendment, and the hon. Gentleman opposite, who represented the Nonconformists, had said that the Amendment had been brought forward in the interests of the working classes. He did not dispute their right to speak in the interests of those classes, but he must say that from what he had seen of the working classes, they appeared to be as thoroughly divided in their opinions as men of other classes. He wished to say a word in favour of a class who worked hard on Sundays— namely, the clergy of the country, of whom there were more than 20,000 in England and Wales, and the Judge Advocate General knew that more than 16,000 of them had signed a Petition against this Bill. If this Amendment were carried, the clergy would feel a far greater sense of injustice. He thought, as regarded the Amendment, that Sunday funerals should be discouraged, whether of Churchmen or Dissenters, because it was certain that if those funerals increased, there would be a much greater infringement of the day of rest. A great deal of Sunday labour must necessarily follow if those funerals increased, and he, therefore, objected strongly to the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton.

said, they were going away from the question under discussion. That question was not whether Sunday funerals should be abolished, but whether or not a large number of the working classes held their funerals on that day. In his opinion, there was no doubt whatever about that. He happened to have with him an interesting report about Sunday funerals, from the Burial Board of Liverpool. What was the proportion of Sunday funerals, taking a daily average from a return of 42 undertakers? Six declined Sunday funerals, seven merely superintended them in special cases, and the remaining 35 had twice as many interments on that day as upon the other six days. Several larger establishments had three or four times as many. He only wished to establish the fact that it was the custom of the working classes to have funerals on that day. He had made personal inquiries of four leading undertakers of Liverpool. The first told him that he had two to one on a Sunday, the second three to one, a third had more on Sunday than any other day, and a fourth said that the number of funerals on that day largely predominated. Therefore, he hold that objections to those funerals were beside the question. The real question involved was this—whether an individual clergyman was to be allowed to prohibit Sunday funerals in the case of Nonconformists if they wished to hold them on that day. A Churchman would probably be allowed to hold that service, while a Nonconformist was to wait until Monday. That was one law for the Churchman and another for the Dissenter. He would simply add that a similar Amendment stood in his name on Saturday when in Committee, and he was exceedingly sorry he was not present; believing Saturday to be a blank day, he had gone away. He felt strongly that the Amendment was of importance to the working classses, and when he found the Committee was to be taken on that day, he had asked the hon. Member for Morpeth (Mr. Burt) to move the Amend- ment for him. Unfortunately, he also was unable to be present; but he was of opinion that the Amendment was one of great importance to the working classes, and ought to be carried. He should certainly support the Amendment-then before the House.

said, he was surprised that the Amendment had not been accepted. If it was a question that would at all imperil the Bill, he could understand the refusal of the Government to accede to it; but the right hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill had given them no such intimation. On Saturday, in Committee, that question was made an open one, and in a most authoritative speech the right hon. Gentleman had distinctly stated that it was well nigh a matter of indifference which way he voted. He was bound to say that it appeared to him that they had not heard the whole of the argument, and that the course the Government were taking was due to some mystery which they did not understand. He did not think that the real reason for refusal was before the House.

said, that in the neighbourhood of large towns Sunday funerals often gave occasion to scenes of drinking of a disgraceful character. The clause should be so drawn as to minimize such scandals, and in such a course they ought to be able to reckon on the assistance of the Nonconformists.

said, he did not rise to continue the argument, but to make an explanation with regard to the matter which hon. Gentlemen opposite especially did not appear to understand. There was an Amendment which his right hon. Friend the Judge Advocate General was prepared to accept. It was that of the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), and although it did not go the length of the Amendment before the House, still it did affect the question, he believed, considerably. It was this—

"That if a clergyman shall refuse, or intimate his intention not to consent to a funeral taking place, he shall be obliged to give his reasons in writing, &c."
He referred, of course, to Sunday funerals. He thought that every hon. Member must see that if a clergyman took upon himself to refuse to allow a funeral to take place and had to give his reasons in writing, that refusal would have to be of a very real character. Therefore, he would put it to the House whether that might not be an unsatisfactory course to take with regard to the matter? If it did not meet the views of hon. Members, he could not help it; but he thought it would be found desirable to accept that alternative Amendment, in lieu of the present one. He merely wished to make that explanation before they went to a Division.

said, that, as his Amendment had been referred to, he should wish to say a few words. The House would recollect that on Saturday a division was taken upon an Amendment of his.

rose to Order. The hon. and gallant Member was discussing an Amendment not before the House.

The remarks of the hon. and gallant Member seem to bear upon the Amendment.

said, he had wished to make an explanation with regard to his Amendment. After the Division the other night, the Judge Advocate General had agreed with him with regard to another Amendment which he had drawn up, and which they believed would be acceptable both to him and his Friends, and also to the Government.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 88; Noes 60: Majority 28.—(Div. List No. 159).

proposed, in page 3, line 4, to add—

"If any such day proposed by notice shall be objected to, notice in writing shall be given within a reasonable time by the person receiving such notice."

said, he should advise the House to accept the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman. He did not pretend to like the Bill either in its entirety or its details; but there were degrees in all things, and he was bound to say that those who wished the preservation of anything like order in our churchyards and churches must be thankful to the right hon. Gentleman for the way in which he had opposed the most mischievous Amendment which had just been before the House.

said, he presumed that the decision arrived at by the House must be regarded as final, and he complimented the Government in having found, on the other side of the House, a number of supporters just sufficient to defeat the proposal of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) but that support was not such as they could place much confidence in. It had been remarked from the other side of the House that 16,000 clergymen had, in an emphatic manner, condemned this Bill, and prayed that it might not pass into law. He had no doubt that the opposition to the measure was deep-rooted and genuine. But he would do the clergy the justice to say that if power were put into their hands they would honestly administer it; but he ventured to think there would be numberless instances of capricious refusal on the part of the clergy. The right hon. Gentleman had said the refusal must be in writing; but he had not stated the wording, or what action would have to be taken upon it. The Government were giving the Nonconformists a Bill on the same lines as the Act which was repealed, as unworkable and unsatisfactory in 1868; and he did not think that this fact, when known, would redound to the credit of those who had unnecessarily forced it upon the House. He presumed any further appeal to the Government would be useless, and, therefore, could not but think the present settlement of the matter was scarcely final, and certainly not as satisfactory as it might have been. He trusted the present Amendment would not be hastily accepted, inasmuch as it was likely to lead to a good deal of trouble and bitterness in time to come. If the House would consider for a moment the position of the question, it would be seen that the result of that evening's discussion would be that, in future, all classes of Nonconformists and Churchmen would stand with regard to Sunday burials in the same position as Churchmen stood before in respect of the law and practice. The refusal on the part of the clergy to bury on Sunday could not but lead to angry controversy, notwithstanding the previous notice of burial and the reasonable grounds on which refusal would have to be based.

said, he voted this evening with the Government be- cause he had seen an indication on their part to go as far as they reasonably could. It seemed to him that the Amendment was of real value to the Nonconformists, because, although the Bill as it stood enabled the clergyman to dismiss in the briefest manner an application for Sunday burial, the Amendment would require him to give a substantial reason for his refusal. It was in view of that he had changed his vote of Saturday, and would now support the proposal of the Government.

said, he thought the House would do well to accept the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman.

said, he should give his support to the Amendment before the House, because he believed it would meet the purpose he had in view nearly as well as the Amendment standing in his name.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 5 (Regulations and fees).

said, he believed the exactions of the fees referred to in his clause were the cause of much dissatisfaction amongst Nonconformists, who objected that the salary of persons connected with the Church of England should be increased at their expense. He believed the effect of the clause would be that about £10,000 a-year would be added to those salaries at the expense of the Nonconformists. He had no desire to see the salaries of the clergymen of the Church of England reduced; but he could not see why they should be increased in this manner, and he was surprised that in this respect the Government had imposed more than had been sought to be imposed by the late Government when the Bill of 1877 was brought before the House of Lords and passed. He begged to move the Amendment standing in his name.

Amendment proposed,

In page 3, line 16, at end of Clause 5, to insert the words "Provided, That such fee or fees shall not exceed the sum of five shillings."—(Sir Alexander Gordon.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

said, he was unable to accept the Amendment of his hon. and gallant Friend. The question of fees was a portion of a much larger question than that dealt with by the Bill.

Amendment negatived.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 6 (Burial may be with or without religious services).

Amendment proposed,

In page 3, line 26, to leave out the word "Christian," in order to insert the words "Christian and religious services,"— {Mr. Warton,)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved, in page 3, line 26, after the word "Christian" to insert the word "service."

wished to point out that, by that Amendment, they were about to make a definition of a religious service. A Christian service was not an ordinary religious service.

said, that he certainly thought such a service was an ordinary religious service.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 13 (Liberty to use burial service of Church of England on unconse-crated ground).

rose to propose an Amendment that he was unable to move on Saturday. The effect of it would be merely to enable a clergyman to officiate in any chapel or other building standing in the cemetery or churchyard.

Amendment proposed, in page 5, line 21, after "cemetery," insert "or in any chapel thereon."—( Mr. Woodall.)

said, he should not object to the Amendment; but he thought it unnecessary, for, as a matter of course, if the ground was thrown open, the clergyman could officiate in the chapel on the ground.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a third time."—( Mr. Osborne Morgan.)

said, he could not agree to that proposal; but, at the same time, he should not then oppose it. He would not detain the House, but he wished to say that he protested against the measure; it was based upon a wrong principle, and was not what was required to be done in the matter. They had not by that Bill created any liability by Statute upon any Bodies or Corporations of any sort or description to provide burial-grounds where they were wanted. The real grievance which lay at the root of the evil had not been remedied; but he did not intend to oppose the final stage of the measure.

said, he simply wanted to protest against the Bill, and also against the manner in which it had been forced upon the Liberal Party in that House. It was brought in for the purpose of conferring civil rights on the community; but its effect would be to deprive a large section of their rights. The Nonconformists were, by that Bill, placed in the charmed circle of privilege; from being oppressed they had been placed among the oppressors. He protested also against the manner in which the right hon. Gentleman the Judge Advocate General had conducted that Bill. Although he had promised repeatedly to answer the arguments brought against several parts of the Bill, he was unable to find that he had given them any answer whatsoever. On Saturday the only argument used appeared to be that they were within three days of the 1st of September. That Bill ought not to have been forced on them in the way it had been. The Government had used the Opposition to defeat their Friends. He pointed out that they were beginning a very dangerous policy. That policy was always a dangerous one. If he were required to show that, he should refer them to the last time the Liberals were in power in 1870. They then had a great majority, though not so great as the present. That majority was first made uncertain, and then destroyed by similar action on the part of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) when, on the Education Question he called in the aid of the Opposition to beat his own fol- lowers. The hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Ashton Dilke) had aptly described the manner of the passing of that Bill by saying that a pistol had been placed at their heads. Although a most loyal supporter of the Government, he begged emphatically to protest against that Bill, as it stood, being passed into law.

said, that at the last stage of that measure, with resistance to which he had been identified in Parliament for many years, and had followed about the right hon. Gentleman the Judge Advocate General like his shadow, he must be allowed to offer a few words. They should be short and decided. He simply desired to attest that he had never feared to bring before the House the injustice of the change, and had exposed what would occur if that Bill was passed. Now, he would say in all sincerity, after listening to long arguments that had been employed on both sides, that he was conscious of having done his duty in the matter, and that he sat down unconvinced and impenitent.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read the third time, and passed.

Motion

Hereditary Legislators

Resolution

begged to move the following Resolution, which stood in his name on the Paper:—

"That it is no longer just or expedient that all measures for the improvement of the condition of the people of England, Ireland, and Scotland should he at the mercy of a body of Legislators hereditary and irresponsible."

rose to Order. He objected to that Motion as being unconstitutional. It was unconstitutional for either House of Parliament to bring forward Motions reflecting upon the other.

said, he only asked for a few minutes in order to explain his Motion. He should not make a long speech. In reply to the observation of the hon. and learned Member for Bridport (Mr. Warton), he would say that it must be remembered that the measures introduced into that House were often ma- terially modified by the other. That House was of a representative character, and its composition could be altered comparatively easily whereas the other House was only to be altered by a strong exertion on the part of the national will. When he first proposed his Motion, it was just double its present length. Mr. Speaker, in the exercise of his discretion, which he always used wisely, had compelled him to cut it in two, whereby he (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) thought it lost much of its grace and force.: The Motion had concluded with the words—

"At the mercy of a body of Legislators, hereditary and irresponsible, selected for their eminence as lawyers, for party convenience, or from administrative failures."
It appeared to him that those words most aptly described the men by whom that House was recruited. It was sometimes said that it contained the cream and wisdom of the nation. He should like to point out that if they examined the eases of the most recent additions to that Assembly, it would be scarcely found that principle and practice hung together. He hoped that none would misunderstand him. He had no wish to say anything unpleasant. A certain right hon. Gentleman failed as Home Secretary; he was at once elevated, and became a Member of the more sagacious Assembly. Another was a failure as Postmaster General; he also became a Member of the more sagacious Assembly. A short time ago, a Gentleman who supposed that he was a fit candidate for the highest Office in the Realm, but was not supposed to be so by his Colleagues, also became a Member of that House. Another most respected Member of the House of Commons, who, somehow or other, was always quarrelling with his best friends, was put into the other House. He saw an article in a newspaper of that day in praise of the noble Lord the Leader of that House, in which it said—"That the unfortunate thing was that the time must come when he would have to sit in the House of Lords." Under those circumstances the noble Lord would be a loss to the country, because he could not exercise anything like the same amount of influence upon the rank and file of Liberalism. Another Member of that House, who he earnestly hoped would not be called to "another place," was the noble Lord the Mem- her for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill). He was sure it would he a misfortune to that House if his activity should he lost to them. He did not know anybody more to be pitied than an hon. Member of that House who, in the course of nature, was doomed to sit in the other House. He did not know which was the mere cruel, that, or compelling a widow, as they did in some Eastern countries, to go to the tomb of her husband and he buried alive. One could not describe that transference to the other House in better terms than by saying that it was being buried alive, so far as politics were concerned. With regard to the arguments which had been used in favour of the maintenance of that Assembly, one was that a Democratic Assembly, such as the House of Commons was inclined to go too fast. He wished to point out that in the opinion of a great many that House did not go half fast enough. That night they had tried to remedy a grievance to which a large body of the people had been subject for generations, and notwithstanding that there was a strong Liberal Party in Office that measure had been condemned as not dealing with the question effectually. It was said that that other Chamber was necessary for the protection of property. He was taught, when reading books on law, that there was more than one kind of property in the world. There was personal as well as real property; and if it were necessary to maintain an Assembly for the protection of real, why not necessary for the protection of personal property? Both kinds of property had been affected by the Bills just brought before that House. Did not the Employers' Liability Bill expose personal, as well as real, property to great risks and serious damage? No one said that there should be a Chamber representing the manufactures of the country selected with hereditary rank. He had spoken of the Upper Chamber as being irresponsible. Of course, to some extent, that was not correct. They were supposed to be responsible to public opinion, but there was a great influence exercised by them which never came before public opinion. It was not the direct influence that injured the legislation of the country, but the indirect, such as that of mutilating a Bill which had just passed the third reading in the House of Commons. He was sorry that the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was not in his place, because he might quote some passages from him in his days of wildness. There could be no doubt that several important measures brought in by the Liberals had been seriously modified by the Upper House. He would quote, what he believed to be in support of his proposition, some words used, he would not say where, or when, with regard to that proposition. It was—"If the House adopts that Motion, it will render itself liable to much misrepresentation and misapprehension." He would say, as regarded that, that for his part, he had no wish to disturb Ministries or reform them; but his desire was to remedy a defect in the Constitution of his country. Of that Constitution that House was one of the guardians; and he felt sure that he and his supporters, if they exercised clue discretion, would receive the support of the bulk of the people of this country. Finally, he would say that if the House would adopt his Resolution they would, he believed, obtain the lasting confidence both of their constituents and the country at large. He begged to move the Resolution which stood in his name.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That it is no longer just or expedient that all measures for the improvement of the condition of the people of England, Ireland, and Scotland should he at the mercy of a body of legislators hereditary and irresponsihle."—(Mr. T. P. O'Connor.)

said, if he failed to understand the exact object of the Motion of the hon. Member for Gralway Borough (Mr. T. F. O'Connor), he gratefully acknowledged the brevity of the very amusing speech which had preceded it. The hon. Member would, no doubt, agree that the short space of time within which he had confined his observations scarcely allowed him to do justice to the importance of his subject. It was hardly convenient that questions of that kind, involving great Constitutional improvements, should be submitted to the House at half-past 3 o'clock in the morning, and the House would admit that very few Assemblies had ever been induced to make such great Constitutional changes in the manner now proposed. He considered the time improper for the discussion of the question, and hoped that the Motion would be disposed of with as little delay as possible, so that the House might proceed, if necessary, to the consideration of more serious Business.

said, he agreed that the hour was unfavourable for the discussion of the question raised by the Motion of the hon. Member for Galway, and suggested that the debate should be adjourned.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 13; Noes 71: Majority 58.— (Div. List, No. 160.)

Ways And Means

Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill

Resolution [August 30] reported.

Ordered, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to apply a sum out of the Consolidated Fund to the service of the year ending the thirty-first day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one, and to appropriate the Supplies granted in this Session of Parliament; and that Mr. PLAYFAIR, Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, and Lord FREDERICK CAVENDISH do prepare and bring it in.

Bill presented, and read the first time.

House adjourned at half after Three o'clock.