having placed upon the Paper the following Amendment:— In page 8, at end, add the following sub-sections:—

"(12) If the judicial rent of any holding is less than the rent payable by the tenant at the date when the application was made, the landlord, on showing to the Land Commission that the reduced rent that will probably be actually received from the estate will not be sufficient to pay taxes, rates, cesses, interest, and instalments on public loans, and other charges of a public nature, on the estate, and to keep down the interest or yearly charge for incumbrances thereon, and to leave for the landlord a reasonable surplus, may require the Land. Commission to purchase, and the Laud Commission shall purchase the estate, under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Acts incorporated with this Act;

"(13) The purchase money shall be applied and distributed by the Land Commission, first, in discharge of incumbrances, as far as the purchase money extends, and then according to the rights of the landlord and others interested in the estate; and for that purpose any trustees may be appointed by or with the approval of the Land Commission;

"(14) The application and distribution aforesaid shall be valid and binding to all intents, and, in case of a deficiency, any proportion or part of the purchase money allocated by the Land Commission, and paid in respect of any incumbrance, shall be deemed to be paid and received in full discharge of that incumbrance, as far as the estate was a security for the same;

"(15) For the purposes of this section, in-cumbrance includes mortgage in fee or for a less estate, trust for securing money, registered judgment, decree, or order, legacy, portion, lien, or capital or other sum charged in any manner on an estate."

It may save discussions upon Order if I state, before asking the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) to propose his Amendment, that I have carefully compared it with the Money Resolution of the 30th May, and that I consider it is within the wide terms of that Resolution. By it the Committee can consider proposals for "advancing or purchasing of estates," no limiting words being attached to such purchases except provisions which may ultimately be enacted in the Bill before us.

On a point of Order, Sir, perhaps you will be kind enough to explain to us the difference between a Committee of this character and a Committee of Supply, in which the power of making proposals for taking money, through the authority granted to it by the House, is entirely limited to Ministers of the Crown? I understand you, Sir, to say that it is open to any hon. Member to propose an outlay of public money in a Committee on a Bill, provided only that the terms of the Resolution of the 30th May do not exclude the purpose for which the money is proposed to be taken.

The difference is that in Supply the sums are fixed and may be reduced, but cannot be increased, either as a Vote or a tax, by a private Member. Any increase of a Vote or a tax can only be moved by a responsible Minister of the Crown; but, in a Committee on a Bill, the Ministers of the Crown have no privileges as to Money Clauses beyond private Members, after the House has come to a Resolution regulating the monies to be voted by Parliament for the purposes of the Act. Both are governed by the Money Resolution of the House, and any proposals made within the terms of this Resolution may be considered, whether they are made by private or official Members of the House.

said, the object of the Amendment which had been referred to was to provide for those cases which it appeared to him might possibly arise under the Bill in consequence of a reduction of rent by the Court. He was quite aware it was a somewhat startling proposal to make that landlords or any other classes of the community should be relieved of debts which they had legally incurred, and he quite admitted it was a choice of evils. It was a painful dilemma in which to be placed; but the fault was not his. The fault lay with the Government who introduced this legislation, and it seemed to hint that it would be even worse that any class of the community should suddenly be reduced to beggary and ruin through no fault of their own, but owing to the action of the Government who introduced legislation of this kind. It appeared to him that this was another illustration of the difficulty which Parliament must necessarily encounter the moment it departed from sound principles of legislation, and from that strict regard for the rights of property which had hitherto been recognized by the Administration of every country in the world with the exception of Her Majesty's Government. No doubt, it would be a very considerable shock to those persons and those classes in this country who had invested their money in securities of this nature to find that it was im- perilled by this legislation, or by Amendments moved in consequence of it, and no one regretted more than he did the necessity of moving an Amendment of this nature. But he confessed that he would regard it, to a certain extent, as a mitigating feature of that necessity if it brought home to the general public some sense of the dangers which were incurred at the present time by property of all daises and descriptions through the legislation introduced by the present Government, and the dangers they must necessarily encounter the moment Government or Parliament began to tamper with the rights of property, and devise legislation which he looked upon as nothing less than confiscation. The effect of the Amendment would be this—if the judicial rent was lessened by the Court to such an extent that it was not sufficient to meet, in the first place, either the taxes or the encumbrances of the estate, and, in the second place, to leave some reasonable surplus for the landlord, then the landlord might require the Land Commission to purchase the whole estate under certain terms. The 2nd section provided that the estate, having been purchased in this way, the purchase money should be applied and distributed, in the first place, to the discharge of all the encumbrances on the estate, and, if there were any surplus, it should be applied to the rights of the landlord, or the rights of any others who might possess an interest in the estate. The 3rd section provided for the case where there was a deficiency of funds after the estate had been purchased to meet all the charges and encumbrances on the.estate. In that case it enacted that the purchase money having been allocated by the Land Commission, if there was not sufficient to pay the whole, it should be treated as a discharge of the debt in full—that was, so far as it related to the State giving security. Before he moved the Amendment, however, he wished, on a point of Order, to ask the Chairman's opinion, because he had observed there was another Amendment, somewhat of the same nature, on Clause 20, page 13, line 23, standing in the name of the hon. Member for the Eastern Division of the West Riding of Yorkshire (Sir John Ramsden). He wished to know, by the Chairman's ruling from the Chair, whether, in the event of his moving this Amendment, and it being negatived, it would prevent the Amendment of the hon. Member for the Eastern Division of the West Riding of Yorkshire from coming on? If his (Mr. Chaplin's) Amendment were moved and negatived, and the position of the hon. Member's Amendment was not thereby interfered with, he should be glad to go on with his proposal.

The Amendment referred to by the hon. Member (Mr. Chaplin) is much further on, and I do not like to give a definite opinion so far in advance of the Business of the Committee. There is a difference between the two Amendments. In the Amendment the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire proposes to move, I apprehend he suggests that if the judicial rent is lower than than which existed before, that the whole estate should be purchased; but in the Amendment of the hon. Baronet the Member for the Eastern Division of the West Riding, it is suggested that if the holding has a judicial rent fixed lower than formerly, that that holding should be purchased. But I am not prepared to say whether they are substantially the same, until I have given further consideration to the subject.

said, that as he understood if he pressed his Amendment it was possible that the subsequent Amendment to which he had referred would be placed out of Court, he would refrain from bringing forward his proposal.

The reason that I rise now is that I desire to state to the Committee what is the view of Her Majesty's Government as to the principles contained in the clause; and that I shall do in the briefest manner, as the discussion has already ranged over a very wide field. It has been observed that there is more than one point involved in the present clause. There, are, however, only two to which I will refer, and the first of them is that which relates to judicial rents, whilst the second is that which concerns the renewal of the statutory term. Those are the two main principles of the clause, and, undoubtedly, those two principles might have been separated and put into two different clauses. This case might have arisen. Some hon. Gentlemen, or important numbers of hon. Gentlemen, might have been adverse to, and others in favour of, the proposition; but it would have been perfectly competent for hon. Gentlemen, if they had thought fit, to endeavour to remove themselves from this difficulty, to move to omit from the clause so much of it as to have enabled the portion struck out to be renewed in the statutory term later on. In that way it would have been open for us to bring up that matter on a separate clause. No such difference, however, so far as I am able to ascertain, exists in the views of the Committee as to this clause. The right hon. Baronet the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote), when he was dealing with the question of judicial rents, stated that he intended—I presume that he intended on behalf of his Party—to record his objection to the judicial rent when the question was put for the adoption or rejection of the clause. Since that, general objection has been taken to the renewable statutory term, so that I conceive that there is no practical difficulty under which we he in having these two questions in the same clause. As to the judicial rent, I shall hardly say a word, because I am under the impression that a very great majority of this Committee—a greater majority probably than voted for the second reading of the Bill—are friendly to the adoption of a judicial rent. And, then, again, this judicial rent was recommended by two Commissions, one of which embraced and in-eluded many Members of this Committee, amongst them being the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ritchie) and the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin). [Mr. CHAPLIN: No.] The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire says "No." The Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners for inquiring into Agricultural Distress was undoubtedly signed by the hon. Member, and it contains a paragraph which appears to me to be a recommendation, and if it is not a recommendation it would be well that the matter should be explained. It contains this statement, that I understand to be a recommendation—"Considering that improvements are generally the work of the tenant." I will not quote the whole of the words; but a general proposition which goes far beyond that principle is embodied in the Report, and the proposition is this—

"The desire for legislative interference to protect the tenant from an arbitrary increase of rent, does not seem unnatural; and we are inclined to think that by the majority of landlords legislation properly framed to accomplish this end would not be objected to."

So far as I am able to understand the English language, this appears to me to be a recommendation of judicial rents. It does not say that it is a judicial rent in cases affecting the tenant's improvements, but it speaks of rent at large, and states that legislation, properly framed for checking increase of rent without distinction between rent on improvements and any other rent, should not be objected to. It may be said that this legislation is not properly framed; but that answer can hardly be made, because the framing of the legislation has not been objected to. No other form of legislation of this kind for checking increase of rent has been proposed against it. It has been accepted as, perhaps, on the whole, not perfect legislation, but as being as free from objection as any that we can devise. But that is not the main question as to what is to be said on judicial rent, and on this point I do not propose to detain the Committee. What I wish to say is that there has been language used in this House which, in my opinion, is altogether loose and inaccurate, to the effect that this is a clause for giving perpetuity of tenure. In my opinion, and not in my opinion only, but as a matter of fact, I think it can be shown to be no such thing. I am not saying this in the interest of any particular Party, or to acquire the favour of any particular section of the Committee. There are those who would wish that this clause did confer perpetuity of tenure, and there are those who entirely object to perpetuity of tenure. It appears to me to be absolutely undeniable that this clause does not confer perpetuity of tenure, and that the use of the phrase "perpetuity of tenure" in connection with it is an abuse of language. It is altogether a misapprehension. Now, this is my proposition—is this, or is it not, perpetuity of tenure? What is perpetuity of tenure? I should say that it wits a tenure which was incapable of forfeit even by a breach of covenant; but, whether that is so or not, it is undoubtedly a tenure which is absolutely incapable of being interfered with by the expression of a man's will to take the tenancy in his possession, or when he transfers it to another person. If I do not call this clause perpetuity of tenure, I call it durability of tenure, reasonable ecurity of tenure—security such as is intended to obviate apprehensions, reasonable security such as is intended to give confidence, and such as is intended to set free both the mind and the arm of the tenant for the improvement of his holding, and to give confidence that the whole of the fruits of,his labour will be secured for his own use and enjoyment. That is the extent of what we give; and for this purpose, in our judgment, it is absolutely necessary that a durable tenure should be given to the tenant. That perpetual tenure should be given to a tenant is a totally different matter. There are many who urge that perpetual tenure ought to be given to the tenant. With very slight exception, indeed, I think it might be said that the Commission of Lord Bessborough recommended perpetuity of tenure. Even that is not altogether true; but it is not very far from true. But, with respect to this clause, it is, in my opinion, whether as a matter of praise, or as a matter of blame, inaccurate to speak of it as giving perpetuity of tenure to the people of Ireland generally. As regards the people of Ireland generally, many of them may not go to the Court at all. I do not believe there is anyone in this House competent at this moment to form a trustworthy judgment as to what proportion of the tenantry of Ireland will go to the Court. There are some of the conditions under which the Court will operate which will make them very desirous to go before it, and there are other conditions that will make them, in my opinion, very unwilling in some cases to go before it. But, however that may be, many of them may not ask to go to the Court. Many may be absolutely repelled from going, because there are particular cases—such, for instance, as the limited enactment as to estates conducted on what is called the English custom, and this matter as to judicial leases—that may be the means of excluding the action of the Court altogether so far as statutory terms are concerned, and so far as anything except the terminable interest is concerned. Well, that disposes of some people in Ireland. Is perpetuity given to those who go into the Court, whose applica- tion is accepted and approved by the Court, and who receive from the Court a judicial rent and a statutory term? And now, what I state appears to me to be so plain that I cannot conceive how it can be contested. I can conceive anyone saying, "this is a tenure of durability which you have no right to give," and I can conceive all sorts of objections on the merits of it; but let the objection be raised on the merits, and do not let it be described as "perpetual tenure." It is not a perpetual tenure for various reasons; because, for instance, of the distinction between present tenancies and future tenancies, and because of the modes provided by the Bill, by which what has been a present tenancy becomes a future tenancy. In the first place, there is the mode of forfeiture of a present tenancy, and the replacement of it by a future tenancy, in consequence of a breach of conditions by the tenant. A present tenancy may cease on any and every of the occasions when a tenant right is transferred. When the landlord exercises his right of pre-emption the future tenancy is entered upon, which does not reserve to the tenant the right to apply to the Court, though it does reserve to the tenant his interest in his holding, and places certain restrictions on his rent. When a tenancy is transferred, there is a power in the hands of the landlord of converting, if he thinks fit, a present tenancy into a future tenancy. But this is not all. It would be no perpetuity of tenure if a man were not free to hand it over to someone else. A tenant is subject to the provision I have mentioned, and he is subject to the choice or the veto of the landlord over the vendee. The landlord can, on any reasonable cause—and the interpretation of a reasonable cause is a thing traditional in Ireland—the landlord can oppose and object to the transfer. This shows, again, that you will be misusing language to call this a perpetuity of tenure. But even this is not all; because whilst a tenancy continues in the hands of the existing tenant, it is liable to resumption by the landlord upon reasonable and sufficient cause. I admit that for 15 years, which is the first statutory period, it is not liable to resumption. The exception which we have made with regard to labourers' cottages is, I am afraid, one of a narrow scope; but whatever it is, it is only for this par- ticular purpose, and can hardly be considered as greatly affecting the measure before us. For 15 years there will be, practically, fixity of tenure; and the fact remains, that after every statutory term, where the landlord can show sufficient cause, the tenant can be displaced with compensation, and the holding may be resumed by the landlord. Therefore, when the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire, or any other hon. Member, thinks it worth while to refer to speeches made by me against perpetuity of tenure, my answer is a simple one. I can reply simply, that I adhere to the statements contained in those speeches. I do not think perpetuity of tenure desirable. What is desirable, what is necessary, what is absolutely vital to this Bill, and what in this Bill cannot be departed from by its framers, is that we should give the tenantry of Ireland a durable interest sufficient to become the basis of a real practical security. Unless we were prepared to do that, we had better not have drafted the Bill at all. Without a provision of this kind the Bill would be a departure from our duty. It would be a mockery, and would satisfy neither the Committee nor the Irish nation—it certainly would not give peace to that still unhappily disturbed country. We have got to attain this end without granting perpetuity of tenure. Why do we not grant perpetuity of tenure? Because we cannot reconcile perpetuity of tenure with the maintenance, or, still more, the duties of the landlords. I grant you that it was this very difficulty that we endeavoured to deal with; but we made an endeavour to obtain security to the Irish tenant, not only security for compensation when removed from his holding, but something more than that—namely, an assurance that he would not be removed from his holding except for grave and sufficient reasons. We have endeavoured to secure this in a manner compatible with retaining the position, the privileges, and the duties of the landlords. It is difficult, perhaps, to bring these things together; but, Sir, we have made the attempt, and we have endeavoured to adhere to the basis on which the attempt is founded. If, in the future, other attempts are made which are to become the law of that country, they will be attempts which will be likely to be in the direction of greater fixity of tenure. This is an important opportunity; this division is an important division, because the maintenance of the clause, which, as I have said, seems to us to be absolutely essential and vital to the Bill, is in the balance; it is a question of the standing or the falling of the labours of the year—the work of the Parliament during the year—and not only that, but upon this rests oar hopes for the tranquillity and good order of Ireland. But I have said that I have no title to restrain the liberty of objection to and impeachment of this clause, and I only wish to express the hope that in all justice we may not be credited with praise that we do not deserve nor be charged with imputations that do not attach to the course which we have taken. I know that what I have said—almost every word of what I have said—will be characterized by hon. Members as depreciatory of the Bill. I am not here to conceal the character of the Bill; I am here, on the contrary, to make its true character appreciated and understood. Take it for what it is worth. It aims to give the tenant a durable interest; it does not aim to give him perpetuity of tenure. Let us discuss this clause and the Bill on the ground that they are for the purpose of giving a durable interest to the Irish tenant without dispossessing the landlord of his social position and the responsibilities that belong to it. We do not seek to dislocate society, and we have never had that object in view; but we cannot offer less to the Irish tenant than is here offered to him, that is, the pledge involved in this Bill—a pledge which is the more consolidated, and, if I may say so, consecrated by the reception which this measure has had from the masses of the people of England, Scotland, and Ireland.

said, that, as he had a Motion on the Paper for rejecting the clause, he might, perhaps, be allowed to say a few words with regard to it. He imagined that the Prime Minister had an object in view in taking the unusual course of commencing a debate on the Motion for rejecting the clause; but with that object he (Mr. Balfour) had nothing whatever to do. It was, no doubt, to warn his followers that he regarded the fate of the Government as depending upon the clause itself. That was a matter of the internal policy of the Liberal Party with which he (Mr. Balfour) was in no way concerned. But the first part of the Prime Minister's speech was intended, no doubt, to restrict the area of the discussion on the clause, and with that object the Committee would sympathize. He (Mr. Balfour) should not like to extend the discussion; but the Prime Minister had tried unduly to restrict the discussion, and to put it into limits which, he thought, they on that side of the House would find themselves impossible to keep within. The right hon. Gentleman had said that there were two principles contained in the clause—namely, judicial rent and fixity of tenure. With regard to the second question, the right hon. Gentleman referred to the Reports of two Royal Commissions, which, he said, supported the view of the Government. Well, as to the Bess-borough Commission, he (Mr. Balfour) should have thought, after the recent debate which had occurred in "another place," it would have been well to have made no further allusion to it. He should have thought that no Government would have been rash enough to have urged the authority of that Commission in any way. But with regard to the other Commission the right hon. Gentleman claimed that it had pronounced in favour of valued rents; and when the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) dissented from that proposition, the Prime Minister proceeded to read out from the Report words which he regarded as conclusive on the point. He would point out to the Prime Minister that if the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire showed half the ingenuity in explanation that he did not report in favour of valued rents that the Prime Minister had shown in demonstrating that the Bill did not give fixity of tenure, he would find it a very easy task to escape from the strictures of the right hon. Gentleman. What did the Report say? It stated that there was a very general feeling throughout Ireland that valued rents would be desirable, and that many landlords would not object to a measure framed on those principles. He did not think that that bound the Commissioners in any way. He must confess that he (Mr. Balfour) himself should not have signed those words, because they were really a misinterpretation; but, at the same time, he was sure that the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire, when lie came to speak on this question, would find no difficulty in escaping from the net which the Prime Minister had attempted to throw round him. Now, with regard to the question which the Prime Minister had raised as to fixity of tenure, the right hon. Gentleman argued elaborately to show that this measure did not give perpetuity of tenure. He (Mr. Balfour) did not wish to waste the time of the Committee over what was, after all, a mere verbal excuse. The Prime Minister said the Bill gave durability of tenure; but it seemed to him that durability of tenure, which lasted, practically, for ever, was undistinguishable front perpetuity of tenure. The right hon. Gentleman's contention was that to call it perpetuity of tenure was nothing more nor less than abuse of the English language. Those were the two questions which the Prime Minister said were raised by this clause; but there was another question which, though it was intimately connected with them, might be distinguished from them, and, in his opinion, it was by far the most important. That was the handing over to to the Court, with no directions whatever, the regulation of a gigantic industry like agriculture. Yet that was what the Government did in this clause. Was the Court to deal with a country of 5,000,000 of people who practically supported themselves by but this one industry? A little section of the people of Ireland showed a sense of discontent, and the Government came down to this House and actually proposed, as a remedy, that all the most delicate and important interests of that great industry, by which a whole people were supported, should be handed over, without any regulations, to a Court not yet named. It was against this proposal that he should protest, more especially when he voted, as he shortly should vote, against including this clause in the Bill. In deciding this question of rents they could not possibly act without determining also the question of the interest in the capital and the question of wages; because, whatever might be the elements that the Court would take into account in deciding fair rents, there could be no doubt that the Court would have to also take into consideration the fair value of the labour, and the fair value of the capital, of the landlord. He admitted that, so far as the Bill went, they were at present only determining the wages of the farmer; but did they think they would be able to stop there? There had already been brought to bear upon the Government a great deal of pressure to induce them to deal with the question of the agricultural labourers. They had dealt with the farmers; would they be able to resist the appeal of 500,000 agricultural labourers when they came and asked them to determine—as they had already determined what was a fair day's rent—what was a fair day's wages? The action of hon. Members who came from Ireland showed that they did not mean to lot the question rest, and they would be weakening their hands when asked to deal with it if they assented to the principle of the clause now presented for their acceptance. This was a subject on which he confessed he felt very strongly; and if there was any one consideration which would make him take a more serious view of it than another it was that the Government and hon. Members opposite appeared to think that in establishing this omnipotent Court they were doing the most ordinary legislative act in the world. No doubt, the Prime Minister had made some statements showing that he fully considered that the position was one not without gravity; but he (Mr. Balfour) had not heard that sentiment echoed from the Benches behind the right hon. Gentleman. Nor did he think there was in the Party opposite, nor in the country at large, a just apprehension on this matter. This was an experiment that had never before been made in any civilized country. [An hon. MEMBER: In India.] He was talking of Western Europe and the civilized world. No country had ever ventured on an experiment analogous to this; and not only was the experiment destined to failure, but it was one that would have serious consequences in the interests of legislation generally. Hitherto they in England had prided themselves on their principles of free contract between man and man, and they had regarded those principles as the highest mark of civilization; and there was a right hon. Gentleman sitting on the Front Bench opposite who, during the past 40 years, in season and out of season, had preached that doctrine, and who had gained and maintained his popularity by preaching it. He did not know what the right hon. Gentleman thought of it now. What did the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright) think of the speeches he had delivered in years gone by on the Ten Hours' Bill, and other measures in which that great principle was involved? Had they any right to suppose that they might not in the future, and in the not very far distant future, see large classes coming to the Government and declaring—"You must step forward and protect us from free contracts?" That was what was said now in Germany. In this country they desired no interference with the operation of the laws of free contracts; and if such a movement ever spread to England, and if large numbers of the working classes of this country ever came, in the future, to the Government, and said—"Our lot is pressing hardly upon us; we are suffering extremely from the want of equality in the distribution of wealth, which is the result of your economic laws with which you can interfere, as you have shown in the case of Ireland that you are able to do"—he wished to know what reply could be given by the Government or their successors? The question was one on which he had already troubled the House at the time of the second reading; and it was one which, he thought, on account of its great importance, ought to be raised again on the third reading of the Bill. He should certainly divide the Committee on the question that this clause be omitted from the Bill.

I am much surprised that the hon. Member opposite (Mr. A. J. Balfour) should have proposed the omission of this clause from the Bill; for, if there is one portion of it above all others justified, not only by the necessity and circumstances of the present crisis, but also by sound policy, it is this clause, which creates a tribunal securing fair rents to the tenant farmers of Ireland. It is the duty of every Government, it is the duty of every statesman who legislates for any country, to see that all obstacles are removed out of the way of the fullest development of national industries. That applies just as much where the national industry is agriculture as where it is manufacture or commerce. The statesman would be neglecting his duty, therefore, if he allowed agricultural improvements to be obstructed by the imposition of a fine upon them. In the case of all sciences, the sole sanction for whose laws is experience, Adam Smith defines political economy to be the science which deals with the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Stuart Mill defines it as the science which treats of the production and distribution of national wealth; that which promotes the production of national wealth and prosperity best accords with the principles of political economy. That which hinders it is most opposed to it. What can hinder it more than taxes on industry and enterprize? What can be more impolitic than to leave in private hands the power to tax a national industry by raising rent in proportion to improvement? Theoretically, it is open to the farmer to refuse increased rent; to accept his compensation and go; but, in practice, he has hitherto preferred to submit, though with a deep sense of wrong, because over and above the money value of his improvements was the attachment he felt for the farm, the improvement of which had, perhaps, been the great object and interest of his life. Is it politic to allow the state of the Land Laws to endure which leaves it open to owners to confiscate the capital and labour which tenants have invested in their farms, by clapping on additional rent for every additional improvement? Is not this to make improvement penal? Does this not account for the backward state of agriculture in Ireland? Can legislators, honestly attempting to remedy this evil, deserve the term impolitic? I know that the great majority of Irish landlords would scorn to take advantage of their tenants in this way; they are, in fact, much better than the laws. Most of them are sincerely anxious to deal justly with their tenants; but a very small percentage of grasping and unscrupulous men suffice to do the mischief. Nay, the very fact that the law renders it possible is enough to frighten the farmers and deter them from doing justice to their farms; and, if their present landlord is too just to take advantage of the law, what security have they that his successor will not do so, and thus fine them heavily for their own industry and enterprize? Such a state of law is enough to kill all enterprise and all improvement. Is it politic to allow the law to remain unaltered? Is it not the duty of the State to remove out of the way all obstacles to the development of the resources of the country they govern, and I see no better means of remedying this serious evil than the establishment of land tribunals to insure fair play in the matter of rent. If it be objected to on tile principle of political economy, I ask, has there been a divine revelation from heaven on the subject, that we can claim infallibility for the existing theories of political economists? Political economy is not an exact science like mathematics, the premisses and conclusions of which admit of no dispute, nor has any heaven-sent gospel on the subject come down to us; no, it is a science built up by experience, but the conclusions of human experience are continually subject to modification. New experience and new combinations in endless succession arise, requiring us to admit now exceptions to our rules, in the case of all sciences, the sole sanction for whose laws was experience. At all events, in the problem before us, necessity is the unanswerable argument. When the alternative lies between reform and revolt, we cannot afford to be too nice; when a conflagration is in progress, we must use the engine we have at hand, and not wait to consider whether we might not get a better one. Liability to rack rent causes smouldering discontent, which periodically passes from the chronic to the acute stage. A very acute stage prevails at present. When the pasions are aroused, when men are dragged from their beds to be shot in the presence of their families, or murdered while attending a father's funeral, or have their houses blown up, all which incidents occurred last week, it is high time to strike at the root of causes which give excuse for such passions to blaze out. I say the excuse—God forbid that I should say the justification—of the crimes that have been committed, and that are now daily being committed, must fill us with indignation and horror. The state of the law cannot justify them any more than it can justify the unholy work of sowing hatred between class and class of their fellow-countrymen, in which some of the popular loaders have been employed; but defects in the law furnish the excuse, and it is not politic to leave that excuse in exist- ence. Of course, State interference in what have been regarded as matters of private contract do clash with the notions which have hitherto prevailed. But I am one of many landlords in Ireland who have been compelled to come to the conclusion that such interference is necessary, and that it would have been well for us if it had taken place long ago. I have no hesitation in saying that it is for the interest not only of the tenant, but also of the landlord, that this interference should take place. I believe the Reports of the two Commissions prove that the great majority of the Irish landlords would shrink from exacting an exorbitant rent; but, unhappily, there are a small minority of landlords who are not guided by the just and humane principle of "Live and let live," who regard their tenants as mere rent-paying animals from whom to wring the last farthing that can be extracted. The mischief which even a small number of such men can cause is immeasurable. Men of the class I refer to have no scruple in turning their own improvements against their tenants, and in pushing up the rent in proportion to the amount of improvement that has been effected upon the farm. There is nothing which the Irish farmer dreads so much as having his improvements turned against himself in this way. Any one single case of this kind will frighten all the farmers in an entire district; and it is impossible to over-estimate the mischievous consequences to the development of Irish agriculture which have followed from this cause. The State is undoubtedly justified in interfering in the matter of rent—for what might happen if they were absolutely precluded from doing so? It was the State that originally conferred their land upon the landlords; but there must always have been this condition reserved—that they should not use the powers conferred to the detriment of the State. The landlord who tried to carry out to its extreme logical conclusion the theory that he had a right to do what he liked with his own would soon find out that there were limits to that right as regards the public. It would be intolerable, for instance, if he were to proceed to convert a populous manufacturing district into a grouse moor by evicting the entire population, and levelling every town and village upon it; but he might do this if the State had no power to interfere in the matter of rent, for he might demand impossible rents. In this last resort, therefore, the State is justified in interfering in the matters of rent; and it is for the Government of any country to determine when such a crisis has arisen as renders it expedient to interfere; this right to interfere is not limited to land, it was at one time deemed expedient to interfere with the interest to be charged for money, as was done in the case of the usury laws, when it was declared unlawful to exact a higher rent or rate of interest than 5 per cent. A still more arbitrary exercise of the right to interfere with the interest to be charged for the use of that which is a man's own property in a sense more absolute than can be predicated of land is the case of the London cab-drivers. Their cabs, their horses, and their time is their own. Yet they are precluded from charging what they please for the use of them. And a fair rent has been fixed for them in a very arbitrary fashion, and the plea in this case was not necessity but convenience. There is, therefore, plenty of precedent for interference by the State in the case of land rents. Of course, it is open to dispute whether the necessity for such interference has arisen. But the most impressive argument in favour of the necessity is the united testimony of two special Commissions, one of them appointed by a Conservative Administration, the other by a Liberal one. I joined an association last Autumn called the Land Tenure Reform Committee, of which such landlords as Lords Monck, Monteagle, and Emly, and Judge Longfield were members; they were all unanimously of opinion that a Land Court, as a security against rack-rent, was necessary; and a number of the most enlightened landowners in Ireland have come to see the danger of their own order, which is threatened, if some security against the unlimited exactions for rent is not devised. Nor have I seen any other effective measure for this purpose suggested, except tribunals empowered to control and regulate the relation between landlord and tenant, and insure to the people the use of the land at a fair rent. Speaking as a landlord myself, I would say that it is vitally necessary for the landlord as for the tenant that this interference should now take place. Had such control been established long ago, we should not be involved in the dangerous crisis which now prevails.

said, his first objection to the clause was that it was wholly unpractical and unworkable. That would become more apparent when they considered, on the ground of time alone, the work the Court would have to do. The first and most elementary duty of the Court would be, after hearing the parties and considering all the circumstances of the case, holding, and district, to fix a judicial rent for all the parties who might apply to it. He was informed by the highest authority that, at a moderate estimate, it would take two hours to hear each case; and he understood there were about 600,000 tenants in Ireland. There were three classes of tenants in Ireland—the highly-rented, the lowly-rented, and the moderately-rented. The highly-rented tenants would all, of course, go into the Court at once; while the Government had now empowered the landlord also to go into Court; and it would be unfair to suppose that if the landlord were taken into Court by the highly-rented tenant, the landlord would not be likely to take the low-rented tenant into Court. But they were told by the Prime Minister that rent was not the only thing which would induce the tenant to apply to the Court; that he would go into Court to obtain stability also. What would be the consequence? The whole case of the Government was that this stability of security which the Bill insured to the tenant was the one thing which the tenants in Ireland wanted, and that it was the absence of that which the tenants complained of. That was the essential grievance which they said they were about to remove; and the consequence would be that unless the Bill had been introduced on grounds totally false, the great majority of the tenants in Ireland would go into Court at once, not on account of rent only, but in order to get the stability which the Government said was essential for them, and which they also said was one of the main causes for the introduction of the measure. If that were so, he entreated the Committee to consider for one moment, before the clause was finally accepted, what was the gigantic, the impossible task they were about to impose on the Court. He might quote the words of the Prime Minister on the first introduction of the Land Bill, when he said—

"I have very great doubts indeed whether—if we were, by compulsory law, to refer the ultimate regulation of every bargain relating to land to a Judicial Commission sitting in Court—any judicial authority you could create would not break down under the weight so imposed upon it."—[3 Hansard, cclx. 907.]

Well, it did not appear to him to matter much whether the action of the Court was to be compulsory or permissive, the result would be the same, that the great majority of tenants would go into Court. He would take the number applying to the Court at the moderate estimate of half of the entire number—namely, 300,000; and, on the supposition that each case would take an average of two hours to try, it would require 600,000 hours to decide all the cases, and, allowing that the Court sat six hours each day, something like 12 years would have passed before all the cases could be decided. Such was the position in which the Court would be placed, and after all the inducements they had held out to the Irish tenants, after the manner in which the Irish people had been excited, what, he asked, would be their feelings, when they found everything brought to a dead-lock, and the security offered to them a sham and a delusion, because, owing to the weight and bulk and clumsiness of the Bill, it was absolutely unworkable? But if the primary difficulties were got over, what were the particular difficulties that remained? He regretted to detain the Committee; but he would remind hon. Members that that was the last opportunity they would have of discussing the most novel, if not most revolutionary, proposal that had ever been submitted to the House of Commons. He asked the Committee to consider what were the principal difficulties in the way of arriving at a judicial rent by the machinery provided by the Bill; and here he must refer to some of the observations which fell from the Prime Minister upon this point, and in support of his (Mr. Chaplin's) contention, because he was aware of his inability to adduce any arguments so able and so unanswerable as those which had been used by the right hon. Gentleman himself. What did the right hon. Gentleman say 11 years ago as to the difficulties attending the valuation of rents in Ireland? He said—

"Now, look at its practical difficulty. We are to value these rents. What an army of public officers are you to send abroad to determine from year to year the conditions of the 600,000 holdings in Ireland, conditions which are settled with comparative ease when settled by private intercourse, but conditions the fixing of which beforehand by a public authority would be attended with tenfold difficulty."—[3 Hansard, cxcix. 1846.]

The right hon. Gentleman added—

"How are these rents to be valued? What is the test? The prices of produce? Of what produce? Of one kind of produce or of all kinds? Can any man fix by law any system upon which it will be possible to adjust rents by calculation founded upon prices of agricultural produce of all kinds.……It is impossible, in my opinion, to get the prices of produce so as to found the rent upon them by a public authority; and if you could get them it would be absolutely impossible to apply a standard according to the varying circumstances of each particular holding, and its capacity to produce this or that kind of produce. But what are we to say with regard to the quantity of produce? Supposing the quantity of produce is doubled, is the landlord to receive the same price for the increased quantity, or is he not? If he is to receive the same price for the increased quantity where is the tenant's inducement to increase the quantity? But if the quantity is to remain the same, by what authority do you cut off the whole of the landlord's interest in the prospective increase in the quantity of produce? "—[Ibid. 1847–8.]

And the right hon. Gentleman wound up by saying—

"If I state these things it is that I may provoke confutation. I disbelieve in the possibility."—[Ibid. 1848.]

He (Mr. Chaplin) disbelieved in it too, and he could not but say that he thought the Committee had been treated very unfairly throughout the discussion, because no Member of the Government had risen in his place to say in what respect the Prime Minister in those days was so completely deceived. But what was the objection of applying that principle of valued rents to Ireland? He must again trouble the Committee by quoting the right hon. Gentleman, who said—

"If I could conceive a plan more calculated than anything else, first of all, for throwing into confusion the whole economical arrangement of the country; secondly, for driving out of the field all solvent and honest men who might be bidders for farms, and might desire to carry on the honourable business of agriculture; thirdly, for carrying widespread demoralization throughout the whole mass of the Irish people, I must say, as at present advised—to confine myself to the present and until otherwise convinced—it is this plan, and this demand, that we should embody in our Bill, as a part of permanent legislation, a provision by which men shall be told that there shall be an authority always existing, ready to release them from the contracts they have deliberately entered into."—[Ibid. 1845.]

He regretted extremely that the right hon. Gentleman was not in his place; but he asked, was it conceivable, on any principle of morality or justice, and in the face of those declarations, that neither the right hon. Gentleman himself, nor any of his Colleagues, should not have had the manliness or courage to explain, maintain, or contradict them? But the right hon. Gentleman had said that he (Mr. Chaplin) was a party to that plan; that the Richmond Commission had recommended it, and that his name was affixed to the document which, as he had endeavoured to explain to the Committee, distinctly recommended the adoption of the plan by which rents in Ireland should be fixed by some judicial tribunal. He supposed the right hon. Gentleman thought nothing of the fact that he had repudiated all connection with such a plan or such a recommendation; and, further, he supposed it was nothing to him that that recommendation had also been repudiated by the President of the Richmond Commission in "another place." If the Committee would allow him to explain, he would, in a very few words, endeavour to show that the right hon. Gentleman was mistaken. His (Mr. Chaplin's) contention had always been that the institution of a Court of public authority was not necessary to give the tenant legislative protection against the arbitrary raising of rents. There were a variety of ways in which that protection might be given. He would submit one to the Committee—he did not say it was the right, or the only one; but it would insure protection to the tenant, and was preferable to the clumsy machinery of that ingenious Bill, introduced for the purpose of puzzling tenants, and enriching all the lawyers in Ireland. What objection was there to this—when a tenant made improvements on a farm to give him power by statute, before the landlord was allowed to raise his rent, to call upon the landlord to buy up all the improvements? So in the case of tenant right. Where the tenant had been encouraged to give large prices for tenant right he had always said it was both reprehen- sible and undesirable to allow the landlord so to raise the rent as to eat up the tenant right. What was the objection in such cases to giving the tenant the same power to call upon his landlord, before the rent was raised, to purchase the tenant right? This he mentioned in order to show that there were other ways of carrying out the recommendation of the Richmond Commission besides the way proposed by the Bill. Again, the right hon. Gentleman had dwelt at some length upon the subject of perpetuity of tenure, and knowing, probably, that "conscience doth make cowards of us all," said "that he did not care what quotations the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire made from his speeches delivered in 1870." He was sorry that the right hon. Gentleman was not present, as he believed he was in a position to convince him by his own words that perpetuity of tenure was in the Bill. What did the right hon. Gentleman say as to perpetuity of tenure? He said—

"My proposition is that if you value the rents you may as well, for every available purpose, adopt perpetuity of tenure at once. It is perpetuity of tenure, only in a certain disguise. It is the first link in the chain; but it draws after it the last."—[3 Hansard, cxcix. 1846.]

Well, the right hon. Gentleman had argued at great length, in 1870, against perpetuity of tenure; and what was the description of the scheme against which his arguments were directed? He would give the right hon. Gentleman's description of it, and leave it to the Committee to say whether his speech delivered that day was consistent with that which he delivered 11 years ago. The right hon. Gentleman said—

"As I understand it, the scheme itself amounts to this—that each and every occupier, as long as he pays the rent that he is now paying, or else some rent to be fixed by a public tribunal charged with the duty of valuation, is to be secured, for himself and his heirs, in the occupation of the land that he holds, without limit of time."—[Ibid. 351.]

There was, at that moment, on the Treasury Bench the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Had either of those right hon. Gentlemen the manliness, courage, or candour to get up and state to the Committee in what respect the scheme denounced by the Prime Minister differed from that which was now proposed; and why did the right hon. Gentleman object to perpetuity of tenure? He objected to it because of its effects—its malevolent effects, as they might be called. The words of the right hon. Gentleman were—

"As I understand it, the scheme itself amounts to this—that each and every occupier, as long as he pays the rent that he is now paying, or else some rent to be fixed by a public tribunal charged with the duty of valuation, is to be secured, for himself and his heirs, in the occupation of the lands that he holds, without limit of time. He will be subject only to this condition—somewhat in the nature of the Tithe Commutation Act—that with a variation in the value of produce the rent may vary; but it will be slightly, and at somewhat distant periods. The effect of that provision will be that the landlord will become a pensioner and rent-charger upon what is now his own estate. The Legislature has, no doubt, the perfect right to reduce him to that condition, giving him proper compensation for any loss he may sustain in money."—[Ibid.]

What distinction was there, he asked, between the two cases—that denounced in 1870, and that advocated in 1881 by the Prime Minister—which justified him in refusing compensation to the landlord to-day, seeing that he had said in 1870 that the landlord ought in justice to receive compensation? Under this Bill every tenant might apply to the Court to fix a judicial rent; when that was fixed, it became subject to a statutory term of 15 years, and the tenant might apply from time to time for the renewal of that statutory term; and the sole limitation upon it was that, by the 10th section of the 7th clause, no renewal could take place until the end of the first statutory term, and that the rent could not be altered at a less interval than 15 years. However much the Prime Minister might choose to play on the words, the real effect of the Bill was that it gave the tenant optional perpetuity of tenure—a perpetual lease with the option of a break at the end of 15 years, but with regard to which no option whatever was given to the landlord. If that were true—and he defied any hon. Member opposite to contradict his description—what were they to think of the speech delivered that day by the Prime Minister, and of the consistency of his Colleagues? He had never withheld or concealed his opinion of the Bill. He believed it to be a bad Bill, an unjust Bill, and a confiscatory Bill from beginning to end. But there was something worse which he had seen in the course of those discussions, and it was the levity with which expressions of opinion on the part of the Prime Minister of England, not on matters of fact or circumstance, but expressions of opinion on the great principles of morality and justice, were brushed aside by the transparent special pleading they had heard, and dismissed apparently without a thought or feeling of compunction, and in a manner which he could not but feel would be fatal to the public life of England, when the people of this country reflected on the character for consistency of their foremost public men.

observed, that the charge just made by the hon. Member (Mr. Chaplin), that his right hon. Friend at the head of the Government was capable of treating that or any other important subject with levity, was one which would be regarded with surprise by all who heard it.

said, he was sure the right hon. Gentleman did not wish to misrepresent him. He had made no charge against the Prime Minister of having treated this question with levity. What he said was that the right hon. Gentleman brushed aside, without, apparently, the smallest thought or feeling, all allusions to his statements in former years, with regard to which he (Mr. Chaplin) had charged him with inconsistency.

said, he distinctly heard the expression "levity of opinion of the Prime Minister." He was very much struck by it at the time.

I said nothing of the kind. I alluded to the levity with which the right hon. Gentleman treated allusions to his past statements. I used the word "levity" deliberately, and I adhere to it now.

said, he was quite content to accept the hon. Member's explanation, although he thought it would not carry conviction to the country. He was not, however, going to take up the time of the Committee on that subject. He would not say that the hon. Member would not have used the same words if his right hon. Friend had been present; but when he charged Members of the Government with want of courage and manliness in not answering his charges, he had to remind him that his right hon. Friend had over and over again done so. He was willing to leave the defence of his right hon. Friend to what he had said that day, and to what the House, the Committee, and the country would think of what his right hon. Friend had advanced. The hon. Gentleman had dwelt, as he had dwelt before, on the fact that his right hon. Friend had expected better results from the Bill of 1870 than it had produced; and he congratulated the hon. Member on the industry with which he had read the speeches of his right hon. Friend. But it was too late then to bring forward those speeches, as both on the second reading of the Bill and in Committee they had been repeatedly explained. They had now to consider a very important matter—namely, whether they would accept the clause; whether, in fact, they would accept the Bill, for without the clause the Bill would never have been brought in by the Government. He might, in passing, refer to the inconsistency of the hon. Gentleman in signing the Richmond Report. If the hon. Gentleman thought he had acted consistently, let him, by all means, remain of that opinion. He (Mr. Forster) would only refer him to the speech of the hon. Member who had given Notice of moving the rejection of the clause (Mr. A. J. Balfour), because it conveyed to the Committee that the impression of the hon. Member's inconsistency was not an unnatural one. But they had got more or less into a second reading debate. He did not complain of that, because that clause, the 7th, was the most important clause of the Bill. Its principles had been challenged on the second reading, and fully discussed. Nobody supposed on either side of the House that the Government would, as a matter of choice, have created a tribunal for the fixing of rent; but the majority of the House had recorded their belief that, in the present circumstances of Ireland, they must create such a tribunal. And he asked hon. Members opposite, if they were in power and administering the affairs of Ireland, would they leave matters as they now were? Almost every person who had studied the question felt that, in the present exceptional circumstances of Ireland, they were bound to have an outside tribunal to fix the amount of fair rents. Several hon. Members had tried to frighten the Committee by drawing fancy pictures of the view both landlords and tenants would take of the Court. But in a very short time after they had begun to have any experience of the working of the Act both landlords and tenants would get a pretty close idea of what the decision of the Court was likely to be in any particular event, and they would settle the rents for themselves, and so avoid the trouble and expense of going to the Court. He could assure the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire that if he would make inquiries in any part of Ireland, alike of landlords and tenants, he would find that no such feeling existed with regard to the Court as that with which he credited them. So far from that being the case, they looked forward to the establishment of the Court as their hope and resource, in order to enable them to get out of their present difficulties. If the hon. Member for Hertford were to be successful in getting the clause struck out of the Bill, it would be a matter of great disappointment, he might even say of dismay, to the receivers of rent, as much as to the payers of rent. He did not mean to say that the working of the Court would not be attended with inconveniences and difficulties; but he maintained that these would not be so great as the inconveniences and difficulties which they would remove. He doubted whether they could continue to use the power of the law in the landlord's interest, in order to compel the fulfilment of a contract, when they knew that the tenants had not been by any means as free to contract as they ought to be, and as free as tenants were in other countries. The hon. Member objected to the proposal of the Government on the ground that it would give perpetual tenure to the tenant. The Government did not so regard it; and he could not see how it could be so regarded by anyone in view of the fact that it gave to the landlord power to resume possession of his estate at the end of 15 years. They did not for a moment deny—indeed, it was their pride and boast—that though the Bill did not enact perpetual tenure, it would give great stability and security of tenure, and unless it did so the Bill would not be worth the paper on which it was drafted. He did not think that any measure short of that which the Government had introduced would, in the present strained state of relations between landlords and tenants in Ireland, have done any real good to either party. He could not complain that the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire had taken another opportunity of referring to the speeches of the Premier and explaining away his own Report. There were, however, no points in regard to the clause on which hon. Members had not had ample opportunity of forming, and probably had formed, an opinion; and he, therefore, hoped the Committee would go to a division without further delay.

It may be perfectly true, as the right hon. Gentleman says, that there are no points which can very well be raised with regard to this Bill upon which hon. Members have not probably formed their opinions; but I will endeavour, in a few words, to show why I think, at the present moment, on the passing of the 7th clause, it is important that we should put on record the impression made upon us by the manner in which the clause has been handled since it went into Committee. It is not my intention to throw myself into the controversy which has been raised with regard to the consistency of the Prime Minister; but, at the same time, I would point out that I think it ought to be borne in mind, when references are made to the previous opinions of the Prime Minister, they are made in these circumstances. Ten or 11 years ago the right hon. Gentleman, after great care and study of the question, brought forward a scheme for dealing with the land system of Ireland. In so doing, he discussed at great length, and with very great ability, several leading and fundamental questions connected with the tenure of land. He laid down certain principles, and argued them out with great ability, thought, and clearness. We are now brought face to face with a measure, also introduced by him, in which we find a considerable number of the principles adopted by him in former times set aside, and we complain that no sufficient reason has been given, either by the Prime Minister or any of his Colleagues, why those views are now set aside. Therefore, while I do not think my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) ought to be rebuked for the course he has taken, I think we should not be wise to spend much time upon this question. What we have to consider is the 7th clause, which has been truly said to be the most important part of the Bill, and concerning which I will say that, as originally drawn, it was very different in character from the clause as we are now asked to pass it. It began, in the first instance, by providing that the tenant should have the power of demanding a fair rental to be fixed by the Court, and it went on to define the manner in which the Court were to arrive at what a fair rent would be. The clause, as it originally stood, contained rather minute and complicated directions to the Court—namely, that, in settling what the fair rent would be, they were to take into account what was called the "tenant's interest," and the manner of calculating this was set out at full length in the clause. On looking at that part of the clause I was of opinion that the manner in which it was proposed to calculate the tenant's interest was unfair, in that it would not only have given to the tenant that which I believe he had no right to claim, but also more than had been claimed for him, especially in recent years, by as great a friend of the tenant as the late Mr. Butt. It was my intention to challenge the definition given as to the manner in which the tenant's interest was to be arrived at, and, if possible, to make the definition correspond more precisely with that which would meet, as I believed, the fair justice of the case. But before we reached the discussion of that part of the Bill, the Government changed their view and struck out those minute directions intended for the guidance of the Court, and which I intended to oppose, and in place of them proposed that it should be left to the Court, with due regard to the circumstances of the case, holding, and district, to fix what was to be the fair rent. If the matters had been so left, I think it might have been satisfactory, because we could then have concentrated our attention on the construction and constitution of the Court and the powers which ought to be given to it. And, as I have said, the clause in its amended form would have been one which we might have been content to allow to pass unchallenged, in order to concentrate our attention on the Court, to whose power of discernment the question of the fair rent was to be intrusted. But, Sir, in the course of the discussion an alteration was made, not by the Government, but on the suggestion of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell), who took an active part in the discussion and with very great ability. The hon. and learned Member for Dundalk introduced some words which I think may lead to some difficulties hereafter—I mean the words "having regard to the interests of the landlord and tenant respectively." These sound very harmless words; but I think that, to a certain extent, they are words which may be held to imply that very direction to the Court which it was our object to do away with. [Cheers from the Home Rule Members.] The cheers from that part of the House rather confirm me in my opinion, and render it all the more important that we should bear in mind what the possible effect of the words of the hon. and learned Gentleman was, and what effect they may have on our future proceedings. Our view has been that it is necessary, and I am far from saying that, in my own view, it may not be necessary, to make, as a temporary arrangement, under the peculiar circumstances of Ireland, provisions for fixing the rent. If it is necessary, then I think it should be made without letting in a principle which is of such a character that I do not think the Committee ought to accept it. It is a principle which has been recognized almost accidentally, and without the knowledge even of the authors of the Act of 1870—certainly without the knowledge of a large portion of Parliament who accepted and passed that Act, and it is a principle which not only recognizes the right of the tenant, but largely extends it. When we say that the right was not only recognized, but intended to be stereotyped by the clause relating to compensation for disturbance, we certainly did feel that the proposal was one which must necessarily challenge a great deal of criticism on our part. Then there is the other point to which reference has been made, and upon which I will not delay the Committee now—the question of perpetuity, or fixity, or durability, or whatever else it may be called. Undoubtedly, the effect of these clauses is to give something very much beyond the mere rent for a statutory term of 15 years. The effect is to give a power of renewal, and a power of renewal which may, subject to a few exceptions, be exercised over and over again for all time, and which I think can hardly be distinguished from what may be called perpetuity of tenure. Exceptions they are, but they prove the rule and go beyond the necessity which we recognize in the case; and, under these circumstances, it becomes our duty to express our opinion by dividing against the clause. I think that is necessary, for this reason—if we did not divide against the clause in its present shape, we should always be told in future discussions on other parts of the Bill—"Oh, but that was included in the 7th clause, which, after a great deal of discussion and a great deal of amendment, was accepted by the Committee without a division." Therefore, I am not prepared to accept it without a division. While I recognize in the Bill some things which are not bad, I recognize also in it some things which I think we are bound to protest against; and, therefore, it is my intention to advise my hon. Friends to join me in dividing against the clause.

said, the hon. Member who introduced the Amendment (Mr. Chaplin) had made a reference to the Bessborough Commission which he (Mr. Shaw) considered most unfair. Indeed, it was not the first time that unfair references had been made to that Commission, and he thought it would be much better if hon. and right hon. Gentlemen would give Notice of a Motion in regard to that Commission. There might have been a dozen witnesses who gave their evidence very absurdly; but he was quite prepared to defend the recommendations of the Commission and the conclusions to which they arrived. The hon. Gentleman also referred to a debate which had taken place in "another place." Until that day he (Mr. Shaw) had not read the speech of the Duke of Argyll. He had been more pleasantly occupied in taking a few days' holiday; but he had not the slightest hesitation in saying that a more incorrect and a more unfair speech he had never read. [Cries of "Order!"]

The hon. Member is at present referring to a debate in the other House, and he is not in Order in so doing.

thought he might be allowed to refer to the debate in question, seeing that the Chairman had not interposed when it was referred to by a previous speaker.

I did not hear the reference, or I would have stopped it at once.

asked if it was not a fact that a noble Lord in "another place" referred to a speech made in the House of Commons this Session by the Prime Minister?

I have no knowledge whatever of what has taken place in "another place."

said, he wished to ask a question on a point of Order.

The point of Order is already settled.

said, he wished to ask a question on another point of Order. Of course, it was perfectly clear that any Member of that House would not be justified in referring to what had been said by a Peer in "another place;" but would he not be justified in referring to a published report of that Peer's speech which had appeared in the newspapers?

continuing, said, he had been asked by a friend whether he did not intend to reply to that speech, and his answer was that he could not very well, in the present hot weather, answer it by a letter in The Times. It was only a Scotchman who was able to do that. However, he had expressed his willingness to answer the speech at any time in the place in which it was made. [Cries of "Oh!"] He did not mean what hon. Members seemed to think he meant. He hoped that Providence would preserve him from acquiring a right to speak in that House; and what he meant was, that ho was ready at any time to appear at the Bar of the House of Lords and answer the speech, and he had no doubt that Baron Dowse would also be quite ready to appear there. [Cries of "Order!"] He really did not think he was out of Order; but he would address himself now to the clause under discussion. He regarded it as containing what he understood to be a real and perfect security for the present tenant, and for the present tenant alone. As such the Irish Members had always regarded it; not as giving security in perpetuity, but as giving security to the present tenants. If the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister were now to withdraw the clause, he (Mr. Shaw) was sure the Irish Members would entirely dissociate themselves from the Bill, and cast upon the hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who threw out the clause the responsibility of passing the measure. He considered it absolutely essential that on every change of tenancy the tenant right and the improvement rights of the tenant should be purchased, and he understood that to be the recommendation of the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire.

said, he had not stated that he recommended that as the right plan to adopt; but he had mentioned it to show that the recommendation of the Commission was not inconsistent with the possibility of doing it.

said, he could not understand why the hon. Member should propound a plan of this kind without being prepared to give the Court power to carry it out. He understood that the hon. Member propounded it as a great political scheme; but it was a plan that would work absolute and entire ruin to the landlords.

Will the hon. Gentleman explain why?

If the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire desires to make an explanation he will have an opportunity of doing so after the speech of the hon. Member for Cork (Mr. Shaw) is concluded.

continuing, said, it had been suggested that he should move an Amendment to the clause; but he believed that the clause as it stood was sufficient to protect all the interests concerned. It was absurd to suppose that any valuer in Ireland, being required to enter into the whole question of the interest of the tenant and of the landlord, would not take everything into consideration.

said, that as his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the County of Roscommon (Dr. Commins) was not present, he would move formally the Amendment which stood in the name of his hon. Friend, in order to give the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General for Ireland an opportunity of deciding whether the substitution of "inequitable" and "inequitably" for the words "unreasonable" and "unreasonably" would make any difference in the view of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. As a non-legal Member, he (Mr. Biggar) could see no difference; but, on the other hand, there might be a difference in the legal mind. If there should prove to be a material difference he would not press the Amendment. He begged to move, in line 31, to leave out the words "unreasonable" and "unreasonably," and substitute for them the words "inequitable" and "inequitably."

said, he must decline to accept the Amendment. If the landlord demanded too high a rent, it would come under the word "unreasonable," as the Court would have to decide whether the demand was unreasonable or not. The insertion of the word "inequitable" would not be any improvement.

said, that after that explanation he would withdraw the Amendment.

moved, as an Amendment, in line 34, after "same," to insert "or postpone the same." It would be grossly unjust to the landlord who had originally placed a farm in the hands of a tenant in a thoroughly good condition to give power to the Court to accede to the tenant's application, and declare the landlord's conduct unreasonable so long as the farm continued in a bad condition. He wished to have these words inserted in the clause in order to indicate to the Court that it should have power to say to the tenant—"I will not give any decision yet as to rent, owing to the scandalous condition into which you have allowed the holding to run; but if you will come back to me in two or three years' time, I will then consider your application, and, in the meantime, you must put the farm into good heart and condition." The Court in such a case would be able to say—"I do not dismiss your application absolutely; but I postpone the consideration of it for two, two and a-half, or three years, and at the end of that period you may come back, and I will then see what the condition of the farm is." The tenant might receive the farm in a perfectly good condition, and might by the worst conceivable husbandry reduce it to the worst possible condition, in which it might be worth only 2s. 6d. an acre. The words he proposed to insert in the clause were "or postpone the same," subject to certain terms; and the terms he assumed. Would be that the tenant should put the holding into something like a reasonable tenantable condition. The Court would always have an opportunity of seeing whether the tenant had bonâ fide carried out the terms and conditions of the clause.

said, he did not like to refuse anything proposed to him by his right hon. and learned Friend; but he did not see that it was desirable to accept the proposal now made, which was altogether unnecessary. When a man entered upon a farm, he ought to be wise enough to keep his farm in the highest possible state of cultivation, so that he might realize the highest possible sum from it. If a tenant who had allowed his farm to run out of condition applied to the Court, the Court would at once be able, under that 8th clause, to deal with it at its discretion. It might consider whether the tenant had done anything that was unreasonable, and might thereupon refuse the application. But there was nothing to prevent the Court from entertaining the application again at the end of two or three years. The clause, as it stood, would enable the Court either to grant the application, or to refuse it until the tenant had restored the holding to a satisfactory condition. When the farm had beer placed in a tenantable condition, there was nothing to prevent the tenant from making an application again; and if the application was a proper one, it would, no doubt, be heard.

failed to see that any advantage would be derived from the adoption of the Amendment of the right hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson). The Court would have power to take into consideration the rent that was substantially paid, and in a case where the holding had been very much impoverished and allowed to run into a very bad condition the interest of the tenant would be exceedingly small. The case put by the right hon. and learned Gentleman, where a tenant had allowed a farm worth 30s. an acre to become so impoverished that it was only worth 2s. 6d. an acre, was a very extreme one; and the Court had ample power, as the clause now stood, to deal with such a case.

said, he proposed to move the omission of the last paragraph of the clause, which provided that—

"The Court in considering whether the landlord or tenant has unreasonably refused any proposal made by the other, may take into account any proposal that may have been made of the grant by the landlord to the tenant of such a lease as is hereafter in this Act referred to as a judicial lease; but the conduct of the tenant in refusing the grant of any such lease shall not be deemed unreasonable unless the Court is satisfied that the interest of the tenant, having regard to the value of his tenancy, would have been sufficiently secured by such lease."

The object of that part of the clause was to protect the tenant from any undue force the landlord might bring to bear upon the tenant to compel him to accept a judicial lease, and then from setting up such lease in opposition to the tenant's claim. The clause, in the first paragraph, provided that—

"Where the Court, on the hearing of an application of either landlord or tenant respecting any matter under this Act, is of opinion that the conduct of either landlord or tenant has been unreasonable, or that the one has unreasonably refused any proposal made by the other,"

the Court might do certain things specified in the second paragraphs of the clause, and which were to be a direction to the Court in regard to the matters that were reasonably left to its discretion. The words, as they stood in the first part of the clause, were, he thought, quite sufficient, and it was not expedient to drag into the clause the offer of a judicial lease to the tenant for the purpose of enabling the landlord to go before the Court with what he might consider to be a reasonable offer in satisfaction of the claims of the tenant. At the present moment, he proposed to move the omission of the third paragraph of the clause.

hoped that the Government would adhere to the clause as it stood. The provision which the hon. Member proposed to strike out was only an invitation to the landlord and tenant to settle their differences out of Court. The paragraph itself simply enabled the landlord to draw the attention of the Court formally to the lease which the Government proposed to call a judicial lease; otherwise the Court might not have regard to the perfectly equitable and fair terms of the lease. It was open to the tenant to refuse it if he thought it would bind him too much; but, on the other hand, if he did accept it, the landlord ought to be able to take advantage of it.

said, he did not attach very much importance either one way or the other to the Amendment. As to the paragraph of the clause against which the Amendment was directed, he did not think it improved the first part of the section, which might be described as the general equity section. The first part of it was sufficiently comprehensive in its general terms to give the Court power to deal with all applications by the landlord or tenant; and he did not think it good drafting, after having laid down general principles, to proceed to point out particular cases.

thought the tenant was protected by the words at the end of the sub-section—

"But the conduct of the tenant in refusing the grant of any such lease shall not be deemed unreasonable unless the Court is satisfied that the interest of the tenant, having regard to the value of his tenancy, would have been sufficiently secured by such lease."

In fact, the lease was not forced by the landlord on the tenant; but it was a lease accepted by the Court on behalf of the tenant, and approved by the Court on behalf of the tenant. It therefore stood upon entirely different lines from the clause of the Act of 1870, which provided that a 31 years' lease should take the tenant out of the Act. This clause did not take the tenant out of the provisions of the Bill; but it left it directed that a lease, when accepted by the tenant and approved by the Court, should be binding upon the landlord. If the Court said that the refusal of the tenant was not unreasonable, that would be a sufficient protection for the tenant.

said, he was of opinion that it would be undesirable to allow the Court to say that the offer of a judicial lease was to be a receipt in full to the tenant for all claims under the Act. He did not suppose that a single tenant out of a lunatic asylum would dream of accepting a lease of 31 years in lieu of the benefits conferred by the Act. Now, what were the benefits of the Act? The right of getting a perpetual renewal of a term of 15 years, so long as the tenant thought proper to go to the Court and prove that he had observed the conditions of a statutory tenancy. What, then, could be the object of placing the Court—recollecting that the Courtwould probably be the County Court Judges in Ireland, who, whatever their abilities were, had their feelings—would it be wise or just to place upon them the invidious duty of determining that a lease of 31 years offered to the tenant was a lease that ought to be accepted by the tenant? It was quite true that the words were "thirty-one years or upwards;" and it might be contended that the County Court Judge, before he refused the application, might say that unless it was a 41, or a 51, or a 61 years' lease, he would not consider it reasonable. Under all the circumstances, he apprehended that it would be a great improvement to the Bill if these words were struck out, as was proposed by his hon. Friend the Member for the County of Monaghan (Mr. Givan). They were quite unnecessary for the general purposes of equity; and, under the first part of the clause, the matter might very well be left to the discretion of the Court.

wished to remind the Committee and the Government that many of the evils which afflicted Ireland at the present moment had arisen out of the power given by the Land Act of 1870 to force judicial leases upon the tenants. Much bitterness of feeling and heartburning had originated from that practice. He said that the leases had been forced upon tenants. They had never been more forced upon them than now. It might be said that the tenants were open to refuse them; but if they had refused them they knew what the inevitable consequence would be. He was satisfied that no man in Ireland would accept one of these judicial leases in lieu of his rights under the present Bill.

Two distinct questions have been raised in the course of the observations of hon. Members who have taken part in the discussion. The hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) did, however, place the matter suggested by the Amendment on its proper ground. The suggestion is this—the two first paragraphs of the clause are quite ample to cover any judgment the Court may form as to the offer of a judicial lease. Now, I think it is not expedient to argue, on the present occasion, the question whether these leases are desirable, or, if they are desirable, what should be their precise terms. The Committee will have to consider that question under the 9th clause, and they will have not only to consider the whole of the terms of the leases, but to give their judgment upon the 9th clause itself. Therefore, I would respectfully suggest that we would do well to postpone that subject entirely, and confine ourselves now to the narrow question whether it is expedient for the purposes of the Bill that after investing the Court with general power to consider and determine and draw its own conclusions upon every question of a reasonable offer between the parties we should proceed to point out one particular kind of reasonable or unreasonable contracts. I am bound to say that I think we should do much more wisely to trust to the general powers contained in the first part of the clause. No doubt, under the general powers conferred by the clause, it will be in the competency of the Court to deal with the question of unreasonable contracts; and the refusal to entertain the offer of a lease would, under the first part of the clause, undoubtedly come within the jurisdiction of the Court. The closing words of the first paragraph in line 31 are—

"Or that the one has unreasonably refused any proposal made by the other the Court may do as follows."

Then the clause goes on to say what the Court may do, and the alternative is that—

"It may refuse to accede to the application, or that it may accede to the application subject to conditions."

Under these circumstances, I think it will probably be bettor to drop the third paragraph, especially as the matter may be considered better on the 9th clause, which contemplates the duration and consequences of judicial leases upon the settlement of the whole condition of the tenancy, whereas this clause does not contemplate such matters, but only the settlement of the amount of rent.

thought the Government had acted very unwisely in giving up this section. Judicial leases were the particular invention of the Prime Minister himself. He recollected quite well the speech made by the right hon. Gentleman in introducing the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman said, in effect—"We recognize that there are good landlords in Ireland, and we wish to make a distinction between them and bad landlords, and to keep them, if possible, out of Court by permitting them to make arrangements with their tenants. We wish to give them an opportunity of continuing to their tenants, for some considerable time, the benefits the tenants now enjoy under them; and, therefore, the tenants who enjoy judicial leases will not come under the clause." The offer of a judicial lease was to be considered by the Court as a reasonable offer, not to be refused by the tenant; but the right hon. Gentleman now proposed to leave the Court to say that the tenant might be free to refuse it or not. As the clause originally stood the tenant could not refuse a judicial lease, as long as it preserved the fair interests of the tenant. He thought the concession of the Government was really a very important one; and he deprecated the readiness which they displayed in abandoning their proposals in order to meet the views of the extreme Party.

regretted that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had not, on other occasions, displayed the same readiness to make concessions which he had manifested now. He (Lord John Manners) also entertained an objection to the mode in which it was proposed to deal with judicial leases; and if the 3rd section of the present clause had been allowed to remain in it, it would have been his duty to move the insertion of the larger and more liberal words which appeared in the 18th section of the Act of 1870. The Act of 1870 was not to be displaced from the Statute Book; and as they had heard nothing in condemnation of the operation of the 18th section, he thought, if the words of the present clause were to be changed at all, it was expedient that the Amendment should be in the direction of adopting the phraseology of the 18th section of the Act of 1870. Therefore, if the section had been retained he should certainly have felt it necessary to move the Amendment which stood in his name.

wished to put a question to the Prime Minister. The right hon. Gentleman, if he understood him rightly, seemed to be abandoning the third paragraph of the 8th clause of the Bill on the ground that judicial leases were not worth having. He wished, therefore, to know whether it was also the intention of the right hon. Gentleman to abandon the 9th section?

said, that nothing in the conduct of the Bill had struck him with more surprise than the observations of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General for Ireland (Mr. Law) upon the meaning of the word "unreasonable." He did not dispute that there might have been cases since the passing of the Act of 1870 which the Court might fairly hold to be unreasonable; but if they were to make the Bill understood and effective they ought not to leave out of consideration the important question of the deterioration of the holding. As the clause was at present drawn, the only questions the Court could really consider were questions relating to that which happened at the time the landlord and tenant came into Court, or nearly about that time; and, in reality, they did not go back far enough into the history of the conduct of the parties, and especially into the important question whether the tenant had or had not deteriorated the condition of the soil. In passing, he wished to put a question to the right hon. and learned Gentleman upon a point which had agitated his mind very considerably, in regard to the provisions of the 4th clause. Long as it was since the Committee disposed of that clause, some of them would remember that, in the 4th section, a number of conditions were defined which were called "statutory conditions." At first it was thought that a breach of these conditions would lead to the loss of the holding and to the re-entry of the landlord. It was now found that, nevertheless, the tenant was to be compensated by damages. He wished to know whether, in the event of the tenant breaking any of the statutory conditions, such, for instance, as breaking up the farm and sub-dividing it, that was a question which was to come up for the consideration of the Court, because the words of the clause, as they stood, were—"Or that the one has unreasonably refused any proposal made by the other, the Court may do"—certain things. All the statutable conditions made by the 4th clause were interfered with by the present clause; and he was, therefore, anxious to move the Amendment which stood on the Paper in his name.

(Mr. LAW) hoped the hon. and learned Gentleman would accept the same answer as that which he had given to his right hon. and learned Friend opposite (Mr. Gibson). The word "unreasonable," which was already in the Bill, would include waste, and all the deterioration which the hon. and learned Gentleman wished to guard against was already provided for by the Bill.

intimated that, after the clear statement made by the right hon. and learned Gentleman, he was satisfied, and would withdraw the Amendment.

moved, as an Amendment, to leave out "thirty," and insert "sixty." He thought that 30 years were too short a term, and that 60 or 61 years would be much better. He was, however, unwilling to press the Amendment, unless he had reason to believe that it would be favourably received by the Committee. He should, therefore, ask the Chairman to put the Amendment.

As the hour for reporting Progress has nearly arrived, it is hardly worth while to call upon the Committee to discuss the Amendment, which is of some importance, now. I will, therefore, move that the Chairman report Progress.