I wish to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether Her Majesty's Government have received any telegraphic information which would either confirm or, as I hope, qualify the statements as to massacres in the interior of Egypt which have appeared in the newspapers?

We have received no information since yesterday on the subject. Yesterday I stated that we had heard of massacres in the inte- rior of Egypt; but we really did not know how much credit to attach to accounts of Native travellers who came down to Alexandria. I hesitated, therefore, to say anything on the subject, because frequently before statements have been made and repeated hero which afterwards have been proved to be inaccurate. I stated a few days ago that we had received information of two Englishmen having been murdered in the interior, and names were given; but one of these Englishmen is now stated not to have been murdered, but to have escaped.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is true that Sub-Constable Finney, stationed in the iron hut at Derreenavoggy, near Keadne, reported on the night of the 18th of April that he had been fired at by five men on the public road, and that he had returned the fire; whether it did not afterwards appear that this statement was unfounded, and that instead of being attacked, the sub-constable had waylaid and threatened to shoot five persons; whether on the night in question Sub-Constable Finney had not asked a man named Muldoon to take his (Finney's) revolver, and fire a shot at him; whether, subsequently, he did not stop two men, named Patrick Walsh and John Regan, and, without provocation, present his revolver and threaten to shoot them; whether Messrs. Muldoon, Walsh, and Regan, summoned Sub-Constable Finney before the Keadne Petty Sessions; and, whether, a few-days before the trial day, the Crown entered charges against Finney; whether it was suddenly discovered, on the day preceding the trial, that Finney was insane; and, why the opinion of the local dispensary doctor was not taken as to alleged insanity of Sub-Constable Finney?

I find that Sub-Constable Finney did make the statement attributed to him in the Question of the hon. Member, and that subsequent inquiry led to the impression that there was no foundation for his statement. The other facts also appear to be correctly stated in the Question; but before the sub-constable's conduct could be inquired into it was found necessary to place him in an asylum as a dangerous lunatic. The question why the opinion of the local dispensary doctor was not taken on the case has been referred to the district for report.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is the fact that Mr. Henry O'Mahony, who is confined in Kilmainham, was, on the 15th instant, offered his liberty on condition that he would proceed to America; whether an intimation was given him that the Alien Clause of the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act would be put in force against him in case of his refusal to quit the Country; whether Mr. O'Mahony has lived in Ireland during the last seven years; and, if so, whether the Government have the power to expel him; and, whether it is the intention of the Government to grant Mr. O'Mahony a hearing before the Privy Council, in order to give him an opportunity of defending himself against the charge on which he is detained in prison before taking further action?

It is the case that Mr. Henry O'Mahony was, on the 10th instant, offered his liberty on condition of his leaving the country and going to America. It was intimated to him, at the same time, that if he still refused to leave the country His Excellency might feel it his duty to take advice as to whether any action should be taken under the "alien" provisions of the Prevention of Crime Act. Mr. O'Mahony returned to Ireland from America in the beginning of 1881. It is not the intention of the Government to take any further stops in the matter at present.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is the fact that Mr. Denis Healy, of county Clare, who was arrested on a charge of murder on February 5th, and discharged as there was no evidence against him, was re-arrested on the 25th February, under the Protection of Person and Property (Ireland) Act, for intimidation, and is still in Enniskillen Gaol; and, whether, as he has an aged father and a sister only to manage his farm, the Lord Lieutenant will reconsider his case?

in reply, said, that Mr. Denis Healy was released on the 21st instant.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If his attention has been called to a Memorandum recently issued by the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, showing that some two hundred negroes are now held in slavery in Brazil by the St. John del Roy Mining Company, an English Company working under English Law, and the head office of which is in London; and, whether, if the facts be as stated by the Society, the directors of the Company in question being British subjects, are not liable to criminal prosecution under the Slave Trade Act of 1873?

in reply, said, that in Questions of this kind a reasonable interval should be allowed in order that the facts might be learned. He would give an answer in a week or a fortnight.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether his attention has been called to the following statement in the "Bio News" of June 24th:—

"There are yet a large number of slaves in the province of Minas Geraes belonging to the extinct 'National Brazilian Land and Mining Association,' commonly known as the 'C'ocaes Company,' which are illegally held because the English law forbids slave-holding to British subjects. These slaves, however, are hired out, and their wages are regularly received and administered by the British Court of Chancery. It is altogether likely that a brief note to the British Government on this matter will secure the liberation of these unfortunate captives;"

I must refer the hon. Member to the reply recently given by the Attorney General on this subject. Her Majesty's Government have been informed that the St. John del Rey Company have granted freedom to their only remaining slaves. The question of the liability of British subjects in these matters comes within the province of the Treasury.

said, the hon. Baronet had not answered the last part of the Question.

I believe that is a matter which comes within the functions of the Treasury.

asked the First Commissioner of Works, Whether complaints have reached him of defective ventilation and noxious exhalations in and about the House; and, if so, whether he will have the nuisance abated?

read the following Report from Dr. Percy, who has charge of the ventilation of the House:—

"During the 17 years I have had charge of the ventilation of the Houses of Parliament complaint has occasionally been made by Members of the House of Commons of unpleasant smells within the House, and in every case it has been found that they were caused by contamination of the air outside, and sometimes at a considerable distance from the House. As the House is supplied with air from the Common Court, the Star Court, and the River front, it is not possible to prevent such smells when the air is impregnated with odorous matter. A short time ago an unpleasant smell in the House was temporarily caused by an exceptionally high wind blowing down smoke into one of the Courts above mentioned from a smoke shaft. The smell of tarry matter, which has occasionally been perceived in the House, was caused by the wood pavement in the Star Court, which, in order to preserve the wood, has been set with asphalte. No sewer gas can by any possibility escape from the drains connected with the House, as the gas is effectually exhausted from that drain by a furnace at the bottom of the Clock Tower, and ascends to the top of the Tower, where it passes into the atmosphere."

said, he had taken upon himself the duty, possibly very rash, of placing on the Notice Paper, no other Notice being there, the following Resolution:—

"That this House, while ready to vote whatever Supplies may he necessary for the protection of the Khedive and the security of the Suez Canal, is not prepared, having regard to the position of England as a great Mussulman Power, to enter upon a War for the restoration of the authority of the Khedive in Egypt, unless in conjunction with the Forces of the Sultan."

Does any hon. Member second the Motion?

said, he desired to do so.

The proceeding taken by my noble Friend places the House in a peculiar position. The situation, as he says, is one of very great gravity; and, under these circumstances, he invites the House to bind our hands by a Motion of which even the terms are not before us. They are before us as moved; but they are not before us for the purpose of full comprehension and reflection.

I am quite ready to withdraw the Motion now, and bring it on at any time.

Well, with regard to that, I must leave it to the judgment of my noble Friend himself. I only point out the difficulty in which we are placed by the fact that such a proposal has been made. My difficulty in acceding to his courteous suggestion, that it should be brought on at another time, lies in this—that it would seem to imply on my part that I thought that at some other time it would be a proper subject for the House to entertain. Now, Sir, I wish to state briefly that I cannot conceive any early phase of this question in which it would be admissible for the House to entertain a proposal of that nature. The proposal is not to abstain from intervention in Egyptian matters. By no means. We are to undertake the defence of the Suez Canal—that is to say, we are to deal with what is symptomatic, while we leave the source and seat of the mischief untouched; that we are also to maintain the personal security of the Khedive, which abolishes all distinctions of principle in this matter, because that implies the carrying forward of warlike measures in Egypt, and leave behind nothing but the question of degree. Then, thirdly, we are to announce that we are ready to make war in Egypt, provided the Sultan, as the Sovereign of the country, will join us. Well, Sir, it would be most unwise, in my opinion, to make a declaration of that kind. Be it remembered that what we are now doing is, excepting as regards the City of Alexandria, making preparations for warlike measures, which it may, and probably will be, necessary to take. But it is impossible for anyone to say at the present moment what may be the exact position we shall occupy before these warlike measures, which the Vote of Credit is to support, can become practical measures. But reference has been made to the Conference at Constantinople. It may yet result, for all that we know, in more substantive support than perhaps the noble Lord supposes. We are not entitled in any manner to say that the Sovereign of the country—namely, the Sultan, has refused to send his troops to Egypt. I shall be nearer the mark if I were to say that he has asserted, in principle, his readiness to send troops to Egypt. I am not in a position to say that no European Power, other than England, will take part in military measures in Egypt. We are in a condition to say that France will take part up to a certain point. Now, Sir, under those circumstances, I think my noble Friend will see that it is impossible that the House could discuss the question at large upon a proposal of this kind, which ties and shuts us up in the midst of a number of contingencies which may take shape in a short time, but which have not yet taken shape—a Motion which shuts us up to a certain limited proposition, having, as far as I can see, no clear basis of principle to dwell upon, and having no other practical effect than that of greatly hampering and narrowing our liberty of choice, and which will prejudice our means of action. Under these circumstances, I need not say that it is impossible for me to accede to the proposition. We had better be permitted, after negativing that Motion, to go into Committee of Supply.

Before the Sitting is suspended, I wish to put a Question to the Under Secretary of State—namely, Whether there is any truth in a report which has come by telegraph this evening, to the effect that Turkey has consented to send troops to Egypt?

The Turkish Government have not accepted the Identic Note of the Conference, but have stated that they consider the essence of that Note to be a proposal to send troops, and that they accept that proposal. It is entirely open to the Porte in to-morrow's Conference to discuss the conditions.

said, when the discussion was adjourned he was endeavouring to recall the attention of hon. Members from Blue Books and marine gunnery to the subject before the Committee. He had asked the question whether our interests in, and our obligations with regard to, Egypt warranted and justified the proposed military action of the Government? And he ventured then to say that an impartial and honest review of the actual facts and circumstances of the situation would compel an answer to that query in the affirmative. He again asked the Committee what were our interests in connection with Egypt? Though these, of course, had been more or less stated in detail by every speaker who had addressed the Committee, he still felt it necessary to re-state them. They were—first, the Suez Canal; secondly, our trade with Egypt; and, thirdly, the subordinate, but still important, interest of the bondholders to whom Egypt was indebted. Now, as regarded the Canal, he could, of course, say nothing new on that subject. Its vital importance to England had been recognized by every hon. Member who had taken part in the discussion; and, indeed, so vital was it, and so inseparably was it bound up with our interests in our Indian Empire, that if we had in Egypt no other interest, that alone would justify the Government for having taken military action. As he had observed, our interest in the Canal was not merely one of enormous political weight, but there was also the minor, but still considerable interest, of the proprietary shares in that Canal. That interest was now of the market value of about £9,000,000; and upon that point he ventured to express his approval of the original purchase of the shares, which only cost the country £4,000,000 four years ago. He thought that the increased value of our stake in the Canal was one which called for the acknowledgment of every thorough-going Liberal in the House; and he, for one, felt grateful to the late Conservative Chief for the action taken by him in this matter. But, besides our ownership of these shares, there was the additional fact that four-fifths of the whole traffic passing through the Canal was British.—a fact which, in itself, constituted an interest of the very highest importance. There was also our trade with Egypt, which represented £13,000,000 sterling a-year; and he was quite sure that if it were possible to conceive that trade to be annihilated, there would be a loud cry raised from Manchester and other places interested in the Egyptian trade. He thought the importance of that question alone would entitle the Government to the vote of every commercial Radical below the Gangway on the other side of the House. Then there was the interest of the bondholders. Now, it seemed to be the fashion with many hon. Members in that House, and with many persons out of it, to speak of that interest with much less respect than he thought fairly belonged to it. The bondholders were far too commonly regarded as being no better than Irish "gombeen men"—as usurers who exacted exorbitant interest from the Government of Egypt from year to year. But there was absolutely no justification—so far as nine-tenths of the present holders of these bonds were concerned—for such an opinion. He had himself owned Egyptian Stock, and during the greater part of the past 20 years had been much interested in Egyptian finance. In the fewest possible words, he would, therefore, tell the Committee what was the foundation of the claim which the bondholders might fairly prefer, and for which they might justly ask Government support. Exclusive of the Daira Debts, the Egyptian National Debt proper consisted of five loans. The first of these was negotiated in 1862, towards the end of the Reign of Said Pasha, and amounted to £3,292,800, of which sum the Egyptian Government received only £2,500,000. The next, which took place in 1864, early in the Reign of Ismail Pasha, was for £5,704,000, of which the Government received only £4,864,063. The third loan, that of 1868, was for £3,000,000 nominal. This was secured upon the railways, which even then constituted a perfect guarantee; and it was actually repaid in cash in six yearly instalments of £500,000 each. But, although this loan was so amply secured and so speedily repaid, only £2,640,000 was paid into the Cairo Treasury, so that in six years the Egyptian Government by this transaction lost £360,000 over and above the interest. Now, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) would probably address the Committee with the great authority that attached to anything which he might say on the subject, it would be right for him (Mr. M'Coan) to mention that the firm of which the right hon. Gentleman was then a member were the contractors for all three of these loans. The right hon. Gentleman would, no doubt, be able to explain to the Committee how the large margins shown by the figures he had just stated were disposed of—how much of the loans went to Cairo, and how much remained in London. The right hon. Gentleman might or might not find it convenient to state this; but, at all events, he would have a personal knowledge with regard to some £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 of the Debt incurred up to the time indicated. Then there was the large loan of 1868, amounting to £11,890,000, of which amount the Egyptian Treasury received only £7,193,334. In other words, nearly £2,750,000 sterling remained in the hands of somebody. He now came to the loan of 1873, which was of the nominal amount of £32,000,000; but of, this the Egyptian Treasury received £20,740,077 only, and of that sum £9,000,000 consisted of bonds of the Floating Debt of the Government at that time, which were bought up by the contractors at rates as low as 63 per cent, and paid into the Egyptian Treasury as cash at 93 per cent, a circumstance which, Mr. Cave subsequently remarked, "materially enhanced the profit accruing to the negotiators of the loan." For these reasons, he said that whenever Egyptian finance was spoken of, it was only just that the whole blame should not be thrown upon the late Khedive. A full share of it belonged to those who had helped him to incur these huge debts. The figures he had quoted showed that out of a total of £55,870,000, the Egyptian Government received only £35,000,000 in cash. Of these £35,000,000, it had, so long ago as the year 1875, repaid, in interest and sinking fund, £29,570,994; but, notwithstanding, in that year it still remained indebted in the sum of £46,734,000. If the present bondholders stood in the shoes of the original contractors for these loans, the moral strength of their claim to consideration would be much less than it was. But there were pro- bably now no original holders of the bonds. These had passed into the hands of persons who had, from time to time, bought them long ago at their full market price; and persons who had so bought, and who received but a moderate rate of interest on their purchases, stood in a very different position from that of the "gombeen man" to whom they were far too commonly likened. They had a substantial claim, which the Government were, in fairness, bound to recognize and support. From the condition of things which he had described, the state of Egyptian finance became rapidly more and more embarrassed, and in 1875 the Cairo Government still owed to its foreign creditors nearly £47,000,000, and as it could not pay the high interest accruing thereon a state of bankruptcy was imminent. In the following year Mr. Cave was sent out to investigate the state of affairs, and afterwards made the valuable Report with which hon. Members were familiar. Later on the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) went out as Delegate of the English, and M. Joubert as Delegate of the French, bondholders. The materials for a careful and exact judgment on the situation had already been provided by Mr. Cave's investigation; and Messrs. Goschen and Joubert proceeded to devise some scheme which should relieve, not the Egyptian Government, but its creditors. He happened to be at Cairo at the time, and could speak from personal recollection of what occurred. He was bound to say that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon had lent himself very readily indeed to the suggestions of M. Joubert; and the result was a settlement much in favour of the French as against the English bondholders, which imposed conditions on the Egyptian Treasury that he ventured to say at the time would, in the result, prove to be perfectly unworkable. However, owing to the joint pressure put by those Gentlemen upon the Khedive, the scheme was adopted and put into execution. The best feature in it was the creation of what was known as the Control. This consisted of two English and French gentlemen named by their respective Governments, and who, with the consent of the Khedive, exercised a most extensive ad- ministrative control over the affairs of Egypt. They were, in fact, appointed over the head of the Khedive, who was himself a most able administrator. But, although he submitted to this supersession, he did not like it, as also did not the large body of dismissed Native employés, whose posts were given to Europeans. The scheme was borne with till 1879, when, its working having become intolerable, it was put an end to, under circumstances which resulted in the deposition of the Khedive himself. It was, however, soon after revived on a different basis by his successor. The new Controllers were not invested with any actual administrative power; but they had the right of supervising the whole fiscal system of the country, and of reporting thereon to the Khedive and their own Governments. With the deposition of the previous Control the European employés, who had been imported into the Egyptian Service, had been dismissed; but one of the first steps of the revived Duumvirate was to re-import these gentlemen, and to add largely to their number. In fact, a very army of European employés was re-organized at a cost of £300,000 a-year to the Egyptian Government. Against this, Native feeling again gradually revolted. The dismissed officials found voice, and complaint became general amongst all classes. In this way, and to this extent, grew up what had been miscalled a National Party. The Turkish and Circassian officials found voice, and they extended their influence amongst their fellows until the little wave of discontent that he had spoken of widened out over the whole country. Still, it must in justice be admitted that, notwithstanding the angry feeling thus provoked, the Control reformed many abuses, and conferred great benefits on the country. The further history of what was falsely called, the "National movement" in Egypt had been told by several speakers, especially by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but he ventured to add, with whatever might be the weight attached to the opinion of one who had known the country for many years, that the movement of Arabi Bey had not behind it a shred of National feeling in any sense in which that term could be rightly employed. It was simply and purely a military revolt—a revolt began and promoted in the interests of the class to which it brought promotion and higher pay; and Arabi Pasha had, therefore, no sort of claim on our sympathy as the exponent of National feeling in Egypt. But, besides our interests, which were in themselves quite sufficient to justify the action of Her Majesty's Government, there was another consideration which went to the same conclusion, and that was our Treaty obligations. ["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Gentlemen behind him cried "Oh, oh !"at the idea of reviving our obligations; but they seemed to have forgotten that under the Treaty of 1841 we entered into a positive engagement to maintain and uphold through all time the settlement of Egyptian affairs that was then arranged. That Treaty was still in force, and the five Powers who were parties to it then were bound by it now. Unless we were to abrogate Treaties and all the moral and political obligations which they entailed, he maintained that those arising under that particular Treaty were substantial, real, and strong at the present moment. Then, not only were we direct parties to that Treaty, but we had also been parties quite as directly to every one of the Organic Firmans since issued by the Porte to the Governors of Egypt. By the settlement of 1841 the Porte virtually acknowledged the semi-independence of Egypt. The successive Firmans, to which he had referred, slightly modified some of the details of that settlement; but, whatever modifications took place, we and the four other Powers were parties to the whole. Therefore, he said, by that Treaty and by those successive Firmans there was imposed upon this country an obligation from which in honour we could not recede. If that were so—and he ventured to challenge contradiction upon any of the facts to which he had alluded—he thought they had a mass of justification which amply warranted the action of the Government; and he, for one, was "Jingo" enough to regret that the Government had not recognized the force of those obligations upon itself without any reference whatever to the Concert of Europe. He believed that the Government had made out a strong case for action, and he ventured to hope that it would be carried to its only logical, consistent, and safe con- clusion in the establishment not of a self-aggrandizing control over Egypt, but of an efficient Protectorate, under the cover of which the best interests of the country itself might be further promoted, and the liberties and welfare of its people be permanently secured.

I am quite aware that there are Gentlemen in this House who listen with some degree of prejudice to whatever I may say on any subject involving questions of peace and war. They are pleased to assume that I belong to what is called the "Peace-at-any-price Party." I do not know exactly what that phrase means. If, in its application to myself, it means that I love peace and hate war too much, I own that the charge lies very lightly on my conscience. But, in truth, it is only an opprobrious nick-name, invented by political partizans wherewith to smite their adversaries when no more convenient or effective weapon is at hand. I do not know whether the House is aware of the origin of this foolish phrase. My hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has traced its genesis. He says that, so far as he knows, it was first used by Friedrich von Gentz, the celebrated German political writer, and one of the Secretaries of the Congress of Vienna, who, in 1815, applied it contemptuously to Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington a few months before the Battle of Waterloo. It has been applied with the same want of discrimination ever since, by a certain class of persons, to all who are not prepared to run to the same excess of riot with themselves in enterprizes of violence and blood. No doubt there is a body of persons, not very numerous in this country, who, from profound religious convictions, hold views about war that are not generally accepted. I am not ashamed to acknowledge that I am one of them. But I have never obtruded those views on this House, because I feel that this is not an Assembly before which it is safe to hazard an appeal to any high or ideal Christian principle. We can be very zealous, even almost ferocious, Christians in this House on occasion, especially when it concerns the outward and ceremonious acknowledgment of Christianity. But no one would be safe from ridicule here who would attempt to bring our national policy, and espe- cially our foreign policy, to the test of a severe Christian morality. There is another class which may be regarded as the antipodes of the "Peace-at-any-price Party"—namely, the "War-at-any-cost Party," who are always ready to inflame public opinion to the fighting point, but who are careful to keep far away from the privations, the hardships, and the horrors which war entails. They indulge in what the Americans call "high-falutin" declamation about national dignity and glory and the honour of the British Flag. But when these are brought into peril by their own counsels, they preferred sending forth poor follows, whom they hired at 1s. 4d. a-day, to bear the brunt of the conflict while they stayed at home wrapped in luxury and ease. And yet these are the men who crow over us, who vaunt themselves as the only true patriots, and as the advocates of a spirited and heroic policy. Spirited and heroic! I call it cowardly and contemptible. I am fortified in this view by the authority of a great and distinguished politician. A Minister was defending the Government to which he belonged against the charge of not being sufficiently prompt to enter into war, and in doing so said—

"There is nothing easier than to he brave with other people's blood, and to he generous with other people's money. If Her Majesty's Government had, in the course of a war, to sacrifice all their own fortunes and then to go into the field and be shot, he would say it was a brave and generous action for them to undertake such a war. But as long as the two duties fell, the one exclusively and the other mainly upon other people, he disputed the application of these two adjectives, brave and generous, to the act of a Government which plunged a nation into war."

"To be careful not to commit the Government to any course of proceeding, by advice or otherwise, which might be taken to imply a desire to exercise any undue influence on the internal affairs of Egypt."

"In cases in which any Government with which they were on friendly terms had applied to them to recommend the persons who were trustworthy, they had felt that those Governments were making an application which was perfectly natural and which might be complied with, but they had always been particularly cautious and reserved. They had, as a rule, said—'We will not undertake any such responsibility; but what we will do is to give you a list of gentlemen whose names occur to us.…We will place this list in your hands, and offer any facilities for you to make inquiries, and if you like to make any bargain with those gentlemen, do so by all means.' But they had abstained from entering upon any direct responsibility.…The single instance of an exception to the rule being made was that of Mr.Rivers Wilson. With respect to him they had done what they had not done in any other case. They had given him leave for two years to undertake his office. It was not correct, however, to say that they recommended him. His services were sought for by the Egyptian Government, and they were granted by us, but not tendered by us. He made that distinction because he thought it was important.…When Mr. Wilson went out, he went as the Minister to the Khedive, who had the right to dismiss him from his post whenever he thought fit."—[3 Hansard, ccxliv. 850–831.]

"The precipitate and causeless dismissal of the two Ministers constituted a grave and apparently intentional discourtesy to friendly Powers,"

"He deliberately renounced all pretensions to the friendship of England and France."

"I hope it will not he thought that I am premature in calling attention to the very slight and at the same time appalling outline of the scheme which it is proposed to substitute for the scheme of the Khedive. I shall he glad if any explanation is given which will remove the difficulties and apprehensions which we may feel in connection with it. Let me say that while I can understand the motives connected with recent transactions which have led Her Majesty's Government to feel that it may be a matter of importance, for reasons connected with their own conduct and proceedings, to bolster up Egypt, I think that in the whole of that matter they are treading upon tender ground. This is a question on which the public mind is extremely sensitive, and unless they are very cautious in the proceedings they adopt they may bring serious consequences upon Parliament and on themselves."—[3 Hansard, ccxxvii. 1424.]

"Lord Salisbury had virtually taken the Government of Egypt into our hands and those of the French Republic, and had reversed the cardinal principles of our Egyptian policy."

"The terms of this Note had not been previously submitted to Her Majesty's Government."

"The political advantage of the arrival of vessels at Alexandria would he so great as to outweigh in consideration the danger which might possibly accrue to Europeans in Cairo."

"He would guarantee public order and the safety of the Khedive so long as he remained Minister; but that, in the event of an Anglo- French Squadron arriving, he could not guarantee public safety."

"To link our national interests to the claims of the bondholders is the sure way to imperil them."

"Our true policy is to maintain universal peace; and, therefore, non-interference is the principle—the great principle—which ought to be, and will be, heartily adopted by the present Administration."

said, he had hoard with pleasure the speech of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but the hon. Baronet would, perhaps, forgive him for saying that there was an important defect in his speech. The hon. Baronet told the Committee everything upon which the great majority of the House was agreed. He said we were in conflict with a military movement in Egypt; he described the great interests and duties this country had in Egypt, and drew the conclusion that we were bound to maintain law and order in Egypt. So far, he thought, the great majority of the House, with the exception, perhaps, of the hon. Member who just spoken, and one or two other hon. Members, was agreed; but the hon. Gentleman did not state and discuss those points of the case upon which the Committee would very much like to be informed. He did not describe what the events were which led to the conflict, or how far those events were preventible or not. He thought the Committee were entitled, in voting this money, at all events, in their speeches, to ask the Government how they had brought the country into this unfortunate position? The Committee had no opportunity on this occasion of expressing their opinion on the policy of the Government by voting, because they could not put any Resolution on the Paper, and could not take any vote in the House or in Committee without standing between the Government and that Supply which they were only too ready to give to the Executive in its need. Therefore, there was no opportunity of taking the sense of the House or the Committee; but they had a right in debate to point out the errors and faults by which the Government had brought the country into this unhappy conflict with military despotism in Egypt, and to ask for an explanation. It seemed to him that there were two forces which the Government might have invoked to control the military movement in Egypt. These two forces were, in the first place, the Suzerain Power of the Sultan; and, in the second place, the National movement as represented by the Chamber of Notables. Unhappily, the Government had by their policy brought themselves into conflict with both forces, and that not in pursuance of any distinct policy, but because they had allowed themselves from the very outset to be led by their Ally, the Republic of France, or rather by M. Gambetta, the greatest of the Republicans, into a course to which the Government had, when they took Office, expressed their disapprobation. The Under Secretary of State in his speech had said that the Government had treated the National Party with sympathy, and had also said that they had raised no objection to the National movement until it had become military. It would have been very much more consonant with facts if the hon. Gentleman had said that Her Majesty's Government had discouraged and repressed the National movement Egypt until they had thrown it into the arms of Arabi, and had, through their own misconduct, identified it with the military movement. He would try to make that good. The Government had had every reason to regard with favour the Chamber of Notables, because at the time of the military revolt, in September, 1881, the Chamber had come in a most unexpected manner to their rescue. When, on the 30th of September, events took an unexpected turn for the better, relief had come from an equally unexpected quarter. Arabi had summoned to Cairo in support of his demand for a Constitution the Members of the Old Chamber of Notables; and those gentlemen on their arrival had gone in a body to Cherif Pasha, and had entreated him to form a Ministry, offering him their personal guarantee that if they consented the Army would submit, and it was by that means that the military movement had been put down. The Government had had, therefore, every reason to look with hope and favour upon the meeting of the Chamber of Notables. That had taken place soon after the despatch of Her Majesty's Government on November the 4th; but the Ally of Her Majesty's Government had been of a different opinion. They had been told in the month of December by M. Gambetta that the approaching meeting of the Chamber of Notables made him uneasy—

"They might support the Khedive's authority, or they might make common cause with the colonels."

"That they did not wish to commit themselves to a total or permanent exclusion of the Chamber of Notables from handling the Budget."

"Very strong objection to any interference by the Egyptian Chamber with the Budget."

"It behoved France and England to be very firm, lest any appearance of vacillation on their part should encourage the pretensions of the Notables to lay their hands on the Budget."

"That the proposal of the Notables could not be agreed to."

"To concert measures with Malet, and to insist upon Cherif Pasha absolutely rejecting the demands of the Notables, and not to listen for a moment to the proposed compromise or anything of the kind."

"I should prefer to give the Chamber the right, and to wait until this right is abused before interfering. It must be borne in mind that the Egyptians have distinctly, for good or for evil, entered upon a Constitutional path— that the Organic Law of the Chamber is their charter of liberties."

"Armed intervention will become necessary if we adhere to the refusal to allow the Budget to be voted by the Chamber."

"It appears as if the opposition to the law had come from Cherif Pasha himself, and that the English and French Governments had supported him in his opposition."

Will my hon. and learned Friend read to the end of the sentence?

said, he was about to read it. Cherif Pasha, had stated on the 10th, to the Chamber, that he could not accept the Amendments; and the Controllers General objected that by such an arrangement they would lose their hold on the finances. There had been, at all events, an instruction to the British and French Agents to support Cherif Pasha, and they had supported him so effectually that he had been turned out of Office. The language used on that occasion by the Chamber of Notables to the Khedive would mark the sympathy and respect of a liberty-loving Assembly like the present. They had said that the discussion of the Budget was not one which affected Foreign Powers. The Controllers had then very soon reported to the Governments that the power in Egypt belonged to-day to the Chamber of Delegates, and to certain Military Chiefs, "to whose influence the Chamber submits." But whose fault had it been, he would ask, that the Chamber had submitted, but that Government which had rejected the reasonable demands of the Chamber? They were then told again by the same Controllers that—

"Cherif's Ministry fell only because it would not disregard the opposition of the English and French Governments to the pretensions put forward by the Chamber to vote the Budget."

"Such a demonstration could hardly in itself be a sufficient remedy or safeguard for the present condition of affairs: but it might be useful as a moral support to the three Commissioners if it were decided to send them."

"Its arrival in support of the Khedive, who now seems to have with him all hut the Military Party, diminishes the danger."

"As the French Government held absolutely to it, and as they have gone so far to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government, they have concurred in the course taken."

"The small Squadron, actually in port could only silence the fire of the Egyptian forts, and when those forts were disabled then would commence a great danger for Europeans, who would he at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, while the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for shore operations does not exceed 300 men, although the Squadron was sent here to safeguard European life and property."

"If the Egyptian garrison apprehends any hostile action on the part of Europeans, there is danger of a general conflagration throughout the country;"

"Make no mistake. At the first news of an armed intervention, even exclusively Turkish, all the Colonists will fall victims to a fanaticism which has no longer any limits."

"It is not arguable, in our opinion, that it was a natural or a probable consequence of the bombardment of the Fleet that an army estimated to number from 10,000 to 15,000 men should evacuate and burn and pillage the town."

I say I did not call it the "Self-Denying" Protocol. That is what it has been called; but it was not my phrase. It was an engagement entered into by the members of the Conference.

I take the words of The Times report, according to which the right hon. Gentleman stated—

"Our judgment is that preparations adequate to cope with that army would most certainly not have been allowable under the instrument which is called the 'Self-Denying' Protocol."

I did not call it so. I do not deny that it has been called so.

said, that, to prevent misapprehension, he would state that he had read the document in question yesterday to the House in answer to an hon. Member opposite.

said, he was anxious not to misrepresent the Prime Minister. The Instrument he referred to stated that—

"The Government, represented by the undersigned, undertake, in any arrangement which may be made in consequence of their concerted action for the settlement of the affairs of Egypt, not to seek any territorial advantage, nor the concession of any commercial advantage for their subjects which those of any other nation shall not be equally able to obtain."

said, that was not the "Self-Denying" Protocol. There had been another Paper read.

The "Self-Denying" Protocol was the one I read yesterday.

said, there seemed to be a difficulty in this matter; and he should very much like to know why these documents were concealed?

said, he had read to the House yesterday the Instrument in reply to a Question. Either on Thursday or Friday last the right hon. Gentleman the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) had asked him when the Instrument would be produced, and he had then said that the proceedings of the Conference being secret he could not answer the Question at once. A telegram was sent to Lord Dufferin asking if he knew any reason why the Instrument should not be placed before the House, and a reply was received yesterday from Lord Dufferin stating that his Colleagues would allow it to be communicated. That being so, he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had at once read it.

said, that was not the "Self-Denying" Protocol, or the Instrument which had been called the "Self-Denying" Protocol. The hon. Member for Greenwich (Baron Henry De Worms) had referred to it, and had been told by the Prime Minister—

said, that a verbal ambiguity had arisen in regard to his answer to the hon. Member for Greenwich. Two or three days after giving that answer he had explained that the document the hon. Member was referring to was not the "Self-Denying" Protocol, and that an arrangement had been made between the Members of the Conference in regard to their action.

said, the statements of the Government were so contradictory that the Committee was getting mixed up. What he had himself read was a document signed by the different Governments on entering the Conference. He now remembered the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reading a Protocol or an extract from the proceedings of the Conference; but he challenged the Government to show, either by the one document or the other, that they were prevented from having in Alexandria Harbour a force sufficient to land and prevent the pillage and sack of the place. Her Majesty's Government might escape, and, no doubt, would escape, a Vote of Censure in this House—no Vote of Censure could be brought forward with a chance of success; but they would not escape the con-sure of the whole civilized world. They talked of the moral law and of blood-guiltiness; but they might depend upon it that, whether or not they escaped any censure from the Imperial Parliament for the pillage and destruction of Alexandria, they would merit and would receive the condemnation of history.

At the commencement of the speech to which we have just listened, the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chatham stated that he was unable to move an Amendment to the Vote before the Committee, not, of course, because that would be inconsistent with the Orders of the House, because we have already had an Amendment moved by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho), and the hon. and learned Member could have moved an Amendment in a similar way if he thought fit to do so; but he considered it improper to move an Amendment which might embarrass the Government at a time of national emergency. While, however, the hon. and learned Member hesitated to embarrass the Executive in a time of great need, he did not consider himself do-barred from making a speech in which, at great length, he brought charges against the Government which he might have condensed into an Amendment; but, with a modesty for which I am bound to give him the greatest credit, he assumed that no speech he could make could possibly embarrass the Executive. Well, the hon. and learned Member went on to say that he admitted the existence of a military despotism in Egypt; and he added that the Government might have invoked, in order to deal with this military despotism, two forces—they might either have called in the authority of the Sultan, or have appealed to the influence of the National Party, as represented by the Chamber of Notables. Well, I confess I should have thought the Papers would have shown conclusively that, from first to last, Her Ma- jesty's Government had invited and suggested the interference of the Sovereign of Egypt. We appealed to the Sultan of Turkey to exercise the duty of Sovereignty in restoring order in that country, and the real charge is not that we did not make this appeal, but that we did not enforce it in season and out of season, and independently of our Ally, the Republican Government of France. He taunts us, in fact, because throughout these proceedings we have not on every occasion acted independently of our Allies. Apparently he sets very small store upon the French alliance. ["Hear, hear!"] Well, that cheer may represent the opinion of hon. or of some right hon. Members opposite; but it is not the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. It has been throughout a cardinal point in our policy that, as far as possible, we would maintain that alliance which has existed for so long, and with such great advantage to the two countries. The Committee is aware that, in an eloquent speech which he made a few days ago in the French Chamber, M. Gambetta declared that the alliance was fraught with many benefits to France; and it has been rather unfairly urged, I think, that, therefore, it is of no advantage to England. But, on the contrary, I am persuaded that every word M. Gambetta used with regard to the interests of Franco may be used with equal force with regard to the interests of England. Everywhere throughout the world we meet the French nation, and we must meet them either as friends or foes; and I, for one, say better lot us meet them as friends than as foes. Our relations with France extend over so many and such vast interests that it is of the utmost importance that our negotiations with them should be, as far as possible, of a friendly and confidential character; and, that being the case, in this matter of Egypt it has been from the first the desire of the Government to make to their Ally any concession which did not involve any sacrifice of principle. The hon. and learned Member went on to charge us with deceiving the Sultan with reference to the despatch of the iron-clad Invincible, which took place in the month of October last year. The charge of the hon. and learned Member is that, whereas the Invincible was sent to Alexandria on the demand of the Consuls as a refuge for British subjects, we told the Sultan that it would be withdrawn as soon as the Turkish Commission was withdrawn.

What I said was that, after having sent out the Invincible to protect life and property, we pretended to the Sultan that it had been sent out because his Commissioners had not been withdrawn.

No doubt it is true that, while, on the one hand, we said we sent the Invincible to protect British life and property, on the other hand, we said it would be withdrawn as soon as the Turkish Commission was withdrawn; and what I have now to say to the hon. and learned Member is that there is absolutely no inconsistency between the two statements. What was the statement of the Sultan to us? It was that the incident had terminated, that order had been restored, and that the presence of our ships was no longer necessary. We said, in reply—"If you are convinced that order is restored, and that the incident is terminated, you will show your conviction that that is the case by withdrawing the Commission; and, when you have given that proof, we shall be ready in turn to withdraw our ships." The hon. and learned Gentleman then went on to speak in terms of great severity of the despatch of Lord Granville, dated November 4. He said it was distinguished by its intense hypocrisy, as it laid down, in one of its paragraphs, as a cardinal principle, that we were concerned for the prosperity of Egypt and the good government of that country, whilst it was elsewhere stated that our interest was in the safety of the Suez Canal. I fail altogether to conceive the precise inconsistency between these two statements. It appears to me that the well-being and prosperity of Egypt was intimately bound up, on the one hand, with the safety of the Suez Canal, and, on the other hand, with the reasonably good government of the Egyptian people. The hon. and learned Member went on to complain that the Government allowed themselves to be placed in opposition to the National movement, and drove the Chamber of Notables into the arms of Arabi Pasha. It seems to me that that is absolutely the reverse of the facts as they happened. So far from the Chamber having been driven by the action of England into the arms of Arabi Pasha, on the contrary, as time went on the Members of the Chamber separated themselves from Arabi. In the first instance, the Chamber was convoked on the initiative of Arabi Pasha; but subsequently they separated themselves from him, and refused to sit when they were convoked without the consent of the Sultan; and it was the President of the Chamber of Notables, one of its ablest Members, who demanded the retirement of the military leaders and the banishment of Arabi Pasha, and in that way laid the foundation for the despatch which the hon. and learned Member refers to as the Ultimatum of the Consuls General. Then the hon. and learned Gentleman says he will make his charge good; and he does so, in the first instance, by proving that M. Gambetta was hostile to the Chamber of Notables. There is no doubt that at one time M. Gambetta was hostile to the Chamber, and that hostility was based upon the fact that that Chamber of Notables was convoked at the instigation of Arabi Pasha, and would prove to be creatures of his.

What is the date of the Paper in which that is stated?

I do not state it as appearing in the Papers; but as an inference drawn from the facts which appears to me extremely reasonable. I should think that, considering the circumstances in which Arabi Pasha rose to power, and considering that one of his first acts was to summon the Chamber of Notables, it was a reasonable inference to suppose that he had assured himself beforehand that their view was likely to be favourable to his schemes. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not prove his case by proving that M. Gambetta was hostile to the Chamber of Notables. Her Majesty's Government were never hostile to it; but the hon. and learned Member says they showed their hostility by objecting to the proposal of the Chamber to control the Budget. As to that, I would say that the Chamber made a claim which, in the opinion of the Government and in the opinion of the Controllers, was in contravention of the existing international agreement; and it is not competent for the Chamber of Notables or the British Government to permit an infraction of international agreement without, at all events, consulting the Powers concerned. All the Controllers and the British Government did was to point out that the arrangements were the subject of international agreement, and could not be altered without a fresh agreement. But the English Government did not express itself as at all unfriendly to a modification of the Control—on the contrary, negotiations were going on for a compromise, and were proceeding very favourably, when matters assumed a critical appearance, owing to the action of Arabi Bey and the Military Party. The whole matter, I will venture to say, is still in suspense. The question of the Control, no doubt, is an extremely difficult one. In the first place, it is perfectly certain that, whatever objection may be taken to the Control, it has been of immense advantage to Egypt. There is no doubt that it has legalized the collection of taxes, that it has prevented extortion, that it has secured the honest collection of the Revenue and lessened the burdens on the people, and that in that manner it has given an extraordinary impetus to the material prosperity of the country. Of course, if the sentiment of Egypt was opposed to the Control, and if they preferred a corrupt system of administration to the stern integrity and inflexible honesty of European administration, then I say that it may well be a question for consideration whether we are entitled to force the better system upon the people against their will. All I urge is that that, at all events, is a matter for the subsequent consideration of all the Great Powers, and not for the isolated decision of the British Government. I observe that in the French Chamber the other day, M. de Freycinet acknowledged the undoubted existence of a National sentiment in Egypt, and said that the time, perhaps, would come when due consideration must be given to it; and I say that when that time comes, the influence of the British Government will be used in order, as far as possible, to give due effect to all reasonable National aspirations on the part of the Egyptian people. Then the hon. and learned Member added to his indictment the charge that, in deference to this French alliance, we ordered our ships first to Suda Bay, and then sent them on to Alexandria. That matter is explained in the Papers, and the explanation is a simple one. The British Government were naturally anxious that the sending of the ships should not provoke an outbreak—a massacre or disaster—at Alexandria, and they wanted to be assured that their presence would not provoke such an outbreak before they finally gave an order that the ships should go to Alexandria. It will be found, on reference to the Papers, that Sir Edward Malet, while he asked at one time that the ships should be delayed, subsequently informed Her Majesty's Government that it was then most desirable that their arrival should be hastened. Our action as to the sending of the ships was guided by the information we received from our Agents. The hon. and learned Member went on to say that while we had recommended and desired that the other Powers should be invited to co-operate in the Naval Demonstration, we had again yielded to the desire of France, and refrained from giving that invitation; and he says that whilst the Prime Minister stated that we had done this in consequence of the French compliance with our wishes in other respects, the most careful examination he had been able to make of the Papers had failed to show him any single proof of such compliance on the part of the French. I must say I cannot understand how the hon. and learned Gentleman can have given any careful attention to the Papers without finding in those very documents, from which he quoted, proof of the statement of the Prime Minister. What is the fact? Why, in the very Paper in which the French Government propose that English and French ships alone should be sent to Alexandria, the French Government conceded to the English Government that the Sultan should be invited to send a military force to Egypt. Up to that time the French Government had persistently opposed the introduction of Turkish military intervention, and at that date, for the first time, they yielded to the representations of the English Government. This point seemed to us to be at the time of the very highest importance. Then the hon. and learned Gentleman, in the concluding part of his speech, called the Government once more to task for not having a sufficient force at hand at the time of the bombardment, and he says we received innumerable warnings as to the certain consequence of the bombardment. In the first place, he refers to the despatch of Sir Edward Malet, which was one of those earlier despatches to which I have already referred, and in which we were warned that the mere presence of the Fleet in Alexandrian waters would be productive of danger to the population—an opinion justified, no doubt, by the state of things that existed. He stated that Arabi Pasha made the threat that if the Fleet did not withdraw he would not be responsible for order. That was a threat which Arabi Pasha made directly on that occasion, and subsequently through other channels; but the hon. and learned Member seems to have failed to observe that a short time afterwards Arabi Pasha, himself and the Prime Minister of Egypt both joined in assuring Sir Edward Malet that when the Fleet arrived there would be and should be no disturbance. The hon. and learned Member adds that the residents in Alexandria also warned the Government; but here, again, he has failed to study the Papers with sufficient care and accuracy. What the inhabitants represented to the Government was that the Squadron then in Alexandrian waters was insufficient for its purpose. As a matter of fact, there was only one iron-clad—the Invincible —and two small despatch boats at Alexandria; and the residents represented that that was not enough, and that from such a Squadron only 300 men could be landed. In consequence of these representations the Government sent another iron-clad directly, and two or three days afterwards three more; and the result was that when the bombardment took place there were three or four times the number of men at the disposal of the Admiral. The hon. and learned Member went on to say that we were warned also by the Khedive and Dervish Pasha. At the time we received these warnings the Khedive and Dervish Pasha were mainly the channels through which Arabi Pasha wished to convey to the British Government a menace to prevent the bombardment, and to induce the Fleet to withdraw; and this, the hon. and learned Member suggests, was the course we ought to have taken. It was a menace from the very man who at that time was preparing and organizing the outbreak that subsequently took place. The hon. and learned Member concluded by saying that we should be condemned by the whole civilized world for not having taken precautions to prevent a massacre. I would answer him by saying that in the sense in which such words are ordinarily used, there never has been a massacre since the bombardment and in consequence of it. It is true an hon. Member asked a Question in the House the other day as to the thousands of persons who were killed in consequence of the bombardment. I will answer him by referring to a telegram which appeared in The Times newspaper, I think, on Friday last. The Correspondent of The Times in that telegram declared that up to that date he had only been able to ascertain that five persons, in all, had been killed since the bombardment, and that he did not believe there had been any more. Of course, there has been deplorable destruction of property, which I think we may say could hardly have been foreseen. It was not possible to suppose that a strong army that was in no possible danger of offensive operations would let loose the convicts, the scum of the place, in order to destroy the property of innocent people, and retire from the town. That disaster, much as we regret it, could not have been foreseen, and if it had been foreseen, I do not think it could have been prevented. The mischief was done before it would have been possible to have landed troops from the ships, and no force that could have been landed could have prevented the incendiary fires that took place. I should like to turn now for a few moments to the speech delivered from a very different point of view, at an earlier period of the evening—the speech of the hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr. Richard). The hon. Member had said he was sometimes described as a member of the "Peace-at-any-price Party." I understand him to admit that he is a Member of the Party that would never concede, under any circumstances, the right of military intervention in the affairs of another country, unless we ourselves were directly attacked. But I am prepared to allow that there is a difference between a view of that kind, extreme as I hold it to be, and what might be represented as "Peace-at-any-price principles." Certainly, I shall not approach the argu- ment of the hon. Gentleman with any prejudice, or scorn, or contempt, for I honour him for the consistency with which, on this and on all occasions, he has courageously advocated the views he holds. But my hon. Friend went on, in a tone and spirit which he will allow me to say was hardly worthy of him, to say that those who differed from him, and held views not so strong as to nonintervention as his own, might properly he described as the"War-at-any-cost-Party"—the Party that inflames others to bloody deeds, and remains at home wrapped in luxurious ease. I do not think it is necessary to impute cowardice and selfish motives to those who like myself believe that the honour and the interest of this country imperatively demand a military intervention. I, for one, at all events, have never accepted the doctrine of absolute non-intervention: and I cannot, for the life of me, understand how that policy of international arbitration, which has one of its most distinguished advocates in the person of my hon. Friend, can ever become a practical policy, unless it is coupled with the idea of an international police. The present appears to me to be a case for the intervention of an international police, and it seems to me that the special circumstances have thrown the duty and burden upon this country. Well, my hon. Friend went on to say that our action was, in his opinion, the irrevocable consequence of the policy of the late Government, unfortunately adopted by the present Government. Sir, it is not my business to defend the policy of the late Government, and, certainly, I am not prepared to say that we are adopting it; but that statement of my hon. Friend, in any case, does not convey the whole truth in this matter, because I venture to say that whatever may be our opinion as to the wisdom of the arrangement which constituted the Dual Control, and which involved this country in a constant interference in and supervision of the internal affairs of Egypt, if no such arrangement had been made, and no Control had existed, there is every reason to suppose that a state of things would have been brought about which would have threatened anarchy and disorder in Egypt; and, under these circumstances, the same duty as that we are now discharging would have fallen upon us. Sir, the cause of our intervention is the danger of anarchy in Egypt. Anarchy in Egypt would affect British interests of paramount importance, and I would say the interests of civilization generally. Now, what are these British interests? They are not— certainly not exclusively, certainly not primarily, or chiefly—the interests of the bondholders. I believe the total amount of the Egyptian Debt is something like £60,000,000 sterling, and I suppose it is probable that £30,000,000 of this amount is held in this country. I am not going to abuse the bondholders as being necessarily the enemies of the human race. I do not think it follows that because a man lends his capital to promote, in many cases, the material prosperity of other countries, that, therefore, he is to be represented as a usurer unworthy of any sympathy. But, on the other hand, any person who engages in a speculation of that kind must take the risks of it, and he is not entitled to call on his Government for military intervention in order to protect his investment. That is a position, however, which has been recognized in the past by the holders of Egyptian Bonds. They have already had to submit to a considerable reduction of the original terms on which they entered into these loans; and in the future, as in the past, they must make their own arrangements, and must not call on Her Majesty's Government to support them. But there are other interests, less questionable, more direct, and more important. There is, in the first place, our interest in the Suez Canal, the great highway of all nations, and, above all, the road between this country and our Eastern Possessions. I had the curiosity to have some figures prepared for me as to the British traffic on this Canal; and I find, on the best estimate that could be made, that £50,000,000 sterling in goods of different kinds pass through the Canal both ways and annually. In other words, one-seventh of the whole foreign trade of this country passes through the Canal at the present time. The fleet engaged in carrying this enormous trade is worth about £15,000,000 sterling, and four-fifths of the entire shipping passing through the Canal is British. As showing also our direct interest in Egypt, I may mention that of the total Egyptian exports, amounting to £7,000,000, £5,500,000 are British, while the French portion-is only £410,000. I hold that the security of that great highway is of paramount importance to this country, and we are bound to protect it against risk. Then, again, there are the private interests—the private commercial interests—which we have in Egypt. Probably there is between £20,000,000 and £30,000,000 of English capital engaged in private, peaceful, and legitimate undertakings in Egypt. Men so engaged in trade, whether in Egypt or any other country, have a right to look to their Government for reasonable protection. I have seen it assorted outside this House that we should give notice to British traders everywhere that they trade at their own risk, and that the British Government will give thorn no assistance and no support. Sir, I am not prepared to agree to such a doctrine as that. I only wish to point out to hon. Members what its immediate consequence would be. If you withdraw from those persons engaged in legitimate occupations the protection which hitherto they have been entitled to claim, you will withdraw also, I expect, a very large proportion of that enormous foreign trade which gives employment to so many of our people and contributes, not only to the prosperity of this country, but to the prosperity of other countries where these great commercial enterprizes are undertaken. I say it is a monstrous notion that all these great interests are to be sacrificed by this country to the ambition of a military adventurer—not to promote the National interests of the country, not to secure freedom in Egypt, not to secure the introduction of liberal reforms, but purely and solely in order that a military adventurer may continue his career unchecked and without opposition, I would ask also—though I do not intend to dwell at any length upon it—what effect would the holding of such a doctrine as this have upon our position, not merely in Europe or Egypt, but throughout the East? It has been said, and said truly, that we are a great Mussulman Power—that is to say, that millions of Mahomedans own our rule, and I cannot conceive anything more dangerous to the security of our people and to the security of our Possessions than that an idea should get abroad that we could be set at defiance with impunity under such circumstances as these. Well, Sir, my hon. Friend attributes the whole of the difficulties which have arisen in Egypt to the existence of the Control. He speaks of the number of Europeans who have been imposed upon the Egyptian people, and who draw largo salaries, and whom the Egyptians look upon with jealousy. But I would point out to him, in the first place, that the great majority of Europeans in the service of Egypt are not appointed by the Control at all, but are in the direct appointment of the Egyptian Government, which may also dismiss them at any time. I quite admit it is natural that there should be some indignation amongst the most intelligent of the Egyptians, who see places that they fairly might desire to occupy themselves filled by foreigners; and certainly' it will not be the duty of this country, when order is restored in Egypt, to use any influence it may possess in order to replace these Europeans in office. But, in my opinion, it would be entirely a mistake to assume that there is the slightest connection between what I would call this National sentiment, which I am inclined to think exists, and which is hostile probably to the control of the Egyptian administration by foreigners and the military movement that has for its leader Arabi Pasha. From first to last Arabi has never said a word against the Control. On the contrary, in a Manifesto he issued early in these proceedings, he admitted that the Control had been of immense material advantage to Egypt; and from first to last, throughout these proceedings, it will be found that his object, as tested by the result of his proceedings, has been to secure personal advantage for himself and his abettors. Let me follow that out for a moment. In February, 1881, the first military riots took place. What was their object? What view was put forward as justifying them? They had nothing to do with the increase of liberty in Egypt, with Constitutional reforms, or the Dual Control. But in connection with them a claim was made for the dismissal of an unpopular Minister of War, and a protest was made against the promotion of certain Circassians to the detriment of Egyptians. That riot, being successful, was followed almost immediately by an increase in the Army charge to the extent of something like £50,000 a-year. Again, in September, when the second military riot took place, the chief object insisted upon by Arabi Bey and the mutinous I colonels was an increase in the Army from 12,000 to 15,000 men, and that riot was almost immediately followed by an increase in the Army charges. The demand was for an increase of £280,000 in the Estimates; but that was finally compromised, and an actual increase made of £120,000 per annum. Then, in March, when another demonstration was threatened, the personal character of this conspiracy was still more clearly shown, for its object was to secure the promotion of a number of lieutenant colonels without the examination demanded bylaw— the object was to secure the promotion of men who could not pass the examination; and no words were uttered at that time, or at any other time, as to any Constitutional reform being required. And so the result of the movement up to the time of the bombardment was this— that 560 officers had been promoted, the numbers of the Army had been increased, and the Military Estimates had been enlarged by something like £200,000 per annum, while all the military opponents or rivals of Arabi had been proscribed, and some of them banished. These were the only "reforms promoted by Arabi Bey, whose action is now represented as a great National movement. If there is any doubt whatever remaining as to the position of this man, I think the Papers will show what is the opinion of the most intelligent Natives about him. There is, for instance, on record the opinion of Cherif Pasha, the most able, the most intelligent, and the most courageous of Egyptian statesmen. He accepted Office at the request, in the first instance, of the Army and Arabi Pasha; but with the greatest reluctance, well knowing that with a mutinous soldiery the situation would necessarily become intolerable. Accordingly, a short time afterwards he found himself in opposition to the Army, and the same Army which had promised obedience to him demanded his subsequent withdrawal and retirement. Then, at that period, there was an interesting conversation reported of Sir Edward Malet with the then Minister of Egyptian Foreign Affairs, Mustapha Pasha, who was supposed to be a creature of Arabi, and who declared in March that the condition of things had become intolerable, that the promotions made in the Army would only lead to further discontent and further promotions, and that settled government, under the circumstances, was hardly to be hoped for. Lastly, in May, Sultan Pasha, the President of the Notables, is reported as having demanded the retirement of the military leaders, and the withdrawal of Arabi from power. Subsequently, Arabi returned to power, not as leader of the National movement, hut in opposition to the Chamber of Notables, the most representative body in Egypt, and in opposition also to the Khedive and the Sultan. My hon. Friend went on to say that the Government made three cardinal errors in the course of their policy, and that the first of these was the Dual Note; the second, what my hon. Friend called the Ultimatum of the Consuls General; and the third, the sending of the Fleet. But I say that all these things hang together. The judgment of the Committee upon them will, of course, be influenced by the view they take of the situation. If my hon. Friend is right that it would be just and expedient to withdraw altogether from Egyptian affairs, to leave Egypt to anarchy, and to run the grave and serious risk of the interruption of the Suez Canal, and of danger to the lives and property of European and other subjects, then, of course, these three steps in the Government policy must be condemned. On the contrary, if it is evident to the Committee now, as it was evident to the Government after the military riots which had taken place, that some kind of interference was necessary if British interests were to be protected, then these were three steps which are easily to be justified. The Dual Note did not go further in principle than Lord Granville's despatch of the 4th of November, to which reference has already been made. That despatch was received with universal approval, not only by the Great Powers, but also in Egypt; and the Dual Note only put in another form the views which it expressed, and promised what at that time the Government were determined to afford—namely, the influence of this country in support of the Khedive against a military adventurer who was threatening his authority. Then the Ultimatum was described by my hon. Friend as the most monstrous demand ever made upon an independent Government. I have already pointed out that this so-called monstrous demand was originally the demand, not of the English Government, but of the Representative Chamber of Egyptian Notables; and as to the sending of the Fleet at the time it was sent, in view of the dangers which were threatening British and other European people in Egypt, I say that the Government would have been open to the severest condemnation unless that step had been taken by them. When my hon. Friend declares that the sending of the Fleet was the sole cause of the disaster which has since happened, I think he has not studied the Papers with sufficient care. Those Papers would have shown him that long before the Fleet was sent information was in the hands of the British Government that anarchy was rife in the Province. This information came to us, in the first instance, from our Agents in Egypt. My hon. Friend is disposed to distrust everything that comes from British Agents; but the Government do not share this distrust, and they relied on the information which they received as to the attempts made to rouse the fanaticism of the people, and as to the probability of general anarchy in Egypt if effectual measures were not taken to prevent it. And I do not doubt, if the Fleet had not been sent, that the loss of life, great as it undoubtedly is, would have been very much more serious. I hope my hon. Friend will receive what I say as being said with perfect sincerity. The Government have not entered upon this business without a full sense of its gravity, without a sense of the deep responsibility which their action casts upon them, and without the greatest possible reluctance. But there was a duty thrown upon Europe and upon Turkey, but primarily upon this country, to see that all the interests which had been created and which existed in Egypt should not be put in danger by a military revolt which it was in our power to put down. We have thought it our duty to interfere, and we have interfered with the sole purpose of putting down this military revolt, and of liberating in this way the National sentiment, to whose free expression we shall be prepared to give the most serious consideration. When those duties are accomplished we shall retire, having sought and having claimed no selfish advantage for ourselves.

I do not think that any Member of this Committee can possibly conceal from himself the occasion on which we are at the present moment assembled. We have before us the consideration of the military action of Her Majesty's Government, taken upon what the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has chosen to call the determination to put down military tyranny in Egypt. I do not in the least quarrel with the way in which he has described that action; but, at the same time, we cannot conceal from ourselves that we have entered upon a very grave undertaking. It is impossible for us to enter upon that task with a light heart, because, when once the sword has been drawn, we know not, considering what has occurred in Europe and what may occur hereafter, when that sword can be again sheathed. Now, there are two sentiments expressed in the speech of the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. Richard) with which, although we have probably arrived at our conclusions, for different reasons I entirely agree. I agree with him in feeling the greatest surprise and pain at the action which Her Majesty's Government have taken. The other conclusion I agree with is one which relates to a fact which Her Majesty's Government have not con sidered, and which I think they ought to have considered, in the course of these transactions; and that is that we (the English) were, before these transactions took place, on good terms with all the people of Egypt, and that the people of Egypt looked up to us more than to any other European Power. I am afraid it will be a long time before we can restore those good relations with the Egyptian people, which, up to the period I speak of, so happily existed. But I am very glad to hear from Her Majesty's Government that, at all events, they recognize the vast interests which we have in Egypt. Those interests seem to me to be almost paramount, and the despatch of Lord Granville contains the statement, with which I agree, that—

"The situation of Egypt on the most direct maritime route between England and her Indian Possessions and Australian Colonies gives to this country a special interest in Egyptian affairs. In addition to this British capital and industry have been largely employed in the introduction into Egypt of the great works of modern improvement, and a largo British com- munity is resident in the country. Its prosperity cannot be affected without involving the material welfare of many British subjects."

"Foremost amongst British interests is the necessity of keeping open uninjured and uninterrupted the communication between Europe and the East by the Suez Canal; and to blockade or otherwise interfere with the Canal and its approaches could not be regarded by the Government in any other light than that of a menace to India and a grave injury to the commerce of the world;"

"Such a course could not be consistent with the maintenance by them of a passive neutrality. Moreover, the maritime interests of the world were so largely involved in Egypt that an attack on the Canal could scarcely be regarded without concern by the neutral Powers, and certainly not by England."

"A declaration was at the same time signed by the Representatives of England, Austria, Germany, Italy, and France, engaging to accept the decisions of the Commission, and agreeing that the law to be framed on its recommendations should be recognized as obligatory in the International Tribunals."

"It was undoubtedly working well for the material prosperity of the country, and promised to do so for the future. Her Majesty's Government accepted it as a fact, and gave it their unreserved support."

"If you explain that away the whole value of the Note will be gone, and we shall have to write a new one."

"The present situation, which is so grave, arises from the belief that the Powers will not interfere, and that France will not allow Turkey to interfere. For Heaven's sake, do something to dispel this illusion. If you are going to interfere let them know it."

"We have great practical reason to act together in this matter—whatever happens do not sacrifice the great advantage which we have got from our joining on this point."

I think there is some confusion here. I was not speaking of the undoubted massacre of June 11th, but of the events subsequent to the bombardment.

Then that will do equally well for my argument at the present moment. It backs up my argument that there was a massacre on the 11th of June. I misunderstood the right hon. Gentleman when he referred to one massacre. The fact is there have been so many, and I thought he was referring to that of the 11th of June. There was, then, an undoubted massacre on the 11th of June. There can be no doubt about that—I see the Prime Minister smiling; but this is not a matter about which a single smile ought to come from an English Minister—it is not a question on which a single smile ought to pass across the face of an English Minister.

I smiled at the errors of the right hon. Gentleman.

Even if I have made an error, which I deny, this is not a matter on which a smile ought to be produced by a British Minister. The question is far too grave—it is far graver than the massacres in Bulgaria. Does not the right hon. Gentleman believe in the massacre of the 11th of June—in the terrible horrors which passed through the whole City of Alexandria on that day, when life and property were both destroyed? That is a state of things into which we have been brought entirely by the action of Her Majesty's Government. The massacre of the 11th of June did take place—I observe that the right hon. Gentleman still smiles—and the British Consul was insulted and wounded; and though we are going to ask some day that reparation shall be made, none has been made as yet. That was the state of affairs on the 1lth of June; but what is the case now? The arrogance of Arabi has certainly swelled to vast dimensions; and not only has he ignored the Khedive, but the authority of the Sultan as well; and yet he is allowed to go free. We had warning from our Admiral that forts were being built in opposition to our ships. We requested that their erection might be stopped: it was stopped for a time; but soon it went on again, more forts were built, and our ships, which were sent there, as I understand, as a refuge for British subjects and Europeans who might be there in need of help, were no longer safe at their moorings in the Harbour of Alexandria. We were put to all this trouble entirely through the action of the Government, which made it necessary either that our ships must run away, or that there must be a bombardment of the town. [Mr. GLADSTONE:: Of the forts.] Of the forts I mean. Nobody accuses the Government of wishing to bombard the town. If the action of the Government had been much firmer, none of these efforts would have been necessary. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not smile upon this point. If the Ministry had shown a firm determination that the forts should not be built, they had the power to prevent it; but it was not until those forts became real dangers that they took effective steps to prevent it, and we know the mischief that has happened since. The events of the 1lth of June had shadowed out to the Government that there were not troops enough, and that if the bombardment did take place it would be followed by massacre. In consequence of the despatch of the 30th of May we did take steps to prevent massacre, but we did it only by halves; and this, at all events, may be depended upon—that if we had only sent more troops the Admiral would have made use of them. He did not confine himself to the 300 he had before, but he used all the forces at his command; and I must hold the Government responsible, to a great extent, for the massacre which did take place. Now, I want to know—and it would be extremely interesting to have it cleared up—why it was that at that point, after the bombardment, and as soon as the massacre was heard of, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright) left the Government? It was such a curious point at which to leave. He approves the bombardment, lights the match, and after it is all over he changes his mind, and immediately runs away. That must mean one of two things. Either he repents the action he took, or there were great dissensions in the Cabinet before that action was taken. It is clear that when the orders for the bombardment were given, that meant war. Why did he stay and give those orders for war, or, having given them, why did he not stay and bear the brunt of the consequences? We have never heard any explanation from him on that point; but we are thoroughly entitled to have ample explanation before the debate is over, because it might show that throughout all the previous conduct of the Government there have been great dissensions in the Cabinet as to whether action should or should not be taken. However, at last, we are compelled to go to war, and the Prime Minister comes down and asks for a Vote of Credit. He knows quite well that when a Minister comes down and demands a Vote of Credit on such a matter, that Vote will be given to him, and that fact necessarily deprives the debate of some of the interest it ought to have. But there is one question I would like to ask. We are told that this Vote of Credit is sufficient only for three months, and we very much want to know whether the Government calculate that the war, or whatever it may be called, will only last three months, or whether at the end of that period we are likely to be asked for more money? We were told that on Saturday the Prime Minister would give us a full account of the amount of the Vote of Credit; but he did not appear in his place on that day. Of course, we all know what his engagements are, and after a good deal of questioning we did get from the Secretary of State for War the announcement that we were going to be asked for £1,300,000, of which sum £900,000 was to be for the Army, and £400,000 for the Navy. We went away thoroughly satisfied that that was all that would be required, even though we thought the sum so small that we were almost tempted to ask whether there were not any shillings or pence in the calculations. But in the middle of the day an error of £1,000,000 was discovered. It was not £1,300,000, but £2,300,000, that was required. We were tempted to ask how it was, if the Cabinet had decided on the 6um, that a Cabinet Minister should make such a difference between his announcement at 12 and his announcement at 2 or 3 o'clock, when the other £1,000,000 was added? We should have thought very little about, and might have imagined that there had been a mistake about, the amount for the Navy, had it not been that the Prime Minister told us yesterday that, of the £1,400,000 which is nominally for the Navy, no less than £1,200,000 is really for the Army—for the transport of troops. How, then, was it that the Secretary of State for War was not aware of the sum? That wants explanation. [Mr. GLADSTONE: It is taken for the Navy.] Yes; but for Army purposes. The Secretary of State for War must have known that, in addition to the £900,000 required for the Army proper, no less than £1,200,000 of the balance was required for transport or other Army purposes. We cannot help thinking that a great deal of money has been spent already, and that the Government have undertaken a greater task than they are aware of, and have not laid before the House anything like the expenses which they will be asked for before the war is over. I believe they have totally miscalculated what the war is to be, and what it is to cost, and that they have now only asked the House for a first instalment of that cost. We have unhappily been brought into this war by the incaution, the vacillation, and the want of concert of Her Majesty's Government. [Mr. MUNDELLA: Hear, hear!] The right hon. Gentleman says "Hear, hear!" but he is not a Member of the Cabinet, nor can he tell us why the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has separated himself from the Prime Minister, especially at so peculiar a point. Although we shall readily vote the amount now asked for, we shall hold the Government responsible for this war, because we believe it is entirely owing to their action that there has been any occasion for the Vote of Credit at all.

expressed a hope that the debate would be allowed to finish to-morrow. Hon. Gentlemen should remember that every day added to the debate was a day added to the Session.

said, it would not be necessary for him to keep the House more than a few minutes in moving the second reading of this Bill. The Bill simply embodied the unanimous proposals of a Select Committee appointed at the commencement of the Session. That Committee was a representative one, embracing Representatives not only of each Party, but of almost every section in the House. Although the Bill embodied the unanimous proposals of that Committee, he found that there was one portion of the Bill to which considerable objection was raised, and that was a proposal to increase the maximum of insurance to £200, and make the maximum of annuities £200 also. Although he was extremely reluctant to relinquish that portion of the Bill, which was unanimously approved of by the Committee, he felt that at that period of the Session it would be perfectly useless to persevere with the provision in face of the opposition with which he had to contend. Therefore, as he had already stated, if he was allowed to get into Committee on the Bill, he would himself propose to alter the maximum of insurance and annuities to £100; and, if the Bill was now read a second time, he had Amendments which could be at once placed on the Paper, He thought hon. Members interested in the subject would see that he had faithfully carried out his promise. There was another portion of the Bill which was objected to by the bankers—namely, Clause 7; and it had been suggested, by a Circular which the country bankers had issued, that the Government were proposing, by a side-wind, to raise the amount allowed to be annually deposited in the Post Office Savings Banks. Nothing was further from his intention than that. He felt strongly that if the limit of the Savings' Banks' deposits was to be increased, it ought to be increased in an open and intelligent way, and not by a side-wind. But, to remove all doubts on the point, he had prepared an Amendment to Clause 7, which, he believed, would completely remove the objection of the bankers to this provision. If it did not, he should be ready to adopt any suggestion with the object of carrying out more fully their wishes on the subjcet. He hoped that those remarks would show that he had been anxious, as far as possible, to meet the wishes of those who objected to the Bill.

said, as the hon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. H. Fowler) and himself had felt it their duty to oppose the Bill in its original state, he was exceedingly obliged to the Postmaster General for the consideration he bad given to their objections, because, in its original state, the Bill seemed to interfere with the Insurance Companies, and to put a considerable risk on the Exchequer, inasmuch as the amount by which it was proposed to alter the annuities was very considerable. He was also obliged to him with regard to the objections raised by the country bankers. But he had to make a practical suggestion, and that was that, if the opposition was withdrawn to the Bill, the right hon. Gentleman would give some time, three or four days say, for the consideration of the Amendments which he had now proposed in regard to bankers and Insurance Companies. He made this proposal in perfect good faith and with the best intentions, and wished to offer no opposition to the Bill.