Mr. Speaker, I rise to submit to the House a Motion of which I have given Notice; and I wish, in the first place, to say that there is nothing that I should deprecate so much as anything in the nature of an irritating debate upon a delicate question; and I earnestly hope that as I shall myself abstain from anything that I am conscious can bear an irritating character, so others who may follow me will reserve themselves, and use careful language upon the subject. I do not see why there should be any occasion for us to import irritating topics into the present discussion. The question to which I wish to draw attention is one of a business and commercial character; it is one which I think may be, and ought to be, discussed in a manner in which we usually discuss important questions of that character; and my belief is, that those who are anxious and profess themselves to be nervous with regard to the consequences of any discussion on such a subject are entirely in error, and are even conducing to cause the danger which they seem to apprehend. For my part, I admit there is a responsibility, which, of course, lies upon every Member of the House, whatever may be his position in the House, in discussing questions which affect our foreign relations; but if there is a responsibility in speaking, so also, I believe, there is a responsibility sometimes in silence; and I cannot help thinking that there is nothing which conduces more to misunderstandings than what may be called half-understandings. Often and often we have seen that where there is thought to be a necessity for practising reserve, and for not communicating all that might be communicated to the public and to Parliament, it has happened that mischief—the very mischief you wish to avoid—has resulted from that reserve. What I wish to do on the present occasion is to obtain, if I can, from the House such a clear expression of opinion as shall release the House from the embarrassment which would result from its taoit acceptance of the language of some Members of our own Government. Certain Ministers have given us to understand that they recognize as legal and binding a right which is claimed on the part of the Suez Canal Company to entire command of the waterway, or to any water communication across the Isthmus of Suez. ["No, no!"] On the part of the House of Commons I wish to put in a disclaimer to that contention. I heard words of dissent just now. If I am wrong in my view—if it is not the case that Members of the Government have used such language, or if they did not intend the language which they used to bear the significance I have put upon it, then we should have a disclaimer and correction from the Government, and we should obtain, in the best possible form, the object which I myself seek. My object is not one of a Party character. It is not intended to fasten any reproach upon the Government; it is intended to obtain a practical object, and to release the House from what I think may be a difficult and embarrassing position. Hon. Members who sit on that side of the House may, I think, do us who sit on this side of the House the justice to remember that if we had desired to make Party capital out of this business, and if, regardless of every consideration, our object had been to throw blame on the Government, we might have caused very great embarrassment to the Government, and we might have caused very great danger, I think, to the interests of the country at the same time, by moving in this question at the time that the public mind was not as calm as I am happy to think it is now. We most cautiously abstained from bringing forward the question at a moment of irritation, and all I am anxious for is, that we should not allow, on the other hand, the proper time to slip by, and then find ourselves in such a position that it would be too late to take what we may hereafter think would have been necessary steps. There has been some doubt expressed as to the exact meaning of the terms of my Motion. I do not profess to be a master of language, and I am not at all proud of the construction of my sentences; but I confess I do not myself share—I do not exactly understand—the difficulty which seems to have presented itself to the minds of a good many Gentlemen on this subject. The object and intention of my Motion will be realized very clearly, if we consider what the actual facts of the case are. At the present time the Suez Canal Company have in existence a Canal, which they have made in pursuance of a concession made to them by the Rulers of Egypt; and I say, once for all, that I use the expression "Rulers of Egypt" in order to avoid the introduction of any difficult questions as to the relative rights of the Porte and the Khedive. I may have to say a word of distinction hereafter; but the principal object I have is to call attention to the relations of the Government of Egypt, whatever that Government may be, and the Directors and Company of the Suez Canal. Now, the Suez Canal Company hold, under a concession from the Rulers of Egypt, a certain Canal which they have cut from Port Said to Suez. There is no question whatever as to their having an exclusive right to the use and management of that Canal; and there is no doubt also that they have certain rights, limited territorial rights, on either side of the Canal—at least, I assume that is so—which would enable them somewhat to enlarge that Canal. Nobody doubts for a moment that they have an exclusive right and control over their own undertaking; but beyond that it is suggested that they have not only a right over their own Canal, but that they have a right to forbid other persons from taking steps to make another Canal within the same district, which they claim to have a monopoly in—that is to say, as they describe it, across the Isthmus of Suez. I maintain—and I think I am supported by a very considerable authority—that they have no such right of exclusion. I maintain that their right is a positive right only—a right to the Canal, and within the limits to which I have referred to, and that they have no right either to forbid other persons to take steps for forming Companies or for making operations, always with proper authority, in any other part of the world, in any other part of Egypt, in any other part between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, or, in fact, as contained within that region—within the Isthmus — across the isthmus of Suez itself. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Brighton (Mr. Marriott) has put down a Notice of Resolution, in which, in substance, he takes exactly the same view as I take. But my object in making my Motion in this general form was not to make it unnecessarily blunt and, perhaps it might be thought, offensive; and I was anxious to couple it with an acknowledgment, as a matter of course, of the distinct right of the Company within the limits of their own concession. I desire to challenge the claim which has been made; and I desire to challenge it, because, in the course of the transactions which have recently taken place, it is undoubted that more than one of Her Majesty's Ministers have in public, and in discussions in this House, in replying to deputations and otherwise, stated it to be their opinion that the claim of the Company to this power of exclusion was well-founded. I venture to think that if we do not clear ourselves from acquiescing in that view very serious inconvenience may be produced. The circumstances of the case are these. It is acknowledged—indeed, it has recently been pressed upon attention by many shipowners —that the commerce has become too large for the Canal to carry, and some steps are being taken and are urged upon the consideration both of Her Majesty's Government and of the Direction of the Canal itself —steps are being taken or urged upon those authorities for the extension and the increase of the facilities which the Canal is now able to afford. Whatever your view may be of the exclusive power of the Company, this at least is clear—that technically, at all events, the Company cannot get the land and powers which are necessary for the construction of an additional Canal without going to the Rulers of Egypt for that purpose. What I wish to point out is, that if they so go with this claim of theirs still remaining, and with the endorsement which it has received, or appears to have received, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, the Rulers of Egypt, to whom the application will be made, will be placed in a very serious dilemma, because if the Khedive, on being applied to for the purpose of giving additional concessions, should say that he was indisposed to give them and would grant no more, he would be regarded, and would feel that he was regarded, as a sort of dog in the manger, as one interfering with the development of commerce and as guilty of an unfriendly action. But, on the other hand, if he were to grant those concessions—with the claim of the Company to this exclusive monopoly still to the fore—without making some conditions for the benefit of commerce, he might be equally reproached for having sacrificed interests which ought to have been protected, and which there was an opportunity of protecting. It is, therefore, important, on all grounds, that he should know whether or not this claim is admitted as a legal and technical claim. I hope the House will bear in mind the great distinction between a legal and technical claim and a moral claim. I should be the last person to dispute, or try to water down, the strong moral claim which the promoters of the Suez Canal Company have upon the consideration of all the world, and not least upon the people of this country. I do not wish, in the slightest degree, to disparage the Company, and certainly not M. de Lesseps; but I am anxious that we should try to test, and should not lightly admit, this claim to a legal and technical right, which seems to me a most embarrassing claim to acknowledge, and one which, if admitted, would render it much less likely that we should come to an amicable conclusion. The right hon. Gentleman has stated to-night, as he has on more than one occasion, that as matters now stand, time should be left to shipowners and members of the commercial community to consider the position in which they are placed, and the best course to be taken to attain the object they have in view. I desire also that time should be given for consideration, and that it should be given fairly. But let us not go into that consideration without knowing how we stand in the matter of our legal position. I do not think it would be possible for shipowners and others fairly to consider this question, and exercise what the hon. Member for Hull (Mr. Norwood) calls "freedom of judgment" in this matter, if it is left without any further explanation than it has now received. The hon. Member for Hull must allow me to remind him—for I suppose I may assume the correctness of the report of the deputation of shipowners to the Chancellor of the Exchequer—that he made a claim very similar to that which he now proposes to make in his Amendment to my Resolution—namely, that the question of the legal and tech- nical position of the Company, and its right to exclude other persons from the Isthmus, should be left an open question, and that he was immediately answered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who said—"Yes; but it cannot be left as an open question. It is a question which we have decided in our own minds; it is a question which must be considered as concluded." There is an assumption that the legal right exists. Both the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister have, on more than one occasion, stated that this Provisional Agreement was an Agreement which they should not have thought of recommending, were it not for the legal and technical right they recognized in the Company. And, therefore, I say that it is of great importance that we should endeavour as far as possible to clear our minds, and to be actually free in our judgment upon this matter. Now, Sir, I do not mean to detain the House with any lengthened review of the history of the Suez Canal and its transactions. I shall be very brief. The first concession was made in November, 1854. It was made by the then Viceroy of Egypt to M. de Lesseps, and it is in that concession that in the first instance are to be found the two words upon which so much stress has been laid, and upon the meaning of which so much argument turns — I mean the words "pouvoir exclusif." That was the form of words used by Said Pasha in the concession conferring upon M. Ferdinand de Lesseps the exclusive power of constituting and directing a Company for the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez. It was followed by some general provisions intended to form the basis of the whole design. Remember, that at the time when that concession was granted, the question of the great work of cutting a Canal through the Isthmus was one which had been discussed in general by others, and in particular between M. de Lesseps and the Viceroy of Egypt. There had been other proposals which had been more or less advanced—not, perhaps, fully advanced then—but there were other ideas and projects afloat at the time, and which had been brought more or less to the notice of the Viceroy, especially the scheme of M. de Talibot, the distinguished French engineer, for making a communication between the Sweet Water Canal and the Nile. It was the intention of the Viceroy to show that he gave his confidence entirely to M. de Lesseps. After hearing M. de Lesseps' views of the possibility and importance of the enterprize which he contemplated—thatis, of cutting through the Isthmus—and having concluded that it was a matter which ought to be undertaken, he entrusted M. de Lesseps with the whole power of proceeding with the undertaking, to the exclusion of all other persons. And that was a most important concession, because it dealt with the real difficulty which M. de Lesseps felt he had to contend with. I imagine that M. de Lesseps, having considered the engineering obstacles of the project, and got the best advice he could, and having himself studied it carefully for a long time, was not greatly alarmed by the physical difficulties he had to encounter. He would feel that if he was once in plain sailing, and if he was once able fairly to grapple with his task, he would be able to accomplish it. But what he did feel to be a difficulty, no doubt, was the difficulty of getting the means that he wished to employ fairly to work. He proposed to proceed by the establishment of a Company. But by what means was he to get that Company into existence? What difficulties had he to contend with? He had to contend, first, with the general incredulity with which his great plan was met. He had to contend with the direct opposition of great and powerful influences, and among them no less an influence than that of the Prime Minister of England himself. He had to contend, of course, with the rival schemes which might be afloat, and with all those difficulties of a financial character which must necessarily attend the launching of so great an enterprize; and that to which M. de Lesseps—we have plenty of evidence of it in his own words—attached by far the greatest importance was this—that he should have such plenary power given to him to construct and work his Canal that he could resist and push aside any interference that might be put in his way after the Company had been formed. Now, I have various proofs that that was his view; but there is one to which I may, perhaps, be allowed especially to draw attention. I take this as an extract from a letter which was written by M. de Lesseps on the 2nd of January, 1855. He, speaking then to a confidential friend—a relative of his own in Paris—says—

"My ambition, I confess, is to be the only person (le seul) to manage the threads of this immense enterprize up to the moment when it can go on freely of itself. In a word, I do not wish to accept conditions from anyone; my object is to impose them all."

Writing a few months later, in April, he uses some very remarkable expressions. He says—his correspondent was in Paris—

"You tell me of the agitations and the pretensions of some financiers. What constitutes my chief strength against them is my position as the holder of the exclusive powers (chargé des pouvoirs exclusifs) of the Viceroy. In the face of certain movements (agissements), I have always to support me the Prince, who after all (en definitive), is the master of the house (le maître de la maison), whereas if he had made me grantee (concessionnaire) before the formation of the Company, he would have, so to speak, abandoned his rights, and I should have had less strength to resist the encroachments of Governments and speculators. When I conceived the idea of getting powers given to me instead of a concession, I was not aware that the same idea had occurred to Prince Louis Napoleon," &c., &c.

Now, Sir, I consider that an extremely important piece of evidence, and I could quote other phrases and passages to the same effect. It is clear and significant evidence as to what he meant by the pouvoir exclusif for which he had applied, and which was granted him. It was a power to set aside all interference. How did he do it? By showing all who attempted to interfere that they were not interfering with him, because he was not the concessionnaire, but with the Ruler of Egypt, "the master of the house," as he expressed it, and in whose name M. de Lesseps claimed to act. I need not go at all into the steps which M. de Lesseps took in order to push forward the constitution of his Company. Suffice it to say that it took four years from the time of the concession in November, 1854, until in November, 1858, he was able to say that the Company was constituted. Anyone acquainted with the movement from M. de Lesseps' account of his own proceedings, or from the records of others, will see that he was constantly under difficulties, and constantly obliged to take sudden decisions upon his own responsibility, and if he had not had the pouvoir exclusif he could not have called the Company into existence. I have dwelt upon that point for some time, because it has been said that it is incredible that such great power could have been given or would have been necessary for the mere purposes of constituting a Company, and that, therefore, it must have had reference to something else. Let me tell the House what is the effect and meaning of the claim which is now put forward to a monopoly. It does not merely mean that M. de Lesseps and his Company, of which we are ourselves members, and among whose Directors we have representatives, have a right to say to any body of gentlemen associated for the purpose of forming another Canal—"You must not come here; we have nothing to do with you; we have an exclusive right to this land, and we keep you off." No; it does not only mean that; but it means that the Khedive himself has parted with his right of giving to any body, or of executing himself, any work which he may think necessary, or that may be proved necessary, for the extension of the Canal, without the consent of the Suez Canal Company. That is a very serious contention, for the rights affected are not as between one body of capitalists and another; but you are claiming that a particular body of capitalists shall have the right to control and limit the Ruler of a country himself in a matter deeply affecting the interests of that country. Such a claim ought not to be maintained, and cannot be supported, except on the clearest evidence showing that it was the intention of those who made the concession to grant this vast power. Not only must you have evidence that it was their intention; but you must have some evidence that they had the right — the moral right, at least—to give such a power. But the evidence to which I have called attention, and the relations which existed between M. de Lesseps and the Khedive at the beginning of the negotiations, seem to prove conclusively that the Viceroy never intended to part with his own power of making a new Canal, when he gave M. de Lesseps this power to form a Company for the execution of a particular project. You may say, and say truly—"The possibility of a future extension of the Canal being required was a question not contemplated at the time;" but you have no evidence to show how the difficulty was to be met if such a case should arise. According to the doctrine of the Government, it could not be met by the existing Company, because they have not the necessary concession; and it could not be met by anybody else, because the existing Company stops the way. So you come to this—that the Porte, or the Khedive, or whoever you may treat with as the Ruler of the country, is entirely in the hands of the Directors of the Suez Canal Company, and cannot, by any possibility, take any independent action. That is such a state of things that, before you can admit it, you want the clearest possible evidence that it was intended to exist. But do you find anywhere in any of the concessions any negative words whatever? You find powers given in more than one document as to what the Company may do; but nowhere, though grants are made to them of lands, and though powers and every sort of facility are given for carrying on their operations—never anywhere do you find even a suggestion that there was an intention to give a monopoly. Nor do I think that in any of the prospectuses which M. de Lesseps issued at the time, and in which he naturally set forth the advantages of the Company in the best colours he could, nor, I say, in those prospectuses do you find any claim of this sort advanced. We have certainly, in the absence of any negative words of the kind, in the absence of any claim put forward by those who naturally would put it forward, good grounds for hesitating before we admit a claim of which we never heard anything until about a year ago. It was not till last September, as far as I remember—I may be wrong—that M. de Lesseps made any claim of this kind. At all events, no such claim has ever been brought under the notice of Parliament until the present time; and that is what makes me so anxious that now, on the first occasion when we have the matter legitimately before us, we should not let it go by and slide without taking any notice of it, because our silence must necessarily be construed into an assent. We have the opinions of two Ministers, and I presume of the Government generally, in favour of this claim; and there is also, we are told, an opinion that has been given by the Law Officers of the Crown in support of it. I desire, of course, to speak with the greatest respect of the opinion of the Law Offi- cers of the Crown; but it is impossible not to feel that, however right the practice may be, and however good the grounds for it may be, it is a very great disadvantage that the Law Officers' opinions cannot be brought forward and quoted in the House, because of the professional rule which prohibits their publication. We are, in consequence, left very much in the dark about their views. We do not know what was the case that was submitted to them, and we do not even know the time when their opinion was given. We therefore do not know whether, when it was given, there was still time enough to act upon it, or whether it was asked for after a decision had already been arrived at. But, as against the opinions of the Law Officers, which we have not seen, there are some opinions—and opinions of considerable weight—which we have seen, and of which we have an opportunity of judging. There is the very strong opinion of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Christchurch (Mr. Horace Davey), who holds, I believe, as high a position among the legal authorities of this country as any man who can be named; there is the opinion of Mr. Underdown, who has a very high reputation in matters of this kind; there is the opinion of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard), who was consulted by a body of shipowners quite independently of the other gentlemen to whom I have referred; and there is the opinion of Mr. Mark Napier, who has also considered this matter very deeply. Then I am in a position to state that my noble and learned Friend Earl Cairns takes the same view, and that he cannot consent to believe that this power exists in the Company. He very clearly states that which I have endeavoured to put before the House, that he cannot see in this concession anything beyond the grant of a power to constitute and form the Company, and that he cannot conceive it possible that the Khedive or the Viceroy could have given authority, or did by those words give authority, which would prevent him from proceeding himself with any other work of the kind that might be necessary. I hope that those whom I am addressing will not suppose that when I use these arguments I desire to make a case against the Company in a hostile manner. I only wish to clear up our rights. It is much better that these rights should be cleared up; and when it is understood how far we are bound and how far we are free, let us act towards the Company in a spirit of wise liberality as our duty demands. My belief is that what has to be done had far better be done through the agency, and with the co-operation, and through the intervention of the Canal Company, which has such a position, such advantages, and such a credit in the country. But that is if you are able to obtain proper and sufficient security that what will be done is the right thing. But if you throw away your greatest weapon, your greatest lever—that is to say, the natural leverage of competition—if you sacrifice that in favour of monopoly, you must either get into some quarrel or difficulty with the Company, or submit to whatever terms they may choose to propose. The history of the case is this. The first concession was granted in the year 1855. In 1856 M. de Lesseps made a preliminary Report to the Viceroy, laying down the principles upon which he would proceed. The Viceroy thereupon granted him a concession in detail, and at the same time sanctioned the Statutes which were intended to be Statutes of the Company. In one of the Statutes, among the objects for which a general meeting of the shareholders must be called is mentioned a power of "fusion with other enterprizes." That rather points in a direction contrary to the exclusive claim. In 1858 the Company was constituted. It must be remembered that the grants that were made under its original concession were grants of a very large and important character. These grants were, in fact, for a very different enterprize—for a very much larger and more important enterprize —than that which was ultimately sanctioned. Not only was there to be a Salt Water Canal from Port Said to Suez, but there was also to be a Sweet Water Canal, which was to connect the other Canal with the Nile; and power was to be given, and large concessions of land were to be given, to the Company in connection with that Sweet Water Canal. The result of that great scheme was, that strong remonstrances were made on the part of other countries against the step which was being taken, and it was pointed out that such a concession might lead to the most inconvenient political results. Representations were made on the part of the maritime nations interested in the Canal, in view of the proposed action of the Company, which ultimately led to the retrocession of the Sweet Water Canal to the Egyptian Government; and it then became necessary that there should be a revised concession. The revised concession was not made till the beginning of 1866; and when it was made by the Egyptian Government it was remitted to the Porte for approval and ratification, and ultimately it received the sanction of the Porte. That is the concession under which M. de Lesseps formed the Suez Canal Company, and under which the latter hold their lands and made the Canal. Now, that was a complete concession, and it was a concession in virtue of which certain powers were given to the Company by the Egyptian Rulers, which powers were confirmed by the authorities of the Porte. If I may be permitted to do so, I should wish to call attention for a few minutes to a matter which may not, at first sight, appear to be quite germane to the subject I am discussing; but yet, in my view, it has a considerable bearing upon it. The Suez Canal was opened in 1869. Just at first it seemed not to be going on very well; but after a short time the attention of this and of other maritime nations was more particularly directed to the route, and they began to build ships expressly constructed to pass through the Canal. The result was that a very great increase in the traffic through the Canal took place. Notice was then taken that the Suez Canal Company were making exorbitant charges upon the vessels that passed through the Canal; and a dispute arose as to the correct method of measuring the tonnage of the ships upon which the charge for the use of the Canal was based. Upon that the Company claimed to have a right to make the charge they did under the terms of their concession, and they maintained that right. At that time the right hon. Gentleman opposite and Earl Granville were in Office, and they had a great deal of correspondence with the Company and with our Ambassador at Constantinople upon the subject. The dispute, which threatened to become a serious one, led to the calling of a Con- ference of the Representatives of the maritime nations at Constantinople; and that Conference arrived at a certain decision with regard to the right mode of measuring the tonnage and of fixing the amount of the charge to be made under the terms of the concession. There are two passages in the despatches sent by Earl Granville at that time to which I should wish to call attention. One is comparatively unimportant; but in it Earl Granville states that the British Government could not admit the claim of the Company to construe the terms of its own concession. To the second and the more important despatch I desire to call particular attention, for this reason. Some little time ago my noble Friend Lord Salisbury, in the course of a discussion upon this subject in "another place," spoke of the Suez Canal as a highway of nations, and questioned the power or right of any nation to stop or impede the traffic through such a highway under any pretence without the consent of other nations. My noble Friend was thereupon immediately taken to task very sharply by the Lord Chancellor, who remarked that the case of an artificial Canal cut through a piece of land by a private Company was very different from the cases suggested by my noble Friend. The passage I am about to read occurs in a despatch sent on the 3rd of March, 1873, by Earl Granville to our Ambassador in Constantinople, in which the question was raised as to the right of the Company to construe their own concession, and to determine the method in which the tonnage should be measured; and reference was made to the suggestion that had been made, and which was rather approved at Constantinople, that it was in the power of the Porte to authorize the Company to make whatever charge they pleased. Earl Granville, in referring to these claims, said—

"Her Majesty's Government do not in the slightest degree impugn the right of the Porte to increase the dues. … The Company is, as Her Majesty's Government consider, Egyptian, and the rights over it of the Porte are undoubted. Her Majesty's Government, however, feel confident that the Turkish Government cannot but be sensible of the equitable consideration which is due from the Porte to the great maritime interests which are concerned. By the Firman of 1866 the Porte solemnly endorsed the concession of 1856, on the faith of which numbers of vessels have been constructed in France, England, and elsewhere, for traffic through the Canal, which has thus become one of the highways of the world"—Lord Salisbury's own expression, borrowed, perhaps, from this — "the obstruction of which, by the imposition of an excessive toll, would be an injury to commerce, which Her Majesty's Government cannot believe that the Porte would willingly inflict, and against which every nation would be driven to protest."

My object in calling attention to these observations is this—I think that we cannot look upon this matter as one that can be laid at rest, as being entirely between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company, irrespective of the interests of the maritime nations. My object in calling attention to this matter to-day is, that I am very earnestly desirous of impressing upon Her Majesty's Government the great importance of so conducting any future negotiations in reference to this subject as to avoid, by being early wise, any possible collision taking place hereafter in connection with a protest from maritime nations. My belief is, that in these matters the first loss is the best, and that the earlier the point is cleared up the bettor for all parties, and that this idea of leaving the question to stand over, in order that time may solve it, is not the best mode of dealing with it. Depend upon it that this is not a matter which we can afford to trifle with. In my opinion, it is possible at this moment to bring about a satisfactory settlement; and I am sure that all classes and interests in this country will combine to assist the Government in bringing about a settlement of a matter which so deeply interests us all. I am quite sure that such a settlement can be brought about without offending the sensitiveness or the susceptibilities of anybody. I do not think, therefore, that we should be taking a wise course if we were to neglect the opportunity, and were to endeavour to put the question aside for the moment. I have placed a Notice upon the Paper, which I think puts the case in a satisfactory manner. I do not, however, say that there may not be other ways of attaining the object I have in view. My first object is to invite Parliament to pass a Resolution denying the right claimed by M. do Lesseps, and the other is to make a declaration which shall fully and effectually reserve our freedom of judgment in this matter. What is the object of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Hull (Mr. Norwood), which the Government tell us they mean to accept? It will not leave us our freedom of judgment in the matter; it will merely maintain the freedom of action of the Government; and, therefore, I can fully understand why they give their assent to an Amendment which might actually have been drawn by one of themselves. I cannot understand the hon. Member for Hull placing such an Amendment on the Paper after the rebuke which he received the other day from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who told him that there was no freedom of judgment possible in the matter, and that we were tied hand and foot in reference to it. How the hon. Member can be satisfied by simply negativing my Resolution, which declines to recognize the validity of the claim of M. de Lesseps, and, in substitution for it, to say—

"This House desires to maintain its entire freedom of judgment in regard to all matters connected with the question of water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; and this House, in consequence, declines to pass any Resolution as to future negotiations or proceedings respecting the same,"

is a matter that really puzzles me very much. What is the meaning of that Resolution? I do not understand why we should pass a Resolution to say that we will not pass a Resolution. It would have been much simpler to have moved an Amendment of a different character, such as the Previous Question; but I must point out to the hon. Member that his present Amendment is totally inconsistent with his former protests against the action of Her Majesty's Government. I do not wish to detain the House longer, and I hope that I have succeeded in stating what my anxiety is in this matter without saying anything that is offensive or irritating—a thing which it is far from my wish to do. My desire is earnestly to impress upon the Government that they should take this matter into consideration, and that they should do their best, as far as they can, to relieve us from the difficulty in which they themselves have placed us, so that we shall no longer run the risk of the same thing happening again which happened, or rather which so nearly happened, the other day. Do not let them, in any future negotiations in reference to this subject into which they may have to enter, enter into them with this clog round their necks, or, if they do, let it be made clear that it is a clog which the nation and the House of Commons are not content to place upon them; because, if we do not do so, we shall find ourselves in exactly the same difficulty as that in which we were a short time ago, and we shall be driven into making a bad arrangement because of a claim which we do not accept, and yet which we admit is binding upon us. I beg to move the Resolution which stands in my name. Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that, in any negotiations or proceedings with reference to the Suez Canal Company to which Her Majesty may be a party, She will, while respecting the undoubted rights of the Company in regard of their own concession, decline to recognise any claim on their part to such a monopoly as would exclude the possibility of competition on the part of other undertakings, designed for the purpose of opening a water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea."—(Sir Stafford Northcote.)

, in rising to move, as an Amendment—

"That this House desires to maintain its entire freedom of judgment in regard to all matters connected with the question of water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; and this House, in consequence, declines to pass any Resolution as to future negotiations or proceedings respecting the same,"

said, that he had listened with much interest to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, because he had been greatly exercised in his own mind to discover the real scope and meaning of the Resolution. The question he had put to himself was—Why should the House be called upon to rush into the presence of Her Majesty with advice in reference to a state of affairs which did not exist, and which there was no likelihood of existing? Why should Her Majesty be asked to preserve the rights of the country in respect to claims which had never been preferred? When and where had M. de Lesseps asserted his exclusive right to create water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea? He was aware that M. de Lesseps claimed the exclusive right of constructing a Canal through the Isthmus of Suez; but he had not learned that he had claimed the right to make a Canal through the Delta or through Palestine. Although he did not agree with every statement of the right hon. Gentleman, much of what he said met with his approval, and it appeared to him that his own Amendment attained similar results to the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman, but by different means. But the great distinction between the two was that, whereas the right hon. Gentleman's Resolution asked the House to do something, his Amendment called upon them to do nothing. No doubt the right hon. Gentleman was in a widely different position from that which he occupied. The right hon. Gentleman was the Leader of the Opposition, while he, a private Member, represented a constituency of merchants and shipowners; and, though not unmindful of higher considerations, he confessed that the object which he sought was, in the main, a commercial object. He said, on behalf of the commercial community of England—"Give breathing time for the relations between this country and France to settle down; allow us to consider our position; permit misunderstandings to be removed; allow time for mercantile men of both countries to arrive, if possible, at a solution." Therefore it was that he asked the House to abstain from committing itself to any opinion whatever on the question of communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The right hon. Gentleman had said that the question was one of great delicacy, and ought to be approached with great care. Yet the right hon. Gentleman had gone into a hypercritical, historical, and argumentative examination of the position which M. de Lesseps and the Company held since the first concession was given. Now, that was exactly the course of argument he declined to follow, because it was precluded by the terms of his Amendment. He contended that this was not the time for the discussion of the disputable questions raised by the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman had accused him of inconsistency. But he had been guilty of no inconsistency. He had carefully protected himself, both when he headed a deputation to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and in his Amendment, from expressing an opinion as to the rights of M. de Lesseps. The right hon. Gentleman said that the House was compromised in the matter; but he contended that it was not compromised in any way whatever. When had the House expressed an opinion on the subject, or when had the Government submitted any step taken in the late negotiations to the judgment of the House? The House ought carefully to abstain from pronouncing a decision on the question. He was anxious to take that opportunity to remove certain misconceptions which appeared to have grown up, not alone in England, but in France, and had caused a special feeling of irritation in Paris. He believed that the true feeling of the English mercantile community had been altogether misunderstood. People talked as if the controversy were one which only affected shipping and shipowners. But it ought to be remembered that though shipowners were brought into immediate contact with the Canal, the charges imposed did not fall ultimately on the merchants and manufacturers, but on the consumers. When the first disappointment as to the Agreement came upon us, a very injudicious tone was adopted by certain gentlemen and traders on the subject. There were two meetings in the City to which he would especially refer—namely, at Lloyd's and the Chambers of Commerce. Very tall language was employed; and even the worthy Alderman who sat for the City of London (Mr. Cotton) expressed himself in terms which he was sure his hon. Friend had since regretted. Reference had been made at those meetings to the position this country occupied in Egypt — as though that position would justify them in disregarding the rights or property of the Suez Canal Company. He wished at once to repudiate the slightest desire on the part of any honest British merchant to acquire by any means, except the fairest and most honourable, any control over, or interference with, the property of the Suez Canal Company. What had been the actual course of events? When a deputation of merchants and shipowners waited on Lord Granville, the shipowners went one step further than the merchants, and expressed their desire for a second Canal to be constructed with British money and under British management. Lord Granville replied on that occasion that when a definite plan was submitted to the Government they would consider it. The shipowners immediately called a meeting, appointed a Committee, and raised £10,000 for surveys and preliminary expenses. But, before taking a single step, they decided to ascertain the precise position of M. de Lesseps, and a case was submitted to eminent counsel, who advised that M. de Lesseps had no exclusive right to pierce the Isthmus with a Canal. At that time there was a rumour that the Government were negotiating with the Canal Company; and he (Mr. Norwood) addressed Questions to the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, asking him whether the rumour was true, and requesting him to give a definite assurance that no binding arrangement should be made without due consultation and the approval of the House. The moment the Prime Minister's reply was made known to the shipowners they suspended further action. When the Agreement by the Government was laid before the House and the country, no doubt a strong feeling of disappointment was generally expressed throughout the commercial community. But that feeling was not of the uncompromising character which had been attributed to it. The resolutions passed at the Council of the Associated Chambers of Commerce and at public meetings in the great towns were couched in moderate language. At Liverpool, for example, the Chamber of Commerce urged the expediency of re-opening the negotiations with a view to better terms being secured, and similar resolutions were passed by Chambers of Commerce at Edinburgh, Wolverhampton, Birmingham, and Newcastle. The principle of making the reduction in charges dependent on increase in profits was approved, subject to amendment of detail; and the chief objection to the Agreement was the absence of British representation and control commensurate with our interest in and the assistance to be given to the new Canal. It had been said that the issue of this matter in the withdrawal of the Agreement between the Government and the Suez Canal Company was now bitterly regretted by the shipowners; but he differed altogether from that opinion. Indeed, he thought the Government showed much wisdom in the course they adopted, and also great dignity in the manner in which they announced their decision to the country and the House. The Government took up their position with the universal concurrence of mercantile men; but the right hon. Gentleman made much of the point that the Government committed themselves and the country, when they announced their belief that M. de Lesseps had an exclusive right with reference to the Isthmus of Suez. In that House he occupied the position of a private Member. He was not in the confidence of the Government; but it struck him that possibly the Prime Minister might consider that the position of the Government of a country like England was not precisely that of a mere "honest broker." He could imagine the Government reasoning that this great country, interested more than any other in the world in the maintenance of good faith, ought to be extremely careful when they disputed the validity of documents. Their merchants held property in every clime. Many held concessions of the greatest importance embodied in written language. Might there not be something higher and more important than a mere temporary advantage over the Suez Canal Company?—that of holding up a standard of the highest commercial morality, and declaring our unwillingness, except on the clearest reasons, to challenge unnecessarily the validity of the acquisition held by our neighbours. He thought there was considerable force in the view he had expressed. It might, however, be entirely disavowed, and he might say it was a view which he, as a private Member, should not hold or ask the House to adopt. He wished the House to reserve to itself complete freedom in this matter. He thought Government would have been wise had they not negotiated through their own British Directorate. These gentlemen had been long under the influence of M. de Lesseps, and scarcely understood the mercantile feeling of this country on the matter. They might, too, have taken into their confidence such mercantile gentlemen as they could trust. He wished to point out how much was lost by successive Governments in not sufficiently consulting their followers of the rank and file. He had watched proceedings in the House for many years, and he was of opinion that one-half of the time of the House had been wasted, and one-half the blunders committed, because Gentlemen in high Office had not consulted sufficiently with those beneath them. In the serene heights of Office, and surrounded by all the talent of their Party, Ministers too often overlooked the scattered grains of experience which might be found on the back Bench of both sides. He did not consider that the commercial position of this country in reference to the matters in question was at all of a hopeless or unsatisfactory character. Indeed, he believed that the negotiations and that very debate would clear away misconceptions, and would really tend to bring about a fair and honourable understanding. Whether they were able to make a bargain with M. de Lesseps and the Canal Company was one thing; but what he did say was that they were not helpless and hopeless in the event of his exclusive right being maintained. In the first place, there were no fewer than three schemes for communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. One was a scheme for starting from Alexandria and passing by Cairo to the Red Sea; another would start from Damietta; and the third, which he was himself inclined to favour, would effect a communication through Palestine from Acre to Akabar. There were other solutions. Was it altogether impossible for the British nation to buy up French interests in the Canal and make it British? Would it be impossible to persuade the maritime nations of Europe, who had an interest in this Canal, to purchase shares in proportion to their interest in such a scheme, and to place the Canal under international management and control? No doubt the Canal was a wonderful convenience to the trade of the East, as a short cut, especially to Bombay and other Indian ports; but so far as the Australian Colonies—the trade of which would develop enormously — were concerned, with sufficient coaling stations, they could be reached almost as speedily by the Cape route. When they had these coaling stations, a proper class of ships, and proper engines, it would be perfectly possible—the difference in the two routes being only a few hundred miles—to carry on the communication without going through the Suez Canal at all. Again, by piercing the Isthmus of Panama M. de Lesseps would provide an alternative route to a portion of our Eastern trade. They were not, therefore, so much at the mercy of the Company as some were inclined to think; but were they still without hope that a rational and satisfactory agreement with the Company would be arrived at? He was not without hope. He knew something of M. de Lesseps, and he believed no man was better able to comprehend the advantage which must accrue from the co-operation of England. Suppose the mercantile voice of this country said to M. de Lesseps—"We respect your genius; we admire your determination, and the pertinacity which overcame great difficulties. We admit that to France must belong the honour of the inception of the Canal. We admit we declined to join. Do not force us into an alternative route, because British commerce must and will find that, if there are not proper concessions. Let us second your efforts; let us put another garland upon your brow. Admit us into full partnership. Give us one-half of the administration, and one-half of the responsibility." He had little doubt as to the response. He could see bases for a fair arrangement. Why should not M. de Lesseps continuo President for life, and an Englishman and a Frenchman alternately succeed him? Then, the Committees should be partly French and partly English. England and France had stood shoulder to shoulder on the Alma heights, and it would be a grander sight to see them jointly protecting a maritime highway that would last as long as the fabric of the Globe. He doubted whether the question of M. de Lesseps' exclusive right could be decided by English lawyers solely; and considered that if it was to be decided at all it must be done by an international body of jurists. We were disposed too much to ignore the interest of other maritime countries in the Suez Canal. It was true we owned four-fifths of the ships passing; but by no means four-fifths of the cargoes. Odessa, Trieste, Venice, Genoa, Marseilles, even Havre, were greatly benefited by the opening of the Canal, and a large amount of the cargoes carried in English bottoms were owned by France, Russia, Italy, and Germany. As a merchant anxious to secure the interests of his constituents and his countrymen generally, he recommended the House not to follow the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, for, to use the irreverent language of a Conservative journal, as well might a claim be asserted to the monopoly of the North Pole as to the territories referred to in the Motion of the right hon. Baronet.

Of course, the Motion includes the Isthmus of Suez.

said, he was bound to examine the Motion in the terms in which it stood on the Paper. He trusted that he had made out a case to show that in the highest sense of international politics the House should adopt the Amendment he begged to propose, and refuse to bind itself by an expression of opinion on this matter.

, in seconding the Amendment, said, he thought this question should be left at rest for a period. The Resolution moved by the right hon. Baronet had his support in almost every particular; but he could not approach it from his point of view, in that he had endeavoured to impart into it a Party feeling. The mercantile and shipping interests throughout the country had expressed a strong opinion that whatever might occur this question should not be permitted to fall within the region of politics. Some Gentlemen were, however, trying to rouse the country from a political point of view, and the fact was to be deeply regretted. An endeavour was being made to throw blame on Her Majesty's Government for the proposed Agreement into which they had entered; but he, on the contrary, thought the commercial and shipping interests were deeply indebted to Her Majesty's Government for having taken up this great question. They had been told that the withdrawal of this Provisional Agreement would be regretted throughout the country. He, however, ventured to hold an entirely different opinion. He was quite sure they would be much better without any such Agreement. In the first place, the prolongation of the concession was a question of a most serious character. Then, again, the enormous charges for pilotage and dues on the shipping now were such that if the Canal Company did not take counsel and advice in moderation, they would very soon discover that we should find some means of carrying on our vast trade by other means than the Canal, and in another direction. The Canal Company were exacting rates for pilotage and other charges, and for passengers which the concession granted to M. de Lesseps did not entitle them to demand. Then, as to the control on the Board, he might say that the concession itself, if he mistook not, required that the whole of the nations interested in the Canal should be represented on the Board of Direction. That had not been so. The door had been shut, and we in this country had been carefully and zealously excluded from all control. He, however, did not wish to enter upon the question of the monopoly, which he understood, and always had understood, M. de Lesseps had never claimed. He had a pamphlet written by M. de Lesseps himself, in which that distinguished Frenchman repeated, over and over again, that the concession granted to him was the power exclusive to make a universal water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. He (Mr. C. Palmer) believed this country was anxious to remain on the most friendly terms with the French nation; but the question was, how far was the shipping and commerce of this country to be prejudiced by the question of the susceptibilities of the French nation? The French nation, he would like to remind hon. Members, did not consult the susceptibilities of this country when their Government paid a bounty to shipowners with the object of destroying our trade. But what would the French Government say if we paid a bounty to our ships that went round the Cape? Why, if we were to adopt some such course as that, we should soon almost empty the Canal. The susceptibilities of the French Government would, of a certainty, be very severely taxed if we were to follow the policy of which they themselves had set the example. It would, however, be found that the Canal Company had not entirely their own way on every point. But what he would ask was, did this susceptibility extend beyond the Government of France and the shareholders of the Suez Canal? If he was correctly informed, at Marseilles, and in the South of France, and at Bordeaux and in the West of France, there existed a strong feeling against the Canal Company because of the onerous dues they levied. Before sitting down he would venture to bring before the House the question of whether or not a Commission ought really to be appointed to investigate the whole matter, and whether it ought not to be made an international affair. For his own part, he would at once say that he did think it was the only solution of the situation—the one way of meeting the susceptibilities of the French nation and of all other nations. At one time the Company offered to sell the Canal for £13,000,000, and a yearly payment of £400,000. He supposed it would go up to £40,000,000 or £50,000,000 at the present time; but that would be a small matter as compared with the enormous advantages to be derived from seeing this Canal placed in the hands of administrators who were desirous of reducing the dues levied on the ships passing through, instead of making as much revenue as they could for their shareholders. He hoped that Her Majesty's Government would either examine into the whole question for themselves or authorize others to do so on their behalf. The shipping interests of this country could not stand still. They must go forward, and another Canal had become an absolute necessity. Finally, he would say that he did trust the Suez Canal Company would approach the whole question with greater moderation than they had previously done, and that before long a satisfactory conclusion would be arrived at between all parties. Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House desires to maintain its entire freedom of judgment in regard to all matters connected with the question of water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; and this House, in consequence, declines to pass any Resolution as to future negotiations or proceedings respecting the same," —(Mr. Norwood,)

—instead thereof. Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Sir, I am in complete harmony with both my hon. Friends who have last addressed the House, as to the course which they advise us to take on this occasion; and I think that the manner in which they have stated their case, and the reasons which have led them to their conclusions, must carry much weight with the House. But, of course, it must happen that the Government, from its point of view, while it has less occasion to dwell upon certain aspects of the question, has an anxiety to bring into view other aspects of the question which do not so readily, or so forcibly, present themselves to the minds of those who, like my two hon. Friends, stand towards the House rather in the character of independent and unofficial Members not connected with the Executive of the country. I shall only notice one observation of the Mover of the Amendment, the hon. Member for Hull (Mr. Norwood). He stated that he thought it was an error on the part of the Government to employ in these negotiations the agencies of the British Directors of the Company. I can understand the considerations which dwelt in the minds of my hon. Friends upon that subject, and I am not about to enter upon that argument; but I should be very sorry, indeed, if it were to be supposed for a moment that on the part of my hon. Friend there was any intention in making that remark to depreciate the services, character, or ability of the British Directors. [Mr. NORWOOD: Hear, hear!] The fact is that since they were appointed some seven or eight years ago they have had to discharge duties of very great delicacy and great importance; and they have discharged those duties in such a manner, I think I might say without exception, according to the evidence of all those who from immediate contact with them are best qualified to judge, as to establish a very high claim to the respect and even to the gratitude of the Government. But, Sir, I do not enter on the question whether we judged rightly or wrongly in calling in their aid on the present occasion. I think we should have found a difficulty in employing any other aid, and I am not willing to accept the proposition of my hon. Friend. Well, I leave him in full possession of it, without entering into controversy upon the matter, at this moment. Sir, the House will feel, I think, that the time has now come, after the Motion and the Amendment have been placed before the House, when it ought at once to be informed what is the view that the Government take on this matter. I have great pleasure in acknowledging that the right hon. Gentleman who has moved this Motion has in his speech done everything, that the nature of the case and the purposes of his argument admitted of, to eliminate from the discussion controversial and irritating matter. In giving him that credit I am sorry to say I am not able to recede from the opinion I have formerly expressed that there is far greater disadvantage than advantage attaching to a discussion of this nature. But the right hon. Gentleman cannot impose on others the reserve he himself maintains. He has expressed, partly to-night and partly on another occasion, with great freedom, the opinion that there is no danger in a discussion of this kind, that this is no international question, that it is a question simply between the British Government on one side, and what has hitherto been a private Company on the other. But, Sir, is that the fact? Is this simply a case on behalf of commercial interests alone—of the British Government dealing with a private Company? Has nothing been said and has nothing been done to a very different effect? Was this the language taken in 1875 — that the purchase of the Shares then effected was a purely commercial transaction? Was this the language which was held, or apparently held—judging from the reports which, at any rate, passed without contradiction — by Lord Salisbury on a recent occasion, when Lord Salisbury said that Lord Beaconsfield had stated at the period of the purchase of the Shares that the transaction had a political rather than a commercial object. [Mr. BOURKE: Hear, hear!] The right hon. Gentleman corroborates me in that assertion. But what, then, becomes of the assertion that this is a mere transaction between the British Government and a private Company? Does the right hon. Gentleman suppose that the British Government, of all Governments in the world, has a pouvoir exclusif in this matter—a power of interfering in the transactions of a private Company for a political object, and yet laying down the doctrine that no other Government can interfere? The right hon. Gentleman himself must see that such a doctrine is totally untenable. It is impossible to maintain that we are entitled, on national and political grounds, to associate ourselves with the transactions of this Company, and to deny that other Governments also may look to the interests, and, perhaps, the susceptibilities, of this Company; and to have a certain position and certain rights is a matter for their direct consideration quite as much as it can be for the consideration of the British Government. And, Sir, has any language been held which must tend to quicken the susceptibilities which may exist upon this subject? I refer again to the most recent indication; I refer to the speech of Lord Salisbury. In that speech there was laid down a docrine which, if I understand it, amounts to this—that upon commercial grounds, for the convenience of uniting any point severed by a neck of land, territorial rights may be overridden by nations interested in the commerce of the world, and that those interests justify an invasion which would put down the rights of the Government, and the rights of the people who inhabit the particular place. Not only so, Sir; but the language held by Lord Salisbury appears to have been this—that at present—I beg the House to mark my words—that at present there are diplomatic complications in the matter in Egypt, and that these diplomatic complications may pass away this year, next year, or a short time hence. Is that language relating to our position in Egypt likely to allay any susceptibilities which foreign countries or foreign Governments may entertain? The right hon. Gentleman has cautiously avoided such language. But he cannot prevent, he cannot neutralize its effects when used by others. And then there is a declaration that there may be an opportunity shortly—and here I quote the words as they are reported—"by the aid of British capital to secure a British Canal from sea to sea." There is no such thing as a British Canal except in British territory, and that is the language so indiscreetly, and so unfortunately used, by Lord Salisbury on a very recent occasion. Therefore, there is, no doubt, the greatest reason for caution in this matter; and the most ably conducted and most powerful journal connected with the interests of the Opposition in this country well and wisely observed, no later than this morning, that in this debate Ministers must impose upon themselves, and upon their own language, the severest reserve. I thank the right hon. Gentleman for having given us the best assistance in his power; but I am afraid he cannot answer for others that the experience of the past is a lesson in that respect for the future. Well, Sir, I turn from the right hon. Gentleman's speech to his Resolution; and here, undoubtedly, I am confronted by a contrast such as has never within my recollection met my view before—the contrast, I mean, between the speech of the right hon. Gentleman and the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman has spoken of some supposed ambiguities in his Motion, and as to his readiness to remove them. There are no ambiguities in his Motion, Sir, whatever. Clearer language could not be held. Let it stand as confessed that the Motion is as clear as words can make it, and it goes simply to the point of asking the House to address the Crown to the effect that the powers of the Executive are to be used in such a way as to decline recognizing any claim on the part of the Suez Canal Company to such a monopoly as would exclude—what? The possibility of a Canal across the Isthmus of Suez? No. The possibility of a Canal from Alexandria to Suez? No. But—

"Such a monopoly as would exclude the possibility of competition on the part of other undertakings designed for the purpose of opening water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea."

So that the monopoly which is excluded by the right hon. Gentleman's Motion is the monopoly asserting, on the part of the Suez Canal Company, an exclusive claim to the water communications between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Their Canal is between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Certainly it is. But what the right hon. Gentleman asks us to exclude is a monopoly which shuts out all communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; and, consequently, any Government that might admit the possibility of a communication through Palestine, but should accord to M. de Lessees and his Company the exclusive right across the Isthmus of Suez and the whole of Lower Egypt, would satisfy the terms of the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman. All he asks is that some door should be left open for some possible method of communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. If the possibility of a Canal through Palestine were admitted, the terms of the Motion would be satisfied, and M. de Lesseps would be welcome to his exclusive claims so far as the Isthmus of Suez and the whole of Lower Egypt were concerned. The right hon. Gentleman says the words of this Motion are not clear. I think they are clear, and I think the House bears me out in the construction I have just put upon them. I am obliged, I am sorry to say, to draw a distinction between the speech of the right hon. Gentleman and the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman. They are not one thing, but two things. I will suppose, now, that the argument of the right hon. Gentleman has carried conviction to some minds, and that, in consequence of that conviction, the Motion will be carried by this House. Well, Sir, nothing whatever would have been done towards sustaining the argument of the right hon. Gentleman, because the argument of the right hon. Gentleman refers to the claim to an exclusive right over the Isthmus of Suez; but the speech leaves everything open, providing you leave one door open for a communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. However much we may respect the general position of the right hon. Gentleman or his particular argument, there cannot be a doubt that the right hon. Gentleman would be the first to admit that if such an event were to happen, as I do not expect, as the adoption of his Motion, foreign countries, becoming cognizant of the transaction of to-night, would have to interpret that transaction by the words of the Motion, and not the argument contained in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. On the argument, therefore, I shall dwell but very shortly indeed; it is not necessary for me to dwell upon it at length. The right hon. Gentleman has satisfied himself that the documents obtained by M. de Lesseps receive a rational construction by interpreting them to mean that they conferred on M. de Lesseps an exclusive right to form a universal Company. But, Sir, the Khedive had no power to give exclusive right to form a universal Company; and M. de Lesseps could form a universal Company without the authority of the Khedive. I or anybody else could form such a Company, if we had the necessary resources, without the authority of the Khedive or anyone else. Unfortunately, when one exclusive Company is formed, there is nothing to prevent my hon. and learned Friends the Attorney General and the Solicitor General, or anyone else, forming any other exclusive Company by my side; these exclusive Companies might be multiplied without limit. In fact, in order, as I understand, to give consistency to the construction of the right hon. Gentleman, you must convert into mere shadow that which the Khedive by these important concessions conferred on M. de Lesseps, and you must suppose that the Canal Company was satisfied with receiving that shadowy concession. But I will not enter upon the argument of the right hon. Gentleman. It is rather my duty to turn to the Motion before the House. I will not enter upon it beyond one point, which I think somewhat important. The right hon. Gentleman used this language. He said that the claim of M. de Lesseps in September last was limited to a published letter giving the exclusive right over the Isthmus of Suez, and that the claim made in September last was one of which we never heard anything until about a year ago. I was, I confess, surprised when I heard the right hon. Gentleman make that declaration; for what I have heard is this—that the claim of M. de Lesseps to an exclusive right, and to a larger claim to an exclusive right than that which he advanced in September last, was in the knowledge and possession of the Government to which the right hon. Gentleman belonged at the time when they purchased the shares in the Suez Canal. In the year 1872 a plan was formed and brought before the Khedive of Egypt for constructing a Canal from Alexandria to Suez—from Alexandria across Lower Egypt—I do not know whether the exact point was Suez; but, at any rate, it was at that end of the Red Sea, and M. de Lesseps protested against that Canal as an infringement of his monopoly. He has since seen cause, and, I think, wisely, to limit his claim; but what I wish to state, and to state without the possibility of contradiction, is this—that this claim of his to a larger monopoly was made in the year 1872, and was not contested by Her Majesty's late Government at the time they purchased the shares in the Suez Canal. It was not admitted by the Khedive of Egypt; but it was asserted by M. de Lesseps, and was within the cognizance of the late Government at the time I have mentioned.

The late Government at that time—[Cries of "Order, Order!"] I know I am not strictly in Order; but—

So that, at any rate, there is this to be said—that if the present Government, in their communications with M. de Lesseps, did not make any admission, but had in their own mind the belief that he had a valid claim so far as the Isthmus of Suez was concerned, they had before them the fact that a much larger claim was before the late Government.

In 1874.

No; in 1872.

We were not in Office in 1872.

I beg pardon. You were not in Office; but were not the records in the Foreign Office? I assert it was in the records of the Foreign Office that a claim had been made by M. de Lesseps and had never been retracted.

I never saw it.

You never saw it? Unfortunately, Gentlemen who take Office in this country must be held responsible for knowing the information that is in their Department, and that bears on the great transaction which they advised and induced the country to make. Now, Sir, as I have said, it is the Motion now before us which is the subject of real importance. We may be compelled by the course of the debate to enter upon a vindication of our own conduct; yet we would willingly waive a discussion of that kind if we could. I will not now, at any rate, enter upon any detailed examination of our conduct, for I do not see that any public advantage would arise. But I come to the question whether it is wise that we should do that which the right hon. Gentleman invites us to do, and which my hon. Friend, by his Amendment, would dissuade us from doing? The right hon. Gentleman must allow me to say this. I can conceive no vote by the House of Commons giving an opinion upon any of the points connected with the Suez Canal Company and its rights which would not seriously increase the difficulties of the Government and gravely diminish the hopes they entertain, which are not otherwise than sanguine, of a favourable termination of these transactions. The right hon. Gentleman said it will be very desirable to clear up the rights of the case. But, Sir, it is not in the power of this House to clear up the rights of the case. It is, no doubt, in the power of this House to express an opinion upon the rights of the case; but this matter is not one within your jurisdiction. You cannot determine it; it is of a character wholly distinct, and I am bound to say that, if I understand the question aright, it appears to me to be one which it will be most unfortunate that Legislative Chambers should so attempt to deal with as to give a binding judgment upon it. This is a question of legal right. There may be a doubt in what way this legal right should be ascertained; but I think I am right in saying that it is a judicial matter. It is a matter which, probably, I suppose would have to be settled in the Courts of Egypt. I can hardly conceive that it could be settled, if it be a judical matter, in any other way than in the Courts of Egypt, or by some competent tribunal representing internationally the various countries which have been concerned in the Suez Canal, and which claim to be interested in it as a great waterway of the world. Now, Sir, is it desirable, if that be so, that we should attempt to deal with it by a vote in this House? What is to be gained by it? What is the advantage of what the right hon. Gentleman calls clearing up the rights, when you do no not clear them up at all except to your own satisfaction—when you do not establish any binding authority or any moral influence to weigh with anyone else in the world? Is the House bound at this moment? No, Sir; the House is not bound. Is the House bound by the opinion of the Executive Government, which opinion had never been submitted to them? Even had the agreement been adopted—even had the House voted the loan of money, it does not follow that the House would have been bound, because what we said on the Agreement had reference to a sentiment and a conviction in our minds; but there was no expression of that sentiment in the Agreement, and the Agreement itself in no way involved it. In point of fact, those who look at the case impartially should find that there was an Agreement, should find, that that Agreement was made by a Government holding a certain opinion as to the Isthmus of Suez, and should find that, in consequence partly of the attitude of the House, that Agreement was withdrawn. Surely, they would say that if any inference is to be drawn on this subject—and I do not think any inference can be drawn—but if it could, it certainly would not be very favourable to M. de Lessep's right. But I think no such inference can be drawn; and most certainly I think it is an extravagant proposition to say, as was said by the right hon. Gentleman in terms of great moderation, that we should prevent the tacit acceptance by the House of the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. I think the right hon. Gentleman must feel and know that there is no such acceptance involved, and that the House remains totally and absolutely unpledged, and may, subject to the considerations of right and equity, which I am sure the right hon. Gentleman never will lose sight of, adopt whatever course it pleases in the future stages of this important matter. Is it merely on the ground of inutility that I would say, do not adopt the terms of this Motion? No, Sir; I contend that this Motion would be injurious and mischievous in ways not intended by the Mover—mischievous in more ways than one. Let us consider what the proposal is immediately preceded by. It has been fully admitted by Members of Her Majesty's Government that upon the best examination they could make of the facts, and upon obtaining the best authority at their command, both in the Foreign Office, which is very strongly armed on the subject of law, and likewise from their own Law Officers, and from the Lord Chancellor, they had adopted a certain opinion as to an exclusive right of M. de Lesseps over a limited tract of country. Upon that the right hon. Gentleman makes a Motion, in which he asks the House to affirm that it ought, in no respect, to admit a monopoly extending over an unlimited tract of land. [Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE dissented.] Of course, the right hon. Gentleman will understand the sense in which I use the word "unlimited"—namely, a tract of country not comprised within those limits. You have before you an admission by the Government of an exclusive claim in a limited tract of country, and then a Motion is made by a distinguished opponent of the Government, binding the Government not to acknowledge the claim over a tract of country extending to much wider limits. What inference will arise? The inference will arise that the House had no objection at all on the subject of an exclusive right to a limited tract of country; and the House would be led indirectly into doing that very thing which, I hope, it will on no account do—namely, committing itself on a matter that is not a matter for its opinion, and in which no Executive Government could support it by its authority. It appears to me that that objection is very strong; but, even apart from that objection, I will venture on one other topic before I close these remarks. Will the House take upon itself to set an example to other Legislative Chambers of the practice of laying down opinions and doctrines with regard to the rights of the Suez Canal Company over the Isthmus of Suez? Is the right hon. Gentleman ready to take upon himself that responsibility? I have great doubts whether he is. I do not feel at all sure that he intends to ask the opinion of the House upon the Motion he has submitted. Of course, he may do so; but whether he does or does not, I wish the House to consider what will be the force of that example. Can you make sure that other Legislative Chambers will not exercise their right in the same sense as you have done? Suppose you choose to lay down a particular opinion on this subject. Have not other Chambers as good a right to do it as you? Suppose that, in the exercise of that right, they chose to express opinions different from those which this House has expressed, I ask the House whether, in that case, you have not enormously increased the difficulties, at present serious and grave, but by no means desperate or insurmountable, which beset this question? Why, you will have such a mixture of national sentiment, national susceptibility, and national interest as, judged by each Party from distinct points of view, will constitute a state of affairs perfectly hopeless and impossible to contend with. If ever there was a question in which the general dictates of prudence and equity ought to be borne carefully in mind by the House, it is this. This question has not only a future, but it has also a past. We may, perhaps, be thinking of nothing but our present and prospective traffic; but in the memory of others there abides a lively image of what happened 15, 20, and 25 years ago, when the bold projectors of this Canal, who have earned for themselves an immortal name among the benefactors of mankind, were struggling with difficulties which we were doing everything in our power, by a combination of political Parties, to accumulate upon their path. These things are not forgotten. It is not for our duty, it is not for our interest, to revive and quicken such recollections. It is for our duty, and it is for our interest, to have some sense of regret and compunction for the errors into which I will not say this nation, I will not say the merchants of this nation, but undoubtedly the political authorities and the Government of this nation were led in that deplorable opposition to that great enterprize. The opposition was, in the first place, undoubtedly, confined to the action of the Executive; but, in 1858, I think a Motion in support of the scheme was made by Mr. Roebuck, who at that time had not ceased to act with the Liberal Party to which he originally belonged; but that Motion was, unhappily, put down by a great majority, formed of both political Parties, its supporters being those waifs and strays not looked upon as good company in any assembly of respectable politicians. When I reflect upon some of the declarations which we have had to read, either as spoken or written within the last few weeks, there is in me the most painful emotion. I am convinced we cannot support or strengthen national interests by such means. The ground upon which you tread is of the utmost delicacy. I have not a doubt or apprehension in my mind as to the future of this question, provided we act with prudence and equity. I am convinced that there is an absolute union of interests, that there is a substantial union of views; and it is impossible, in my opinion, unless by the perverseness of men, that the vast interests with which we are allied with the commerce of the world, and with the consumption of the world, should not find their way and should not receive a just and full satisfaction in the settlement of this important question. There is no cause for fear; but we can only dismiss fear from our minds when we determine to take prudence for our counsel. In a question of this kind, where at every turn and every step you have to steer among the nicest national susceptibilities, the gravest national interests. the dictates of prudence, when they are clear, are the dictates we are bound to follow. I own I have never seen a conclusion before me more stamped with truth and justice, than now when I entreat the House not to accept a Resolution which asserts nothing that any one of us desires to deny, which establishes nothing that any of us has occasion to question, and which is simply a vindication of a freedom that is at this moment absolutely unimpared, and which would set a pernicious example, fraught with the gravest inconvenience, were we, unhappily, to be led in a moment of weakness to give an affirmative voice on its behalf.

, who had given Notice that he would move, as an Amendment to Mr. Norwood's proposed Amendment to Sir Stafford Northcote's proposed Motion, to leave out all after the words "this House" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words—

"Having regard to the recent Correspondence between M. de Lesseps and the Prime Minister, thinks it necessary to declare that it maintains its entire freedom of judgment in regard to all matters connected with the question of water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea,"

said, that he had some difficulty in convincing himself of the identity of the hon. Member for Hull (Mr. Norwood), on comparing the remarks which that hon. Gentleman made when he headed the deputation to the Chancellor of the Exchequer with his extremely ingenious speech to-night. As to the Prime Minister, though often charmed by his eloquence, he had never listened to a speech which, with greater subtlety and dexterity, covered the issue before the House. The right hon. Gentleman began by saying that this was an international question, and ought to be approached with a great deal of delicacy. But if it was an international question, as he was willing to admit, there was all the more necessity that the issues should be clearly defined. If the issues were merely of a commercial kind, explanations might be given which would, perhaps, remove them. One objection of Lord Palmerston to the Suez Canal, which objection the right hon. Gentle- man did not quite appreciate, was that he feared the preponderance of foreign influence. That was a great and important consideration; but he held that it was still more dangerous to truckle to foreign nations, which might lead them to believe that we had not the strength or the power to carry out our convictions. He thought it was the duty of Members of the House to defend what they considered the interests of their own country, and he entirely demurred to the idea that it was extremely dangerous to enter upon questions of this sort because it was possible in so doing to wound the susceptibilities of Foreign Powers. He held that that was a dexterous way of getting out of the difficulty, but it was not a line of argument that could be accepted as affecting the real merits of the case. If such a policy had been carried out to its full extent when, some time ago, difficulties arose between France and this country relative to the Treaty of Commerce, it might have been maintained that, in order to avoid wounding the susceptibilities of France, they should have then sacrificed the commercial interests of England. He hold that the Amendment which he had placed upon the Paper was preferable to that of the hon. Member for Hull, because it contained a special reference to the letter of M. de Lesseps to the Prime Minister, in which he asserted his exclusive right to cut a second Canal through the Isthmus, and because that letter was the only subject which demanded attention, now that the Agreement had been withdrawn. In that letter M. de Lesseps used those words—

"Cet accord constant venait do se traduire par une entente écrite, qui donnait à ce double intérêt les justifications que comportaient, d'une part lee obligations d'une compagnie jouissant du monopole exclusif, pour 99 années, de tout creusement de canal maritime dans l'Isthme Egyptien."

The claim of M. de Lesseps had been acknowledged as valid by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 12th and 13th of the present month, and the voice of M. de Lesseps, who claimed the monopoly, was said by so distinguished a man as M. Léon Say to be the voice of France. Under these circumstances, although he (Baron Henry De Worms) did not wish to introduce any Party spirit into the debate, he held that it was the duty of the House so to express itself that it might not be hampered in any future negotiations by the claim that had been made. It was a remarkable thing how Her Majesty's Government, who had so earnestly warned us against mixing ourselves up with the affairs of Egypt, should at other times rush into engagements with that country into which no sane man would dream of entering. They had entered into a contract in which France was to obtain a monopoly of the right to make waterways between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea for 99 years to come, and for the construction of which they agreed that the English Government should advance £8,000,000 sterling at a nominal rate of interest, while there would be no diminution of rates until the dividends of the Company reached, which they never would do, 21 per cent. Under these circumstances, it would be most impolitic for the House to permit the recognition by Her Majesty's Government of the right of France to this monopoly to remain upon record. He therefore thought that he had made out his case for proposing to amend the Amendment, and for asking the House to refuse to recognize the validity of the claim which the Government had so rashly and unwisely admitted.

said, the question of M. de Lesseps' sole right to construct a Canal across the Isthmus of Suez might be left to the Law Officers, and eventually to the international tribunals who would ultimately have to decide the question. Whatever difference of opinion there might be about the somewhat vague and colourless Amendment which had been moved to the still more vague and colourless Resolution of the Leader of the Opposition, the hon. Member for Hull (Mr. Norwood) was to be congratulated for his able speech in vindication of the Government's action with regard to the construction of a second Canal. He could not but wish, however, that the Amendment had been of a more pronounced character. On behalf of the Chambers of Commerce he desired to express his acknowledgments to the Government for the readiness with which they entered into negotiation with the Company; and although those negotiations had not resulted in the success desired, yet he believed the country had not adequately appreciated the value of the admissions and concessions which had been made by M. de Lesseps. Since 1879 the amount of tonnage which passed through the Canal had risen from 3,236,942 in that year to 7,122,125 in 1882, and 4,305,882 in the first half of the present year. During the same period the tolls had been successively reduced from 12 francs to 10½ francs a-ton, and at the beginning of next year the rate would be 10 francs. The Agreement provided for a reduction of 2½ francs on vessels in ballast next year, while M. de Lesseps offered to make large prospective reductions, contingent on an increase of profits, which contemplated a remittance of 50 centimes a-year, after the pilotage dues have been finally extinguished in 1886. It should not be forgotten that M. de Lesseps was now under no obligation to reduce the tolls below 10 francs at any time, or to take off the pilotage dues. Where he thought the Government scheme was most defective was in not providing definite reductions of tolls to take effect at definite periods; the uncertainty of the proposed reductions operated against the Agreement. Then a stronger British element on the Directorate ought to have been secured; and another essential condition was that there should be an office of the Company in London for the transaction of English business with the Canal. If we could come to terms with M. de Lesseps, no doubt it would be desirable and to the interests of Her Majesty's Government to aid him in obtaining a concession of further land adjoining the present Canal, through which a parallel Canal might be constructed at very much less cost than any other means of water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. He had no sympathy with those financiers and speculators who were eager for the construction of Canals by the Valley of the Jordan, or from Alexandria to Cairo. These schemes would not be remunerative, and they would bring no relief to the commercial community. Speaking on behalf of the Chambers of Commerce, he might observe that they, in concert with the Chamber of Shipping, first set this stone rolling, and that since their interview with Lord Granville on the 20th of April last that stone had certainly gathered no moss. He was ready to admit that their Association from the first took an independent line and advocated palliative, not hostile measures. He believed he interpreted the wishes of the vast majority of those Chambers when he said they had not that distrust which had been evinced in some quarters of M. de Lesseps. They looked upon him as a friend and an ally to whom the greatest consideration was due on the part of this country. M. de Lesseps had been most anxious to meet the wishes and requirements of the commercial community in this country as far as his duty to his own shareholders would allow. In conclusion, he would express a hope that the further negotiations between Her Majesty's Government and the Canal Company would not be indefinitely postponed.

Sir, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has received very hard treatment from the Prime Minister. Although the forbearance of the Opposition has been asked for by the Ministry, on account of the delicacy of our relations with France, the Premier has been very severe upon the right hon. Baronet (Sir Stafford Northcote) on account of his very temperate dealing. No one can say that the right hon. Gentleman's speech was other than extremely forbearing, though I confess to a preference for the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Brighton (Mr. Marriott). I am afraid that considerate and gentle criticism are thrown away upon the Treasury Bench. They always return bitter invective for moderation. A great deal has been said by the Prime Minister, both in this and his former speech, about the international gravity of this question; the danger of provoking irritation; the delicacy of our relations with the French Republic. To quote his own words—

"A hostile issue formed upon an Agreement of this kind could not possibly take place without very serious international mischief. In this instance, in a very peculiar degree, undoubtedly, the handling of subjects of this kind requires the utmost delicacy in the forms of the proceedings, on account of the international interest, and, possibly, the international irritation which any miscarriage in such proceedings might have tended to bring about."

But, as the hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Baron Henry De Worms) has just put it, there was something for the Government and for Parliament to consider, on a question of this kind, more important than diplomatic deli- cacy, or than the sentimental feeling of a Foreign Power. The political interests and the commerce of Britain have the first, and infinitely the first, claim. The real question is— How would British interests have been affected by this extraordinary Agreement? Now, at the outset, it must be remembered that this is not a sudden suggestion flashed upon the Ministry within a few hours, or even a few days. It is not a hasty proposal from M. de Lesseps which Her Majesty's Ministers have not had time to examine, and on which they are now asking the advice of the Commons. It is a deliberate, long-considered arrangement, which, after full examination, the Cabinet formally approved and then submitted to Parliament. The Prime Minister himself confesses that the scheme has not been well received by the country. And no wonder! For so one-sided, so preposterous, so unprofitable an Agreement could not do otherwise than fall to the ground. The Government have shown wisdom and dexterity in so quickly withdrawing from their hopeless scheme. Never has so astonishing a set of proposals as this Suez Scheme been assented to, I will not say by any Government, but by any men of business. To lend £8,000,000 at 31/4 per cent to a French Company over which we have no practical control, and without stipulating for any further control, even for a fair quid pro quo, would be of doubtful policy; but in view of the fact that the present crushing tonnage dues were not to be lowered until the shareholders had received 25 per cent interest on their capital, the scheme is, indeed, without precedent. When to this ridiculous bargain is added the wanton concession to M. de Lesseps by the Prime Minister and his Colleagues of the sole right of making Canals across the Isthmus of Suez, and the fact that seven-eighths of the revenue of the French Company are derived from ships, we get a combination of astounding inaptitude for which it would not be easy to find a parallel. It is not for the Prime Minister to complain of the inopportuneness of this discussion, because it is he who is responsible for the controversy as to the legal and international questions, for he began by laying down the law in a wholly unnecessary and wanton manner. There would have been no dispute at all if the right hon. Gentleman had not deliberately surrendered the claim of an exclusive monopoly to M. de Lesseps and the French Company. It is all very well for the Prime Minister to deprecate the setting of an example to other Legislatures; but he has himself, by his uncalled for concessions, set an example to other Prime Ministers. Although three months have been spent in the secret and now abortive negotiations with M. de Lesseps, yet the Ministry seem to have taken no steps to consult those whose opinion would have been most valuable upon such a subject, and still less to ascertain the feeling of the country. Ministers might have asked the advice of some of those Liberal shipowners who have so gallantly come to their rescue to-night. But they were too self-confident; and so, after three months of negotiation, they produced an Agreement so grotesque and so detrimental to the interests of the nation, that it died still-born the moment it saw the light. No one appears to have been consulted who ought to have been consulted. The country was kept, to use the striking words of the Government of Victoria, "all in the dark" about this wonderful plan. The choice of negotiators was as unfortunate as the terms of the bargain. For the Ministry to leave such a matter as this in the hands of two Directors of the Canal Company, who are naturally much under the influence of M. de Lesseps' able and masterful spirit, was, at the least, injudicious. It is not surprising that the Prime Minister should describe M. de Lesseps as "sagacious." He has proved himself a great deal too sagacious for Her Majesty's Ministers. The Government could not admit their failure more absolutely than by their abrupt abandonment of this child of many hopes and of much scheming. They dare not submit the product of their labours to the judgment of Parliament. The precipitate and ignonimous retreat ci its authors from a scheme which had been heralded with so much ostentation is the most eloquent condemnation that can be passed upon it. It is pretty evident, however, that the Ministry have been acting under the influence of political motives throughout. They have been led to make these extreme concessions in the hope of conciliating the French Government and French feeling, which, in spite of all the Prime Minister's protestations, has been growing steadily more hostile to England. The right hon. Gentleman has said of even the discussion of this scheme, that—

"(c.) On the one side claims would be made which would unquestionably be felt of an irritating character, and which might tend to the raising of questions in foreign countries that would not conduce to the maintenance of those cordial relations of good will and amity which it is our main duty to promote."

This, with my previous quotations from his remarks, will show that the abortive Agreement, whose premature decease we are now considering, was really intended as a bribe to France. It might have been thought that the prior experience of the Ministry as to Tunis, the Commercial Treaty, and the Egyptian War, would have convinced them of the futility of trying to buy over the French Republic. The hon. Member for Hull (Mr. Norwood) wishes the House to affirm that its hands are perfectly unfettered. His Amendment states that—

"This House desires to maintain its entire freedom of judgment in regard to all matters connected with the question of water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea."

He forgets that the Prime Minister has, without provocation and with gratuitous contempt for the interests of British trade, done his utmost to bind the country to an admission of the exclusive monopoly claimed by M. de Lesseps. In its general sense, no doubt, the hon. Gentleman's Amendment is a distinct condemnation of the concession of Ministers. To state that the House is not bound, after the declarations of the Prime Minister, is to place little value upon those declarations. Yet, though the Government may escape the direct censure implied in the Resolution of the Leader of the Opposition, their acceptance of the modified censure of the Member for Hull is a confession of the desperate nature of their cause. With the Agreement itself and its absurdities we need have little concern. It is gone. It has perished without hope of revival. But the statements of the Prime Minister and of some of his Colleagues, which have been made in connection with this question, are not to be so lightly treated. For by these statements they have most unnecessarily, and with a wanton disregard of political and commercial prudence, surrendered the whole basis on which British interests rest as regards M. de Lesseps and the French Company. The Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have, in the most public and emphatic manner, conceded to M. de Lesseps his novel claim to a monopoly of Canal-making across the Isthmus. It is sufficiently incredible that, under any circumstances, they should have allowed such a claim to be well-founded. Even if it appeared just to minds so constituted as always to favour other nations at the expense of their own, ordinary sagacity would have restrained them, as negotiators, from thus recklessly flinging to the other side the very keystone of the resistance to so injurious a monopoly. There is absolutely nothing to be gained by such thoughtless gifts, while everything may be lost by it—at least everything- in the shape of British interests. What is it that the Ministry have conceded? On July 12, the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury stated in this House, to the universal astonishment—

"M. de Lesseps is in possession of an exclusive right to make a Canal, as far as the Isthmus of Suez is concerned. That is the position of M. de Lesseps in our view and in that of our legal advisers. Upon that supposition all the money was subscribed for the making of the present Canal."

This last sentence is a purely gratuitous assumption, in support of which not the smallest evidence can be given. No such monopoly was claimed by M. de Lesseps at that time, nor dreamt of by anybody. But the Prime Minister was not satisfied with this personal concession to M. de Lesseps, for which there may be something, though little, to be said. On July 19, in reply to a Question of the hon. Member for Waterford County (Mr. Villiers Stuart), he declared—

"The privileges referred to" — i.e., the monopoly of Suez Canal-making — "do not, according to our view, determine with the life of M. de Lesseps, but pass to the Company formed by him."

These two serious statements of the utmost importance, involving, as they do, the whole case of British commerce, and indeed of the world's commerce, as against the French Company, were made, without any necessity, before the debate, and apparently out of sheer pettishness caused by the general condemnation of the scheme. What lawyer would thus jeopardize the case of his client? What guardian would thus imperil the future of his ward? What man of business would thus sacrifice the interests of those for whom he was negotiating? Yet the Prime Minister has in charge interests more extended and more sacred than any private trustee. He is guardian of the Empire of England. It is his duty, a bounden and paramount duty, to guard with unwearying care the splendid commerce of these Realms. He has to safeguard the vast shipping trade between Great Britain and the East; and especially is he bound to protect the avenue to our vast dominions in Hindostan. But, in face of these duties, he lays the rights of his country and the traffic of the world at the feet of a "sagacious" Frenchman, and enters into a financial arrangement which enables M. de Lesseps and his Company to continue for an indefinite period their extortionate imposts on British merchandize. This generosity on the part of the Ministry would be all very admirable if it was exercised at their own cost. Unhappily, British shipowners and Imperial interests have to pay for this vicarious liberality of the Government. On what, then, is M. de Lesseps' claim to a monopoly based? The wording of the first Concession—that of the Viceroy Said Pasha, dated November, 1854—is as follows:—

"I give to my friend Ferdinand de Lesseps an exclusive power to constitute and direct a Universal Company for the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez"—throughout all the concessions and documents the words 'a Canal,' not 'Canals,' occur—"and the making of a Canal between the two seas."

Would any lawyer so phrase a concession which was intended to give the concessionnaire the monopoly of making Suez Canals? Would he not simply say "an exclusive power to pierce the Isthmus of Suez?" or "an exclusive power of making Canals through the Isthmus of Suez?" As a matter of fact, all that was promised to M. de Lesseps, in 1854, was the sole right of constituting a "Universal Company"—that is as opposed to a Société en Commandite —that is, an English, or French, or Italian Company—for the purpose of the Canal. It was intended to protect M. de Lesseps, on the one hand, against the Viceroy, who was himself the great monopolist of all power in Egypt; and on the other hand, against any other "universal" concessionnaires. But this concession was never itself ratified by the Sultan, without which it could have no validity. It was not until 1860 that the Sultan gave his sanction to the convention dated the same year between the Viceroy Ismail Pasha and M. de Lesseps. Neither this Convention, nor the cahier des charges— or conditions of the contract—of January, 1856, nor the compromis of 1864, on which the French Emperor's first award was based, contain any reference to an exclusive right or power of Canal-making. Their language is very uniform and much less comprehensive than the Concession of 1854. They clearly specify what pecuniary benefit M. de Lesseps received from the Viceroy, and what he is, in turn, obliged to do. No exclusive powers can be claimed which are not sot forth in the cahier des charges, or conditions of the contract. Under this document M. de Lesseps' obligations and privileges are distinctly and at length set forth. It also repeals all previous dispositions which are inconsistent with its conditions. He has to make a Canal suitable for general maritime navigation between Suez and Pelusium; also a canal of irrigation, (i.e., the Sweet Water Canal), and two branch canals of irrigation. In return he obtains freedom from imposts, the right to work mines, the power of putting a maximum tariff of 10 francs per ton upon vessels. Furthermore, 10 per cent of the profits are to be divided among the founders. Article 20 of the cahier des charges states that—

"M. Ferdinand de Lesseps shall preside over and direct the Society as first formed during 10 years from the time of the commencement of the first 99 years of the Concession (i.e., from the completion of the works)."

So that the "power to construct a canal" would naturally be exhausted when it was finished; and by this Article the power "direct" or manage the Company was limited to 10 years. These quite justify the conclusion of the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch (Mr. Horace Davey) and Mr. Underdown, that—

"The only exclusive privilege was one personal to M. de Lesseps—viz., to constitute and direct the Company. The benefits which were to accrue to him for presenting the matter to the Khedive, and for acting as the agent and friend of the latter in forming the Company, are clearly set forth and have been enjoyed by him."

This opinion is also held by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Launceston (the late Attorney General) and by Mr. Mark Napier. These eminent authorities will carry quite as much weight with the country as the Law Officers of the Crown. There is a very important Convention between the Khedive and M. de Lesseps, bearing date April 23, 1869, in which the Company, in consideration of the payment by the Khedive of a sum of 20,000,000 francs in addition to the 84,000,000 francs awarded them by Napoleon III., "renonce a toute exception faculte on privilege special et reutre dans le devoir commune." So that, even if they claimed a monopoly which was never given to them, the Company renounce any such pretension. Lastly, the Firman of the Sultan, which was not given until March 19, 1869, in confirming the Concession, expressly reserves "the sacred rights of the Porte and of the Egyptian Government." To deny now that the Viceroy and Sovereign of the Egyptian territory have no power to authorize the construction of another Canal, is as absurd as to deny that Parliament could give a concession to a second railway to construct a rival line between two districts because it had already given a similar concession to another Company. Let it be noted, too, how this claim of M. de Lesseps is growing. It was once the monopoly of making "a" Suez Canal. This was scouted by the Khedive and the Porte in 1872. It is now the monopoly of "any" Canal. It was formerly limited to the Isthmus of Suez. Now it has become the Egyptian Isthmus. The House should not overlook the remarkable letter addressed by M. de Lesseps to the Prime Minister on July 20. In it he claims for the Company "the exclusive monopoly of excavating any maritime Canal through the Egyptian Isthmus." This enlarged claim would cover the Canal suggested along the Nile to Cairo and thence to Suez. This letter is a State document. It crystallizes and enlarges the claims which the Prime Minister has granted. M. Leon Say states that M. de Lesseps' letter represents the voice of France. Yet, in his reply to M. de Lesseps, the right hon. Gentleman takes no excep- tion to these exaggerated assertions. If they are not noticed and contradicted now, it may well be said hereafter that England is bound by the declarations of the Prime Minister and by the silence of the House of Commons. On a question of this kind it is perfectly fair to consider what benefits M. de Lesseps and his cofounders have actually reaped from the Canal. The Prime Minister has indulged in his usual vague and majestic language as to the gratitude due by the world in general, and England in particular, to this Company. No one will deny that M. de Lesseps has been a benefactor to the commerce of Europe and Asia. But where the interests of a great Empire are at stake, we are justified in examining thoroughly, in no grudging or narrow spirit, but fairly, what the Company and its founders have obtained in return for the benefits they have conferred. In the first place, the shareholders are now receiving 19 or 20 per cent—and this mainly out of British trade—on their investment; secondly, the founders, of whom M. de Lesseps is the Chief, divide among themselves this year, as their 10 per cent, no less than £125,000. In the third place, the Directors, of whom M. de Lesseps is the President, receive £25,000. These are well-deserved returns; but they are far from inconsiderable. They would never have been received by the Company but for British shipping, which furnishes seven-eighths of its revenue. I contend, therefore, that M. de Lesseps and his coadjutors are sufficiently rewarded for their enterprize without giving them a monopoly of Suez Canals for all time to come. The Prime Minister has stated that "large advantages have been gained by this Agreement" for British trade; and that his—

"Arrangements would have led to a considerable increase in the practical influence of Englishmen over the Government and over the Direction of the Canal."

These are bold assumptions, which the facts of the scheme do not justify. What were the "large advantages" gained? When the interest paid on the shares amounted to 25 per cent, then 50 centimes, or 5d., was to be taken off the present tax of 10 francs 50 cents (8s. 5d.) per ton. This reduction of 5d. would, on a ship of 1,000 tons, amount to about £15 out of a total charge of £435. When the interest had risen 27½ per cent, another 5d. was to be taken off, and a third 5d. at 30 per cent. These reductions were to be repeated at every 3 per cent rise of interest, till a minimum tariff of 5 francs was reached. Below this there was to be no further relief. What a magnificent boon! We were to lend £8,000,000, at 3¼ per cent, that this French Company might therewith double the value of their property. In return, when the shareholders were getting their 25 and 30 per cent interest, these miserable fivepences were to be slowly and grudgingly taken off the tonnage tariff. Then, as to the changes in the Direction of the Canal. At present there are 24 Directors, of whom three are English. The defunct scheme proposed no increase of the English Directors. At present the Court de Direction, or Executive Committee, consists of five regular and three honorary members. One only, and he an honorary member, is English. It was proposed to make him a regular member, leaving the Committee seven foreign members to one English member. The Finance Commission has now nine members, of whom one is English. The late scheme would have given one more English member, making two out of nine. There was also to be one English Vice President out of three. There is something supremely farcical about the idea of these infinitesimal changes causing a "considerable increase of practical influence." A very just estimate of the practical value of these so-called advantages was made by the British public, no less than by the commercial community. They laughed the whole scheme out of existence directly it was made known. The contrast between the proposals of the present Ministry and the conduct of the late Administration deserve a brief notice. Lord Beaconsfield saved Egypt from bankruptcy, and the Khedive's shares from falling into the hands of a French Syndicate, by purchasing them at a cost of £4,000,000. British influence in Egypt was greatly increased by that statesmanlike act. At the time the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) scoffed at the transaction, and said the £4,000,000 had better have been divided among the Ministers who concluded the purchase. On those £4,000,000, which only cost England 3¼ per cent, interest at the rate of 5 per cent has been and is regularly paid by the Egyptian Government. Thus, in 36 years from 1875, even at 5 per cent, the whole sum, principal, and interest, will have been reimbursed to the English Treasury. We shall then hold the shares, which will, in 1894, become entitled to the full profits of the Canal, absolutely free of cost and burden. The whole £4,000,000 will have been paid off, probably by the year 1897, and England will be gathering the 20 or 30 per cent interest enjoyed by the other shareholders. Now, I beg the Treasury Bench to mark the difference. You lend £8,000,000, at 3¼ per cent, to a French Company for their gain, and for the development of their property. British influence is positively lessened by your weakness. The advantages to English shipping would have been, under your scheme, as I have shown, but trifling; the gain to the Exchequer would have been absolutely a minus quantity. When, in 50 years, the loan might have been repaid, England would not have owned a single fresh share, and would be receiving no interest for her liberal loans. What is our position as to Egypt and the Suez Canal? Our trade supplies seven-eighths of the shipping and seven-eights of its revenue. Our financial and industrial interests in Egypt itself are enormous. Our political and military interests are even greater. It is the high road to our Indian Empire. England owns over 40 per cent of the share capital of the Canal. At present we are in military occupation of the country, and must remain so for a considerable period, unless we are to abandon Egypt to anarchy, or to another European Power. The Prime Minister speaks of our "tempory and exceptional position" in Egypt, as if to imply that we have no greater interests there than other Powers, and that we are bound to scuttle out as fast as possible. If not in defence of British interests, I would ask why did we undertake the costly and troublesome "military operations" of last year? Why did we crush the efforts of the Egyptian people after self-government, and overwhelm Arabi and the National Party? Was it out of a spirit of pure knighterranty, and for hardly the worthiest of causes? Unless the Ministry wish to convict themselves of the purest folly they must admit that the Campaign of 1882 was undertaken to secure our interests in Egypt and the Canal. This being so, the Government are bound to see that our sacrifice of blood and treasure are not fruitless, and that the results of our labours are not thrown away. £6,000,000 and many precious lives have been given to the war in Egypt. Early in the century, the valour and genius of Nelson and Abercromby wrested Egypt from the grasp of the Great Napoleon. Forty years ago, the resolution of Lord Palmerston again saved Egypt from becoming a French Province. It is essential that British influence shall be predominant in Egypt. Our interests demand it, and the country expects it of the Government. During the past two years a great change has come over the Egyptian Question. Whereas, two years ago, both France and ourselves were satisfied and Egypt tranquil, since that time Egypt has been overwhelmed with troubles, and the greatest dissatisfaction is felt both in France and England. A perfect crop of troubles and ill-feeling has sprung up between the two States. Why is this? Because of the exaggerated delicacy our Government have shown in dealing with France in this and other matters, and because of the subservience they have evinced to French policy and prejudices. I assert, with perfect good feeling towards France, that the more our Government yield, the more they talk with bated breath, as the Prime Minister has talked, the bigger will be the demands of France, the greater will be the irritation, and the greater the certainty of future trouble. We should lose nothing by a courteous, but, at the same time, a firm attitude towards France. The Prime Minister has ridiculed the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition that this is a commercial and not a political question. The purchase of the Suez Canal Shares had, no doubt, a political as well as a financial object—it was to prevent those shares falling into the hands of a French Syndicate —but the present proposal is simply to lend £8,000,000 sterling to the Suez Canal Company, without any chance of England reaping advantage, political or commercial. The policy of the late Government in purchasing the ex-Khedive's shares in the Canal was so wise, so farsighted, and so beneficial to this country, it conferred upon us so much politi- cal and general advantage, as well as pecuniary gain, that I challenge the Government to show any parallel in the history of the financial transactions of the world. I am afraid that, in their late scheme, the main consideration which has guided the Government has not been the advantage of British commerce, nor the political interests of the British Empire, but a fair desire to conciliate the French Government by giving M. de Lesseps and his Company a good bargain. I will only say, in conclusion, that if anyone is responsible for this debate, it is the Prime Minister, for, without necessity or provocation, he has deliberately abandoned to this French Company an exclusive monopoly. He has thereby surrendered without cause the ground on which all international resistance against French monopoly must in future be based.

said, the legal aspect of the question of monopoly could only be presented in a direct form by raising a suit in the Egyptian Courts. If the Egyptian Government granted a new concession to another Company to construct a Canal, the present Company could at once, under Article 16, apply to the Egyptian Court for an Injunction. In that way only could the question be brought to an issue; and it would be decided, not by English, but by Foreign law. That ought to be remembered when they considered whether the House should express an opinion as to what was the proper mode of interpreting this concession. He did not think the conduct of the Government ought to be determined solely upon the mode in which a Court of Law might decide this technical legal question. Let them put Her Majesty's Government in the position of the Government of Egypt of having granted a similar concession, and then he believed all the difficulty would be solved. He had arrived at the conclusion that the International Suez Canal Company had an exclusive privilege in the sense which he would afterwards explain. No doubt, if the only statement of an exclusive power were to be found in the Concession of 1854, it would be extremely difficult to understand how Her Majesty's Government could have received the advice which was given to them. The Concession of 1854 gave exclusive power to M. de Lesseps to form a Universal Company for the purpose of constructing a Canal; the concession was granted, not to M. de Lesseps himself, but in trust for the benefit of the Company of which he was the promoter. It was argued that the Concession of 1854 was revoked by the Concession of 1856; and, according to Lord Salisbury, it was of no validity, because it did not receive the sanction of the Sultan. But the last Article of the Concession of 1856 revoked only those parts of the Concession of 1854 which were inconsistent with the cahier des charges. And as for the Sultan's Firman of 1866, it just as much confirmed the Concession of 1854 as it did the Concession of 1856. It was asserted that the only object of the Concession of 1854 was to enable M. de Lesseps to announce that he was the sole mandataire of the Viceroy for forming a Company to construct the Canal. But, if that was so, why should the Concession of 1854 be treated as in force after the Company was formed; because, if the formation of the Company was the only object of the Concession of 1854, then when the Company was formed the concession was exhausted, and it had come to an end? If that was so, why was the Concession of 1854 treated as in full force in the Concession of 1866? M. de Lesseps was to have the exclusive power of forming a Company. No one else was to have the right of piercing the Isthmus and making the Canal. Probably no one thought then that another Canal would be constructed. But to what inference did that lead? Was it not to this, that at that time the work of piercing the Isthmus and constructing the Canal was considered an "indivisible unity," which was not to be split into fractions, but was to be the work solely of the Company formed by M. de Lesseps? It was not the granting of a monopoly at all. A monopoly was an exclusive power given to an individual to do that which, otherwise, every person would have a right to do. But this was strictly a franchise, like the right to build a bridge or the right of ferry. Seeing that there was au existing concession containing the words "exclusive power," and alluding to them as being in force as late as 1866, he could not refuse to give effect to those words. Although holding that opinion, he wished to observe that the proposition he had stated, like all general legal propositions, was subject to limitations and conditions, so that he did not consider this question of exclusive privilege was of much importance. And for this reason. It was established by incontestable authority that in every grant made by a Sovereign there was reserved the right of domain—that was, the right of resumption of possession of the thing granted on the ground of public utility or expediency. That being so, the International Suez Canal Company could not impose arbitrary terms upon the world. The true construction, therefore, to be placed on the Convention now occupying the attention of the House was this, that as long as the concession should exist the Ruler of Egypt could not grant to any other Company the power of constructing a Canal. But that concession might be taken away; and if the International Suez Canal Company would not construct a Canal on reasonable terms the Ruler of Egypt would be perfectly justified in resuming the concession, or constructing a Canal himself. M. de Lesseps knew very well that he could not abuse the power granted to him, and after negotiation he would doubtless yield. But we ought not, for the sake of our mercantile interests, to make use of our influence in Egypt for the purpose of inducing the Ruler of Egypt to act towards the Canal Company in a manner which we should consider unfair on the part of our own Government, if that Government had granted a similar concession in similar circumstances. In his endeavour to enforce that view upon the House, he was speaking, not against the interests of this country, but for her true interests, her honour, and her reputation.

said, he wished to point out that the contention of M. de Lesseps was that for the next 100 years the mercantile traffic between the West and the East was to depend upon the good pleasure of the Suez Canal Company. That, in his opinion, was a very monstrous proposition. What, he asked, was this Company? It called itself "Universal," and in the original concession there were provisions calculated to give it a character corresponding to its name. There was one provision to the effect that the Directors of the Company should be chosen from the different nations which had an interest in the affair; and another to the effect that the Chairman, after the lapse of the special powers given to M. de Lesseps, must be chosen by the Viceroy from among the largest shareholders. These provisions, if carried out, would give to this country a considerable control over the Canal; but, as a matter of fact, they had not been acted upon. Those who had an interest in the Canal, and who wore entitled by the concessions to exercise power over it, were met by an obstinate determination on the other side to refuse to grant them their just share in its government. That was seen in the negotiations that took place in connection with the tonnage dues; and again last year, when, being obliged to occupy the Canal under the authority of the Egyptian Government, we were opposed by the agent of M. de Lesseps. In interpreting this concession the real point to be kept in view was that the words "exclusive right" attached themselves entirely to the right of M. de Lesseps to form a Company, while the rights of the Company must be determined by other considerations. It must be recollected that at the time M. de Lesseps obtained this concession it was quite possible that the Khedive, after having given one Company certain privileges at one time, might afterwards have given another Company other privileges which might have rendered those of the first Company valueless. Therefore it was that this concession conferring the very valuable privilege of forming this Company was given to M. de Lesseps. It was a striking fact that although M. de Lesseps had at one period of his career been in want of money, he had never set up this claim to the very valuable right he now asserted he possessed in order to raise the necessary funds. It had frequently been urged, with great force, that in dealing with M. de Lesseps and his Company, which had accomplished so much for us, we could not proceed upon the narrow considerations of strict legal rights, and this no one would be more willing to admit than himself; but, on the other hand, he thought that to hand over the exclusive control of the traffic of the East and of Australia for the next 100 years to a single Company, or even to a single nation, would would be paying too dearly for the services of even M. de Lesseps and his Company. He must remind the House that the conditions contained in the concession which M. de Lesseps ac- tually obtained were very different from those contained in the original concession which was set aside. It was the opposition—unreasonable enough in many respects, as he readily admitted—to the scheme that had brought about a removal of some conditions contained in the original concession, which would have been most injurious to the world. There was another point to which he desired to draw attention. Since the successful attempt to form this Canal, this Company, which had originally been put forward as a Universal Company, had had its praises sounded as being exclusively a French Company; and political capital was sought to be made out of the so-called sacrifices which the French nation had made in order to benefit the commerce of the world. But was the House aware of the exact proportion in which the French nation had contributed towards the expense of making this Canal? In round numbers the French nation had contributed £6,000,000 towards the making of the Canal, while the Egyptian people had paid down in hard cash, or in money's worth, £10,000,000. Therefore, while we were called upon to admire the great work which the French nation had achieved, we were also called upon to ignore the services which the Egyptian people had rendered us. It was hard that, while we heard so much of the great sacrifices which the French nation had made, we should hear so little of the forced labour of the wretched Egyptian fellahs who had been dragged by force to do the work of making the Canal, and who had afterwards been compelled to pay compensation to the State for the loss which their absence from their homes had entailed. The Company, moreover, had obtained, under the award of the late Emperor of the French, the sum of £4,000,000 in respect of the withdrawal of the concession as to the Sweet Water Canal. The benefit derived by the Egyptians from the Suez Canal was absolutely nil. The result of the whole transaction had been that Egypt received 15 per cent upon the net revenue of the Company in consideration of having given the latter the concession, the land, and 65 per cent of the outlay incurred. This was, perhaps, not a reason for doing away with any legal rights which the Company might possess; but it was a good ground for not being over-sympathetic with the Company, nor investing the work it had accomplished with a halo. In addition to the facts to which he had referred, it must be recollected that the shares of the Company had, for a considerable time, been at over 400 per cent premium. On the whole, therefore, the French shareholders had not suffered very greatly in consequence of entering into this very successful speculation. It must not be forgotten that the real master of the Suez Canal was the Khedive, acting under the Porte. The terms of the concession not only limited the amount of land to be acquired by the Company, but rendered a further concession from the Khedive and the Porte necessary before a second Canal could be constructed. The question was too great a one to be determined on so narrow an issue as the interpretation of two words in a concession. It was our right and duty—especially as we occupied so strong a position in Egypt—to regard the question as one affecting the commerce of the world. We ought, no doubt, to use our influence, in the first instance, to effect a reasonable arrangement with M. de Lesseps, if such an arrangement could be made. The questions for the consideration of the Government were—first, whether a second Canal was necessary; secondly, a reduction of the rates; thirdly, how Great Britain, as the Power most concerned in the welfare of the Canal, should be more adequately represented; and, fourthly, it ought to be borne in mind that in the view of the Government the question was so important that, in defiance of all ordinary rules, they were prepared to lend £8,000,000 at a very low rate of interest. He could not help thinking, therefore, that we possessed very valuable means of negotiation. There was one other point to which he would refer. He had heard with regret one or two Gentlemen on the Ministerial Benches speak of referring the Canal to an International Commission. He hoped we should have nothing of the sort. They had had enough of a Dual Control in Egypt. Unsatisfactory as the proposed Agreement was, he would rather accept it than hand the Canal over to a Commission composed partly of indifferent and partly of decidedly hostile elements. He hoped that we should have no repetition of such a Commission as the Sanitary Commission, whose performances in Egypt had been so remarkable.

said, he did not desire to dwell on the purely legal aspects of the question; but he felt bound, out of justice to his learned friend, Mr. Underdown, and to himself, to say that he had very recently carefully gone through all the documents which had been submitted to his learned friend and himself, and, notwithstanding the adverse opinions given by persons of far higher authority than himself, he had seen no reason to alter in the slightest respect the opinion which his learned friend and himself had expressed on the subject. In fact, if he was not aware that there were other lawyers who were more likely to be right than he, and who had given a contrary opinion, he should not have for a moment doubted the accuracy of his own. He was surprised to hear the Prime Minister say that if the Provisional Concession of 1854 did not give M. de Lesseps an exclusive right to make a Canal through the Isthmus of Suez it gave him nothing. At all events, that concession, in which M. de Lesseps was spoken of as the mandatory and friend of the Khedive, enabled M. de Lesseps to go with his concession to the capitalists of Europe and to found a Company on the strength of these documents which he possessed. It enabled him compulsorily to expropriate private owners, and gave him powers possessed by no other person. There was no doubt that after the great efforts of M. de Lesseps, in which it must be remembered that he encountered the opposition of this country, that gentleman was entitled to the highest moral consideration at our hands. But he had always considered, and he still considered, that the question which the shipowners, the merchants, and people of this country had to consider was a practical question, which was to be discussed as a matter of business among business people, and not to be determined by nice considerations as to the exact meaning of a curiously worded document. That question was, whether, in the first place, a second Canal was necessary, and then, if it was, whether it should be carried out under the present Company so as to insure uniformity of management for both Canals; or whether a British Com- pany should be formed with British capital and under British management? It should be remembered, however, that if the latter alternative were adopted, a fresh concession from the Khedive would be required, and that concession would have to be ratified by a Firman from the Sultan. Even if these preliminary steps were got over, it was easy to perceive that the existence of a second Canal, side by side with that of the French Company, might bring about a state of collision and friction between the two countries. He desired now to explain the reasons why he proposed to vote against the Resolution of the right hon. Baronet the Member for North Devon. He conceived that the question for that House and for the country was not to be determined by mere conflict between lawyers as to the true interpretation of these documents. It was a question to be determined as a matter of business by men of business. He objected to the right hon. Baronet's Resolution on various grounds. It embodied an abstract proposition, which bore no relation to anything in Nature or in Art. It asked Her Majesty's Government to affirm a proposition which nobody had ever denied. In the next place, he objected to the House being asked to pronounce its opinion upon a legal question. With the greatest possible respect for that House, he ventured to say that there was no Assembly in this country less fitted to pronounce an opinion upon a question of law. If the question as to the monopoly claimed by M. de Lesseps were to be judicially determined, it must come before a judicial and, he presumed, an Egyptian tribunal, the operation of which, particularly under existing circumstances, might be seriously hampered by an opinion solemnly expressed by the House of Commons. Again, he thought it would be extremely impolitic, with a view to future negotiations, to affirm the Resolution of the right hon. Baronet; and he might here express a hope that the negotiations would be renewed and brought to a successful termination with the present Company. In his judgment, the Amendment proposed by his hon. Friend the Member for Hull (Mr. Norwood) expressed the view which that House ought to favour. If the House would wisely abstain from expressing an opinion on a question in regard to which lawyers differed, the House, the Government, and the country would be committed to nothing, and we should be able to renew the negotiations with M. de Lesseps in a much more favourable attitude.

said, he desired to make a few remarks on the commercial bearing of this question; but could not refrain from first noticing some of the statements made by the hon. Member for Hull. The hon. Gentleman had spoken of the Resolution of the right hon. Baronet the Member for North Devon as meaning something, whereas he himself proposed to do nothing. The hon. Gentleman expended a good deal of time in endeavouring to persuade them to do nothing; but he observed that towards the close of his speech he asked—"Are we without hopes of a rational Agreement?" To that he answered—"No. Put it to the self-interest of M. de Lesseps, and we shall get a rational Agreement." Then the hon. Gentleman proposed that we should have one-half of the administration. Well, he thought that if we could obtain anything like that, we should be very well satisfied. A good deal had been said about French susceptibilities, but nothing about rousing English susceptibilities; and if friendly relations with our neighbours were to be so easily strained, it would seem almost better to be without friendly relations. The Prime Minister had said that the House could not determine a legal question. If that were so, why had the Government determined it? Of course, the House would not be likely to stultify itself by voting £8,000,000 if it were not satisfied with the Agreement. It would be to the mutual advantage of the shipping interests of this country and M. de Lesseps that they should make some bargain that would be acceptable to both parties. He would show by figures what was the difference in cost to a ship between using the Canal and going round by the Cape, and he said the amount of the tolls was enough in many cases to make shipowners hesitate to use the Canal; and, indeed, he knew cases in which they found it to their advantage to send round by the Cape, when, if the tolls had been lower, they would have used the Canal. For instance, the traffic for the last six months was 4,306,000 tons of shipping, and the charges thereon were 35,329,000 francs, or 8.2 francs per gross ton. A ship of 3,000 tons gross would, therefore, pay £1,000 to go through the Canal. Now, the distance round the Cape to Bombay was 4,450 miles longer than through the Canal, which, at 10 knots an hour, would occupy 18½ days. Deduct from this 21/2 days—being the average time in getting through the Canal—and the extra time was reduced to 16 days. The question, therefore, arose — Was it worth while to spend £1,000 to save 16 days? It certainly could not be to the advantage of the Canal Company to drive away traffic; and as traffic was being driven away the sooner there was a reduction of the tolls the better would it be for all parties. The shortest route between the two seas was that between Port Said and Suez. That in itself was an argument in favour of the present Canal; and his recommendation, as an engineer, was that they should widen it, as he considered one wide Canal would be more useful than two narrow ones. The present traffic equalled about 12 vessels per day, so that it was really idle to talk of the necessity for two Canals. The widening, too, of the existing Canal could be effected at less than one-half the cost of constructing a new Canal, and that idea he recommended to the careful consideration of the Government.

Although I rose after the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce), I was glad to give way to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr. Horace Davey), considering the important part which he has taken outside the House upon this question; and I am glad to add that the remarks which I had the pleasure of listening to from him were very valuable, and I have further the satisfaction of knowing how he intends to vote on the present occasion. I have also had the advantage of listening to the remarks of the hon. Member for Southampton (Mr. Giles), whose speech, if acted upon, would demolish the whole of the present controversy, because the hon. Member says it is a mistake to make a second Canal, and that all we have to do in the interests of commerce is to widen the present Canal, at an expenditure of £2,000,000. Whatever controversy there may be as to the power of M. de Lesseps to make a second Canal within his pre- sent concession, there is no controversy at all as to his power of widening the present Canal. If, therefore, the proposal was to do that, cadit quæstio altogether, the Canal would be widened at once by M. de Lesseps, and there would be an end of all controversy. There are, however, very excellent reasons why nothing of the kind should be done; and, with every respect for the views of the hon. Member for Southampton, who is eminent in matters of this kind, the opinion of the mercantile world, and especially of the shipping world, is that one great disadvantage of the present Canal is that ships coming in opposite directions have to wait a long time at the sidings in order to pass each other. Therefore, if you were only to widen the Canal that difficulty would practically continue; whereas, if you have two Canals—and I am speaking almost the unanimous opinion of the mercantile world—if you have two Canals, so as to have an up line and a down line, none of the present delay would take place, and the passing of the ships in both directions would be easy.

I have estimated for double the width of the present Canal, so that ships could pass each other without difficulty.

Now, let me say a word as to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce). I am always glad to follow my hon. Friend, because he invariably speaks with knowledge, and a great deal of what he says ought to be well weighed, both by hon. Members who sit opposite to him and by hon. Members on the same side of the House. There is a great deal which my hon. Friend has said to-night that is well worthy of consideration by this House, if we are to carry on further negotiations upon this subject. I was particularly glad when my hon. Friend pointed out the extreme difficulty of what is known as the internationalizing plan—a plan which has a good deal of support in the country, but which, if it has to be taken in hand, will be found to be attended by enormous difficulties. My hon. Friend, in a very few words, I think, summed up those difficulties, and I wish to point out to the House how just his observations were. My hon. Friend also made some remarks as to the cha- racter of the concessions and privileges granted in Eastern countries, and pointed out that they are not to be weighed in the same scale with similar concessions and privileges granted in Western countries. Every word of his remarks on the subject appeared to me to be of the greatest value; but when we come to the legal question as to the rights of M. de Lesseps, both in respect of the construction of the Canal at the Isthmus, or a second Canal at the Isthmus, or the construction of Canals in other parts of Egypt, I shall follow the careful warning of my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government, and ask the house to excuse me altogether if I decline to go into those controversial matters. It is perfectly right that Gentlemen learned in the law should, up to a certain point, discuss these matters; but for us who have been, and will be, responsible for conducting the negotiations, nothing could be more unwise, under present circumstances, than to carry on such a discussion. Therefore, I shall follow, most rigidly, the example set by my right hon. Friend and the precepts which fell from him, and in the few words I may have to say to-night I shall endeavour to say nothing that can in any way compromise this House, or rather the Government, for we could not compromise the House, in future discussions beyond what we have already stated in debate—already stated in debate this evening. I am particularly anxious to make reference to what has fallen from hon. Gentlemen during the last few hours as to the conduct of the recent negotiations ending in the Provisional Agreement. It has occurred to me, having read a good deal on the same subject outside the House, that there is much misapprehension as to the nature of the origin of the negotiations which have been carried on; and I think it will be for the public advantage, not only with respect to the past, but still more with reference to the future, that it should be understood how these negotiations arose and what their general character was. The history of these negotiations is simply this. In 1876 an arrangement was made by the late Government with the Suez Canal Company, which is commonly known as the Lesseps-Stokes Agreement, under which the Canal Company were bound to expend 30,000,000 francs, or £1,200,000 sterling, in making the Canal on capital account, irrespective altogether of the casual improvements on revenue account, and that expenditure was to be spread over a series of years. Last year it appeared that the Company had expended, roughly, £300,000 out of that sum of £1,200,000, and the Government were warned by their Directors in the Company that it was contemplated by M. de Lesseps and the French Directors to expend at once the remainder of that £1,200,000—the exact sum being, I believe, 23,000,000 francs. In answer to that communication, Lord Granville instructed the Directors to take care that due provision was made for the widening of the Canal, to which they replied on the 17th of November last that, in their opinion, the widening of the Canal as proposed in two different ways by the French Engineering Commission was not the only method which could be used for improving the Canal. They said there were two ways in which that widening might be made; but they added that, in their opinion, it would probably be better to make a second Canal altogether, and they asked leave to discuss that question with the French Directors. The leave for which they asked was given on condition that they were not supposed to advocate any particular system, and on the 5th of December they reported to the Government that the preliminary examination for the expenditure of the 23,000,000 francs had been already carried out; that this examination had reference only to the two alternative methods of widening the Canal; but as the construction of another Canal had been mentioned as an element worthy of consideration, instead of carrying out the smaller work during the next four years, they urged that their brother directors should provide for the much greater work of constructing a new Canal. They reported, as the result of that discussion, that there was much difference of opinion among the Directors, although, on the whole, the majority of the French Directors were in favour of forming a second Canal. M. de Lesseps himself said that he was of that opinion, because it was plain that the commercial world looked urgently for something of the kind to be done, and in December last he said that if the Company were to carry out so enormous a work as that it would require some consideration and compensation; and at the time it was mentioned that they would expect an extension of their concession, and, of course, an extension of the grant which had been given to them in 1854. The result was that the case was well considered by us at the time, and we came to the conclusion that it would be wise that neither Her Majesty's Government nor the Directors should stand committed to any such plan, but that the matter should remain over for further consideration. There was some disappointment on the part of the French Board of Directors at this decision. However, the matter did stand over, and the 23,000,000 francs were ordered, in the meanwhile, to be expended on the improvement of the existing Canal. The French Directors pointed out that they were quite prepared to meet the views of the English Directors, provided they got the compensation alluded to, and also received the support of the English Government. That was how matters stood on the 9th of January last, and about that time there was a strong pressure put on Her Majesty's Government by the commercial and ship-owning class of this country to take even more vigorous measures in regard to the Isthmus. The first proposal of much importance was made on the part of a gentleman in August last, and it will be found at page 2 in the preliminary Papers. That proposal was to construct a new Canal through the Isthmus of Suez; and it was stated by the gentleman in question that he was ready with £4,000,000 for that purpose. On the 19th of December the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom asked Her Majesty's Government to promote the construction of a new Canal under British control. Two or three days afterwards the General Shipowners' Society asked the Government to promote an alternative Canal through Egypt to Suez, and they said that it was a favourable opportunity for securing for this country power amounting to control over any second Canal, owing to the position of affairs in Egypt at that moment—alluding, of course, to our occupation of Egypt. A few days afterwards, on the 19th of December, the Clyde Steamship Owners' Association urged us to promote another Canal through Egypt, exclusively under British control; and on the 11th of January the North Shields Shipowners' Society urged us to promote another Canal through Egypt to Suez under the absolute control of the English Government. A few days afterwards Lord Napier and Ettrick presented to Lord Granville a Memorial from 298 representatives of Companies, representing 3,000,000 tons of shipping using the Canal, and more than one-half of the aggregate tonnage using it, asking' for a new Ship Canal across the Isthmus parallel with the present Canal. They proposed to disregard altogether the claim of M. de Lesseps, for they used words which have since been freely employed, that the terms used in the original concession were simply intended to debar the Egyptian Government from dealing with other parties during the negotiation of the work, but that they were never intended to prevent the construction of another Canal. Being disappointed with the reply they received at the time, they returned to the charge, and asked for the active interference of Her Majesty's Government in favour of this rival Canal. Finally, on the 26th of April, the Associated Chambers of Commerce asked for greater facilities and an increased share in the management of the existing Canal; and Lord Granville received two deputations, one from the Associated Chambers of Commerce, who said they took no antagonistic position in regard to the existing Canal, but they only wanted more British Directors and more facilities for passing through the Canal; and another deputation from the Chamber of Shipping, saying they wanted another Canal, made by the British nation, and that advantage should be taken of the British Government being in Egypt at the present moment in order to obtain an alternative right. This is a summary of the views of the deputations, and of the opinions expressed in the letters and Memorials addressed to the Government between January and April pressing upon them to do something, and all of them, with one single exception, in favour of the construction of a second Canal. The result was that M. de Lesseps, who read the reports of what had occurred in the newspapers, said it appeared to him, particularly after the double deputation to Lord Granville, that the whole situation was changed; that any concession would be attended with pressure, but that he was willing that negotiations should be re-opened upon the basis of the discussion between the English and French Directors, and he added, for the first time, that he was prepared to make some reduction of tolls in proportion to the increase of traffic. Her Majesty's Government had then to decide what course to take. They had been blamed for being precipitate; they had been rather severely blamed, slightly in this House, but rather severely outside; but I think they had shown that they had not been precipitate, seeing that they had held their own carefully from January to April in reference to these all-important Memorials, and the pressure brought to bear upon them with the view of finding out the proper course to take. It was quite evident that no further delay could take place, and that we had to make our choice between two things. We had either to repudiate the position of M. de Lesseps or his claims, whether they were real or not. That was not the advice of the late Government, because, in their letter to M. de Lesseps, they said that they recognized the pre-eminent part taken by him in the foundation and construction of this great work, and that they would always be found ready to support him in any measure conducive to its welfare. We had, therefore, either to pass by M. de Lesseps and his claim and his position in regard to the Canal, and to take the advice of the Chamber of Shipping, and With only one exception for the whole of the representatives of the shipping interest who had addressed us, and to endeavour to make a new Canal under British control in rivalry to the existing Canal, or to take the other course of negotiating with the existing Canal Company as requested by one body of Memorialists—namely, the Associated Chambers of Commerce, who advised us to go in that direction. Now, there could be no doubt among ourselves as to the course we ought to take. I am not going to enter at all, as I have already said, into disputable matters connected with legal arguments; but we ourselves believed that the pouvoir exclusif prevented us from constructing a new Canal across the Isthmus unless M. de Lesseps should forfeit his right and privilege of making that Canal. We thought that the overtures which had been made to us on the 30th of April afforded an opportunity for opening further negotiations. Accordingly, on the 16th of May—that is to say, more than four months after the original overtures which were made in December and January, and after duly weighing and considering the whole position of matters, we determined to offer to the Company to help them to obtain the necessary land and concessions in reference to the Fresh Water Canal, and a longer extension of their concession, if, on the other hand, they would construct a satisfactory second Canal of a proper depth, suited to the requirements both of the present and prospective commerce; and if they would also reduce the dues and tolls on the existing Canal, and give us an increased share in the management. I think that a majority of those hon. Members who have spoken to-night, whether or not they considered that we claimed sufficient terms, will agree that that was the only course which Her Majesty's Government could take. The negotiations which followed are set out fully in the Papers before the House. On the 20th of May, on the 4th of June, the 5th of June, the 4th of July, and, finally, on the 11th of July, there were negotiations which will be found fully showing the differences between us. And now, if the House will allow me, before I say a few words as to the main points of the negotiations, let me again meet the criticisms which we have heard to-night, and which is embodied in the words—"Why did you not threaten M. de Lesseps with the construction of a rival Canal? Why did you throw away the only weapon you had —namely, the threat of a new Canal?" The reasons we did not use that threat were, firstly, because we thought it would have been dishonest to do so; and, secondly, because we thought it would have been impolitic to do so; because we knew very well that the first hint of such a threat would lead in a moment to the breaking off of the negotiations. Therefore, under those circumstances, we tbeught that it was our duty not to use that dishonest threat. Then we have been asked, why did we say that we went as a buyer eager to buy to a seller indifferent about selling? I made a statement upon that matter on the second day after the Agreements were laid on the Table, and I repeat now that that was the position in which we found ourselves. If hon. Members will refer to the Papers laid on the Table they will find what passed between the English and French Directors in the first part of the negotiations. If hon. Members will refer to page 32 of the Papers they will find these words in the Report of the British Directors—

"In the discussion of these matters, which extended over four long interviews, the attitude of M. de Lesseps and his representatives were in substance firm. They disclared that if the second Canal was to be made by the Company, it was not out of any fear of competition. They were strong in the right of their monopoly for the construction and working of a Canal across the Isthmus, and were convinced that no rival Canal by any other route could successfully compete with them. In the interests of their shareholders, they would be perfectly satisfied to abide by the decision taken last January, which, in the judgment of M. de Lesseps, would sufficiently provide during a considerable period for the requirements of commerce. If, therefore, they now are willing to undertake this important new work, it would be entirely in deference to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, and to meet the express demand of English merchants and shipowners."

That, therefore, was the position in which we met M. de Lesseps. It has either been expressly stated or implied that in the course of the negotiations we went into the question of the exclusive right of M. de Lesseps. There was nothing of the kind. We knew perfectly well what the view of the French Directors was as to their exclusive right; but neither here nor in the negotiations in Paris did we ever drop a word on the subject. All our anxiety was to obtain the best terms we could, and then it became our duty, after having got the best terms we could expect, to say whether or not they were worth the acceptance of the nation; or whether we ought to break off the negotiations. One or two words about the negotiation itself. We have heard a great deal about its inadequacy. The hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett)—but we are accustomed to very hard words from the hon. Member for Eye—and others have spoken of the inadequacy of the reduction in the tolls which was accepted. Now, let me tell the House what the amount of that reduction is when expressed in figures. I find some reference to it in these Papers; but this is not all. The proposal was pressed upon us at a time when a much less reduction of tolls was offered than that which we succeeded in obtaining subsequently. The reduction we did succeed in obtaining would have amounted, in eight years from the present time, to £1,170,000 a-year, and ultimately, in 11 years from the present time, to £2,550,000 a-year. When we hear mention made of 50 centimes, 55 centimes, and 37 centimes, it may seem a very small matter; but when we have to deal with millions of tons the sums become very large indeed, and I am bound to say that I think an arrangement which promises a reduction of some £1,000,000 a-year after eight years, and more than £2,500,000 a-year after 11 years, was not an arrangement which could be called a trumpery one, but an agreement which would succeed in effecting a very solid and substantial reduction. An hon. Member behind me thinks that £2,500,000 is not a substantial sum. I confess I think it is, although we are accustomed to deal with a great number of millions in this country. Allusion has been made to the low rate at which we offered tho loan. It is quite true that a loan of £8,000,000 was offered at 3¼ per cent; but its immediate effect on our own interests in the Canal would have been to the extent of £45,000 a-year, in reference to the amount which would have to be paid in respect of ships going through the Canal, and in a short time that sum would have been increased to £120,000 a-year. I venture to say that these sums are not small sums. I do not think I should be justified, at this hour of the night, if I were to weary the House with fuller details. I should have wished, had I spoken earlier, to explain to the House the five separate points in regard to which we obtained an additional share in the government of the Canal—all of them substantial points—namely, the appointment of Vice President, the appointment of additional Members upon the Finance Committee, and the appointment of an Inspecteur de la Navigation, whose duties were to be defined. That was a very great concession in respect to British interests. All these are questions of detail, and it would not be reasonable for me, after the Agreement has been withdrawn, and in view, at some future time, of further arrangements being made, to offer to the House to enlarge upon these subjects. All I have to say is that we accepted the position which became necessary when it was made clear that Parliament and the country did not desire to be committed to the Provisional Agreement, and that there was so much opposition raised to it on the part of the shipping and mercantile interests of the country. We have thoroughly accepted the position which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister laid down at the commencement of the debate; and we feel that further discussion would only do mischief. I have confined myself as much as I could to what has actually taken place. I have said nothing as to the legal question, and the House may rest assured that in any future transaction of this kind we shall adhere steadily to the principles which have now been laid down; and I firmly believe that before many months or years are over we shall succeed in making arrangements which will be satisfactory to the country.

I am not surprised that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have thought it right to pronounce a funeral oration over the Agreement, which is now dead, and has been abandoned. But I think it material to observe that, upon the question now before the House, the right hon. Gentleman has said nothing whatever. It is true we have had an extensive view of all the Papers; but we have been told all that before. The question before us now is, How is it that we come to be discussing this question to-night, and what is the question before the House? One would suppose that the right hon. Gentleman was discussing and defending his Agreement; but that is not the question. The question in which the country is deeply interested is this—With what materials will the right hon. Gentleman's Government, or any other Government, enter into negotiations with the standing admission by him and by the Prime Minister that the rights of M. de Lesseps are exclusive, and that no other Canal can be made? That is the question we have to discuss, and I think I am justified in saying that the right hon. Gentleman has said not one word on that subject. The right hon. Gentleman, indeed, gave a most powerful argument against expressing an opinion; but I ask again—How is it that we come to be discussing this question to-night? It is because the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have accepted the rights of M. de Lesseps. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, I must do him the justice to say—and in doing so I must retract an observation I made a short time ago—that he had said nothing relevant to the question before the House, did make the admission I have referred to. If he had not done so, one might have supposed that, in the course of the negotiations, Her Majesty's Government felt themselves compelled, as a matter of conscience and honour, to admit that M. de Lesseps had this exclusive monopoly; and if they had so said the right hon. Gentleman might have given some reason for repeating that admission to the House. But the right hon. Gentleman takes away that excuse, because he says that they never did make that admission. Nevertheless, the House is solemnly warned not to give utterance to opinions which may, peradventure, seriously hamper this country in negotiations hereafter. That is exactly what we have been complaining of, and is exactly why my right hon. Friend (Sir Stafford Northcote) has brought forward the Motion; and if some hon. Members who have spoken to-night had only been authorized by Her Majesty's Government to discuss with M. de Lesseps the questions which they had discussed, I cannot help thinking the result of the Agreement might have been very different, because I find that the hon. Member for Hull (Mr. Norwood) began by saying that with the language of the Resolution of my right hon. Friend he entirely concurs. He has not a word to say against it, and the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr. C. M. Palmer) tells us that, as a matter of fact, he cannot agree with any such Motion as that M. de Lesseps has the exclusive rights that he claims. Well, that is all that we say, and that is all we are asking the House to affirm. All that the Leader of the Opposition asks the House to say is that M. de Lesseps has no such exclusive rights. I observe that the Law Officers of the Crown, whose opinions have been vouched, and by whose opinions the Government claim to be supported, have not given us the benefit of those opinions to-night; but my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr. Horace Davey) and I have not had the same privilege of having our opinions concealed in obscurity. Our opinions have been published, together with the case submitted to us and the date; and, although I do not intend to discuss the question whether our opinions are right or not, I must certainly say that I have seen no reason to assume from anything that has occurred since they were wrong. Yet the Law Officers of the Crown are put forward by the Government before the House as justifying their action. Nevertheless, they neither tell us what the Law Officers have said, nor when they said it, nor upon what case they gave their opinion. I give both of my hon. and learned Friends credit for believing that they gave their opinions with perfect independence, and that they did not act simply as Officers of the Government, because I believe that every Member of the Bar, when appealed to for an opinion, is entitled to the credit of giving his real opinion. At the same time, it is impossible to know how much the opinion of my hon. and learned Friends may have been affected by the nature of the case presented to them and the materials afforded to them; and, certainly, if it is part of the regular course that the opinion of no Law Officer should be put forward in this House, then I should have thought that it would not have been regular to have referred to it. Certainly, my experience is that some Law Officers' opinions have not only been asked for, but circulated, and even somewhat freely canvassed in the House. That was my experience during the existence of the late Government, when I was a Law Officer myself. If the Prime Minister is right on a question of this sort in justifying the action of the Government by the opinions they received, it certainly seems that the right hon. Gentleman is treating the House somewhat cavalierly when he calls on hon. Members to swallow whatever the Law Officers have been pleased to say, without affording the House an opportunity of knowing what the opinions themselves were, or the data upon which they were pronounced. Their only supporter in this matter has been my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Southwark (Mr. Cohen). If the Government had said that the pretensions of M. de Lesseps were doubtful matters admitting discussion, the present Motion would not have been made. But that is not what they have said. What they have said is that which will be in the mouth of every negotiator on M. de Lesseps' part against every negotiator on the part of Her Majesty's Government whenever this question comes to be negotiated again—namely—"Your Chancellor of the Exchequer and your Prime Minister have admitted that you are absolutely in our power; and, therefore, you must take whatever we please to give." That being so, I would ask the hon. Member for Hull (Mr. Norwood) what he means by the suggestion that we are to preserve our independence of opinion? The independence of opinion is gone by the recognition on the part of the Executive Government of the basis of the question in dispute. What the hon. Member for Hull says is that he wants to preserve our future independence of opinion. It is all very well to shelter the Government; but how will that prevent the country, or any Government which follows the present Government, having that matter put before them as no longer a question of negotiation, but as a matter which is entirely settled? My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Southwark (Mr. Cohen) was compelled to admit that, even if the concession were as clear and absolute as I believe it to be doubtful, it is a question not between private persons; but of a concession by a Sovereign; and if the Sovereign, having made a concession to a particular trading Company in the interests of the country and of his subjects, finds it necessary to recall that concession, it is quite within his power to do so. That is a very familiar principle of law, which I am sure neither of my hon. and learned Friends on the other side of the House will dispute. It simply becomes a question of compensation, and is not a matter of absolute right in the sense of a monopoly between private persons engaged in trade, where one can restrain the other by an injunction if he considers that the monopoly he has acquired is being invaded. This is a question of international right, and if it is found for the advantage of the people of Egypt, or for the interests of the Government, that the concession should no longer be treated as a monopoly—and I am using the language of the Chancellor of the Exchequer when I say monopoly—the concession could be withdrawn, compensation being granted. I understand that some question has been raised as to what is meant by the use of the word "monopoly." It is language which admits of a doubtful interpretation, and is a very convenient phrase to employ. No statement is made as to the conditions under which a monopoly has been granted; but the Chancellor of the Exchequer says that M. de Lesseps has a monopoly. Then I say that if it is for the advantage of the Sovereign or of the people that that monopoly should be withdrawn, as a familiar principle of law, it becomes simply a question of compensation, and not a question of absolute right. What I would venture to submit to the House is this—that if the Government would see their way to admit that it is a question in dispute, that it is a question actually to be debated, and that they were not to be precluded in future negotiations by the statement made to the House from entering into the matter because that statement was inadvisedly made—made, perhaps, after they had rashly entered into an engagement; but if, at all events, they can see their way to retract, to that extent, what at present I believe this country regards as a serious peril to future negotiations in a matter that affects all the commercial interests of the country, everybody would be satisfied. But that is what the hon. Member for Hull says we are not to do. We are not to express an opinion; we are not to do anything to interfere with that which, if unchallenged, is a serious and unfit admission by the Executive Government, and may prevent any future negotiations from being entered into at all. What are you going to do with your future negotiations? I understood the Prime Minister to express a sanguine belief that all would come right, and that we should have something in the end that would satisfy everybody. That would be very delightful; but can the Prime Minister give us any assurance that M. de Lesseps has waived the claim which gives him the absolute mastery of the situation? We heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce), and from my right hon. Friend the Member fur North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote), how M. de Lesseps and his Company have treated English commerce, and with what confidence we may rely upon him in the future. We are informed by the Prime Minister that he has confident belief that, some time or other, all will come right; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer a little enlarged that idea. He said that in the course of a few months—but, thinking he had been rash, he added, "or years"—matters might be satisfactorily settled. But, in the meantime, British commerce will suffer in a way everybody on both sides of the House has admitted. Then, what is the condition of things at which we have arrived? The Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have given utterance to opinions which are seriously compromising to us in our future negotiations. Everybody desires that the negotiations should take place on a basis which will allow of a fair and reasonable agreement being arrived at; and all that my right hon. Friend says is, at all events, let M. de Lesseps understand that the negotiations which are to go on will require the sanction of the British Parliament. That is the effect of the Resolution of my right hon. Friend; and he wishes it further to be understood that the rash utterances of two Members of Her Majesty's Government do not bind the British Parliament. I believe that if this debate has done nothing else, it has been of infinite value in eliciting from the Prime Minister himself that the utterances of the Government do not bind this House. At the same time, all my right hon. Friend asks of the House is, that it should be so understood and resolved in order that foreign negotiators may understand when they enter into negotiations that that which was rashly said by two Members of the present Government was not binding on the British Parliament, and that any agreement the British Parliament can be asked to sanction is not one that can be based on an assumption which the British Parliament negatives.

I am sure the House will give me credit for saying what I feel when I say that I am speaking this evening under very great difficulties, not only because the hour is late, and because I know that hon. Members wish to bring the debate to a conclusion, but because of the interests that are involved. I do not forget that the Amendment which we are about to support asks us not to debate the question, nor do I forget the speech of the Prime Minister calling attention to the evil effect of discussing the question in a hostile spirit. I, therefore, ask the House to bear witness that I have been dragged into the debate by the speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard), who has alluded with a sneer to the silence of the Law Officers, and who told us that we have not been prepared to stand by our opinions. My hon. and learned Friend has even gone further, and has told us that we dare not meet the House, but are compelled to keep silence. [Cries of "No!"] My hon. and learned Friend certainly used words to that import. He taunted us with not having spoken, and he asked us why we had not spoken, and he challenged us to speak. Is that not very nearly daring us to take part in the debate? If we had remained silent, would not the inference have been that all my hon. and learned Friend said was correct, and that we were afraid to meet the House and support our opinions? I shall be as brief as I can, and as little technical as I can; but I must answer my hon. and learned Friend when he says why are we discussing this question to-night? We are discussing it because a meaningless and colourless Motion has been submitted to the House —a Motion which no one has disputed in its terms. [Sir HARDINGE GIFFARD: Then why not accept it?] It is a Motion, the terms of which the Government have never disputed; but they are not prepared to accept it, because they do not think it desirable that it should be passed by the House. I say that the Government have never disputed it. More than that, I say that M. de Lesseps has never disputed it. On the 27th of September in last year, M. de Lesseps wrote his views of the question, and he said—

"With regard to the construction of a second maritime Canal, you can choose any other point but that of the Isthmus of Suez."

What does the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote) suggest? He suggests that you should prevent the possibility of any other undertaking being accepted. He suggests that competition shall be prevented between any portion of the Mediterranean and any portion of the Red Sea; and, thereby, we are not denying or accepting the exclusive power of M. de Lesseps in regard to the Isthmus of Suez. It is practically clear, according to the Motion, that exclusive power does exist, because the right hon. Gentleman says—"I will be satisfied with conceding the exclusive power in the Isthmus of Suez, so long as you give communication by another route between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea." That is what the Government have not disputed, and what M. de Lesseps has not disputed either. Therefore, so far as that point is concerned, the Resolution is meaningless. But we have to deal not only with the terms of the Resolution, but with the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, which is far within his Motion. He has departed from these vague terms, and he has confined his speech, not to the question of making a Canal by way of Alexandria, or by way of Cairo, to any portion of the Red Sea, or by any other route such as Palestine; but he contests the exclusive power of M. de Lesseps to supply canal accommodation, through the Isthmus to Suez, to the Red Sea. That is his speech, and not his Motion. Let me take the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion. He says—"Turn to the Concession of 1854." I understand the right hon. Gentleman to treat that as a concession giving M. de Lesseps exclusive power, but nothing to this country. Now, it is not a matter purely for lawyers; but it is a matter upon which the common sense of the commercial world may be exercised. You cannot give a concession to a Company until that Company exists, and yet you cannot call a Company into existence until you have a concession. What is the course that is usually taken? In forming a Company of this nature, it is customary to give a concession to someone on behalf of the Company, and the benefit of the concession goes to the Company when it conies into existence. In every line of the concession it is a grant to the Company which is being carried out and acknowledged up to the very last moment in every transaction between the Egyptian Government and the Company, and the whole of these words form the basis of the contract. Will the House forgive me if I refer to what those words are? In the first place, Article 4 provided that the works are to be executed at the exclusive cost of the Company. The next clause speaks of 75 per cent of the profit of the Com- pany; and, passing on from that, you will find that the land is to be given to the Company—à la compagnie concessionnaire. What Company? Why, the proposed Company when in existence. Then 15 per cent of the profits are to be paid by the Company. What does all this lead to? To the term for which the concession is made to M. de Lesseps. It is to be a term on behalf of the Khedive for 99 years. Was 99 years considered to be the duration of M. de Lesseps' life? Of course it was not. Then how could it be regarded as a personal contract? It is a contract which necessarily is to cover a long period; but it was a concession to the Company, and as soon as the Company was formed the concession would go to them. It will be found, by a further Article, that at the end of the term so granted, the Company are to surrender up the Canal and works in working order to the Egyptian Government. That is to take place at the end of the term for which the concession is made, and yet it is said to be a personal concession to M. de Lesseps, notwithstanding this stipulation, that at the end of 99 years the Company are to surrender up the whole of the works to the Egyptian Government. I will not weary the House with further details upon this matter; but the right hon. Gentleman will see that the words of the concession are throughout "the Company," and the Company are treated in the document itself as being the concessionnaires. What was the object of the second concession? It was to start afresh and give a new concession to a Company then coming into existence. From first to last throughout all these documents, every benefit was given to the Company as the original concessionaires of 1854, although it is now said that there was simply a personal concession to M. de Lesseps. Let me give an instance. It is said that the concession was only made to M. de Lesseps. Now, there is an Agreement which was entered into in 1866, under which the Company gives up certain rights. It gives up its rights to certain lands taken under the 7th and 8th Articles of the Concession of November 30, 1854; it renounces all the benefits which the Company took under that concession, and which it did not take under the Concession of 1866, and in that document, in the 2nd Article, there is this expression, that "the Company" renounces all the benefits that it took under the Agreement of 1854, and all the land which the Company took under it. The right hon. Gentleman says that the Company took nothing under the Convention of 1854; but that it was purely a personal grant to M. de Lesseps; but, passing hurriedly over a variety of details, the clause I refer to in the Convention of 1866 distinctly states that the Company renounces the benefits taken under Articles 7 and 8 of the Act of Concession of the 30th of November, 1854. Yet the right hon. Gentleman's argument is, that at that very date the exclusive concession to M. de Lesseps came to an end, because he then formed the Company. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Launceston does not go to that extent. He uses the phrase "when the Company came into working order." But that gives up the whole matter. Let me remind the House that even later still, when a disagreement arose, and certain matters had to be submitted to the determination of the Emperor of the French, the award in the 5th Article dealt with the indemnity which was to be given under that concession, and decided what benefit the Company was to receive for giving up its rights. Yet the right hon. Gentleman says that the Company had no rights under the Concession of 1854, but that they were given to M. de Lesseps, and that no power was given to the Company at all. Let me ask any man of business in the House, when once you admit that M. de Lesseps was contracting for the benefit of the Company, and that he undertook that the Company were to incur certain obligations under the original Concession of 1854, ought they not to have the privileges as well as be bound by the obligations of that concession? What was the use of giving M. de Lesseps the exclusive power of forming a Company if that Company was not to obtain any benefit when formed? If hon. Members read these documents carefully, and do not pass them over lightly as the right hon. Gentleman has done — ["Oh, oh!"] Yes; the right hon. Gentleman dealt very lightly with these details—they will come to the conclusion that the Company is entitled to the benefit of the Concession of 1854, and that it is impossible that it could have been made per- sonally to M. de Lesseps. But I am anxious to discuss the question in rather a broader manner than it has yet been approached. I am sorry I do not see my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dublin University (Mr. Gibson) here to-night. I do not know whether he is responsible for this colourless Motion; at any rate, he is not the man to fight under a colourless Motion. On Wednesday last he took the open field and addressed the Conservative working men of Portsmouth, attacking those concerned in making the arrangement; and I must say it would have been more in accordance with his usual habit if he had attacked those he wished to attack to their face in a place where an answer could have been given to him. My right hon. and learned Friend, however, chose to address the Conservative working men of Portsmouth. He read to them a Judgment of Lord Ellenborough, and his object in doing so was because he conceived that the opinion therein expressed was contrary to that of Her Majesty's Government. I am not going to discuss the question in the same spirit as my right hon. and learned Friend, for I believe no judgment is applicable to the matter we are discussing. Curiously enough, the name of that case was "Gladstone &Co. in error." [Laughter and Opposition cheers.] Hon. Gentlemen who cheer will, perhaps, allow me to say that the judgment of the Court was unanimously in favour of Messrs. Gladstone. But I do not think this question ought to have been argued as my right hon. and learned Friend argued it. He took a narrow view of it, whereas these matters should be looked upon according to the broad principles of English law; and the right hon. and learned Gentleman should have remembered that in 1879 Lord Cairns and Lord Selborne united to say that a case was misunderstood if it were not read in the light of common sense, and they put the case in question aside as nothing worth. If these matters are to be decided on the broad principles of English law there are some things which ought to have attracted the right hon. and learned Gentleman's attention, and which he should have conveyed to the Conservative working men of Portsmouth. If I can find an analogy for this in England it is nothing more than that which commonly happens here—namely, a grant from the Crown to a subject to do something which the subject cannot do without that grant. Technically, it is a franchise, and not a monopoly; if we apply English principles to this matter it is a franchise. I regret that my right hon. and learned Friend is not here, for he is acquainted with these subjects better than I am. He knows full well that in this country, if the Crown grants to a subject the right to hold a fair, or a market, or a ferry, it cannot possibly grant a similar franchise within the same limits to any other person. A similar grant, if made, would be void. In saying this, I guard myself with the statement that these principles ought not positively to apply in discussing this broad question. But if you lift it from the narrow view that was taken of it at Portsmouth to the broader view of the principles that govern English law, that broad principle will be against the construction my right hon. and learned Friend put upon it. Let us look at it in a broader view; let us lift this grant from the Egyptian Government to M. de Lesseps from mere legal considerations. It seems to me, if the truth must be told, that this is what the Egyptian Government said to the Canal Company—"We ask you to perform certain duties; construct this Canal at your own cost; spend many millions on it—be it a failure, or be it a success, the cost shall fall upon you; you shall undertake other obligations; you shall maintain the Canal in good repair for 99 years, and at the end of 99 years you shall surrender it to us, the Egyptian Government." That was certainly giving good value to the Egyptian Government. The Canal Company paid for what it was to get. What was it to get? It was to receive the tolls, if any, under certain limitations. If the Canal failed, it was to receive nothing; but if it were a success, it was to receive tolls, and tolls only. Let us apply the laws of this country, or the laws of every country which are governed by justice, to this case. Ought these tolls to be taken away, now that the Canal has proved a success? If the contentions of those who argue against the exclusive right are correct, we must translate the concession made by the Egyptian Government into very different language from that I have given. According to the right hon. Gentleman's contention, the Egyptian Government said—"We tell you, who are about to subscribe to this Company, we grant you this right; and we call upon you to find these £16,000,000 for the construction; we call upon you to construct the Canal; we call upon you to run the risk which eminent engineers see as a very great one; we call upon you to maintain the Canal for 99 years; and we call upon you to surrender it to us at the end of that period; but we tell you that, before the end of that period, when you have proved the possibility of making the Canal, if it pleases us, we will grant power to make a second Canal to someone else, and will grant to that Canal power of taking tolls similar to those you enjoy." If that had been said—and that is the contention of the right hon. Baronet—is there a sane man who would have subscribed one single farthing to that Canal? And yet that is the proposition the right hon. Baronet sets before us. If England had been before other nations in this undertaking, and had obtained a concession in similar terms, what should we have said if the French had, under like circumstances to the present, applied for a second concession? What should we have said to the Government of Egypt if they had said to us in effect—"You have obtained the money you required, and have constructed the Canal which has turned out successful; and now that you have proved what other men can do, we will rob you of your profit by granting a similar concession to someone else?" My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Southwark (Mr. Cohen) spoke of the doctrine of inherent domain, as though the Khedive had the power to take away the Canal from its constructors after its completion; but I would remind the House that that doctrine means compensation. No one denies that, if the present and prospective value of the Canal is paid to the Company, the Government of Egypt has the technical power, inherent in every State, of resuming possession of that which it has conceded. Nothing that Her Majesty's Government have said has gone the length of such denial; nothing has been said as to what may be the power of M. de Lesseps to form a second Canal, or the power of the Khedive in certain circumstances to form a second Canal, nor has anything been said as to what may be the new condition of things if the present owners of the Canal should fail in their duty. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has touched on none of these propositions. The proposition we had to deal with was this—Was the English Government in a position to support the claims of a new Company which would go to the Khedive, and ask for a concession for a Canal to run, within the limits of the Isthmus, side by side with, and as near as possible to, the present Canal, and with a power to charge only three-fifths of the present toll? I say the question was, whether that demand for a new Company to work in competition with the existing vested owners of the Canal was just, and whether we had power to say to M. de Lesseps that an exclusive right against that demand could not be claimed? It was of that exclusive power, and of that exclusive power alone, that the Prime Minister spoke. He said we could not assent to the proposal for a competitive Canal running parallel with the existing Canal. I say this because I wish to leave those other claims to which I referred open for future consideration. We had to deal with things as they are, and not with things as they may arise; and it is because we consider it undesirable to deal with matters which are not before the House for its consideration, and which may arise in the future, that we prefer the Amendment of the hon. Member for Hull to the Motion of the right hon. Baronet, which is a declaration of that which, up to the present time, no one that I know of has disputed. As to the position which my hon. and learned Colleague and I have occupied during the past three or four weeks, we have been more than criticized. We have been severely censured. We have been told, by those who do not know how long we took to consider the matter, that we gave a hasty opinion to the Government; and I, certainly, never before heard Law Officers of the Crown complained of on the ground that their opinions were given too quickly. It is said that we were partial; but we had no financial purpose to serve, no speculators to advise, and we had no juniors to come to us with doubtful opinions. We were asked to tell the Government what we thought was right, and we did so to the best of our judgment. I know that we need not care for these things which are now said of us. Whenever great interests are involved, much excitement is caused, and when there is great excitement you generally find extravagant language indulged in. Certainly, of such language there has been no absence in the discussion of the matters connected with the Suez Canal Company. When the excitement cools down the time for reflection will come; and, whatever interested persons may say, the judgment of commercial men will coincide with what has been said by my hon. Friends who proposed and seconded the Amendment. They will know, as they carry their trade amongst foreign nations, that there are things which stand them in better stead than quick communications and low rates and charges. They will know that in their dealings, however small and minute, that the character and honour of the nation to which they belong is a greater benefit to them than immediate pecuniary advantage. I am certain of this —that they would have been the first to blame us if we had set ourselves to work with ingenuity to find out flaws which our common sense could not discern, and if we had endeavoured with casuistry to argue in favour of that which we really believed to be unjust, because it would be of advantage to a large class of people. In giving that advice, which had been followed to the extent I have mentioned by Her Majesty's Government, I still believe, and I hope I am right in believing, that we did our duty not only to those who asked our opinion, but also to those whose material interests were most concerned.

At this time of night (12.35 A.M.) I will not detain the House with many remarks; but there are one or two things which I think it necessary to say after the discussion which has taken place. It would have been a great satisfaction if I could, from the course of the debate, have gathered such assurances from Her Majesty's Government as would have dispensed me with the necessity of asking the House to pronounce a decision upon my Motion. It is one that is brought forward with a practical purpose—with the view of obtaining some security for the independence and freedom of the judgment of the House; and I must own that when I listened to the speech of the Prime Minister I was not altogether without hopes, from some of the expressions that he used, that I might attain my object without a Division. But I have listened to the debate as it has gone on, and, remembering the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, still more, bearing in mind what has been said by the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down, I find it is quite impossible for me to refrain from asking for the decision of the House, though I am very well aware what the decision is likely to be. In the first place, let me say a word to my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich (Baron Henry De Worms). I do not see any distinction between his Motion and that which I submit to justify a second Division; therefore, the one Division that will be taken will be on the question of the substitution of the words of the hon. Member for Hull for those I have laid before the House. As to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I will only make one remark. After all that he has said about the Provisional Agreement which was recently entered into, I cannot understand how it was that the Government refrained from bringing that Agreement before the judgment of the House. It does appear to me that if the Agreement was one which had all the advantages claimed for it, it was one which ought to have been brought forward and pressed upon the decision of the House. As far as I can understand, what has taken place amounted to this—that having made an Agreement which involved a concession of which very considerable use had been, and would in future be made, the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had abstained, in consequence of objections which were made, from taking the judgment of the House upon the proposal of the Government. I think the conduct of the Government in the matter has been the main cause of the difficulty which has arisen. If they had had a discussion on the Agreement, and had been able to take the sense of Parliament upon it, we should not have had occasion to ask for any separate discussion of the subject; but the position in which we have been placed by the withdrawal of the Agreement without discussion has been that which has rendered it necessary for me to move my Resolution to-night. With regard to the observations of the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down (Sir Henry James) on the subject of the wording of the Motion, I cannot help saying that if the hon. and learned Attorney General construes the documents which are submitted to him for his opinion in the same extraordinary manner to that in which he has construed my Resolution, I cannot wonder at any opinion the hon. and learned Gentleman may give. Not only have I distinctly stated in the House what the meaning of my Resolution is, but I contend that the language of the Resolution is perfectly clear, and is not at all open to the misrepresentation it has received at the hands of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General. Let me put this imaginary case. Suppose a Member of the House came down to Prayers and placed his card in a particular seat, everyone admits he had thus established a right to that seat for the evening. Supposing the same hon. Member were to claim that, in consequence of his having put his card into a particular place on one of the Benches, he had thereby obtained a right not only to that seat, but to exclude everybody else from the Bench except those whom he chose to admit there. Now, that is a good illustration of the meaning of the words of my Motion—

"While respecting the undoubted rights of the Company in regard to their own concession, decline to recognize any claim on their part to such a monopoly as would exclude the possibility of competition on the part of other undertakings designed for the purpose of opening a water communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea."

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General tell us whether the Canal which is now in existence is not an undertaking designed for the purpose of opening communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea? It is absolutely childish to deny that such is the case. I never denied, for one moment, that a concession was made to the Company; but what I have said is, that the pouvoir exclusif was given to M. de Lesseps for a particular purpose. It was given for the purpose of enabling him to constitute a certain body which he was to form, and there was a provision made that that Company should have certain concessions. Those concessions alluded to M. de Lesseps's exclusive power to enable him to form a Company, which Company should have certain concessions, which are there set forth. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General has spent a great deal of time in arguing a point which was never disputed. Those concessions were given in the several documents to which reference has been made; but they are altogether outside, and have nothing to do with, the pouvoir exclusif. I will not detain the House any longer. I know the views which were stated in regard to the celebrated case of "Gladstone and Company in error" will end very much in the same way; and whatever the error may be, I suppose it will be justified by a majority, judging from such indications as that given by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. C. Palmer) who seconded the Amendment. The hon. Gentleman surprised me not a little by the speech he made. We all know the hon. Gentleman to be a consistent and an able advocate and supporter of the shipping interest; and when I heard the hon. Gentleman say that he agreed with my Motion, and agreed with the arguments upon which it was founded, I must say I expected that I would have had the benefit of the hon. Gentleman's vote on this occasion. The hon. Gentleman is one of the many who, at the first blush, strongly opposed the agreement entered into. The hon. Gentleman now says, however, that he must, nevertheless, take a leading part in voting against the Resolution because it savours of a Party character. We must take the matter as we find it. All we can say is that we protest, and we will justify our protest by our votes; we protest against the doctrine which has been laid down, and the claim that has been put forward by M. de Lesseps on the part of the Suez Canal Company—a claim which has been too freely admitted by Her Majesty's Government. I shall have no scruple of conscience in the vote I am now about to give; and without any further delay I invite the House to go to a Division.