, in rising to call attention to the state of affairs in the Transvaal, and to move—

"That this House is of opinion that the annexation of the Transvaal was impolitic and unjustifiable, and would view with regret any measures taken by Her Majesty's Government with the object of enforcing British supremacy over the people of the Transvaal, who rightly claim their national independence;"

said, that at the outset he craved the indulgence of the House in the performance of what he deemed to be his duty. He had been deprived of the assistance of his hon. Friend the present Under Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Courtney), from whose wise counsels on former occasions he had greatly benefited, and with whom he had expected to be in alliance in making the present Motion, and in asking the attention of the House to it. But he begged that he might not be misunderstood. He believed his hon. Friend was in no sense precluded by the views he had taken upon the Transvaal Question from giving his services to a Government in whom he had, necessarily, the highest confidence. It would be utterly impossible to expect that all Members of the Liberal Party should take exactly the same views of public policy; and he (Mr. Rylands) only hoped that his hon. Friend, in his new position, would endeavour to the best of his ability to uphold the views he maintained when he sat in another part of the House. Objection had been taken in the public Press to the terms of his Motion, inasmuch as it did not recognize the Native question in connection with the Government of the Transvaal. Now, he (Mr. Rylands) wished to say that he did not in any way depreciate the importance of the Native question; but he thought that question was one which belonged rather to South Africa generally, than to any particular part of South Africa; and in order to meet it, it would be necessary that the White inhabitants should join together and lay down a policy that would be just and fair towards the Natives. But he could not think it desirable, in this question of the Transvaal, that they should include in the Resolution matters connected with Native policy, because he did not doubt that in the future, whatever might be the result of the present struggle, the protection of the Natives would be secured as far as possible by the influence of Her Majesty's Government; and he would remind hon. Gentlemen who were anxious to secure the best interests of the Native population, that their experience of the way in which the Native population had been treated in Cape Colony did not give them absolute assurance that if they were placed under the Cape Colony, they would be dealt with in a just, fair, and equitable spirit. Of course, if it could be shown that under the Transvaal Government the Natives must necessarily suffer great injustice and great cruelty, and that it would be impossible for the British Government to do anything in their favour, and if it could be shown that by withdrawing them from the Transvaal they should place them under a humane, peaceful, and just Government, then he should say that that would be a consideration that must be borne in mind. He could only remind the House that, so far from that being the fact, the very excuse that was made for taking possession of the Transvaal was that it was in the interests of peace and to protect the Zulus; and yet, by the annexation of the Transvaal, they had one of the most wicked and one of the most destructive wars that was ever levied by the Cape Colonists, or the Government at the Cape. They knew also that, under the Cape Government, there was at present a very unjust and cruel war going on; and, certainly, the excuse given for it by the Cape Colonists did not encourage them to believe that, from their administration, they could safely rely upon justice being done to the Native population. He did not propose to go into the history of the Boers in South Africa; but hon. Gentlemen must be aware that there were many instances in that history which could not be looked upon by Englishmen without some shame and regret. The Cape Government had continually taken the course of driving these people from one part of the country to another, driving them from their homesteads, and very often inflicting serious cruelties and injustice upon them. Having driven them across the Vaal, and having passed through various struggles with the Dutch Boers, at length in 1852 they entered into a Treaty; and the starting point he wished to take was the recognition, by the Treaty, of the independence of the Transvaal. He was not one of those who were superstitious in regard to the sanctity of Treaties. He believed that many Treaties had been made that might have been more honoured in the breach than in the observance; but this engagement between this country and the Boers could not be honourably broken without the full consent of the other parties to the Treaty. The Treaty of 1852 was entered into between W. S. Hogge and C. M. Owen, Her Majesty's Assistant Commissioners of the one part, and General Pretorius and a deputation of 15 members from the emigrant farmers of the other part. By that Treaty we recognized the independence of the Boers. By the 1st clause of that Treaty, the Boers were guaranteed in the fullest manner the right to manage their own affairs without interference on the part of the Queen's Government, and the British undertook that no encroachment should be made on the territory North of the Vaal River. The policy of 1852 was a wise one. The Prime Minister had pointed out in striking language the wisdom of diminishing the sphere of our responsibility. That reasoning operated powerfully in favour of our withdrawing from the Transvaal. The wise policy pursued by the Liberal Government with respect to the Transvaal, however, was reversed by their Successors when they broke that Treaty in 1877. Even if the reasons they gave for it had been proved to be as sound as they had been proved to be false, they would have formed no justification for such a breach of faith. The late Government were constantly seeking to justify an immoral policy, under the pretence of upholding "British interests." ["No, no!"] It was a policy which disregarded the rights of other nations; and, as a part of that policy, they annexed the Transvaal, sacrificing the independence of the Boers. The question to be decided was, Did the people of-the Transvaal agree to that annexation or not? So far from agreeing to it, they solemnly protested against it at the time, and they had protested against it ever since. In proof of that statement he would refer to the Blue Book published on the 9th of August, 1877. In that Blue Book it would be found that the Executive Council of the Boers, after referring to the Treaty of 1852 and our recognition of Boer independence, expressed their readiness to satisfy all just and equitable demands made upon them; but stated, at the same time, that the large majority of the people were averse from annexation and protested most strongly against it. But in that House they had been entirely misled. He recollected that when the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. James Lowther) was Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, he was asked how the annexation had been received. The reply was, that it had been received with gladness. In the Queen's Speech, too, in August, 1877, it was stated that the proclamation of the Queen's Sovereignty in the Transvaal had been received throughout the Province with enthusiasm. To say the least, that statement was an inaccuracy. He did not like to use stronger language; and although some hon. Members of Parliament might have been imposed on by it, those who knew something about the manufacturing of Queen's Speeches were not. In the country he (Mr. Rylands) had no doubt it was accepted as a positive and acknowledged fact. But in a very short time they began to discover that the statements of the late Government were not to be relied on. He thought they might assume that the fact was now universally admitted that the annexation of the Transvaal was carried in opposition to the will of the Transvaal people, and there was no excuse for it. First, a deputation representing the Boers of the Transvaal came to this country to urge the restoration of their independence. Then there was a second deputation, which represented 6,600 out of 8,000 Boers, and which stated that the people of the Transvaal in large numbers protested against the violation of their independence. Early in 1879 Sir Bartle Frere met a large assembly of Boers in conference on the subject; but his persuasive eloquence entirely failed to induce the Boers to believe they were better off under British rule than when independent. Sir Bartle Frere undertook that their representations should be conveyed to the Home Government; but no result came of those representations. It thus appeared that the annexation was carried out in utter opposition to the will of the Boers, and that we, without the slightest excuse, broke the provisions of the Treaty into which we had solemnly entered in 1852. He wished to draw attention to certain utterances of the present Prime Minister in the Mid Lothian speeches. He believed that the Prime Minister had not only raised the ideas of the people by his eloquent speeches to a high standard of public policy, but that he had touched the conscience of the nation, and that many of those who voted for the Liberal Party at the last Election had done so because they felt that their country had been degraded by the policy of the Conservative Government. In several of these speeches the Prime Minister re- ferred to the policy which had been adopted by the late Government in annexing the Transvaal. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the Transvaal as—

"A country where we have chosen most unwisely—I am tempted to say insanely—to place ourselves in the strange predicament of the free subjects of a Monarchy going to coerce the free subjects of a Republic, and to compel them to accept a citizenship which they decline and refuse. But if that is to be done, it must be done by force. There is no strength to be added to your country by governing the Transvaal."

On November 25, at Edinburgh, the right hon. Gentleman condemned the late Government for having annexed the Transvaal—a country inhabited by a free, European, Christian, Republican community—and having brought it, in spite of the protest of 6,500 of the people, within the limits of the Monarchy. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) also, at the commencement of the first Session of last year, said—

"That the annexation of the Transvaal was a measure adopted by the Government and sanctioned by the House under wrong impressions and under inaccurate information."

The noble Marquess also added that—

"If the people of England found it would be more honourable to restore the former Government, no false sense of their dignity being involved in the question ought to stand in the way; and that their true dignity would be best consulted by acknowledging that they had made a mistake, if, indeed, it was found that a mistake had been made, and restoring the Government of the Transvaal."—[3 Hansard, ccl. 92.]

Those sentences of the noble Marquess were truly honourable. They evinced the same kind of real British honour as the noble Marquess showed when, in reply to a deputation about the retention of Candahar, he said—"The first question we have to consider is, What right have we there?" It was, he thought, refreshing to hear such sentiments as these after our late experience of a Conservative régime. Well, these declarations of the right hon. Gentleman and the noble Marquess were, of course, published in Africa, and they naturally excited hopes among the inhabitants of the Transvaal, that when the present Government should accede to power, the decision of their Predecessors would be reversed. Why had it not been reversed? He was not going to condemn the Government, for he knew the difficulties in which they were placed by the inheritance of their Predecessors' policy, and by the deception practised by official correspondents and others, whose object was that the Government at home should remain satisfied with the policy at present prevailing in connection with the Transvaal. Since the accession to Office of the present Government there had been a constant system of misrepresentation by the officials of the Colony, which had led Her Majesty's Ministers to suppose that the state of things in the Transvaal had been comparatively satisfactory. In a recent number of a leading Cape journal, The Cape Argus, were the following words:—

"As to the profound discontent of the entire population in the Province so rudely annexed there can be no doubt. As to the detestation in which the Government is held, by British winkler and British adventurer, as well as Boer, that is a fact beyond question or cavil. The authorities appear to have been systematically misrepresenting the situation. Despatch after despatch has gone to England, leading the Secretary of State to believe that the Boer population was fast ceasing to care for independence. The present gathering at Paardekraal is a sufficient answer to these mischievous perversions of what we do not pretend to regard as other than a most unfortunate truth. The most glowing accounts of financial revival have been periodically published abroad, By these our scepticism was more than once aroused, and the mail which arrived yesterday brought us a copy of the one Pretoria newspaper which is on the side of British rule, and this we find describing them as 'fallacious in every respect.'"

No one, he (Mr. Rylands) maintained, who read the despatches of Sir Owen Lanyon, could doubt that that official was one of those who were in the habit of closing their eyes in order to avoid seeing what they would not like to see. There was evidence of that in Sir Owen Lanyon's recent despatches, in which he said the Government would be strangely wrong were it to mistake the clamour of agitators for public opinion. It was, he (Mr. Rylands) thought, a most singular thing that whenever we found ourselves ruling people despotically, our Representatives never failed to persuade us that any expressions of the public will and of discontent did not emanate from the vox populi, but came from agitators and others actuated by self-interest. The result of our refusal to admit the grievance of the Transvaal people was the terrible struggle in which we were now involved—for terrible he deemed it to be. The justification of the Government lay in the fact that they had, no doubt, been deceived by their Representatives. But he thought the Government had also been anxious to maintain a continuity of Government policy. It was understood that when one political Party succeeded another, there should be a continuity of Governmental policy in regard to foreign affairs as far as possible, and, no doubt, in regard to Colonial affairs. He was not prepared to dispute that continuity of policy in some cases might be justifiable. He was not prepared to deny that, in many cases, it was undesirable that where it could be avoided there should be an absolute reversal of previous Governmental policy; but the continuity of policy was really the continuity of the permanent officials of the State to a great extent, and he had no doubt whatever that the Colonial Office was entirely in favour of the annexation of the Transvaal. But there were exceptions, and these were where an iniquitous policy had been followed. He had no doubt Her Majesty's Government believed that this policy was an unfortunate one to have entered upon, and that they would rejoice if it were possible that that annexation should never have taken place. He had not brought forward his Motion with the view of indicating that he had not perfect confidence in Her Majesty's Government carrying out those principles of policy which the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) advocated before he took Office. He brought forward his Motion simply because he felt that they were possibly getting into an obligation which would involve them still further in a policy which was iniquitous in its commencement, and was criminal in its development. The Government must either give up this iniquitous policy and seek some means by which they could restore to the inhabitants of the Transvaal that independence to which they had a just claim, or they must decide to support this iniquitous policy to its bitter end, to use all the power of Great Britain in order to crush the Boers of the Transvaal. No false idea about British honour and British prestige need affect their judgment in regard to a question of this kind. The world would never believe that they did not put forth their power against the Dutch in the Transvaal because they were afraid of them. If they did not crush them, it would be known, to the world that it was because they did not believe it was just to crush them. The House should bear in mind that these few thousand Dutchmen were connected by ties of blood, and by national sympathy with two-thirds of the White inhabitants of Cape Colony. It was impossible to take any steps to crush the Dutch in the Transvaal without creating the most painful feeling amongst the loyal subjects of the British Crown in the Cape Colony. The Cape Argus dwelt upon that fact, and a speaker at a recent deputation to the Administrator (Sir George Strahan) used these remarkable words—

"We are very anxious about this Transvaal matter. We see the agitation which is going on here, and which must be expected to go on throughout the whole of the country. It is of no use disguising the fact, that there must be a fellow-feeling between the inhabitants of the Cape Colony and the Transvaal. In the present state of affairs, anything occurring in the Transvaal cannot fail to prejudice the Cape Colony and the majority of Cape Colonists. Every shot fired in the Transvaal will find its echo down here in the Cape Colony. Every drop of blood shed in the Transvaal will sow the seeds of that bitter feeling which was dying away between Dutch and English."

They had proof, also, of the sympathy of the different sections of the Dutch population with each other in the very influentially signed and representative Memorial presented to the English Government by the inhabitants of Holland. He could not but think that the Government were prepared to do justice to a weak and struggling race, and, therefore, he begged to move the Resolution of which he had given Notice.

, in seconding the Motion, said, he did so in the firm conviction that it was most desirable, at the present conjuncture of affairs, that the whole of the facts as to the relations of this country with the Transvaal should be subjected to the thorough sifting and investigation which resulted from a debate in that House. He, of course, agreed that the first duty of the Government was to assert the dignity and authority of the British arms; but when that had been done, they would have to consider certain important political conditions to which, perhaps, it was not inappropriate that he should now invite the attention of the House. He thought it had been conclusively shown, and the people of this country could not too often be told the fact, that the repre- sentations under which the Earl of Carnarvon was originally induced to sanction the annexation of the Transvaal were not borne out by subsequent events, but had rather been confuted by the official Papers which had been presented to Parliament. Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who was mainly instrumental in bringing about that annexation, based his policy upon three grounds—first, that the state of the Transvaal was anarchical; secondly, that danger was involved in a continuance of this state of affairs; and, thirdly, that in consequence of the anarchy which existed in the Transvaal, a large and important section of the population desired to have annexation with this country; and it was upon that view that the instructions which were sent out by Lord Carnarvon were drawn up. Certain conditions were put forth as a basis; but he (Mr. Cartwright) believed that those on which the annexation was to take place were not fulfilled. It was in January, 1876, when Sir Theophilus Shepstone arrived at Pretoria. He did not put forward that he had come to bring about annexation; he represented himself as having come to confer with the Transvaal Government in respect to certain events which constituted a danger to the English Colonies. There was no evidence to show that at that time there existed any hostile feeling against the English in the Transvaal. Shortly afterwards, Sir Theophilus Shepstone initiated the annexation policy, and supported it with Memorials from the Transvaal population. Now, it was evident that much depended upon the character of those Memorials. He (Mr. Cartwright) had, therefore, carefully examined them as they appeared in the Blue Books, and the conclusion that he had come to was that they could not be considered as fairly representative of the public opinion of the Transvaal. Some had no names attached to them, only the number of signatures being given, and where names did appear they were principally signed by Englishmen who lived in the hamlets which were called towns in the Transvaal; while the Dutch farmers, who really formed the White population of the country, had nothing to do in the matter at all. It should be remembered that the condition of the Transvaal was, that there was a Dutch population and an English population; the former resided in the country dis- tricts, and were scattered far and wide, and the latter in the hamlets—places called towns—and the capital, Pretoria, had not more than 600 inhabitants. Those Memorials did not at all show the measure of feeling existing among the whole population; but they were acted upon, and the annexation pure and simple took place. Sir Theophilus Shepstone next instituted a Commission to inquire into the financial condition of the country, and he selected as the head of that Commission a gentleman who had for some years been engaged in commerce in Natal, and large tracts of land in the Transvaal had been purchased, if not in his name, at any rate for his profit. It should not be forgotten, too, that at the time of the annexation Sir Theophilus Shepstone issued a proclamation, in the course of which he promised that the annexed Transvaal should have not only a continuance of the existing system of law, but a Legislative Assembly to conduct its own affairs. This promise had not been fulfilled, and the inhabitants of the territory had good ground for complaining on that score. The people of the Transvaal might not be able to hold their own successfully against disciplined arms; but they had shown all the pertinacity and tenacity which in former times marked the conduct of people who resisted the aggression of strangers. It was a fact worthy of notice that whereas Sir Theophilus Shepstone had, whilst in Natal, considered the Boers wrong in their frontier dispute with the Zulus, as soon as he was established in the Transvaal he completely changed his views. From the moment of the annexation the Boers tried to bring home to the mind of the British Government the fact that they loved their independence and that annexation was a thing detestable in their eyes. They sent to England a deputation, who put this view in simple and forcible language before the Earl of Carnarvon, who was at that time Secretary of State for the Colonies. The noble Earl heard what the deputation had to say, and simply informed them that, annexation having become an accomplished fact, Her Majesty's Government could not go back from the position they had taken up. When this deputation returned to their own country and stated the result of their visit, they were told that it could not be; and the leaders issued a document upon the subject, which re- minded him (Mr. Cartwright) of the old Covenanters. The inhabitants left their farms and travelled, some of them hundreds of miles, in order to protest against the course which had been taken, and to urge that, in their view, the Imperial Government would consent to listen to reason and justice. The assembled inhabitants of the Transvaal, not satisfied with the result of the first mission, clubbed together and provided the necessary funds to defray the charges of a second deputation, who came to this country in order to lay before the Government the views of their countrymen on this subject. Those views were fully set forth by the deputation; but no satisfactory answer was given to them, and on their return to the Transvaal they had to report the fact, together with a statement that the promises made by Sir Theophilus Shepstone in his proclamation were not to be fulfilled, unless it could be supposed that a Legislative Council to manage the affairs of the Transvaal could be satisfactory which consisted mainly of persons who did not know the Dutch language. It was absurd to suppose that a Government of the kind could win the affections or soothe the asperities of a people who felt that they suffered under a grievance of which they had a right to complain. The danger with which the Government was menaced was a grave one, and he hoped the House and the Government would not hesitate in giving to it most serious consideration. The danger of annexing a hostile population was not a small one. It was, on the contrary, one which, under certain circumstances, might tax the power even of this great Empire. The British Army might be able to meet the Boers in the field and to shoot them down, but they would never subdue their indomitable spirit. Had anything been done by the Government calculated in any way to satisfy the wants of the Transvaal? There was a Legislative Council; but there were on it only two Dutchmen, the rest being Englishmen, who were squatters and adventurers. Was a Council so constituted calculated to win the affections and soothe the asperities of the people? The Colonial tendencies that had carried us to the Transvaal were of the most dangerous kind, tending in the direction of an African Empire, which this country would have to support; and those ten- dencies were explicitly set forth, in a characteristic despatch by Sir Bartle Frere at the very time that we were annexing the Transvaal. He hoped the example set by what was so wisely done in 1852 would not be lost upon Her Majesty's Government, and that when the proper time came, and when we had vindicated our arms, some settlement would be arrived at which would insure to those populations that which, they would not cease to seek—namely, their autonomy. He begged to second the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), and thought he might appeal to the House to accept it.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House is of opinion that the annexation of the Transvaal was impolitic and unjustifiable, and would view with regret any measures taken by Her Majesty's Government with the object of enforcing British supremacy over the people of the Transvaal, who rightfully claim their national independence,"—( Mr. Rylands, )

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

, who had given Notice of his intention to move the Previous Question, but who was precluded from doing so by the Forms of the House, said, his hon. Friends who introduced the subject had claimed the indulgence of the House, and he had to make the same appeal, on the ground that a very few hours ago no hon. Member knew that the debate could be proceeded with that night. His hon. Friends had put forward their views with great force and skill, not only in the points they brought forward, but in those they avoided. His hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) had expressed unlimited confidence in Her Majesty's Government, notwithstanding that his Resolution was really a Vote of Censure; and his hon. Friend who spoke last (Mr. Cartwright) said that no settlement could take place until after the vindication of our authority, a view quite inconsistent with the terms of his own Resolution. He (Sir John Lubbock) could not, for his part, see how the Queen's authority could be maintained, except by the steps the Go- vernment were taking. His hon. Friend the Member for Burnley said he would not enter into the Native question; but that question was the whole gist of the controversy—a question, moreover, which the Government could not avoid, since it rested at the root of the whole difficulty. The hon. Member had quoted the Sand River Convention in support of his view; but had omitted from it one very material passage. It was there agreed that slavery should no longer be carried on in the Transvaal. His hon. Friend began his Resolution by inviting the House to affirm that the annexation of the Transvaal was impolitic and unjust. The first statement he (Sir John Lubbock) was not disposed to question. He did not feel called upon, nor did he think that that was at all a convenient moment to express any opinion upon it. So far, however, he would concede to his hon. Friend; that at the time and in the manner in which the annexation was effected, it was, in his judgment, impolitic; it involved us in heavy expense and great responsibility. Beyond that, however, he was unable to go with his hon. Friend. He could not think the annexation was an unjust act on our part. No one could read the South African newspapers, or even those portions which had been laid on the Table of the House, without being convinced that the Boers behaved with great cruelty towards the unfortunate Natives. Sir Henry Barkly's despatches contained numerous and indignant letters with reference to the atrocities perpetrated on them. In his despatch of December 18, 1876, he says—

"I had felt it my duty to address President Burgers against the barbarous mode in which, according to accounts from many quarters, the war with Secocœni is being prosecuted."

Lord Carnarvon, in April, 1877, said—

"Her Majesty's Government, after having given full consideration to all the information obtainable on the subject, and with every desire to view matters in the most favourable light, deeply regret that they are forced to come to the conclusion that the barbarities alleged to have been committed, though denied by the Transvaal Government, have, in fact, occurred."

But the ground of complaint against the late Government of the so-called South African Republic was not confined to the mode in which they carried on war. A system of slavery had been organized, which certainly ought not only to be condemned by every generous mind, but which was in direct contravention to the Sand River Conference, in which we made the absence of slavery a condition of our recognition. His hon. Friend had several times referred to The Cape Argus as a paper of authority in support of his proposition. He (Sir John Lubbock), however, would now quote to them that very paper in the opposite sense. That newspaper, speaking on the subject, said—

"The whole world may know it, for it is true, and investigation will only bring out the horrible details that, through the whole course of this Republic's existence, it has acted in contravention of the Sand River Treaty; and slavery has occurred, not only here and there in isolated cases; but as an unbroken practice has been one of the peculiar institutions of the country; mixed up with all its social and political life. It has been at the root of most of its wars. It has been carried on regularly even in times of peace. It has been characterized by all those circumstances which have so often roused the British nation to an indignant protest, and to repeated efforts to banish the Slave Trade from the world. The Boers have not only fallen upon unsuspecting kraals simply for the purpose of obtaining the women, children, and cattle, but they have carried on a traffic through Natives, who have kidnapped the children of their weaker neighbours and sold them to the White man. Again, the Boers have sold and exchanged their victims among themselves. Waggon-loads of slaves have been conveyed from one end of the country to the other for sale, and that with the cognizance of, and for the direct advantage of, the highest officials of the land."

Other local papers expressed themselves quite as strongly. But it was not only the local Press and Her Majesty's Representatives who expressed themselves so strongly. The German missionaries themselves, who could not be supposed to have any leaning one way or the other, were equally outspoken. The Rev. Mr. Ludorf, for instance, protested most strongly against the cruelties exercised towards the defenceless Natives. Mr. Merensky, another German missionary, says that the Transvaal was a

"Vast preserve for the Slave Trade; wide fields over which the lust of land and cattle and of the bodies of men may hold its devastating sway."

Mr. Nachtigal, of the Berlin Missionary Society, who had also resided for many years in the Transvaal, spoke most indignantly in similar terms. He protested against the proceedings of the Boers

"As in conflict with all the laws of civilized nations, and as placing me in the eyes of my fellow-men as a dishonourable man and a deceiver. I can only conclude that those concerned in this matter are too cowardly to be merciful."

Even President Burgers himself admitted that the Natives had been cruelly treated. He said—

"Do you know what has recently happened in Turkey? Because no civilized Government was carried on there the Great Powers interfered and said, thus far and no further. And if this is done to an Empire, will a little Republic be excused when it misbehaves. Complain to other Powers, and seek justice there? If we want justice, we must be in a position to ask it with unsullied hands."

He (Sir John Lubbock) was unwilling to dwell on this painful part of the subject; but the hon. Member forced him to allude to it. Now, what was the condition of the Transvaal at the time of the annexation? People often spoke as if it was a country inhabited by a sturdy and numerous people of Dutch extraction. That was entirely a mistake. They were told that three-fourths of the people were strongly opposed to British rule. But what were the numbers? The country itself was about as large as France, and it contained about 40,000 White men and 800,000 Natives. Of the 40,000 Whites, it was calculated that there were 8,000 adult males, and that of these 6,000 were opposed to British rule. But the idea that 6,000 should claim to hold a country as large as France was one of the most preposterous pretensions on record in history. The 800,000 Natives, the original owners of the soil, surely ought to be considered; and they were bitterly opposed, not without good reason, to Boer rule. Indeed, at the time of the annexation, the Boer Government had utterly collapsed. The country was in a state of anarchy; the Treasury was empty; the salaries of the officials were unpaid; the Government had overdue bills which it was unable to meet; the military system had broken down; the Boers were split into factions, and were surrounded by a warlike and hostile population. To show how powerless the Government was, he might mention that at Lydenburg a public meeting was held in October, 1876, and a remonstrance was addressed to the Volksraad, signed by nearly every adult male of Lydenburg, and Kruger's Post. They said—

"Matters in connection with the war with Secocœni are daily becoming more complicated, our position more critical, and we have looked vainly for help and for the fulfilment of the promises made by His Honour the State President while at Lydenburg. … It is alone attributable to Providence that everything has not been burnt and devastated by our enemies. The assistance promised has not been afforded, and lately no effort has been made by the Government to stop the war."

They continued—

"An attack by Kaffirs will inevitably result in the murder of our families, to say nothing of the destruction of property. We therefore request the Government candidly to let us know whether it intends to do aught for this district; and, if not, or if it is not in a position to do anything, to let us know, so that we may try to adopt measures for our own preservation. We were surprised to notice the Confederation with the British Power, so nobly offered, was not accepted, inasmuch as we have all to gain and nothing to lose thereby, the more that it continually appears that the Government is not in a position to properly protect us, as is evident from the unpunished incendiarism and thieving by the Kaffirs. If no other measure can be devised to quell the disturbances, we desire that the Government proceed to request the intervention of some other Power."

As proving how hopeless was the financial condition of the country on the eve of a war with Cetewayo, who was not, as was afterwards found, so easy to beat, he might state that a bill for £2,500 to the Port Contractors being overdue, the Government, after much pressing, promised to pay £1,500 in a fortnight, or to forfeit £2,000; and yet when the time came only £600 was forthcoming. The Volksraad themselves, having appointed a Special Committee to consider the disastrous state of the finances, after receiving their Report, resolved that it appeared

"From the Report of the Financial Commission that the taxes have not, for the greater part, been paid; and it has thus become impossible, under such circumstances, for the Government to carry on the administration and control of the country."

The President himself hoped for a moment that the Volksraad might in-trust him with greater powers, and that then possibly it might be in his power to "right the State," as he said. He introduced his Reform Bill, and, according to Sir Theophilus Shepstone—

"He enforced the necessity of adopting this measure very strongly upon the Volksraad as the only possible means of saving their independence; but the Raad threw it out without even discussing it."

Lest it should be supposed that he (Sir John Lubbock) was taking too gloomy a view, he would quote from the candid and graphic speech to the Volksraad, delivered shortly before the annexation by Mr. Burgers, the President of the Republic. After detailing the ruinous state to which affairs had drifted, he alluded to the non-payment of taxes, and the consequent state of bankruptcy which had ensued. He said—

"To-day a bill for £1,100 was laid before me for signature; but I would sooner have cut off my right hand than sign that paper, for I have not the slightest ground to expect that when that bill becomes due there will be a penny to pay it with."

At that very moment, without money and without military organization, the Boers were in imminent danger of being attacked by an overwhelming Native force. His people, said President Burgers—

"Were as good as any other people; but they were completely demoralized."

Then he referred in warm terms to the ant, extolling its patience, industry, and courage. He wished, he said, that they had

"The instinct of that little insect, the wisdom and sense shown by the ant."

He continued—

"We should delude ourselves by entertaining the hope that matters would mend by-and-bye. It would be only self-deceit. I tell you openly, matters are as bad as they ever can be; they cannot be worse. These are bitter truths, and people may, perhaps, turn their backs on me. But then I shall have the consolation of having done my duty."

It was, perhaps, too much to expect that the President of any State would say, in so many words, that his Government had broken down utterly; but what was President Burgers's advice to his fellow-countrymen? What were his aspirations for the future of his country? He said—

"Let them make the best of the situation and get the best terms they possibly could; let them agree to join their hands to those of their brethren on the South, and then from the Cape to the Zambesi there would be one great people. Yes; there was something grand in that, grander even than their idea of a Republic, something which ministered to their national feeling; and would this be so miserable? Yes; this would be miserable for those who would not be under the law, for the rebel and the revolutionist; but welfare and prosperity for, the man of law and order."

But what was the opinion of the people? So hopeless was the state of things, so imminent the danger, that Sir Theophilus Shepstone received addresses in favour of annexation from many towns and districts—from Potchefstrooin, Lydenburg, Pilaansburg, Bloemhof, Waterburg, Middleburg, Rustemberg, &c. They were told that the Petitions presented to the English for annexation were from, small towns; but it must be remembered that, though they were small compared with British towns, they were about the most important the Transvaal possessed, and it must be further remembered that there were no Petitions in the other sense. The principal Transvaal newspaper expressed, in fact, the general opinion when it said—

"It would be mere affectation on our part if we were to hint a belief that the change would not be beneficial to the country, although we do not share the extravagant ideas of rapid progress which some of our friends anticipate. And although we would have preferred to have seen the improvement brought about by our own agency, yet now that another Power has stepped in which will accomplish the change quicker than we could have wrought it, we are not going to quarrel with that Power."

One little indication of this was afforded by the fact that the Proclamation of Annexation was actually printed in the printing-press of the late Government. No doubt, it was much to be regretted that the consent of the Volksraad was not obtained. But if they did not assent, neither did they dissent. It was true that in February they passed a Resolution in favour of maintaining their isolation; but the annexation did not take place till the middle of April. By that time things had become much worse, and then was the time they ought to have protested. This they did not do. Moreover, we must remember not only the addresses which Sir Theophilus Shepstone had received, not only the tacit acquiescence of the people of Pretoria, but also the alarming state of affairs with the Natives. During the second week of April things looked still more serious; and, fearing a catastrophe, which might have happened at any moment, Sir Theophilus Shepstone did not venture even to wait for the actual annexation, and, accordingly, the day before it took place, he sent a trusted messenger to the Zulu King, informing him of his intention. The reply was as follows:—

"I thank my father for his message. The Dutch have tired me out, and I intended to fight with them once, and once only, and to drive them over the Vaal. My armies are gathered. It was to fight the Dutch I called them together. Now I will send them back to their homes."

It would be seen, therefore, that Cetewayo was on the point of swooping down on the helpless Boers. The annexation of the Transvaal was often spoken of as if it had been an act of arbitrary violence. But what were the facts? Sir Theophilus Shepstone entered the country with a staff of 12 persons and 25 Native policemen. He found the country in a state of bankruptcy, anarchy, and terror. As he moved slowly up to Pretoria, he was everywhere well received by the inhabitants, who held meetings in favour of annexation, but none against it. Though he had no troops with him, and had given notice of his intention, he met with no opposition when he proclaimed the annexation, not by stealth, as the hon. Member for Burnley said, but in open day in the principal square of the town. At Pretoria itself the state of things was long and frankly discussed with the Executive Government. Sir Theophilus Shepstone's idea of annexing the country was long known, but no meetings to protest against annexation were held; the Volksraad did not themselves protest. No force was threatened. The English troops were a month's march away. At last Sir Theophilus annexed the country—which, be it remembered, was as large as France and had a population of nearly 1,000,000 persons—with a force of 12 Englishmen and 25 Colonial policemen. The whole thing read like a scene in a fairy tale rather than one of real history; and Lord Beaconsfield was, perhaps, the more disposed to accept the annexation because it must have reminded him of a chapter from Endymion or Lothair. Although a representation was sent over here against it, at the same time a Petition, which was influentially signed, was sent to the contrary effect. He did not understand why his hon. Friend (Mr. Cartwright) should speak so slightingly of the English settlers. Surely our countrymen who vested their money there had rights as well as people of other nationalities. The fact of the Government of the Republic having been cognizant of all the steps taken, and of having made no resistance, proved that the act was not done against their wishes. Under these circumstances, he contended that if there was not a feeling in favour of annexation, there was no strong feeling against it at the time. Yet now, after we had spent our money and shed our blood, conquered their enemies, improved their finances, restored law and order and security, we were met with obloquy and abuse, with violence, if not with treachery, and were accused of having committed a violent act of arbitrary injustice. But while it seemed clear that when we annexed the Transvaal a considerable proportion of the White population were really in favour of that step, while it was obviously impossible that Sir Theophilus Shepstone and his 25 men could not, after ample notice, have annexed a country as large as France without the consent of the people, it was much to be regretted that he did not obtain the actual assent of the nominal Government, or of the Volksraad. He would, perhaps, say that the danger of war with the Natives was so imminent that it might have broken out at any moment, and that when blood was shed it would have been very difficult to restore peace. That might be; but the fact was not the less to be regretted. The real state of the case was well put in a Petition in favour of annexation, and protesting against the so-called mission of Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen, which was very influentially signed by members of the Volksraad, landowners, and other influential inhabitants of the Transvaal. These gentlemen, writing in June, 1877, say—

"That the fact of the Government of the Republic having been cognizant of all the steps taken by the Special Commissioner from the commencement, and the Legislature and the population generally practically acquiescing in the Act, proves that it was not against their wishes or real interests.

"That the mission of Sir Theophilus Shepstone was known to the country long prior to the Proclamation of Annexation being read, and that no movement was organized to prevent that step being taken.

"That the plea of coercion cannot be maintained, as no armed force entered the country until after the annexation, and no attempt whatever was made to oppose the small number that subsequently did arrive.

"That the inherent weakness of the former Administration was such that anarchy already prevailed, and civil war would to a certainty have resulted had the Special Commissioner left without proclaiming the country."

As regarded the Natives, one of Sir Theophilus Shepstone's first acts was to summon a large meeting, numerously attended by the most influential Chiefs. After he had explained to them what had been done, they expressed their satisfaction at the change, their thanks for what he had said, and their confidence that their grievances would now be redressed. But perhaps it would be said that in maintaining that the Boers, at any rate, had no ground of complaint against us we deceived ourselves; that no one could make a good judge in his own case, or decide fairly when his own interests were concerned. That was true; but that very consideration seemed to strengthen his argument. This country assuredly gained nothing by the annexation of the Transvaal; one of the first results was that they had to provide £100,000 for the pressing and immediate necessities of government, and they had also entailed on themselves heavy military expenditure. They would not grudge their lives or money to protect their brother Whitemen at the Cape; but it did seem hard that, having lavished both the one and the other, the Boers should repay them with obloquy and violence. On the other hand, the Transvaal itself had immensely gained. The security of life and property was restored. The income, which had fluctuated between £58,000 and £65,000, rose, without any new taxes, and, though the war tax was remitted, to £82,000 in 1878, £93,000 in 1879, while the first six months of 1880 produced £84,000. He had received a very respectable Petition signed by a number of Dutch citizens. He had a most sincere admiration for the Dutch people, and was most anxious to retain their good opinion. With the spirit of that document he concurred; but if those who signed it had had the facts fully before them, he felt sure they would have acquitted us entirely of any avarice or injustice, and do us the justice to believe that in very difficult circumstances we had done what we thought to be our duty; and in defence of the Boers had not hesitated to spend British money, and, alas, to sacrifice British lives. The truth seemed to be that when the Boers found themselves in the face of a powerful enemy, with a bankrupt Treasury, and in a state of anarchy, they welcomed our protection; now that we had restored order, replenished their Exchequer, and vanquished their enemies, many of them sighed for the old state of lawless licence, and chafed at the idea of being, not so much under British rule, as under any rule at all. They were told that the people of the Transvaal claimed their "national independence." These 6,000 Boers claimed a great deal more than that; they claimed for themselves to rule over, as he had said, a country as large as France, and to exercise a dominion over 800,000 Natives. He would not enlarge on the manner in which they were carrying on the struggle, or refer to the cruel treachery with which they were said to have acted, because he would fain hope that the accounts we had received might admit of some explanation. Under existing circumstances, however, he could not imagine that the House would do anything to weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government, or discourage the loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal. Her Majesty, in Her Gracious Speech from the Throne, informed them that it was her wish

"To give the European settlers in the Transvaal full control over their own affairs, without prejudice to the interests of the Natives."

The policy of Her Majesty's Government, as stated in the Instructions given to Sir Hercules Robinson, was as follows:—

"Her Majesty's Government have anxiously looked forward to the time when it might be possible to confer such institutions on the Transvaal also; but the recent news of an attempt to overthrow the Queen's sovereignty by armed force renders it useless to discuss arrangements which can only be practicable when the authority of the Crown has been vindicated, and the maintenance of tranquillity is firmly assured. When this has been effected Her Majesty's Government will be prepared carefully to consider the best means of assuring to the Dutch settlers such full control of their local affairs as may be consistent with the general interests of Her Majesty's Dominions in South Africa, and with the obligations which have been incurred by this country to the very large Native population in the Transvaal."

The English Government was, therefore, in favour of giving the settlers in the Transvaal full control of their own affairs. For his own part, indeed, he (Sir John Lubbock) regretted that the Government of the Transvaal should have so utterly broken down. A strong and free State there would have been a great advantage. If such a State entered into a South African Confederation voluntarily so much the better; if they were really reluctant to do so they could never be a source of strength to the Empire. They had not, however, now to deal with facts as they could wish them to be, but as they were; and, being quite satisfied with the Instructions given to Sir Hercules Robinson, he should much regret any Resolution of the House which would seem to imply a difference of opinion or want of confidence in Her Majesty's Government. Any appearance of disunion among themselves, the adoption of any Resolution such as that proposed, could only encourage resistance, and prolong and intensify the war. He was satisfied with the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the Transvaal, and hoped the Motion would not be pressed to a division; and though things at the present moment looked gloomy there, he was as anxious as anyone that the present unfortunate war might soon be brought to an end; that the policy of giving the Boers all possible power of managing their own affairs, as desired by both the late and present Governments, might happily be carried out; and that we might soon see the Transvaal a prosperous, contented, and self-supporting people, none the less free because it formed a part of this great Empire.

said, that, from what was said by some persons, one would think that the Transvaal was a model Republic, such as had been the dream of philosophers from Plato to the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands). He, on the other hand, maintained that the Boers were curvœ in terras animœ ac cœlestium inanes, as was proved by the statements just made by the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock) as to the relations of the Republic with the Natives, which indicated what were the origin and character of this Government. The truth was that the Boers, who were originally British subjects, disgusted with the abolition of slavery by the British Government in 1834, rather than give up their slaves, marched forward from the possessions they originally inhabited, and squatted on the large tract of land on which they now lived, said to be the finest in South Africa. The course taken in 1852 had been referred to as a precedent to recommend to Her Majesty's Govern- ment; but the two cases were not analogous. In 1852, the Colonial Office, which had previously claimed authority over those regions, entered into the Treaty referred to by his hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright), in the 1st Article of which it was stipulated that no slavery should exist in the Transvaal. There could be no question that that Article had been most grossly violated. A system of slavery had been introduced, in atrocity second to none that ever existed in the world. England, it was forcibly urged some years ago by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright) and the Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. W. E. Forster), could extend no sympathy to the Southern States of America, because slavery existed there; but, whatever could be said against the slavery existing in the Southern States of America, much more might be said against that system which prevailed in the South African Republic. The Southern States treated their slaves with humanity, and, at all events, even in cases of exceptional harshness, they took care of them as cattle; but the Boers murdered the adults, both men and women, and carried the children into slavery. The hon. Member for the University of London referred to a case in which a number of children too young to be carried into slavery were burned alive; and he (Mr. R. N. Fowler) asked the House whether it was prepared to support a Republic which could be guilty of such atrocities, and where such a system of domestic slavery was maintained? The atrocities of the Boers made the surrounding Natives so hostile that it was impossible for them to maintain their independence. Whatever they might say now, they were then very glad to have the ægis of British protection thrown over them. It was now stigmatized as a nefarious transaction; but it was not so then. They were glad to be protected by British bayonets. Indeed, it was in consequence of the annexation we became involved in the quarrel with the Zulus, which led us into a disastrous and expensive war. When the annexation was made, no objection was taken either by Lord Kimberley or by Lord Brabourne (then Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen), the official Representatives of the Party opposite in their last Government, and the latter noble Lord had recently expressed approval of it; and, in fact, it took place with the approval of some of the most eminent Members of the Liberal Party, and with the general assent of a large number of the Members of that House. Only one Member of the present Government (Mr. Courtney) was strongly adverse to it; but he was then a private Member; and the Office he now held had nothing to do with the question. If the details which had been given of the insurrection were correct, as to the treacherous attack on the convoy at Heidelberg, he hoped no hon. Member would get up and defend the Boers, who had been all along a slave-holding and slave-trading race. The annexation of the Transvaal was a necessity; and he most earnestly appealed to the House not to support a Republic, to which he might apply the burning words of Canning—

"Its infant lips were stained with blood, its whole existence has been a series of rapacity, cruelty, and murder."

said, he had as little sympathy with slavery as any-one; but it should be remembered that the Transvaal was not annexed because the Boers were slaveholders, and he wished to remind the House that when reference was made to that institution the conduct of England with regard to it had not always been consistent. It should be remembered that although the emancipation of our West Indian Colonies was highly creditable to us as a nation, we had subsequently adopted a policy which gave a great impetus to the Slave Trade in order that we might obtain cheap sugar. He was not prepared to question the motives of the late Government for what it did in the annexation of the Transvaal, nor the present Government for continuing that policy; but he must say that, in his judgment, it could not be justified upon any ground of public law or expediency. He would, at the same time, admit that the late Government had acted with the best intentions, accepting in good faith the representations which were made to them on the subject. The hon. Baronet the Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock) had referred to the Boers as arrogating to themselves the right of ruling over a district as large as France; but they must remember that it was the British Government which gave the Boers this right. We gave it to them by solemn treaty; and when, within a year after the Transvaal had become an independent Republic, complaints were made by some societies of their misconduct, the Duke of Newcastle, in a despatch from the Colonial Office, said distinctly that while he was prepared to use friendly offices he declined to interfere, because—

"As the Convention with, the Boers recognized their independence, any act of interference which might lead to collision was totally out of the question."

No doubt, the finances of the Boers were low; but he had yet to learn that because a people were insolvent and could not meet their obligations that afforded justification to the British Government for putting an end to its independence. If that was a reason for annexation, there were countries nearer home that the Government might annex, and with greater show of reason. The insolvency of the Transvaal did not concern foreign States. It affected only its internal obligations. What a valuable acquisition this insolvent country was, when we had to advance £100,000 at once, and since then £140,000 more to carry on improvements and public works. No doubt, under English rule they would be benefited; but that was no reason for enforcing our rule. We hunted these people before from Natal, and with our consent they went forth and founded an independent Republic. Who were these men? They were the descendants of a great race—a race that for 80 years withstood the whole power of Spain. Such men were not likely to submit to a rule which they detested, and which they had endeavoured to avoid. The country was in extent about 114,000 square miles, thinly peopled, its towns, little more than hamlets, and its White population distributed over that enormous tract, families being separated 10 miles from one another. Were we going to embark in a war against these men, to send an army to take one farm and then another 10 miles off? The hon. Baronet the Member for the University of London said that we must first of all establish the authority of the Crown. What did that mean but shooting down these people? He (Mr. Serjeant Simon) believed that the dignity of the Crown and the honour of the country would be best established by acting with justice. He did not believe that either the dignity of the Crown or the honour of the country could be promoted by the shooting, or hunting down of people who had protested from first to last against our rule, and from whom we had no claim of loyalty. The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government had said that—

"The late Prime Minister had spoken of difficulties in Europe and Asia, but of the difficulties in Africa he did not speak; and yet there, without the slightest necessity or excuse, he spent £5,000,000 of their money in invading a country which did him no wrong, and was trying to spend more of their money in establishing the authority of the Queen over a community Protestant in religion, and Dutch in origin, against their will."

He (Mr. Serjeant Simon) did not wish to embarrass the Government, nor did his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands); but the discussion of the question would be useful as showing the opinion of the great constituencies of the Kingdom; it would impel the Government, and give them strength to act in accordance with the policy which the right hon. Gentleman had shadowed forth. In the Instructions to Sir Hercules Robinson it was stated that—

"Her Majesty's Government anxiously looked forward to the time when they could confer free institutions on the Transvaal; when that was effected, they were prepared to consider the best means of insuring full control over their local affairs."

He should like an explanation of that passage. Did it mean that they were to continue a kind of semi-rule over that country—to have a Republic within the dominion of the Crown—that the White men were to have an independent Government, with the right to manage their own affairs, with or without the superintendence of the Colonial Office, and that the Black men were to be under the Crown? We had widespread possessions; but we should desire least of all to extend those possessions into the interior of a savage country. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had said that the prospect of the multiplication of our possessions from sea to sea was far from desirable. We were at peace with the Transvaal when we took possession of the country. His hon. Friend (Sir John Lubbock) said that the people had notice. But in a country as large as France, with a scattered population, what was the good of a notice to the people of Pretoria? There was no doubt that from the beginning the people made a stand against annexation. They sent delegates to England to protest against it. It was not until all peaceful measures had been exhausted that, at last, 6,000 armed men assembled at Pretoria to protest against our rule. He never knew a case in which a people had more modestly and humbly claimed their rights, rights which we had given them. Their conduct from first to last had been praiseworthy and admirable. It was only when every peaceable effort had failed that they had recourse to arms. He hoped that, if it was deemed necessary to vindicate what was called the authority of the Crown, Her Majesty's Government would spare the lives of these men and treat them leniently, for they had only fought for the liberties which belonged to them of right. It was we who had committed the wrong. Having done so, we ought not to add to our wrongdoing by massacreing the insurgents, or treating them in a vindictive manner. He had no wish to force the hand of the Government, and would not call upon the Prime Minister or the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies to say precisely what course they intended to adopt; but he hoped that some intimation would be given that would satisfy those who took an interest in the subject. He had full faith in the good intentions of the Government, and he hoped some indication would be afforded that we were not intending to carry out a wrongful act by worse means than the act itself. He believed that but for the anxiety prevailing respecting the state of Ireland, there would have been a cry throughout the country against this annexation.

said, that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Serjeant Simon) had assured the House that he did not desire in any way to force the hand of the Government or to cause them the least embarrassment. That was also the plea of the hon. Gentleman who had introduced the Motion (Mr. Rylands), and he (Mr. Chaplin) hoped that both hon. Members might be successful in their desire; but the Motion, unless he was altogether mistaken, was calculated to produce very considerable embarrassment. He had listened carefully to the speech of the hon. Member for Burnley, and could not help differing from many of the observations he had made. The hon. Member had informed the House that the late Government, under the pretext of advancing British interests, had been in the habit of pursuing an immoral policy. He denied that proposition in toto, and begged to observe that the hon. Member had not adduced any facts in support of his statement. Again, he could not concur with the hon. Member in his description of the annexation as a most iniquitous piece of policy, or assent to the terms of a Motion that characterized it as impolitic and unjustifiable. There was, however, one point as to which he was heartily in agreement with the hon. Member—namely, as to the expediency of a declaration from the Government whether they would continue or abandon the policy of annexation. Such a declaration would, no doubt, involve the Government, and especially the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, in considerable difficulties. But that result would not be the fault either of the hon. Member for Burnley or the Boers themselves. As it appeared to him (Mr. Chaplin), it was only an additional instance of the great difficulties that had been created for the present Government by certain rather unwarrantable statements and utterances of the Prime Minister and of some of his Colleagues just before the last General Election. No doubt, the intelligence from the Transvaal was most distressing; but the Prime Minister had the least right of any man in the world to complain of the conduct of the Boers, seeing that eight or nine months ago he had distinctly pledged himself to repudiate the annexation of the Transvaal. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Where, and when?] He would tell the right hon. Gentleman with the greatest pleasure. Unless the right hon. Gentleman had been totally misreported, he had made a most remarkable statement, and other statements had also been made that bore out his assertions. [Mr. Serjeant SIMON: Condemning the original annexation.] That might be so; but the hon. and learned Gentleman, on hearing the quotation that he (Mr. Chaplin) proposed to read, would find that it was a question not of condemning the original annexation, but also of repudiating it. Now, the words of the right hon. Gentleman were as follows, and had been spoken at Peebles, on April 1, 1880:—

"That is the meaning of adding places like Cyprus and places like the country of the Boers in South Africa to the British Empire. And, moreover, I would say this—that if those acquisitions were as valuable as they are valueless, I would repudiate them, because they are obtained by means dishonourable to the character of our country."

His charge against the Ministry was this—that in the rising they witnessed to-day the Boers had a right to complain, as the rising was made, if not under the sanction, at all events at the incitement, of the right hon. Gentleman himself. Could that House suppose that such utterances, coming from so distinguished and eminent a man, at a time when his campaign against the late Administration was the wonder and the admiration of the whole civilized world, would not also reach South Africa? He could imagine the sensation of delight with which the news of the General Election would be received by the Boers, and how they would hail it as an announcement of liberty. But, of course, that simple-minded people were not aware that the right hon. Gentleman engaged in Scotland in compassing the overthrow of the late Government was one thing, and the right hon. Gentleman safely back in Downing Street another. Nor could they know that the language by which the hon. Gentleman had deluded them, which had misled many of his own countrymen, and had utterly bamboozled the hon. Member for Burnley and his Radical Friends below the Gangway, would probably receive a different interpretation from an English Minister, that Minister who was now sending troops and money to suppress the victims of his fatal eloquence.

If I rise immediately after the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, it is not because I feel it incumbent on me to make any particular or detailed reply to the well-intentioned attack which he has made upon me; but because I think it would be best for the convenience of the House that, at the point to which the discussion has reached, some declaration should proceed from Her Majesty's Government upon a subject of so much interest and delicacy and difficulty. Now, we are engaged upon a Motion which is entirely of a prospective character; but the character of the discussion by which that Motion has been opened and illustrated has been almost entirely retrospective. Having so described it, I think I may add that it is quite needless for me to enter at large into the retrospective view of this question. A few words, indeed, I may say, and should have said, even apart from the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin). The hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. R. N. Fowler) has stated that when the annexation of the Transvaal took place there was some amount of support and countenance given to it by eminent Members of the Liberal Party. As far as Lord Kimberley is concerned, he would not be disposed to admit that he had ever pronounced any approval of that annexation, however qualified, except upon the supposition, stated at the time, that it was an annexation made in conformity with the wishes of the Boer community. In regard to Lord Brabourne, I need not speak. But my own account of the state of opinion at the time when the annexation was proclaimed would be this—That Her Majesty's Government of that day were, I think, fully supported and sustained in the annexation by a considerable majority of the House. It may be that there were individual Members of the Liberal Party who concurred in the policy. It is certainly the fact that only a very limited portion of the Liberal Party expressed dissent in a regular and Parliamentary manner. Of that admission they are entitled to the full value. But I must say that value is not so great as it might appear to be. I certainly, for myself, and I think I may venture to speak for my noble Friend not now in his place, then Leader of the Opposition, decidedly and strongly disapproved of the annexation—but for myself I will say, I think I may venture also to say for him, that while disapproving of it, we had a duty to consider to ourselves and to the country, over and above the function of making known our opinion in the House of Commons, and that was to consider the bearing that the expressions of those opinions would have upon the public interest, for the reason—the plain reason—that, in my opinion, votes of this House, or speeches in this House, against the annexation of the Transvaal, made at that period, would not have reversed the act; and although I was averse to the annexation, and, I confess, thought it would involve us in unmixed mischief, for that reason I remained entirely silent. But, says the hon. Member, I was not silent when I went before the constituency of Mid Lothian. That is perfectly true. I was not silent. My hon. Friends on this side of the House are entirely justified in the citations they have made of my speeches, and in the construction they put upon them; but the hon. Member for Mid Lincoln (Mr. Chaplin) is not at all justified in the construction that he puts upon the citation that he has made. He has said that I declared—I do not doubt that the report is accurate; whether it is from a corrected report or not I cannot say—and repudiated the policy of annexations made by the late Government in Cyprus, and in the Transvaal, and he might very properly have added their extension of the Afghan Frontier. The hon. Member supposes that the word "repudiated" bears no sense except that of intention to reverse a thing, although, in fact, the word does not necessarily bear any such sense at all. I will give the House an illustration of this. I repudiate—if I may say so without disrespect—entirely the speech which the hon. Gentleman opposite has just delivered; but I cannot undo that speech and prevent it from having been made, or I admit I would do so. Still, I repudiate the speech just as much as I repudiated the annexation of Cyprus and the Transvaal. To disapprove the annexation of a country is one thing; to abandon that annexation is another. Whatever we do, we must not blind ourselves to the legitimate consequences of facts. By the annexation of the Transvaal we contracted new obligations. I have not said a word, and it was totally unnecessary to say a word, of adverse comment on the annexation itself at this time; but I may remark that I do not disown or recede from the opinion I expressed at a former period; and although I thought it was my duty not to add to the difficulties of the case by speeches in this House, it was impossible for me to go before my constituents to arraign generally, as I did endeavour to arraign, the policy of the Government, and to give reasons why I thought it should be displaced, without pointing out the various items. I do not, however, intend, in the slightest degree, to go back on that point. On the contrary, I would say that, having listened with a great deal of personal sympathy to the able speeches of my hon. Friends the Mover and Seconder of the Motion, and of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Serjeant Simon), yet I am extremely glad that the able speech of the hon. Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock) opened up fairly and fully the other side of the question, as did also the hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. R. N. Fowler) in his more highly-coloured and thorough-going address; because I admit that there were two policies in this House, and that there were two sides of the question, for I never said there were no arguments that might be advanced in justification of what was done. But on that, at the present time, I consider I have nothing more to say. I must look at the obligations entailed by the annexation; and if in my opinion, and in the opinion of many on this side of the House, wrong was done by the annexation itself, that would not warrant us in doing fresh, distinct, and separate wrong, by a disregard of the obligations which that annexation entailed. Those obligations have been referred to in this debate, and have been mentioned in the compass of a single sentence. First, there was the obligation entailed towards the English and other settlers in the Transvaal, perhaps including a minority, though a very small minority, of the Dutch Boers themselves; secondly, there was the obligation towards the Native races, an obligation which I may call an obligation of humanity and justice; and, thirdly, there was the political obligation we entailed upon ourselves in respect of the responsibility which was already incumbent on us, and which we, by the annexation, largely extended, for the future peace and tranquillity of South Africa. None of these obligations could we overlook. We shall endeavour to give full value to them; and, while giving full value to them, we shall endeavour, as far as we are able, to weigh every other element of the case, and allow it to have that influence on our future conduct and policy to which, subject to the correction of this House, we may deem, and which we may believe in our consciences, is correct. And now I come to the Motion upon which the House has heard—I may say without respect to Parties—a very interesting discussion. The hon. Member who moved the Motion calls upon us to declare—

"That this House is of opinion that the annexation of the Transvaal was impolitic and unjustifiable."

And, secondly, that it—

"Would view with regret any measures taken by Her Majesty' Government with the object of enforcing British supremacy."

With respect to the first part of the Motion, which invites us to express our opinion that the annexation was impolitic and unjustifiable, I am unwilling to concur in a Parliamentary statement to that effect, because I can anticipate from such a Parliamentary statement, at the present juncture, no advantage either to the public interest of this country, or to any other interest; but, on the contrary, an aggravation of the difficulties in which the Government of this country are involved, and an aggravation of the dangers which hang over some of our fellow-creatures, fellow-Christians, and fellow-subjects. With regard to the second part of the Motion, my objections are still more pointed. Here, I think, I may almost invoke against my hon. Friend the Seconder of the Motion, the Motion itself; because he, in the most candid manner, and with that intelligence which belongs to him, did not scruple to admit that we had at present one duty upon us anterior to every other, and that was the duty of vindicating the authority of the Crown. I will not say that the House is, in the slightest degree, bound by the declarations in the Speech from the Throne; but the Government is bound by them, and we have advised the Queen to state that—

"A rising in the Transvaal has recently imposed upon me the duty of taking military measures with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority."

The remainder of the paragraph states that the rising in the Transvaal—

"Has of necessity set aside for the time any plan for securing to the European settlers full control over their own local affairs."

With regard to that, I need only state that the Seconder of the Motion did refer to the promise which had been given by the late Government for the institution of what I may call a free Legislature in the Transvaal, and that that promise had not been fulfilled. With regard to the promise, I have not the slightest doubt that the late Government were precluded, as we have been precluded, from fulfilling that promise until the greater and larger question is thoroughly disposed of. The question of giving free institutions to the Transvaal would never cause the slightest difficulty to either side of the House; but there is the larger question of the relations which are to subsist in future between the Transvaal and the British Crown, and the way in which we are to reconcile the obligations we have undertaken with respect to the future tranquillity of South Africa, and the interests of the Natives of that country, with the desire that we feel to avoid everything like even the appearance of assumption of authority over a free European race adverse to the will of that race. That is a question of rather a moot character, most difficult and important, and completely absorbing and enveloping within itself every minor and undisputed question as to the grant of free institutions to a country with which your relation is well determined. I shall, therefore, say that, as Her Majesty's Government have advised the Crown to state that the rising in the Transvaal has imposed on the Queen the duty of taking military measures for the prompt vindication of her authority, my second objection to the Motion is that the latter part of it is in direct contrariety to the announcement which is made from the Throne; because, after all, so far as they go, the measures we adopt for enforcing the authority of the Queen, and for putting down armed resistance to that authority, may justly be termed measures for enforcing the authority of the Crown. In passing a Motion of this kind, my hon. Friend would involve himself in consequences of a most serious description, which all those who are inclined to support the Motion ought to have clearly before their minds. If it be right for the House to state that they would view with regret any measures taken by the Government to enforce British supremacy, it would be felt that those words exclude the prosecution of that which we have announced to be our duty and our design—namely, the vindication of the policy of the Queen. I avail myself gladly of the concession of the Seconder of the Motion; but I am almost disposed to believe that the Mover of the Motion would hesitate before he went so far as to intercept the Government in the execution of that work which is certainly viewed by them as incumbent upon them in the circumstances of the case. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Serjeant Simon) quoted a passage from the Instructions of Sir Hercules Robinson, and expressed a hope that I would give an explanation of it. He then proceeded to put to me questions of a very searching character—questions which went far into the future; and further, I must say, into the future than I am prepared at this moment to travel with the hon. and learned Member. I feel that at this moment, viewing the state of things in South Africa, which I must describe as not only an approximation to war, but as a state of actual war, as far as we know, in the Transvaal—I make no extravagant demand on the House of Commons when I say, without respect to Party, that those who approve or disapprove the annexation will feel this is not a moment when we can be called upon for such specific declarations as we have been asked to give. General declarations of our views we have made. The object of the publication of the Instructions of Sir Hercules Robinson was to convey to the House, as far as we were able, a general, but, at the same time, a faithful and a tolerably clear idea of the views with which we approach the question. I am glad to think that these Instructions have not been made the subject of adverse comment; for while every liberty of adverse comment may be reserved for the future, it is probably better that, on the one side or the other, either looking backwards or forwards, it should for the present be avoided. Yet I am not compelled entirely to refuse the request of my hon. and learned Friend; because, since these Instructions were prepared, there has arisen in a manner not due to the action or the wish of Her Majesty's Government an occasion which appeared to them to call for some further declaration. The hon. and learned Gentleman read in the public prints the various telegrams which had been transmitted to this country from a source which has every title to respect in our eyes—namely, from the President of the Orange Free State—a gentleman associated by kindly national ties with the Boers of the Transvaal—and at the same time, I believe, a gentleman whose policy and whose desire it is to maintain the tranquillity of the country, to respect the authority of the Crown, and to do his best for bringing into harmonious relations all the different races. That communication from the President of the Orange River Free State imposes upon Her Majesty's Government the choice between two alternatives—either that of appearing insensible to a step which was evidently dictated by an amicable spirit, and which proceeded from one who was entirely entitled by his station, and by the proximity of his relations to the country, to address us; or, on the other hand, of making an answer to it, communicating our own views with regard to the particular proposals which were submitted to us, and, as far as it appears to be within the lines of our duty, to give that communication. Accordingly, this is the letter which was sent as a reply to the first of the series of telegrams which hon. Gentlemen have read. Of course, it will be our duty to lay the letter upon the Table with the telegrams as far as they have gone. The first telegram bears date some time before the 11th of January. The President of the Orange River Free State telegraphs to the Consul of that State in this country—

"Do not believe the fabrications about the wishes of the Free State. The Free State only wishes peace and prosperity for the whole of South Africa; and, further; it hopes that every effort will be made without the least delay to prevent further bloodshed."

That telegram was not sent to Her Majesty's Government, but it became an official communication to us from its being immediately forwarded by the Consul in this country, the agent of the Orange River Free State, to Lord Kimberley; and we, therefore, concluding that he acted according to the spirit and intentions of the President whom he represented, looked upon this as a communication from the President. Mr. Herbert, the Under Secretary of the Colonial Department, wrote as follows on the 11th of January, in reply to the Consul, of course, for transmission to the President:—

"Sir,—In reference to your telegram, which you left this morning for the Earl of Kimberley, I am desired by his Lordship to request that you will inform the President that Her Majesty's Government have received with pleasure the expression of his friendly wishes, and that provided only the Boers will desist from their armed opposition to the Queen's authority, Her Majesty's Government will not despair of making satisfactory arrangements."

That is a letter which will be immediately laid upon the Table. I venture to hope that what I have said of our desire to respect the conditions of free people, wherever we find them, on the one hand, and of our recognition of the obligations which we have undertaken with respect to the future of South Africa, with respect to the Natives residing within the Transvaal, and with respect also even to the minority of the Europeans of the Transvaal; I hope that after that the House may think that, under the circumstances of the case, I have probably said all that my duty will permit. I conclude with expressing the hope that I have not given to these remarks any controversial character in consequence of quotations not unnaturally made by others. I can assure the House that we shall, with earnestness, with temper, and, I hope, with firmness and decision, pursue the course that we have marked out for ourselves—namely, resolutely, and let me add also, as promptly as possible, to re-establish the authority of the Crown; and, having re-established the authority of the Crown, to pursue such a policy for the full settlement of the question as will deserve and receive the approval of the House and the country.

:I shall not detain the House long, for I am not very well able to do so; but I am anxious to say a very few words upon the position of this question. In the first place, I wish to express my regret that my right hon. Friend the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) is not here to-night. I have received a telegram stating that he is detained in the country in consequence of the state of the weather; and having had no Notice, as none of us have had Notice, that this debate was to come on, he is not here. I say that to explain why we are not fully prepared to enter into the details of this question as we might have been. I do not think it necessary to enter at any great length into what my right hon. Friend has said with regard to the retrospective part of the question—first, because it is not that to which our attention is mainly directed; and, second, because the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock) has stated, in a most admirable, succinct, and correct manner, the exact state of the case as regards the steps that were taken three years ago for the annexation of the Transvaal. I feel, however, that this is a matter on which it is desirable, as far as possible, that no uncertain sound should go out from the British Parliament on this question. We are engaged at this time, sad as is the necessity, in carrying on hostile operations; and, however sad it may be that this necessity is imposed upon us, nobody can doubt that, if we are carrying on such operations, they should be carried on in a spirit which would show that the mind and conscience of the country are satisfied, and that we should not, on the one hand, be dealing blows to those who are in arms against us; and, on the other hand, be using language that may lead them to believe that we consider them to be in the right and ourselves in the wrong. But this appears to me to be a strange moment to choose for bringing on such a Motion; and it is open to very serious doubt whether you do not do much more harm than good, even in the interests of those whose interests you profess to have at heart, by using language that is calculated to put into their minds false ideas as to the real feelings of this country. We have had a controversy just now between my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) and the Prime Minister with regard to some language used by the Prime Minister on a former occasion, and my right hon. Friend disavowed my hon. Friend's interpretation of the word "repudiation." Well, no doubt he is a great master of language, and we cannot undertake to dispute his meaning of language he has himself used. But where language of that kind is used, it is calculated to have to an ordinary mind a meaning which may be very different. Let us take this word "repudiation." There are two cases in which we know the word is used, and used in the sense which my hon. Friend suggested. We sometimes say that a man has repudiated his wife. That does not mean that he disputes the validity of her marriage; it means that he has put his wife away. You hear of a State repudiating its debts. That does not mean that those debts were contracted under such circumstances as to make it doubtful whether they were properly contracted: it means that the State intends to refuse payment of its debts. And, therefore, when a statesman gets up and says—"I repudiate the general policy," the impression upon ordinary minds is that he intended to reverse the steps that had been taken. Well, it is very unfortunate that such expressions should go abroad; and we are glad to have got in this debate from the Prime Minister an assurance that that is not the sense in which he used the expression. The hon. Member for Burnley felt it repeatedly necessary, in the course of his speech, to assure the Government and the House that he had no intention of embarrassing Her Majesty's Government; but it is rather a curious mode of attaining this end that he felt it necessary, from time to time, to lay on very thick such a censure on the late Government. The present Government are, in every respect, excellent men; their intentions are admirable; they are in a difficulty; they had a legacy left them by their Predecessors which it was extremely difficult for them to deal with without entering on a course of conduct which, perhaps, they themselves did not desire to pursue. Their motives must be excellent, although they are going to do a very severe thing which we did not do: they are going to carry fire and sword against the Boers. I do not say that they can help themselves. We did nothing so strong as that. But then they are justified by having only a moral view, and we are to be stigmatized as being immoral, and as constantly justifying an immoral policy under the cloak of protecting British interests. Now, we have, at least, a right to take the same credit to ourselves as we give to our opponents, and to say that in what we did we acted on no immoral principles at all, but according to what we believed, and still believe, to be our true duty in the case in question. Everybody is, of course, at liberty to form his own opinion as to the merits and the wisdom of a particular policy; but when you attribute these motives to your opponents you ought to be rather careful how you venture to impute to men, who generally have been considered honourable men, an entire disbelief in the statements which they make. You ought to be careful, for instance, how you impute to Lord Carnarvon that he was entirely misleading the House of Lords and the country in the statements he made as to the circumstances and the grounds on which his policy rested. If that is the view to be taken, if we are to be told that everything that we did is so base, so immoral, and so improper, let me assure hon. Gentlemen that they are not adopting a line which is likely to conduce to the real interests of the country. I will not repeat that which has been so well said by the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of London. Lord Carnarvon stated his case twice in the House of Lords at the time when these matters were under consideration. Twice he brought the subject before the House of Lords in the year 1877. The first time was before the annexation took place. That was in his speech on the 23rd of April, when he introduced the South Africa Bill with a view to the Confederation of the Colonies, and what did he then say as to the Transvaal? He first spoke of the very serious position in which that country was; its utter want of vigour and of power; the confusion among its inhabitants themselves; and he then went on to say—

"Although I cannot but anticipate, knowing as I do how large a portion of the people of the Transvaal desire to come under British rule, that in the end the Transvaal will become a British State, I have no desire, if it can be avoided, to take over that State. We have territory enough and to spare in South Africa, and I feel no desire to have unwilling members in this Confederation."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxiii, 1650.]

About three weeks afterwards we received the news of the annexation of the Transvaal. Lord Carnarvon was questioned on the subject, and he stated that undoubtedly a telegram had arrived stating that Sir Theophilus Shepstone had taken that step. He does not speak of it as a matter either that had been directed or that was received with joy by Her Majesty's Government. On the contrary, he says—

"If the measure has taken place, I have no doubt it has been adopted as a measure of self-preservation, so far as we are concerned, far more than anything else."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxiv, 354.]

And he speaks of it as a measure which he regrets. He says he is hardly surprised that it has been taken, but he regrets it, although, at the same time, he regarded it as inevitable. I quote this to show that it was no deliberate purpose of that wicked Government which the hon. Member opposite is haunted by to annex that country against its will. But, finding ourselves in a position of the greatest difficulty and delicacy—finding that the condition of the South African Colonies was such that there was the greatest danger of serious evils, of bloodshed, and of terrible wars breaking out between them and the Native States in their neighbourhood, and earnestly labouring, as we were doing, to bring about a policy of co-operation between our own Colonies and the other States which were contiguous to us in order to prevent those evils, it did so come about that it was necessary for us to take the step that was taken. We took it without any sinister wish, but because it was the only thing that could be done; and I am perfectly certain that it did for the moment ward off from the inhabitants of the Transvaal the most serious evils. They were absolutely insolvent. The hon. Gentleman opposite says that you have no right to annex a State simply because it is insolvent. Of course not; but here the question was whether its insolvency did not render the State absolutely powerless to protect itself, and, therefore, it could form no barrier for the White race against the serious evils that were about to fall upon them. Then we were told that they at that time passed a Resolution declaring that their Administration was not capable of carrying on the government. And in connection with all this, bear in mind what the state of South Africa was—how, as has been well stated by the hon. Baronet opposite—it was the case of a small party of Whites in the midst of a very large Black population, with that great force of the Zulus bearing down upon them, the Whites, moreover, not being able to show that they had quite clean hands in regard to the hostility aroused against them among that vast mass of Blacks. I say that our position in those circumstances was one in which we should have been criminal if we had shrunk from taking all the steps that were necessary to ward off that great danger. It is easy now to Say that errors were committed here or committed there; but it is not only altogether unfair to political opponents, but injurious to the interests of the country, that it should be permitted that language of the kind which has been used to-night should go forth from the British Parliament at the time when the Ministers of the Crown find it necessary to assert the position of their country and the rights of their Sovereign even by force of arms. For heaven's sake, let us not use language of this sort when we are obliged to use force with the other hand! There was one part of the speech of my right hon. Friend to which I listened with the greatest pleasure and sympathy. It was the concluding passage of the telegram from that distinguished man the President of the Orange River Free State, and when, at the same time, he said that it was the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government, and even their hope, that it might be possible to bring about the result which President Brand wished. There never was any doubt in the mind of the late Government that it was most desirable that it should, as far as possible, harmonize the institutions of the Transvaal with the wants and wishes and the natural feelings of its people. We have no desire to live in hostility with them—far from it. We have every desire that they should live under institutions suited to them. But I say that this is not a moment at which it is desirable to give vent to such sentiments as are expressed in the Motion of the hon. Member for Burnley, because they are liable to be mistaken; and I do earnestly trust that the House will sustain, not only in the letter, but also in the spirit, Her Majesty's Government in the course which they are now taking.

said, that as an Irish Member, who had received a communication from some Dutch people, he could not pass by the debate in silence.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,

said, he had heard with much satisfaction that the Boers intended to vindicate their national independence. He did not think that the Government should continue a struggle merely because their Predecessors had commenced it. The examples of retiring from a territory on an honourable understanding after hostilities had commenced were not wanting. It was, however, with much pleasure that he (Mr. Dawson) heard the cause of the nationality of the Boers vindicated by Members on the Liberal side of the House; and he only regretted that his lot, instead of being cast in Ireland, had not made him a member of some South African Colony that enjoyed such a vindication as he had heard that night. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote) had spoken of the different senses of the word "repudiation," which the Prime Minister had put upon that word. There was another sense—the repudiation of a debt. A promise was made by the right hon. Gentleman in Mid Lothian, and the people in the Transvaal and in Holland would expect that whenever he came into power he would undo that which he repudiated. The promise was a debt, and the repudiation of it now did not become the present Government of the country, nor the right hon. Gentleman who had raised such hopes. The treatment of the Natives by the Boers in 1877 could have no bearing on that hope, because whatever force was in that argument was as strong in 1879 as it was now.

said, that the utterances of the Prime Minister had been very misleading to the people of Ireland as well as to the Boers of the Transvaal. He well remembered the remarkable expressions used by the right hon. Gentleman about the Clerkenwell explosion, which was stated to have brought the question of the Irish Church within the range of practical politics. He feared that the words referred to would hardly bear, even in English, the meaning attributed to them by the right hon. Gentleman,. and when they were translated into Transvaal Dutch the difficulty would be further increased. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had repudiated—looking to the exact words quoted—not the policy which had led to the annexation, but the acquisition of the territory itself. He (Sir Henry Tyler) thought that the expression in question would be so understood by the people in the Transvaal, as they had been by the hon. Member for Mid Lincoln. And what really had been repudiated was the right hon. Gentleman's speech in Mid Lothian.

wished to address himself to the question, not as to who was responsible for the acquisitions in the Transvaal, but as to who must be held responsible for the present war. His impression was that Her Majesty's present Advisers were mainly responsible for it. When out of Office they condemned as loudly as they could the policy of their Predecessors; and holding the strong opinions which he did, the Prime Minister, when he assumed the reins of power, should have made it one of his first duties to have taken into consideration the position which this country occupied with regard to the annexation of the Transvaal. What he did for the Montenegrins he should have done for the Boers; and if Her Majesty's Ministers had carried out when they came into Office the intentions which they expressed when in Opposition, he felt confident that the present war would not have taken place. The annexation was brought about in the belief that it would be good for the country; and it so happened that the ex-President of the Transvaal was in this country at the time, and told him that it was the best thing that could be done. The late Government felt assured that it was for the interest of the Boers and the White population that it should take place; and, therefore, he thought that the language of the hon. Member for Burnley was much too strong when he condemned the policy of the late Government. In the reply to the telegram from the Orange Free State, the Government expressed a hope that the present difficulties would terminate satisfactorily. The Prime Minister left the House entirely in the dark as to what he considered a "satisfactory" conclusion. He (Mr. Gourley), when listening to him, inferred that the right hon. Gentleman meant to crush the Boers, and retain their territory as part of the possessions of the Crown. Instead of a crushing policy, it would be much more in harmony with the opinions of the various Members of the Government if they would endeavour to meet the Boers as a friendly Power, and negotiate with them with the intention of giving back to them that independence which rightly belonged to them.

said, that he desired, in the first place, to answer what he could not but consider an unfair and ungenerous attack which the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies had made the previous night upon Lord Carnarvon. The Under Secretary of State had, practically, accused Lord Carnarvon of being the cause of these different troubles and complications in South Africa. Now, as regarded Basutoland, which was last night the question before the House, Lord Carnarvon had absolutely nothing to do. Basutoland became British territory when the Duke of Buckingham was Secretary of State, and was annexed to the Cape Colony when Lord Kimberley was Secretary of State. Nay, more than that, Lord Carnarvon, in 1867, while concurring with Mr. Cardwell against taking over that territory, went even further than Mr. Cardwell, for he declined to sanction the sending a British Resident into Basutoland for fear of creating any complication. Again, Lord Carnarvon had nothing to do with the Transkei War; and he was not in Office when this country was plunged into war with Zululand. As regarded the Transvaal, the case was different, as Lord Carnarvon gave the commission to Sir Theophilus Shepstone to annex that country under certain conditions; and afterwards, though in guarded terms, approved of the annexation. The Under Secretary of State said that these troubles and difficulties arose from Lord Carnarvon being a man who could not sit still in a room. Well, in certain cases it was very desirable to sit still; but if the adjoining room was on fire, and the fire was likely to extend to the room where one was sitting, and to destroy property and perhaps life, it was doubtful whether sitting still would be a wise course to pursue. If, from a line of action adopted by a neighbouring Power, the peace and welfare of a Colony was likely to be endangered, it was not the duty of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to sit still. And that was the case with the Transvaal. He (Sir Henry Holland) would not travel over the ground so ably covered by the hon. Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock); but he would very briefly show the House how the conduct of the Transvaal Government necessitated our interference, and justified the steps that had been taken. In the first place, a system of slavery had prevailed in the Transvaal in direct contravention of the terms of the Convention of 1852. Not only had that system been carried on by individual Boers, but it had been fostered by the "Pass Laws" of the Government. For evidence of that, he (Sir Henry Holland) need only refer to Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen's speech in that House of August 7, 1877, and to Sir Henry Barkly's despatches to Lord Carnarvon in 1875. Remonstrances were made in vain against these proceedings of the Boers. In the second place, this Transvaal Government was in constant trouble with Native Tribes, owing to their encroaching upon Native lands. So far did this greed of land grow upon them, that in 1875 the Government issued a Proclamation quietly annexing a very large territory to the Transvaal—a proceeding possibly involving a further breach of the Convention of 1852, but certainly one that could not be allowed by Her Majesty's Government. Again, early in 1877 they attempted to annex the territory of the Barolongs, and again Lord Carnarvon had to inform them that that would not be allowed. Now, what was the status of the Government which was taking these high-handed steps, and which, by exciting the Natives, was causing danger to the peace of our Colonies? It was utterly bankrupt and rotten; unable to enforce payment of taxes; unable to keep its forces in the field; and unable to check the advance of Sikukuni. The hopelessness of the position could not be more forcibly described than it was by the then President Burgers, in what might be called his "last dying speech and confession." Sir Henry Barkly also, in a despatch of March 20, 1877, confirmed the account of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and spoke of the "helpless confusion," and the "gloomy and alarming picture." Sir Theophilus Shepstone might have acted too hastily in assuming the unanimous feeling of the inhabitants to be in favour of annexation. But in his favour it might fairly be urged that, while he had addresses from important places—such as Pretoria and Lydenburg—in favour of the change, he received none against it; and that no resistance of any kind was made, though he had no force to back him up. The truth was, that at that time the great majority of the White settlers distrusted the Government, and feared the Natives; but now that peace had been restored, and that prosperity and commerce had revived, some lead- ing and active men, who had hoped for power and office, had come to the front and raised the cry of independence, in which it was but natural that great numbers should join. He (Sir Henry Holland) would not dwell any further upon what the Prime Minister had called the retrospective part of the case. The very grave and important question remained—namely, what was to be done with the Transvaal after the rebellion had been put down? He (Sir Henry Holland) assumed that, with the exception of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), all must agree that, in the first place, the uprising must be put down, and Her Majesty's supremacy re-asserted. Of course, if Her Majesty's Government had made up their minds ultimately to give up the Transvaal, they would be bound to let it be known, as that would materially shorten the struggle, and prevent much bloodshed. But he (Sir Henry Holland) gathered from the speech, of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister that the Government had not yet made up their minds; and though there ought to be no undue pressure put upon them to do so, yet he (Sir Henry Holland) feared the effect that this delay in arriving at a decision might have upon the Boers. He feared that when the Boers were informed that, after peace was restored, Her Majesty's Government did not despair of a "satisfactory arrangement"—he believed those were the words of the telegram to President Brand—they would be led to see in that message a promise of independence; for what arrangement, but a renewal of their independence, could be satisfactory to them? He did not say that they would be justified in these hopes; but he believed they would entertain them. In the meantime, he would venture to state to the House and to Her Majesty's Government some considerations which weighed with him in favour of retaining the Transvaal. It was said that the inhabitants were unanimous in favour of restored independence. That assertion could not be tested till peace was restored; but he believed that it would then be found that all the English, and many Dutch settlers, would be unwilling again to change masters. The Papers presented to Parliament showed that many were compelled to join the meet- ings for independence; and many might have been, in like manner, lately compelled to declare themselves on the side of the rebels. However that might be, it was certain that all the Natives—some 800,000 in number—would be found on our side if Her Majesty's supremacy was re-asserted. It must be remembered that if we retire from the Transvaal we leave these Natives, as well as the well-inclined settlers, to the tender mercies of the victorious Boers. And we leave, not only the Natives within the Transvaal, but the Native Tribes adjoining that territory, to those tender mercies. We expose them again to the constant harassing and encroachments which prevailed for so long before 1877. It might be said that the Boer leaders had agreed to make conditions, if their independence was restored, as to the future treatment of Natives and Native questions; but their past history would not lead him (Sir Henry Holland) to put much faith in their engagements to keep those conditions. Who was to secure the performance of such conditions; who was to punish for the infringement of them? Certainly not the Cape Government, who would have nothing to do with the Transvaal; but it would be the duty of the Imperial Government to secure to the Natives the rights which might be guaranteed to them by the conditions. Then all the trouble would come over again; blood would have again to be shed; the country would have again to be annexed; and again would the cry be raised of independence, the cry, as it would again be called, of a free people against oppression. Those considerations weighed with him against surrendering the Transvaal. On the other hand, if we retain the Transvaal, we might hope, when peace was really restored, that the influence of the quiet and well-disposed inhabitants would prevail, and that in a short time we might be enabled to re-establish their Volksraad and free institutions under the Government of Her Majesty. We might also look forward to the entrance of the Transvaal into a Confederation with the other South African States. That Confederation might be, nay, probably would be, postponed for some years; but he (Sir Henry Holland) believed that in Confederation would be ultimately found the security for a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Government in South Africa.

said, he felt sure that his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) would not think that he was influenced by any want of respect to himself, or that he did not appreciate the importance of the subject which he had brought before them, if he said very little in reply to his speech, and confined himself almost entirely to one single point; which he should like to make quite clear to the House and to all persons interested in the Transvaal. It was the less necessary for him to go into the question of the annexation by the last, or the retention of the country announced in the month of May by the present Government, because he had nothing to add to, or to take away from, the considerations which he had the honour to lay before the House at the beginning and at the end of the late Session. It might be necessary, at a later period, to go over that ground again; but to do so that night would be a waste of the time of the House. If it was useless for the moment to speak at much length of the past it was quite impossible now to speak of the future. The Boers had thought fit to attack the Queen's troops, and to kill a very large number of them, under circumstances not yet fully explained; but which had a most suspicious aspect. They had thrown down the gauntlet to the British Empire, and it was idle to talk about any settlement that might ensue upon peace until, at least, there was some prospect of peace. "Parcere subjectis" was an admirable maxim; but a Government which did not remember that "debellare superbos" was equally its duty would not retain, or deserve to retain, the confidence of the British people. The one point which he wished to make clear was this—that from the day of the annexation down to the outbreak of the war, the British Government had, again and again and again, offered to the people of the Transvaal the most absolute control of their own affairs, conditional only upon their professing allegiance to the British Crown, and permitting it to control their relations with the Natives in and around their border, so as to prevent intolerable injustice and imminent danger alike to themselves and to Her Majesty's other possessions in South Africa. The attitude taken up by Her Majesty's late and present Government with regard to this matter would be seen from the following extracts. He must read a good many; but it seemed to him a matter of the last importance that the position of this country in this matter should be thoroughly understood abroad, and especially in Holland—a country for which all right-thinking men had so much respect and regard. The hon. Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock), in his very able speech, had shown that the 40,000 Boers of the Transvaal were in 1877 in such a position that they could by no possibility have long retained their lawless independence. If the action of Lord Carnarvon had not been so premature, they would have come to us to save them, exactly as the Basutos did eight years before. His object was now to show that we had all along offered them everything they could ask short of lawless and perilous independence. And this position would be clear from the following extracts. In 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, speaking as a subordinate of Lord Carnarvon, said in his Proclamation that—

"The Transvaal would remain a separate Government, with, its own laws and Legislature, and it was the wish of Her Most Gracious Majesty that it should enjoy the fullest legislative privileges compatible with the circumstances of the country and the intelligence of its people."

In 1878 the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), replying to the Transvaal delegates, repeated those words, and added—

"You are aware that the present system of Government, though continued in consequence of the unsettled state of the country for a longer term than had been contemplated, is altogether temporary and provisional. It is the desire of Her Majesty's Government that no time shall be lost in carrying out the promises given in the Proclamation, so as to satisfy the wishes of those who deprecate any avoidable departure from the old Constitution of the country. Whether it will be in their power to proceed at once with that policy depends, in a great measure, upon you, and upon all over whom you have influence. I earnestly recommend you, and those on whose behalf you act, to turn your attention from that which is impossible to those much needed reforms and undertakings on the necessity of which all are agreed, and to co-operate loyally and heartily with Her Majesty's Government in concerting such measures as may make the Transvaal a prosperous, contented, and self-supporting country."

Again, upon the 20th of November, 1879, the right hon. Gentleman reiterated the same assurances. Among other things, he said—

"As there has never been any room for doubting that Her Majesty's power would continue to be supreme in South Africa, the union provided for by the South Africa Act, 1877, is practically that which the people of the Transvaal have professed to desire; and it is obvious that, as a member of the South African Confederation, the country might receive a Constitution which would confer upon the people, under the paramount authority of the British Crown, the fullest independence compatible with that thorough unity of action which the common welfare demands, and would enable them practically to govern themselves according to their own views in all matters except those as to which an independent Power, unless determined to be hostile, would be obliged to co-operate with its neighbours."

In the month of April the present Government had to consider what course to take; and it came to the conclusion that although, as he had on former occasions said, it thought the annexation a very great error in policy, yet that to cut the knot of the difficulties in which it found us involved in the Transvaal by restoring that country to its old anarchy would have been at least as great, and a less excusable error in policy. Of course, occasions arose when it was right and necessary for an in-coming Government completely to reverse the policy of its predecessor. English history could point to two such instances in very recent times, both of them occurring in Asia, the one redounding to the credit of the Conservative, the other to that of the Liberal Party; but such sudden breaks of the continuity of foreign policy were to be avoided as much as possible, and had, in fact, been rare in the annals of this country. It was all very well to say that if the Government had instantly withdrawn from the Transvaal there would not have been the present trouble; but troubles, and probably far worse ones, would, as he had endeavoured to point out in the month of August last, have come in other forms. The new Government, however, put in the forefront of their Transvaal policy their desire to give the country self-government. On the 12th of May the new Secretary of State telegraphed to say that he hoped that the speedy accomplishment of Confederation would enable free institutions to be given to the Transvaal with promptitude. Similar declarations were made in that House in the debate upon the Address some 10 days later; and on the 8th of June the Prime Minister, replying to the Transvaal delegates, said—

"Looking to all the circumstances, both of the Transvaal and the rest of South Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a renewal of disorders which might lead to disastrous consequences, not only to the Transvaal, but to the whole of South Africa, our judgment is that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal; but, consistently with the maintenance of that sovereignty, we desire that the White inhabitants of the Transvaal should, without prejudice to the rest of the population, enjoy the fullest liberty to manage their local affairs. We believe that this liberty may be most easily and promptly conceded to the Transvaal as a member of a South African Confederation."

Some time after this, the Confederation scheme having for the time broken down, a debate upon South Africa took place in that House, in the course of which he said, among other things—

"I should be extremely sorry that the idea should for a moment get abroad that we are not most anxious to give to the Transvaal, as soon as we can, as much local self-government as possible."

Precisely the same language was held by the Government officials in the Transvaal itself, as would be seen from the following extract from a debate in the Transvaal Legislative Assembly, which reached the country only the other day, long after we had heard by telegraph of the outbreak. Sir Owen Lanyon said—

"With regard to what has fallen in this debate to-night, I have nothing more to say on the matter than that no one will be more glad than I if the united people of the Transvaal were to come forward and ask for these representative institutions, such as have been repeatedly offered them. The offer is now before them, and all that they have to do is to come forward and ask for it. But in asking for it, there is only one condition necessary—that is, that threats should be dropped, and that peace should reign within our borders. If these things be accomplished, I see no reason why the Transvaal should not have such free institutions as are enjoyed in the adjoining States."

He thought that he had shown that nothing whatever had been asked from the malcontent portion of the Boers of the Transvaal, but that they should frankly accept the sovereignty of the Queen, and submit at the hands of the Home Government to some such control over their dealings with the Natives as would have been provided in South Africa itself if a Confederation had come into existence. If they had done this they would instantly have had the most complete control of their own affairs, after having been picked by the British Government out of the gulf of bankruptcy, and set financially, so to speak, upon their legs. How thoroughly this was understood by the foremost men in the Transvaal might be gathered from some extracts which he should read from speeches made in that same debate by persons in no case of English birth, and invariably persons who, although not elected, but nominated, hold very great positions as men of landed property in the Transvaal. The first whom he should cite was Mr. Marais, a Member of the Legislature of the Transvaal at the time of the annexation. Mr. Marais said—

"I claim that what is now clamoured for—namely, representative Government . … is at the present moment still by Great Britain offered to the people of the Transvaal, if they will but accept it; but to speak of the people accepting representative Government until they are united and have concluded to accept the British Government is, to my idea, preposterous on the very face of it. And it would be absolutely necessary for the British Government, which has annexed this country, first to place it in a position to accept of representation, before that could be established."

He would next cite Mr. Forssman, a man of Swedish birth, but who had been 30 years in the Transvaal, and had great estates there. That gentleman said he did not consider that they were ripe for responsible Government in the Transvaal, and he did not wish to see it. One reason was, perhaps, selfish on his part. He did not wish to see the soldiers go away, because we should then have, as under the old Government, the old "commando brief."

"If the Kaffirs did a little mischief, we should be commandered as formerly, and everyone would be taken away from his occupation, and have to go and risk his life, which was not the case at present. That was one of the boons the people of the Transvaal owed to the British Government. They were defended at the cost of the Imperial Government; and if anyone wished to fight, he would volunteer, and if any one wished to attend to his business, he could do it."

Next he would take Mr. Holtzhausen, a Boer and Member of the late Volksraad, also a very prominent man. Mr. Holtzhausen said—

"One thing I can declare, and that is that the present Government is the best I ever served under in the Transvaal. Since my 21st year I have lived in the Transvaal, and I have done my best for progress. There have been very few resolutions come to this country in which my name does not appear, and I have ever had my advice listened to by the present Government. None of the officials of the Government here complain that they do not receive their salaries at the proper time. Every private person who does not sit still has profit, the speculator as well as the farmer. There were times before the present Government was here when the farmer could not move to the bush-veld with his cattle. I belong to that number, and the enemy took away every head of my cattle, and I had not a calf left; and I have now freedom and safety, and can go safely to my farm. Concerning the Constitution that is asked for by the hon. Member from Pretoria, I know it myself; it was not necessary to state the fact that it was promised by Sir Theophilus Shepstone; I, for myself, have reason enough to say that it was not possible. The Government, as at present constituted, was at war with the Zulus; during the Zulu War and the Secocoeni campaign, Sir Theophilus Shepstone and Sir Owen Lanyon had neither Executive Council nor Legislative Assembly; it is only since the 10th of March the present Government was constituted, and possibly every man who wishes to see can see its difficulties."

Another man of high position and large property spoke in the same sense—another Boer, and, like the last-mentioned gentleman, a Member of the late Volksraad at the time of the annexation. Mr. Esterhuyze said—

"That he had thought not to speak on the matter before the House. He thought it was no time to do so under the present circumstances. But as the hon. Member from Pretoria, in speaking to his Motion, spoke about the Assembly having failed to secure the confidence of the people, it was, therefore, his (Mr. Esterhuyze's) opinion that confidence cannot come from one side."

He might quote others; but surely that was enough to show that the position of the British Government was perfectly understood in the country. The simple truth was that the persons who had revolted against the Government of the Queen were not fighting so much against her Government as against all government. It was precisely the same spirit of lawlessness which broke out against the Government of President Burgers, and which made him utter those strange and tragic complaints when, in addressing the Volksraad shortly before the annexation, he said—

"Do you know what has recently happened in Turkey? Because no civilized government was carried on there, the Great Powers inter- fered, and said, thus far and no further; and if this is done to an Empire, will a little Republic be excused when it misbehaves? Complain to other Powers, and seek justice there. Yes, thank God; justice is still to be found even for the most insignificant; but it is precisely this justice which will convict us. If we want justice, we must be in a position to ask it with unsullied hands."

And, again—

"To take up arms and fight was nonsense, to draw the sword would be to draw the sword against God; for it was God's judgment that the State was in the condition it was to-day, and it was their duty to inquire whether they should immerse in blood the thousands of innocent inhabitants of this country, and, if so, what for?"

When the Transvaal Papers which he had laid upon the Table were in the hands of hon. Members, they would see that phrases about nationality and independence, and so forth, went a very little way, and that the question was how things, being as they were, and the annexation having taken place, prudently or imprudently—he, of course, thought imprudently—four years ago, how was the government of 40,000 Whites and 800,000 Blacks, scattered over a territory larger than France, to be provided for without inflicting intolerable inconvenience, not to say misery, upon all South Africa? Before that question could be answered events must have further developed; meantime he need hardly say that the Government were as anxious as any people could possibly be to prevent unnecessary effusion of blood. No one would ever justly be able to say of them "Bella geri placuit nullos habitura triumphos" but not Empire only but government was at an end if armed men openly defied the law and attacked our troops with impunity. Let those defend the annexation of the Transvaal who annexed it in 1877, instead of allowing it to fall into our hands, as it would have done before long as a troublesome inheritance, no doubt, but not a painful one. That was not his function. But the Government which he had the honour to represent had to deal with things as it found them, not as it would have wished to find them. There was no doubt that before the annexation of the Transvaal the state of the country was rapidly becoming desperate; and he could only counsel the House to proceed with the utmost deliberation, unless they wished to bring about a state of things which everyone must deplore.

observed, that the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had quoted the opinions of Members of the Legislative Council on this question; but it would be well to know who these Members were. He understood the right hon. Gentleman to quote a number of gentlemen who were the paid nominees of the Crown; a fact which somewhat weakened the force of the evidence adduced by the right hon. Gentleman. With regard to the remarks of his hon. Friends, he was obliged to repudiate a great deal of what they had said. He was, for instance, astounded that his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), after making out such a strong case, should come to the lame and impotent conclusion not to divide the House on his Motion. The hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright) also made an admirable speech, but said that nothing could be done until we had vindicated the authority of our arms. If his speech meant anything, it meant that a great territory had been taken by fraud, and was being kept by force; and it was astonishing he should think that an honourable and upright course for this country to pursue. First kill the Boers and then do them justice was, to say the least, a somewhat curious doctrine to promulgate. That reminded him of the North of England proverb, sometimes called the Eleventh Commandment—"Tell a lie and stick to it." When an honourable man, an Englishman, did a wrong, he would frankly acknowledge it, and do the aggrieved party justice; not kill him first and then do him justice. The whole policy was a mistaken one, for if England were to go to war with every Power that committed a wrong, she would not have a single day's peace. It was all very well to talk about the brutality of the Boers; but, from what he could learn, the British were just as bad as the Boers. It was said that the annexation of the Transvaal led to the Zulu War; so that, having killed the Zulus in order to protect the Boers, we were now turning round to kill the Boers themselves. In August, 1877, the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney), now Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, moved a Re-solution condemnatory of the annexation of the Transvaal; and Mr. James Lowther, as the then Representative, of the. Colonial Office, expressed, fully, and com- pletely the reasons which led the late Government to annex the Transvaal. He utterly repudiated the pretext that their policy was in any degree founded upon the internal affairs of the Republic, and declared that it was based upon the fact that its external policy would inevitably, but for the interference of Her Majesty's Government, have led to a Native war, which must have extended to Her Majesty's possessions. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) hoped we should hear no more, after that statement, of our having annexed the Transvaal in order to put down slavery. As for the statement which had been made on the present occasion by the Prime Minister, he could only say that, in his view, it was exceedingly vague and unsatisfactory, particularly as far as its closing sentences were concerned. He said that if the Boers did so and so he hoped there would be a satisfactory settlement. The right hon. Gentleman could not say less. Everyone, of course, wished to see a satisfactory conclusion arrived at; but the statement of the right hon. Gentleman involved the radical mistake of upholding the theory that we must carry to a successful conclusion an unjust war for the suppression of an independent Republic—for that was what it really amounted to. He could not help thinking that the Government ought to feel humiliated in considering the view which foreign countries must take of the course which had been pursued. We talked of freedom and liberty at home, and yet sent out armies to crush the liberties of nations. He was so dissatisfied with the state of things that, although his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley would be at liberty to withdraw his Motion, he should insist upon a division being taken upon it. His right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) had said in a speech which had been much commented upon that force was not a remedy. It was not a remedy in this case. In his view, a policy of justice was the only true one to be pursued if Parliament wished to add dignity to the Crown, credit to the Government, and honour to the country.

observed, that the hon. Baronet who had just spoken treated the question under consideration in the same spirit as he treated the temperance question—that of no compromise. He would not even allow local option to have any part in bringing about a settlement of the existing difficulty. It used to be a doctrine held by certain hon. Members that dominion compassed by fraud and maintained by force ought not to be upheld. Well, he might be permitted to say that if anything had ever been obtained by fraud and maintained by force it was the much contested Act of Union between England and Ireland. But he could not forget what had been said by an eminent and learned man, Mr. Peter Burrows, on that subject—that while he had been opposed to the marriage he was also opposed to the divorce, lest it would bastardize the offspring. The same principle which applied to the dissolution of the Act of Union also applied to the case of the Transvaal. He had now for four hours listened to recrimination and reproach as to the motives which actuated those concerned in the act of annexation; but he considered that the Business of the House was not to compare or vivisect motives, but to look to tendencies. If the reversal of the policy which had been adopted would be to plunge the whole of South Africa into confusion, whatever might have been the motives of Lord Carnarvon, or of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, such a policy ought not to be arbitrarily imposed on the present Government. When the wishes and the rights of the Boers were talked of, surely the interests of the overwhelming majority of the coloured race was worthy of some consideration. He believed that the Government had acted within their plain duty in taking up their present position, and that the House ought not to pledge them to undo what had been done. The Prime Minister had, they should remember, reserved to the Government of which he was the head discretionary power to act for the best when peace had been restored. He asked the House to bear in mind what had taken place in Jamaica, in India, and elsewhere, and to say whether it was safe, when a treacherous attack had been made upon Her Majesty's troops, to allow the surrounding population to believe that the upper hand had been obtained over the power of England—whether, in short, a policy of impunity was not a very dangerous one to adopt in such a crisis. Although he sincerely deprecated the effusion of blood, he could not but think that the Imperial Government were right in arguing that until peace was re-established they ought not to be called upon to state the course they would pursue. For his own part, he believed that their efforts, like that of their Predecessors, would be to set up, as far as possible, a system of local self-government compatible with safeguards for the safety and welfare of the various communities, Native, Dutch, and English, which, in proportions so unequal, co-existed in South Africa.

I am sorry that this discussion has arisen, and I shall hope that the House will not come to a division on the Motion of the hon. Member for Burnley. I trust I may be allowed to impress upon hon. Members the danger to South Africa, and to the future of the Transvaal itself, which may arise from prolonging this debate. Acknowledging the great indulgence which was extended to me last night when, with reference to Basutoland, I was allowed to make a few observations, hon. Members will excuse me if I venture to say a few words now, seeing that the last delegates from the Boers of the Transvaal, Messrs. Joubert, Kruger, and Bok, were introduced by me to the late Government, as the delegates sent previously had been introduced by me to Lord Carnarvon. I remember very well the effect of one debate in this House upon the Transvaal Question. Paul Kruger and Joubert were sitting under that Gallery when the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney), now Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, advocated the cause of the Boers, and was answered by the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the last Administration (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach). They heard sufficient to convince them that there was no hope of the independence of their country being restored, and they telegraphed to me in Scotland that they could not follow me thither, and they left on their return to the Transvaal immediately afterwards. They wrote to me that their mission was ended, and they went away deeply disappointed, as they had hoped that some satisfactory arrangement would be secured. This present debate cannot be telegraphed to the Cape in detail, but most certainly some message will go to the effect that the Motion of the hon. Member has been adopted or rejected; and the people of the Transvaal will not understand that we are debating here, not the Transvaal Question on its merits, but simply the Motion of the hon. Member for Burnley, as against the Motion of the hon. Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock), who moves the Previous Question in order that the Government may proceed with the pressing Business of the day. It might be that if certain statements made in the course of this debate became known in South Africa through the medium of the telegraph, the result would be to embitter still further feelings which are only too bitter already. It has been stated that the Zulus would have invaded the Transvaal, and that the Boers could not have withstood them; but the people of the Transvaal distinctly assert that they were not afraid of the Zulus and Cetewayo. It has also been stated that we had to protect the Natives; but the delegates challenged the Government here to prove that within a recent period there had been any such thing as slavery in the Transvaal in the aggravated form complained of in this country. It has also been stated in the debate that we annexed the Transvaal because the Republic had employed men of the Amaswazi Tribe against Secocoeni; and yet, when Sir Garnet Wolseley attacked that Chief's stronghold, the Amaswazis in great force were employed alongside of the British troops, and left their dead and wounded in large numbers on the field of battle. These Amaswazis were rewarded, or rewarded themselves, with the cattle of Secocoeni, and returned to their homes, but not until they had destroyed many of the wounded, and even, it is said, women and children. Now that which is declared to be wrong in the Boers as against Secocoeni, was it right on the part of the British against the same Chief? These are the things which will be discussed in the Transvaal, and our deliberations in this House will occasion trouble there when the news is read in detail; and there is manifestly greater danger of misconception now when only brief telegrams are sent. What will be the belief in the Transvaal? It will be said that the defeat of the hon. Member for Burnley in his Motion for the restoration of independence means that the House of Commons denies the Transvaal liberty. I think that it is inexpedient in the present state of feeling to discuss this question, and that the decision which will be given upon a division, if we divide, will be prejudicial to the best interests of the Transvaal. The situation is complicated enough. We are obtaining taxes from the Natives in the Transvaal which the Boers did not collect. "With regard to this question of taxes, an hon. Member has remarked that the Revenue of the Transvaal has been increasing, and that it now amounts to about £100,000 per annum; but this increase of Revenue is explained by the fact that a considerable portion of it is levied from the Natives, and we must be careful that these Natives do not turn round and say that they were better off under the rule of the Boers than they are under our Government. It is the interest of this country to have the friendship of the people of the Transvaal. We have enlarged our borderline on the north of the Orange Free State from about 100 miles to nearly 1,200 miles; and I venture to say, without fear of contradiction, that if we annihilate every White man among the Boers and people of the Transvaal, we shall be face to face with graver difficulties than we have had yet to encounter in South Africa. I do hope that we will think of what is best for the future of that great Continent.

said, he had received for presentation a Petition from 50 gentlemen from South Africa, protesting against the annexation of the Transvaal as contrary to the Sand River Convention. Trusting in the justice of the British Parliament, they petitioned that this whole question should be re-considered by the House of Commons. One important point about the Petition was that it was accompanied by a paper, in which the Petitioners state the part of the country from which each came. He found out of these 50—students at Edinburgh University—only about six were from the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, or Natal; the others were from our own Cape Colony, and in this matter they might be regarded as representative men, as they were sons of Cape Colonists who had sufficient means to send their children to this country to receive a University education. He wished to read one sentence which they had written to him, in which they stated that they felt that they were acting as the mouthpiece of their countrymen, who formed the very backbone of our Colonists over a large extent of South Africa. The fact that such a Petition had been sent brought into prominence a point on which sufficient stress had not been laid, which was that the Boers of the Transvaal had the sympathy of the majority of the Cape Colonists. He did not say that serious difficulty was impending from that; but he believed that if they treated these Boers as rebels, and dealt with them in a harsh and unconciliatory spirit, they would arouse a feeling that would be detrimental to the welfare of South Africa. The Dutch Boers had long memories, and we might create a difficulty with them, to be paralleled only by the difficulty we now had in Ireland.

said that after the discussion he should desire to withdraw the Amendment. ["No, no!"] He had told many hon. Members he should do so, and they had left the House on that understanding.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 129; Noes 33: Majority 96.—(Div. List, No. 8.)

Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Supply Committee upon Monday next.

said, he had given Notice of his intention to call attention to the refusal of the magistrates to admit to bail Messrs. Harrington and others at Tralee, and to move a Resolution on the subject. He found that, in consequence of the Forms of the House, it would not be in his power to take a division on the subject; and, therefore, he would postpone his Motion till he could submit it to the judgment of the House.

Treaty of Berlin—Abandonment of Candahar

said, he did not intend, owing to the lateness of the hour and the fatigue of the House, to proceed at the present moment with the Motion he had put on the Paper to the effect—

"That, in the opinion of this House, Her Majesty's Ministers should adopt a peaceful and conciliatory policy with regard to the execution of the Treaty of Berlin; should advise the Greek Government to moderate its excessive demands and to demobilise its Army; and should retain possession of the great strategical and commercial position of Kandahar, in view of the advance of the Russian Armies towards India, and of the grave events now taking place in Central Asia."

He would only say that the action of Her Majesty's Government abroad had been, and was likely to be, as disturbing and as disastrous as it had been at home. We were very probably on the eve of an European conflagration, and it seemed that the bulwarks of our Empire in the East were to be abandoned. Although leaving the question for the present, he would take the very earliest opportunity of calling the attention of the House to the subject.