asked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether it is the case that the recent circular with regard to engine-room artificers having been placed before the men (entered before November 1882), in order to ascertain how many of them would accept its terms, the returns already received show that less than five per cent. are willing to accept them, and that these are in special employment; and, if this is so, will the Admiralty consider the advisability of withdrawing a circular so obnoxious to this class, with the view to the introduction of a more beneficial one?

As I stated, in answer to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth (Mr. Macliver) a few days ago, we have not yet received complete Returns as to the extent to which the new terms offered to engine-room artificers are accepted. It will be some time before we can tell the ultimate result.

Will the hon. Gentleman tell us what number of the men have already accepted the Circular? I understand that upwards of 200 have already expressed their opinion against it; and as I shall raise the point on the Estimates it will save time if the information is forthcoming.

asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether, notwithstanding the answers that have already been given in this House upon the subject, the Governor General of Angola has caused notice to be given to the agents of the British mail steamers at St. Paul de Loanda that a Portuguese official had been appointed at Banana to put the visé on their bills of health; whether the Governor of Angola had also notified to the agents of British mail steamers the appointment of a Portuguese postmaster at Congo, and stated that all correspondence which those steamers might bring for the Congo was to be delivered to that official; and, whether Her Majesty's Government intend to request the Portuguese Government to instruct the Governor General of Angola to withdraw these orders so far as they affect British vessels, subjects, and mails going to the Congo and to neutral ports outside the possessions of Portugal?

Her Majesty's Minister at Lisbon has been informed by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as there was no direct telegraphic communication between Lisbon and Angola, instructions to the Governor General of that Province, in the terms of the information contained in my reply to the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Jacob Bright) on the 23rd ultimo, had been sent by the first vessel leaving for that place. At the request of Her Majesty's Minister, the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs has further promised to telegraph these instructions to the Portuguese Consul at the Cape of Good Hope, with directions to forward them to Angola.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If the salary has been withheld, up to the present, from Mr. Owen Ryan, who was appointed as seventh assistant in the Milford Street Male National School, Belfast, on the 10th day of October 1882, and whose appointment was notified to the Board of Education on the 21st day of February 1883; and also if it is not true that the said Owen Ryan was previously employed in the capacity of principal teacher at the Clonmore Male National School, county Tipperary, where the Commissioners, by their letter of 24th August 1882, granted him provisional classification, pending next annual examination to be held in July 1883; and, if so, if he would explain why his salary has been withheld?

, in reply, said, the average attendance was not high enough to qualify the Milford Street School for assistance. The circumstances with regard to Mr. Owen Ryan were as stated; but they had no bearing upon the refusal to pay his salary as teacher at the Belfast school.

asked the Postmaster General, Whether he cannot relax the prohibition to the contractors for mail carts and cars to be employed by the Parcels Post with regard to their carrying parcels under the weight of seven pounds for the public, so far as to permit of private arrangements being made by the proprietors of newspapers for the carriage of small parcels of newspapers as heretofore?

asked the Postmaster General, If mail carriers will be forbidden in the North of Ireland to carry newspaper parcels as heretofore, except at postal parcel rates; and, if he is aware that such a prohibition will virtually double the cost of country newspapers?

With the view of preventing any interference with the cheap and early circulation of newspapers in rural districts, I have, after giving the subject careful consideration, decided to allow contractors for mail carts and cars to continue, as at present, to enter into private arrangements with newspaper proprietors for the carriage of parcels of newspapers; but on the understanding that the carrying of newspapers in no way interferes with either the Letter or Parcel Postal Service.

, Will the right hon. Gentleman say, if possible, when he expects the new Parcels Post to come into operation?

It has been decided that the Inland Parcels Post shall come into operation on Wednesday, the 1st of August. A Circular will be issued to the public this afternoon as to the dimensions of parcels, the rates, and other particulars.

asked the Postmaster General, in anticipation of the Parcels Post coming into operation shortly, Has any of the superior appointments under it yet been made; and, if so, what has been the mode of selection, and has any undue preference been given to the Postal over the Telegraph branch, of the Service, complaint having arisen that such was the case on the promulgation of the late scheme; and, will any of the appointments fall to the share of those telegraph clerks who, owing to the requirements of the Service, have long service in provincial offices, and who have not fared so well under late revision as some of their more fortunate brethren, of equal service, attached to larger offices?

I do not, at present, anticipate that the introduction of the Parcels Post will necessitate any appointments of the kind which I presume the hon. Member has in view; at any rate, the number will be very small, and in making selections for them care will be taken to promote the best qualified.

asked the Postmaster General, If it is true that there are a number of telegraph clerks in the Belfast office with from nine to twelve years' service, performing night and Sunday duty, who are only allowed two weeks' annual leave, while others in the same office with only six or eight years' service, performing exactly similar duties, are granted an annual leave of three weeks; if this be so, why is this distinction made between members of the same staff of the Belfast office; and will he have the anomaly removed; and, if it is not also a fact that clerks in the Dublin office, with similar service and performing precisely the same duties, are allowed three weeks' leave in the year?

I stated, in reply to a Question put to me last year, that the telegraph clerks at Belfast had been found to be enjoying exceptional indulgence in the matter of annual leave of absence, and this indulgence, while continued to those who already enjoyed it, was not to be extended to others. The officers referred to as having only a fortnight in the course of the year, though of longer service than some who have three weeks, have entered the Belfast office since the difference between that office and others has been discovered. As regards Dublin, I may state that some time since it was decided that future entrants into that office would be allowed only the same period of annual leave as the staff at Belfast.

asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Inland Revenue Commissioners are justified in calling upon residents in this Country to return for assessment to the Income Tax profits arising or accruing to their credit from property, trade, or manufactures, such profits being made abroad under the protection of and subject to the taxation of Foreign or Colonial Governments, except for the proportion of such profits as may have been received for expenditure in this Country?

Yes, Sir; there is no doubt whatever that, by law, residents in this country are required to return for assessment the full amount of their profits made abroad, and not only the amounts remitted for expenditure in this country. The hon. Member for Carlow (Mr. Macfarlane) is, I believe, about to raise this question on the 8th clause of the Customs and Inland Revenue Bill, and I shall then be able, I hope, to show how untenable the apparent contention of my right hon. Friend would be.

said, that when the Motion was discussed he would draw the attention of the House to the grievances to which his Question alluded.

asked at what hour the right hon. Gentleman would get Progress reported on the Navy Estimates, so that the Customs and Inland Revenue Bill might be discussed?

asked whether the right hon. Gentleman still persisted with Part 3 of that Bill?

said, the conduct of Business was not in his hands. With regard to the Question of the right hon. Baronet, he would prefer not to make any statement until the Bill was before the House.

asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, What efforts have been made by Her Majesty's Government to take advantage of what was regarded in November 1882 as "the present opportune moment" for releasing the Chief Langalibalele from captivity; whether Her Majesty's Government still entertain the hope they did in 1880 that "there are no insurmountable obstacles to that Chief's early-return to Natal;" and, whether he will lay any Correspondence on the subject upon the Table of the House?

Sir Henry Bulwer has been requested to prepare and transmit the conditions which are thought necessary to be attached to the return of Langalibalele, and as soon as the Legislative Council of Natal reassemble they will be informed of the details of the proposed arrangement, which will then, I hope, be carried out without delay. The Correspondence in the matter will be laid on the Table with the next collection of Natal Papers.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he will produce the papers relating to or connected with the inquiry ordered by the Local Government Board, and held at Castleblayney Workhouse, 9th September 1882 concerning the election of Poor Law Guardians for Castleblayney Division in June 1832; and, what decision the Local Government Board came to in this matter?

, in reply, said, there was no objection to produce the Papers; but the Correspondence was very voluminous, and extended over four months, and he would rather show it to the hon. Gentleman privately. The evidence was very contradictory, and the Local Government Board did not feel justified in coming to any decision on the matter.

asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Whether his attention has been directed to a letter from the Under Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, dated 30th January 1883, to the Earl of Granard with reference to an application for a fresh loan towards the completion of Rossclare Pier and Harbour, county Wexford, in which His Excellency declines to recommend such application until the amount of traffic on the unfinished pier has been ascertained, or until collateral security for a further loan is offered; whether the Commissioners of the Harbour have not stated that the unfinished state of the Pier and Harbour exclude the possibility of increased traffic; and, whether he will recommend an inquiry into the truth or otherwise of the above statement?

I have seen the letter referred to, and also a subsequent Memorial from the Harbour Board to the effect stated in the second paragraph of the Question. This application, being for a loan under the Harbours and Passing Tolls Act, falls to be dealt with by the English Public Works Loans Board, who have inquired fully into the matter, and have declined to accede to the application for a fresh loan. I should hesitate before in any way interfering with their discretion; but I have satisfied myself that in this case they have arrived at a right conclusion.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If it is true that an action was recently brought against Mr. James Francis Lennox M'Farlane, J. P. Morien, Dundrum, county Dublin, before Chief Baron Palles, for blowing up a portion of his neighbour's premises with dynamite; whether a verdict for £100 was found against him; whether he settled the action by going through the Bankruptcy Court and has never paid the costs; and, whether he will continue this gentleman in the Commission of the Peace?

The facts of this case are not before me; but I am aware that they are at present under the consideration of the Lord Chancellor.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he is aware that the Catholic Chaplain of Donegal Workhouse has resigned in consequence of the refusal of the Protestant majority of the guardians to permit the presence of any Catholic official or to pay a Catholic Catechist for the instruction of the Catholic children; and, what steps he proposes to take to provide for the rights of conscience of the Catholic inmates, numbering nearly ninety per cent, in Donegal Workhouse?

I am informed that it is the case that the Roman Catholic Chaplain of Donegal Workhouse has resigned on the ground stated. The Guardians, I understand, persist in their refusal to appoint a Catechist, one ground of their refusal being that some years ago the salary of the Chaplaincy was increased by £5, partly on account of his having to catechize the inmates himself. I have already stated that the Local Government Board consider the application for the appointment of a Catechist reasonable, and regret the action of the Guardians; but they have no power to appoint a Catechist. I can only express my hope that the Guardians will alter their decision in the matter.

asked the Postmaster General, Whether it is proposed to enlarge the accommodation of the Telegraph Department of the General Post Office by adding a story to the present building; what height from the ground the new story will be; how many persons will be located in the building when completed; and, what precautions against fire it is proposed to take?

In reply to the hon. Member, I may state that the height of the floor of the new story in the Telegraph Department above the pavement is 76 feet. The maximum number of persons employed in the entire building is about 2,500. Of course, the whole number are not employed at one time. About 300 are employed at night. The building is fire-proof, and every precaution is taken against fire by having large tanks on the top of the building and hydrants on each floor. The means of exit are so good that it is considered that the whole staff at the busiest time of the day could leave the building in 10 minutes. In answer to a further Question from Mr. RITCHIE,

stated that, to the best of his belief, no more than 2,000 persons were ever employed in the building at the same time.

asked the Lord Advocate, Whether his attention has been called to a Petition for inquiry into his case, sent to the Home Secretary by William Meikle, accountant in Edinburgh, convicted, in April 1881, of breach of trust and embezzlement; and, whether there is any truth in the statement made therein that Robert Laidlaw Stuart, Procurator Fiscal of Court of Midlothian, at whose instance the prosecution against Meikle was undertaken, was a partner in the firm of Messrs. Stuart and Cheyne, W.S., who had been employed as agents in the civil disputes out of which the charge of breach of trust and embezzlement originated; and, if so, whether he will urge upon the Government the necessity of adopting means to prevent public prosecutors compromising their position of neutrality by engaging in private practice in districts where they prosecute in the public interest?

A Petition was received from William Meikle, who was convicted of breach of trust and embezzlement in 1881 by the unanimous verdict of the jury. The presiding Judge reports the case to have been a very bad one, and Meikle was twice previously convicted of the same offence in the Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire in 1876 and 1877. Mr. Stuart, Procurator Fiscal of Mid Lothian, is a partner of the firm of Stuart and Cheyne, W.S. Mr. Stuart reports that his firm never were, to his knowledge, employed as agents in any civil dispute connected with the matters out of which the charge of breach of trust and embezzlement arose. But Meikle has forwarded a letter which shows that he had had correspondence with that firm on a subject which had a connection, though not a very direct connection, with the criminal charge. In the present case, I cannot find the slightest indication that the interests of justice have suffered by Mr. Stuart's partnership in a professional firm. But I am of opinion that it is desirable, where possible, that Procurators Fiscal should not engage in private practice as solicitors. An absolute rule to this effect would involve a heavy demand on the Treasury. But on the occurrence of recent vacancies, wherever the salary has admitted of it, provision has been made for the separation of the public duties from private practice.

asked the Secretary to the Admiralty, If he will state the number of ironclad vessels building in the private yards of this Country for Foreign Powers, their size, probable armament, and the dates on which they will probably be completed?

We are aware of only one ship, of 5,700 tons displacement, being built in this country for a foreign Power. She is well advanced, and I understand that another ship of the same character has been recently ordered.

asked the Chairman of Ways and Means, Whether, as Tuesday next is the only day during the past two years when any opportunity has been found to discuss any matters relating to India, except on the day of the Budget Statement at the end of August, he will postpone the Motion which stands in his name, at the time of Private Business, to some other day?

, in reply, said, he fully recognized the importance of the subject to which the hon. Gentleman had referred in his Question; but he had also received a letter from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), who was Chairman of the Committee appointed by the House last year to examine into the matters which were regulated by Standing Order 167, informing him that he had been suddenly summoned to Scotland, and would be unable to attend to-morrow to take part in the discussion of his (Sir Arthur Otway's) Notice of Motion. Under these circumstances, he would postpone the Motion till another day.

asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether he has yet received any details of the barbarous murder of Mr. James Scott M'Gilloray and another Englishman by the Boers in the Transvaal last September, as recorded in the Colonial Papers brought to the knowledge of the Colonial Office so long as last January?

Our despatch to the High Commissioner instructing him to make inquiries relative to the death of Mr. M'Gilloray and another Englishmen on the borders of the Transvaal crossed despatches from Sir Hercules Robinson in which he informed the Secretary of State that the matter had been brought to his notice by the Cape Government, and that he had instructed Mr. Hudson to make a representation on the subject to the Government of the Transvaal State. We have not yet heard anything further in the matter.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether, during the Whitsuntide Recess, the Government will consider the advisibility of appointing one or two additional Land Commissioners, so as to form a second Court of Appeal, and to thus dispose of the large number of appeals (over 4,000) within a reasonable period?

Sir, this is a very important matter; but the Government really consider that they cannot make any statement with regard to it.

asked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether it is true that Professor Tyndall, D.C.L., F.R.S., has resigned his position as Scientific Adviser to the Board of Trade and the Lighthouse Boards; and, if so, what reasons he has assigned for so doing?

I am sorry to say that Dr. Tyndall has resigned his position as Scientific Adviser to the Trinity House, the Irish Light Commissioners, and the Board of Trade. He has not stated very precisely his reasons for so doing; but no doubt they are indicated in a lengthy Correspondence which has taken place between Dr. Tyndall and the Board of Trade. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman thinks the production of these Papers sufficiently important I shall not oppose the Motion.

I will move it. Will the right hon. Gentleman include in the Correspondence that with the Trinity House, the Board of Trade, the Commissioners of Northern Lights, and the Irish Lights Commission?

I will inquire, and communicate with the right hon. and learned Gentleman.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, What are the intentions of Pier Majesty's Government with reference to those officers of the Metropolitan Police Force who have been employed in the administration of the Contagious Diseases Act?

, in reply, said, the Government, in consequence of the vote which the House came to the other night, had thought it right to repeal such portions of the Acts as might appear to be optional with the Government. The employment of the Metropolitan police was merely optional, and therefore it had been discontinued.

Will those men so previously employed be retired, or will any consideration be shown to them?

Certainly, Sir. These men will not suffer in their employment owing to the step the Government has taken.

I should like to ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether the ordinary police in garrison towns are still to be employed for carrying out the Acts?

The hon. and gallant Member must know that I have no voice in that matter. The Secretary of State has no authority whatever over police in boroughs, I can give the local authorities no instructions as what to do or what not to do.

asked the Secretary of State for War, If his attention has been drawn to the following statement in a letter from the Rev. F. W. Taylor, Chaplain of Maidstone Union, to the editor of the "Times":—

"I speak from experience, and information, that on a low average the number of children unlawfully begotten by soldiers would be four in each 500 unions out of 632, thus giving a population of 2,000 illegitimate children annually, for the maintenance of which neither the mothers nor the ratepayers have any redress;"

and, whether the Government will make any proposal to remedy the state of things described?

The writer of the letter in The Times would seem to have been unaware of a fact, which is no doubt well-known to the hon. Member, that, under the Army Act, a soldier is liable to a payment of 1s. 9d. a-week for the maintenance of an illegitimate child, and that in cases where the paternity is properly established, this payment is always enforced. After full consideration, it was decided that 3d. a-day was the utmost that a soldier's pay could bear.

asked the Secretary to the Treasury, If the drainage works at Meeluk have been stopped although still incomplete; and, whether it is the intention of the Government to resume these works and to carry them to completion?

Assuming that the Question of the hon. Member relates to the works on the Shannon at Meeluk, I have to say that those works have been substantially complete for some time. Some few accessories could not be finished while the river was in flood; but they are now being dealt with, and the works will be very shortly brought to a final conclusion.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Is it a fact that Mr. George Bolton, Crown Solicitor, on receiving the jury panel for the present Commission in Green Street from the Sheriff on the 5th of April last despatched a messenger with a copy of the said jury panel to Mr. Welch, now or at one time an official of the Leinster Street Conservative Association; and, whether Mr. Welch has received £5 5s. for his services in connection with the panel, together with further fees for subsequent searches; and, if so, what was the nature of the services so rewarded?

I stated, in reply to a former Question, that I must decline to make any statement as to the steps which the Crown Solicitor, for the proper discharge of his duty, thinks it necessary to take to obtain confidential information in matters of this kind; and I must adhere to that decision.

Then the right hon. Gentleman declines to state what part the Secretary of a Dublin Conservative Association takes in ordering Catholic jurors to stand aside?

I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the confidential information refers to the religion of the jurors?

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to the fact that on the 22nd of February last Mr. Dagg, Sub-Inspector Royal Irish Constabulary, in company with Constable Steward, of Ventry, made a search, lasting for several hours, through the papers of the Reverend C. M'Carthy, M.A., the Protestant clergyman, which search was continued through the following day, and that on the 24th February Sub-Inspector Dagg informed the reverend gentleman that the police had received information identifying him with Carey and the Phoenix Park assassinations; whether he approves of these proceedings; and, whether he means to take any notice of them?

The Rev. Mr. M'Carthy, I may mention, is a gentleman who has been prohibited by the Archbishop of Dublin from performing any ecclesiastical duties. ["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Gentlemen say "Oh, oh!" but that appears to me to bear upon this question, that he has been prohibited from the discharge of his duties. ["Oh, oh!"] I do not know why hon. Gentlemen groan at that statement, as it is not likely the Archbishop would make such an order without proper reason. The charge against the rev. gentleman was that he was concerned in a fraudulent transaction, and that bears, in my opinion, very strongly on this case. I am informed that his lodgings were searched on the 2nd of March. He has no house of his own, and the papers which were examined were handed, to the police by his landlady, who had seized them for debt. It is not the case that the search was continued on the following day, and the Sub-Inspector reports that it is not true that he made any reference to Mr. M'Carthy about the Phœnix Park murders, or any statement that he had received information identifying him with them. From the information before me, I see no ground for expressing any disapproval of the action of the Sub-Inspector, or of taking any further notice of the matter.

Perhaps I may be permitted to state, if the House will allow me, that I should not have put this Question on the Paper if I had not received a distinct statement from the clergyman referred to, in which he sots forth the matters contained in the Question, and states in express terms that the Inspector informed him that he had received information identifying him with Carey and the Phœnix Park assassinations.

I do not think the Question requires any explanation from the hon. Member.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether Constable Graham, a man of thirty years' service in the Royal Irish Constabulary, lately stationed at Carros Hut, county Mayo, committed suicide there, about three weeks since, by shooting himself with his own rifle; whether, notwithstanding his length of service, this constable had recently been removed from Claremorris, where his wife and children live, to Newport, and, on appealing to County Inspector Carey to be allowed to return to Claremorris, that officer took the course of sending him to the hut at Carros, still further away from Claremorris; whether there is reason to conclude that the constable committed suicide through depression, resulting from the course pursued towards him by County Inspector Carey; and, whether the Government approve of the conduct of the County Inspector in this case, and will inquire into the course adopted by him, in numerous cases, with regard to the separation of married constables from their wives and children?

I think the hon. Member will be glad to hear the answer to this Question. Constable Graham committed suicide as stated. He had been stationed at Claremorris, in order that he might be in a place where his wife and family could get accommodation; and it was at his own request that he was transferred from that station to a protection post, as his eyesight was not good, and he was unequal to all the writing that he had to do at Claremorris. It is not the case that the County Inspector had, in numerous instances, transferred married constables to stations where they could not obtain accommodation for their families.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether, in the last election of a Poor Law Guardian for the Gorrel Electoral Division of the Carrickon Shannon Union, the police left the voting papers of the following nine electors, Michael Horan, James Mulherin, Luke M'Laughlin, Patrick James Mulherin, Francis Murphy, Richard Brennan, Michael Mulherin, Patrick M'Laughlin, and John Morton, not at their own houses, as prescribed by Law, but at the house of Mr. Arthur Harrison, Sub-Sheriff of the county Leitrim, who is agent of the property on which these nine voters are tenants, and who was himself a candidate in the election; whether Mr. Harrison, having obtained possession of the voting papers, caused the electors named to attend at his house, and there induced them to vote for him; and, whether the Government will take notice of the conduct of this public official, and will protect the voters from intimidatory courses by ^instructing the police to leave the voting paper for each elector at his place of abode, and nowhere else?

I have received a Report from the Sub-Inspector of the district, from which it appears that the constable at the Leitrim station received the voting papers from the Clerk of the Union, accompanied by a written request from the voters named in the Question that the papers should be left at the house of Mr. Harrison, as they feared that, if left at their own houses, they would be defaced in their absence. The constable complied with this request. In doing so he was technically wrong; but he bears a high character, and his officers are persuaded that he acted in good faith. Whether or not these electors voted for Mr. Harrison I am unable to say; but that they intended to do so when they made the request above-mentioned seems pretty clear. The incident had no effect on the result of the election, as Mr. Harrison was not elected.

I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, in leaving the papers in this way, the police do not leave the people open to intimidation; and whether, in all cases, they should not leave the papers at the voters' own houses, and nowhere else?

said, that that was his view of what should be done.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether section 12, sub-section 2, of the 37th and 38th Victoria, c. 69, enacts that certificates for beer dealers' licences shall only be granted at annual licensing sessions in October of each year, unless in cases where special circumstances are shown to exist; if he will state on what special grounds Mr. John A. Curran, Q.C., one of the divisional magistrates, granted such a certificate to Mr. Edward Quinn, of Newport Street, on the 13th June 1882, out of annual sessions, Quinn having previously lost his licence for habitual violations of the Law; whether, as reported in the "Freeman's Journal" on the 20th of April last, Henry Skelton, Spirit Grocer, Curzon Street, Dublin, was prosecuted by the police authorities before Mr. Curran for supplying intoxicating liquor to a constable while on duty; whether Mr. Skel- ton had previously been charged with a similar offence, and, if his defence on this occasion was that the drink supplied was by way of a treat; whether this is an offence against the Statute, and if Mr. Curran dismissed the summons; whether Skelton was a previous client of Mr. Curran at licensing sessions; whether on the same day Mr. Patrick Bagnall, publican, of Thomas Street, was charged with a like offence before Mr. Curran, and pleaded guilty; whether Mr. Curran dismissed this summons also; and, if Mr. Bagnall was also a client of Mr. Curran'a at licensing sessions?

The hon. Member does not accurately quote the words of the statutory provision to which he refers, which says nothing about special circumstances. The words of the Act are—"In such cases as may seem fit to the Justice." I have already explained, in reply to a former Question, the circumstances under which Mr. Curran saw fit to renew Mr. Curran's licence. The charge against Henry Skelton was not for supplying intoxicating liquor to a constable, but to an ordinary member of the public. The defendant was examined, and swore that the drink was given by him as a treat, and was not paid for. Taking this and the defendant's respectability into account, the magistrate dismissed the case. Patrick Bagnall was charged with having supplied drink to two constables on duty. He pleaded guilty, and threw himself on the mercy of the Court; and he was "cautioned" by Mr. Curran. This caution can and will be quoted against him in the event of his being again prosecuted. The police are quite satisfied with the decisions in these cases. I am not aware whether these persons were former clients of Mr. Curran, nor do I think it necessary to inquire. Mr. Curran, like every barrister who is appointed to a judicial office, is liable to decide on cases connected with former clients of his own. I may add that Mr. Curran is a magistrate of whose integrity and ability the Government entertain a high opinion.

asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If his atten- tion has been directed to a statement in the "Times of India," that a native magistrate has prohibited natives from appearing in court with shoes on; whether a native pleader who contravened the order was turned out of court by order of the magistrate; whether the Deputy Commissioner being appealed to decided that—

"The native pleader had a right to enter court without removing his shoes, provided they were of European design;"

and, under what Law has such a regulation been authorised?

The India Office has no information on the subject beyond that derived from the newspaper report referred to by the hon. Member. On the general question of the wearing of shoes in the Courts of British India, I have nothing to add to the statement which I made in answer to the hon. Member on the 12th of March last, except that it is the custom not to require Natives wearing European shoes to remove them under ordinary circumstances.

asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If his attention has been called to the fact that the "Calcutta Englishman" has published the following among other advertisements—

"Wanted—Sweepers, Punkha-Coolies, and Bhisties for the residents of Saidpur. None but Bengali Babas who have passed the Entrance Examination need apply. Ex-Deputy Magistrates are preferred. Applications should be forwarded to the postmaster of Saidpur, with testimonials;"

whether the provisions of the Indian Criminal Code punish insults intended to stir up resentment and animosity between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects in India; and, whether Government intends to take notice of the conduct of the "Calcutta Englishman" in placing educated Native gentlemen, and Native servants of the Crown, on the same level with the lowest menials?

I have seen the very disgraceful advertisement quoted by the hon. Member. Under the Indian Penal Code—

"Whoever intentionally insults and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation. will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence,"

is punishable with imprisonment and fine. The Government of India will, doubtless, exercise its discretion as to whether or not it will take any steps in the matter.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If Mr. Philips Newton, now acting as Land Sub-Commissioner in Kerry, is the same gentleman who acts as coroner for the county of Wicklow; and, if so, whether he can discharge both duties satisfactorily at the same time; whether he is the same Mr. Philips Newton who, as Court valuer in the case of Toole v. Fisborne, valued the farm 113 per cent. over the Government valuation, 80 per cent. over the judicial rent fixed, and 90 per cent. over the rent as fixed on appeal; and, if so, whether he will continue Mr. Newton in his position of Sub-Commissioner?

Mr. Newton, a Sub-Commissioner employed in the county of Kerry, is one of the Coroners for the county of Wicklow. I do not think that he can satisfactorily discharge the duties of both offices at the same time, and I shall communicate with the Land Commissioners on the subject. Mr. Newton informs me that he did not act as Court Valuer in the case of "Toole v. Fisborne," but was examined as a witness for the landlord. I must decline to attempt to review his evidence.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether a man named James M'Claskey was, on the 4th January, at Armagh, sentenced to two months' imprisonment; and, whether there was any other charge against him except that of having put out his tongue at the sub-inspector?

I have received a telegram stating that James M'Claskey was on, January 4 last, ordered to find sureties for his good behaviour, and, in default, to be imprisoned for two months for persistently putting out his tongue and grinning at the Sub-Inspector— such offensive conduct being calculated to create a breach of the peace. He was unable to give bail, and sent to prison. I will have the case looked up.

Might I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he means that the Sub-Inspector was likely to break the peace because James M'Claskey insulted him?

asked the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Whether he will afford an opportunity to the House of discussing the sale of the Southport foreshore to certain landowners before the sale is completed?

, in reply, said, he begged to point out, in the first place, that the rights of the Duchy to this foreshore was in dispute with the riparian proprietors; and, therefore, if the Corporation had acquired it, they would still have had the riparian proprietors to deal with. In answer to the Question, he was afraid he could only repeat what he had said before, that there was a binding contract from which the Duchy could not recede. The sale was in equity complete. He did not know whether the hon. Gentleman was aware—if not, he would be glad to hear—that the riparian proprietors had offered to the Corporation those portions of the foreshore opposite the town, which were required for sanitary or recreation purposes, at a nominal price. That being so, he ventured to hope that an arrangement between the parties might, before long, be arrived at on amicable terms.

asked whether the seal of the Duchy had been attached?

said, he stated the other night that the seal of the Duchy might not be put in requisition for some time to come; but the contract entered into was none the less binding, and it was not one which it was in his power to recede from, even if he wished.

asked whether he was to understand that the right hon. Gentleman had agreed not to attach the seal until the question had been brought, under the notice of the House? ["No!"] He wished also to ask whether the right hon. Gentleman was not aware that the written Report of the Surveyor General of the Duchy was to the effect that the Duchy had full powers, and that the so-called riparian owners had no rights whatever? This was a question of life and death to Southport. Was the right hon. Gentleman aware that the landowners had refused to name the nominal price; and, further, that as regarded the borough of Preston, which was in precisely the same position, the landowners had already refused an increase of 100 per cent on what they had paid to the Duchy for the land?

said, he was not aware of the transaction with regard to the borough of Preston to which the hon. Gentleman had referred. With respect to the opinion which the hon. Gentleman stated that the Surveyor General of the Duchy had expressed as to the rights of the riparian proprietors, he would point out that the Surveyor General was not a legal authority, nor one by whose legal opinion he ought to be guided. The contract, as he had said, was a binding one; and he could not refuse to attach the seal of the Duchy when he was called upon to do it.

asked whether the right hon. Gentleman was aware that it appeared from the Correspondence that Mr. Whittaker, the Legal Adviser of the Duchy, agreed with the Surveyor General that the lords of the manor had no right whatever to the foreshore?

said, he was not aware that Mr. Whittaker had ever laid that down. At all events, the position was this—the Duchy had a dispute as to rights with the riparian proprietors, and that dispute was not unlikely to lead to a lawsuit. It was not for him to question the validity of the right which the Duchy asserted.

was proceeding to put further Questions, when——

said, that several Questions which had already been put had been fully answered, and that Notice of any further Questions ought to be given.

said, he would again put a Question to the right hon. Gentleman on the subject to-morrow.

I must point out to the hon. Member that he has already asked several Questions, and has received answers; and if he desires to put further Questions on the matter, I submit that Notice should be given.

gave Notice that to-morrow he would ask a further Question on the subject.

asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he is prepared to adopt some scheme now to mitigate the evils likely to arise from the present action of the Government in annulling the provisions of the Contagious Diseases Acts?

The action which I stated the other day the Government proposed to take is with, the view, not of annulling the provisions of the Contagious Diseases Acts, but of retaining as much of those provisions as we can reasonably expect to receive the support of the House in retaining. The Lock Hospital will remain, and the power of detention of women who are found to be diseased will also remain in force. I also stated that we are considering whether it will be possible to adopt any of the recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1871, which, in their opinion, might be applied, not only in these districts, but more generally with a prospect of improving the health of the troops and of the population generally.

asked whether the statement of the noble Marquess, that the employment of the Metropolitan Police under these Acts was permissive, and not obligatory, was given after consultation with the Law Officers of the Crown?

It was after consultation with the Law Officers of the Crown. In answer to Sir R. ASSHETON GROSS,

said, that he had no control over local bodies of police. Over the Metropolitan Police, however, the Executive had authority; and the principle upon which the Executive had acted was that after the recent decision arrived at by the House they were bound to discontinue enforcing so much of the executive portion of the Acts as it was in their discretion to enforce or not to enforce. Of course, the word "police" in the Acts included the two classes of police, one being that over which the Executive Government had authority, and the other that over which they had no authority.

wished to know whether the authorities over the local police had the power to exclude from the duties of that police the execution of the Acts in question?

said, that was a question upon which he would rather not give an opinion, as it was one with which he had nothing to do, and with respect to which he ought to say nothing regarding their legal rights, or the rights they might choose to exercise.

said, the right hon. and learned Gentleman did not quite follow his meaning, which was, whether there was any difference between statutory duties imposed upon the Metropolitan Police and statutory duties imposed on local police? If statutory duties could be withdrawn from the one body, why not from the other?

said, that the local authorities were not under the same—what word should he use?—pressure from the House of Commons as the Executive Government was. The House of Commons had control over the Estimates from which the payment of the Metropolitan Police must come; and, consequently, the House could exert great pressure upon the Executive. The payment of the local police did not depend upon the Estimates, and thus the House could not exert the same pressure in the case of that body.

observed that, by the 15th and 16th sections of 29 Vict., c. 35, local Justices of the Peace might, on the information of a Superintendent of Police, order compulsory examination in a given locality. He asked whether the Government had the power to interfere with the discretion of the Justices of the Peace?

replied, that he had no power, by Circular or otherwise, to interfere. If he were to give instructions to the local police they would not be bound to respect them. In local boroughs the autonomy with respect to the local police was absolute. The Secretary of State had a slight remnant of authority over the county police; but the local authorities were entirely independent of the Secretary of State.

asked whether the House was to understand that no Vote would be proposed in the Estimates with a view to the carrying out of the Acts?

said, that it was the intention of the Government to substitute revised Estimates for the administration of the Acts, as he had already stated. When the Votes were moved there would be a convenient opportunity for discussing the matter.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is true that Sub-Constables Burke and Mulholland, on 29th April, tore down from the pillars of Toames Chapel gate, in the parish of Kilmichael, county Cork, a placard, of which the following is a copy:—

"Irish National League. A Public Meeting to establish a branch of the Irish National League will be heldon Sunday, May 6th, 1883, at 2 o'clock, at Toames Chapel. Deputations from Dublin and Cork will attend. Irishmen of all classes are invited to co-operate in a movement to save the Irish Race from death and expatriation; to revive and encourage the Industries of the Country: to secure fair wages and cleanly accommodation to the Irish Labourer; to the Irish Farmer the full fruits of his Industry; and to the Irish people the right to make their own laws in a Native Parliament. Prudence, courage, and union were never more necessary for Irishmen than at the present moment. God Save Ireland;"

and, whether steps will be taken to prosecute Sub-Constables Burke and Mulholland for their conduct, or otherwise express their disapproval?

The constables did take down the "placard," which they believed to be of an inflammatory character. In doing so, they took, in my opinion, a wrong view of their duty; and I have directed that they shall be so informed.

asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, with reference to a former Question, Whether he has received any further information tending to show that the lunatic, John Flanagan, was removed by his father from Ballyshannon Workhouse; whether it is true that a record appears on the minutes of the Board of Guardians to the effect that he had been discharged by the master, on his own application, in error, having been mistaken for a night lodger; whether the Local Government Board were aware of the fact when furnishing him with the reply he gave, and had already censured the master for his culpable negligence, by letter dated 5th January last; whether it is true that, some days prior to the murder, Hugh Flanagan was brought before the local magistrates charged with being a dangerous lunatic, and that they declined to commit him, although warned by a medical man that the case was dangerous; whether it is true that the body of the murdered man lay for several days awaiting the coroner's convenience, and that decomposition had set in before an inquest was held; whether it is a fact that, on the face of the Scotch transfer warrant, the lunatic was simply described as a pauper, his lunacy being referred to in an almost illegible endorsement in rod ink, which the master says he overlooked; and, whether, if the facts are as stated, he will condemn the conduct of all who are responsible for these painful occurrences, or supplying incorrect information in regard to them?

From the fuller information now before me it appears that John Flanagan was not removed from the workhouse by his father, as I had been led to believe; I was not so informed by the Local Government Board, but by the police, who had themselves been misled on the subject. The facts as to the man's discharge in error, and as to the censure passed on the master, are as stated. When the master found out his mistake on the day following the discharge, he at once sent to John Flanagan's father, who refused to allow his son to return to the workhouse. There was nothing in his appearance to indicate insanity. Two mouths prior to the murder, Flanagan was brought before the magistrates, who declined to commit him as a dangerous lunatic, not being satisfied that the circumstances would justify them in doing so. He was carefully examined by these magistrates, one of whom was surgeon to the County Infirmary, and he was re-examined in their presence by the doctor who had previously declared him to be insane, and the conclusion arrived at by the three gentlemen was that he was not a lunatic. The body of the murdered man lay from the 17th to the 20th awaiting an inquest, the Coroner being unable, from illness, to attend. An inquest was held as soon as possible by two magistrates. The Scotch transfer warrant was as described, and the master of the Ballyshannon Workhouse did not at first observe the words "Insane case" noted on it. I think if the hon. Member desires to make any complaint as to the notion of the Scotch authorities it should not be addressed to me. They are not under my control.

asked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether it is true that the solemn declarations made by Patrick Joyce and Patrick Casey previous to their execution in Galway Gaol, and afterwards communicated to the Lord Lieutenant, were made at the solicitation of the clergyman who attended them to prepare them for death; and, whether, having regard to the public feeling in Ireland upon this matter, he will cause copies of these declarations to be laid upon the Table of the House? The hon. Member hoped he might be permitted to explain that a portion of the Question was omitted, which the right hon. Gentleman would, no doubt, have answered had he seen it. It was, whether those declarations were made with the avowed object of saving the life of Myles Joyce? He wished to state that had received letters from several Catholic clergymen, thanking him for having asked this Question—["Order!"] He hoped also he would be permitted to say—["Order!]—that he had addressed this Question to the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury. ["Order!"]

The Question was, in its original form, irregular, and was revised under my authority. The addition now made is not in Order.

stated that he would postpone the Question if the Prime Minister could not answer it, as he had not been satisfied with the answers of the Chief Secretary.

AS the Question is on the Paper I am bound to answer the first portion of it, and my answer is, that His Excellency is not aware whether the statements referred to were made upon the solicitation of any person. I have already, on a former occasion, answered, perhaps, somewhat over fully in the case of a Question of this description, and I can add nothing to what I then said.

Arising out of the right hon. Gentleman's answer, may I ask whether His Excellency, not being aware of the fact, had made any inquiry regarding it?

asked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether he would be able, before Whitsuntide, to state the intention of the Government with respect to the introduction of the Government of London Bill?

My answer to my hon. Friend will embrace other subjects besides that to which his Question refers. Our first duty, after the long period of time occupied by the debate on the Parliamentary Oaths Act (1866) Amendment Bill, has been to examine into the state of Supply. That is in a backward condition, and we are certainly under strong pledges to the House to do our best to put forward Supply in a more satisfactory manner than was possible either in the last Session or last but one. With that view, it will be absolutely necessary to appropriate several Government nights—certainly not less than three, and probably four—after the Recess to the subject of Supply. That being so, it would take us to the close of the month; and I do not propose, therefore, under those circumstances, to make any further statement in relation to what I may call the principal Government Bills. We have, of course, got those Bills before the Grand Committees; but in regard to the principal Government Bills, with which no progress has been made, I do not propose, until after Whitsuntide, to make any further statement. Then, there is one subject which I wish to mention, because I believe that many Members connected with Scotland are desirous to leave town before we come to the day of adjournment. I have to say that, on an early day after Whitsuntide, my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary will ask leave to bring in a Bill with a view to make further provision for the despatch of Business relating to Scotland. Lords Alcester and Wolseley's Annuities Bill being a matter upon which Questions have been asked, I will state on Friday the exact course which we will take with respect to that Bill. I have already said that we intend to alter the basis of the Bill, by substituting capital sums for annuities. I may say, as the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) asked me a Question, and made a proposal on Friday with respect to South African affairs, that I am afraid it will not be in our power to make arrangements for meeting that proposal, which I take to be one of a new description; but I will state again on Friday the reasons which have led the Government to that conclusion.

The right hon. Gentleman has not mentioned one measure, the Parliamentary Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Bill, and the House is very anxious to know what has become of it.

I did not mention that, or the Tenants' Compensation Bill; but I have already declared that on Thursday my right hon. Friend (Mr. Dodson) will ask for leave to introduce the Tenants' Compensation Bill—the Parliamentary Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Bill is already before the House—and these were the Bills which I had in view when I said that I would not be able until an early day after Whitsuntide to make a statement.

said, that in view of the answer of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War to the Question he had addressed to him a few nights ago, he desired to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance—namely, the withdrawal by the Government of Officers duly appointed to carry out the the provisions of the Contagious Diseases Acts.

asked whether it was the pleasure of the House that the hon. Member be heard; and afterwards called upon those supporting him to stand up in their places. And not less than 40 Members having accordingly risen in their places:—

said, that he should not have taken the course he had done but for the great misunderstanding which prevailed in the House and the country as to the effect of the action which had been taken by Her Majesty's Government since the Motion of the right hon. Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) on the subject of the Contagious Diseases Acts had been carried. He wished particularly to refer to the speech made by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War when that Motion was before the House. The noble Marquess then said that the Government were at variance with one another on this question; but the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Home Secretary—the three Ministers who alone had the administration of the Acts—were entirely antagonistic to the Resolution. Beading from carefully prepared notes, the noble Marquess went on to say that, whether the Resolution was carried or not, it would make no difference whatever in the carrying out of the Acts. The advocates of the Acts did not ask for their extension. They simply wished them let alone. A great deal had been heard lately in favour of Local Option and Local Self-Government; but in this case, notwithstanding the unanimous wish of all political parties and all creeds in the towns where those Acts were in force for their continuance, they were not to have the option of continuing them. It was said that there was an attempt to make this a Party question. He would tell the House what the Liberal newspapers in the towns affected said. The Western Morning News said that a more disastrous blow at the efficiency of the Army and the Navy had not been struck for years. Opinion in the three towns was, it said, unanimous as to the improvement effected by the Acts; and the sweeping them away, without the substitution of any regulation or legislation, would have a most prejudicial effect on public order and morality in those places. The Western Daily Mercury, also a Liberal paper, expressed the view that the health and the morality of Plymouth and the neighbourhood would suffer severely from the withdrawal of the Act. The inhabitants of the three towns were almost in a state of panic. [A laugh.] It was all very well for the hon. Member opposite to laugh; but he knew nothing about it. The minority of the Members of the Committee all belonged to Associations avowedly established for obtaining the repeal of the Acts; and they utterly ignored the overwhelming evidence given by the witnesses from the subjected districts, who were practically unanimous. The Mayor of Plymouth had just sent him a telegram to the effect that the magistrates at a meeting earnestly protested against the recent decision of the Government. But the serious question for the House of Commons was, whether an abstract Resolution was for the future to have the force of law? There had been no more important question raised on the floor of this House than this, and that from the several standpoints of the working of the Acts, their vital consequence to the garrison towns, and the still greater consequence to this House, and to the country at large, as to whether an abstract Resolution was to be allowed to override an Act of Parliament? He supposed the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War had not changed his mind with regard to the beneficial action of those Statutes. It was remarkable that those who presided over the three Departments of the Government more immediately connected with the working of the Acts were strongly in favour of their continuance, and opposed to the views of the Prime Minister and of the other Members of the Government. It had been stated that the Government had recently discovered that the Acts were of a permissive character, and that, therefore, they had the power to suspend their operation. If that were so, he hoped the Judge Advocate General, or some other Member of the Government, would discuss the question from that legal standpoint. The hon. Member concluded by moving that the House do now adjourn.

said, he was not quite certain what was the object of the hon. Member's speech, for it was impossible that any conclusion could be arrived at by discussion. The Resolution that had been passed by the House could not be reversed that evening; and no definite decision of any kind could be come to. He did not understand that the hon. Member desired to obtain fuller information as to the intentions of the Government than was contained in the answer given on Friday night to the Question of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill). He could not help thinking it was inconvenient that the ordinary Business of the House should be interrupted by a Motion such as this, which did not go directly to any definite object, but was simply a means of expressing the dissatisfaction felt by the hon. Member, and, he (the Marquess of Hartington) did not doubt, by a large number of his constituents, at the Resolution of the House the other night.

said, he had moved the Adjournment in the hope that the Government would be able to say something definite which would relieve the intensity of feeling in an important constituency.

said, he did not gather that there was any particular point on which the hon. Member desired information other than that which was given on Friday night. The Motion appeared to be made solely to express dissatisfaction with the Resolution of the House and with the action of the Government. The hon. Member said that the working of the Acts had given great satisfaction, because they had produced great improvement in public order and morality. But these considerations were very much beside the question. The Acts were not passed for the promotion of order and morality in certain districts. If that had been their object, why should they have been confined to those districts? Their object entirely was the preservation of the health, as it was hoped, of Her Majesty's soldiers and sailors. ["Hear, hear!" and "No!"] He repeated that the object of this legislation was not the improvement of public morality. If that were the object, why were not the Acts made general?

said, they were not made general because they were intended for garrison towns.

replied, that that was exactly what he said. The object was not the preservation of public order and morality in garrison towns more than any where else; it was the promoting of the efficiency of the Public Service, as large numbers of soldiers and sailors quartered in certain towns suffered greatly from the effects of immorality. He did not doubt that the Acts were popular, and that they worked well, as far as the morality and order of the towns in question were concerned; but he could not admit that the principles of Local Option and Local Self-Government, which had boon referred to, applied to this matter in any degree. It must be remembered that these Acts wore administered at a considerable expense to the State. He could well understand that it would be advantageous and popular in a district that some of its police duties for the preservation of order and the morality of its citizens should be effected at the cost of the Consolidated Fund. The popularity of the Acts in certain places was, therefore, not a conclusive argument that those places ought to have the decision of the question whether the Acts should be retained or not. No doubt, their local popularity and efficiency were elements in the discussion of the question; but the decision must be come to on general principles. The House had condemned compulsory examination; and the advantage conferred on a locality by the Acts would not, in his opinion, induce the House to reverse that Resolution. The power of an abstract Resolution as against an Act of Parliament was, as the hon. Member had said, an important question; and he was inclined to agree with him that it could not be held to have the force of law. The Acts gave the Government certain powers; but it was not compulsory on the Government to execute them. There were many such Acts, both with regard to the Government and to local authorities. But, however that might be, Parliament had placed in the House of Commons an absolute power of deciding whether these Acts were to be administered or not, because all the expenses of administration had to be defrayed out of money voted by Parliament. Therefore, it was in the power of the House of Commons, and it must have been intended to be so, to bring the operation of the Acts to a cessation by simply refusing to vote the money necessary for their administration. If the Resolution had been passed in January or February it would have been a question whether the Government ought to take any immediate action in withdrawing the Police Force, as the money for the administration of the Acts to March 31 was voted last year. But they were now in a new financial year; no money had been voted for the Acts, and from the Resolution of the other evening it was exceedingly doubtful whether, if the Government had not made some concession to the strong feeling of the House on the subject, any money would be voted to the Government for their administration. It was, therefore, necessary to consider whether the funds required for the certified hospitals, and the detention of diseased women in them, should be risked; and the Government thought it was not desirable to risk them, and that the most practical course was at once to suspend the periodical examination, which was the only part of the Acts directly condemned by the Resolution of the House. There did not appear to be anything un-Constitutional in that course; on the contrary, what they had done seemed to him to be quite conformable to the Constitution and the law. As to the panic alleged to exist in the towns in question, he would point out that a large part of the good done by the operation of the Acts was of an indirect character, and that the local authorities might retain that advantage by directing their police to exercise much of the control over the houses and women which had been exercised, under the Acts, by the members of the Metropolitan Police. The moral influence of the Metropolitan Police was distinctly apart from their duties under the Acts, and there was no reason to think that a large part of the good done by them could not be effected by the local police acting under the local authorities.

said, that his hon. Friend's object in moving the Adjournment of the House was to call attention to what had been done by the Government, and, in particular, to the statement made by the noble Marquess in the course of the debate a few days ago, that, in his opinion, the efficiency of the Army and Navy depended on the continuance of these Acts.

I said I thought these Acts had contributed to the efficiency of the Army; but it is quite impossible that I should have stated that the efficiency of the Army and Navy depended upon these Acts.

said, there was no doubt that the noble Marquess had used the words that the efficiency of the Army and Navy was bound up with these Acts. ["No, no!"] If the noble Marquess was not strong enough, he was sure the Judge Advocate General was in favour of this Bill. There wag no doubt the Judge Advocate General had given the House to understand that the efficiency of the Army and Navy could not be kept up without those Acts.

explained that what he did was to give the figures showing the extent to which the efficiency of the Army and Navy was affected by the operation of these Acts.

said, it appeared to him that the noble Marquess and the right hon. and learned Gentleman were anxious to imitate the course sometimes adopted by the Prime Minister with far greater skill, of informing the House that the expressions which fell from them were totally misunderstood. The noble Marquess did not seem to be aware that the Business to be discussed that night was the Navy Estimates; and, therefore, this was a most excellent night to bring on the topic on which the efficiency of the Army and Navy depended. His hon. Friend's Motion had had one result—that of enabling the House to hear the noble Marquess making two speeches—one speech the other night strongly in favour of the Acts, and one that night strongly against them. It was only another instance, to his mind, of the infinite squeezability of the Whigs, and also that the noble Marquess was one of those who, according to the President of the Board of trade, "neither toil nor spin," but who was, nevertheless, ready to swallow any amount of stuff which the Radical Caucus offered to him, and, rather than he should get into a row with the right hon. Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) and the Birmingham Caucus, the Army and Navy of England could go to ruin. He was prepared to maintain, that it was a snatch vote. He did not know that 99 per cent of hon. Members on the Opposition side of the House had the slightest idea that the Government would have taken the line they did. No intimation had been given that the Government were going to treat this as an open question; and he ventured to say that upon an administrative Act of such importance no Government was ever known to have adopted such a line as they did. What did the Prime Minister do? He retired from the House at 11 o'clock, having selected a respectable Conservative borough Member who would fill the office of pair; but, curiously enough, that pair had never appeared in the public journals. It was simply a snatch vote, and numbers of hon. Members would have come to the House to prevent it had they suspected the policy of the Government. Since that vote was taken the noble Marquess had said that it was useless to enforce the Acts because the House would not vote the money. But how did the noble Marquess know that, and why need he have been in such a hurry to show that he had no opinions of his own, but was influenced by Birmingham and the Caucus? The whole administration of the entire law depended on money voted by Parliament; and if an abstract Resolution were carried on matters relating to the Courts of Justice, would the Home Secretary suspend the action of the Courts on the ground that it was useless to ask for the money? It was monstrous that an abstract Resolution, carried by a snatch vote, should supersede the law of the land, without the other House of Parliament being consulted, and that the Government should abandon the law for fear of the right hon. Member for Halifax and his sentimental agitation. The fact was, and it was becoming clearer every day, that Her Majesty's Government had not the confidence of the House of Commons [Ironical Ministerial cheers.] All he could say was, that on the important question of faith and morals Her Majesty's Government had not the confidence of the House of Commons. How could they have the respect and confidence of the House, when they presented such a pitiable sight of administrative tergiversation?

said, there could be no doubt the House and the country had been taken by surprise. Public feeling in Winchester, where the Acts had been operation for many years, was strongly in their favour, and he had never heard a single complaint of the manner in which they had been enforced; and he knew, on the other hand, that they had been the means of restraining many women from entering on an immoral course of life. If each locality had its option in the matter, he ventured to say they would all adopt the Acts without exception. No doubt, they were passed originally for the protection of the Army and Navy; but they had also very greatly benefited the civil population of the places where they were carried out. He trusted that the Government would reconsider the matter, and would not allow the new Act to be so permissive as the House was at present told it was likely to be.

, however much he personally deplored the result of the recent division, would not at this moment offer any factious opposition to the course of the Government. In fact, he felt strongly convinced that the Government had acted only as they were impelled to do by the large majority of the House of Commons; and he must reserve any opinion he might have to offer for a future stage when the Estimates were under discussion.

said, that the speech of the Secretary of State for War made it almost imperative that the debate should be prolonged, because he had asked what was the object of taking the present course. The first object was to enter a strong protest against the action which had been taken, not in obedience to a decision of the House, but to a vote of 180 Members, many of whom differed in important points from one another. The result had been arrived at by surprise, and the current of the debate was almost wholly unexpected by those interested in the subject. It was scarcely possible, after hearing the speeches of the Judge Advocate General and the noble Marquess who was responsible for the efficiency of the Army, to expect that at the last moment they should hear a speech from the Chancellor of the Exchequer in which he tossed aside the opinions of all those of his Colleagues who were immediately responsible in the matter. The right hon. Gentleman's speech also pointed to a future occasion on which the de- liberate judgment of the House should be invited on the matter; he spoke of the Bill of 1872 as one which would have modified for the better the operation of the Acts; and he practically suggested that the effect of adopting the Amendment would be to give the House an opportunity of discussing the matter. If the statement in the Plymouth papers was correct, he could not understand this speech of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War. Unless that statement was deliberately untrue the Government had interfered with portions of the Act over which they had no jurisdiction at all. Great advantage in the administration of the Acts had been found in the employment of careful and responsible officers of the Metropolitan Police. Not a single instance of abuse had been discovered even by the vigilant opponents of the Acts; and yet the services of the officers of the Metropolitan Police were to be dispensed with, and in their place local police were to be employed, who might be subject to local influences, and exposed to imputations which would seriously interfere with the efficiency of the Acts. He ventured to say that not one of the 19 Members who were directly representative of these places would get up and say that he represented the opinion of even the substantial minority of his constituents by opposing these Acts. Speaking in the presence of his hon. Colleague (Mr. Stewart Macliver), he would say that the people of Plymouth, the ministers of religion, magistrates, and those who were charged with the administration of justice were all of one accord, to whatever political Party they belonged, as to the benefit of these Acts. The noble Marquess had said that the Acts had not been put on the Statute Book for the protection and orderly behaviour of the towns, but for the protection of the Army and Navy; but why should not both objects be effected? It was not because 180 Members, in a haphazard division upon an abstract Resolution, supported the Motion that Government should take the course they now proposed to do. If the case were to be brought forward again with due notice, the result would be very different. If it had been imagined that the Resolution would have produced the disastrous effect now contemplated, there would have been, not a majority in its favour, but a substantial majority against it. Therefore, as the Acts were on the Statute Book, it was the duty of the Government to carry them out until they were repealed. Parliament never intended to leave it at the will of a Secretary, or of two Secretaries, of State whether the Acts should be enforced or not. It was the duty of Her Majesty's Government to let the Acts stand, and the Estimates come before the House in the original form, and in that way to give the House an opportunity of expressing a definite opinion on the question.

said, the representation made by the last speaker with respect to the public feeling of Plymouth was quite correct. Without discussing the merits or the demerits of the Acts in the abstract, he would only say there was a large preponderance of opinion in favour of continuing them. He had just received a telegram from the Mayor of the town saying that at a meeting of magistrates an earnest protest had been made against the repeal of the Acts, and a hope expressed that he would support in the House the views of the meeting.

said, he felt compelled to make a few observations upon the subject before the House, as he represented the largest town (Portsmouth) affected by the Acts under consideration. He wished to know how it was that if the whole operation of these Acts hinged upon compulsory examination and the employment of the Metropolitan Police Force in the administration, the ordinary police were also employed? The real question, however, they had to consider was, whether Acts of Parliament which had been in force for 16 years should be abrogated by a Resolution which had not the support of more than one-third of the Members of the Whole House—Acts, the beneficial effects of which had been acknowledged, not only by the Judge Advocate General, but also by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Home Secretary. As regarded the Prime Minister—the real Prime Minister was the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain), in whose presence they could not say their souls were their own; but the right ton. Gentleman who was the nomi- nal Prime Minister retired from the House during the discussion, and left the question to drift where it might. He had received a letter from Admiral Chads, stating that, in that gallant officer's opinion, the abolition of compulsory examination would deprive the Acts of their efficiency; that the inhabitants of Portsmouth were convinced that the Acts had had a beneficial effect, and that the power entrusted to the police had not been abused. The operation of the Acts, it should be borne in mind, had resulted in the reclamation of many women. The Vicar of Portsmouth, a Liberal in politics, had deposed in evidence that, in 1877, 52 girls were sent to their homes from Portsmouth; in 1878, the same number were sent home; and in 1880, 44 were sent home, and 83 were sent to their friends. The noble Marquess and the First Lord of the Admiralty had issued orders for the immediate abolition of the operation of the Acts. Before that was done, he thought the Government might have passed the measure for the better protection of young persons. There had been precipitancy in this matter, for which it was difficult to account. The change in the action of the noble Marquess that night was most extraordinary. The noble Marquess always handled a question in a conscientious manner; but when he found that there was a majority against him he turned round in a way which was not statesmanlike, and which was unworthy of the high position which he filled. In the name of his constituency he protested against the precipitancy which the Government had shown in this matter.

said, he had no desire to enter into the merits or demerits of the subject; but he wished to protest against the precipitancy of the action of the Government. They had had Acts of very great importance in force for 16 or 17 years, and these Acts had been repeatedly discussed, not only in that House, but before Commissions and Committees, and had caused a good deal of sensation generally. Yet, acting upon a single vote given on a Resolution, the Government at once set aside the whole of the substantial part of those Acts. It did seem to him that, considering what an Act of Parliament was, how much thought was given to it, and how many opportunities had been devoted to the discussion of its details, a little more time, and care, and formality wore required than were afforded by the passing of a single Resolution. If the Government were of opinion that, in consequence of the recent vote, or in consequence of opinions of their own, it had become their duty to modify the law, they ought to have submitted a Bill to Parliament, or, at least, they should have submitted their Estimate for the administration of the Act as it was framed before the Resolution was passed. He thought it was a matter which ought to be noticed, not as regarded that particular subject, but as regarded the principle involved in the action of the Government in setting aside an Act of Parliament upon the mere passing of a Resolution of the House.

said, that the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman and of other Members had shown that there were considerations of great importance involved in this subject, not merely with regard to the merits of the Acts, but with regard to the conduct of the Government. He was anxious that the pledge given by the Government with regard to the discussion of the Estimates should not be frustrated; but points had been made in the discussion which he could not pass without notice. He felt, in the first place, that it was an exaggeration to describe the vote which the House had lately come to as a snatch vote. It had been said that the number of persons by whom this matter had been decided amounted to less than one-third of the strength of the House. He should like to know what number of questions, in the course of a Session, were decided by a greater number than one-third? In 19 out of 20 of the cases in which divisions took place—perhaps in 49 out of 50—the majority was not greater than the majority which had decided this question. Then it should be remembered that the Members who paired upon this subject, and who declared their opinion just as much as if they had voted, when added to the number of Members who did vote, brought that number up to a moiety of the whole House. The vote was not an insignificant one so far as the very considerable majority by which it was agreed to was concerned, nor was it an unexpected vote, for the question had been before the House for years. He would, therefore, dismiss from consideration any question as to this having been a snatched vote? With respect to local sentiment, which had been so strongly insisted upon, he did not at all doubt that the balance of opinion in those towns was in favour of the system that had existed; but it was a remarkable fact, if local sentiment was so overwhelming and so overpowering, that not more than one-half, or rather less than one-half—eight out of 17—of the Members representing these constituencies should have taken part in the division. That did not look like overpowering local sentiment. He did not deny the existence of local sentiment; but he could not agree that the Executive Government ought to be guided by that sentiment. With regard to the division of opinion in Her Majesty's Government, he was not aware that any Member of it held extreme views. For his part, he had not always voted against the Acts, nor had his noble Friend always voted in their favour. That the Government should be divided in opinion on an administrative question was, no doubt, a matter of considerable inconvenience; but some consideration ought to be shown them under the circumstances. It should be remembered that the majority of the Members of the present Cabinet were parties to a Bill which they introduced into the House, and which went the whole length of abolishing compulsory examination under these Acts. Therefore, it could hardly be a matter of surprise if some of the Ministry thought it necessary to act according to their opinions on this question. Most unfortunately, though from the very best motives—from the desire to prevent public discussion on a subject not fit for proper discussion—these Acts were passed almost without the knowledge of anyone. He was a Member of the Government at the time they were passed; but he did not know how they passed, or by whom they were carried through the House.

said, that the Acts were all referred to Select Committees.

said, that there was, at any rate, no discussion in the House and no collective Resolution of the Government upon the question, nor was there any opportunity of informing the public mind; and it was the obscurity with which the Bill was agreed to, combined with the extreme novelty of the subject, which had led to what was a very inconvenient state of things, and one which he hoped would not recur. It had been suggested that the Government should submit the Estimate as it was framed before the Motion was carried. Had the effect of that proposal been considered? Had it been considered that the Government, as a body, would have to do a collective act against doing which a number of the Members of the Government had voted, and which would reverse a decision of the House solemnly arrived at? If there was any one act done by a Government which was more a collective act than another, it was the submission to the House of Commons of the Estimates necessary to carry on the Services of the year.

observed, that in the debate on the Motion the noble Marquess had expressly told them that, if the Resolution passed, until an Act was brought in to repeal the Acts they they would continue to be carried out.

believed that it was perfectly true that the noble Marquess had said that. Undoubtedly, he described the general principles upon which the Government ought to act. But the application of those general principles must depend upon the particulars of the case. He thought that he had shown that, the submission of the Estimates being a collective act, the Government, if it had submitted the original Estimates to the House of Commons, would have been carrying out what Members of the Cabinet disapproved—the compulsory examination under the Acts—and would have been contradicting and reversing the decision of the House of Commons. The Government could take no such course. With regard to the notion that it was the duty of the Government to let everything go on until a Bill was passed altering the present law, what did that come to? His noble Friend had pointed out that the constructors of these Acts had deliberately and advisedly left it in the hands of the House of Commons to determine whether, year by year, Votes should be provided by means of which the Acts should be administered, or whether they should be withheld, the effect of which would be to reduce the law to a dead letter. That construction of the Acts did not express the will of the House of Commons, but of the Legislature, which had thus left the House of Commons to determine what course should be taken respecting the carrying out of the Acts. It must be taken that the Legislature intended that the operation of the Acts should depend upon the will and judgment of the House of Commons. He would admit, however, that the principle was not of universal application. The contention of the Opposition was that a Resolution having been passed by a large majority of the House, declaring against compulsory examination—a Resolution having been passed expressing the will of the House—the Government ought to have spent the money of the people in administering Acts condemned by that Resolution. [Mr. E. H. PAGET: Until you had brought in a Bill.] Until they had brought in a Bill, they were without the authority of Parliament to spend money raised by taxation from the people, for purposes directly condemned by a Resolution of the House of Commons. That was a doctrine in which he thought the hon. Gentleman had surpassed almost anything he had heard from that quarter of the House for a considerable time. The Government would be prepared, as soon as they could, to bring in a revised Estimate and submit it to the House. He believed they had a Vote of Credit for three months; but he was bound to say he thought it would be felt by all that a technical point of that nature ought never to avail against any matter of principle involved in the Estimates. That would be fatal to all Votes of Credit. Certainly it was the distinct and undivided opinion of the Government that they could not, without the authority of the House of Commons, spend this money in exercising a power made discretionary to them by the law. That, in their opinion, would be a course quite impossible. They were compelled to believe that the majority in favour of the Resolution expressed the view of the House of Commons. The hon. Gentleman said he was perfectly certain, if there had been full notice, and it had been supposed that the Government would take some strong course in reference to the Acts, the result would have been different. The fact was, full notice was given; and as to the course of the Government, why was it to be supposed that the President of the Board of Trade was the cause of it when the right hon. Gentleman was not a Member of the Government which, brought in the Bill of 1872? There had then been no manifestation against these Acts, and that Bill was acceptable to the friends and the opponents of the existing Acts. This was not a question of arresting the operation of the law simply because there was a vote of the House of Commons. The language of the law was that the Government might I make certain payments essential to the administration of the Acts; but it was admitted that it was not compulsorily made; and the centention of the hon. Members opposite was that the Government ought—in face of the Resolution passed by a large majority—not only to have proposed an Estimate, but ought to have continued the exercise of their discretion, which was dependent entirely on money which they had a right to believe the House would not vote, and also to exercise their discretion in the employment of officials whom they had a right to consider it certain the House of Commons would refuse to pay for. If it was the judgment of Parliament that this proposition was tenable—that such a course of conduct could be supported on Constitutional grounds—then the Government were wrong; but they believed that was an opinion which would not, and could not, be sustained on any side of the House.

I have listened from the first to the last of the right hon. Gentleman's speech (Mr. Gladstone's) with great attention, and never was more disappointed than I am now. I admit that he did perfectly right when he paired the other night and went away from the House. No one will grudge him taking all the rest in his power; but he is wrong when he says the House was perfectly aware of all the circumstances of the case, and knew that the Government were divided on this question.

I did not say the House knew.

If the right hon. Gentleman did not say so in so many words, he implied it. Until the Judge Advocate General rose in his place, no one knew the course the Government were going to take. It astonished the whole of the Conservative side of the House. Then the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War rose in his place and stated that the three Most responsible Ministers in the Cabinet, who had control of these matters—namely, himself, as representing the Army; the noble Earl in "another place," the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook), as representing the Navy; and the Home Secretary, were all in favour of these Acts, I say it was an extraordinary statement for the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Judge Advocate General to have to get up and say that the Government were divided on this question.

I did not say that. I said I had personally no mandate to speak for the Government.

We immediately inferred from that that the Government were divided upon the question. Whatever the right hon. and learned Gentleman may have meant, that was the way it was understood in the House. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has stated clearly that the Estimates are the collective view of the whole Government, and must be voted for by the whole Government. He also stated that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) had this Notice down on the Paper for weeks before it came on. But the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government must have known perfectly well that that Notice was upon the Paper when the Estimates were introduced into the House; and if the Government were divided in opinion regarding this subject, he ought to have been prepard to say that he would withdraw this particular Estimate, the Government having changed their mind regarding these Acts. Year by year the Estimate for carrying on these Acts has been brought in and passed with the entire consent of Her Majesty's Government; but what did they now find? The right hon. Gentleman, who was now Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Childers)—although when he was Secretary of State for War, and when this Estimate came on year by year and could be called in question every year, he was one of those who signified, by his vote and voice, that he approved of these Acts—got up the other night and said his view was that a certain portion should be carried out, but not the whole of them. This he did, although his noble Colleague (the Marquess of Hartington) declared that they were an absolute necessity to the Army. On such questions we have a right to expect that the Government should know its own mind; and if it is their opinion that those Acts ought not to be carried out, they ought to have the courage of their opinions, and tell us so. I go further than that, and say the House was taken by surprise, and that the right hon. Gentleman knows it was taken by surprise. I do not know whether there was a Whip out on the other side. Perhaps it was a very strong Whip, and perhaps it was a Government Whip; but we had no Whip whatever. We did not know the Government had altered their opinions; and we believed the law was perfectly safe in the hands of the Government, and that they would support what they had hitherto supported. Into the merits of these Acts I do not propose to go, except to say this—that I have had many communications on the subject, and I think the people over whom they are exercised are the best able to give an opinion on them. The Metropolitan Police, who have carried out these Acts, have done their duty with admirable discretion, and the Acts have been administered to the great benefit of the towns where they have been exercised. The right hon. Gentleman admitted that it was an evil precedent for the Government to be divided upon an administrative question of this kind. If it is an evil precedent, surely we have a right to know of the fact, and the Government ought to take the responsibility of getting these Acts repealed. Nothing of that kind has taken place. I admit that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) has always consistently advocated the repeal of these Acts; but we were never for a moment allowed to suspect that the Government, without going into the merits of the question, and merely because they believed a large section of their supporters would vote against them if they supported these Acts, would follow in the wake of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax, and without bringing in any Bill to repeal the Acts would stop their operation. The Prime Minister admitted the justice of the remark of an hon. Member. He said how much, more satisfactory it would be if we had only time to bring in a Bill—he admits that a Bill ought to be brought in—to repeal the Acts. But he cannot wait for this, he cannot even wait until the House of Commons has had the Estimate before it; he must at once withdraw the police, who alone are able to carry out the delicate provisions of these Acts. He thereby places, I venture to say, the Goverment in a false position before the House and before the country.

remarked, that it was by no means usual for a Government to give immediate effect to abstract Resolutions, and an example might be seen at once in the case of the proposal to establish 6d telegrams. When the Motion in that instance was carried, the Government did not at once promise to give effect to it, but agreed to bring in a Bill in due time. So, it was rather strange that the Government were putting this Resolution into force as soon as ever it was passed, instead of waiting to deal with the question in well-considered legislation.

said, that his constituents at Portsmouth were almost unanimously in favour of the Acts, and that opinion was hold most strongly by those who had the best moans of judging as to their effects. He was surprised that the Government should have taken advantage of a chance division practically to put an end to their operation.

said, he could not allow this debate to close without expressing his very deep regret that the Government had thought it right to take the particular course they had done. He deplored the necessity for measures of this kind; but he satisfied himself, before he would consent to administer them, that they were necessary, and conducive to the cause of religion and morality. He was convinced they had been most beneficial to the unfortunate women themselves. The mischief that had already been done by the action of the Government was of a most grave and serious character, and had produced feelings of consternation and alarm in the towns most interested. If the Government had come to the House and had said that, having based their Estimates on the faith of the continuance of an Act of Parliament, they would be bound to administer that Act until it had been repealed or modified, he be- lieved even the opponents of these laws would have been satisfied. There was yet time for the Government to reconsider the question, and he hoped they would give it their earnest attention.

said, he had read through the whole of the evidence which had been published as to the effect of the Acts, and he had come to the conclusion that they were absolutely essential to the welfare and morality of the districts to which they applied. Though, as a rule, an opponent to the principle of Local Option, that principle was rightly applicable to that case, as all the towns affected after long experience were strongly in favour of the Acts. The Resolution of the House was not equivalent to an Act of Parliament, and as long as an Act existed it ought to be enforced. Until an amending Bill was brought in and accepted, the Government were bound to administer the law as it stood, and to refuse to do so was to cease to become Ministers, and to place the Ministry above the law. It was not for the Home Secretary to shirk his duty by withdrawing the Metropolitan Police, who had acted with so much judgment that there had been only two ridiculous complaints, and these had collapsed on investigation. It was mere political cowardness to act as the Government had done, and he could not help saying that he considered their shilly-shally conduct in connection with those Acts most contemptible. [The hon. and learned Member was proceeding to comment upon the course taken by the Government in appropriating for Government Business a private Members' night, and thereby preventing a discussion from taking place upon the Vaccination Acts.]

The hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston) has moved the adjournment of the House for the purpose of calling attention to the Contagious Diseases Acts. The hon. and learned Member for Bridport (Mr. War-ton) is bound to confine himself to that question.

said, he was only seeking to explain himself, but he would bow to the ruling of the Chair.

observed, that if the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston) needed any justification for bringing forward the matter, it was to be found in the remark- able speech of the Prime Minister who, in taking up the cause of the repealers of the Acts, had selected from their armoury the weapons which they had been using of late years. It was surprising to him to hear it said that the original Act was passed sub silentio, seeing that the Bill was twice referred to Select Committees, and that there was afterwards a discussion in the House, followed by a division. However, now the main point was the attitude of the Government in the recent debate. The sense of the House was not taken, because the Opposition had no knowledge of what the views of the Government were. He desired to direct the attention of the Prime Minister to an answer he had given to a Question in the House, for that answer showed that the Judge Advocate General did represent the Government on the recent Committee. Having himself been a Member of the Government when the Committee was appointed, and being placed upon it as a Member of the Government, it was his duty to prepare the evidence and to see that the case of the three Departments —the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Home Office—was properly put before the Committee. If he had not conscientiously believed that the Acts were justifiable, he should not have taken that course, and he should have resigned his place on the Committee. In reply to a Question, the Prime Minister said that the Government were originally parties to the arrangement under which the First Commissioner of Works was placed upon the Committee, that in a certain sense he represented the Government, and in the same sense the Judge Advocate General represented the Government, for the purpose of assisting the proceedings of the Committee, but by no means in the sense of representing any official opinion, which the First Commissioner never represented. That might be true as regarded the First Commissioner, because he was on the Committee in 1879–80, and after the Dissolution and the change of Government, he was re-appointed, but the Judge Advocate General did represent the Government, and the evidence of I that was what he said and did, the course he pursued, and the efforts made to secure that the Departments were properly represented in the evidence which was adduced. After the Com- mittee had agreed to its Report, on the 19th July, the right hon. Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) brought forward his Motion for the repeal of the Acts; and in the debate the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that it would be the duty of Government to study the Report and the evidence, and to consider what course they would recommend the Government to adopt. That was nine months ago. What had the Government been doing since? Had they followed the course thus indicated? If they had intended to propose the repeal of the Acts, or what was tantamount to it, it was not their duty to take the House by surprise, as they did in the recent discussion. The right hon. Gentleman said that he had not changed his mind on the subject; but if that were so, he supposed it was the only subject on which he had not changed his mind. The other night there was a great banquet at the Aquarium, at which the future of the Liberal Party was discussed. ["Order!"]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is not confining himself to the question before the House.

observed, that he was going to make a citation from the speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle—that was to say, the new Member (Mr. John Morley)—in which he spoke of these Acts as being a connivance by the Government at a state of immorality. He wondered whether the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War agreed with that? He was unaware whether the noble Marquess was present at that banquet; but if it were true that the maintenance of these Acts had been a connivance at immorality, on the Benches opposite they would find those who were the connivers, and the greatest conniver of all was the Prime Minister, who had just left his place. The House was never more surprised than when the Judge Advocate General said he had no mandate to speak on behalf of the Government, and when it was afterwards stated that the Government treated this as an open question. The division was a snatch division and an unfair one, because they had no indication whatever what the Government were going to do. Under these circumstances, they had cleared the ground a good deal as regards the future. They had seen the Government halting between two opinions, and finally deciding to go against that which for the last 15 or 16 years had been acknowledged on all hands to have conferred the greatest possible benefits. It was high time that Members of the House should think a little more for themselves, and take care that the present Government did not set about the abrogation of some of those measures which had been of lasting benefit to society.

said, he wished to explain, as briefly as possible, what had been his position on the Select Committee, as that position had been somewhat misrepresented and misunderstood. In July, 1880, his right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State for War (Mr. Childers) had requested him to join the Committee, not for the purpose of officially representing the Government, but in order to watch its proceedings, and, if possible, assist in its investigations. His right hon. Friend at the time informed him of his own views on the subject, which were exactly those expressed in his speech the other night. But on the evidence which came before the Committee the case for the Acts appeared to him so overwhelming—on this point he could not retract a word which he had uttered in his former speech—that he was forced to bend to it, and he so informed his right hon. Friend, and even requested him to relieve him from the duty of further attendance on the Committee. And it was only on the express understanding that he was to be left perfectly free and unfettered that he consented to remain a Member of it.

, in rising to call attention to the state and condition of the Iron-clad Navy, said: The subject I have to bring before the Committee is one of the most important that can occupy the attention of Parliament; but, seeing that this is the dinner hour, I cannot expect to have a large audience, especially as the question is not one at this moment of an exciting character. The question also wants something else to attract the attention of the House of Commons. It lacks the flavour of that bitter political partisanship which alone fills the Benches of this House. Although my indictment in regard to the Navy must be addressed to the Members of the present Board of Admiralty, yet I shall have, in the course of my task, to comment upon the action, of those by whom the present Board were preceded in Office. I wish at once, before entering into the subject, to state that I have no wish to make any remarks that may be considered personally offensive to any Member of the Admiralty in this House or to any Member of the Board of Admiralty at Whitehall. Having taken now for the last 14 years a great interest in everything connected with Naval Administration, I feel myself compelled not to allow the Statement made the other day by the Secretary to the Admiralty to pass unchallenged. I consider the statement made by the Secretary to the Admiralty on that occasion to be of the most unsatisfactory character I ever heard from any Representative of the Board of Admiralty in this House. The Secretary to the Admiralty, it is true, talked of "maintaining our position, and securing our maritime supremacy;" but while he expressed his confidence in this respect, he does not give us any of the data on which he bases his confidence in our maintaining our position and securing our maritime supremacy. They were nothing more than relative terms. If I should be able to show to-night that at the end of 1883 England would have 41 iron-clads built and building, and if, happily, the Secretary to the Admiralty could get up and tell us that the French Government would have only 21 built and building at the same period, then, indeed, our maritime supremacy would be assured, and I should not be standing here to-night. But if I can show, as I hope to do, that at the end of 1883 the English Government will have 41 iron-clads built and building, and that the French Government will have 37 built and building, then the Secretary to the Admiralty, in coming down to the House and talking about our maritime supremacy being secured, makes use of a mere phrase, calculated greatly to mislead the public. It has always been held that our English Navy should be double the Navy of France, and that it should be able to cope, under any circumstances, with any possible or probable combination. The other day I saw a letter in a newspaper from a gallant Admiral—Admiral Elliot—who puts that matter much more clearly than I can; who describes what our position would be if the French Fleet was ever allowed to get into a position of superiority, and who points out that in such an event we are bound to lose either the command of the Channel or of the Mediterranean. I have spoken of the apathy which prevails in the House of Commons. I do not at this moment even see any Dockyard Member present. That apathy arises, I believe, from the over-confidence which the English nation possesses in the strength of the Fleet. "Rule, Britannia!" is still for them one of the shibboleths of their existence, and they do not believe that anything can shake the truth of that patriotic song. Unfortunately for that feeling we know that the same spirit of confidence prevailed in 1870, in a country which is a near neighbours of ours—namely, France. I have the authority of a very distinguished Friend of mine—(Dr. Russell)—for saying that when he went over to Paris on his way to become a War Correspondent in connection with the Prussian Army, he was met with questions on all hands, not as to whether the French would be beaten by the Prussians, but how long it would take for the French Army to get to the Rhine, the places they would occupy when they crossed it, and the terms on which they would occupy Berlin. Indeed, the French went so far as to ask whether there was any Prussian Army at all against whom they had to compete. They had the same overweening confidence in their Army as we have now in our Navy. Although, no doubt, confidence is much better than half-heartedness, it is not impossible that confidence may be too far strained when it comes to be looked to in connection with that Service on which our national life depends. In the early part of this century, the late Duke of Wellington laid it clown as a necessity that the English Fleet should be double that of the French, or of any other nation. At that time there was very little danger of competition. France had no Navy of consequence to combine against us. Our ships were as good, and our guns were as good, as those of France and Spain, whilst our sailors and the personnel of the Navy—our blue-jackets—were infinitely superior to those of any other country in the world in gallantry, in discipline, in seamanship, and in all those characteristics which ensure success. I am, therefore, surprised and exceedingly sorry to hear the dictum uttered by one whose words on this subject at this time must command great attention—the highest Admiralty authority in the country—in which he said that the Navy of the future will not depend so much on the number of ships as upon the discipline, daring, gallantry, and. other high qualities of our seaman. Now, I cannot help thinking that the noble Lord who made that assertion must be aware that from the nature of our modern iron-clads those high qualities of the British seamen are less and less called into action every day that we live. The iron-clads of to-day and of the future will not depend so much on our blue-jackets, I regret to say, as upon gunners and stokers. The sailing power of our battle ships is daily and hourly disappearing. The result of all this is, that whereas in our old wars, at the beginning of the century, we had a great superiority both in the number of our ships and in the quality of out guns, and an enormous pre-eminence in the quality of the personnel of our Navy, at the present moment we are losing, of have lost, that superiority in the number of our ships; and the great qualities of the British seamen, on which we formerly depended, are of less and less account every year. In considering the condition of our Fleet, I will simply call the attention of the Committee to a statement made by a gallant Admiral—Sir Edward Fanshawe. He tells us that in 1805 England had 88 line-of-battle ships in commission, while the French had 37, and the Spanish, 24. But such little reliance could be placed on the whole of our Fleet—owing to the necessity for providing for the defence of our Colonies and of our trade—that Sir Edward. Fanshawe tells us that at that time, when our Colonies were less numerous, and less widely scattered than now, and when our commerce was not one-hun-dreth part of what it is to-day, out of 83 line-of-battle ships we could only bring 27 ships into action at the decisive battle of Trafalgar against 33 ships of France and Spain combined, the remaining 58 ships being engaged all over the world in defending our commerce and our Colonies. I have no wish to weary the Committee; but I should like to give some slight idea of what the commerce is which our Navy has to protect. The gross steam tonnage in the world amounted, in 1881, to 6,700,000 tons,of which 4,200,000 tons was British, 630,000 tons American; whereas that of France—whose Navy is now closely approaching our own—is only 420,000 tons, or one-tenth of ours. The value of British shipping at that time amounted to £100,000,000; and the value of British commerce now to be protected, should war take place, amounts to the gigantic sum of £800,000,000 or £900,000,000 sterling. In fact, upwards of 70 per cent of the sea-carrying trade of the world is carried on in English ships. Therefore, I am here tonight to tell the Government that they should increase our Navy, and take some further steps than they have hitherto thought it right to take in order to ensure that command of the sea, which is necessary, I might almost say, for our daily bread. If I have the temerity to urge this upon the Admiralty to-night, I think the figures I have given in regard to our commerce, shows some slight reason for the action I am taking. The Secretary to the Admiralty, I have no doubt, will tell me, as his Predecessors have told me before, that it is very unpleasant and unwise to wound the susceptibilities of foreign nations, and to alarm them; but that is a very one-sided view of the case. Now, I do not think that foreign nations care a farthing about wounding our susceptibilities or of alarming us, because they go on year after year spending enormous sums of money for the purpose of building up gigantic Navies, when they have neither commerce nor Colonies, to speak of, to defend. There is another reason why I wish the Admiralty to look the matter in the face, and to make some further additions to the Navy. In olden days the cost of a line-of-battle ship, and the time required to build her, wore not a third of what it takes now to build an iron-clad line-of-battle ship of the present day. Further than that, in the olden days, there was always due notice of a war coming on. Wars did not then come upon the country suddenly, as they do in these days. In those days wars and diplomatic relations were spoken of and coming on for days, and months, and years, during which time England, with her vast resorces, could build what line-of-battle ships she thought necessary. But in these days no Member of the present Board of Admiralty, nor my right hon. Friend the Member for Westminster (Mr. W. H. Smith), who sits by my side, need be told that war, like a man's hand, first appears in the horizon scarcely a speck, and then breaks out all over Europe in a war involving us in one of those panics which lead to a ruinous and profitless expenditure of money, and induce us to add to the Navy ships which at other times we should be ashamed of. I say, therefore, that maritime supremacy is a relative term, and that we cannot tell whether we have ensured our maritime supremacy. We cannot tell whether we are maintaining our position as mistress of the seas, unless we look round and see what our foreign neighbours are about. It is for that reason I have taken upon myself the task—perhaps the obloquy—of drawing the attention of the Committee to what is going on around us in foreign countries. I am not going to weary the Committee by going into details as to the Russian preparations that are now going on so rapidly for the reviving of her Navy. I will not more than allude to the enormous and expensive fleet of torpedo boats which the United States are building. I will not even touch upon the smaller Powers, which now appear to think they cannot be looked upon as Powers at all unless they can more or less provide themselves with an Iron-clad Fleet. What I wish to do is to draw the attention of the Committee to nations nearer home, and especially to nations whose greatness, whose ambition, whoso geographical position, induces, and I will say entitles, them to think they ought to have a voice in the settlement of every great European question. First among these great nations is Germany. Since 1876 she has added 12 iron-clads to her Fleet. In 1871 she passed an Act of compulsory enlistment for that Navy, so that whenever it is required there is the material to man the Fleet at once; and now she has just given an order for a fleet of most powerful torpedo cruisers—steel cruisers, armed with the heaviest guns. I come next to a country which was thought not to be in. such a condition of financial prosperity that she was likely to be induced to expend any large sum of money. On this point I have obtained my information from a Spanish newspaper, which relates what took place in the Chamber of Madrid. We are told that in Spain the new Minister of Marine is about to ask the country to raise a loan of £16,000,000 sterling, which is to be applied to what he is pleased to call the re-organization of her Navy. The scheme of the Minister of Marine is to apply this money in making a very large and powerful addition to the personnel of her Navy. It is to be expended in the purchase of iron-clads, torpedoes, in the fortification of her arsenals, and her forts, and, above all, in the purchase of guns of the most modern type and of 40 and 80 tons calibre. These guns, we are told, are to be put up at Ceuta, Tarifa, and Algesiras, and other places; and, to use the words of the Minister of Marine, they are to be mounted in such positions as will best and most effectively command the Straits of Gibraltar. Now, I am not afraid of Spain, and I do not suppose that any Member of this House is afraid of Spain; but I only mention these facts to show the feeling that exists all over Europe, and how every country of the world, except England, is taking steps to defend herself in case of war. The third country I will mention is one which affords, certainly, one of the most extraordinary instances in modern history—namely, the rapidity with which Italy has placed herself in the front rank of European Powers by her marvellously rapid creation of a most powerful Iron-clad Navy. In 1875 the Italian Government applied themselves to the re-organization of the Navy. That re-organization was to consist of seven monster iron-clads, armed with guns 39 feet long in citadels. Two of them are already in commission, while two others are in a forward state of progress, their engines having been ordered of Messrs. Maudsley, in England, while the composite iron plates necessary for her armour are in the hands of Messrs. Cammel, of Sheffield. The Italian Fleet, I may remind the Committee, is numerous besides these vessels. I come now to the nation which is most in my mind, and the last I am going to mention tonight—namely, France. No one will deny—not even Her Majesty's Government will deny—that France has made, not only rapid, but gigantic strides of late years in the creation of a Navy. That very Blue Book of Estimates now lying on the knees of my hon. Friend the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Sir Thomas Brassey) tells us of the strides which the French Government have made. In 1870, after their crushing defeat by Germany, they had no ships and no Navy at all. What have they now? They have a Navy worthy of the consideration of the British Admiralty and of my hon. Friend the Civil Lord of the Admiralty. I have not the slightest wish to exaggerate the strength of the French Navy, and still less to underrate the strength of our own Navy. Eighteen months ago I first brought to light these French ships and the rapid progress being made by France. Since that time many and most exaggerated statements as to the strength of the French Navy have appeared, partly through ignorance, and partly fostered by the extraordinary reticence of the Admiralty authorities, I have no wish whatever to exaggerate the strength of the French Navy. What I desire to-night is to lay before the Committee, in a calm and dispassionate review, an actual resumé of what the Navy is and will be of our most powerful and most restless neighbour. Before I go into the question of a comparison between the French and English Navies, I should like to say a few words explanatory of my meaning in this matter. We are often in the habit of hearing a good deal of talk about tonnage. Now, one sort of tonnage is one thing, and another sort of tonnage is another. I do not think there prevails in the public mind a sufficiently clear idea of how far one system of tonnage goes, and where the other stops. There are two kinds of tonnage, and I will sketch out what is really meant by tonnage. One kind of tonnage is called a tonnage of displacement— that is to say, the ships with engines, coals, guns, provisions, and everything on board. Then there is another kind of tonnage, which merely consists of the weight of the hull, and is merely the shell of the ship. The former—the tonnage of displacement— if I am not wrong, and I see the eye of my hon. Friend who was my first instructor in naval matters upon me—the tonnage of displacement is generally half as much again as the tonnage weight of hull. I have taken down two ships from the Estimates this year. Ono is the Conqueror, and the Conqueror's complete tonnage of displacement is 6,200 tons, whereas her tonnage weight of hull is only 4,200 tons. The other ship is the Rodney. The Rodney's tonnage of displacement is 9,600 tons, and her weight of hull only 6,005 tons. But in order to make it quite clear, and to assure the Committee that I wish to be perfectly impartial in the matter in any of the weights I give in regard to French ships, I have reduced the French Ships to a corresponding weight of hull; so that when I speak of an English ship and a French ship, both are calculated upon the weight of hull. Having stated that, I have no desire to exaggerate the condition of the Navy, and having informed the Committee upon what principle I intend to take the tonnage, I will now go on with my comparison between the English and French Navy, In the year 1882, on the 16th of March, the hon. Gentleman who was then Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan), and who has since distinguished himself so much by the ability with which he has discharged the duties of Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, made his statement upon the Navy Estimates in this House. The hon. Gentleman told us that he was going to lay down four ironclads. I remember well that my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Wigtown Burghs (Sir John Hay) said that, after all, they would see that the Government were awake to their position, and that they were going to have four ironclads laid down. But let us see what these ironclads were. There was, first of all, the Howe, which was certainly not to have an alarming advance made upon her, seeing that it was only 13 per cent. Next came the Renbow, which, although she had been put out to contract, was only to be advanced 7 per cent. The Camperdown was to be advanced 3½ per cent, and the fourth ship, that redoubtable ship, the Anson, was to be advanced 0·3 per cent. At that time I ventured to say to the Committee that I looked upon the Anson and its advance of 0·3 per cent as nothing more than a paper ship. The year has now gone round, and the keel of the Anson is not yet laid. Then let us see what, for the same period, the French Government were going to do. I may mention that, in the case of both countries, in the year 1882–3, the Government promised to lay down four ironclads. Before I go on to compare the state of things in this country with the French programme, I should like to make another remark, because I am quite sure that many Members of the Committee will not know that whereas the English financial year goes from the month of April until April in the next year—or from April, 1882, to April, 1883—the French financial year runs from January, 1882, to December, 1882. Therefore, whatever work the French Government had to do in the financial year corresponding with ours, they had three months advantage of us, which in these days of sudden wars and troubles is a very great advantage. The French programme for the year 1882, corresponding to that brought in by the present Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, consisted of four first class barbette ships of 10,000 tons each, armed with very heavy breech-loaders of modern type, which were to be ready when the ships were ready to take them on board. Now, upon that point I must dwell for a moment or two. In April, 1882·3, the English Government, proposed to advance the Howe 13 per cent, the Benbow 7 per cent, the Camperdown 3½ per cent, and the unhappy Anson 0·3 per cent, but which faded into nothing. The French Government, in 1882, proposed to advance four large barbette iron-clad ships —the Magenta, 14·5 per cent, the Neptune, 16½ per cent, the Hoche, 17½ per cent, and the Marçeau, 30 per cent; so that the least advance of a French ship at that time was more than the greatest advance proposed to be made in any of our four ships by 1½ per cent. I should like to go a step further, and to point out the condition of the Estimates in regard to these ships in that year. The Estimates, as I have already said, were brought in with signal ability the other night by the hon. Gentleman the Secre- tary to the Admiralty, and the hon. Gentleman boasted to the House of the large increase which was going to be made in the iron-clad tonnage over that proposed by his Colleague (Mr. Trevelyan). He said that his Colleague only proposed 11,400 tons, whereas he was going to add 13,200 tons; but in the very next sentence the Secretary to the Admiralty, with a näivete, which I fully commend, said, "I think it is only fair to say that in these 13,200, I include two protected ships"—which, in my opinion, had no right to be called ironclads at all. As these two ships were to be advanced 1,000 tons, it is necessary, therefore, to strike them off the magnificent programme of 13,200 tons, which reduces it to 12,200 this year, against 11,400 proposed by the hon. Gentleman's Predecessor, or an actual increase of 800 tons. I feel bound to say another word upon this subject; and I will ask the Committee to look at the French Estimates for this year, because it is only fair to say that everything connected with tonnage at all is an estimate. The Secretary to the Admiralty estimates that he will add to the Navy 12,200 tons of iron-clad ships in the course of the year. The French Secretary to the Admiralty, or the Minister of Marine, estimates that in a period, which will end three months before ours, he will add no less than 17,200 tons to the French Navy, or 4,000 tons in excess of that which was proposed to the House of Commons with such a splendid flourish of trumpets by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty. I once had the honour to be connected with the administration of the affairs of the most powerful Service of the world —namely, the Royal Navy of England?—and, therefore, I am perfectly aware that these Estimates are only Estimates, and that neither the English Estimates of 12,200 tons, nor the French Estimates of 17,200 tons, maybe realized. Having said that, it will be well to examine what really the probabilities are of the one programme being carried out or the other; and I am fortunately able to place my case before the Committee both upon the British and the French Estimates. In the English Dockyards we have 18,000 men employed, whilst in the French Dockyards there are 23,000. England is building one ship by contract—the Benbow: France is building three large iron-clads by contract—the Marçeau, the Requin, and the Neptune. Well, then, France has 28,000 men, and we have only 18,000; and what are our 18,000 men to do? Have they not a large demand upon their time, which does not exist in the French Dockyards, for the repair and refitting of various ships as they come home? I shall have more to say about repairs later on; but if the Committee will realize for one moment that we have only 18,000 Dockyardmen, and that France employs 23,000; that we have one ship building by contract, and that they have three; and that our Dockyard-men are, every year, more and more wanted for repairs and refits, while France has very few ships to repair or refit, they will be able to form a very good estimate as to which of the two programmes is most likely to be fulfilled in the course of the year. I will endeavour to make our position a little clearer. I hope I am not wearying the Committee too much; but I may say that, during the two years from April, 1882, to April, 1884, England will have laid down four first-class iron-clads; while from January, 1882, to January, 1884, the French will have laid down seven first-class iron-clads. In April, 1884, there are four English ships, which may be advanced 4,500 tons; in December, 1883, seven French ships will have been advanced 10,000 tons. Now, Sir, I have something more to say than that. If the French programme of the year does not really produce this advance on those seven ships, and which, as far as I can make out from the Estimates laid on the Table a few weeks ago in Paris, has not been maintained on the four ships which were to have been advanced by the end of the year 1882, so also the advance on our ships has not been maintained. It is alleged that the amount expended on the advance of these four ships—the Hoche, the Magenta, the Neptune, and the Marçeau—has not been equal to the Estimate. But what have the French done instead? They have laid down, or are about to lay down, two large iron-clads, one called the Brennus and the other the Charles Martel; and not only that, but they are going to lay down eight large armoured gun vessels, possessing great speed, I presume, because I see the engines are to be of the same power as those in the large iron-clads. Therefore, when we talk about the French programme and the English programme, it simply comes to this—that whilst the English Government have, this year, what I must call dished up the Anson as the only iron-clad we are to have new this year —and dished up I call it, because the Anson was approved in the Estimates proposed by the present Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant—this year the Government give us in their programme only one iron-clad and two protected ships; whereas the French set forth in their programme two large iron-clads and eight armoured vessels of great power and speed. At the end of 1883, as far as my calculation goes—and I have tried all I can to be correct in this matter—England will have building and completing 11 first-class iron-clads; whereas France will have 17 at the same period. At the risk of wearying the Committee, and in order to prove the accuracy of my statement—in regard to which I challenge contradiction-—I will, with the permission of the Committee, run over the names of these iron-clads. The 11 English iron-clads building and completing at the end of 1883 are the Colossus, the Conqueror, the Edinburgh, the Howe, the Impérieuse, the Warspite, the Rodney, the Anson, the Camperdoun, the Collingwood, and the Benbow. The French ships estimated to be built by September 1, 1883, are the Amiral Baudin, the Neptune, the new ditto, the Formidable, the Indomptable, the Hoche, the Brennus, the Magenta, the Charles Martel, the Marçeau, the Furieux, the Terrible, the Cuïman, the Requin, the Vauban, the Du Guesclin, and the Tonnant, plus eight armoured gun vessels and four torpedo vessels. I have a very great dislike to disagree with anyone, and it is a very great pleasure to me when I can find myself at one with my Hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty. On this particular occasion, if the programme I have just read out—? that programme in which the poor Anson is again dished up—is made to do duty against this formidable list of French ships, I am certainly at one with the Secretary to the Admiralty; because I am satisfied there is no one in this House, let him sit on whatever side he may—there is no naval officer on half pay or full pay, wherever he may be stationed, who will not agree with me in feeling that the Secretary to the Admiralty, on the night he made his Statement, made an assertion which no one could differ from, when he announced, to use his own words, that the policy of the Earl of Northbrook was neither of a startling nor an ambitious character. Anything less startling, anything less ambitious for an English Minister of Marine to present to Parliament, I do not think any House of Commons ever heard. But the worst of all this is that, miserable as this programme is, there is something still more disquieting —namely, that even these promises are never carried out—that is to say, that in the last 10 years only on two occasions have the promises of the Board of Admiralty been fulfilled. During the greater part of my political life I have had the privilege of sitting here, and upon one occasion it was my duty to answer the Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, at the request of my late lamented Friend the Earl of Beaconsfield. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) came down and made one of the best speeches he ever made, and in that speech he proposed to build a largely increased amount of tonnage, without providing for an increase in the number of Dockyard workmen to carry out his scheme. I warned the right hon. Gentleman that he would not carry his programme out unless he was a conjuror. A year passed by, and the hon. Gentleman again came down with his Estimates, and he said, with perfect frankness—"I must admit that the noble Lord the Member for Chichester was correct." Sir, I am no conjuror; but I knew that it was impossible to carry out that programme. I am deeply indebted to the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty for one part of his speech the other day. He gave the House a most excellent example of how utterly these programmes are unfulfilled, and how little the Admiralty authorities know whether they are fulfilled or not. On that occasion the Secretary to the Admiralty, with the greatest bonhommie and desire to please and interest the House and the public, told us that a certain amount of iron-clad tonnage had been added to the Navy since the years 1877, 1878, and 1879. Now, the corrections I desire to make in the Secretary to the Admiralty's figures are simply drawn from the Navy Estimates, laid on the Table by the hon. Gentleman himself. In 1878–9, said the Secretary to the Admiralty, 8,430 tons were added to the Navy; but according to the Navy Estimates it was only 4,506 tons. In 1879–80 the hon. Gentleman says that 7,327 tons were added; but according to the Navy Estimates only 5,314 tons were added. In 1880–1 the calculation of the Secretary to the Admiralty is that 9,235 tons were built; but I cannot find that more than 7,833 tons were built in that year. In the year 1881–2, according to the statement of the hon. Gentleman, 10,748 tons were built; but according to the Navy Estimates only 9,802 tons wore built. In 1882–3 the hon. Gentleman says that 11,460 tons were built; whereas, according to the Navy Estimates, only 9,733 tons were built. The total number of tons, according to the hon. Gentleman, was 47,206: whereas the actual number of tons was 37,188, making a difference of 10,018 tons.

Does the noble Lord include the ships built by contract in the total amount of tonnage built and added to the Navy in those years? I believe the figures are given in the Expense Account.

Oh, yes; and I shall have something to say about the Expense Account by-and-bye. The Estimates laid on the Table this very year, compared with those introduced by the Secretary to the Admiralty, show a diminution in the tonnage building over the tonnage promised of no less than 1,235 tons of iron-clad shipping; while in one case alone—that of the Benbow, which is a ship building by contract—there is a deficit of 285 tons out of the small amount of 450 tons ordered and promised to Parliament this year. Therefore, this shipbuilding by contract in this year, 1882–3, was out by nearly one-half of the tonnage promised. The hon. Gentleman was good enough to remind me of the Expense Account; and, in passing, I must say that the hon. Gentleman has not been very much disposed to give me information, because when he based one of the great arguments in his speech upon the Report of a Committee superintended by Mr. Hamilton, he based his arguments on the Report of an Admiralty Committee, which, when hon. Members asked for it, so that they might see if there were two sides to it, as there are two sides to everything, they were told that it was a confidential Report, and could not be given up. Now, only twice in the last 10 years has the Dockyard iron-clad building been maintained in anything like the tonnage promised. In 1873–4 there was a deficiency of 2,513 tons; in 1875–6 there was a deficiency of 268 tons; in 1876–7 of 490 tons; in 1877–8, 3,766 tons; and in 1878–9 of 5,325 tons. Now, on that point I wish to say a word. That was the time when the Admiralty was presided over by my right hon. Friend near me (Mr. W. H. Smith), and the late Secretary to the Admiralty made some capital out of that fact last year, when he was addressing public meetings in the country. He said—"Why, you see, we have ordered so many iron-clad vessels, and the late Government also ordered a certain number; but the late Government took only a small sum for that purpose, whereas we have taken a large one." Now, I say that the failure of tonnage, while my right hon. Friend was in Office, was creditable to his feeling of patriotism, and to the proper motives of economy by which he was actuated, because I know that at that time the most elaborate and the most crucial trials were going on to test the penetrating power of armour, and the question was being considered whether it was better to have plain armour plates or plates combined of steel and cast-iron. Until that vexed and most anxious question was properly settled by my right hon. Friend, he was perfectly right not to put money into the Estimates for buying armour-plates which might prove to be useless. Now, I thought, when I found that in 10 years there was actually a deficiency of iron-clad tonnages to the extent of 15,160 tons, that I had got at the bottom of the case; but I was very much mistaken—indeed, I was confronted at that period by a most remarkable Report from a most eminent man, whose authority, ability, patriotism, and intelligence, no Member of the present or of the late Board of Admiralty will dare to question. It is a Report of Mr. Hamilton, who was at that time the Accountant General of the Navy, and whose services have since been found to be so valuable and useful, that the Government have attached him permanently to the Secretariat of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Now, what does Mr. Hamilton say? He discloses the fact that from 1869–70 to 1879–80 there was a deficiency of iron-clad tonnage added to the Navy of 9,409 tons beyond the deficiency admitted in the Navy Estimates. As that is rather a startling statement to make, perhaps I shall be excused if I read the two lines in which it is contained. Mr. Hamilton says—

"The total number of tons calculated to have been added during the period from 1869–70 to 1879–80 was 206,545 tons, which, compared with the quantity provided for in the Estimates, leaves a net deficiency of 13,165 tons."

As regards armoured vessels, an endeavour has been made to compare and calculate the quantity promised with the actual additions to the Navy during this period, with the result that a further deficiency has been discovered, which amounts to 5,409 tons. In other words, while it has been calculated that during the last seven years, 83,770 tons of new armoured vessels have been added to the Fleet, and the money has been formally voted for this purpose, it has only been found possible to add in actual vessels 74,361 tons. I regret to say that the same deficiency is still going on, and the inquiries I have made have all been made upon the Navy Estimates themselves. I find that, not content with the deficiency of 13,165 tons of which I have spoken, and taking only the 10 years, without going as far back as Mr. Hamilton's Report—namely, from 1872–3 to 1882–3—there is a further deficiency of nearly 7,000 tons more, making together 21,665 tons of deficiency in the iron-clad tonnage given by the Dockyards of the country to the Queen's Navy in 10 years. And what does that represent? It represents in weight of hull at least five ships of the Conqueror type, of which the Queen's Navy has been deprived. The Secretary to the Admiralty has a right to ask me how I arrived at this conclusion. Now, a ship, after all, can only be of a certain size; I have looked down the list of ships added to the Navy, and I find that the amount is 65,556 tons during those years. In that I do not include the Northampton or the Nelson, which, although useful ships, can hardly be included in the ironclad ships of the Navy. To summarize matters, there have been in the last 10 years, 88,471 tons ordered by Parlia- ment. The Admiralty, in their Estimates, have taken credit for 73,307 tons—that is, that the Admiralty admit a deficiency of 15,146 tons. On looking over the various ships which are being built, and which have been built, and going on the principle that no more can be put into a vessel than her actual size, which is an incontrovertable fact, I find that the amount actually built is 66,806 tons; and that is the way in which I get at the real deficiency of 21,665 tons, or, as I have said, five line-of-battle ships of the Conqueror type. I make no charge against anyone. But I think it is time that the country should be made aware of what is going on, and that we should not be told that we are perfectly safe; that our iron-clads are going on well; that we are adding a large number of tons every year; that one Secretary to the Admiralty is adding more than another Secretary; that the supremacy of the country is quite secure; and that there is no chance of our dreams being disturbed. I think I am only doing my duty, as an independent Member of Parliament, when I disclose facts which nobody can controvert. And now I pass to another part of the subject, and one in regard to which I have always felt very strongly, and which enters very largely into the argument of my speech to-night. My objection is that the Ironclad Navy of the country is always, owing to Treasury supervision, and perhaps to a wish to flatter the vanity of the Prime Minister of the day, if he wishes to have a good Budget, kept under the mark. These are facts which nobody can controvert. We have heard a good deal about thrifty administration; but I do not call that so which, at a moment when there is a cloud of danger, lands us in a violent panic, in consequence of which bad ships are obtained at a ruinous expenditure. When the war broke out between France and Germany, and an European war was threatened, we were seized, in the month of August, with a violent panic. Our Navy was not sufficiently strong to protect the interests of the country in the Mediterranean, if the war was to take a wider range; and the consequence was that the Minister came' down and asked for a Vote of Credit of £2,000,000 to increase largely the personnel of the Army and the stores of the Army, £500,000 being handed over to the Navy. I should like to show—and I hope the Committee will allow me to tell them—what happened in regard to that £500,000. That £500,000 went, in a great measure, towards building what were by courtesy called four coast defence ships—the Hydra, the Hecate, the Gorgon, and the Cyclops. Now, the Cyclops cost £154,026; the Gorgon, £138,567; the Hecate, £140,593; and the Hydra, £141,372, making a total for those four coast defence ships of £574,658. These ships, very naturally, did not meet with the approval of the Admiralty or the Naval Authorities, and accordingly a Committee, presided over by Admiral Ryder, was appointed to report upon them, the conclusion arrived at being that the vessels which had cost £600,000 were not safe to go even from one port to another, except in very fine weather. Now, Sir, I think that was a wretched mistake. To keep your Iron-clad Fleet below its proper strength until there comes a time of danger, and then, telling Europe that you are not strong enough, to rush in and buy four ships at a very heavy cost by way of defending your coasts, that are only fit to move in fine weather, is, in my opinion, a penny-wise and pound-foolish policy, that no Admiralty in the world but ours would be guilty of. In saying this, I feel sure I shall have the cordial support of my hon. Friend opposite. It was said that the sum of £15,000 or £20,000 additional was about to be spent in altering the Hecate. I have not heard whether that alteration has been made. [Mr. CAMPBEIX-BANNER-MAN: It has not been made.] Then, I would ask my hon. Friend when it will be commenced; and whether the contemplated alteration is of a character that would lead us to suppose that a similar additional sum will have to be spent upon the three remaining ships of the same class? The next panic followed eight years after the time I have just referred to—in 1878–9—when a victorious Russian Army was marching on Constantinople, and when my right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith) was First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Earl of Beaconsfield Prime Minister. That was a grave state of affairs; but it was still more grave that the Authorities of the day had no confidence in our Navy being strong enough to resist any combination which might be brought against it. What was done? Four ships, the Superb, Orion, Belleisle, and Neptune— ready-made ships—that had been ordered and made for other Governments, were bought at a very large cost. Now, ready-made articles are never likely to be as good as those made to order, and certainly not so in the case of such a complicated machine as a modern ironclad. I do not blame the Government of that day any more than I blame the Liberal Government of 1870 for coming down and doing what they could to provide for the deficiencies of the Navy; but, Sir, I do object to what I think the mad policy—the parsimonious views—that for many years kept down our Navy to so low an ebb in order to save money, and which, as soon as a cloud arose over Europe, obliged us to go and add to our Navy four ships of the kind I have described. I am told that the Orion rolls even in harbour, and that when out of harbour her normal condition is to roll 28 degrees in a smooth sea. The Committee will be familiar with the voyage from the coast of Ireland made by the Belleisle, the only iron-clad we had at the time on this side of Gibraltar to defend our coasts. I will not, however, go into details. But what is the history of the Neptune, a vessel which, no doubt, is of good design, because it was designed by my hon. Friend who sits opposite? The Neptune was bought for £614.000, because she was ready to go to sea at a moment's notice; He has stores, fittings, guns—Whitworth guns, by the way—engines, and even provisions on board. That was in 1878; but from that time the Neptune has never been to sea until last week, when she was sent on her trial trip. Having Whitworth guns on board, as the Admiralty must have been aware, it was found that there was no Whitworth ammunition at any of the Mediterranean Stations. Accordingly, having bought the vessel in 1878, because she was ready to go to sea, the Admiralty had to set to work upon her, taking out her fittings, stores, guns, and, in short, dismantling her, and this operation has added the nice little sum of £70,000 to her original cost of £614,000; while, as I have already stated, except for the purpose of trial last week, she has never been to sea. I do not call that good economy. But I wish to make an appeal to the Secretary to the Admiralty. It is rumoured that the Neptune is to be sent to the Mediterranean; and, if that be true, I would express the hope that before she is sent to sea my hon. Friend will have her bottom examined in dry dock, for I understand that those who are called upon to serve in her did not feel over anxious to trust themselves in her at sea until that operation has been performed. It may be asked what is the cause of this perennial failure in building our iron-clad tonnage? Why is it that the Admiralty cannot build the amount of tonnage which they put in the Estimates with the money and men at their disposal? The answer is obvious. The Secretary to the Admiralty has not been long in Office; but he has been there long enough to know that there is no quantity so unknown as the amount that will be required for repairs—refitting, and making good defects in ships—nevertheless, there is no item in the Estimates the cost of which is calculated to so great a nicety, and that fact alone is sufficient to show that there is no bona fides in the whole transaction. I hold in my hand the Estimates of this year; and if hon. Members will turn to page 189, they will find the charge of £279,971 for Repairs and Befitting. The Committee will observe that this unknown and varying quantity is actually calculated down to £71. Then there is, for making good defects in the Channel Squadron, the charge of £123,086; and the same remark applies to this item. There are the further sums of £12,375, added under letter A, for repairs at Malta and other places in the Mediterranean, and £28,052, under letter B, for making good defects in the Channel Squadron; the total for the year for Wages and Repairs being £443,584. All these unknown and uncalculable quantities are set forth with the greatest minuteness; the calculation in the case of this large sum being brought down to £584. Now, I think it is altogether wrong, and, moreover, quite contrary to Parliamentary practice and Constitutional usage, that men for whom credit is taken in the Estimates for the purpose of shipbuilding should be transferred from that to the work of repairs and refitting without the knowledge and sanction of Parliament. I do not say that there may not be limes when an extra amount of work thrown upon the Dockyards would render it advisable that some latitude should be given to Superintendents in this respect; but I point out to the Committee that this practice, which certainly to my mind is unconstitutional, is not the result of accident, but the annual and perennial rule. But the men having been transferred in the manner I have described, this question presents itself—Are the repairs and refitting for which that transfer is made completed? I am afraid not. I believe the repairs are rather behindhand; but I shall be glad to hear from the Secretary to the Admiralty that the contrary is the case. I should like to ask what is the position of the Raleigh, the Shah, and the Inconstant, which are oxidizing in our creeks and harbours for want of men to bring them forward, even although men have been taken from shipbuilding and put upon repairs and refitting? Passing from this to the question on which my right hon. Friend the Member for Westminster has often addressed the House—namely, that of the guns, I will remark that about 18 months ago I was astonished at the late Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan), who made what, to my mind, appeared the startling assertion that the English Fleet was being armed with weapons equal to the most powerful of any Fleet in the world. Sir, I was at the time in a position to object to that statement, and I did so on the ground that I knew there had not been a single breech-loading gun supplied to any of our ships; whereas all the French ships were armed with breech-loaders of more or less approved type and with many of the newest typo. And a gentleman of the highest distinction, whose name commands respect in this and every other Assembly— Sir William Armstrong—confirmed this view when, shortly afterwards, he said, in his address at the British Institute—

"Our Navy is at present armed with guns which could not be expected to contend successfully with the best modern guns that could be used against them. Happily, most of the older ships of Foreign Powers are in the same position; but all their new vessels, and some of their older ones, are being armed with artillery which, weight for weight, is superior in power to that of our Navy. Our Service guns have simply been overtaken in that rapid progress of artillery which has been going on for the last eight or ton years."

Soon after this spurt between the late Secretary to the Admiralty and myself, it was officially announced that the Navy was to be armed with breech-loaders at no distant date, and the Secretary to the Admiralty came down with confidence and exuberance of feeling, as though he were going to carry everything before him, and expressed the hope that during the current calendar year the Conqueror would be supplied with 43-ton breech-loading guns. Now, the year had passed away, and, I ask, where are the Conqueror's breech-loading guns? The fact is, no heavy guns have been supplied. Well, the other night, my hon. Friend the new Secretary to the Admiralty came down to the House, and, apparently in even a more sanguine frame of mind than his Predecessor, said, flatteringly, in effect—"If you will only be patient for another year, I think we can supply you with 11 43-ton guns." I shall believe in the realization of that hope when I see the guns in the ships, and not until then. But this is not all, for the late Secretary to the Admiralty, at the end of 1882–3, went so far as to tell the House and the country that by the present time 174 guns of all sizes and of the new type would be delivered to the Navy. But not a single breech-loading gun, except of small type, has been issued to the Navy. I ask, where are the 174 guns promised by the late Secretary to the Admiralty? Again, the House has been told, in an official speech, that the Rupert was to be armed with new 18-ton breech-loading guns. But, if I am not mistaken, the Rupert has not received any 18-ton guns of the kind; she has muzzle-loading guns on board; and if she had to be sent to sea it would be with those guns, and not with the 18-ton breech-loading guns promised. I wish to show the Committee, from the Estimates themselves, the great danger which results from the dilatoriness of the War Department in the supply of guns to the Navy. My right hon. Friend beside me long ago settled with the Secretary of State for War that new 43-ton guns should be supplied to the Navy. Will the Secretary to the Admiralty tell me whether those guns have been tested, or whether even their pattern had been approved? I am told not. The Secretary to the Admiralty stated the other night that the Conqueror, which was in other respects ready for commission, was incomplete for want of her armament that was promisedl8 months ago; and, at the same time, he stated that several other large iron-clads were delayed through the same cause. But the hon. Gentleman rather titillated our palates in telling us that not only the 43-ton guns were to be supplied, but that some ships of the Admiral class were to be supplied with 63-ton guns. In the Army Estimates of this year I do not find provision for a single 63-ton gun; and as long as the guns are not in the Estimates, I think we should be living in a fool's paradise if we suppose they will be supplied at all. But, Sir, the position in France is the reverse of this. There the patterns of their breech-loading guns have been approved, and the guns themselves tested, of which there is an abundant supply. The new French iron-clads are all supplied with these very 43-ton breechloaders. Now, Sir, not only have our ships been delayed by the want of the guns, but they have been delayed by the Dockyard authorities not even knowing the nature of the guns to be supplied to them, for which reason they cannot employ themselves in settling the nature of the requisite carriages and fittings. I wish also to draw the attention of the Admiralty to the delay that has occurred year after year in the supply of armour-plates promised to be delivered by the contractors within a certain time from the date of the order. This is a question which merits serious attention on the part of the Admiralty; and I say that if there is one thing more than another that should be made binding upon those who undertake to supply us with armour-plates, it is that they should serve us before all others, and deliver the armour-plates at the time contracted for. This question of Naval guns is one which, as the Committee is aware, has interested me for some time past; and in the spring of last year I stated, in a humble pamphlet, that more than a year before attention had been drawn to the fact that nothing was more unbusinesslike, and less conducive to economy, than that our Naval guns should be ordered from, or supplied by, the War Office. I urged, also, that these monstrous and ruinous delays could never cease until an Ordnance Board was established for the Navy; that the guns should be supplied by that Naval Ordnance Department; that they should be ordered by the Naval Authorities, and paid for out of sums voted for the purpose in the Navy Estimates; and that this was the only way to fix upon the Admiralty, who now shelter themselves under the plea of War Office responsibility, the real responsibility for the guns of the Navy. Sir, I am much pleased that I expressed those views, because my right hon. Friend the Member for Westminster last year spoke warmly on the question, and actually proposed to ask for a Royal Commission to inquire into the subject. I was delighted at that—first, because I was sure that this great subject, having been handled by my right hon. Friend, would be influentially and effectually dealt with; and, secondly, because I felt somewhat flattered that the suggestion I made some six months before was taken up and endorsed by my right hon. Friend. Now, Sir, how many systems of guns have we in the Service at this moment?—and I would at this point impress upon the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty the necessity of doing something to simplify the number and different descriptions of guns in the Naval Service. There are now no less than four distinct systems in use in the Royal Navy, including, under those four systems, 37 different sorts of guns, each requiring its own particular ammunition and fittings. I ask the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty whether he thinks that such a condition of affairs would be likely to be dealt with easily in a time of panic or in a time of war? I congratulate him on having gone a step forward in taking part of the fittings of the guns out of the War Office Estimates and putting them on the Navy Estimates. I was delighted to see that, because it was the first step in recognizing the advantage of a policy of which I have always been a humble but consistent advocate. But, Sir, I do regret very much that the Admiralty, by their Estimates of this year, do not seem to have realized the state of our Navy, either with regard to Foreign Navies or the state of affairs in Europe. In 1883–4 the Admiralty proposed to build an amount of tonnage, including unarmoured ships, less than last year. In 1882–3 we had 20,140 tons, as against only 19,424 tons for 1883–4, and yet we are told that the number of Dockyard workmen is increased by 1,700. I will tell the hon. Gentleman that when he comes down to the House next year, although he has a diminished amount of tonnage to deal with, and has employed 1,700 more workmen, he will not have completed his programme. I am very sorry that an old and valued friend of mine, a distinguished Member of Her Majesty's Ministry, is not present in the House to-night. I am sure I could make an appeal to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and I wish he was here. I should claim his support for my contention that 19,424 tons, which the Secretary to the Admiralty proposes to add to the Navy this year, is utterly inadequate for the safety of the Empire. It is 12 years ago that the right hon. Gentleman filled the Office of First Lord of the Admiralty. At that time, Sir, France lay bleeding in the dust, without a Navy; Germany had no Fleet; Spain had not negotiated the loan of £16,000,000, and, as was also the case with Italy, she had no Fleet. At that time we were in a state of profound peace, arising from the very exhaustion of other European Powers; and what was then the dictum which the right hon. Gentleman wished to lay down for the future? He said it was not safe, for the simple wear and tear of our Fleet, to add less than 20,000 tons yearly to the Navy. Now, Sir, at a time when the world is bristling with iron-clads, with the gigantic Navy of France close upon us, the Secretary to the Admiralty asks us to accept, as a great favour, 400 tons less than the First Lord of the Admiralty 12 years ago told us was necessary. I am aware that there are those in this country who believe in no danger; and, were wars of slow growth and long duration, I might assent to that doctrine. But I know that wars in these days are begun and finished before the dormant resources of the countries engaged in them can be called into action. Armour-clads and guns cannot be produced in a hurry; and, therefore, I say that the argument of there being no danger is most destructive, inasmuch as its effect can only be to foster a reckless confidence. It is clear to mo, and it must be clear to the Admiralty, that the French are successfully aiming at pre-eminence over our-selves in regard to our ships in speed, weight of armour, and certainly in power of guns. If that be so, I, for one, as an Englishman, cannot imagine that anyone, however steeped in red-tape officialism, would think it right or meet for the Government not to take some extra steps for such a crisis, and to retain for England the command of the seas, to protect her flag wherever it may float, and to maintain inviolate the Empire of the Queen in every part of the world.

It is very much to be regretted that the discussion of Naval questions so frequently lands us in hopeless controversy; but there is one observation in which I think all parties will agree, and it is this—that if we were in the lamentable position which has been represented by my noble Friend—which, however, personally I do not admit— and we were in that position in spite of the large additions were have made to the Naval Expenditure, the blame for that situation would rest not with ourselves, but with a long succession of previous Administrations. I have not risen to enter into an unprofitable comparison between our performances and those of other Administrations. My object is to indicate the various points in which the extremely unfavourable statements which have been made lately with reference to the condition of the Navy are inaccurate. Ships have been included as complete and ready for sea which are still in hand, and, in some cases, very far from completion. All foreign ships are regarded as being armed with the armament proposed for them; whereas we know that, in numerous cases, they are armed with guns very inferior in power to those for which the ships were built. Delays in completion are spoken of as exclusively characteristic of British Naval administration; whereas we know that the disappointments which have been experienced at the British Admiralty, both with regard to the increased time and money required to complete our formidable iron-clads, have been, at least, equally experienced in France and Italy. Comparisons are made of mere numbers, without reference to the fighting efficiency of the ships. Thickness of armour is compared, without reference to the area protected, although in the one case you may have a mere belt above the water line, and in the other complete protection. Lastly, differences of coal supply are ignored, although I find, in arguing with my Colleagues in favour of restricted dimensions, that coal endurance is a quality upon which they insist most strongly. As a broad principle, displacement is the fairest measure of the fighting power of contemporary ships. Displacement means weight—whether of armour, armament, machinery, fuel, or material used in the construction of the hull. The proportions assigned to each may vary according to the qualities insisted upon in the particular type; but we may assume for the able Constructors of the chief Maritime Powers of Europe equality of skill in the utilization of tonnage. If a comparison be made on the basis of displacement between the Navy of this country and the Navy of France, to which allusion has been more particularly made in the speech of the noble Lord, I venture to say that the result will be highly satisfactory to this country. I will confine myself to a comparison of ships actually ready for sea in the years 1882 and 1885 respectively, and built either of iron or steel, or of wood, launched subsequently to the year 1867. Older ships of wood are excluded, it having been laid down by the Committee on the French Estimates for 1880–1 that the life of wood-built iron-clads should be reckoned at 15, or, at the utmost, 16 years. Grouping together in the first class ships with armour of not less than nine inches, and with a displacement exceeding 8,500 tons, we had, in 1882, 10 ships aggregating 96,000 tons, while the French had three ships aggregating 2,000 tons. In 1885 we shall have 15 ships with 140,000 tons; the French five ships with 51,000 tons. Taking for the second class ships protected with armour exceeding eight inches, and a displacement under 8,500 tons, we had, in 1882, 13 ships of 80,000 tons; the French, seven ships of 56,000 tons. In 1885 we shall have 16 ships of 101,000 tons; the French, 13 ships of 93,000 tons. In the third class, consisting of ships with four-and-a-half to six inches of armour, and without limits as to displacement, we had, in 1882, 13 ships of 104,000 tons; the French, 12 of 50,000 tons. In 1885, we shall have 12 ships of 98,000 tons; the French, five of 24,000 tons. For coast defence we had, in 1882, eight ships of 28,000 tons; the French 14 of 37,000 tons. In 1885 we shall remain as at present, while the French will have increased to nine ships of 41,000 tons. In this comparison the three vessels of the Cerberus type for Colonial defence are not included, nor the Viper, the Vixen, and the Waterwitch; while on the French side seven floating batteries and the Onondaga are omitted. I venture to think the Committee will be satisfied with the comparison I have made; and I would point out that while we are especially strong in ships of the first class, the advantages we possess in ships of the older type should not be disregarded. With improved machinery these ships could be made extremely useful for the protection of our commerce. While I have been able to place what, I hope, will be a satisfactory comparison before the Committee, it must be admitted that the French have made great efforts of late to strengthen their Navy. In the interval between 187C and 1879, a large addition was made to the sum which they appropriated to shipbuilding. In the last three years, however, their expenditure has remained comparatively stationary, while our expenditure has increased from £3,123,000, in 1880–1, to £3,754,000 for the current year. By this increase of expenditure our armoured tonnage, including the Mersey and the Severn, has been increased from 10,863 tons to 13,206 tons; and the number of men employed on repairs from 5,000 to 6,500. Hon. Members opposite may say that we ought to have done more; but we have proceeded with deliberation, because we knew we were secure, and we are seeking, by every means in our power, to make a better application of the money already at our disposal, rather than propose to Parliament a further, and perhaps unnecessary, increase in the Estimates. I fear I am not justified in holding out hopes to the Committee that any sensible reduction can be made in the expenditure of this country on the maintenance and repair of our large seagoing Fleet; but I venture to hope that a material improvement is practicable in the application of the money devoted to shipbuilding. Powerful sea-going ships must always occupy the first place in the British Fleet; but I consider that it would be unwise—and that is the opinion of our professional advisers—to concentrate our resources unduly on vessels of that class. These large vessels should be supported by swift auxiliaries, protected as regards buoyancy, and armed with light or medium guns. Vessels of that class, while combining with the larger ships in battle, would be found highly effective for the protection of our commerce. This new and valuable type is represented in our present programme by the Mersey and the Severn. I venture to hope that two or three more ships of this class will be included in the programme of the ensuing year. They should take the place of the large corvettes, the Calliope and the Calypso, which are rapidly approaching completion. Torpedo vessels are scarcely inferior in importance to fast cruisers. A combined attack of numerous torpedo vessels would be formidable, and perhaps fatal to the largest iron-clads. They are being largely built for all the principal nations of Europe. The provision in our present Estimate for vessels of this class is confined within somewhat narrow limits; but we hope in the coming year the completion of the six gun vessels, which are included in the present Contract Vote, will set free a considerable sum which can be most usefully applied to the increased construction of torpedo vessels. Ships capable of cruising under canvas are, in my opinion, indispensable for the training of seamen. We have, thanks to the exertions of former Administrations, a very large reserve of vessels of this class; and the universal use of composite construction has added largely to the durability of our armoured cruisers. The relative fighting efficiency of the Navy may be raised without increasing the expenditure by superior skill on the part of our constructors. I regret to see that in some public utterances by Naval authorities the skill of our Naval architects is impugned; but I venture to say that a comparison between the British Fleet and Foreign Fleets redounds greatly to the credit of our Naval architects. No Navy contains so small a proportion of obsolete ships as our own. We may regret the deficiency of speed in some of our unarmoured vessels; but the new ships we are now building or completing are a remarkable and gratifying advance in the essential quality of speed. As a Fleet, they are unrivalled by anything which is in the course of construction for any Foreign Navy. The speed of 15i knots an hour attained in the recent trial of the Conqueror was a gratifying incident in recent shipbuilding history; and all the later iron-clada will be capable of 16 knots an hour. In the Mersey we look for 17 knots, and in, the five protected ships of the Leander class we look for 16 knots, or, with the use of forced draught, 17 knots. We have thus no less than 16 ships building which will have a speed of 16 knots, rising to 17 knots. In point of fighting capacity, no ships of equal tonnage now building for Foreign Powers are equal to the Collingwood, and later vessels of the same type. We are quite ready to improve; but, as at present advised, we see no necessity for departing from a type which had received the endorsement of two Boards of the Admiralty. If the type be satisfactory, it is obvious that by repeating it we are doing much to reduce the time occupied in construction, and also to economize the cost. Having thus indicated the means by which the fighting strength of the Navy may be increased without adding to the expenditure, I must leave the question of a further addition to the Votes to the consideration of the Government. The decision must obviously depend on proceedings elsewhere, which we can neither foretell nor control. If our expenditure has increased, and if it should be increased in the future, we have been following, and not leading, in a rivalry which we deplore. For the present Board of Admiralty I would contend that they have taken the measures which they have deemed necessary under the circumstances; and we ask for the confidence of Parliament in our future administration.

said, that, after the very elaborate and full speech of the hon. Gentleman (Sir Thomas Brassey), he should not venture to go over the same ground; but some of the hon. Gentleman's statements required some further elucidation. The hon. Gentleman had stated that in the year 1885, or, rather, in April, 1886, there would be 51 British ships ready for use—15 of the first class, 16 of the second class, 12 of the third class, and eight ships for coast defence; while the French would have 33—six of the first class, 13 of the second class, five of the third class, and nine for coast defence. He was sorry to contest any statement of the hon. Gentleman, who, of course, had more accurate information on this subject than he himself, or any other person in the country; but he was anxious for a little more explanation. In the French Estimates it was shown that the French Fleet would be made up to 35 in 1886, and not only to 33. That gave a difference of two ships; but as the hon. Gentleman, of course, did not give names, it was difficult to see how the difference arose. The English Fleet, however, so far as he could make out, would only amount, in 1886, to 43 ships; and he could not tell where the 51 to which the hon. Gentleman had alluded could come from. Forty-three ships were all we should have complete by that time, unless the Defence was included, and then there would be 44; but he had omitted the Defence, because he found no proposal for repairing her; and, according to a Return last year, her boilers were in a condition in which they could not be considered of value.

They are perfectly capable of being repaired.

said, that might be so; but there was no Estimate for their repair. Last year the pressure of her boilers was down to 15 lbs., and, as there was no Estimate, he assumed that they were not worth repairing. If the Defence was to be repaired, it was a pity there was no Estimate for new boilers and other matters. Did the hon. Gentleman include the Cyclops and her three sisters? [Sir THOMAS BRASSEY: Yes.] And the Mersey and Severn? [Sir THOMAS BRASSEY: No.] Would the hon. Gentleman state which were the eight vessels he had spoken of for coast defence?

The Glutton, the four ships of the Cyclops type, the Scorpion, the Wyvern, and the Viper.

said, the Report on the Cyclops class stated that if they were in sea, broadside on, with 10J-seconds' interval, they would roll over, and, of course, they would become coffins for all on board. The Cyclops and her three sisters could not be considered seaworthy, and ought not to be included in this list; and, therefore, he thought the Committee would see that these eight ships ought not to be considered as belonging to the Iron-clad Navy of a first-class Power. They did not steam nine knots an-hour; their un-seaworthy qualities were recognized as dangerous, and they should not be regarded as coast-defence vessels for a first-class Power. Neither were they to be compared with the French ships of that class, all of which where iron-clad, and were seaworthy, and which, with the guns with which they were mounted, would form a great addition to the French Navy. Deducting these eight ships, he was quite satisfied that on the 1st of January, 1886, while England would have 43 sea-going iron-clads, France would have 35. It might be said that was a due and proper proportion. He did not think it was. He did not think that 43 sea-going iron-clads were sufficient for this country. The old proportion of line-of-battle ships for this country was twice the number of France. It was always considered that it was necessary that we should be able to keep the sea with a force which should be equal or superior in Home waters to any combination in Europe, and that, at the same time, we should be able in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans to protect our Colonies and our trade. Eight of our ships could not leave the Channel. If they did go beyond the Channel they would be quite as dangerous to themselves as to their enemies; therefore, they were not fit to be considered for a moment as swelling the list of iron-clads from 43 to 51. With regard to the question of guns, he confessed that he viewed with some alarm the apathy which was displayed. Avery valuable Return in regard to guns was laid on the Table by the War Office on the 20th of April, it having been moved for by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Westminster (Mr. W. H. Smith). The Committee would remember that for the service of the Navy—he asked the attention of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Kincardineshire (Sir George Balfour), who thoroughly understood the subject, and who would correct him if he was wrong—for the service of the Navy some 2,200 guns were required; he believed the number was rather larger, amounting to nearly 2,300. In addition, a certain number of spare guns were required; and the Secretary to the Admiralty had told the Committee, with great satisfaction, that a very large number of merchant steamers were of such a quality as to be fit to be used as cruisers in the event of war. When, however, the hon. Gentleman was asked whether the guns were prepared for those vessels, he was not able to answer, and he had not yet been able to give the information required. The Return which was moved for by his right hon. Friend the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith) showed, however, what guns they had got. The number of guns "ready, delivered, and in store" amounted to 131–131 guns for the service of a Navy which required 2,245, and which also required for the 280 merchant ships which the hon. Gentleman alluded to 560 more guns, of which there was no trace. His noble Friend (Lord Henry Lennox), in that excellent speech which they listened to in the earlier part of the evening, pointed out that the gun question was complicated by the great variety of the patterns. At any rate, one would think that it would be desirable that the guns and ammunition should be complete, so that whatever the pattern should be there should be an ample supply of each description at the base of Naval operations. Here he differed from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Westminster (Mr. W. H. Smith) and the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox) as to the desirability of having a separate manufacture of guns under the charge of the Admiralty. He never thought it was a desirable thing that there should be two establishments in the country for the manufacture of guns.

said, he had never suggested two manufactories.

said, his noble Friend (Lord Henry Lennox) made the remark, and his right hon. Friend did not correct it. He, therefore, assumed the remark was correct. He was glad the right hon. Gentleman was not of that opinion. It seemed to him that though it might be good that the gun carriage should be under the direction of the Admiralty, the manufacture of guns was a big question, which a Committee or a Commission ought to inquire into. He was of opinion that, looking to the fact of the enormous charge for the Army, and for the manufacture of guns both for the Army and Navy, the manufacture of guns ought to be a separate concern. In the panic during the Crimean War the Ordnance Office was abolished. He thought it was better that the Ordnance Corps—Artillery and Engineers—should be under the War Office; but the manufacturing department for both the great Services ought to be separate. The manufacturing department might buy guns from private traders, or manufacture them themselves, or do both; but, at all events, the Army and Navy should draw the guns from it. That was the old process; and it would be of the greatest advantage to the House if, instead of having thrown on the Table enormously swollen Army Estimates, they were to have separate Estimates in regard to the manufacture of guns, which manufacture could be conducted by the Master General of the Ordnance, or by some Minister responsible to the House for the expenditure upon guns and ammunition and other articles of that kind which were necessary for the Services. The reason why he should dislike to have the Army manufacturing guns for itself and for its fortifications, and the Navy manufacturing guns for itself, was that if, in a Naval action, they fell back upon Malta or Gibraltar for a fresh supply of ammunition and guns, the same guns which the fortifications had, and the same ammunition which the fort had, would be available for the ships, and they would not be required to keep a large separate supply for ships which at times might run short, and might lead to great complications and disaster. He was persuaded that until they went back to a separate Ordnance Department for manufacture, both for the Army and Navy, they would not have a satisfactory supply of guns and ammunition for either of the Services, neither would the House have that control over the manufacture of guns which it ought to have, and which it had previous to the abolition of the Ordnance Department. But, in the meantime', the Navy was without guns. The ships had certain guns, no doubt; but they were inferior to the guns of other Naval Powers. They were told that the ships which would be ready in a few years' time would not be armed in a satisfactory manner. He saw that of the 12-inch 43-ton guns "ready, delivered, and in store," there were none; of the 18-ton guns, one; of the 6-inch 80-cwt. guns, 14; of the 81-cwt. guns, 92; of the 4-inch, 22-cwt. guns, 19; of the 13-cwt. guns, five; making 131 guns. Such was the total number of guns returned by the War Office on the 20th of April, 1883, as "ready, delivered, and in store." It was possible he might have omitted to mention some guns; but, at any rate, 255 guns was the outside number, according to the Return he had previously spoken of. There were also 229 guns ordered. Such a condition of affairs was not satisfactory; and, looking to the condition of Europe, he could not believe the Committee, would be satisfied they had either guns or iron-clads sufficient for the defence of the country.

said, he thought the noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox) had done good service in placing before the country, with great fulness, the views taken by himself and by many other hon. Gentlemen who had studied these questions thoroughly. At the same time, he felt bound to say that that was no place for the threshing out of the questions involved. It would be quite impossible to completely sift matters in a Committee of the Whole House; and he hoped the day would come when they would have Select Committees of the House appointed to deal with questions of this kind. To his mind, the Government would show greater judgment and discretion by granting a Committee to deal with moot points of this kind, rather than by making such a large concession as they were disposed to make on a recent occasion, when the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) brought his Motion regarding National Expenditure before the House. It appeared to him that the Prime Minister was ready to refer the framing of the Estimates, more or less, to a Grand Committee of the House, and for the Government to receive its guidance largely from such Committee. He (Sir Edward J. Reed) thought it would be highly impolitic for the country to hand its finances over to the charge of a Committee; but, at the same time, he considered that on questions of great public importance, which were limited in their scope and defined, in their nature, there might be a Committee occasionally—a Committee which would thresh out the subject, and put the public mind at rest. He listened with great pleasure to the speech of his hon. Friend the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Sir Thomas Brassey), because, as hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House would admit, he gave them encouragement to believe that that which was the object of all of them was likely to be more or less accomplished. He apprehended it was not the object even of hon. Gentlemen opposite, who did. not profess to be always actuated by the same principles of economy as they on the Ministerial side did—he believed there was no hon. Gentleman on that side of the House who desired the Government to embark in any large or ill-considered expenditure. What they all had in view was to get a better expenditure of the money voted by Parliament. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty told them that it was the intention of the Admiralty, as far as possible, to check expenditure upon slow ships, and ships that were imperfect in many respects, and to concentrate their attention and efforts, as much as possible, upon fast ships. The hon. Gentleman told them it was the endeavour of the Admiralty to obtain in the ships a speed of 16 knots or more. If that could be supplemented by some satisfactory statement as to coal supply he believed the satisfaction of the Committee on the point would be complete. There was one point in the statement of his hon. Friend that struck him as a little remarkable. The hon. Gentleman said that the vessels of the Mersey and Severn type were representative of that class of vessels which it had been said should form an auxiliary fleet to the great line-of-battle iron-clad ships. Now, the Mersey and Severn cost £100,000 for their hull, and £65,000 for their machinery; and he thought that vessels costing £165,000 were rather too expensive to be regarded as auxiliaries to individual iron-clads, however important an auxiliary fleet might be. It had been publicly advocated for a long time past that there should be attached to the principal iron-clads vessels which should operate as defences about them against torpedoes; but surely they should expect smaller and cheaper vessels for that specific service than the Mersey and the Severn. So long as nothing contrary to that had arisen in the statement of his hon. Friend he could only regard the statement as satisfactory. He should like to say a word or two about some other ships which had been mentioned during the debate. The Cyclops class of vessels had been condemned; but he should prefer to take, for the purposes of illustration, vessels designed entirely outside the Admiralty. If the Orion and Belleisle, for instance, had been built for any Foreign Government, they would have been extolled as vessels possessing the wonderful advantage of a combination of great power, small size, and moderate expense, and also as examples of the great skill which the private shipbuilders of this country brought to bear upon iron-clads. The Orion and Belleisle were designed and constructed by Samuda Brothers; and he thought if the former Member for the Tower Hamlets could have been present during this discussion he would have been a little shocked to hear the harsh terms in which the Orion and Belleisle were spoken of. He (Sir Edward J. Reed) knew they were powerful vessels; and he could only say that if rolling was their defect the Admiralty knew well how to remedy it. He should also say that if the Cyclops class of vessels had been built for some other Government they would not have been subject to the criticism passed upon them. He was aware that in the case of the Cyclops his noble Friend (Lord Henry Lennox) and others had the justification of a Committee; but Committees sitting on Do-signs of Ships—Committees in which there was no Naval architect with power to vote—wore extremely likely to go to extreme lengths. The Cyclops class of vessels was immeasurably superior to a very large number of vessels which they used to hear extolled in the House of Commons and elsewhere in the days of the American War. He did think that that class of vessels was not deserving of all the censure which had been expressed with regard to it. With respect to the Neptune, twice over had he been credited with the design of that vessel. As a matter of fact, she was designed in his office, the object of the designers in coming there being to protect themselves with regard to calculations—to ensure themselves against running into miscalculations. The conception of the ship was not his, and the responsibility never could be his, because the building of the ship was entrusted to private builders, who were quite incompetent to perform the work. Later on, it was true, she was completed under his care. He should like to say that the argument of his noble Friend (Lord Henry Lennox), in which the Neptune was referred to, was a perfectly sound one. It was true that, although successive Administrations came down to the House and told them, with the utmost confidence, that the Navy was never in a better condition, that they were quite satisfied with it, that those who criticized and complained of its position were altogether in the wrong, and were exaggerators; the very moment there was any risk of the Navy being called upon to do anything, they bought up every ship they could lay hands on, and in that way got into the Navy vessels with which they themselves were dissatisfied, and which their own officers condemned; that it was in this way public money was expended extravagantly, and with less wisdom than it ought to be. Although his hon. Friend the Civil Lord of the Admiralty had made a powerful speech, and made striking statements, the accuracy of which he (Sir Edward J. Reed) should be sorry to doubt, he had no hesitation in saying that if they ran any risk of entering on a European war the present Government would come to the House and ask for a special Vote of Parliament to enable them to buy ironclads. The Government would lose a great opportunity if they failed to pay serious attention to the representations that had been made from both sides of the House. The Navy Question was one which did not prove very inviting to the House; it was generally discussed when very few Members were present; but it was, nevertheless, one in which the public were deeply interested. The concern of the people in the Navy was manifested on every occasion when necessity arose; and he considered it would be a weak thing for this Government, or for any Government, to leave anything undone which would give to the people complete confidence in the Naval Administration. In conclusion, he would repeat that he considered the speech of his hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Brassey) an extremely valuable one, holding out to them, as it did, the expectation, at least, that the Admiralty would do their utmost to curb useless and wasteful expenditure, and apply the money saved to useful purposes.

said, that in a discussion on Navy Estimates there was such an enormous variety of subjects to be covered, that it was quite impossible for any Member, in a single speech, to go thoroughly into all the questions involved, although he was bound to say his noble Friend (Lord Henry Lennox), who opened the debate, had, as nearly as possible, covered the ground which lay open to them in a consideration of the Estimates under discussion. He (Captain Price) asked the attention of the Committee for a few minutes whilst he entered into a consideration of the fighting strength of the Navy—that was to say, the strength of their Iron-clad Fleet. His hon. Friend the Civil Lord of the Admiralty gave them just now a very fair comparison between the Fleet of this country and that of France. In all such comparisons, however, it was a very difficult thing to make a correct classification. Hon. Gentlemen always dealt with the kind of classification which they themselves took up; and he asked the attention of the Committee, and especially of his hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Brassey), to a classification which he would now endeavour to put before the Committee. It was a very simple one, and might be, perhaps, very popularly understood. Possibly, before introducing his classification, he might be permitted to refer to one remark of his hon. Friend of which he took a note. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty said that in all these matters of comparison they ought to consider, amongst other things, the area of protection in an iron-clad ship. In was all very well to talk about having so many iron-clads; but a most important element of consideration was the area to which the ship was protected by armour. If they were to go into that subject fully, he feared it would be found that the advantage lay with the new French ships which were building. All the French ships of the Inflexible type were more fully armoured than ours. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty also spoke about the coal-carrying capacity of our armoured ships. He (Captain Price) was not quite sure how the matter stood with regard to France; but the large armour-clad ships which were being built in Italy had considerably more coal-carrying capacity than our ironclads had. [An hon. MEMBER: They are larger.] They were larger, he admitted, and we had got nothing to equal them. Some of the Italian ships were capable of steaming from the Mediterranean to South America and back without coaling. We had no ship in this country capable of doing anything like that. In the comparison he wished to make between the fighting strength of the Fleets of England and France he should divide the Iron-clad Fleet of both countries into three classes. He did not quite understand the classification his hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Brassey) made. He understood the hon. Gentleman to put into the first class all ships carrying armour of over nine inches. If he did that he must include ships of very small power indeed. The hon. Gentleman's classification also depended upon tonnago; but he (Captain Price) excluded that from his classification. He took the two most important elements of classification of the strength of ironclads—namely, the thickness of the armour and the weight of the gun. If they did that they found this result— and, though he did not use the tonnage as a distinct element, it almost entirely lent itself to this classification— that in the English Fleet, in the first class, which he would take to mean vessels of not less than 18-inch armour and carrying guns of not less than 43 tons in weight, there were 10. He was alluding not only to the number of ships which were at present existing, or were ready for sea, but was taking all those which were contemplated at the moment; because he took it that discussion of the Navy Estimates was for the purpose of considering not only what ships they had ready, now, but what were to be provided for in future. The Fleet of 1882 and the Fleet of 1885 had been referred to; but he thought it would be better if they went further into the future. He wished to take account of every ship which was at present contemplated in France and England, as well, of course, as those in existence at the present moment. If they took all these ships and looked through the Navy Estimates and at the Dockyards, they could not make out more than 10 ironclads of the class he had mentioned as belonging to the English Navy. France, on the other hand, of the same class of ships—that was to say, carrying armour of not less than 18 inches, and guns of not less than 43 tons—possessed no fewer than 18, the names of which had been given by the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox). One ship on each side had less armour than 18 inches; but he had put them in the list on account of their armaments. The ships of the second class he had taken as those possessing armour of not less than nine inches, and guns going up from 18 tons to 38 tons weight. Of that class in England, built, building, and promised, they had 26, and in France they had 18. The total was, therefore, 36 to France and 36 to England. The third class he omitted altogether. In that class he put every iron-clad not mentioned in the first and second class, and it would be useless to go into that, as all sorts of questions would be continually cropping up as to whether such and such vessel ought not to be included, or whether such and such vessel ought not to be excluded. He ought first to mention how the case stood, so far as Italy was concerned. In that country there were these enormous ships he had spoken of. In the first class there were seven; in the second class five; and in the third class seven; making a total of 19. The sum total of all this was that on the completion of this programme, about which they were talking, and which was presented to them in the Navy Estimates, whether it took place m 1885, 1886, or 1887, they should be in possession of 51 armour-clads, 36 of which would be in the first and second class; France at a similar date would be in possession of 50 iron-clads, 36 of which would be in the first and second class; and Italy would possess 19, 12 of which would be in the first and second class. This showed that on the completion of the respective programmes France would have a number of iron-clads at least equal to our own, if not greater, and Franco and Italy combined would have a preponderance of 12 ships of the first and second class. What they had to consider that evening, and at all times, was, whether this was a safe state of things? Of course, in considering that, they had to consider whether any combination was possible between France and any other country. They always looked upon France as their principal opponent —he did not mean to say the most likely one—for they were not likely to meet her in anything but an amicable way, at any rate for some time; but they looked on her as the principal Power they might have to deal with. He was struck very much the other day by a letter he read from one of our senior Admirals—namely, Sir George Elliot— on this point. The Admiral had put the case so much better than he (Captain Price) could, that he should like to mention what he had said to the Committee, He had said—

"Suppose we were at war with France, or with France combined with any other country, let us consider this —that our Fleet, roughly speaking, would he divided between the Mediterranean and the Home ports."

That was a proposition which no one would deny. He was not going to consider the number of iron-clads it might be necessary to have on Foreign Stations—in China, Australia, and in the Pacific. He left those places out of the question altogether; but supposing they had their whole fleet of iron-clads concentrated in European waters, where would they be? Why, they would be divided between the Mediterranean and the Home ports; but where would the French Fleet be? That would occupy a position midway between the Mediterranean and the Channel, consequently the whole of it could at any time be concentrated on the one-half of our Fleet in the Mediterranean, or the other half remaining at home to guard our coast. We could not get out of that—no amount of telegraphing, or anything of that kind, would enable us to escape such a strategical event as that. Many people said the only way to guard against such a difficulty as that was to have a Fleet of double the strength of the French Fleet, and such people he must answer by saying he did not think they were far wrong. It had been our policy in past times to do that, and it should be our policy now. If it was not, he should like to ask the Government what was their present policy with regard to the Naval strength of the country, because they had never been able to get at that yet. Was their Fleet to be equal to the combined Fleets of the world, or ought it to be equal to some combination of European Fleets, or simply to be nearly equal to the strongest Fleet in the world? He had noticed that in "another place" a noble Viscount (Viscount Sidmouth) had mentioned what he believed to be the Prime Minister's opinion on this point—namely, that their Fleet ought to be equal to the combined Navies of the world. The Earl of Northbrook contradicted that, and said the noble Viscount could not quote authority for such a statement. But he (Captain Price) was correct, he thought, in saying this much—that both the Prime Minister and all Ministers who had had anything to do with the administration of the Navy had, up to the present time, at all events, agreed that it was necessary for this country to be equal to most combinations of European Powers. He remembered one Minister—the present Home Secretary—not many years ago saying that the Fleet of this country was equal to the combined Fleets of the world put together. Of course, having said that, the right hon. and learned Gentleman must have been of opinion that their Navy ought to be as good as the combined Fleets of the world, or else a person in his position should come down to the House, and say—"I cannot agree to the Estimates —they ought to be considerably reduced." He held that if this question as to what the comparative strength of their Navy should be was inquired into and reported upon, it would, no doubt, settle the question for many years to come. It seemed to be impossible to get any statement from the Government on the subject; and when hon. Members made any comparison between their own Fleet and the Fleets of other countries, such comparisons were strongly deprecated. That had been the case over and over again. He had not heard comparisons deprecated so much that evening; but that was because the Government were taking it for granted that these comparisons must be made. They might take it for granted that they always would be made. The First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook), in "another place," and the Secretary to the Admiralty in this House, he was bound to say, made such statements as were calculated to lull the people of this country into a sense of false security. He should like to call the attention of the Committee to one or two statements made by the First Lord the other day, which, he thought, would bear out the assertion he made, that what fell from the noble Earl was calculated to lull the people of the country into a sense of false security. The noble Earl might have been improperly reported, for they had only The Times and the other newspapers to tell them what he had said. Viscount Sidmouth had drawn a comparison between the ships building in this country and those building in France, and had said that in the French Naval Estimates there appeared 18 large and powerful iron-clads. The Earl of Northbrook, in answering Viscount Sidmouth, said there was a great error in the comparison, and that the figures for 1885 had been taken, 10 ships having been reckoned, neither of which, up to the present day, had been launched; whereas, of the total number of English ships taken into account, only two had not been launched. He (Captain Price) did not know whether that statement was wrongly reported or misprinted; but it was calculated to give the most erroneous impression of the state of things. The Earl of North-brook said they had only two ships in the programme which had not been launched; but how did the matter stand? As a matter of fact, there were nine ships in the programme which had not been launched—nine out of 13 building in this country; and in France, according to Viscount Sidmouth, there wore 10 out of 18 which were building and were not yet launched. The Earl of Northbrook's was a most misleading statement—namely, that they had only two ships building which were not yet launched. The Earl of Northbrook denied that there was any extraordinary endeavour being made to increase the Navy of France, and they had heard a good deal about that that night. The noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox) had shown conclusively and clearly the extraordinary steps taken by the French Government at the present time to increase their Navy. He had alluded to the tonnage which had been built, and which was to be built during the present and forthcoming year. He told them of the number of men that France employed in her Dockyards, pointing out that she had 5,000 more than we had, the number she employed being 23,000, against our 18,000. He (Captain Price) was inclined to ask what these 5,000 men were doing? Were they sitting down doing nothing, and was all this money that France was voting year by year being thrown away, or being pocketed by Ministers, or what became of it? It was certain that France was making most extraordinary efforts to replace her obsolete ships and increase the force of her Navy. He would allude to one more statement by the Earl of Northbrook, which, if it was correctly reported, was most extraordinary—namely, with regard to the armaments of these Fleets. The noble Earl had said that, speaking roughly, 43-ton guns were the guns which were being put on the French ships now being completed for sea; whilst in our ships which were being completed—in such ships as the Rodney, for instance—63-ton guns were to be mounted. What was the impression conveyed by that? Why, that the French ships were being armed with 43-ton guns and our ships with 63-ton guns. Why, in the first place, there was no such thing as a 43-ton gun in France; and, in the second place, there was no 63-ton gun in the English Navy. They were told something about this last year. He remembered the Secretary to the Admiralty dealt grandly with the 63-ton guns, or the 60-ton guns, with which the Fleet of this country was to be armed. Why, at the moment the Secretary to the Admiralty spoke not only were there no 63-ton guns in existence, but they did not even exist on paper. The designs for the guns about which the hon. Member talked so much had not been completed, and the Surveyor General of the Ordnance would bear him out in what he was saying. The fact was that in the French Navy four of the 18 vessels of which he had spoken would be armed with 48-tonbreech-loaders—indeed, they were so armed, and half of the remainder would be armed with 59-ton breechloaders, and the remaining half with either a 72 or a 75-ton gun. Some doubts had been expressed as to whether these 72-ton guns that he was speaking of in the French Service had been supplied to the ships. He had had the advantage of being over at Cherbourg last year, and of going over the magnificent Dockyard there—a Dockyard which, he thought, compared very favourably with our yards. The French officer who conducted him over the yard gave him a great deal of valuable information. He (Captain Price) tried to get from him the number of these 72 guns actually completed; but the French officer said he could not state the exact number which had been made, although he had reason to suppose that several had been. He added that only a few weeks before —and it was then August of last year— eight of these guns had been in Cherbourg Dockyard, and had been forwarded from there to Toulon, in view of complications arising in Egypt. Therefore, unless the Admiralty had much superior information to that, he was correct in saying that whereas we had no 63-ton guns in existence, or certainly had them no more than half com- pleted, the French Navy possessed guns of a much larger and more powerful kind. Hon. Members were constantly taunted with dealing in exaggeration; but he had shown, he thought, some exaggerations which had been made by so estimable a person as the First Lord of the Admiralty himself. He wanted to know—and he had never been able to understand—why it was that the Admiralty concealed from the House and from the public the real state of things? They were constantly talking about their great Naval strength. Public men, at dinners, meetings, and so forth, were constantly talking in this strain. Undoubtedly, they had an immensely powerful Navy; but they never talked about the relative strength of their Navy and the Navies of foreign countries, or of its efficiency, and these were the great points. The Admiralty knew very well what the opinion of Naval officers in this country was as to the state of their Navy—they knew very well the opinion of their own advisers. He should like to hear them deny that they had at the Admiralty information from their advisers to the effect that at the completion of the respective programmes of the two countries this country would be in possession of fewer ironclads than France and Italy, or France and Russia combined. That was a distinct proposition, which he should very much like to hear replied to. He asserted that they had sufficient information at the Admiralty to enable them to give a distinct answer. He referred to the completion of the programmes, and hon. Members knew what he meant by that. He believed that before long their Navy would not be strong enough to cope with any combination of Navies of European countries. He did not know whether the Secretary to the Admiralty or the Government were in a position to guarantee that they should have no Naval war within the next five or six years. If they were not, they should be able to deny the proposition he had just laid down. There was a sentence which fell from the Secretary to the Admiralty last year which indicated that he did not feel quite easy in his mind on this particular point. He said that the general consideration governing the policy of the Admiralty was—

"That it was not necessary for the safety Of the country to ask for any special grant of money for iron shipbuilding, unless the French Admiralty, having completed its programme of 1872 and replaced its obsolete ships, should then go on building as fast as ever."—(3 Hansard, [268] 1063.)

When the French Government had completed their programme it would be too late for us to take the proper measures. We could not build ironclad vessels in a year, or in two years; and we should find that when the French and British programmes were completed, and the French Admiralty went on building at the normal rate, increasing their Fleet as we did, it would be too late to make up for lost time, and to maintain that superiority which, undoubtedly, we ought to have. He was not one who desired to increase the Expenditure of the country unnecessarily. Undoubtedly, he always urged an increase of expenditure on the Naval Estimates, because he thought it was most urgently required. He believed their general Expenditure might be cut down in many respects. He thought they might save a little by refraining from teaching the children of the poorer classes how to solve equations, and how to translate Latin and Greek. He found in the Civil Service Estimates that they were to be called on shortly to spend £100,000 on a new site for the Admiralty Offices. Surely that was rather like beginning at the wrong end. What did they want new Admiralty Offices for before they had got a new Navy? The Government were acting like the little boy, who desired to have a pretty purse before he had any money to put in it. The present Admiralty Offices were amply sufficient for the transaction of the business of the present Navy; and if, in cases of this kind, the Government would save a little money, and give the country a few more iron-clads, they would add to their own reputation and to the efficiency of the Navy. He apologized to the Committee for detaining it so long, and thanked hon. Members for having listened to him so patiently. His only object— like that of the noble Lord who introduced the subject—was to provide, if possible, not only that they should have an efficient Navy in the immediate future, but at the time when they knew that France would have a very much superior Navy to that which she had at the present time. He knew very well that the Government, and those who presided over the Admiralty, were responsible for these matters. Hon. Members were told they ought to leave these matters in their hands. They were quite willing to do that. It would be satisfactory to them, and, no doubt, to the country, if, after a severe Naval reverse, in consequence of which they found the power of this country humbled, they could turn to those who had brought about that state of things, and say that they were, at all events, now reaping the reward which they so richly deserved.

said, they had now been considering the efficiency of the Navy for some time, and he was one of those who thought that it was a Service on which no expense should be spared. Since the usual interchange of courtesies across the Table had taken place, since the guns had been disposed of, and the various ships debated, he might be allowed to invite attention to those who built the ships and those who sailed them. The increase of the Vote this year was moderate, amounting to £283,317, of which £113,804 went to Dockyard work, Devonport getting £23,069 more than last year, and 360 additional men out of the total increase of 1,772 to be provided for. As usual on these occasions, they had the grievances, real and imaginary, of different classes revived; and he could not refrain from complimenting the Civil Lord and the Secretary for the efforts they had made to understand those grievances by visiting the Dockyards and hearing from the workmen the statements they had to offer in their own behalf. This was a much better arrangement than had hitherto prevailed. Then the men could with difficulty get their claims heard, and were naturally dissatisfied. Of course, it could not be supposed that every complaint would be met and adjusted. Some were less reasonable than others; but to hear a complaint was generally found an easier way of adjusting differences. His hon. Friend the Secretary, whose able and exhaustive statement they had all admired, devoted an entire day to the case of the men of Devonport, and won their confidence by his frank and genial manner of dealing with them. The large and important body of shipwrights, who had strong claims upon the consideration of the authorities at Whitehall, were looking hopefully for- ward to some advantage from the interview with the hon. Gentleman. To this they were well entitled, after patiently waiting for nearly 20 years without any advance. So were the joiners, the riggers, and the writers of the various Dockyards. The position of the Naval Engineers he had on other occasions brought to their attention; and while he cheerfully admitted the readiness of the Department to meet the hardship of the 11 years' condition of pension, he yet thought the clause should be so modified as to allow engineers to count junior time and enable them to obtain rates of pay from which they were at present debarred. The total number of Chief Engineers was 220; but of these only a small proportion received 17s. per day. Referring to the engine-room artificers, those men, he said, had looked for some improvement in their position; but instead of that a great hardship had been inflicted upon them, as shown by the issue of a recent Circular. By a new Regulation two years of extra time was imposed upon those men without any corresponding advantage. The effect of this change was to produce distrust and alarm amongst the men, which it was desirable to remedy as soon as possible. He would give the Committee the experiences of those men, one of whose number had written him a letter in which, speaking of his own particular case, he said that having completed 10 years he was made to sign a new indenture. A month afterwards he was sent for and told that the indenture was null and void, and that he must now serve 12 years in order to qualify for a pension. This extra service would be found to inflict injury upon the men in a way which was not intended by the authorities when it was put into force. Its effect would be to defer the rise of pay to the men, while it would compel them to give two extra years of service before qualifying for a pension. That he would show was so in a very few sentences. The number of engine-room artificers who entered the Service from 1873 to 1876 was 98——

The hon. Member is discussing particular items which come under Votes 6 and 16. He is not discussing the general policy of the Estimates, which is the Question under Vote 2.

said, he understood they might go into these cases under the Vote before the Committee. However, he would reserve what he had to say for Votes 6 and 16.

The noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox) has delivered a most interesting and most important speech, and one which, I am sure, the Committee has listened to with great interest. I am not able to follow the noble Lord to all the conclusions at which he has arrived; but I am sure my hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) will feel that the questions raised deserve the most serious consideration from Her Majesty's Government. In "another place" the First Lord of the Admiralty is reported to have said—

"No Government of this country, and certainly it is not the intention of the present Government, will allow any nation to take a position of equality with England on the sea"

— that no other Government should possess a Navy equal to our own. But there was a much more important condition laid down by the present First Lord of the Treasury in 1878—namely, that our Navy should always be equal to any probable or possible combination that could be brought against it. The Secretary to the Admiralty, in introducing the Estimates, laid great stress on the fact that the Admiralty were conscious of their responsibility for maintaining the Fleet of England in a condition equal to the duties that devolved upon it, and he then proceeded to discuss the figures relating to our ironclads. No doubt, a very agreeable impression may be produced by the statement of the fact that we have, at the present time, 51 ironclads, as against 43 in the year 1855. But, Sir, while we put these numbers one against another, we must bear in mind that the Navies of other countries have been also enlarged, and that much greater duties fall upon the English Navy as compared with any other. The Committee and the country are aware that, at this moment, ironclads have to be employed in the China and Australian Seas, in the Pacific, on the Coast of North America, and in the West Indies. Our Fleet is scattered in a manner in which the Fleet of no other Power can be scattered; and while it is discharging duties in three or four different seas, if, unfortunately, we should be engaged in a war, Foreign Powers might be able to concentrate their forces against our Navy. The responsibility of Her Majesty's Government in this matter is a very grave one, and we do right in pointing out and insisting upon that responsibility, and in assuring them that whatever assistance may be required, in order to maintain and keep the Navy in an efficient condition, this House and the country will always give. I feel certain of this, and that there will be no excuse for any Government not taking as much money as may be necessary to provide a thoroughly efficient Navy. I must again refer to the question of the guns, to which the noble Lord near me (Lord Henry Lennox) has alluded at some length, and to the delay which has resulted, on the part of the Admiralty, in completing the programme laid down for the equipment of ships. I do not say this offensively towards the present Board of Admiralty. I confess that when I had the honour to be First Lord of the Admiralty I fully realized the difficulty which the present system of obtaining guns places in the way of the administration in completing the programme laid down both as regards time and efficiency. When the present Government took Office they felt it was necessary to be vigorous in their administration of the Navy; and they promised, among other things, that the ships should be prepared for sea much more rapidly. In saying this I repeat what I have often said before, that I am not speaking from a Party point of view, but merely drawing attention to what, in my opinion, are the inevitable results of the system under which the work of the country is being carried on. Speaking on the 7th of June, 1880, the First Commissioner of Works (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) promised that by certain arrangements which he proposed to make the Agamemnon and the Ajax were to be completed respectively on the 1st of December, 1881, and the 1st of March, 1882; but I think I am right in saying that up to this moment the Ajax has not been to sea, and that the Agamemnon has only just been completed, the delay having, I believe, been due to the fitting of the ships. Sir, it is a serious thing that from a cause of this nature the good intentions of Her Majesty's Government should be frustrated as re- gards two ships, in the one case by a delay of 16 months, and in the other by a delay of 14 months at least, the Ajax not being even now ready for sea. Well, Sir, that is the case with regard to the Agamemnon and Ajax. And now I come to the statement of my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (Mr. Trevelyan), then Secretary to the Admiralty, who, after repeating in March, 1881, that the Ajax and Agamemnon were to be completed at Chatham during "the coming year," went on to say that the Shah and the Raleigh were to be refitted with their new armament also in the course of "the coming year." But neither the Shah nor the Raleigh have been touched, and not a single new gun has been supplied to them. Again, in March, 1882, we were told that the Ajax, Agamemnon, and Conqueror "will be finished in the course of the year," and we had the assurance of the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland that—

"The Conqueror, within this calendar year, as we confidently hope, will be actually armed with the new 43-ton gun."

Well, Sir, that gun, I am told, is not in existence. But the Conqueror is not ready for it; nor will she be ready for it in the course of the year. Then, we were told, in 1882, that five ships were to carry the new 60-ton gun; but the ships have been building for more than 12 months, and I understand that the design of the gun, which ought to have been sent to the Constructor 12 months since, has not yet been sent in. The result of an omission of this kind is that a ship has to be cut to pieces in order to put in the necessary fittings for the guns; and that is a proceeding which involves great delay, additional expenditure, and great disappointment, and so you do not get the ships when you ought to get them. That was the case with the Conqueror, which was to be ready by the 31st of March, 1883; she has not got her guns. [MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: They are ready for her.] I am exceedingly glad to receive that assurance from my hon. Friend; but, at all events, we have been twice promised that the ship would be ready for sea by the 31st of March last at the latest. That period has passed—and I am afraid the next 31st of March will also have gone before the ship is ready for sea and to take her place in the Navy. We were also told that the Rupert would have her boilers renewed, and be armed with new 18-ton breech-loading guns—all that was to be accomplished during last year. No 18-ton gun is in existence, so far as the Navy is concerned—certainly, none have been delivered or are ready; and the Rupert has to be armed with the old gun, and is, therefore, so much less efficient than she would have been had the engagement entered into by the Admiralty been fulfilled, besides costing a large sum of money for refitting. My right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) has spoken of the supply of guns by the Naval Authorities for the Navy. I do not quite agree with that; but I do advocate most strongly the complete reconstruction of the relations now existing between the Admiralty and the War Office, and should certainly desire some explanation of the delay which has occurred during the last three years in the supply of guns. Great delay has been caused to our ships from the present system; and I feel sure it will occur again unless some new system is adopted. The Return I have in my hand will show that, notwithstanding the amount provided for new guns in 1881, not a single gun was delivered; in 1881–2 the sum of £72,000 was provided, with the same result; and in 1882–3, when £207,000 was provided, only 77 guns were delivered to the Navy, of which none were of greater calibre than the 6-inch gun. These figures alone show the necessity for the most serious consideration on the part of Her Majesty's Government as to the supply of guns. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Trevelyan) was very sanguine, in March last year, when he promised that the Hercules should be armed with batteries of 18-ton breech-loading guns. He said—

"She will carry a broadside of 18-ton breech-loading guns, and we shall have 174 guns of all sizes of the new type by the end of the next financial year"

—that is to say, the 31st of March last. But those expectations have not been realized. With regard to the 60-ton gun of which he speaks, I would ask my hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty whether the Admiralty possess information which will enable them now to give the necessary orders for the hydraulic apparatus, and directions for the construction of magazines? I have some recollection of a ship in the case of which, for a long time after her guns were received, the question of ammunition was not settled, the result of which was that a great deal of expense and loss of time was incurred in altering the arrangements of the ship below, and in fitting machinery in order to provide the means necessary for fighting the ship. It was then found that, for want of space, she could not carry as many rounds for her guns as she ought to have carried. There is another point to which I desire to refer; and I wish it to be understood, with reference to the actual performances of the Department, that I am not addressing myself to the present Board of Admiralty as sinners in particular, but rather that I am asking for information, and I hope to find that the Board of Admiralty will find some mode of stating facts to the House which will not be so difficult to understand as the form now before us. When the hon. Gentleman made his speech to the House, I showed that the statement of the tonnage proposed to be built in 1882–3 differed from the statement in the present Estimates to the extent of something like 600 tons. In 1882–3, the Admiralty proposed to build 11,016 tons of armoured and 4,186 tons of unarmoured ships; but in the Estimates for 1883–4, they have corrected those figures to 10,615 tons of armoured and 4,201 of unarmoured ships; and you say you have built 11,448 tons of armoured and 4,792 tons of unarmoured ships, showing an increase in the former of 432 tons on the original Estimate, and 833 tons on the corrected Estimate. But, in page 204 of the Estimates, the Committee will perceive that the actual number of tons built are shown, and these exhibit together a total net deficiency of 1,283 tons on the work promised last year. If the deficiency in respect of the Benbowis taken into account, there will be a total deficiency, instead of an increase, of 1,568 tons. Sir, I have no doubt this is something which can be explained; but it is not explained by the figures which have been placed before the country, and I think it would be much more satisfactory if some method could be arrived at by which a clear view of the work done in our Dockyards could be communicated to Parliament. I do not call in question what has been done in the Dockyards; but I say that, by all appearances, so far from there being an increase, there has been less done by 11 per cent than was in the programme. Again, in the case of the corvettes, it is claimed that there has been more work done by 500 tons; whereas, in point of fact, there is a deficiency of 400 tons, if the figures put forward are correct. Then, Sir, it was stated, in 1882, that only 1,018 tons were necessary to complete the Cordelia; but 1,040 tons are reported as having been built. It seems to me clear that you have not increased the displacement, and I have no doubt that you have done some work twice over; but, if that is so, the proper way would be to write it off as an expense, and not make a claim for it as an addition to the strength of the Navy. There is one other question to which I wish seriously to draw the attention of the Admiralty— namely, the tendency to increased costliness of the Service. Vote 1, in 1881, was for 58,800 men, the amount being £2,721,000. In 1882–3, the men were reduced by 600, but the Vote remained the same. In 1883–4, the men are reduced again by 250, but the Vote still remains the same; so that you are increasing the cost of the Service man per man, and in order that you may not ask for more money you are diminishing the number of men. That is a matter for serious consideration. I know it is difficult, with the pressure put on the Admiralty from all sides, to increase the pay and remuneration; but it is a serious matter that we should have gone down in the personnel of our Navy from 58,800 to 57,250 in three years, while the cost remains the same, and for the same money we are getting 2½ per cent less efficiency. The time is getting late, and I will not occupy much more of it; but I venture to say there is one other matter to which, so far as the building of ships is concerned, the attention of the Admiralty might be directed. I cordially supported the appointment of Mr. Rendel to the Board, as I felt that the Board needed fresh strength in dealing with designs when once prepared, and requiring that they should be properly carried out as prepared, and without loss of time. I cannot help thinking that if an officer was made responsible, from the first, for the complete design for a ship, and was called upon to see it carried out, without any tinkering or changes in construction, we should see our ships fitted more quickly, and at much less cost than now. It is in the knowledge of all who are acquainted with the Admiralty construction that alterations are frequently made in ships, and they are duo, generally speaking, to the fact that things have been forgotten, or not properly considered in the first instance, and it is nobody's fault. I think the Board of Admiralty should make all that some one officer's duty, so that a design for a ship of war should be as thorough and complete as the design for a house, or for a first class mercantile steamer would be. I know very well the conditions with which the Admiralty have to comply are complicated, and that they must march with the times, and make such changes from time to time as may be necessary; but I think designs should be considered completely by competent persons at the first, before the ship is laid down, or the design has left the Office of the Admiralty. It has been alleged that one of the reasons for the delay in the construction of the Leander is that the Admiralty have not fully decided upon the smaller arrangements which have to be carried out by the builders. I have no doubt that is true; but anyone who walks through a Dockyard will know that what I am insisting upon is not usually complied with. A great many things are left open for consideration and decision on a future day; but consideration and alteration do seriously interfere with the efficiency and rapidity of the work. There is one change which has been made in the Admiralty which I regret, so far as the Admiralty itself is concerned, and that is the withdrawal of Mr. Hamilton from the post of Secretary. I had the responsibility of bringing Mr. Hamilton to the Admiralty, and the appointment is one which I never regretted. I believe he was a most efficient servant in every sense of the word, and I cannot doubt he will prove to be a great loss to the Admiralty, however ably his Successor may discharge the duties. I have no doubt he is well placed in his more important duties—if they can be more important—and I can only congratulate the Government of Ireland in having obtained the services of so efficient an officer.

I am sure every Member of the Committee who was present when the noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox) spoke, listened with the greatest interest to his speech; and I only regret, with regard to that speech, that the House was so empty, and that, therefore, the greater number of Members who are now here had not the advantage of hearing the noble Lord's remarks. The noble Lord, in a most able and temperate manner, urged on the Committee the strong view he entertains that the present Administration at the Admiralty are not doing enough for the maintenance of the Navy. That, in one sentence, was the gist of his remarks. Although it is almost a commonplace, yet I wish to say, in the clearest and most unreserved terms, that the Government accept, as the basis of the naval policy, the principle that our Naval superiority must be upheld. That is a doctrine which may be asserted and acted upon in this country without, in the least degree, arousing jealousy on the part of any other nation, because it is a doctrine justified and required by circumstances in our position from which most other nations are free. Our scattered Colonial possessions; the vast amount of our maritime commerce; the preponderating share we have in the carrying trade of the world; the large extent to which we are dependent on foreign supplies—all these considerations, apart from the immediate defence of our coasts, require that we should have no rival on the sea. No Administration would deserve or receive the confidence of either side of this House, which neglected or did not fully realize this necessity; and, therefore, so far as the noble Lord and any other hon. Members who have addressed the Committee, have been urging on the attention of Parliament this necessity, I have nothing on the part of the Admiralty to express but agreement with them. But where we part company is when they say that our proposals are inadequate. Much has been said, and will be said, on this subject, expressive, I will not say of panic, because I have no desire to attribute so unreasonable a feeling to anyone, but of extreme anxiety on account of the active shipbuilding policy of France. Other nations have been mentioned; but, after all, it is upon a comparison with France that the great bulk of the arguments we have heard this evening have been founded. It is, of course, true that when we use the words "superiority" or "rivalry" a certain comparison is involved, and the calculation of our naval strength naturally rests upon an account taken of the naval strength of other Powers; but, for my part, I am not prepared to go into a detailed comparison between the ships of the two countries, partly because it is delicate ground to tread upon, and partly, also, because when we come to individual ships, or even classes of ships, we come to subjects which are really very much matter of conjecture. We have heard to-night one classification given by my hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Brassey), who is one of the great and acknowledged authorities on the subject, and who possesses a power of acquiring and communicating information on the subject which few people possess; and we have heard from the hon. and gallant Member for Devonport (Captain Price) another classification. We have heard the right hon. and gallant Admiral (Sir John Hay) find fault with my hon. Friend's classification in some respects; and, therefore, I think that is a mode of dealing with the subject which is rather to be avoided by anyone who is unable to speak with the great personal authority of my hon. Friend and Colleague I also wish especially to avoid the use of the very doubtful word "obsolete." When we talk of one ship being obsolete, and of another not being obsolete, it appears to me that these phrases are often used in a double sense. An obsolete ship may mean a ship which is perfectly done and useless, or it may merely mean a ship of a type which is not to be reproduced; and, therefore, as there is ambiguity in the phrase, I am not enamoured of it. I, therefore, prefer to direct the attention of the Committee for a few moments, as so much has been said as to the condition of France and her naval preparations, to the broad facts which have led to the recent development of shipbuilding in that country. It is somewhat more than 10 years ago since the people of France awoke to the fact that their naval force had not been kept up to what they considered the proper level. The noble Lord spoke of France at that time having no Navy at all; but, as a matter of fact, it had a very substantial Navy, although it had been neglected for some years. To make up for this neglect, the people of France resolved, for some years to come, to devote large sums of money to restoring their Fleet to what they believed to be its proper position. That was a most patriotic and natural decision on their part, and they have steadily and gradually carried their purpose into effect. In order to show what was the state of things between the two countries then as compared with the present day, I must, of course, make a comparison; but I propose to make the comparison in bulk rather than in detail, in order to avoid dispute as to particular ships. I propose to show the relative position of the two countries in 1872 and what it is at the present time; and I think if the Committee will favour me with their attention they will see that the figures I quote show at once the reason of the great increase in French shipbuilding, and, at the same time, prove that we still maintain that material superiority which I am sure every Member of this Committee thinks we ought to possess. In 1872 the French Navy possessed, in available iron-clad ships, a total displacement of 155,070 tons, while we possessed a total displacement of 269,416 tons. But of these 155,070 tons of French ships only 23,150 tons were iron ships, while of our 269,416 tons 191,056 tons were iron ships. The rest in each case were wooden ships. At that time there were building in France nine armoured vessels—I am talking of armoured vessels only—one of iron, and eight of wood; while we had altogether abandoned wooden ships, and were constructing eight vessels of iron. The Committee will, therefore, see that 11 years ago France, while possessing a formidable number of wooden ironclads, had fallen altogether behind in the construction of iron-armoured ships. Now, an armoured ship, whose framework is of wood, may be an efficient engine of war, but it soon deteriorates, and has a much shorter life than a ship of iron. Indeed, the French authorities themselves have decided, and their opinion is published in the Report of the Commission of 1880, that the extreme limit for the normal existence of a wooden iron-clad is only 16 years. Passing from that time to the present day, how do we stand now? Taking, as before, the whole bulk or mass of iron-clad tonnage, without regard to individual vessels, no doubt many of which are very poor and inefficient, I find that in 1883 France has in available ships 71,500 tons of iron or steel vessels, and 170,560 tons of wooden vessels, while we have 331,910 tons of steel and iron vessels, and only 14,000 tons of wooden, ships. It is thus evident that we have a great preponderance in the more enduring material; but this difference will be to some extent reduced by the tonnage now in the course of construction in the two countries respectively, which, consisting entirely of iron or steel ships, is 150,000 tons for France, and about 100,000 tons for England. These figures may have varying values attributed to them. The deduction to be drawn will depend on the estimate we set upon many of the French wooden ships on the one hand, and on our earlier ironclads on the other; but the figures show, at all events, the reason why the French have been making these great strides in adding to their Navy. The reason is that they are engaged in the process of exchanging their wooden ships for iron ships; they, in fact, speak of it themselves as the "transformation" of their Navy. The noble Lord said France was aiming at pre-eminence over us; but, for my part, I do not believe that at all. I believe the object of France is most reasonable and patriotic, and one which we can regard without any alarm. She finds that the great bulk of her Fleet is composed of wooden ships of short lives, some of which are already, probably, in a material sense defunct, although they may not be absolutely condemned; and she wishes to substitute for them the more modern style of steel ships, which are more enduring, and more permanent and effective. I cannot see in those figures, showing, as they do, this gradual conversion from wooden ships to iron ships of longer existence, any ground for extreme alarm; while, at the same time, I do think that as France is at this moment adding so largely to her Fleet the newest kind of iron-clad ships of a formidable nature, we have been fully justified in making the material additions which the present Administration has made in the last three or four years to the naval strength of this country. That is all I have to say with regard to this rivalry comparison between England and Franco. The French Government and the French people look upon us with no particular individual jealousy, and have no desire to outstrip us; and we, on the other hand, may very well sympathize with the great patriotic efforts they have been making to establish their Navy on a proper footing. But we, as I say, have been making additions gradually and steadily to the amount of armoured iron-clad ships, for which we have asked money from Parliament. Others, no doubt, who are great authorities, and whose opinions we shall always wish to take into account, have urged us to take another course. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir John Hay) takes a very different view of the French Navy; and he has, in a letter to The Times, gone so far as to recommend that we should immediately, "as a commencement"—to use his own words—begin the construction of no less than 11 first class ironclads at the various private Yards throughout the country. That is to say, according to my right hon. and gallant Friend, we are to embark in the expenditure of £5,000,000 or £5,500,000 on one particular type of vessels, or, at any rate, vessels of one particular size. [Sir JOHN HAY: Only for one year.] Well, they were to be begun as a commencement. If we are to make great strides of that kind in expenditure, I am not by any means sure that that is the direction in which we should exert ourselves. There are many other things which we might do. There are fast small torpedo vessels, or protected vessels of the Severn class, which might be most useful auxiliaries to the ironclads; and if we indulge in any such expenditure as the right hon. and gallant Gentleman recommends, I think part of it might be devoted to the construction of such vessels. Let me repeat the figures I quoted in introducing the Estimates, showing the progress which has taken place in armoured shipbuilding in recent years. These figures were called in question by the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox); but I told him at the time that I did not know where the figures he contrasted with them were taken from. I have taken these figures from the Expense Accounts, and, including the tons built in the Dockyards and by contract, I find they stand thus—In 1878–9 there were actually built 8,430 tons; in 1879–80, 7,427 tons; in 1880–1, 9,235 tons; in 1881–2, 10,748 tons; in 1882–3, 11,466 tons; and this year, 1883–4, we propose to build 12,281 tons. But with regard to the alarm with which certain hon. Gentlemen view the immediate future— because it is in 1884–5 that the French, programme is to be completed—I am bound to say that, so far as the present Administration is concerned, nothing that they could have done would have been of any avail with regard to that event. No ship which the present Administration could have laid down since they came into Office could have been ready in 1885; so that, I think, I am justified in supposing that my right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. W. H. Smith), who perfectly well knew what the French programme for 1885 was—and the programme was a good deal beyond the actual performance—and who was in Office at the time when it was possible to lay down ships in anticipation of it, but who did not do so—I think I am perfectly justified in saying that he takes very much the same view as I do of this question. I have said that we have built in past years a certain number of tons, and I have spoken of our intention this year again to build a certain number of tons; and, so far from being astonished, I am not at all surprised—it is what I expected—that the noble Lord and other hon. Members have taken exception to this calculation. The fact is, that to those who study this subject, the question, "What is a ton?" is almost as difficult to answer as the celebrated question, "What is a pound?" Everybody knows what the displacement of a vessel is, and therefore, for my part, I am always more comfortable, in dealing with this question of tonnage, when I speak of a vessel's displacement, because in it you have a completed result turned out for a purpose; but if hon. Members want to know what is meant by a ton in the Navy Estimates, as contrasted with a ton of displacement, I must ask them to turn to page 190, at the foot of which they will find a luminous note, which I hope will give them some useful information. The note

"The tonnage given in this abstract is the weight of hull complete. A ship's state of advancement in building is measured in the following manner:—Each man is assumed to add to the ship for every day's work an equal amount of tonnage, whether at the commencement or the completion. In other words, for every pound spent in labour there will be a certain fraction of tonnage added to the ship. This fraction is arrived at by dividing the weight of hull in tons by the total cost of labour in pounds."

That is a statement of the way tonnage is made up, which, I confess, it may be somewhat difficult for hon. Members to follow. The fact is, that in calculating the progress of a ship regard must be had to two things—namely, the weight of the hull—not the total displacement —on the one hand, and the ultimate cost of the ship on the other hand. It is by calculating the proportion between these things that we can arrive at what a unit of tonnage is. The noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox) alleged as a fact that during several years a great many tons had been lost in the shipbuilding of the Navy; and I have seen articles in news papers almost implying that some ingenious and light-handed gentleman had run away with thousands of tons of iron ships. The plain fact is, that we form the expectation of building a certain definite number of tons in the course of a year—and by tons I mean a certain proportion of the ultimate cost of the vessel—but it is often found that, with a certain amount of labour expended on it, a ship does not progress so far as we had hoped it would, and that, in fact, a "ton" has proved in this case a more costly unit than we expected. At the end of the year, when we thought we had built 1,000 tons, we had only built, perhaps, 700 "tons," and, accordingly, we have had to begin the following year as if our original estimate had been for only 700 tons, because only that proportion of the ultimate cost of the ship has been achieved, although the labour and money actually expended has not fallen behind our original estimate. Again, in the Expenses Account a further calculation, based upon the further progress of the ship, may again increase the value of a ton; and, in fact, if we did not make these corrections in the value of the unit, we might go on until in a vessel of 5,000 tons we apparently built 6,000 or 7,000 tons. To those who hear of it for the first time this may appear a rather ridiculous mode of computation. There is no doubt that a ton, as we speak of it, is an artificial unit altogether. It may, perhaps, be thought that it would be desirable to get rid of the question of "tons" altogether, and to base our calculations and Estimates simply on the ultimate cost of the hull of the ship. I would, however, observe that the system of calculating by the tons' weight built, computed on the principle I have described, has existed in the Admiralty for many years, and therefore has the advantage of forming a perfectly fair mode of comparison with past years. Again, if we took the fraction of the ultimate cost, as is done by our neighbours across the Channel, I am afraid we should still not escape from the awkwardness of the position, because as the cost increases so the value of the unit is increased; and just as we have apparently to build more "tons" than the ship contains, so if we go back over the French Estimates, which are based on "hundredths," we shall find that their ships are often made up of more than 100 hundredths. This is the explanation that I think it right to give in answer to some very strong remarks made by the noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox) as to the apparent loss of tonnage during a course of years. Complaint has been made by my right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith) as to the retardation of ships. I have just said that the French sometimes find themselves in the same difficulty as ourselves—that they find they have had to build more than a ship before they get it finished. When one suffers from a misfortune, perhaps the thing that gives one the greatest solace is to find that other people suffer in the same way; and we can derive this kind of comfort from the fact that the French complain of the very evils of which my right hon. Friend opposite has so justly complained to-night. So far from advancing or exceeding their programme, they are falling behind every year in spite of all their efforts. In fact, on a recent occasion, so disheartening in this respect were the statements made in the French Chamber by the Minister representing the Marine Department, that one of the Deputies exclaimed—"On a fait machine en arrière!"—he complained that progress had actually been made backwards. My right hon. Friend has asked me about some ships which he mentioned, and inquired what is the cause of their delay. I wish to set myself right in one respect. The allegation has been attributed to me that some of our ships have been delayed for the guns. I never meant to convey that impression. I never meant to say that ships were delayed in consequence of waiting for the manufacture of guns. What they have been waiting for is the design of the guns—a much more important matter. If we know what the size and weight, and what are termed the ballistics, of the gun are to be, we can go on building the ship up to the last moment. The non-reception of the actual gun is a matter which would cause comparatively small delay. What causes delay in building the ship is that the guns which are ultimately to be put in it are not even designed. Under such circumstances it is quite impossible to know up to what size to build, and what amount of magazine accommodation must be provided. That was so in the case of the Ajax and Agamemnon, for instance. I will not go through all the circumstances which have caused delay in the case of those vessels; but, in 1878, the possible use of a newer typo of 38-ton gun stopped work on the turrets and citadel deck. It was finally decided to adopt iron armour for the citadel, and to keep the 38-ton muzzle-loader; but, after experiments, the powder charge was raised. It was further decided to carry an auxiliary armament of 6-inch guns. The settlement of the pattern of the guns occupied considerably more than 12 months, and, in addition to this, the novel torpedo arrangements occupied some time in working out. I think I have said enough to show how the delay arose; but I do not wish to imply that there has been undue delay in the manufacture of guns. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. W. H. Smith) knows that we are engaged in the great work of re-arming the Navy, or preparing for the arming of the Navy with breech-loading guns. Not much progress in that direction had been made when the present Government came into power, and I do not think it can be said that we lost much time in setting to work after we took Office. A short experience convinced the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty that it was desirable to have an Ordnance Committee to make sure of the work we were doing. That caused a certain amount of delay; but, as a result of its inquiries, we are more confident in what we are undertaking, and we are gradually feeling our way towards a satisfactory solution of the many problems referred to that Committee. With regard to guns for particular ships, I am glad to tell my right hon. Friend that the Conqueror's guns are ready—that is to say, two 43-ton guns are ready for delivery, and others will be ready in a short time. The Ruperthas retained her old -gun, and of 18-ton guns there are seven which are fast nearing completion. The 63-ton gun, it is expected, will be ready for the Admiral when they are completed. I am glad to say we now know the particulars of the 63-ton gun, and, therefore, we can proceed with perfect confidence with the ships in which it is to be placed. I must again say that when we hear of delay in regard to guns, and when we hear of the guns which the French have as being so much better than ours, we derive a sort of grim satisfaction from reading, as I have done, in a very recent work of high authority, that the French complain exactly as we do, and are constantly asking—"When will the guns be ready?" In speaking of guns, I am disappointed to find that neither the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox), nor the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. W. H. Smith), nor the gallant Admiral (Sir John Hay) gives us any credit for our decision to place two 100-ton guns in one of the new ships. We have been frequently told of the French 100-ton guns, although their construction has been abandoned; and we have been asked why we did not provide guns of this size. I think that now the Government have made up their mind to have them, it might have been taken into account in this discussion.

said, he had understood they were not yet made.

The gun will be the Elswick 100-ton gun, such as was used recently at Spezia, but of slightly improved design. The noble Lord made some observations, in which, to a certain extent, I agree, in deprecation of the custom, if it could be said to have formed itself into a custom, of the Government, in cases of emergency, going into the market and buying any ships that could be found, without much regard being had to their quality. The noble Lord also blamed the Government of Mr. Gladstone in 1870 for rushing into the building of certain vessels for coast defence which have been denounced as unseaworthy. The construction of those ships, however, was not a leap in the dark, because similar vessels had already been tried and found successful for the purpose for which they were intended. We are now engaged in placing on the Hecate a superstructure to remedy the defects that have been pointed out. That work is being done by contract, and it is expected it will be finished in the course of the summer. The cost will not, I hope, very much exceed £10,000, instead of £20,000, the Bum mentioned by the noble Lord, and the same course will be followed with the other three vessels if the improvement on the Hecate justifies it. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Captain Price) made considerable allusion to a speech made by the Earl of Northbrook in "another place." I am perfectly certain that everything my noble Friend stated would be taken from accurate and authentic sources. I It is true we have eight ships in the course of construction, and I do not know how many ships Lord North-brook spoke of. In regard to the men in the Dockyards, Lord Northbrook stated in his speech that it was quite true that the French had a larger number of men in their Dockyards than we had in ours; but the noble Earl's contention, and the contention of many who had studied the labour question, was, that the English labourer aid more work in the end than the French labourer, and that, therefore, it was quite possible that the difference in the numbers might not represent anything like an equal difference in the output of work. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. W. H. Smith) spoke of the growth of the expenditure under many of the Votes. The Government are doing all they can, and they flatter themselves that this year they have been successful, in keeping down the expenditure under many of the Votes. With regard to Vote 1, to which the right hon. Gentleman particularly alluded, it is the case that although the numbers have been reduced, the expenditure has increased, or, at any rate, remained the same. This arises, I believe, from two causes —first of all, from the increases of pay and advantages which are necessarily given to the different men of the Service; and also from the greater tendency there was to introduce a large number of a more expensive kind of men into the Service. This year, for example, there is an increase in the cost, although a decrease in the number, of petty officers I and seamen generally, and it is explained in this way—that greater provision has had to be made for chief and other engine-room artificers, for skilled artificers in ironclad ships, and for the petty officers employed in the gunnery and torpedo service. My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth (Mr. Mac-liver), who was interrupted in his observations, alluded to my promise last year to see some of the workmen who had represented their grievance to the Board of Admiralty. My hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Brassey) and myself have visited the principal Dockyards, and we have, with great satisfaction and pleasure to ourselves, had interviews with the workmen. We were greatly struck with the pleasant and kindly and reasonable tone of those whom we met, and we will take good care that all the recommendations they made shall not be lost sight of.