Sir, I desire permission to call the attention of the House to some remarks made on Thursday last, I think, the 14th of June, at Birmingham, by the right hon. Gentleman the senior Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright), which appear to me, if they are correctly reported, to amount to a breach of the Privileges of the House. I have already had an opportunity of informing the right hon. Gentleman of my intention of bringing this matter forward, and have sent him a copy taken from The Times newspaper in order that he might inform me if there were any inaccuracies in that report. I presume that I may take it for granted that the words are faithfully reported. The matter is one which I am sorry to be obliged to bring before the House, because I quite feel, as you, Sir, have on former occasions expressed it, that it is undesirable that time should be taken up with discussions of this character, except when the case is strong and important. But, Sir, it does appear to me that, in the present instance, the gravity of the charge made by the right hon. Gentleman and the authority of the right hon. Gentleman himself are so great that it is one of those cases that must be treated as exceptional, and demanding immediate notice. I will read the words to which I specially object; but before doing so I wish to point out that by the context the words are evidently pointed at the great body of the Conservative Party in this House. They occur in the course of an argument addressed by the right hon. Gentleman to his constituents at Birmingham, in which he points out various faults which he has found with the Conservative Pary to which he has so long been opposed. He makes a survey of the course the Conservative Party have pursued from the days of Sir Robert Peel to the present time; and there can be no doubt, therefore, as to the persons to whom he refers. The remarks to which I wish particularly to call the attention of the House are these. The right hon. Gentleman says—

"Now, the House of Commons at this moment, and it is the last point to which I will make reference, the House of Commons, in a portion of its Members, seems to me to be abandoning the character and conduct of gentlemen, as heretofore seen in that assembly. The party of which I have spoken, in not a few of its Members, appears willing to repudiate the authority of a majority of the Constituencies."

That appears to me a charge against us for not immediately accepting the dictates of the majority. Then come the words to which I particularly wish to call attention—

"They know that the majority believes as the Constituencies believe, and wishes to do for the Constituencies what the Constituencies de- mand, but they are determined, if it be possible, that the majority of the Constituencies shall fail in their efforts. And, what is worse at this moment, as you see (and you do not so much see it here as it is seen in the House")

—therefore, he was speaking from his own experience in the House—

"They are found in alliance with an Irish rebel party, the main portion of whose funds, for the purposes of agitation, come directly from the avowed enemies of England, and whose oath of allegiance is broken by association with its enemies. Now, these are the men of whom I spoke, who are disregarding the wishes of the majority of the Constituencies, and making it impossible to do any work for the country in the House of Commons."

Now, so far as these words are intended to convey to his hearers and the public that there is anything in the nature of systematic Obstruction by the Conservative Party of measures brought forward in this House—I mean Obstruction as distinguished from that fair opposition and discussion which it is the duty of every minority, which I venture to say that the right hon. Gentleman in his past career has on many occasions found it necessary to give to measures in this House—I say that if there is in these words an intention on the part of the right hon. Gentleman to impute to the Conservative Party any other opposition than that, that charge is unfounded and baseless; and I say, moreover, that it is a charge which, if made at all, ought to be made, not on a platform at Birmingham, but it should be made in the House of Commons, and in such a manner that it can be met and discussed and settled in the presence of those against whom the charge is made. That is my complaint with regard to the substance of the charge; but as regards some of the language which I have read, the matter goes even beyond that. The right hon. Gentleman has charged the Conservative Party, in language which is very clear—his language always is clear —with being in alliance with a "rebel Party," and a Party whose Oath of Allegiance is broken by association with the enemies of the country. That is language to which it is utterly impossible that Members of this House can, on whatever side they sit, listen without demanding some explanation and some satisfaction for such extraordinary observations. I do not mean to trouble the House by going into the question of precedents for calling the attention of the House to breaches of Privilege, though I could detain the House at some length if necessary, for the purpose of showing what the precedents are in this connection. I will only refer to one case, one of the latest, and I refer to it for the purpose of quoting an opinion then expressed by Mr. Disraeli, the Leader of the House, and which I think fairly expresses the view we ought to take on this matter. It was on the occasion when Mr. Sullivan, then a Member of this House, brought certain charges against more than one Gentleman as to certain language used with regard to the Irish Party outside the House, and more especially by Mr. Justice Lopes, who was then a Member of this House. In the course of the discussion Mr. Disraeli said—

"I am not here to deny that it is a breach of Privilege to speak of any Members of this House in their capacity as such in terms which imply disgrace or ignominy."

It appears to me that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham has so spoken of Members of this House. It appears to me that the language he has used is of a character that, being very serious and being applied to hon. Members in their capacity of Members of Parliament, demands notice on the part of the House. I shall not detain the House any longer, as I think it is unnecessary to do so; but I will ask that the remarks which I have quoted as reported in The Times newspaper be now read by the Clerk at the Table; and, when they have been so read, it is my intention to move that they constitute a breach of Privilege. The said Paper was delivered in, and the paragraph complained of read as follows:—

"Now, the House of Commons at this moment, and it is the last point to which I will make reference, the House of Commons, in a portion of its Members, seems to me to be abandoning the character and the conduct of gentlemen, as heretofore seen in that assembly. The party of which I have spoken, in not a few of its Members, appears willing to repudiate the authority of a majority of the Constituencies. They know that the majority believes as the Constituencies believe, and wishes to do for the Constituencies what the Constituencies demand, but they are determined, if it be possible, that the majority of the Constituencies shall fail in their efforts. And, what is worse at this moment, as you see (you do not so much see it here as it is seen in the House), they are found in alliance with an Irish rebel party, the main portion of whose funds, for the purposes of agitation, come directly from the avowed enemies of England, and whose oath of allegiance is broken by association with its enemies."

Mr. Speaker, I am surprised at the course which the right hon. Gentleman has thought it his duty to take, though I admit that, in taking that course, he has not said a single word I could complain of, and his manner has been as respectful to me as I hope in what I have to say I shall be respectful to him. I am not surprised that some of the passages in my speech should have excited what, in ancient phraseology, is said to be "searchings of heart" among hon. Gentlemen opposite. In judging of this matter the House will bear in mind that I was speaking to my constituents, on which occasion men have a right, if at all, to speak with great freedom, and I have had the opportunity during the past week of seeing a great number of my constituents—a greater number than I ever saw before, and, probably, than I shall ever see again; and I found among them a considerable anxiety—an anxiety which, I believe, exists not only amongst them, but also amongst the constituents of many Members of this House—at the slow progress made in the Business of this House. They felt that questions ought to be fairly discussed, and, after being debated to a reasonable extent, that progress should be made, but that, in point of fact, last year and this year no progress has been made; and I think that many constituencies throughout the country partake of that anxiety. Now, that being so, it was my duty to explain to my constituents what it was that caused the difficulty; and I believed that was to be found in showing that on the part of hon. Gentlemen opposite the most easy way to damage the Government was found to be by making it impossible for the Government Business to succeed. I have no objection whatsoever—no man ought to have less—to a full debate and an honest division, and then my opinion is that Business should proceed; and if there be a conduct opposed to that, which I believe there has been, then I think it was my duty to explain my own views to my constituents; and if the right hon. Gentleman bad read the whole of the passage at the end of my speech, he would have found the advice I gave to my constituents on the matter; in fact, it would have been a great advantage to the House if he had read it. The right hon. Gentleman's objection — in fact, I think, his whole objection—is to the use of the word "alliance." The right hon. Gentleman does not object to a section of the Irish Party being called "rebels." The right hon. Gentleman objects to my statement that some Members of the Conservative Party have been acting in alliance with certain Gentlemen, whom I specified, among the Irish Members. There can be no doubt about their acting with them. [Cries of " No, no ! "and" When?"] Hon. Gentlemen will have an opportunity of speaking afterwards. I am free to admit that the term "alliance" is capable of a meaning which I did not intend to give it. I had no idea at all that there were any two Parties or sections who had met or agreed what was to be done, or that there had been any kind of arrangement. I found them acting together, and therefore the word "alliance" is the word that came first to my lips. I quite admit that it is capable of another interpretation, and perhaps I ought to leave been more careful in the selection of the phrase. The right hon. Gentleman must be happy, I think, that I did not use another word — the word "treaty." Why, Sir, for 12 months past hon. Gentlemen opposite have been assailing the Government, and especially my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government, on the ground of some treaty which some ingenious person called the Treaty of Kilmainham. Although my right hon. Friend, over and over again, explicitly denied that any such term could be rightly applied to anything that had taken place, still hon. Gentlemen opposite were incessantly returning to the charge. I used no such words as that I believed there was a treaty; for I am quite sure the right hon. Gentleman who has introduced this subject would not make any treaty, or, in fact, any alliance of the description to which I have referred. Well, then, there are, as the House well knows, in opposition to the Government two sections of the House, one sitting opposite me there, on the Opposition Benches—and one sitting opposite me here—on the Benches below the Gangway—[An hon. MEMBER: And another there—the Fourth Party.] Well, those two sections of the House appear to me to have the same purpose in view —I do not say every Member on that side of the House would admit it—and that is to worry the Ministry and destroy the Government. Well, this state of things leads naturally, not to a combination or alliance, but to an acting together and combined action in debate and in division. [Cries of When?" and "Name!"] I could name an individual; but hon. Members will well recollect that at a great Division lately, in which, taking only the Members for Great Britain, there was a majority of 63 in favour of a Government Bill—[Cries of "What Bill?"] —in favour of a Government Bill. We know that about 1 o'clock in the morning, or lateror earlier, when the Division took place, we were present, and know what exultation there was on that side of the House, cheering of the most vociferous kind, and mutual congratulations; and it was impossible for anybody here to determine accurately to which section of the Opposition the principal glory of the conflict and victory ought to be awarded. There is another point on which I observe the same course is pursued, and that is with regard to Questions at Question time. The House knows that on particular nights—Government nights especially—there are three or four times as many Questions put down on the Paper as on other nights, the purpose of that being, no doubt, to baffle the objects of the Government. The Members of the Government are on these Benches every night. ["No, no!"] I am not, of course, speaking of Wednesday night, but of other nights, and they are ready to answer Questions; but the crowd of Questions are placed upon the Paper for two nights particularly in the week. I think the right hon. Gentleman referred to my having spoken rather unfavourably with regard to the gentlemanly conduct I have observed in the House. Now, I have seen at Question time sometimes five or six Members getting up at once and clamouring to the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government in a manner which I can assure hon. Members in my younger days in the House would never have boon thought of. Do you suppose that my right hon. Friend Mr. Charles Villiers, the Member for Wolverhampton, Mr. Cobden, Mr. Ricardo, myself, or three or four others who sat here constantly debating the question of Free Trade—do you suppose that any one of us would have dealt with Sir Robert Peel in the manner in which hon. Gentlemen deal constantly with the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government? The right hon. Gentleman who has brought this matter before the House will permit me, I hope, to bring one case under his notice of things that are sometimes said by hon. Members out of the House. I am quite certain that the right hon. Gentleman does not read any of the speeches made by his own supporters out-of-doors. He cannot read them; for if he did he would not be so ignorant as ho appears to be of what has taken place. The right hon. Gentleman himself is always courteous. I have never known him, in the House or out of it, to say anything that could be regarded as uncourteous by any person. Supposing, however, the right hon. Gentleman were to read the speeches of one of his followers—I am not sure whether he is a follower or affects sometimes to be almost a Leader—the right hon. Gentleman might not have taken his present course. Now, I should like to read a short paragraph that has been sent me, taken from a speech of the hon. Member to whom I refer. This paragraph states that Lord Randolph Churchill—[ Cries of "Question!"]—I shall not trouble the House with more than this short extract, and I shall sit down in two or three minutes. I hope, therefore, hon. Members will allow me to proceed—

"Lord Randolph Churchill was present at the annual dinner of the Woodstock Conservative Association; and, in responding to the toast of the Conservative cause, he complained that the Government had taken no notice of the agricultural interest, which could only be described as desperate. The real truth, he said, of the present political situation was, that they had to do with a Government of impostors, with an Administration of make-believes, whose every act was either a fraud or an imposture, and it was the duty of all to lose no opportunity of enforcing an appeal to the country."

I think, Sir, if your attention is to be called to everything that is said in the country by hon. Members of either side with regard to public men or Parties in this House, we shall have a great deal to do that will not be satisfactory to the public, and will not be creditable to our- selves. There is another question to which the right hon. Gentleman has not referred. I will refer to it, because it is not unlikely that certain hon. Members opposite may see something in it applying to them; but I beg them to understand that my observation was limited to very few, and I suppose that that few would be very likely not to deny its accuracy. [ Cries of "Name!" and "Order !"] The hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) is not here, or else I would address my observation to him. Not that I have ever received anything from him that I have reason to complain of; but I think the House has a right to complain of their sitting in it with the views they have expressed and the conduct they have pursued; and I will say, in a sentence or two, what I have to say in justification of the phrase referred to. I refer to the declarations which have been made by Members of the Irish Party in Ireland and in this House. I recollect that on more than one occasion a Member, or Members of that Party, have said in this House that this was a Foreign Legislature, and that the Government sitting on these Benches, selected by the Queen and in accord with the majority of the House, was a Foreign Government. I recollect one of the Members of that Party, who is not at present a Member of the House—I refer to Mr. Dillon—stating in an impressive and remarkable speech that the Irish Party were obliged to carry on the conflict on the floor of this House, because they had not the means to carry on that conflict—he meant against the Government of England—on another field. I have not quoted the precise words of Mr. Dillon; but hon. Members will know that I have not misquoted him. I should like to mention two other points. I have before stated to the House what took place at the Convention at Chicago. There has been another Convention at Philadelphia, and the hon. Member for the City of Cork was reported in the newspapers to have telegraphed to the people of Philadelphia that in the things they were doing, the resolutions they were passing, and so on, they were to take care not to cause him any embarrassment by the line that they might adopt. Everybody knows; nobody denies; nay, it is notorious, that the people who assembled at these Conventions in America are avowed enemies of this country, and seek by all means to prepare—this is an idea of Bedlam—for some course of action in order to commence an operation of war against the English Monarchy. Of that there can be no manner of doubt. [Mr. O'BRIEN: They give you the chance of preventing it.] At the present moment funds are being collected in the United States, and publicly announced from time to time, for the use of an Association in Ireland whose Leaders are in this House. I say—and I might put it to the Attorney General, or any eminent lawyer in the House or out of it—whether, if there be an Association in the United States which is raising funds for purposes hostile to the English Monarchy and the English Crown, and sending these funds over hero to an Association which does not adopt the same name, but looks to the same ends, these men do not break the law, and are deserving of the title which I gave to some of them? The object—the avowed object—of that particular Party with which some hon. Members opposite are associated in the United States, is to dethrone the Queen from Her Sovereignty in Ireland. [Cries of "No, no !" from Irish Members.] I would say to the hon. Member for the City of Cork, if he was here, and I will say so to his followers, if there are any of them here, that if they declare that their objects—objects, if you like, of reform of land, reform of various kinds —that their objects are loyal to the Crown—if they will say that the opinions and feelings of the Association in America are not theirs, or if they will dissociate themselves from these Associations, then I will withdraw the words I used. Nay, I will not only withdraw them, but I will make the most complete apology that it is possible to put into words. [An Irish MEMBER: An apology of words.] I am very sorry that there has been any cause to bring me into a discussion of this nature. I have not been accustomed in past years to enter into conflict with the Members of the Irish Party. They have had no warmer friend than I have been to Ireland. The father of Mr. Dillon—John Blake Dillon—a man whom I daresay many of you know, and all who knew him respected him, wrote to me on one occasion, and invited me, on behalf of more than 20 Members of Parliament from Ireland, to go over to Dublin. I went over to Dublin, and I was received by them, not only with courtesy, but with more attention than I was worthy of. Mr. Dillon invited me there for a particular purpose. He was a man who held extreme opinions, who had been concerned in a revolutionary movement, and had to run away to America. He came back, entered this House, and he said that he believed there was no security for the real advantage and good government of Ireland, except by an alliance between the Irish Members and the Members of the Liberal Party. I wish to say no more, Sir. I have explained to the right hon. Gentleman opposite what it was that induced me to make the observation I did. I have told hon. Gentlemen opposite that if it be not true what I said with regard to them, let them say it is not true. If they say they are not disloyal—[Mr. O'BRIEN: We are loyal to Ireland.]—if they say that they do not desire to dismember the United Kingdom, then I withdraw the words I used, and express the utmost sorrow for having made a mistake that was unintentional and so grave. I hope the House will take into consideration that in a free country it is the duty of Members of the House of Commons, when they address their constituents, to speak freely—to speak that which they believe affects their constituents and the country at large. If I have transgressed—if it be the decision of this House that no man can use a word under such circumstances which is liable to two interpretations, as I have explained, and remember that I have repudiated the interpretation of the right hon. Gentleman—then I say that I think it is unnecessary that the House of Commons should tie its hands more than at present, should tie itself down more by its Members, and thus induce Members to bring by—what shall I call them?—other precedents, questions like this before the House. I am certain that I have not intended anything disrespectful to the House. Many hon. Members opposite have known me for a long time; some of them have known me 40 years, and they have never known me to treat lion. Members with discourtesy; and as long as I have a seat in the House they never will. If the House decides that anything I have said or done is not in accordance with that freedom which I think Members of Parliament ought to have out-of-doors, I shall bow to its decision, and I hope hon. Gentlemen opposite will enable me also to change the opinion I have expressed with respect to some of them.

I have to remind the right hon. Gentleman that, according to the ordinary practice of the House, it is usual, when attention is called to the conduct of a Member, for that Member to withdraw.

Mr. Speaker, I was going to ask the permission of the House to remain. I presume it is likely that hon. Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House may speak, and probably they may say something which I should wish to hear. I waited after the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) had spoken for the purpose of allowing any Member to rise who might have felt it his duty to do so; but no one did rise. I spoke, therefore, under some disadvantage; and if I were to leave the House, and something were to be said, I should have no opportunity of making an explanation, and I am sure the House will think that that would not be quite fair to me.

Mr. Speaker, on the point of Order —

Will it be in Order, Sir, no one objecting, for someone to move that the right hon. Gentleman be permitted to remain?

If it is your pleasure that, under the special circumstances of the case, the right hon. Gentleman be allowed to remain, no doubt the House can so determine. The pleasure of the House having been signified, Mr. BRIGHT did not withdraw from the House.

Sir, I listened with very great attention to what fell from the right hon. Gentleman in the remarks which he has made; and I was in hopes, until the moment he sat down, that he would, at all events, have said something which the House would have accepted as apologizing for the charge which he made against a large number of the Members of this House, and I state this not in the interests of either one Party or the other, but in the interests of the House itself. I am quite sure that we must all feel that such an accusation as the right hon. Gentleman made in that speech of his at Birmingham ought not to have been made unless there was absolute foundation for it, and that when it is quite clear that there was no foundation for such an accusation, it should, at all events, be withdrawn. I still hope, before this debate closes, that the right hon. Gentleman will see fit, out of deference to the House itself, to withdraw the charge, which, I am quite sure, he must himself feel he cannot now substantiate. The right hon. Gentleman has stated that he used a word which might be misinterpreted and used in two senses—the word "alliance"—but he must have known perfectly well when he used the word, from the manner in which it was received by his audience, in what sense they would interpret it. That was the whole reason of the speech, and that was the meaning which would be attached to it by those listening to it, and no one could be more conscious of it than the right hon. Gentleman himself. We have now had from the right hon. Gentleman this admission—that if that was the sense in which not only those persons obviously interpreted the word, but in which everyone and every newspaper in London interpreted the word, that was not the sense in which he intended to use it. I am not sure whether I clearly understood the right hon. Gentleman; but, at all events, I did not understand that it was accompanied by an apology for the charge he made—namely, that we, as a Party, or a large number of Members, were not simply doing our best to oppose legitimately those measures of Her Majesty's Government that we thought wrong, but that we were willing to lend ourselves to devices, plans, and schemes by which we might defeat the aim of the Government otherwise than by fair and legitimate argument. Now, I say fearlessly that at no period has the Conservative Party been Parties to anything of the kind. I say fearlessly that they have set themselves decidedly against any action of that character; and I defy any Member of this House to name any time, place, or circumstance in which the Conservative Party in this Parliament have allied themselves to obstructive measures at all. I am quite willing to take the definition of the Prime Minister himself that Obstruction means opposing the action of the Government otherwise than by means of fair argument. I think that was his own definition of it. We have more than once during the present Parliament received the thanks of the Prime Minister himself for the action we have taken. Not only have we received his thanks this Session so far as the Corrupt Practices Bill is concerned, but also last Session in regard to some of his Irish measures, although we were, as he knows, bitterly opposed to many of them. If the right hon. Gentleman will refer to any Bill which the Government have brought forward in the course of the present Session, except one, he will find, I believe, that one single night has been sufficient for the second reading of each. The right hon. Gentleman wished to quote an instance in which he says we had obstructed the Government. There was one instance in which we used the legitimate power of opposing a Bill of the Government; and if that is said to be Obstruction the word "Obstruction" has two senses, and the right hon. Gentleman uses it in one sense, and we must use it in the other. We did oppose the Affirmation Bill, and we used our legitimate power for defeating the Government; and if that be Obstruction the right hon. Gentleman is welcome to the example. We were right in opposing that Bill; and if that is brought forward as an instance of Obstruction, or of alliance, no one can know better than the right hon. Gentleman that the Bill was defeated because it was against the religious instincts of the vast majority of the people of England. It was defeated, no doubt, because all Members who sit on this side of the House voted against it; but that would not have defeated the Bill. It was defeated, not simply because the Irish Members also voted against it, but because many Liberal Members sitting above the Gangway in this House abstained from voting. If this be held up to the people of Birmingham as an instance of Obstruction by the Conservative Party, I think the right hon. Gentleman really ought to withdraw the expression that he has used. The only other instance which the right hon. Gentleman has condescended to give is that of Questions; and he complains of the great number of Questions that are principally put down on Mondays and Thursdays, which are Government nights. He forgets that, at the present moment, they are the only Evening Sittings that we now get. If the right hon. Gentleman goes before that, and means before the Morning Sittings took place, then I must refer him to the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice), who came to me some time ago, and said—"I only wish every Question put to me was put down for Mondays and Thursdays. I am myself endeavouring," he said, "to do all I can in that direction, because it is so inconvenient for the Office if they are put down on any other night." If those really are the only instances which the right hon. Gentleman can produce, I think we may be very well satisfied with the results of this debate; but if such charges are made I must say, on behalf of the Party with which I have the honour of acting, that we have a right to demand that time, place, and Bill should be specified when opposition such as this was offered by the Conservative Party, and I defy any Member of the House to bring forward such an instance. Sir, I hope this debate may, at all events, end as quietly as it began. I have no wish to say one single word to injure the feelings of the right hon. Gentleman; but I sincerely hope that now, seeing the interpretation that has been placed on the words he used at Birmingham, he may be able to say that he is very sorry he made use of any words—[Cries of "No, no "]—I think hon. Members might hear the end of the sentence—that he is very sorry that he used any words which were capable of two interpretations. [Cries of "No, no!"] The hon. Member for Scarborough (Mr. Caine) thinks that that is not the proper thing to do.

I made no remark of any kind whatever.

Then I suppose I may consider the remark withdrawn.

I cannot withdraw a remark I never made.

The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. John Bright) must feel that the words he spoke at Birmingham were not only capable of two interpretations, but that they were interpreted in the way that has now been shown. Therefore, he has now only to state that he is sorry he made use of any words towards any Party in the House, whether Conservative or Liberal, attributing to them proceedings contrary to the dignity of the House, and to the honour of the Party; and I believe my right hon. Friend will accept his assurance.

said, he did not intend to enter into the family quarrels which might have taken place between different English political Parties in that House. It was a matter of indifference to those hon. Members with whom he acted what charges might be made by the Leaders of the two great Parties against each other. But if the Conservatives were sometimes accused of unscrupulous tactics against the Government now in power, it should be remembered that Liberals themselves used similar tactics when their opponents were in Office. The time had, perhaps, not yet come for writing the history of the Parliamentary strategy of the last five or six years; but it was as notorious a fact as any alluded to by the right hon. Member for Birmingham that during the last Parliament there was not an occasion when what were rightly or wrongly called obstructive tactics were practised against the Government by a certain section of Irish Members that they did not get the direct, and, still more, the indirect, support of the Liberal Party. Nor was he (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) concerned with that part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech in which he had alluded to the so-called alliance between the Conservative Party and Irish Members. Both the great political Parties at times evinced a strong anxiety to disavow anything like an alliance with the Irish Party. But, disastrous as they regarded such an alliance to themselves, Irish Members, on their side, were equally conscious that anything like alliance with the English Parties was regarded by their constituents with dislike and suspicion. Now, a word as to what the right hon. Gentleman had said with regard to Mr. John Blake Dillon; and he ventured to say that the sentiments and views which the right hon. Gentleman had attributed to Mr. Dillon never existed in that Gentleman's mind, and that he never could have given expression to anything of the kind. Prom what he had read and knew of Mr. Dillon's family—and their career was well known and thoroughly familiar to Irishmen—he was satisfied that never at any moment did he express the conviction that the welfare of Ireland would be secured by a permanent alliance with the Liberal Party. He desired to be more courteous to the right hon. Gentleman than he had been to his (Mr. T. P. O'Connor's) Party; and, therefore, he said that he had not the least doubt that the right hon. Gentleman had unintentionally mis-stated the views of Mr. Dillon, as he had done those of the Irish people. The Irish people had learnt this, if they had learnt nothing else, since the time of which the right hon. Gentleman had spoken—that the English Liberal Party, which once posed as their traditional friend, was now their enemy. The first time he had ever heard the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham was in the City of Limerick, when he was much impressed, and even moved, by the right hon. Gentleman's eloquence. The right hon. Gentleman was the first English orator he had ever heard; and, listening to his eloquence, he felt much inclined to change his malevolent views of English politicians in general. On looking at a volume of the right hon. Gentleman's speeches, he found he stated on that occasion that—

"An Act which the Parliament of the United Kingdom had passed the Parliament of the United Kingdom can repeal."

What did the right hon. Gentleman mean by those words, addressed to au audience of Limerick men? It was possible to put but one interpretation upon them. Then the right hon. Gentleman went on to say further that—

"He was to admit that any nation had a right to ask for and strive for national independence."

If he himself were to use such words in Ireland now he should recommend himself to the attentions of a Liberal Viceroy; and if he had used such words in Chicago or Philadelphia the right hon. Gentleman would have come down to the House and denounced him as a rebel. If he were to take the trouble, or had the time, he could find in other speeches of the right hon. Gentleman many passages which, if used by him, would be described as incitements to the assassination of a large section of the Irish people. What did they suppose would be the consequences to him under the Crimes Act if, for instance, he was to say to-day in Ireland that if it had not been for the interference of the English Parliament the Land Question would have been settled long ago, and the landlords would have been exterminated? Within two weeks he should have made the acquaintance of Green Street Court; and if his hon. Friend (Mr. O'Brien) were to have printed such a passage in United Ireland, within three weeks he would find himself imprisoned for seditious libel. And yet this converted rebel who had used such words was the Gentleman who came down to the House to teach them what were their duties to the Crown and Constitution. The right hon. Gentleman asked them to give a pledge of loyalty to the Crown; but he thought that a pledge of loyalty to the Crown was more necessary from some Members sitting on the Treasury Bench at the present moment. No Englishman had done more than the right hon. Gentleman to encourage the Irish people to look for assistance to the Irish in America. He had surrounded the kindred alliance with more of the magic of eloquence and poetry than any other man. Some of the most beautiful and touching passages of the right hon. Gentleman's speech had been passages in which he described the indestructible love that existed between the Irish at home and the Irish in America. Now, however, the right hon. Gentleman denied what he once lauded, and reviled what he once praised—an alliance between the Irish at home and the Irish abroad. What the right hon. Gentleman had dwelt on most strongly in his speech was the fact that the funds for use in Ireland were obtained from America; so that he was now reviling that which in his earlier and better years he applauded. Then the right hon. Gentleman asked what were the aims and purposes of the Irish in America. They could be best judged by their acts; but he would say, with regard to the Philadelphia Convention, that it was, in every sense of the word, a Parnellite Convention for the purpose of giving loyal support to his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork in the Constitutional agitation he had adopted. Neither in that House nor out of it, nor in the country, had his hon. Friend used other than Constitutional means. Two or three times the right hon. Gentleman had honoured himself with his abuse; but he would say this—and he trusted the House would. not distrust his personal assurance—that never on any platform in America—and Le spoke on 120 platforms—did he use words that he would not use in that House, or that were incompatible with Constitutional agitation. This he did because he made up his mind before he went to America that he would say nothing which he was not justified in saying; and he did this because his friends in America would have contemned and despised him if he had endeavoured to flatter their prejudices by unconstitutional speeches. But the right hon. Gentleman seemed to have changed the love he once had for Ireland into an implacable and malevolent hatred; and he was now employing all his great talents to malign the Irish Leaders and misinterpret their purpose. The Irish cause, however, would go on in spite of the right hon. Gentleman. But the Irish people saw with surprise that a rather mean and rather vain old age had succeeded to a manhood of vigour and justice. [Loud and continued cries of "Oh!" and "Divide!" from the Ministerial Benches.]

I rise to Order. I suggest that the names of the hon. Members who are interrupting the hon. Member for Galway should be taken down.

said, he did not wish to deny the part which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham had taken in the political life of this country; but he believed it would be one of the bitterest and saddest reflections of his old age that, in spite of his impotent attacks, the Irish cause, against which he was misusing his last years, would be eventually triumphant.

I have heard, Sir, with very great regret, some of the expressions used in the speech of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. I must say that I do not entertain the regret in the interest or on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham. I am not here, I think, to enter, upon an occasion like this, into the polemical part of the debate. I refrained from asking to address the House until I had heard someone who might be entitled to speak on behalf of the portion of Irish Members who had been glanced at, or were supposed to be glanced, at by my right hon. Friend. The hon. Member who has just spoken, on behalf, I presume, of himself and his Friends, has made no complaint of the words used by my right hon. Friend; but simply contented himself by bringing a number of charges against my right hon. Friend, in respect to which I think my right hon. Friend may rest perfectly tranquil in the knowledge of the judgment that will be passed upon them by the nation.

I rise to Order. What is the Question before the House? [Cries of "Order!"]

The reason why I refer to the matter is because it is to be recollected—though anyone who heard the speech of the hon. Member would not have believed it—that we are engaged in discussing the question, not whether my right hon. Friend has been right or wrong, but whether certain language used by him was a breach of Privilege. That question the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down did not condescend to notice; but it is to that question I wish to call the attention of the House. I think that the right hon. Gentleman who introduced this subject, with a moderation of tone that has been generally and fairly acknowledged, must feel that there is a great inconvenience —though I will not say that he is to blame for it—in our having placed before the House as a breach of Privilege a lengthened passage involving very various matters, with regard to which it cannot be intended to assert that the whole passage is a breach of Privilege; and it is not very obvious which part it is intended to designate as a breach of Privilege. There are two parts of this passage that are clearly distinguishable; and my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham has, in his most candid speech, fairly and clearly distinguished them. I draw the broadest line between them, because it appears to me they are entirely distinct. The words in which my right hon. Friend referred to the conduct of certain Irish Members were not dwelt upon in the slightest degree by the right hon. Gentleman who made the Motion, or by the late Home Secretary (Sir R. Assheton Cross). Perhaps they conceive that it is for each section of the House to defend what it thinks fit, and to notice or not to notice what it thinks fit; but they have simply taken up what they consider to be a serious charge against the Conservative Party. With regard, then, to certain Representatives of certain Irish constituencies, I would only remind the House that my right hon. Friend has certainly adhered to this proposition—that the whole circumstances of the case—what has been said and what has not been said taken together—do raise such inferences or such presumptions that he is entitled to say to those Irish Members — "Will you declare your loyalty to the Crown and your dissociation from the enemies of the Crown in America?"

I rise to Order, Sir. I wish to know whether it is in Order for any Member of this House, no matter what may be his position, to call upon any other Member of the House to declare his loyalty to the Queen?

The question of the right hon. Gentleman was addressed to the House. He has not made any observation that is irregular.

May I ask a question on a point of Order?

The right hon. Gentleman is in possession of the House. If the hon. Member rises to a point of Order he may do so.

Is it in Order of debate that the Prime Minister should assume that no one would speak from these Benches when they have not got the opportunity of speaking?

I have simply, Sir, been reciting—not adopting as my own—certain words, or the effect of certain words, used by my right hon. Friend—a request from my right hon. Friend, under all the circumstances, that those Gentlemen would enable him to state, and that he would then state, in terms as strong as he could use, an expression of regret that he should have suspected their loyalty. All I wish to say is this—that, under these circumstances —nay, taking into view the circumstances of this debate, and remembering this circumstance, that when the right hon. Member for Birmingham spoke of loyalty, one or more Members in that quarter of the House said—" Yes; loyalty to Ireland." I wish simply, Sir, directing myself to a practical purpose, to say that I do not propose, under the existing circumstances, to take any further notice of that portion of the passage which refers to Irish Members; but I leave it exactly as it stands, with the invitation of my right hon. Friend, and with the frank offer which my right hon. Friend has made contingent on the acceptance of that invitation. Then I come to the question as it has been raised. I have listened to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the late Home Secretary (Sir R. Assheton Cross). I perfectly understand his anxiety to rebut a charge which he says was made; and, for my part, I am not going either to rebut or to support any charge at all. The question is strictly, whether certain words of my right hon. Friend amount to a breach of Privilege of this House? But the charge, as well as I could recollect it, was this—

"That we were, as a Party, not simply legitimately opposing the Government, but were willing to lend ourselves to devices by which we might defeat the Government."

Something to that effect was the charge which the right hon. Gentleman protested against, and far be it from me to blame him for so protesting; he is entitled to do it. But does he seriously think such a charge, in the words in which he himself recited it, amounts to a breach of the Privileges of this House? I do not think that the charge of illegitimate methods of opposition is a question of breach of Privilege. It is exceedingly desirable that we should discuss this question in the temper with which I admit the two right hon. Gentlemen opposite discussed it, because a Motion of this kind is a Motion to lay down a limit to liberty of speech. [An hon. MEMBER: The clôture.] There is one word in the speech of my right hon. Friend with regard to which I do not think it is a breach of the Privilege of this House, but the recital of a melancholy truth. It is where, at the beginning of his speech, my right hon. Friend says that—

"A portion of its Members seem to me to be abandoning the character and conduct of gentlemen as heretofore seen in the assembly of the Commons."

However, I pass on, and look at the contention of the right hon. Gentleman opposite; and I ask myself, Does this amount to a breach of the Privileges of this House? The right hon. Baronet, most discreetly, as I think, adopted the principle that, for the convenience of the House, in no cases excepting extreme cases, ought language used outside of the House to be brought into discussion in the House. Those who heard the citation from the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill), and which the noble Lord does not deny—probably he thinks he did great service to the country—

I do not admit the accuracy of the report.

Of course, it is in the pleasure of the noble Lord to do one thing or another—to deny it or affirm it; but the effect of what he said was that the Government were a set of impostors.

I said a set of political impostors.

That would be a phrase which I rather think would not be allowed to be used in the debates of this House. Well, I think the late Home Secretary, not very long ago, expressed his contempt for the conduct of the Government in regard to one of the political questions which they had in hand. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Lincolnshire (Mr. J. Lowther) undoubtedly used language in respect to the resignation of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) which went beyond the bounds of anything I have ever known in its licence and its odious character.

Which I repeated in this House.

I am not prepared to admit that the words were repeated in this House. They were not repeated in this House according to me. Of course, the question can be raised if the right hon. Gentleman likes.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give me the reference?

The right hon. Gentleman will have no difficulty about the reference, because a certain portion he did himself refer to and repeat in the House. They were words to this effect —that we had dishonourably plotted against my right hon. Friend and turned him out of the Cabinet. I will ask the House whether anything of that kind has been stated by my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham? I take no credit for it; but we have acted ourselves upon the principle that is adopted by the right hon. Baronet the Member for North Devon—namely, that except in extreme cases language spoken outside ought not to be brought before the House; and, at any rate, in one extreme case we have waived bringing it before the House. Now, is this an extreme case of charge made? In the first place, against whom is it made? The right hon. Gentleman said it was made against the Conservative Party; but my right hon. Friend says "against not a few of its Members." That is, again, a limitation as far as it goes. What is the charge made? My right hon. Friend said at Birmingham that these Gentlemen have not submitted to the verdict of the majority of the constituencies. And the right hon. Baronet opposite says that is a complaint on his part that they do not accept all the Bills of the Government. But, suppose that were the meaning of my right hon. Friend, is that a breach of the Privileges of this House? If he goes to Birmingham and complains, or if I go and complain, that the Opposition have not given their assent to all our Bills, that may be an extravagant or absurd opinion to express, but he who expresses it does not commit any breach of the Privileges of this House. And if it be true that my right hon. Friend stated that, in his opinion, some portion of the Conservative Party had resorted to methods connected with the consumption of time, or any indirect method of slackening the progress of Public Business, was that language amounting to a breach of Privilege? I have nothing now to do with the justice or the injustice of any opinion. If I entered into that question I should have to traverse a very wide field of debate and, consequently, I look upon everything that has been said in no light except this—Does it amount to a breach of the Privileges of this House? Does it imply an insult to character? Does it imply dishonourable conduct? [An hon. MEMBER: Yes; alliance with rebels.] No objection is taken to the charge that it is au alliance with those Members. But to say, whether justly or unjustly, truly or untruly, that some portion of a Party has adopted indirect methods of opposition other than those of fair argument, partaking of the nature of a resort to unnecessary discussion, is no breach of the Privileges of this House. Now I come to the question of an alliance. I must say I recollect the manner in which the words "Kilmainham Treaty" have been used during the last 12 months; and I am, therefore, a little surprised at what I think is the exaggerated importance attached to the use of the phrase of my right hon. Friend. An alliance, at any rate, is not so bad as a Treaty. I do not hesitate to say that what was conveyed under the phrase "Kilmainham Treaty" was so bad, so disgraceful, so dishonourable to every man concerned, personally as well as politically, that had it been true the hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. A. J. Balfour) would have been justified in using the phrase he applied to it—namely, that it was an act of infamy. But this mode of handling the question comes from hon. Gentlemen opposite. Have hon. Gentlemen considered what that charge involved? The Legislature had placed in the hands of the Government, I may say, the awful power of imprisoning at their sole will their fellow-citizens if we believed them to be parties to or inciters of measures hostile to the public peace; and the meaning of the phrase "Kilmainham Treaty" was this—that we had made use of that power to traffic with the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) for political advantages to ourselves and our Party. [ Opposition cheers.] That is the charge that is made by the Gentlemen who cheer me. But these are the very Gentlemen who cannot bear to be told that a certain number —not a few—of them are given occasionally to dabble in a little measure of Obstruction, although they do not scruple to charge upon us—probably there is not a man opposite who has not made the charge—that which is politically and personally dishonourable and base in the last degree. So much for this Kilmainham Treaty. Now as to the question of alliance. I own I do not recollect an important case in which it has happened that Gentlemen of different Parties have voted together when that union, however casual, has not been described by those who objected to it as an alliance or combination. It is not an assertion that there has been a document signed and sealed. It is a mode of describing that concurrent action; and what I state is that habitually, and without offence, it has been adopted by persons of the greatest influence and of the greatest authority. Now, I will quote one instance where the word al- liance does not occur; but the worse phrase does. The speaker was Lord Palmerston, and he was a speaker who employed measured language, and was well acquainted with the just limits of Parliamentary debate. The case was one in which either the right hon. Gentleman himself (Sir Stafford Northcote), or, at any rate, my noble Friend the late Postmaster General (Lord John Manners), whose absence we all regret, was concerned. It was in the China debate of 1857. In that debate a number of persons, not acting in political concert, joined to give effect, by their vote, to their conscientious opinions, exactly as the right hon. Gentleman and his Party have repeatedly given effect to their conscientious opinions, by walking into the same Lobby as the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell). On that occasion Lord Palmerston first declared that a combination had been formed against him. The reference is 3 Hansard, vol. 144, p. 1831. That combination consisted of my right hon. Friend—[Mr. JOHN BRIGHT: I was not here.] I beg my right hon. Friend's pardon. My right hon. Friend will not be surprised that I presumed him to be where Mr. Cobden was. There were Mr. Cobden and his Friends, Sir James Graham, Mr. Sidney Herbert, and others who were then called Peelites; there was Lord John Russell, acting in a completely separate and independent situation from the Government of the day; and Mr. Disraeli, acting with the general mass of the Tory Party. All these were voting together when Lord Palmerston declared that a combination had been formed. Lord Palmerston said that this combination, fearing to put forward their objects in the face of day, and having concluded a secret treaty guaranteeing to each other the state of possession which they hope to obtain by coming into Office together, have done so and so. Then he says the question they put forward is—Will you have the existing Government, or the Coalition Government we have prepared for you? So that Lord Palmerston did not scruple to say in debate—[Opposition cries of "In debate!"] But that does not make it less a breach of Privilege. I apprehend that what is breach of Privilege out of the House is a breach of Privilege in the House. The right hon. Gentleman has complained of some Members of his Party being charged with having formed an alliance; and yet Lord Palmerston, on the simple approach of a single vote which he expected would be given in common, declared that a combination had been formed and that a private treaty had been made. He declared that the object of this treaty was the formation of a new Government, and that in this new coalition among the Parties who were then going to vote together, arrangements had been made for the government of the country. That was done on the floor of this House. It was done by the Prime Minister of the day, and it was done by a man with an experience of half-a-century in Parliament. We who were the objects of that charge sat there with perfect patience and satisfaction. We never dreamt that there was a breach of the Privileges of the House. There was not even a breach of our composure. We certainly gave our votes against Lord Palmerston, but made no complaints whatever of the language he had adopted. The allusion of my right hon. Friend with respect to this question of alliance I should have thought had been a successful one. Ho distinctly stated that he spoke of concurrent action, and did not speak of anything in the nature of a treaty or arrangement; and with regard to his use of the term, I have shown that a similar, but much stronger, phrase has been habitual in Parliament without any intention of imputing what was offensive. Certainly, Lord Palmerston had no intention of imputing dishonourable conduct to Lord John Russell; and I cannot but think that the right hon. Gentleman will see there is no ground for the assertion in this House that there has been breach of its Privileges. My right hon. Friend, I am sure, has had every desire to meet the views of hon. Gentlemen by frankly stating, as he has done, that there has been no arrangement, nothing in the nature of a compact between the Party of the right hon. Baronet and the hon. Member for the City of Cork. What more can be desired? Is it possible to have more? Having regard to the common usages of this House, whatever be the justice or the truth of the opinions which we might entertain, or the opinions entertained opposite, in respect to the modes or measures, or quantities of opposition—I do not at all recede from what has been cited out of my own mouth by the right hon. Gentleman the late Home Secretary—I hold it would be a serious mistake on the part of the House of Commons to treat such matters as a breach of Privilege, because, by so doing, they would be narrowing the just liberty of debate, which, of all Privileges belonging to the Members of this House, is the one most vital to its efficiency and its power.

Sir, I am glad that, for the first time openly in the face of Parliament since that charge of Obstruction has been made, the person who has put that charge forward as plainly as the English language could do has not stood by it, and that the Prime Minister, speaking on behalf of his late Colleague, has not used words suggesting the existence on this side of veiled or any other form of Obstruction. I do hope, before the debate closes, another Gentleman sitting on the Front Bench, not only a late Colleague of the right hon. Gentleman, but a Colleague also in the representation of Birmingham, will come forward and say what he meant himself on a recent occasion. If he does so I think the House and the country will be grateful to him. I think the view taken, both in this House and in the country, as to the recent proceedings at Birmingham, is that they might be permitted to draw to a conclusion amid the enthusiasm of the Friends of the right hon. Gentleman, and without want of sympathy from his political opponents. As long as possible those opponents regarded those proceedings with no want of kindly feeling. They recognized the illustrious career of the right hon. Gentleman, and the Marquess of Salisbury took the opportunity to pay the right hon. Gentleman a high tribute. Therefore, it was to be regretted that the right hon. Gentleman was not influenced by feelings of magnanimity and generosity, and did not allow the week to close without making against his political opponents unworthy, groundless, and baseless charges. This debate has lasted an hour; if it has not yet closed, it is not the fault of my right hon. Friend, who opened it briefly and in a temperate manner, commendable for moderation and forbearance. How has he been met? If, in a few plain, manly words, the right hon. Gentleman had acknowledged and explained the passage objected to, the position would have been different; or, again, it might equally have been so if, in a few plain and simple words, which he is such a thorough master of, he had stated what he meant, and what he did not mean. If he had done that, instead of going into an elaborate reiteration of suggestions of the same charges in different words, this debate would have closed with the approval of everyone in the House; and none would have been better pleased than we should have been with a fair and generous explanation. The right hon. Gentleman has not met us by apology, by withdrawal, by explanation, nor yet by frank and manly insistance. He was invited more than once to use some word of frank and candid withdrawal. ["No, no!"] The suggestion was at once met with cries and exclamations which indicated that the right hon. Gentleman was not to withdraw; he was not to apologize; he was not to explain, but he was to repeat in this House, with a slight variation of language, charges of a gross, serious, and unworthy character against his long-established political opponents. Has the right hon. Gentleman met the charge by saying" I did use the words, and I stand by them?" Nothing of the kind. Has he met it by saying—"I regret the use of the word which you think most serious of all, and I withdraw it unequivocally?" Nothing of the kind. He has met the charge by a laboured and general criticism and discussion of the procedure of the House, beginning with Question time, and ending with the Affirmation Bill. I hope it will be understood that the right hon. Gentleman, having been challenged by letter and by speech, has not given one single instance, one solitary case, to justify, in the face of Parliament and the country, the grave charges which he has made recklessly, and without a shred of foundation, in Birmingham. It is all very well for the Primo Minister to try to throw a shield over his late Colleague. The Prime Minister is a master of language, of resource —shall I say of special pleading?—gifted with enormous tact in developing a technical defence; and how has he presented the case? What his late Colleague said at Birmingham, read by the light of his reiteration hero, was that a substantial portion of the Conservative Party had been guilty of a course of conduct which amounted to Obstruction; that they had deliberately applied themselves to defeat the will of the majority of the constituencies; and, worse than that—and this is the sting of it—that they have joined themselves in alliance with the Irish rebel Party for this purpose. It is impossible to take one part of this charge and withdraw the others; you must take the whole. He was accusing the Conservative Party of having abandoned the character and conduct of Gentlemen in resorting to wilful Obstruction in alliance with the Irish rebel Party. That being the charge made, and in substance adhered to, with the substitution of two words for alliance, when the House had the right to a plain and unequivocal apology or withdrawal, the Prime Minister—a master of the art of minimizing charges—simply glanced at this serious charge, and put it aside with a passing reference. The right hon. Member did not withdraw the word "alliance;" but he substituted "combined action." But, read with the context, what difference do they make? The only combined action he is able to refer to in support of the charge is that the Conservative Party and Members of the Irish Party below the Gangway were found in the same Lobby in the Division on the Affirmation Bill. Am I not entitled to say that a charge more groundless, baseless, and utterly unworthy never was made by a Member of a great Party against another great Party behind their backs? Was not the epithet "Irish rebel Party" used to cast special stigma upon the Conservative Party? Was not the object of the right hon. Gentleman to damage the Conservative Party by associating them with a Party the least popular in England? It is impossible to pass over as a nullity this reference to the Irish rebel Party. It must be connected with the rest of the charge deliberately brought against those who sit on these Benches. I would not fetter freedom of speech to the extent of one syllable any more than the right hon. Member for Birmingham; but we are not now questioning freedom of speech; we are questioning the right to attack a large Party in this House without justification, without courage, and in contempt of the rights and Privileges of this House. How has the remonstrance been met? The House has been advised to vote that this is not contempt of the House of Commons. I trust it will do so, unless we get some further information from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham or from a Member of the Government. There is no alternative that I can see open to the House, and those whose conduct has been impugned, except to go a Division. I should myself be most gratified, even now, if the right hon. Gentleman would rise up, and, in some frank and candid, some worthy and generous language, say that he did not mean any injurious reflection, and would spare the House from the painful and disagreeable duty of coming to a vote with regard to one who has so long been an honoured Member of this House.

said, the subject was one which lent itself readily to vehement declamation; but lie intended to discuss it with coolness, and, if possible, with equanimity. One precedent, and only one, was quoted by the right hon. Baronet the Leader of the Opposition. Mr. Lopes, now Mr. Justice Lopes, described the Irish Party as "a disreputable Irish band." Such a charge was far worse than calling them "rebels," for anyone acquainted with Irish history would understand that that term implied only political disgrace, while the term "disreputable" might have a far wider application; and yet the Prime Minister of that day had advised that no notice should be taken of it. The phrase "disreputable Irish band" was not one that could, like the phrase of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham, be termed a rhetorical exaggeration. He did not mean that the charge of "rebel" was not one that should be promptly repudiated by those to whom it referred; and he was glad that the right hon. Gentleman had intimated by his tone and manner that he had employed a rhetorical exaggeration. A more important question than the language of the right hon. Gentleman was the attitude of both sections of the Opposition to the proposals of the Government. He had at times been as active as anybody in opposing Government proposals, and he was not going to haul down his flag; but he was bound to express his opinion that the people of Ireland, as well as the people of England, had lest a great deal by the Obstruction of Public Business that had taken place during the present and recent Sessions; and, being swayed by that conviction, he had de- clined to take any part in that policy of Obstruction. Non-contentious measures had been fought at every stage with as much vigour and determination as if they had raised again the old quarrels between Parties and classes that had divided the political organizations of the country. He felt disappointed that the right hon. Gentleman had been betrayed, by the excitement of a great public demonstration, into the use of the language which had been quoted; and he felt sure that on reconsideration the right hon. Gentleman would regret that he had described any Members of the House as occupying a political position which was opposed to the Constitution and laws of the country. But he looked upon the words as an exaggeration, and attached no serious importance to them; and, remembering the great services which the right hon. Gentleman had for many years rendered to Ireland, he felt that if that exaggeration had been multiplied a thousandfold Ireland would still be his debtor. Entertaining these sentiments, he should certainly not support the Motion of the Leader of the Opposition. He thought the explanation and tone of the right hon. Gentleman was a sufficient guarantee that he had no intention whatever to be guilty of any disrespect to the House, or any breach of its Privileges, and that after that explanation the subject might be allowed to drop.

said, he was not at first inclined to think that Irish Members would do well to take any notice of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. He did not admit the right of the right hon. Gentleman, or of any man, however eminent, to charge them with being disloyal, and then to say that if they would get up in that House and declare that they were not disloyal he would withdraw the charge. The right hon. Gentleman, by calling them rebels, practically charged them with being perjurers, for he knew they had taken the Oath of Allegiance; and, apparently, he would not give their Oaths as much belief as he would do the Affirmation of an Atheist. What, then, was the meaning of asking them to get up in that House and declare that they were not rebels and were not perjurers? It reminded him of Dr. Newman's famous retort on Mr. Kingsley, when Mr. Kingsley offered to take his word and withdraw a charge of falsehood—" Take my word !—the word of a professor of lying—that he does not lie." He was not going to quarrel with any of the observations of his hon. Friend the Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power) as to the obstruction of this, that, or the other Party; but he might be allowed to remark that his hon. Friend's connection with what was called Obstruction ceased when Members of the Liberal Party ceased to assist Irish Members in that so-called Obstruction. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham called them rebels for holding the same opinions as he held and sustained in the House and out of it until he became a Member of a Liberal Cabinet; and so the obstruction of his hon. Friend somewhat abated when the Liberal Party came into Office. If the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon pressed his Motion to a Division he should certainly vote with him, regretting that time had been occupied in the dispute at all, and being of opinion that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham should have been allowed to stigmatize and brand any Party in the House, great or small, with any epithets he pleased, unchecked and unrebuked.

said, the Prime Minister had actually assumed the truth of the imputation thrown on the Irish Party. He (Mr. Marum) regretted exceedingly that the right hon. Gentleman the late Chanceller of the Duchy of Lancaster, in view of his high position and the debt of gratitude that Ireland owed to him, should have made use of the language he did. He had charged the Irish Party with being a rebel Party. That was a very serious charge, and, as a Member of the Party, he felt bound to repel the imputation. As an organization inside the House it had no connection with organizations outside the House. He had held the Commission of the Peace in two counties now for some years; and it would, therefore, be most inconsistent on his part to be a Member of a rebel Party. As to their alliance with the Conservative Party, he was proud of the occasion when they took together the part of Christianity; and he was glad to see that there was an alliance between Catholicism and Conservatism. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had alluded to the Oath of Allegiance; but was he not himself a pro- minent supporter of Mr. Bradlaugh, who declined to take the Oath of Allegiance? And, if he might be allowed to say so, he had supported a rebel to his God, if not to his country.

I must remind the hon. Gentleman that he is not speaking to the Question before the House.

said, the right hon. Member had made a serious imputation on the honour of Gentlemen, and he only wished indignantly to repel it.

said, he thought the Irish Party could afford to treat the imputation of the two English Parties with contempt. The sting of the observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham consisted in his saying that there was an Irish rebel Party of perjurers in the House. The Prime Minister had laid down the doctrine that when a body of Members in the House were grossly and wantonly insulted, the onus of defence was upon the insulted Members, and that was the position assumed by the Leader of the House towards the Irish Party, and he asked his countrymen in Ireland and the United States to regard that position. There could be no doubt that the right hon. Member had intended to brand the Irish Members with the grossest charge at the disposal of his vituperative capacity. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Conservative Party, in dealing with the matter, although the whole stigma of the charge was in the insult offered to the Irish Members, passed over the subject, and fixed upon the innocent word "alliance" as the only matter which touched his susceptibilities. There was no atom or shade of difference in moral responsibility between those three Gentlemen, and as a specimen of a statesman he could commend any one of the three to his countrymen in Ireland and America. He denied that the Irish people in America were the enemies of England except in so far as England was the enemy of Ireland. With every movement for popular liberty and progress in England, as well as in Ireland, the Irish people in America were prepared to sympathize, and from the day that English misgovernment in Ireland ceased he was certain that there would be no more friendly and no more well-disposd section of the population of the United States than they would be. The insults of the right hon. Member for Birmingham deserved nothing but contempt from the Irish Party, and the position taken up both by the Leader of the House and the Leader of the Opposition, in their deliberate adoption of these insults, was simply worthy of the same contempt at Irish hands which was the due of the original insulter. He trusted that it would not be considered anywhere, except in this House, consonant with the character of an hon. Member to reply to dishonourable insults, wantonly made, utterly unprovoked, and only made because the insulter was a Member of the dominant nation, and could command the cowardly sympathies of a majority of his kind.

said, he had been unable to discover which was the less creditable—the conduct of the Prime Minister, in endorsing the charge of disloyalty and breach of the Oath of Allegiance against the Irish Members, or that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham in the characteristic way in which he had endeavoured to get out of the difficulty. It had hitherto been the practice in that House that when a Member made a charge against another Member, and was challenged with respect to it, he rose and either withdrew the charge or proved that it was true. But the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham had the instincts of race, and had done neither the one thing nor the other. He was thus left in a very discreditable position. There was an old story told—it might be of an ancestor of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham—of a man who was displeased with his dog because the animal was not obedient to his orders; and, perhaps, the right hon. Gentleman was displeased with the Irish Members because they had not been obedient to his orders. "I will neither beat thee, nor will I kill thee," said the man to his dog, "But I will give thee a bad name—halloo, mad dog!" and the dog was killed by the crowd. "Now," said the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham of the Irish Members, "I will give you a bad name; you are rebels who have broken the Oath of Allegiance by associating with the enemies of England," and the Prime Minister had joined in hallooing "mad dog!" For they ought to bear in mind that, as far as the Prime Minister could do so, he had endorsed the charge that there was a rebel Party in the House who had broken the Oath of Allegiance by association with the enemies of England, and that was nothing less than a charge of perjury, because the Irish Members had taken the Oath. The Irish Members regarded that charge as a very serious one, for they did not view the Oath in the same light as a certain protégé of the Prime Minister—as containing simply meaningless words—hut they attached great sanctity to it. The attitude assumed by the Premier in this matter was one that tended to lower the morality of the House, and to put Irish Members on their mettle. It also showed them the little justice they had to expect from the present Government.

said, he rose to renew the protest he had made on Friday last against precedence being given to the Corrupt Practices Bill over the Agricultural Holdings Bill. He had on that occasion pointed out that it had been originally the intention of Her Majesty's Government to proceed with the Agricultural Holdings Bill as speedily as possible. It had, however, afterwards transpired that the Government had entirely changed their views in this respect, and that it was no longer the desire of Ministers to press forward that Bill. On Thursday last he put a Question to the Prime Minister with the object of ascertaining whether it was true that Her Majesty's Government had really changed their views upon the matter. On that occasion the Prime Minister gave a sort of general intimation that the Government had again changed their minds upon this question, and that they were then determined that the Agricultural Holdings Bill should have precedence over the Corrupt Practices Bill. That was the impression which the language of the right hon. Gentleman gave, not only in that House, but out-of-doors; and, in fact, the chief organ of the Government the next morning stated that the Government had made up their minds to proceed at once with the Agricultural Holdings Bill. Then had come the announcement which was made on Friday last, when the right hon. Gentleman stated that he had ascertained that the evident sense of the House was that the Corrupt Practices Bill should be disposed of before the Agricultural Holdings Bill was proceeded with. The hopes of those who desired that the latter measure should pass this Session thereupon fell 90 per cent. For his own part, he could not understand what had induced the right hon. Gentleman to depart from the understanding on Thursday last, because the cheers from both sides of the House that greeted his announcement on that occasion afforded a sufficient indication as to what the real sense of the House was with reference to this matter. Ho could not understand how it was that the right hon. Gentleman had arrived at what was the evident sense of the House on this question. He blamed Her Majesty's Government very much for this change in their programme, which was certainly very unfortunate; but, at the same time, he could not altogether exonerate right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who sat on the Front Opposition Bench from their share of the blame. It was evident to all on Thursday night that the Government were wavering on the point, and if the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devonshire had made an energetic protest against precedence being given to the Corrupt Practices Bill it would have settled the question. The right hon. Gentleman, however, had most unfortunately not taken that course. There were many reasons why the Agricultural Holdings Bill should be taken first. It was a measure of enormous interest to Members of the other House, and it was only a short time since the Leader of that House had impressed upon the Government the importance of its being passed through the House of Commons and sent up to the House of Lords before the Corrupt Practices Bill was proceeded with. There were good grounds for urging that the former Bill should be sent up to the House of Lords at a period of the Session when their Lordships would have ample time to consider its provisions. There was also a general desire on the part of hon. Members on both sides of the House of Commons that the Bill should be passed, and no serious opposition to it was threatened from any quarter. On the other hand, the Corrupt Practices Bill was threatened with most serious and bitter opposition; and if the Agricultural Holdings Bill were not to be proceeded with until it had been passed through that House, the latter measure would be placed in a position of great danger. Unless the Government held out some fair and reasonable hope with reference to the Agricultural Holdings Bill he should certainly take a division on the present Motion for resuming the consideration of the Corrupt Practices Bill in Committee.

Sir, I do not wish to waste public time further by going in detail into the proceedings which have taken place with regard to these two Bills, because, if I were to take that course, I should merely be delaying the consideration of both the Bills to which the hon. Member refers. In accordance with the pledge which I gave the other day, Her Majesty's Government have taken measures to ascertain what was the general feeling with regard to the precedence which should be given to these two Bills, and having ascertained what that general feeling is, they have determined upon their own responsibility to persevere in the line of action which I indicated on Friday last, because they believed that by doing so they will best meet the judgment of the House. The Government is responsible for the exercise of its discretion in the management of its Business, but it is very unusual for that discretion to be questioned. The House gives the Go- vernment power to arrange the order in which not all Bills, but their own Bills, shall be taken, and the Government have arranged to take certain of their Bills in a certain order. The hon. Member now proposes to take the power into his own hands of arranging the Government Business in his own manner. I am very sorry to hear the hon. Member say that his hopes of seeing the Agricultural Holdings Bill passed this Session have fallen 90 per cent, because it has never entered into my mind that this Bill will not be passed during the present Session if it is approved by the House.

said, he wished to point out that the right hon. Gentleman had omitted to note the main point of the contention of his hon. Friend, which was that the Government had failed to carry out their original intention with regard to proceeding with the Agricultural Holdings Bill. The announcement of that intention was received with approval on both sides of the House, and their departure from it had caused very general disappointment, and would not, he feared, tend to promote the despatch of Public Business.

said, that, on the part of several Members on the Liberal side of the House, who would have preferred precedence being given to the Agricultural Holdings Bill, while supporting the Government in their decision, he desired to repudiate the insinuation that they did not desire the progress and passing of that measure. Ho was not inclined to believe that the Agricultural Holdings Bill would be in danger from the course that had been adopted.

said, the difficulties of agriculture were threatening to break up the time-honoured relations between landlord and tenant, and he hoped the Government would consider it incumbent upon them to afford a remedy for the state of things in the agricultural districts.

said, he must protest against the postponement of the Agricultural Holdings Bill on the ground that, while the Corrupt Practices Bill did not concern the House of Lords, the special interest and knowledge possessed by Members of the Upper House in all matters relating to land rendered it most important that ample time for the discussion of the Tenants' Bill should be given the House of Lords. The prospect of the Compensation Bill being sent up late in July, or early in August, would be a great injustice to the agricultural community.

said, that he would be very greatly disappointed if the Agricultural Holdings Bill were not passed this Session. He should like to see the Motion withdrawn under an assurance from the Government that they would name some early date when the Bill would be brought forward. The measure was anxiously looked for by the farmers throughout the Kingdom, and he would prefer to see an Autumn Session rather than the Bill should be dropped.

said, he was one of those who had declared in favour of the Corrupt Practices Bill, because there was probably no doubt about the Agricultural Holdings Bill being passed; but there was considerable doubt about the fate of the Corrupt Practices Bill if the other got precedence.

said, that, in the absence of any promise from the Government that the Agricultural Holdings Bill would he proceeded with before the end of the Session, he had no alternative but to divide the House.

said, he must deny that he had given no promise of any kind. Those who listened to his earlier remarks would be aware that he had given as much promise as it was in the power of any man to give with respect to matters of future contingencies. He considered it part of his absolute duty to persevere in this measure, and to take the judgment of the House upon it this Session.

asked if he was to understand the promise to be that if the Committee on the Corrupt Practices Bill were not concluded before a certain time, the Prime Minister would proceed with the other?

It has no reference to the Corrupt Practices Bill.

said, he was greatly disappointed at the Agricultural Holdings Bill not being proceeded with at once; but, at the same time, he felt he would be assisting the process of both measures by now voting with the Government.

said, with the permission of the Committee, he would remind hon. Members of the position in which they stood with relation to that portion of the clause which the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) sought to amend by substituting certain specific words in lieu of the general words of the clause dealing with undue influence. In drawing this Bill no attempt was made to interfere in any way with the definition of undue influence in the former Act; but the definition of that offence which existed in the Act of 1854 was incorporated in this Bill, and the offence as so defined made one of the corrupt practices to be dealt with. On Thursday last the hon. Member moved an Amendment of which he had given Notice, the object of which was to incorporate certain words in the definition contained in the clause. The hon. Member was, of course, quite within his right in endeavouring to make that alteration, although, in doing so, he thought he had not suceeded in carrying out his views in a very clear or efficient manner. The hon. Member, in framing his Amendment, had apparently been attracted by a sentence in a Judgment of Mr. Justice Willes, in which the learned Judge was not defining the offence of undue influence, but making an explanatory statement. This, however, the hon. Member had adopted, and moved as a definition of undue influence. When the matter was discussed on Thursday last, the Government not having been able to accept that Amendment the hon. Member very judiciously re-arranged it in a manner which carried out the view which he had not expressed so clearly in the former Amendment. The proposal of the hon. Member was substantially to strike out from the existing definition the words "or in any other manner practices intimidation," together with the subsequent words "or otherwise to interfere with." To this Her Majesty's Government could not agree, because it seemed to them that the general words in question were the only words which dealt with undue clerical influence. When the Act of 1854 was passing through the House, Mr. Whiteside asked the question," What words have you dealing with this undue spiritual influence?" To which Mr. Walpole replied, that undue spiritual influence was dealt with in the words "or in any other manner practices intimidation;" and he added that this was the opinion of Sir Alexander Cockburn and Sir Fitzroy Kelly. Under those circumstances, the Government could not accept the Amendment of the hon. Member for the City of Cork, which would have the effect of striking out the words he had cited. But on Friday last the hon. Member for Sligo (Mr. Sexton) stated distinctly that undue spiritual influence should be provided for, but not in general words, and his view was supported by the hon. Member for the City of Cork.

I did not say it was absolutely a desirable policy; but I agreed, seeing that the Government had taken their stand upon it, that the alteration should be made. We did not yield our contention on the subject.

The hon. Member said he should not object to the clause dealing with undue spiritual influence, so long as it was not dealt with in undefined, vague, and general words. That was the first time an opportunity presented itself of arriving at an agreement on this subject with the hon. Member and his supporters, and he had promised to do his best to carry out the view which had been expressed. Accordingly, he had prepared an Amendment, which omitted the words "or in any other manner practices intimidation," but by which it was proposed to insert before the word "injury" the words "temporal or spiritual." It seemed to him that those words would not prevent a clergyman from using proper persuasion, but that they would prevent the refusal of religious rites to a man, and afford sufficient protection against every kind of denunciation or intimidation. He had an argument to bring forward, which he was inclined to hope would have weight with his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard) and influence his vote in favour of the Amendment. When the subject of undue influence was before the Committee in 1854 this very question arose; and inasmuch as it was stated that the general words which he now asked leave to strike out would cover undue spiritual influence, some Members of the Conservative Party took a different view, and it was moved by Mr. Malins, and seconded by Mr. Spooner, to insert the very words, "temporal or spiritual," which he now proposed to substitute. That being the case, he was inclined to hope that a proposal which was satisfactory to Mr. Spooner would recommend itself to hon. Members opposite. He had been asked to do more in the way of definition than he had done; but to this he could not assent, because if they wore to say that a crime could only be committed by certains means, other means would be discovered by which it could be committed. The Committee would recollect the recent trial at which certain persons were charged with levying war against the Queen; and he would remind them that had the Act of 1848, under which the charge was made, defined the means of levying war, a conviction would not have been obtained. The definition he now proposed, therefore, expressed the length beyond which the Government could not go. He believed that under the Amendment he now proposed he had fulfilled the promise he had made. In framing that Amendment he had adopted the middle course, and he hoped it would prove acceptable to the Committee.

said, he thought the country would learn with some degree of astonishment the concession which the Attorney General had made. The hon. and learned Gentleman proposed to give up that which, upon his own statement, had been the law for 30 years, and which, so far as he (Sir Hardinge Giffard) was aware, had never been objected to. He would remind the Committee that upon the words proposed to be struck out a certain judicial decision had been given in Ireland. Hon. Members below the Gangway asked that those words should he struck out, on the ground that they were general in their character, and that a partial and political Judge in Ireland might give them a meaning which they did not desire to be attached to them; and in answer to that appeal Her Majesty's Government had agreed to give up words which for 30 years had been on the Statute Book. But the matter did not rest there. The bon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. H. H. Fowler) very plainly raised an important issue when he said—" Do you mean to say that the passage of the Judgment of the learned Judge is to remain the law, in which he said that whoever told an elector that if he voted for a particular man ho committed a sin was guilty of undue influence?" He had listened with some anxiety to hear what the Attorney General would say to this; but the hon. and learned Gentleman had not replied on the subject, and he would therefore ask whether that was the law now? The Committee were entitled to know what the Attorney General himself thought about the matter. Hon. Members below the Gangway desired that it should be competent to a priest to tell a man that in voting for a certain candidate he was committing a sin. All he desired was that the Committee should understand the position. A most learned Judge, in a Judgment which, so far its reasoning was concerned, few would be found to quarrel with, had decided that to do a certain thing was against the law by reason of the existence in the Act of Parliament of these words which the Attorney General now consented to strike out. It appeared to him that in the latter part of his observations the hon. and learned Gentleman was arguing against himself, because he said" If you define a certain number of things, you except by your definition. everything you do not define." Well, in order to get rid of that sort of legislation, Parliament enacted that if a person intimidated, "or in any other manner practiced intimidation," he should be guilty of the offence of undue influence, and it was by those words that the learned Judge was able to put down that which many persons regarded as undue spiritual influence. He thought the Committee ought to know, and that the country ought to know, what it was that the Government were conceding. Were the Government aiming at encouraging those who desired to get rid of that check upon spiritual influence, or were they not? With all respect, he thought the proposed words nonsensical. What was the meaning of "inflicting or threatening to inflict spiritual damage, harm, injury, or loss?" He thought the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold) had gone to the root of the matter when he said that the actual infliction of spiritual harm or loss was an impossible thing. The Attorney General avoided the use of that which had given the Irish Judge the power to check spiritual intimidation, and he proposed to substitute for it that which was absolutely nonsensical. It was all very well to compliment the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) and the hon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. H. H. Fowler) on being able to accommodate this matter with them; but, before they gave their sanction to that arrangement, the Committee had a right to know whether they all meant the same thing. Would the Judgment referred to have been the same had the words in question not been in the Act of 1854? He should be glad to hear the reply of the hon. and learned Gentleman to that question; because if the Amendment proposed really meant a change of the existing law, he thought it well that the country should be made aware of the fact.

said, the hon. and learned Member fur Launceston had shown conclusively that the Attorney General had not materially improved the position of the Committee with reference to this matter. On Friday last the difficulty before the Committee was the vagueness of the words inserted in this definition, and hon. Members opposite were then successful in obtain- ing the consent of the Government to drop them. But it appeared to him that the Government bad inserted in the definition words which were still more vague. He need not dwell on the word "temporal," because it was only used by way of contrast to the word "spiritual." With regard to the view taken by Mr. Spooner, which had been cited by the Attorney General, he would mention that having had the acquaintance of that Gentleman he was able to say that he was not one whom he should be disposed to follow in a matter of this important character. He, however, humbly followed the hon. and learned Member for Launceston as to the difficulty of interpreting the words proposed by the Attorney General—if the hon. and learned Gentleman found their interpretation difficult, it was impossible to him. He, therefore, proposed to leave out the words "spiritual or temporal," and the Amendment would then run—

"Any person who by himself or any other person threatens any damage, injury, harm, or loss."

The words he proposed to leave out were not needed, because if a priest were to threaten a man with any actual injury, such as the loss of Church membership, he would certainly be brought in as exercising undue spiritual influence. He hoped the Committee would, therefore, be of opinion that they might safely dispense with the words in question, the omission of which he begged to move.

remarked, that his late Colleague, Mr. Spooner, thoroughly understood this subject, and was well informed as to ecclesiastical history. It was at his suggestion that the words were inserted, and he submitted that the House acted rightly in accepting those words, "Temporary and spiritually," which the Government adopted. The insertion of those words had already received the sanction of the House; and it must be borne in mind that they were accepted by a Liberal Government—not by Tories or Orangemen—but that they were inserted in the Act in accordance with the deliberate judgment of a Liberal House of Commons, and they were also assented to by the House of Lords. He, therefore, thought the Attorney General had ample ground for inserting the words now, and he would certainly vote with him if any question was raised as to their insertion. He would, however, venture to make one suggestion —namely, that after the word "spiritual," and before the word "injury," the word "privation" should he inserted, because one of the principal means by which the Church of Rome exercised the terror on which her discipline depended was the privation of the rites of Confession and of the Sacraments. "Privation" was the word recognized by that Church in her ecclesiastical censure. He would, therefore, recommend the Attorney General, after the word "spiritual," to insert the word "privation." He believed, at the same time, that it would be of very great importance to exclude the words "any other means." The ingenuity of a distinct body, generally unseen, of the Church of Rome, but which exercised great influence even over the Papacy itself, and had almost usurped its jurisdiction, was notorious, and especially in regard to the use or abuse of language. He therefore held that in dealing with so skilful a body it was far better for them to rely on general words, which must be interpreted according to the definition given them by the Common Law, which would give a security for effecting their purpose, which he did not think they would otherwise obtain.

differed from the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) as to the kind of language that ought to be used in framing Acts of Parliament. He thought they ought to use words precise and free from ambiguity in creating an offence of this description. Was that done by the Amendment? He had listened to the Attorney General with some anxiety to know what meaning he attributed to "spiritual injury, danger, harm, or loss." Where was there in any Act of Parliament a meaning given to the word "spiritual," to guide the Judge, and where was there any analogy to be found in an Act dealing with crime that inflicted spiritual loss? He thought the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold) was perfectly correct in the apt illustration which he had supplied to the Committee. Telling a man to go to a certain unmentionable place constituted to that man a spiritual loss if he was to go there; but was the man against whom such language was used subjected in reality to any spiritual loss? Was the use of over strong language against a man for voting in a certain manner and telling him he was likely by the vote he gave to prejudice his chances hereafter, to be held as a threat of the infliction of spiritual harm or loss within the meaning of the words used in the sub-section? The Attorney General had admitted it was perfectly right for a clergyman, in the strongest and most forcible terms, to say a man would commit a sin in voting for a particular candidate. He had stated ho dissented from the dictum to that effect of Lord Fitzgerald in the Longford case. Yet the words now used would permit a Judge to adopt that dictum as the true interpretation of the offence of undue influence. It appeared to him that the Attorney General had not given effect to the promise he made at their last Sitting. The present words constituted but a very slight, if any, improvement on those used in the Act of 1854. There should be apt words to define what they meant by "undue influence." Let them have words to guide the Judge in coming to a conclusion as to the facts; but do not let them have expressions used which would leave an Atheist Judge to come to one conclusion, a Catholic Judge to come to another conclusion, and a Presbyterian Judge to another. As the clause stood, the Judges of different denominations would come to different conclusions, and the Attorney General had failed to carry out what he said he would do—namely, define what he meant by "undue influence." What he (Mr. Martin) contended was, that it had been the understanding and do-sire of the Committee that uniformity of decision should be secured by apt and clear words defining what Parliament intended. Let the Judge, when ho came to pronounce his Judgment and find a man guilty of crime, have before him in express terms what it was that the Act of Parliament intended to prohibit. Could any hon. Member who read the Amendment say that that had been done? Notwithstanding the acute intelligence of the hon. and learned Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard), that hon. and learned Member said he could not understand what legal meaning ought to be given to the words used in this proposed sub-section. When the Attorney General thus failed to express, as all the Members who bad spoken up to the present asserted, what the precise legal meaning of this subsection was, how could he, in fairness, ask the Committee to accept what was unintelligible? Ho (Mr. Martin) thought, under the circumstances, the proper course was to adopt the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold). Under the protection of the Ballot Act, the voter now went up in secrecy to record his vote according to his own free will and conscience. Some such words as those of the Amendment would be required if the Committee contemplated the exclusion from the operation of the sub-section of that which the Attorney General had admitted to be justifiable—namely, fair spiritual influence in the way of exhortation. It was right for him to say there was, in his judgment, considerable misconception in the statements that had been made as to the true meaning and extent of what Lord Fitzgerald had laid down in his Judgment in the Longford case. That eminent Judge had not laid down, or intended to declare, that if a clergyman said to the members of his flock that they would commit a sin by voting a certain way he was guilty of "undue influence." He would take the ordinary case of a man who wished to disinherit his son, and the clergyman said—"It is a sin to do that." Was that a crime, or the exercise of undue influence? If a man intended to do that which a clergyman, be he a Catholic or a Presbyterian, bonâ fide believed to be wrong or improper, why should the clergyman be prohibited from pointing out, from his standpoint, the moral consequences of his act to a voter? The question was not one which affected the Catholic clergy alone—for the Presbyterian clergy spoke quite as strongly at elections as the Catholic clergy. Then, why should they be denied the use of free opinion and of strong language, when it was right and proper to use free opinion and strong language? They all knew that no election took place in England without the Press, and more especially the local Press, making use of strong language when the candidate appeared. In election times, whether it was right or wrong that it should be so, all would admit expressions not unfrequently were used of a character which, if used by a clergyman, would clearly come within the meaning of the prohibition created by the words of the sub-section. Then, if writers for the Press were allowed to make such remarks, why forbid the same right to the clergy? Why were Roman Catholic clergymen alone to be the objects of penal legislation in this case? Had the House reflected on the grave consequences of what they were about to do under] this Act? Suppose a case like the Bradlaugh question were to arise; was the Attorney General prepared, because a clergyman pointed out that ho considered it in his conscience a sin to vote for an Atheist, and for the admission of an Atheist into the House of Commons, to declare that it was the duty of the Election Judge to send that clergyman for 12 months to gaol? If not, then the Committee ought not to allow the sub-section to pass. In Ireland, in many of their greatest polical strugges, as those for Catholic Emancipation and the right of free education, it had plainly been the duty of the Catholic clergy to use words of remonstrance and warning to their co-religionists as to the mode in which they intended to exercise their rights when voting. Would the Attorney General be prepared to say that clergymen, who thus expressed their conscientious convictions, were to be made liable to prosecution and imprisonment? A Liberal Government was in power. Let them legislate, then, in a liberal spirit. The great triumphs which had been won for England had been won by free legislation. Let them not attempt to coerce one class more than another. They had wisely permitted the free use of strong, vehement—nay, even denunciatory and threatening—language by the Press and public speakers on political subjects. That licence had worked well. Then, why should they seek to legislate for the Catholic priesthood of Ireland, or the Presbyterian clergy, in a different spirit from that in which they wore prepared to legislate for the Press and public speakers?

said, he was disposed to agree entirely with the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold), that they should leave out the words "temporal or spiritual," because he believed that the omission would render the matter more intelligible. It was scarcely intelligible at present. As the hon. and learned Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard) said, the words were nonsensical as they now stood. Mr. Austin, in his Province of Jurisprudence, pointed out the difference between the positive law and the moral law, and the difficulty of endeavouring by positive law to control a person from doing that which he thought himself bound to do under the moral law. Mr. Austin was Professor of Law in the University of London, and he said—

"The simple and obvious conditions to which I have now adverted are often overlooked by legislators. If they fancy the practice pernicious, or hate it they know not why, they proceed, without further thought, to forbid it by positive law. They forget the positive law may be superfluous or impotent, and therefore may lead to nothing but purely gratuitous vexation. They forget that the moral or the religious sentiments of the community may suppress the practice as completely as it can be suppressed; or that if the practice is favoured by those moral or religious sentiments, the strongest possible fear which legal pains can inspire may be mastered by a stronger fear of other conflicting functions."

There was only one other passage with which he would trouble the Committee—

"In consequence of the frequent coincidence of positive law and morality, and of positive law and the law of God, the true nature and foundation of positive law were often absurdly mistaken by writers upon jurisprudence. Where positive law has been fashioned on positive morality, or where positive law has been fashioned on the law of God, they forget that the law is the creature of the Sovereign, and impute it to the author of the model."

That was exactly what was done here, and he thought the passage he had read was a complete authority for the proposition brought forward by the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold), and alluded to in the course of the debate. It was asserted by the Attorney General that clergymen of the Roman Catholic Church had no right to direct a voter. Now, he (Mr. Marum) held that clergymen had no right to direct a voter upon matters of fact, or upon anything concerning matters of fact; but that questions of that nature must be left freely and entirely to the voter himself. But in matters of religion and morality, he held that a clergyman had a perfect right to direct the voter, and it was not "undue influence" for a priest to advise and direct him upon such questions. He would not object to a clergyman being subjected to pains and penalties if he were to put a voter in fear on account of matters of fact; but he would ask the Committee to consider the collision which would take place when they endeavoured to legislate for two laws that were concurrently running. It was impossible for the Committee to control the moral law by any mere ephemeral legislation in regard to positive law. He regretted that the Attorney General seemed to be determined to press forward this clause without the omission of the words "temporal or spiritual." In the event of the Attorney General persevering, he proposed to add a Proviso, in order to guard a clergyman against being caught by the meshes of the clause. Ho should propose at the end of the clause to add these words—

"Provided that the exercise of any ordinary jurisdiction in the performance of his duties or the fulfilment of his functions as a minister of religion by any clergyman of any religious belief shall not be deemed undue influence within the meaning of this Act."

He protested against the Amendment being pushed to its legitimate issue against the Catholic clergy, and he should do all in his power to prevent it. The words of the Attorney General's proposals were these—

"Every person who shall directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf, make use of or threaten to make use of any force, violence, or restraint, or inflict or threaten to inflict, by himself or by any other person, any temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss upon or against any person in order to induce or compel such person to vote or refrain from voting, or on account of such person having voted or refrained from voting at any election, or who shall, by abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device or contrivance, impede or prevent the free exercise of the franchise of any elector, or shall thereby compel, induce, or prevail upon any elector either to give or to refrain from giving his vote at any election, shall be guilty of undue influence."

Those words certainly did not appear to him to be very intelligible as they stood; and if they were adopted by the Committee he should certainly endeavour to control them by the Amendment he had indicated, and which he should propose subsequently.

said, he thought if they would ask themselves, first, what the Attorney General had conceded, and, next, what he proposed to do, they would be able to come to a better understanding of the position in which the matter stood, without the necessity for beginning, as he was afraid some hon. Members had begun, de novo, as if the question had never been before the House at all. He was sorry the hon. and learned Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard) was not present; but the idea that any communication had passed between the Attorney General and himself (Mr. Fowler) was entirely incorrect. He had never seen the clause until he saw it in print that afternoon; and he could only say that he thanked the Attorney General for the time, attention, and ability he had devoted to the matter in endeavouring to meet the wishes of the Committee. Now, what was it that the Attorney General had conceded? On Thursday and Friday it was contended that under the existing law the words in the Act of Parliament, "or in any other manner practices intimidation," whether rightly or wrongly, had been held by the Irish Judges to apply to the legitimate influence of the clergy with their flock; and it had been further held that the legitimate exercise of spirital influence by the Irish priests amounted to undue influence. It was all very well for the hon. and learned Member below him (Mr. Martin) to say that the Irish Judges had decided wrongly. He understood the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) to object to words that opened so wide an area as the words "or in any other manner practices intimidation." It was contended that they might be held by the Irish Judges, wisely or unwisely, to extend to acts of political as well as religious influence that were not interfered with in this country, and in reference to the exercise of which there would be no objection in this country. The great fight on Thursday and Friday was to strike out these very words. The section, as drawn, covered every other species of intimidation which could be defined, and every other species of intimidation that ought to be defined. The Attorney General said the words were intended, not to extend to political intimidation, but to the undue exercise of spiritual influence. As the case was put on Friday afternoon by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, it was not intended to apply to such legitimate and proper influence as that exercised in Birmingham by so distinguished and able a man as Dr. Dale. The right hon. Gentleman put that case on the one hand, and on the other he put the case of excited and angry persons denouncing a candidate by name from the altar, and threatening those who voted for such candidate with the most severe spiritual consequences. Of course, his right hon. Friend was too clever a rhetorician not to know that nothing was more taking than to put the minimum of one class and contrast it with the maximum of another. But the view he (Mr. Fowler) took was that there was a vast area of ground to traverse between the moderate influence the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade put as taking place in Birmingham and the extreme case which he put as one which might possibly take place elsewhere. He also contended in favour of that legitimate influence which any religious and moral teacher necessarily had, and which he was bound to exercise in the case of what he considered to be morally right, proper, and religious. He was of opinion that they ought not to leave any words in the Statute which might possibly affect such a case. His right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright), when it was proposed to go to war with the Northern States of America on behalf of the Southern States, denounced the stupendous guilt of such a national crime. Now, if the country had been called upon to go to war with the Northern States of America for the purpose of upholding slavery in the South, he believed, with his right hon. Friend, that it would have been the duty of every man who believed in the Bible to denounce such a war on every platform in England as a great national crime, and to use all the influence in his power to prevent a man from voting in favour of what, in his judgment, and that of most Christian men, would be a great national sin. That was the influence he desired to protect, and the Attorney General said he had protected it, while, at the same time, endeavouring to aim at something far beyond. He asked the Committee to remember what the Attorney General had conceded—namely, what they had really objected to—vague, undetermined, and wide words. And what had the hon. and learned Gentleman inserted in their place? He was sorry to say his hon. Friend the Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold) had not quoted them correctly. The hon. and learned Gentleman had not said—"Inflict or threaten any temporal or spiritual injury;" but the words were—

"Inflict, or threaten to inflict, by himself or by any other person, any temporal or spiritual injury."

That meant something a man was to do by himself, or by somebody else. The hon. and learned Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard) said he could attach no meaning to those words. The only meaning he (Mr. Fowler) attached to them was that they were words to give effect to the objection and meaning of the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) and the lion. Member for Sligo (Mr. Sexton) in the debate on Friday. He understood those hon. Members not to object to words condemnatory of undue influence, and those words only referred to the injury which any man could inflict by himself, or by any other person, by the refusal of some religious rite. He did not understand the Irish Members to object to the conduct of a priest who should threaten to deprive a man of the Sacraments for voting in a particular way, as being undue influence. It appeared to him that all the hon. Gentleman was aiming at was—

"Shall inflict, by himself or any other person, any temporal or spiritual injury,"

such as refusing the rites of the Church and the Sacraments for a political act. He understood that the Roman Catholic clergy were not adverse to legislation in that direction; and, if that were so, it seemed to him that every other case was provided for. The case which the hon. and learned Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard) had put, of denouncing a man by saying that he was guilty of sin, could not be punished under the clause, unless it could be shown that the clergyman had inflicted upon the voter any real, temporal, or spiritual injury. The wide words of the Statute of 1854 did allow of that, and the Irish Judges had so laid it down. Under these circumstances, he fully appreciated the concession which the Attorney General had made, and he thought that it was a very considerable concession. If they were taking the old question de novo, he thought they might have omitted all reference to the matter. But they must remember what the law had been for the last 30 years. He advised the Committee to accept the Amendment in the words which the Attorney General had proposed.

agreed with the hon. Member who had just spoken, that the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General for England did amount to a concession, and a concession of some value; and he regretted that, owing to the juxtaposition in which he had put the words "spiritual and temporal," he (Mr. Parnell) found it impossible to accept the Amendment fully and cordially, and that he was obliged to ask for further modification in the shape of an Amendment, which he himself proposed to move later on. He admitted that the hon. and learned Gentleman had displayed a desire to meet the views of the Committee, and also the views of hon. Members sitting on those Benches; and, therefore, it was the more to be regretted that the hon. and learned Gentleman had not framed the Amendment in such a way that the Committee could cordially accept it, with the knowledge that the law, as it was to stand in future, could not be used injuriously to any Church in Ireland, or to the religious scruples of any section of the community in Ireland. He agreed that, so far as temporal undue influence went, the omission of the paragraph in the middle of the old definition in the Act of 1854 did do away considerably with the vagueness and wideness of which they complained, and took away their objection to the spiritual aspect of the question. But he felt sure that the clergy, and more especially the Catholic clergy of Ireland, if the Committee were to agree to this Amendment, without pointing out the mischievous effect of the portion he referred to, would feel that they had been unfairly treated, and the Committee would be neglecting their duty if they allowed the slur to be cast on them, which this Amendment appeared to cast on them, in selecting them in this invidious manner as likely to inflict injury, harm, or loss, by the exercise of their spiritual functions. He and his hon. Friends, consistently maintaining their ground throughout, disagreed altogether ab initio with the policy of introducing the question of spiritual influence; and he believed, as he had over and over again stated, that if there was likely to be undue spiritual influence in Ireland, which he denied and did not at all think likely, it could not be checked by this or any other amendment of the law they were likely to insert in an Act of Parliament. If an Irish priest chose to exercise undue spiritual influence, and an Irish elector chose to permit it, all the law they could enact would not prevent it, because there were ways and means open to the Catholic clergy of exercising undue spiritual influence of such a character that it was utterly impossible for the law to guard against it or prevent it. He therefore thought it would be far better for the House to rely upon that general spirit and feeling which was increasing rapidly in Ireland, that there was a wide line of distinction to be drawn between religious duty—that was to say, duty to the Church—and civil duty, which was duty to the State. He regretted exceedingly that, owing to the vagueness of the definition contained in the Act of 1854, this question had been raised in a manner in which it had been found necessary to raise it. What was the meaning of the expression, "spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss? "How was the law going to define it? As several hon. and learned Gentlemen had already pointed out, it was not a term that had been, so far, known to the law, and they were about to introduce it for the first time in the Statute Book. On Friday they expressed themselves willing to agree to that definition of "undue spiritual influence" which the Irish Judges had pointed out, from time to time, as being contrary to the law. The decision of Mr. Justice Fitzgerald had been quoted by the right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board, and he (Mr. Parnell) and his hon. Friends had also quoted that definition as being one they were willing to accept. For instance, Mr. Justice Fitzgerald, in the Longford case, said—

"He must not threaten to excommunicate, or to withhold the sacraments, or to expose a person to any religious disability, or to denounce the voting for any particular candidate as a sin entailing punishment here or hereafter."

Some of his hon. Friends said they did not agree with the last definition, but they agreed with the two first and the most important ones, and they were both contained in the Amendment he proposed to move. He asked them to consider, if they adopted the Amendment of the Attorney General, and provided that the infliction of any spiritual injury, damage, harm, or less, or threat to inflict it, directly or indirectly, on any person might void the election, what would be the position of a priest who went upon a platform and told the electors that their duty to their country and their religion required them to vote for a certain candidate. There were electors in Ireland who fancied that they would commit a sin if they voted for a certain candidate contrary to the wishes of the priest. He regretted that it should be so; but if an elector was so ignorant—he would not say many of them, but if some of them were so ignorant—that the simple fact of a request from the priest to vote for a particular candidate, or a speech delivered by a priest advising them to vote for a particular candidate and be true to their religion and their country, would bring about such a state of things and induce certain voters in Ireland to believe they were committing a sin if they voted in a direction contrary to that desired by the priest, he did not see how it was to be guarded against by an Act of Parliament. Under such circumstances, the Election Judge would step in and take advantage of the elasticity and vagueness of the definition contained in the Act. He would quote a paragraph from a particular speech, and would say—" There are electors in this constituency who must have thought they were running a risk of having spiritual damage and loss inflicted upon them if they recorded their votes contrary to the priest's wishes, because such a passage happened to be contained in the speech delivered by some gentleman upon a platform; "and, although the great bulk of the constituency might have exercised the vote with perfect freeness, as far as the exhortations of the priest wore concerned, the Election Judge would void the election. He (Mr. Parnell) submitted that they ought not to be called upon to legislate so as to provide for imaginary evils and superstitions, which might exercise influence upon the minds of a few of the electors in the Irish constituencies, so long as the course of events proved that the great bulk of the electors in the Irish constituencies were free from these superstitious fears and imaginations, and refused to allow the influence of the priest from a religious point of view to put away their notions of political duty upon political questions. Then, he contended that that was a proof that this vague and wide definition was not required, and that the freedom of election and the rights of the constituencies would be imperiled by its adoption. It was a curious thing that the Election Judges—Mr. Justice Keogh, for instance—had adopted the definition which he (Mr. Parnell) proposed to move further on. Mr. Justice Keogh, in delivering Judgment in the second County of Galway Election Petition, in the case of Captain Nolan, said, referring to the Judgment he had previously delivered in the Galway Town case —" I further declare "—to these words he (Mr. Parnell) wished especially to direct the attention of his hon. and learned Friends—

"I further declare that if a single elector, even the most miserable criminal in this town, had been refused the rites of the Church in order to compel him to vote, or because ho had voted, or because a member of his family had voted in a particular way, I would have voided this election without the slightest hesitation."

It was in reference to that passage that he and his hon. Friends had said— "Introduce a definition into the Bill, and we will agree to it; but we disagree from the policy of referring to spiritual intimidation at all. If, however, you insist upon it, then, to save the time of the Committee, we will agree to, and we will not oppose, the insertion of such a definition." Then, again, in the case of Lord St. Lawrence and Sir Rowland Blennerhassett, Mr. Justice Keogh refused to void the election, on the ground that there had been no such undue spiritual influence as the refusal of the Sacraments, and so forth. In the Mayo case, in 1857, Colonel Higgins was the unsuccessful candidate, and it was proved that the Catholic priest told the people from the altar that—

"The curse of God would come down upon anyone who voted for Colonel Higgins;"

and that—

"If they were dying he would not give them the rites of the Church if they voted fox Higgins."

Upon that evidence the election was held to be void—

"If, in the present case, it had been proved that in a single instance the rites of the Church had been refused in order to influence voters, I would have voided the election; but that has not been proved. It has, however, been proved that in various churches the celebration of the Mass was suspended after the first Gospel in order to lecture the people upon the conflicting claims of the different candidates. I recognize the full right of the Catholic clergy to address their congregations, and I would not hold a hard-and-fast line as to the language which, in excited times, may be used by Catholic ecclesiastics or civilians, provided they did not surpass the bounds of legitimate influence."

He (Mr. Parnell) took his stand on the objectionable exercise of influence which the Irish Justices had pointed out, and he asked the Committee to insert those grounds in the Statute Book as proving that the necessities of the case need go no further.

said, that what took place on Friday would be in the recollection of the Committee. The Attorney General brought forward the clause, and the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) introduced an Amendment very similar to the one now before the Committee, in which he attempted to introduce the definition from the Act of 1854, instead of leaving the Bill in the general terms in which it stood. But, in proposing that Amendment, the hon. Member omitted from it everything that would at all reach spiritual intimidation, and the effect was that it became absolutely necessary to introduce words to make the matter clear. The words used in the Bill were amply sufficient to meet the description of undue influence which they all sought to prevent, and therefore the object they had in view was attained by them. They had now arrived at a point when all that was necessary for the Attorney General to do was to introduce words which should sufficiently define what it was the Committee understood by "undue spiritual influence," as distinguished from what might be called legitimate spiritual influence. What was introduced here was really all that was necessary to meet the evil of spiritual intimidation. The hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) had told them that spiritualism went further than that, and that there was a class of people in Ireland who were so illiterate that they were influenced by almost any denunciation or threat that any priest might indulge in. If they set themselves to the task of defining every variety of spiritual influence which the hon. Member said was brought to bear on the unintelligent in Ireland, they would utterly fail. It would be utterly impossible to lay down, in an Act of Parliament, anything to thoroughly cope with the evil. The worst possible legislation was legislation which defined what a crime was by setting forth the method in which it could be committed. Legislation of that kind was most mischievous. The words which were here used seemed to him to be sufficient to put a stop to all undue intimidation in the exercise of all improper spiritual influence. Some hon. Gentlemen seemed to think that these words did not go far enough; but they could not reach all the undue influence they desired to prevent. He had no doubt that all the undue influence which had been referred to would be made criminal. He did not feel a shadow of a doubt that any Judge, including Lord Fitzgerald, would hold that such undue influence as they sought to prevent would come within the meaning of these words, and that was all they wanted to get at. As a matter of fact, the Amendment would do that which on Friday night they all agreed it was most desirable to do—namely, prevent that sort of intimidation by threats of spiritual injury—for these were the words of the Amendment—about which so much complaint was made. The words would not hurt the feelings of any sect or denomiation, if clergymen thought it right to exert their influence in election matters; but it would effectually put a stop to that which, all were agreed, it was most desirable to prevent. The hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold) said this was the first time such a thing as spiritual influence had ever been introduced into an Act of Parliament; but the Committee should bear in mind that the law of this country was not altogether made up of Acts of Parliament, but that it consisted largely in the interpretation of law by the Judges, and "spiritual influence" was an expression well known in Courts of Law, especially in the Chancery Division. He was quite aware that many hon. Gentlemen opposite, who belonged to the Irish Party, had an objection to Judge-made law, and so had he himself; but when they came to that which was unquestionably a spiritual injury, whether it was laid down in an Act of Parliament or not, it was an offence, and they had bettor do what they could to prevent it. He agreed that the hon. and learned Attorney General had very fairly endeavoured to meet the difficulty they all felt themselves to be in on Friday night, and he, therefore, very cordially supported the proposal.

said, he wished to put questions to the Attorney General, the answers to which he thought would very materially shorten the debate. When they parted on Friday night the Attorney General stated that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. H. H. Fowler) had put a very plain question to him, and he (Sir R. Assheton Cross) would now repeat as plain a one. He wished to ask this—Whether, if a minister of religion got up in his pulpit —he did not care whether it was a Roman Catholic priest, or a Church of England clergyman, or a Nonconformist minister—and said to his congregation, "If you vote for A or B, who holds such and such opinions, you commit a sin," such minister was guilty of undue influence? That was the question he wished to have answered; and unless they knew exactly what the meaning of the clause was to be it would be impossible for them to vote upon it. He wished also to put another question to the Attorney General. In the Act of 1854 they had a definition of undue influence, and that definition had guided them for many years; and though it might be quite true that when this Act of Parliament was first passed there might have been doubts among the Judges as to how it was to be interpreted, they were now going to propose a new definition, and he very much feared that when that new definition was made there would be very grave doubts as to how the Judges would determine it. Before they went to that, therefore, he should like to know exactly what was the difference between the one definition and the other? [A laugh.] The Attorney General smiled at that, and he was glad to see that smile, for the point he was referring to was the one they had to discuss. It was quite true, and everyone knew it, that statements of Ministers in the House of Commons had nothing in the world to do with the decisions of Judges afterwards; and what he wanted to know was what the Government wished to express? If the Government would only say what it was they wanted to express, probably some Members in the Committee would be able to help them to put their view into proper language. Before, however, they could do anything, it was necessary that the Committee should know the exact difference between the definition in the Act of 1854 and that now proposed. The Attorney General was proposing to change the law of 1859 for something new, and they wished to know distinctly from him what that change was to be? That was a distinct question, and he wished to have a distinct answer. [The ATTORNEY GENERAL here conferred with Mr. GLADSTONE.] He was in no hurry. He had always, however, been brought up to think that a person could not do two things at once, and it seemed hardly possibly that the hon. and learned Gentleman (the Attorney General) could listen to a speech from the Prime Minister and his (Sir R. Assheton Cross's) argument at the same time. He did not wish to make a captious objection; but he had every desire to assist the Attorney General on this subject. He did not in the least know what the meaning of the clause was; it was a great puzzle to him, and he was sure it would also be a great puzzle to the Judges. The clause mentioned "spiritual harm." Well, a minister might warn a man that if he committed a particular act it would be a sin, and the Supreme Being would punish that sin; but that could not be called inflicting spiritual harm, it was merely giving a warning. He could understand a Roman Catholic priest, who unquestionably had more power over his flock than any other minister of religion, saying—" If you do not vote for A, B, C, or D, I will excommunicate you, or refuse you the Sacraments." That, no doubt, would he inflicting spiritual harm. This would not affect Nonconformists, because no spiritual harm of that kind could be inflicted upon them; and all their minister could say would be—" If you vote for such and such a person I believe you will suffer hereafter," and that would not be inflicting any spiritual harm. He did not understand the meaning of these words, and the questions he wished to ask were these—[" Oh, oh! "] He knew Nonconformists did not like this question—.

We want to hear the answer.

resumed his seat.

said, that the right hon. Gentleman had asked his questions very distinctly, and he (the Attorney General) would endeavour to answer them as clearly as he could. As to the first, whether it would be undue influence for a clergyman to say—" It would be a sin to vote for such and such a person "—[Sir R. ASSHETON CROSS: From the pulpit.] Yes; from the pulpit. In his opinion, it would not. If a clergyman said to his congregation—"It will be sinful for you to vote for Mr. Brad-laugh," he should not for a moment contend that that clergyman would be guilty of undue influence. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard) had put a similar question. Let him (the Attorney General) ask the hon. and learned Gentleman whether he would like that rule to be applied to clergymen of the Church of England? If Lord Fitzgerald, in the Judgment to which attention had been drawn, had meant to say—as he (the Attorney General) did not believe he did—that an exhortation on the part of a clergyman to his flock, without any threat, simply not to vote for a particular candidate, was undue influence, he did not agree with him. They could not apply Lord Fitzgerald's words in the abstract, but must take them as referring to absolute denunciation and refusal of the Sacraments—[" No, no ! "] Well, he did not go into the exact words of Lord Fitzgerald; but he would say that if that sentence stood by itself—namely, that a clergyman said it was a sin for a person to vote for such or such a candidate—to his mind it would not amount to an undue influence. His argument would not apply any more to a clergyman than to a layman. He would not put a penalty on a clergyman merely because he was a clergyman, although he quite recognized the fact that it might be more the duty of a clergyman than anybody else to point out any conscientious objection that might be taken to the support of the candidature of a certain individual. The clause did not draw any distinction between clergymen and laymen, and did not put any special prohibition upon a minister of religion. With regard to the second question asked by the right hon. Gentleman opposite — namely, the difference which would be effected in the law by the proposed Amendment, if the right hon. Gentleman meant to put a hard-and-fast construction upon the words of Lord Fitzgerald in the Judgment referred to, no doubt there might be some question as to whether a statement to vote for a certain candidate was a sin that might be looked upon as a corrupt influence; but, apart from that, it appeared to him that the Amendment made no alteration whatever in the law.

said, the hon. and learned Gentleman was referring to his observation with regard to Lord Fitzgerald's Judgment; but the definition in that Judgment he (Mr. Parnell) had only repeated so far as he recollected it from memory.

said, that if the hon. Member for the City of Cork took Lord Fitzgerald's definition he would be worse off than he was at present. When the Act of 1854 was passing through Committee, a Member had asked how a voter was to be protected against the exercise of undue spiritual influence; and Mr. Walpole had said that that point was covered by the words "in any other manner," and he added that that view was entertained by Sir Fitzroy Kelly. Several hon. Members of the Conservative Party were of opinion that those general words would not suffice; and Vice Chanceller Malins had proposed these very words on behalf of the Party —namely, "spiritual or temporal loss or damage; "he had proposed them because they were more certain than the general phrase. These words were believed to be more specific for the purpose of controlling spiritual intimidation than the general words. No doubt, the spiritual less which was meant to be covered in that way was such a thing as the refusal of communion, or the refusal to baptize a child—things which obviously did not entail a money loss, but were yet a deprivation of advantages to which a voter might consider himself entitled. The words ought to be taken in that sense, and should not be taken as con- demning the practice of bringing men's minds under the influence of religion. Anyone had a perfect right to endeavour, by fair argument, to influence a man's action, whether as an elector or otherwise; but it was a loss to a man, and a spiritual injury, to deny him the Sacraments of his Church; and such denial, therefore, would come under the Amendment. Certain Members of the Committee had contended that this was an invidious attack upon the clergymen of the Church of Rome; but where, he would ask, was there a single word in the Amendment or the clause about the clergymen of the Church of Rome? There was no word in either the Amendment or the clause relating to the clergymen of any Church. Why did hon. Members assume that this was an attack on the Church of Rome?

From experience.

What, experience of this clause?

No; the experience of history.

said, that the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny charged the Government with making an attack upon the Church of Rome; and the hon. Member for the City of Cork said that if the Irish Members did not protest against this attack, it would be said that they had not protected. the interests of their Church. In reply to that, he could only say that the proposal was not directed against the Church of Rome. It was intended to make it applicable to every Church, and to every clergyman, and to every layman.

asked whether he was to understand that no threat of punishment in a future world, in consequence of a certain line of action at an election, was to come within this new law as undue influence? The words "intimidation" and "undue influence" were well known to the law. Hon. Gentlemen would remember the discussion which had taken place upon the word "intimidation" upon the Masters' and Servants' Bill some eight years ago. The words "violence" and "intimidation" had then been used; and the whole argument had turned, not upon the question of the threats a person might use, but upon the question of the effect they might have upon the mind of the per- son to whom they were addressed. In that case they were discussing the effect intimidation would have upon the mind of the working man, and intimidation was eventually put into the Statute under conspiracy, yet the thing was well known to the law. Let them take the case of a Roman Catholic priest, or a clergyman in the Church of England—for he wished to make no distinction between the ministers of different religions—and suppose either of these used his position to bring spiritual influence upon a voter, his action could not for a moment be compared to that of a layman. A clergyman might say—" I use my spiritual power over you. I exert my influence as your spiritual adviser, and I say to you that if you vote for that man I will excommunicate you from the altar." [An. hon. MEMBER: No clergyman could do that.] That is what the Roman Catholic priest could do. [Mr. LEAMY: No, no !] At any rate, it was what a Roman Catholic priest was supposed to be able to do. If the clergyman or minister of religion was a Catholic, he could say that; and if he was a Nonconformist, he might use other words, and adopt another course which might, practically, have the same effect upon the mind of the voter. What he (Sir R. Assheton Cross) wished to know was simply this —whether or not a threat of punishment in a future state, in consequence of a vote, would be held, under the Amendment, to be undue influence?

said, the point raised by the right hon. Gentleman seemed to be somewhat casuistical and metaphysical. It was difficult to draw a distinction between a threat and a warning; but his view was that while a clergyman might say—" If you vote for a particular man that is a sin," it would be a breach of the clause to say—" If you vote for him I will excommunicate you."

said, he thought the Attorney General had got himself into an awkward dilemma by introducing these words. The more he listened to the discussion the more he saw that the hon. and learned Gentleman, instead of keeping within the region of practical law-making, had wandered away and lost himself in the region of metaphysics; and ho was inclined to doubt whether the Committee was in a condition to discuss this question. The hon. and learned Gentleman was in such stress that he was driven to resort to a question which, coming from any other man, he would have considered disingenuous. He had asked where was there a word in the clause about clergymen? That was a most extraordinary question. The whole difficulty in the clause arose from the fact that clergymen of the Church of Rome did, and very rightly, exorcise a power far greater in regard to voters during Parliamentary Elections than clergymen of the Church of England or Nonconformists. It was their duty to do so, and that question of the Attorney General's proved what au extraordinary difficulty he was in. The whole thing turned on the clergymen of the Church of Rome, and what they could do and had to do. He would ask the Committee to follow the Attorney General in the argument he had endeavoured to put forward. The hon. and learned Gentleman said it was not an exercise of undue influence for a clergyman to say from the pulpit—" If you vote for such and such a man you will commit a sin; "and the inference, therefore, followed that if a clergyman told a parishioner that his vote would bring upon him punishment in a future world, that, according to the Attorney General, would not be" undue influence. "That theory might be enlarged upon by an eloquent clergyman. The Attorney General said a clergyman might do that; but he must not threaten to excommunicate the man, or refuse him the Sacrament. An English Churchman, like the Attorney General, of course, (lid not recognize excommunication; but in the Church of Rome it was not an uncommon thing, and the refusal of the Sacrament was a very common thing among the Irish people. One of the strongest holds they had over their fellow-parishioners was the power of refusing the Sacrament. The expression "being in a state of sin" was very common in the Roman Catholic Church; and if a priest told a man that if he voted so and so, was he bound not to give the man warning that if he continued in that state of sin he would be deprived of the rites of the Church? A letter had recently come from the See of Rome denouncing, in the strongest language, a certain political Party in Ireland; and that letter must exercise a strong effect upon a moiety or two-thirds of the Roman Catholic clergy. There were two schools of Roman Catholic clergy in Ireland; one headed by Archbishop Croke; the other headed by Archbishop M'Cabe. This matter was likely to become a burning question; and suppose Archbishop M'Cabe wrote a letter to the priests in his diocese tolling them to warn their congregations, in the strongest manner in their power, against voting for any Member of the Irish Party, and, if necessary, to refuse the rites of the Church to any who did so vote, the Archbishop would be acting strictly on a letter with which the Government were not altogether unconnected. See what a difficulty the Archbishop would be in. He would be justified in telling the priests to warn their flocks from the pulpit that they would be committing a sin if they voted for Mr. Parnell, and would be refused the Sacrament. On the other hand, Archbishop Croke might issue a Circular to the opposite effect, warning every voter by post that if he voted for the National Party he would be in a state of sin, and, therefore, would have no right to the Sacrament. He did not think the Attorney General could get out of that desperate dilemma—a dilemma which, if these words were put in the Bill, would hopelessly perplex the minds of the Irish Judges; and if the hon. and learned Gentleman had any regard for the peace of mind of candidates he would not adhere to the words.

said, all these fine definitions raised by hon. Members showed that the best course would be to leave these words out of the clause. Ho should not follow hon. Gentlemen who had preceded him in the field of metaphysics, nor the noble Lord in the religious feelings he had displayed; but he would simply point out this. The Attorney General had stated that, if Church membership or the Sacrament was refused, the person refusing it would come under this clause. What would be the effect of refusing the Sacrament? As he understood, it would be a temporal injury. If it were a spiritual injury, the refusal would come under this clause. There was a certain vagueness in the definition of the Attorney General. The words were—

"Every person who shall directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf, make use of or threaten to make use of any force, violence, or restrain, or inflict or threaten to inflict, by himself or by any other person, any temporal or spiritual injury,"

and so on. Could the hon. and learned Attorney General say what indirect spiritual injury was? No doubt, he would say he could not define everything, and that they must leave everything to the Judges; but ho objected to that when there were certain penalties to be inflicted. He wanted things made clear and distinct; and if the hon. and learned Gentleman brought in a Bill, and said the words were such that he could not define them, and must leave them to the Judges, that was the wrong way to legislate. The Attorney General would attack superstition; but he did not think they ought to attack superstition by legislation. They ought to leave that to improved education and other means. The hon. and learned Gentleman had alluded to the borough of Northampton. In that borough, as he understood the hon. and learned Gentleman, if anyone said it was a sin to vote for A or B he would not come under the clause; but that if ho accompanied that statement with a denunciation he would come under the clause. That being so, the Attorney General, who was there to explain the law, should say specifically what would bring a person under the clause, and what would not.

said, he wished to ask the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) a question. On Friday last the Attorney General and the right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), the Solicitor General, and the President of the Local Government gave their opinions upon this question. He wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether his opinion was the same now as it was then; and, if so, how he could reconcile it with the Attorney General's? The right hon. Gentleman quoted Mr. Justice Fitzgerald, and what he said was that—

"A priest might counsel, advise, or recommend and entreat, and explain why one candidate should be preferred to another, and if he thought fit might throw the whole weight of his character into the scale."

That was reasonable; but he added—

"But he may not appeal to the fears or terrors of superstition to the person whom he is addressing."

That was an important point.

"He must not hold out hope of reward here or hereafter, or use throats of temporal injury, or disadvantage, or punishment hereafter. He must not, for instance, threaten excommunication, or the refusal of the Sacrament; nor must he denounce a vote given for a particular candidate."

Hon. Members would see that all through the decision of Mr. Justice Fitzgerald, and all through the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, a distinction was clearly drawn between temporal advantage or disadvantage, and threats of advantage or disadvantage hereafter in another world. Then the right hon. Gentleman said that, in his opinion, it was impossible to lay down more clearly what the law ought to be; and he now wanted to ask the Attorney General whether his new clause did lay down the law more clearly, and the right hon. Gentleman whether he had changed his mind?

said, he had not changed his mind. The Attorney General had distinctly stated just now that the effect of the Amendment would be to carry out the principles of the Judgment referred to, with the one exception of the word "sin." Ho had answered the right hon. Gentleman by anticipation, and stated that upon that word ho did not agree with Mr. Justice Fitzgerald.

said, the whole question was as to punishment hereafter; and what he and his hon. Friends wanted to know, and were determined to ascertain, was whether a threat of punishment or a promise of a reward in the world to come would come under this clause? "Yes" or "No."

said, he would invite hon. Members to reconsider their intention to support the action of the Attorney General by the light of the declarations now made by the hon. and learned Gentleman. The reasons why the Irish Members were pressing the Government upon this clause were, first, that there was no instance of an election being voided in England or Scotland on the ground of undue spiritual influence; and he did not think the Attorney General was dealing candidly with the Committee when ho said the clause contained no words with regard to clergymen of the Roman Catholic Church. Everybody know that this clause was mainly, if not entirely, directed against them —at all events, the clause would, in practice, operate solely against the Roman Catholic clergy. The second reason why they had a particular claim on this matter was this—whenever an election took place in Ireland, or during the course of an election, there was a meeting of the clergy of the constituency, especially in the case of a county election. They passed before them the names of particular candidates, and selected one; and the candidate they selected was usually on the popular side. There were exceptions; but the popular candidate and the clerical candidate were usually the same. Under the Law of Agency, as laid down by the Judges, every one of those clergymen would become an agent of the candidate selected. Nearly every clergyman took an active part in an election; and under this law the candidate would become responsible for every speech and word of every clergyman, on the platform or in the pulpit, during the contest. Therefore, wore hon. Members not justified in hedging round a clause of this kind in every possible way? Ho invited the attention of the hon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. H. H. Fowler) to this. On Friday he said that the point at issue between himself and the Attorney General was this—he did not mean that a clergyman should be prevented from using general spiritual influence; but they parted company in this way —he said spiritual general influence was legitimate; but the remust not be that influence accompanied by any immediate and definite punishment in the shape of deprivation of the Sacrament. The hon. Member would not object to a priest being allowed to say—" If you vote for such and such a candidate you will be committing personal and national and political sin; "but when a clergyman said a voter would commit sin by taking such and such a course, he implied that the voter would thereby imperil his prospects for ever in the world to come. That was a corollary. If fire hon. and learned Member was consistent with his own proposal, a clergyman should be allowed not only to declare that such a vote would be sin, but that such a sin would be followed by consequences. But the Attorney General did not take that view; but that the priest should be permitted to say that such and such a course would be a sin. [The ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir Henry James): I did not say that.] The hon. and learned Gentleman said the law remained as it was, except as to this question of sin and the punishment of sin. If that was so, then the law stood as it was when Mr. Justice Keogh gave his Galway Judgment. Mr. Justice Keogh cited Sir Samuel Romilly, to the effect that undue influence would be used if ecclesiastics made use of their power to excite superstitious fears or pious hopes; if they sought to alarm consciences by the horrors of eternal misery, or supported drooping spirits by unfolding a prospect of happiness which was never to end. He submitted that what the Attorney General said would be lawful would be unlawful if Sir Samuel Romilly was correct. Sir Samuel Romilly's dictum was adopted by Mr. Justice Keogh, and that was now part of the law of the land. For these reasons, he held that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton was bound to join the Irish Members.

said, he wished to ask the Prime Minister whether threats of a spiritual adviser, of punishment or promises of reward in a future world, in consequence of a vote given at an election, was to be deemed undue influence or not?

said, he would gladly have left the discussion of this question in the hands of those who were much more competent than himself to deal with it; but he had to thank the right hon. Gentleman for saying he pressed this question upon him because he recognized him as an authority. He should be willing to answer the right hon. Gentleman's question, if he did not think the matter had been explained by the Attorney General. The Attorney General was asked what he wished and desired; and he would answer in the exact sense of his hon. and learned Friend, and in a sense which he hoped would be perfectly clear. The hon. and learned Gentleman had said it must remain free to every clergyman and every minister of religion, as to every layman, with the authority which his office gave him, to point out to a member of his flock that if he took such and such a course under given circumstances that would be a sin. He agreed with his hon. Friend behind him as to the general rule of prudence and propriety against introducing this clause; but that was not the question. The question was not what was prudent and proper, but what would come within the law. Again, the right hon. Gentleman asked—"What is to be the case if a clergyman carries his views to the other world, and speaks of the after reward? "The hon. Gentleman the Member for Galway (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) had provided a perfectly distinct answer to this question. It was quite impossible to say to the clergyman —" You may point out to your flock the proper action to take, and yet not be able to tell them the penalties. or to point out the consequences of sin." It was quite manifest, therefore, that, so far, this Act per se could not bring a clergyman within the scope of the Act. What would happen if violence and denunciatory language were used would be quite in another province, and he would not enter upon it. He accepted in full the statement of the hon. Member for Galway that they could not possibly forbid a clergyman to point out that such and such was a sin, without ipso facto allowing him to point out the consequences of the sin.

said, that on the last occasion that this matter was under the notice of the Committee it was stated, in the clearest possible way, by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke), that the Government rested their case in reference to the construction of the doctrine of undue influence upon a passage of the Judgment of Mr. Justice Fitzgerald in the Galway case. That passage was of the broadest possible character, and it recommended itself very forcibly to the Government—at least, the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Charles W. Dilke), in a very short and logical speech, so represented that view to the House. The Attorney General follewed, and stated that although he would place, if he could, on the Notice Paper of today a definition of undue influence which would cover spiritual influence, he did not recede in the slightest degree from the principle which, in substance, he had previously laid down, and he did not intend to effect the slightest alteration in the law as laid down by Mr. Justice Fitzgerald. If the right hon. Gentleman questioned what he (Mr. Gibson) was saying, he would make way for him; but he was speaking from his recollection. His hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General spoke at the close of the debate on Friday, after the speech of the President of the Local Government Board; and the Attorney General stated that although he would apply himself to the difficult task of defining spiritual undue influence, ho wished it to be distinctly understood he had made no change in the substance of his opinion, and he did not intend to alter or to change the law. Well, more recently—within the last 10 months—the attention of the Government had been challenged to the passage in Judge Fitzgerald's speech in which those words occurred, in which it was set forth that it would be wrong for a clergyman to appeal to the fears, terrors, and the superstitions of his audience. Now, he begged the Committee to dwell for a moment upon these words; and he asked if it was intended to seek to qualify the word "superstition," and to use the Prime Minister's expression—sin, and the consequences of that particular sin? Was it intended also to qualify the clear words of Mr. Justice Fitzgerald—that it would be undue influence for a clergyman or for anyone to appeal to the fears, or the terrors, or the superstitions of an audience? Now, that was a clear question. That was one of the most marked passages of Mr. Justice Fitzgerald's Judgment. If he was told that it was intended to retain these words, he would then ask—how was it possible to retain such words, and, at the same time, give a grammatical and logical construction to the statement just now made by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister that the pointing out of the consequences of sin would not in itself constitute undue influence, because it might be that if they told a man he sinned, and pointed out the consequences of his sin, they would appeal to his fears, his terrors, and his superstitions, and they would come within the Judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Fitzgerald, which had been described as a broad and statesmanlike judgment. He would like to know, with something like precision, exactly how much of the Judgment of Mr. Justice Fitzgerald was now adhered to by the Government? Did they seek to strike out any word except sin; and did they still adhere to as much of the Judgment which he had particularly called attention to—namely, the appealing to the fears, terrors, and superstitions of an audience?

said, they had had a good many questions directed to them, all of which they had endeavoured to answer. He thought now they had a right to ask the Opposition what they desired the law to be? His right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had distinctly pointed out what he considered would come within the clause now drawn. Supposing a clergyman of the Church of England said to one of his congregation, or to his congregation as a whole, that he honestly believed that if a member of his congregation voted for a particular individual he would be guilty of a sin. Let them take the case, for instance, of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh), because one could easily see that there were some clergymen who would regard it as a sin to vote for that hon. Gentleman. They would say—" It is a sin; and for that sin you will have to suffer, as for all your sins." Did hon. Members mean that that ought to be made an offence? He (the Solicitor General) admitted, if it ought to be made an offence, they were not making it an offence by this clause. Personally, he did not consider that it ought to be made an offence.

wanted to know why they (the Government) brought in their Bill? Why did they bring their Bill in last year, and state that after considering all the Amendments they were satisfied with it? They had had two years to consider their Bill, and now they were arguing against it, and not against any Amendment. The Prime Minister had now said that unless they inflicted some temporal injury upon a clergyman, that clergyman might denounce a man from the altar. All he (Sir R. Assheton Cross) could say was that, if they were going to alter their Bill in this way, it would be a long time before it passed into law.

said, when he rose a few minutes ago he reminded the Committee that the Government had answered a great many questions, and he put one question to the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir H. Assheton Cross). The right hon. Gentleman, however, did not get up and answer the question; but he rose and put another.

asserted that he answered the question distinctly, for he had argued that they ought to leave their own definition of the clause alone.

said, he did not want to trespass long upon the time of the Committee, because he was anxious to go to a division, and to vote in favour of the proposal of the Attorney General. It seemed to him that the discussion had a good deal wandered from the real question, which was, whether the words "temporal or spiritual injury" were to be included? If they were not, the whole matter was left at large. Personally, he was of opinion that some reference to spiritual injury should be put in the clause. He thought it was necessary to put it in, for the purpose of covering the refusal of the Sacraments of the Church, or a refusal of the advantages connected with membership which would be a threat, which a great many Judges would properly hold not to be a threat of temporal injury. A great difficulty was imported into this discussion, in consequence of the unfortunate Judgments of Mr. Justice Fitzgerald and Mr. Justice Keogh. He (Mr. Clarke) confessed that he did not think that these Judgments were strictly in accordance with law; and he considered that a great deal of difficulty had occurred here, in consequence of those Judgments being taken as part of the law. He was entirely agreed on this matter with his hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. H. Fowler), and with what he thought was the intention of the Prime Minister. It was perfectly idle to say that a minister of religion should not be able to tell his flock that it would be a sin to vote for a particular candidate. If a clergyman thought it was a sin to vote for a particular candidate, it was not only his right, but it was his duty to tell them so, inasmuch as he was responsible for the spiritual welfare of his flock. It was equally idle to say that a clergyman might tell his flock it was a sin to vote for a particular candidate, and yet not be allowed to tell them what were the penalties which, in his judgment, would follow. At the same time, if a clergyman exercised his own personal authority in the Church to which he belonged, so as to expose the person who disobeyed his will to the public stigma of being excluded from the advantages of the Church, then he would be using pressure which could be reached by the law. On the other hand, he had sufficient belief in the beneficent influence of the Churches upon the minds, consciences, and actions of men, to prefer to leave undisturbed by any legislation the appeal which any clergyman of any denomination might make to what were termed the terrors, fears, and superstitions of men, but what were really the highest principles known as a guide of human conduct. Under the circumstances, he hoped the words "temporal or spiritual" would be retained. If they were omitted it would appear to him to be casting away all reverence for authority on spiritual matters. He should be sorry to see that authority disregarded; for he believed it to be for the general welfare of the world that the Church, in its spiritual sphere, should exercise the fullest authority over the minds and consciences of men.

asked the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General if he would define what he meant by indirect spiritual influence? Personally, he considered it absolutely impossible to define it. They did not legislate against superstition, but they tried to eradicate superstition by education; and if the Attorney General would define what he meant by indirect spiritual influence, then they would understand the matter. If he did not provide that definition, he left the question in the same state of uncertainty in which it now existed.

said, there were two classes of spiritual influence used in this country—namely, the Nonconformist spiritual influence and the Roman Catholic spiritual influence. They, of course, all knew that spiritual influence in the Church of England was never exercised at all. He understood that this Bill was intended to strike a blow at the Roman Catholic spiritual influence, while it was intended to maintain Nonconformist spiritual influence; because the latter was the spiritual influence which always acted in favour of the Government, while the Roman Catholic spiritual influence was, as a rule, used against the Liberal Government. The Attorney General had pointed to the refusal of the Sacraments, to excommunication, and to other matters as specimens of undue influence. What about Churches which had no Sacra- ments, and Churches which did not excommunicate? They would not be touched. It was a well-known fact that Nonconformists used their chapels for political purposes; but the Attorney General argued that preaching against any candidate was a fair and due exercise of spiritual influence. But he failed to see that there was any real difference in principle between cursing from the altar and cursing the pulpit. He (Mr. Stanley Leighton) could not regard this Bill otherwise than as a flagrant attempt of the Government to forward their own particular ends and aims.

said, the Attorney General had placed them in a difficult position; and the position was shortly this—they had based their case all along upon the desirability of inquiring the definition of undue spiritual influence. The Attorney General appeared to meet them on that point, and said he would place in the Notice Paper an Amendment defining undue spiritual influence to-day. They saw that Amendment on the Paper; and he (Mr. Parnell) was informed by his hon. and learned Friends that the question of undue spiritual influence was left by the Amendment very much where it was before. The hon. and learned Attorney General, in the course of that evening, had admitted that the law with regard to undue spiritual influence would not be altered by the Amendment; and yet he absolutely appeared to represent, or to wish the Committee to believe, that it was offering them a concession to widen the definition, when, as a matter of fact, it was practically leaving the law exactly as it now stood. But when they pointed to the definitions of Sir Samuel Romilly Mr. Justice Fitzgerald, who were quoted with approval by hon. Gentlemen on the Government Benches, when they pointed out those definitions, and asked the Government whether, in view of those definitions, the Amendment would coincide with them, and with the Judgment of Mr. Justice Keogh, they were told by the Prime Minister and by the learned Solicitor General that it was not so. It was argued that a question of undue influence should not be complicated by any reference to sermons or speeches made by clergymen, in which they would hold out the perils of the future state, or use religious influence of this kind upon their congregations. The Committee really wanted to know where they were? The Attorney General for England said the law was not altered by his Amendment, while the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister and the Solicitor General for England. maintained that the law would be altered, since the law would not be according to the Judgments already referred to. The Government, so far as the Prime Minister and. the Solicitor General went, agreed—that was to say, they agreed—with the Amendment which he (Mr. Parnell) should propose a little later on. If that substantial agreement had been arrived at, why should it not be placed upon the Statute Book, and so free the exercise of political rights and duties by clergymen of the Catholic Church in Ireland from the perils which surrounded it? He had. said that they did not adopt an unreasonable attitude in refusing to accept the concession of the Attorney General, which he admitted to be a concession with regard to undue influence from a temporal point of view; but which did. not affect the case from a spiritual point of view.

said, he wished to remind the Committee that it was distinctly understood that the Amendment of the Attorney General would be one of definition and not of alteration. Now, the two Law Officers of the Crown admitted that the law as expounded would be altered by this Amendment.

said, he was sorry his hon. and learned Friend (Sir Hardinge Giffard) did. not give the Government credit for having endeavoured to make an improvement. The words complained of were "or in any other manner practises intimidation," and it was feared that injustice would be done in consequence of the vagueness of the words. It was now said. that the Government had stated that the law was not altered. If the words were to be construed strictly, it was not an offence to tell a person it was a sin to vote for a certain candidate. The exposition of the law was not the law; the law depended upon itself; they must look to the Statute itself, and see what the law was. The Government really believed they were adhering to the sub, stance of the law.

said, that according to the view of the hon. and learned Gentleman it would not be an offence for a clergyman to state to an elector his opinion that voting for a candidate, under certain circumstances, would be a sin. But he went on to say that if the clergyman proceeded to denunciation the offence of undue influence would arise. But what was denunciation? The only answer they could get from the Attorney General was that it was what the Judge would consider to be denunciation. And there, again, they were referred back to the opinions of ex-Attorney Generals, whom Her Majesty's Government might, for Party purposes, raise to the Irish Bench. They were, therefore, in the same position of uncertainty as to the meaning of denunciation as they were before. The Committee ought also to remember that there were distinctions which should be borne in mind with reference to the interference of the Catholic clergy at elections. There were certain offences, certain sins, which by the law of the Catholic Church necessarily brought with them excommunication. For instance, a project of law confiscating Church trusts might, to its supporters, involve a sin of a charater which drew excommunication with it. Well, they had there a case in which advice to an elector on the part of a Catholic clergyman not to vote for a candidate who supported this project of law would be an offence of the kind. It would carry with it the penalty of undue spiritual influence, although the clergyman might make the declaration entirely without any collusion, and purely as a minister of the Church; but in that capacity he would disqualify the candidate for Parliamentary election, because it would be regarded undue influence in the mind of the Judge. Therefore, he said, that the whole difficulty with regard to spiritual influence remained; and he was afraid that if the Government persisted in refusing to accept any kind of Amendment to this part of the clause, Irish Members would be driven to the course of enacting greater guarantees in the case of the tribunals which would have to try these cases of undue influence. If the Government would not guard against the prejudiced actions of ex-Attorney Generals raised to the Bench in Ireland, why, then, at a later stage of the Bill, they would have to oppose even more strongly the power to be conferred upon them; and they would have to insist that instead of a tribunal of two Attorney Generals raised to the Judgeship there should be a Court so constituted that the number of its members would afford greater guarantees for impartiality. Again, ministers of the various English Churches did not exercise, were not called upon by their religion to exercise, and were not empowered by their religion to exercise, the right which belonged to the Irish Catholic clergy; and, moreover, English Members of Parliament were not liable to be tried before a tribunal which was comparatively impartiality as compared with the tribunal before which Irish Members were to be tried; so that the scales on both these points were unfairly weighted as against Irish Members. Under the circumstances, it was obvious that the satisfaction which the Government denied to them in one part of the Bill must be sought at another. The words made use of by the Government, although apparently implying concession, would only lead to greater difficulties at the later stages of the Bill. For his own part, he considered that every enormity of the Keogh Judgment was just as possible under the Amendment as it was before. The hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) admitted that the term. "law" meant the interpretation of the law by the Judge; it meant, in other words, that the clause was open to any amount of interpretation and misreading by an Attorney General who had won his way to the Bench by violent partizanship.

said, that the Amendment of the Attorney General had been framed in such a way as to include spiritual intimidation. The hon. and learned Gentleman had said, in reply to the hon. and learned Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard)— "My Amendment adopts the words used in 1854 when the Corrupt Practices Bill was passing through the House." He (Mr. Leamy) was surprised to hear the challenge which came from the hon. and learned Gentleman.

said, that the objection which his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork made to the clause was that undue influence was in- terpreted in Ireland in a different way from that in which it was interpreted in England. He thought with regard to Ireland that he was right, after the admissions of the Attorney General and the Solicitor General, in saying that the Judgments of Judges Fitzgerald, Lawson, and Keogh were not only contrary to the intention of the Act, but contrary to common sense. If it was intended to create a new offence they were entitled to know what that offence was. Ho and his hon. Friends had pointed out, in the course of the discussion, that almost any declaration of opinion made by a priest in Ireland would be considered by the Irish Judges as undue influence. Now, the Attorney General had gone a good way to make a concession; he had eliminated one particular interpretation of the law which was objectionable—that laid down by Mr. Justice Fitzgerald. But he must say that the hon. and learned Gentleman had hardly made the matter any better, because he had retained the words "spiritual injury, harm, or loss." Would not the Judgment of Judge Fitzgerald in the Longford case, that of Judge Lawson in the Galway case, and of Justice Keogh in the other, all be appealed to as interpretations of spiritual injury. Every one of them could be so appealed to; and, therefore, all the difficulties which they were now trying to guard against would come up again under the interpretation of spiritual injury, harm, or loss. Undue spiritual influence, as interpreted by these Judges, was quite as objectionable as the definition of the offence they were now trying to get rid of. The Attorney General had promised something more definite; but up to that time Irish Members had obtained nothing of importance. He entirely dissented from the law as laid down by the Attorney General, who said that the Judgment of a Judge went for nothing in interpreting an Act of Parliament. He (Dr. Commins) thought it went for everything, and particularly in cases where there was no appeal. And he feared that, notwithstanding the concession which bad been made, the interpretation of the law as laid down by the Judges named would hold good. For these reasons they still proposed to get rid of this clause; and unless their point was conceded he feared that little further advance would be made.

said, he thought it was to be regretted that the question before the Committee, with respect to what was called spiritual intimidation, should be in the hands of the present Attorney General. It was most unfortunate, for the conduct of the question in an impartial spirit, that the Attorney General should have charge of this clause. On any other matter connected with the offences in the Bill—such as treating, bribery, and corruption—he should not have felt the same objection. With regard to spiritual influence, the hon. and learned Gentleman knew nothing except what he had learned from the Judgment of Mr. Justice Keogh. He referred the Committee to the speech made by the hon. and learned Gentleman on the 25th of July, 1872. on the Motion of the late hon. and learned Member for Limerick (Mr. Butt) with regard to the Judgment of Mr. Justice Keogh. He found that the Attorney General then said—

"I charge the Roman Catholic clergy of the county of Galway that they, with plot and plan, with premeditation and consideration, determined to usurp and seize upon the representation of that county ….. and set at defiance the rules and ordinances of their own Church." —(3 Hansard, [212] 1820–21.)

A contest was now impending in Ireland, and to-morrow there was to be a meeting of priests at Monaghan, not as priests, but as electors, to consider the claims of the rival candidates. The Government had sent over the hon. Member for Tyrone (Mr. T. A. Dickson) to secure the election of the Government candidate by means of this meeting of priests; and probably the Papal Envoy had furnished him with a number of Circulars for distribution at the same time. Now, what did the Attorney General say in 1872? He said—

"I complain, that men who are not electors should hold private meetings, from which the public are excluded, and at such meetings they, acting as clergymen and not as citizens, should combine to dictate to men who are electors how their votes should be given."—(Ibid. 1823.)

And then the hon. and learned Gentleman went on to lay down that this was spiritual intimidation. Under the circumstances, he was not surprised to-day to hear that the Attorney General declined to give any definition of the term spiritual intimidation. But the Committee must judge of what his idea of the offence was by the speech to which he was now referring. The hon. and learned Gentleman proceeded, in the course of his speech, eloquently to denounce spiritual intimidation at a meeting of what he called "this proud priesthood." He hoped the Monaghan priests would remember to-morrow what the Attorney General had said. He promised to pay great deference to the opinion of the hon. and learned Gentleman when they came to the question of bribery, treating, and corruption. But, with regard to the question immediately before the Committee, he again expressed his regret that it should have been placed in his hands.

said, he thought an Amendment he had to move would probably come in now before either that of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), or that of the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny (Mr. Marum). The Amendment to which he referred was in the shape of a Proviso at the end of the section. He proposed to move the words—

"Provided, That spiritual injury, damage, harm or loss, under this section, shall mean excommunication, or withholding or refusing the rights or sacraments of any Church."

Does the hon. Member propose to amend the proposed Amendment?

Yes; I propose to add these words as a Proviso to the end of the Amendment.