said, he had no desire to occupy the time of the House, nor did he wish unnecessarily to divide the House upon this Bill, and he was perfectly prepared to state his views in opposition to the measure yesterday. He might say that he had no personal interest whatever in the Bill, nor was he acquainted with anyone who was directly or indirectly concerned in it. His opposition to it was based entirely upon a question of procedure, and he would venture to suggest that the hon. and gallant Member for Wycombe (Colonel Gerard Smith) should give some reason why he proposed that all the Standing Orders of the House should be suspended by wholesale for the purpose of passing, in this way, a Bill of very great importance, the provisions of which were at variance with all the Forms of the House and with Parliamentary usage. It also ignored some very important principles laid down by the Standing Orders for the conduct of Private Business. The promoters of the Bill applied to Parliament for power to create Debenture Stock to the extent of £1,500,000, and hitherto the rule upon which Debenture Stock was granted had been rigidly enforced by Parliament—namely, that a proportionate amount of share capital should also be issued. As he understood, this Company had already passed a Bill which sanctioned the issue of this £1,500,000; but they had failed to issue it under the name of Preference Stock. They, therefore, came to the House for power to call it Debenture Stock. Now, he thought it was only reasonable that there should be very strong reasons assigned before the House consented, in a hurried manner, at a late period of the Session, to accede to a request to suspend by wholesale every Standing Order of the House in such an important case as this. The Standing Orders required that a Bill should have been printed three clear days before the House was asked to consider it; and, further, that the third reading and the consideration of it should not be taken on the same day. There were one or two other Standing Orders which also involved important principles, but which were proposed to be set aside exceptionally in this case. He thought it was necessary, before the House consented to the Resolution proposed by the hon. and gallant Member, that they should have a statement of the main provisions of the Bill, and know why this extraordinary course was proposed to be taken. He certainly must protest against such an attempt to promote Private Bill Legislation, and to occupy the time of the House by stretching its Rules to a point never previously proposed. He might further state, for the information of the House, that the Company promoting the Bill had already had, during the Session, two Bills before the House, one of which only obtained the Royal Assent last month, and it was certainly competent for the Company to have included in that Bill the provisions now asked for, instead of leaving an important matter of this kind to the last days of the Session, and then rushing the Bill through the House at railroad speed, in violation of every Rule and Standing Order of the House, and in violation of the fixed principle he had referred to—that a proportionate amount of shares should accompany the issue of Debenture Stock. The Bill, utterly regardless of the interests either of share-holders, or debenture-holders, or of the time of the House, involved an innovation in the legislation of Parliament which ought not to be sanctioned. Having said so much, he would add that he had no desire whatever, in opposition to the opinion of the House, to call for a Division; and he thought a Division might be avoided if the hon. and gallant Member who had charge of the Bill would assign any adequate reason for departing from the usual course of Business in that House.

said, he thought it was desirable that he, as one of the Members of the Committee appointed to deal with the Bill, should make an early statement as to what the facts were. It appeared to him that the opposition of the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Puleston) ought to have been directed against the suspension of the Standing Orders on the second reading of the Bill. The House, however, had determined that they would take the Bill into consideration. They had appointed a Committee to consider it, and had instructed that Committee to inquire into its provisions. The Committee sat for two days, and did not dispose of the Bill in any hurried manner whatever. Four hours each day they devoted to a consideration of the Bill, and they listened to the bondholders' view of the subject, because the bondholders were represented before' them by counsel. He could only say that the Committee were unanimous in passing the Preamble of the Bill. The fact was, as far as the Committee were able to make things out, that the original promoters of the undertaking had miscalculated the cost which was involved in the construction of the works. It was also mentioned that they had suffered indirectly from losses which no prudence or foresight could have guarded against, and which no precaution, as far as he could see, would have prevented. Under those circumstances, the Committee unanimously decided that the Preamble of the Bill was proved. They took pains, however, to insert clauses in the Bill, by means of which the interests of the bondholders were protected in the fullest way; and they also took precautions to provide that the money to be raised under the Bill should be devoted entirely to the completion of the original projected line from Barnsley to Hull. As he had said, they devoted two days to the consideration of the measure, and they were not responsible for the suspension of the usual Forms of the House. Whatever injury was done to the Forms of the House, the House itself had done with its eyes open. He would add, however, that a vast amount of injury would be done if, after the Committee had arrived at the conclusion they had, solely upon the merits of the case, the House were now to reject the Bill. If the House decided that the Standing Orders ought not to be suspended, the labours of the Committee would have been entirely thrown away.

said, he begged his hon. Friend's pardon. The Committee had nothing whatever to do with the suspension or non-suspension of the Standing Orders.

said, the House had decided to suspend the Standing Orders, and had referred the Bill to a Committee; and that Committee now, in accordance with the reference to them, suggested that the Standing Orders might be further suspended, in order that the Bill might pass through its financial stages.

said, he maintained that the Committee had nothing to do with the proposal for suspending the Standing Orders of the House.

said, he would admit that the suspension of the Standing Orders was a very grave proceeding; but this was a very peculiar emergency, and one in which the House might easily concede the request now made, without inflicting any great amount of injury upon the regularity and safety of their proceedings. All he would say was that he was under the impression—and he believed it was the impression of the entire body of the Committee—that it was fair and right to give this important undertaking the chance of going on. The Committee had been assured, on unquestionable evidence, that the expenditure of the sum now asked for would be sufficient to complete the railway and convert it into a going concern, turning that which was at the present moment an unprofitable and unsuccessful undertaking into one of profit and success. At any rate, that was the view taken by the Committee. He hoped, therefore, that the House would agree to suspend the Standing Orders, and allow the Bill to proceed. The difficulties which had been stated in regard to the conduct of this Bill were very considerable. A large amount of money had been laid out, and the suspension of the works upon the railway would necessitate, if not the final abandonment of the scheme, a considerable deterioration of property. The non-construction of the railway would be most injurious to the district which it was intended to serve. It was well known that the railway was greatly desired by a large body of persons who were connected with the locality; and, beyond that, he thought, although he made no charge against anybody, for he had no right to do so, that it was the business of the House to do all it possibly could to assist this struggling railway in competing with larger and more powerful Companies. One of the greatest dangers this country ran was in the monopoly of the great Railway Companies, and in a combination among a few Companies to get the traffic in their own hands. They did not always succeed, even where they had obtained a monopoly, in getting all the gain for themselves, for one of the leading gentlemen connected with a great Railway Company remarked to him the other day that he believed Railway Companies occupied much more of their time in spending £5, in order to prevent competition, than in earning an honest sovereign for themselves. He thought it was the duty of Parliament to assist in the creation of independent lines, as far as possible, and not to throw an obstacle in the way of their being carried out. It was true that there had been a great miscalculation in the case of this line, and that was the reason why the scheme had proved a failure; but, for all that, it was most desirable, in the general interests of the public, that the project should be carried into effect.

said, he wished to say a very few words on this very important Bill. He quite agreed that, under ordinary circumstances, the suspension of the Standing Orders of the House ought not to be permitted. But the Committee which sat upon this Bill was a Hybrid Committee, and he presumed that fact was due to the very peculiar character of the Bill, it having been considered by the House that the question involved in the measure deserved more serious consideration than Bills which were originally sent to a Pri- vate Bill Committee. But he, for one, was not prepared to blink the great question involved in the Bill, because it had been proved to the Committee, even by the leading counsel who promoted the Bill. He would not say that there had been gross extravagance; but there had been very great extravagance in the construction of the line. It was a highly responsible matter for a body of Directors, like those of the Hull and Barnsley Line, having already called up capital to the amount of £4,000,000 of money, not to take every means in their power to see that the works they had undertaken to perform for a certain amount of money were carried out. He was not going to say there might not have been some excuse, but hardly for the great miscalculations they had made; nor did he think, under the circumstances, they deserved any great amount of sympathy. He believed the line might have been constructed at a far less cost, and he only mentioned the matter because he thought it was right that the House and the public should know the real state of the facts, and especially that the shareholders, who had subscribed their money in good faith, on the understanding that the capital was fairly, judiciously, and properly expended, should know what the position of affairs was. That, however, was not a matter with which the Committee had anything to do. What they had to deal with was a line which was very nearly completed. When the main line was laid down, a very important communication would be established between one great centre of industry and another, and he presumed that Parliament had originally granted the undertaking on the ground that it was to be independent of other lines. That was the point of view from which the Committee had to look at the matter, and they had also to consider the interests of the shareholders themselves, who, if this money was not raised, would, in many instances, be absolutely ruined. The Committee took into their consideration whether it was right that the money should be raised, and, if so, under what conditions it should be raised? They did not agree to the Preamble of the Bill, until they had framed in their own minds what should be done, and they insisted upon certain clauses being inserted in the Bill, by means of which important conditions were laid down. First of all, they provided that the present debenture-holders should have their money repaid in full, with all insterest, before any other dividends were paid; and they further provided that the new shares to be raised on Debentures should rank after and behind the £1,000,000 of Debentures created by the original scheme. That was the first condition the Committee imposed, and he was of opinion that their intentions were very well carried out by the provisions of the Bill as they now stood. The second condition was that no extension to Huddersfield and Halifax should be carried out until the line between Barnsley and Hull was absolutely completed. The third condition was that the money the Company were authorized to raise should be expended in completing that portion of the line, so that the Company should be able to earn something towards paying the interest on the cost of the construction of one portion of the undertaking. At any rate, until that was done, it was provided that no extra expense should be incurred. They had the assurance of Mr. Forbes that no extra expense should be incurred. ["Oh, oh!"] He heard murmurs; but surely they would all admit that Mr. Forbes knew how to make a pound go as far as any man. He believed the only interest Mr. Forbes had in becoming a Director of the line was to see that it should be put into working order, which was one of the conditions which the Committee had imposed upon the Company. Having seen that these three proposals were embodied in the Bill, the Committee thought it right to pass the Preamble, and to ask the House to accept the Bill. He was not surprised at the remarks which had been made. He had made some strong remarks himself, but it was an exceptional case. He hoped they would never have another case of the kind; and he trusted the House would agree to the recommendation of the Committee, which they themselves—a perfectly independent Committee, who had nothing whatever to do with the line—had agreed to, and that they would allow the Bill to pass through its remaining stages that day.

said, that although in some degree he agreed with the remarks which had fallen from the hon. and gallant Baronet opposite (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), he felt bound to support the the views of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston). He thought the Committee had given powers to this Company which enabled them to break the ordinary laws and rules which had been long established in regard to railway undertakings, and, especially, that when Debenture Stock was issued it should represent a certain amount of the ordinary and preference shares which had gone before it. If Parliament consented to interfere with those rules, what would be the result? They would inevitably reduce the value of Debenture Stock, and prevent it from having the value it had hitherto invariably possessed with the public of the country. They were calling this Stock by the name of Debenture Stock, whereas it possessed a totally different value from ordinary Debenture Stock. They called it Debenture Stock; but, in reality, it was simply a substitution for Preference stock. He would be one of the last Members of that House to interfere with the decision of a Committee; but he maintained that this question was not intrusted to the Committee, and that they had nothing whatever to do with the suspension of the Standing Orders. He entirely agreed with the hon. Member for Devonport, that they ought to require the promoters to give very strong reasons indeed before they consented to such extraordinary deviations from the rules which were applied to the construction of railways generally. He had not the smallest interest in this railway, or in any railway remotely connected or concerned in the matter. He looked merely upon the question as one of public policy, and he believed the interests of the public would be best served by protecting them, he would not say from fraud, or fraudulent pretences, but from the issue of Stock under a misleading name, lest it should be accepted by persons too thoughtless to go thoroughly into the matter, but who would find ultimately that what were called Debentures, were only ordinary Preference Stock after all.

said, he agreed that the matter was one of considerable importance, and that it was one in which the House should not only take interest, but should proceed to legislate upon with caution. He put it to the House whether, in asking the House to deal with hundreds of thousands of pounds, it would not have been only fair and right for the hon. and gallant Member for Wycombe (Colonel Gerard Smith) himself to have explained to the House what the circumstances were under which he came to Parliament for this large sum of money? The hon. and gallant Member was Chairman of the Company. He (Sir Robert Peel) thought it very irregular for the Chairman of a Company to submit the case of the Company to the House. But, in addition to being Chairman of the Company, the hon. and gallant Member was the banker of the Company. Being both Chairman and banker of the Company, he came there in the interests of a particular railway, proposing to deal with hundreds of thousands of pounds, and to ask the House to suspend its Standing Orders, in order that he£independent, of course, and in no way concerned as Chairman and banker£should, at the tail end of the Session, pass this Bill. The hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Thorold Rogers), who spoke from the other side of the House, said that the Committee were unanimous in passing the Preamble of the Bill; but it would not be altogether an unprecedented thing for the House of Commons to reject the unanimous decision of one of their own Committees. There was nothing unusual in such a matter whatever. He recollected himself, many years ago, upsetting the third reading of a Bill which had passed unanimously through Committee, and which had cost £30,000 to the persons promoting the Bill. The hon. Member for Southwark said that the Company, in their original prospectus, had greatly miscalculated the cost of the line. Now, what was the original prospectus? The Hull and Barnsley Railway and Docks Company originally proposed to make a line 50 miles in length. [Colonel GERARD SMITH: 66 miles.] Well, 66 miles. That almost made the case worse. They had not, he believed, completed 55 miles; and the original sum asked for as capital, and which had all been expended, was £4,000,000—£3,000,000 of Stock, and £1,000,000 of Debentures. Now, he did not say there had been any fraud in the matter; but he did say that there had been an attempt to deceive the public, and to induce them to invest in a con- cern which appeared to him to be rotten at the very core of it. He was speaking from information which had been placed in his hands, and which he had been requested to submit to the House, having no interest himself in the matter. He was told that, in the original prospectus, the capital was fixed at £4,000,000; but that the Company let the works for the construction of 66 miles of line for something like £2,700,000. For that sum, both the railway and the docks were to be completed. It was not intended that the equipment of the line was to be completed for that sum; but £2,700,000 was the amount at which the works were let, and for which they were to be completed. [Colonel GERARD SMITH said, the right hon. Baronet was altogether in error.] He should like to be informed in what way he was in error? There had been no statement from the Chairman and banker of the Company; and, instead of getting up and saying that he (Sir Robert Peel) was completely in error, it would be better for the hon. and gallant Member to rise in his place and state what all the circumstances were. He had seen the original prospectus, and he would defy the hon. and gallant Member to say that the sum of £2,700,000 was not the amount at which the works were let, and for which they were to be completed, except in regard to their equipment. [Colonel GERARD SMITH said, he would only repeat that the right hon. Baronet was in error.] If he was in error on that point, he was not in error in what he was about to say—namely, that this railway never had been completed. It was not completed in January in this year. This same Company tried to raise £3,000,000 at 4 per cent, ostensibly for making a line from Halifax to Huddersfield, but, in reality, as he was informed by those who had invested their money in the Company, to complete the original line and docks. The Company, however, of which the hon. and gallant Member was Chairman and banker, were not to be put aside by one failure. Of course, the banker and Chairman of the Company knew better than that; and, therefore, immediately afterwards the same Company tried to issue Preference Stock to the extent of £1,300,000 at 4 per cent. The share-holders at once said—"That will not do at all;" and, consequently, that scheme of the Chairman and banker was withdrawn. Therefore, there had been two failures in the course of the present year to raise money. But that was not all. In the month of June in this year a third attempt was made by the Company, of which the hon. and gallant Member was Chairman and banker, to raise £1,800,000 at 5 per cent—at £85. That also failed; and those three attempts to raise money in the present year had been entirely unsuccessful. What would the House suppose was the actual amount subscribed? There was only £75,000 applied for; and in June last the Company issued an announcement that it would require £2,016,000 to complete the original railway of 66 miles between Hull and Barnsley, together with the docks, and yet there was an attempt now to induce the House of Commons to believe that, by the present proposal, £1,500,000 of Debenture Stock would be sufficient to complete and equip the line. At any rate, that was the statement of the hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Thorold Rogers). The hon. Member said that £1,500,000 would be sufficient to complete the railway and docks, and all he (Sir Robert Peel) could say was, that in the announcement made in June last it was clearly stated that £2,016,000 were required to complete it. Of course, he did not say in that House that there was anything underhand, or suspicious, or dishonest in this transaction; but all he would say in the interests of the public—and he had nobody else to consider in the matter—was, that where they were dealing with hundreds of thousands of pounds, where they were asking the public to subscribe to a concern which he maintained, without fear of contradiction, would not bear the light of day, the hon. and gallant Gentleman, who was Chairman and banker of the Company, was bound to get up and state to the House what were the grounds for the extraordinary proceeding he was desirous of inducing the House of Commons to take for the purpose of passing a Bill in which he was himself so directly and primarily interested.

said, he rose to answer the appeal which had been made to him by the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston) and the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Robert Peel). The hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston) said he thought that be (Colonel Gerard Smith) ought to have given some reason why the Motion had been placed on the Paper. As far as concerned the general course of procedure adopted in regard to the Bill new before the House, he could only say that the promoters of the Bill had, in the first instance, as a matter of course, communicated with the Chairman of Ways and Means. No Motion for the suspension of the Standing Orders could be made without the consent of the right hon. Gentleman. Now, the Chairman of Ways and Means had already given to the House what he (Colonel Gerard Smith) thought were excellent reasons why the Standing Orders should be suspended and facilities given for the introduction and passing of this Bill. The most prominent ground given by the Chairman of Ways and Means was that the state of affairs had become such that, at present, from 5,000 to 6,600 men, either had been, or were about to be, discharged and turned out of employment, thereby creating a considerable amount of distress. The same reasons held good at the present moment. The men had, as a matter of fact, been discharged, and he regretted to say that, unless they could be re-employed, there was every prospect that a considerable amount of distress would be brought about in the locality. He trusted that it would not be of long continuance; but, nevertheless, the fact remained that a very large number of labouring men had actually been discharged. The hon. Member for Devonport asked why the provisions now asked for were not incorporated in the omnibus Bill which the Company had introduced into Parliament at an earlier period of the Session? The reason why they were not so incorporated was that at the time the former Bill was introduced into Parliament and the plans deposited—namely, in the month of November last—the Company were busily engaged in endeavouring to raise money, in the belief that the powers they then possessed were sufficient to enable them to obtain adequate capital for the completion of the works. Under those circumstances, he certainly would not have been a party to putting the provisions, now sought to be obtained, in the omnibus bill to which reference had been made, because it was perfectly obvious that the Com- mittee which sat on the Bill, and even the House itself, would have declined to sanction such exceptional provisions unless the Company could show that they had exhausted every other means of obtaining the capital which the Legislature had placed at their disposal. Therefore, it had become necessary for the Company, in the first instance, with regard to other and more general arrangements, to deposit a Bill which was nothing more than an omnibus Bill, containing no provision whatever for raising fresh capital. That was his answer to the question the hon. Member for Devonport had put. In regard to the remarks of the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) in reference to the extravagance of the Company, he was, of course, aware that they were open to that charge. He could only say that, in the construction of this great public work, he and his colleagues had turned their constant attention to the most economical mode of proceeding with it. The cost of the work had been very largely increased by expenses which were altogether beyond the control of the Company's engineers. The foundations of the work and the soil that had to be cut through proved harder than they thought even possible, and there were accidents at the docks of a very serious character, involving, in one instance alone, an extra cost of more than £100,000. He could only say that, although, looking back on the matter now, he thought the original estimate adopted was too low, he could not fairly acknowledge any other fault with reference to the price of the work than this—that he and his colleagues had endeavoured to do £5,500,000 worth of work for £4,000,000 of money. He thought that was a great mistake; but he knew that the promoters had cut down the estimates to the lowest possible point, in order that Parliament might not be influenced by any charge of extravagance in the estimates in the consideration of the Bill. In regard to the remarks of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Huntingdon (Sir Robert Peel), of course, it was not possible for him (Colonel Gerard Smith) to go into all the provisions of the Company's contracts in that House; but he could assure the right hon. Baronet, in regard to the assertion that the works were let for £2,700,000, without knowing upon what information the right hon. Baronet based his remarks, that they were very wide of the mark. The right hon. Baronet had made some strictures upon his (Colonel Gerard Smith's) position as Chairman and banker of the Company; but he felt certain the House would feel that he and his colleagues had entered into the undertaking solely from a desire to do their best in the interests of the public. The House would remember that they had approached this scheme without any previous experience in railway matters. If they had been, in the outset of the undertaking, able to have obtained the valuable advice they now had, it was probable that many of the errors they had committed would have been avoided, and that they would not have been compelled to ask the House for the assistance they were applying for that day. Perhaps the right hon. Baronet would allow him to assure the House that, owing to the advice and experience which he and his colleagues had now obtained, they would be able to carry on the works with due economy, and to finish them within the sum proposed to be raised by the present Bill. It was also quite true that, some time ago, the estimate for the completion of the works was larger than the sum now asked for. That was because he (Colonel Gerard Smith), with his experience, did not think they could be finished for less; but Mr. Forbes and Mr. Swarbrick, who had now come to the aid of the Directors, and who possessed far more practical knowledge, were of opinion that they could be finished for the sum which had been inserted in the Bill. He was quite content to accept the opinion of those gentlemen upon that point; and he was sure the House would rely, as he himself had relied, upon their judgment and knowledge of railway affairs. He did not suppose that the House would desire that he should detain them any further. He would only add that he trusted, after the Committee had devoted two days to the careful investigation of the Bill, the House itself would not, at the last moment, and upon grounds which had already been fully discussed in the House and adjudicated upon by the Committee, withhold from the Company, whose faults were really due to inexperience, the facilities which were necessary for the completion of the undertaking. He did not ask that those facilities should be given out of sympathy for the Company, but in the interests of the public at large, to whom this work, when completed, would be of the utmost importance.

said, he thought the House would be rather struck by the admissions made by the hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down (Colonel Gerard Smith); but he thought the House ought not to be allowed to come to a decision upon the matter without some guidance from the Treasury Bench, and especially from the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain), who was the official guardian not only of the railway interests, but of the public in general. Now, what was the admission of the hon. and gallant Gentleman who was Chairman of the Company? He had said, over and over again, that the difficulties the Directors of the Company had got into were owing to their inexperience in railway matters. "Owing to my inexperience," said the hon. and gallant Gentleman, "I said that certain sums of money were required for the completion of the line, and I found, on experience, that far larger sums were required." Was not that a complete admission on the part of the hon. and gallant Member who represented the Board of Directors, that they had been, up to the present moment, perfectly ignorant of the nature of the duties they had undertaken to discharge in connection with the Company? That was a strong admission; but what were the real facts of the case? This was a very late period of the Session to bring in the Bill; and he thought it was a thousand pities that, if the Company wanted to get the decision of Parliament, they had not come much earlier, when the whole attention of the House might have been given to the question, and not have waited until the House was about to be prorogued.

said, that not a day had been lost in coming to Parliament the moment the attempt to raise Preference Stock had resulted unfavourably.

said, he thought that if the hon. and gallant Member had not been so completely deluded, and devoid of all experience in railway matters, he would have known that the Preference Stock the Company had tried to issue would never be taken by the public, and he would then have come to Parliament much earlier. But what was the state of the case? The Company asked Parliament to grant the issue of £1,500,000 worth of Debenture Stock. Now, Debenture Stock was very peculiar. It was Stock which trustees might invest in, and if the House allowed a Company to issue these Debentures, it would allow them to have command of a source of capital which otherwise they could not attract. He thought the House might judge of the soundness of the concern by the failure of the Company to issue their Preference Stock. They had not been able to do so, although they had offered it to the public on wonderfully favourable terms—£85 for £100 worth of Stock, at 5 per cent. This was the offer they had made to the public—this brilliant and going concern—and the public, instead of subscribing, only took up £75,000. The Company knew well that they were not able to get more money from the ordinary investing public, and they asked the House to allow them to issue this enormous amount of Debenture Stock, so that they might be able to get hold of money now held in trust. That was a matter in regard to which Parliament ought to exercise special and extraordinary precautions. He wished to know if such an offer had ever before been sanctioned? In the first place, the ordinary laws of Parliamentary procedure were against the Company. They had £3,000,000 of original Stock, and £1,000,000 of Debentures, already issued. That was within the ordinary Rules and Standing Orders of Parliament; but now the Company came to Parliament and asked them to suspend the ordinary rules of procedure in the House of Commons in reference to railways, in order to allow the Company to issue £1,500,000 worth more of Debenture Stock, which would bring the Debenture Stock to within £500,000 of the ordinary Stock; and what ground was there for believing that there was any hope of the concern being finished, even if Parliament allowed this sum to be raised? If the hon. and gallant Member was successful in getting Parliament to take this step, he would have to issue his £1,500,000 worth of Debentures at a discount, and, consequently, he would not get the full sum of £1,500,000; and yet he said that he wanted £1,500,000 in order to complete the line. Even if Parliament allowed the issue of these Debentures, they would be obliged to be issued at a discount. The argument was, that if Parliament did not allow the Company to issue this Stock, they would never be able to complete the line; and even if they were permitted to issue it, it appeared to be quite evident that they would have to come again next year, and ask for another £500,000, or £1,000,000, of Debenture Stock for the completion of the work. What would be the position of Parliament then? It seemed to him to be one of the worst cases that could be brought before the House for a relaxation of the ordinary Rules of the House. They had a Company, whose financial management had been an utter failure; and yet an appeal was to be made to the public to place confidence in them again. But the application went still further, because it involved the sanction of Parliament to the withdrawal of trust money, and the Company said—"If you will not allow us to do that, this line will be altogether useless to the public." He maintained that no case as bad as this had ever been presented to Parliament. The promoters had utterly failed to carry out their scheme as it was originally promoted. Then why not follow the ordinary course? Hitherto, when a scheme of this nature had been put forward, and the promoters broke down after having completed a certain portion of the work, somebody else stepped in and wound up the concern; and instead of the money already expended being lost to the public, as the hon. and gallant Member for Wycombe (Colonel Gerard Smith) attempted to make out, the only persons who were lost were the Directors; and he, for one, could not see why Parliament, for the sake of covering and protecting the Directors of this Company, should allow them to make an extraordinary bargain. It was said that the Committee which had investigated the Bill sat for two days. He must say that, considering the peculiar circumstances of the line, its extraordinary history and demands, two days by no means constituted a very long and searching investigation into the financial position of the Company. Everybody knew what happened when it was proposed to appoint a Com- mittee in the last few days of the Session. There was great difficulty in getting a Committee together at all, and as soon as they met, they were desirous of getting away again. He, therefore, did not think that there was anything of importance in the fact that this Committee had come to an unanimous conclusion. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade would remember that the interests of the public were to be considered as well as those of the Railway Company. It was not absolutely necessary in the interests of the public that this railway should be completed by the present Board of Directors, and he hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would remember that the source of money which the Directors now proposed to utilize were in all probability of a trust character, in dealing with which Parliament ought to be most chary.

said, he was always somewhat chary in offering advice with regard to Private Bills; but after the appeal which had been made by the noble Lord opposite (Lord Randolph Churchill), he felt it was only right to say a few words upon the matter. The issue before the House was a very simple one. The facts lay in a nutshell. The Company having expended a large sum—£4,000,000 of money—found that its original estimates were altogether too low, and that it would be impossible to complete works without an additional sum, now calculated at £1,500,000. The noble Lord, who had been very severe upon his (Mr. Chamberlain's) hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wycombe (Colonel Gerard Smith) and the other Directors of the Company, now alleged that they had displayed an utter incapacity of management. [Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: That was their own admission.] He did not admit the admission. The noble Lord seemed to think that the Directors were convicted of incapacity by their admission that the estimates had been exceeded. All that he (Mr. Chamberlain) could say was, that he had had a good deal of experience as to railway speculations, and he did not know of a single case in which the original estimates had not been exceeded; and if the Directors were to be accused of incapacity because the original estimates had been exceeded, he thought there were very few indeed who would escape condemnation. At all events, a mistake had been made. Nobody would deny that this sum of £1,500,000 was necessary in order that the works might be completed, and nobody denied that the Company had tried, with their existing powers, to raise the money, but had failed to do so; and unless they could create some kind of preference securities, which would stand better in the market than their ordinary Preference Stock, the works would have to be brought to a standstill. The first point he would suggest was that they were not asked to authorize the raising of any additional sum of money, but merely to substitute one form of security for another. The Bill had been sent to a very strong Hybrid Committee, and the proposals contained in the Bill were unanimously adopted by that Committee after careful inquiry, and after taking care to secure the insertion of provisions which should guard the existing interests of the debenture and preference-holders. He was also authorized to say that the matter had been under the consideration of the Chairman of Ways and Means, who had approached the subject originally with something of a hostile prejudice against the proposal; but, after giving to all the bodies concerned his careful consideration, he had arrived at a strong opinion in favour of allowing the Bill to go forward, and had asked him (Mr. Chamberlain) to express that opinion. Now, what were the objections that were urged? In the first place, it would appear to be that the matter almost entirely concerned the existing shareholders, and the preference-holders on the line. The objections came, as far as he understood, from shareholders representing only £30,000 of Stock out of a total capital of £3,000,000. It would therefore be found, practically, that there was a large majority of opinion in favour of the creation of this Preference Stock. He thought nothing of the technical objection which had been taken to the wholesale suspension of the Standing Orders by the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston). There was, he believed, a large number of precedents for a similar suspension of the Standing Orders, and also important precedents for the creation of Preference Stock in the manner contemplated by the present Bill. He might refer to the case of the East London Railway Bill, which the hon. Baronet the Member for Hythe (Sir Edward Watkin) was successful in inducing the House to pass.

The East London Line never paid any dividend at all.

said, that might be so; but he was only quoting it as a precedent to show that these powers had already been conceded in another case. When the noble Lord said the East London Railway never paid any dividend, he did not think that there would be very much difference between that case and the present. On the contrary, it was very doubtful whether, in the case of the ordinary Stock of the Hull and Barnsley Railway, any dividend would ever be paid, or, at any rate, within a short period. That, however, was a question which had nothing to do with the creation of this Preference Stock. A more serious objection was one which was taken by the noble Lord opposite when be said that, by this proposal, the quasi -sanction of Parliament was given to a security in which many innocent persons might be induced to invest, but which, at the same time, was one of doubtful value. Against that objection must be put the consideration that, unless the present proposal was sanctioned, the interests of persons who had already invested, both in the original Shares and in the Preference Stock, would be seriously damaged. If the House refused to pass the Bill, and the money was not raised, the first result would be, as the House had already been informed, that 6,000 men would be turned out of employment, which would be a very serious thing at a moment of general depression like the present. What would also happen would be that the works would be rendered practically valueless. All the enormous expenditure already incurred would be thrown away, and it appeared to him possible that this great undertaking, which, after all, was a public work of considerable importance to the district in which it was proposed to be established, would become a prey to any competing line which might have an interest in obtaining possession of it. Therefore, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, as far as his personal vote went, he should certainly support the recommen- dation of the Committee, and the suspension of the Standing Orders.

said, that as one of the Members of the Committee which had investigated the facts of the case, he wished to put before the House the issue which was raised before the Committee. It was, whether the existing undertaking should be practically extinguished by the exhaustion of the money already expended, and the amount of objection referred to by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, consisting of five shareholders who represented £30,000, out of a capital of £3,000,000? The Committee felt that that was a very small minority of the shareholders; and they were, moreover, acquainted with the fact that the objecting persons did not attend the meeting of the Company called for the purpose of approving the Bill, because they knew that they would be swamped. That was a very candid admission that they did not represent the opinion of the shareholders of the Company generally. As to the question of the miscalculation in the original estimates, the right hon. Gentleman had told the House that probably no Directors were ever free from it. The right hon. Gentleman might have added that no private individual was free from it also, for he (Mr. Macfarlane) was quite sure that most people who had ever had anything to do with estimates for building or other purposes, had invariably found that they were wrong to the extent of 50 per cent. Therefore, that argument would have no weight. The issue was a very simple one—namely, whether the House would suspend its Standing Orders? And he maintained that that question was decided when it was agreed to refer the Bill to a Select Committee, and the Select Committee themselves were unanimous in the decision they had arrived at. But the issue really was, whether this undertaking should be sacrificed? It came out incidentally in the inquiry before the Committee, that the real motive of the opposition was that the undertaking might be strangled, and thus be thrown into the arms of one of the large Companies. He had himself put that question distinctly to one of the witnesses, and had pointed out that unless something of that kind were contemplated, the whole of the money expended so far would be lost. He had no interest whatever in these works; but he was told by this particular witness, that the money expended would not be altogether wasted, because the Midland Railway Company were quite willing to take over the property. That admission let the cat out of the bag. It was an attempt to strangle this small concern—very small as compared with the great lines; and, in the interests of the public, he thought it was desirable that those who were promoting the undertaking should be protected. The country was suffering at this moment from the process of railway strangulation adopted by two or three of the great lines, who thought that the sooner they were allowed to absorb all the smaller ones, the better. He hoped the House would not be induced, on any technical ground whatever in reference to these Standing Orders, to set aside the decision of the Committee, unanimously adopted only a few days ago.

said, that he had mentioned in his remarks the name of Mr. Forbes; and he wished to say that that gentleman had only just joined the Board, and that he had had no connection with the line until two or three months ago.

said, that he had no personal interest in the matter; but his attention having been called to the character of the Bill, he had examined it carefully. The point to which he wished to call the attention of the House was this. It appeared to him that not only the Committee who sat upon the Bill, but also the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, had missed the real point which ought to be brought under the notice of the House—namely, whether they ought to allow to this Company borrowing powers to the extent now asked for; that was, whether they ought to allow the Company to raise money by borrowing in excess of the powers which Parliament ordinarily allowed? He understood the President of the Board of Trade to say that a similar case had occurred somewhere or other; but, be that as it might, he thought they ought to be most reluctant to allow the borrowing powers of any Railway Company to exceed the due proportion of their share capital. The President of the Board of Trade had described the stock proposed to be issued as Preference Stock. It was nothing of the kind. It was not Preference Stock at all. It was Debenture Stock, constituting part of the loan capital of the Company, and carrying with it the right on the part of the holders to put in a Receiver, if the Company failed to meet tee interest as it fell due. He mentioned that to show that it was not in any sense part of the share capital. It was a mortgage on the concern, to a limited extent—namely, for securing the interest on the money raised. The importance of the matter was, that by relaxing the Rules laid down by Parliament in reference to borrowing powers, they were really weakening the value of securities which were open to trustees to invest in, as the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) had pointed out. He thought Parliament ought to be most cautious before it did anything to diminish the value of such security in the market, and for that reason he should oppose the Motion.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 82; Noes 31: Majority 51.—(Div. List, No. 196.)

Bill considered.

Ordered, That Standing Orders 207, 223, and 243 be suspended, and that the Bill be now read the third time.

Bill read the third time, and passed.

said, that, in rising to move the reduction of the Vote, he must explain that he had no wish to deprive Sir Henry Bulwer of secretarial assistance with regard to his duties in Zululand, if only the Government would give the Committee some assurance that they would take the necessary steps to make that Office something more than the pretence and sham which their policy had made it become during many months past. He moved the reduction of the Vote in order that he might have an opportunity of calling attention to the terrible and disgraceful state of Zululand by the only means in his power—short of availing himself of the Forms of the House, to which hon. Gentlemen on those Benches were always reluctant to have recourse. He thought it had been most unfortunate that, for two successive years, the House had not had an opportunity of expressing its opinion on this question by a Division; and he was anxious that the Committee should not lose this opportunity of recording against the Government, the censure which every impartial Member who had paid the slightest attention to the subject must acknowledge they had most fully and richly deserved. Having obtained an opportunity at last of criticizing the policy of the Government in South Africa, he wished to trespass, as briefly as possible, on the attention of the Committee, and the reason which would induce him to curtail his remarks was not because he failed to realize the immense importance of the subject, but because it seemed to him that the case was so clear, and that the mismanagement of the Government in Zululand so acknowledged, that it would be mere waste of time for him to further prove such well-known facts, or to enter into the details of a story which for months past had been writing itself but too clearly and too plainly in "such vivid characters of blood. It was curious that the same policy which had anarchized the Soudan, if he might use the expression, had been tried in South Africa with a precisely similar effect. All the skeletons which were at that moment whitening the sands of Northern Africa, had their counterpart in the Southern hemisphere, in the Golgotha into which Zululand had been converted under the "No Responsibility" policy of Her Majesty's Government. He had no doubt that the Government would find words to defend, if they could not find arguments to justify, that policy, and that they would attempt to do so on religious, moral, and philanthropic grounds. But could they also attempt to defend it as successful—as successful in this, that it had done anything to lessen the sufferings of humanity in Zululand? Could they deny that, from every point of view, the welfare of the Zulus, the security of Natal, the maintenance of the honour of the English name among the Natives of South Africa—from each and every such point of view, the policy of the Government had failed in as complete and ghastly a manner as ever discredited a Government? He must express a hope that, in the interest of honesty and fairplay in politics, no hon. Member would on that occasion, as last year, rise in his place and throw the blame of the present state of anarchy in Zululand on the late Government and the Zulu War. That had been done last year; but be was sure that no hon. Gentleman on the Treasury Bench could feel it consistent with his own self-respect to again rake up that past history as in the smallest degree offering any justification for another 12 months' continued and even more hopeless anarchy, and for an amount of unceasing inter-tribal slaughter which surpassed anything that Zululand had known since the Zulus first won the dignity of a nation. Last year, that ludicrously inadequate excuse was given, but only because the Government could find no other words to excuse the effects of their policy of restoring Cetewayo. They could not deny that they were warned of the results which would follow that restoration, that they had neglected those warnings, or that those warnings had turned out to be true. He had urged as strongly as he could last year, however little weight his words might carry, that in view of the fatal fiasco in which the restoration policy of the Government had then terminated, the Government should no longer lend an ear to the mistaken voice of unpractical humanitarians in that House or in the country, but that they should rather listen to those whose experience in South Africa, either as English officials or as Native-born dwellers in that land, entitled their opinions to be treated with consideration and their advice to be listened to with respect. He had urged, as earnestly as he could, that, as the only possible solution of the question, the Government should extend the principle of Reserved Territory up to the Black Umvolosi; he pointed out that such a policy would entail no expense upon the country; and he had overwhelming evidence to show that such a plan would have been gladly received and willingly adopted by the majority of the people in Zululand, and that it would have put an end to that anarchy and bloodshed which now for 18 months had disgraced our connection with the land. Sir Henry Bulwer had expressed the opinion that that course was one which ought to be followed as the one most hopeful for the welfare of the Zulus of any course, excluding our actual assumption of the rule of that country. He did not think they could justify their disregard of that advice on the ground of the success of their own policy, and still less could they justify that disregard on humanitarian grounds. Nor did he think that any hon. Members who last year warmly opposed this plan, could now, in the light of the history of the past 12 months, congratulate themselves on the success of that policy of leaving the Zulus to manage their own affairs, which they then advocated, and under which system, as the Bishop of Zululand had pointed out in a letter in The Times at the beginning of the year, "mutual extermination became the only possibility." If it had been the de-liberate, the diabolical design of the Government to settle the question on the "Kilkenny cat" principle, they could not have gone to work in a surer manner to effect that end. The country was settling down under the old Settlement of Lord Wolseley; and whether or not that settlement might have been the best possible settlement, still, had that policy been faithfully followed, it would have preserved order there. Hon. Members who differed from him might again talk of the Sitimela fight. What had happened in that case bore out his statement, and was the best proof of the propriety of that policy. That was the case of one Zulu, who, with a considerable following, revolted against his Chief; the Chief called in the help of a neighbouring Chief, and the revolt was put down with one fight. That was the exact reason why Lord Wolseley divided Zululand amongst a number of Chiefs—that if there was a revolt in the territory of one Chief, a majority of the other Chiefs would support the loyal subjects of the Chief. It was, however, absurd to talk now about the Sitimela fighting, or to make much of the Native bloodshed which then took place. Why, all the fighting that took place during the three years after Cetewayo's deposition did not result in as many deaths as took place in one half-hour of one morning within six weeks of his restoration. All the bloodshed during those years were but as a single drop as compared with the ocean of blood which had deluged that land since that unhappy morning when Cetewayo was once more restored to his Chieftainship at Ulundi. The Government first encouraged the agitation of a few malcontents, who pretended to be anxious for Cetewayo's restoration; and having done that, they insisted on forcing back Cetewayo on an alarmed and reluctant people. And in order to do that they broke the solemn engagements made four years ago with the Chieftains. Now, that was a deliberate breach of faith with the Chieftains which he had last year challenged Her Majesty's Government to justify, to defend, or to deny—he challenged them, quoting the Prime Minister's own words spoken in that House in support of the charge he brought against them, and they were dumb. He knew that that engagement was made by the Representative of a Power which boasted that on its Dominions the sun never set, with a party of uneducated and naked Zulus in a Kaffir kraal; but he said that it was as solemn and sacred, and the breach of it as shameful and wrong, as if it had been made with the Representatives of a European Power and signed in a Royal Palace. Her Majesty's Government had set this solemn engagement aside, and had restored Cetewayo; and the firebrand having done its natural work in producing a general conflagration throughout the land—

"The torch being lighted, and the flame being spread,

And carnage smiling on her daily dead"—

the Government had then announced their intention of standing calmly by and waiting till the fire had burnt itself out, only watching to see that the flames did not come into too dangerous proximity with their own immediate Possessions. This was the general result, this was the magnificent outcome of our philanthropy, our humanity, our Christianity, and our statesmanship in the 19th century, under a Liberal Government—

"To make a solitude and call it peace"

or, rather, to encourage the Zulus to make the solitude, and then, on the hustings, to point to it as peace. He did not know of any instance, and he believed no instance existed, of a Government behaving at the same time in worse faith, with more consummate folly and shortsightedness, and with more conspicuous and disastrous unsuccess. With the permission of the Committee, he would read the following extract from a Natal newspaper, which gave an excellent account of the state of Zululand—

"It looks as bad now as can be in all the country between Umhlatuzi and the Umvolosi. The people are leaving their kraals, and they who are there sleep outside, because they are afraid. A great number of Zulus are wavering and afraid, fearing both sides. The people are surprised at the English Government doing nothing; they cannot understand it. They could when a King was alive, because it was a difficult question what to do with him. But now that is taken away, a lot of Chiefs have refused to pay taxes. The Resident went back to his residence the day after the women disturbed him, and the next day he set out to take the taxes, but heard there would be trouble up country, so turned back. He might easily have settled affairs in the Reserve; but I suppose his hands are tied and he can do nothing. The Zulus are thoroughly demoralized, and they have lost all respect for the English. This is annoying when one thinks how easily the English might have managed the country after they conquered it. The Zulus now say, 'We trusted in you, and you do nothing.' They say further that the English only know how to write letters."

The next extract which I will read, is a short one from a letter received a few weeks ago from John Dunn himself. He said—

"Affairs here are in a pretty muddle. The Boers have got possession of the central part of Zululand, and in the Reserve the Resident has been attacked by Dabulamanzi at night, but fortunately he was warned and prepared, and beat them off. I have all my men under arms ready, and this is the only part of Zululand up to this where there has been no fighting or bloodshed."

And in one of the letters contained in the last Blue Book which had been issued with reference to Zululand, they had this account sent by Sir Henry Bulwer from Mr. Osborn with regard to the state of things in the Reserve Territory itself—

"The attitude of the Usutus, Mr. Osborn states, is causing great alarm to the loyal people for many miles round the Inkandhla, who are repeatedly insulted and threatened by individuals of the Usutu party, so much so that they and their families dare not sleep at their kraals for fear of being attacked at night, and after dark retire to the hills and donzas; and this is the case even with some of the people residing a long distance from the Inkandhla. The loyal Chiefs and people cannot understand why the lawless and defiant proceedings of the Usutus should be tolerated in the Reserve. They consider they are in danger from the Usutus, and unless he (Mr. Osborn) takes steps to deal with Ictuka, they will take the matter into their own hands."

And now, as a corollary to that, they heard that at the date of a letter received three weeks ago, our Representative in Zululand, Mr. Osborn, had actually been attacked by 10,000 Usutus, under Dabulmanzi, the same Chief to whom the Government had been deferring, and coaxing, and patting on the back for two years; the result, being that about 200 people had been killed. They found that a large proportion of the Zulu people, not only in the Central and Northern parts, but also in the Reserve Territory, were hiding and starving in the bush; and, finally, they heard that Usibepu, the one gallant, plucky, and loyal Chief, had been routed, not by the Usutus, for he had already defeated them, but by some 500 of those infamous marauding Boers, who were the outcome of another portion of the policy of Her Majesty's Government in South Africa. The Government refused to rule, or to take any part in the ruling, of Zululand, and the result was that carnage, starvation, and desolation reigned triumphant in that country. He congratulated the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gladstone) and the Colonial Office, on the brilliant success which had followed from the diplomatic wisdom and the timely courage which they had manifested throughout in dealing with the Zulu question. Now, answerable as they were for this state of things in Zululand, as they must confess they now were, he asked them what they intended to do, or, rather, whether they intended to still pursue the shameful—he might say murderous—policy of doing nothing—that policy of "writing letters," as the Zulus had so graphically described it? Did they still intend to disregard the advice of Sir Henry Bulwer, and every competent authority, recognizing, as they must, that on every previous occasion on which they had disregarded it they had been utterly and fatally wrong? Just to show how consistently wrong they had been, and how persistently they had neglected advice, he would read a telegram from Sir Henry Bulwer, dated the 5th of May last, which ran thus—

"It is reported that the Boers have proclaimed Dinuzulu King of Zululand, and have declared an independent Republic. The report requires confirmation; but there is good information to the effect that a large number from the Transvaal and Pretoria Free State have agreed to the conquest of Zululand for Cetewayo's son in return for territorial cession. It is said that they will join in the united attack on Usibepu. Usibepu is well able to hold his own against the Usutu party, but not against the unjustifiable combination, and he will be destroyed; and Zululand, except the Reserve, will fall under Boer domination, unless we interfere."

Then, 10 days later, he said—

"The action of the Boers is an interference with a Chief made independent of us. It introduces a new element in the Zulu question, and entirely revolutionizes it, destroys balance of power existing in Usibepu, encourages the Usutu party, and intimidates the Natives of the Reserve, who, fearful of the establishment of the Usutu party, powerful under Boer protection and not sure of us, will think how to save themselves. The question of the Boers, therefore, presses for decision. In the meantime, the Reserve is seriously endangered by the Usutu party being able to concentrate against it, and already people are taking refuge in Natal."

On the same page there was another letter, if anything, stronger; but he would not trouble the Committee by reading it. He would only ask if they were to stand still while they saw a new Stellaland arising in South Africa? Were they to remain passive while they saw these rascally filibustering Boers taking possession of the country, and carving it out into farms for themselves? It was curious, and he thought worthy of notice, that the Boers were, with regard to Zululand, occupying very much the same position as the Abyssinians now were to occupy towards the Soudan; and as their civilization was in about the same rudimentary condition, and as their Christianity was in about the same fossilized state, they were equally valuable allies to the Government in carrying out a policy which in both countries appeared to aim at the utter extermination of those Native races, whose struggles for freedom and whose patriotic valour they were once bidden to admire and respect. Was that, he asked, their policy? It was, at least, an intelligible policy, because the extermination of the Zulus would relieve the Government of any further responsibility or troubles in regard to Zululand. [Mr. WARTON: Just what they want.] And while the Government would reap all the advantages of that extermination, all the dirty work—all the direct bloodshed—would be done by the Boers, and the Government would be able to relieve their conscience by a combined Scribe and Pharisee policy of writing letters and publishing Blue Books, deprecating bloodshed and addressing remonstrances to the officials of the South African Republic. He would not, however, seriously charge Her Majesty's Government, or any Member of Her Majesty's Government, with a policy so .ineffably mean; but it was a possible policy, and a policy to which there were only two alternatives—one that a Commissioner should be appointed to reside on the frontier to prevent aggression by the Boers, and to allow the Zulus to exterminate themselves without any White man's assistance; the other, that policy which he had already advocated in that House, and which he now again advocated, as warmly as he could—namely, the extension of the Reserve Territory to the Black Umvolosi. It was of no use going again into details; but let it be understood that such extension and its proclamation would mean at once the cessation of bloodshed in Zululand, the future civilization of that country, and the saving from extermination of the finest race of savages which South Africa had produced. Let the Committee understand that, from the midst of the misery and desolation of their land, the cry of the Zulus themselves was for such a settlement of the question, and for such a deliverance for themselves. Now, he said that, at least, if the Government would not consent to extend the Reserve Territory, it was their duty to give some reason for such refusal. What was their reason? Did it rest on the ground of expense? They might almost believe that, for Lord Derby, some few months ago, telegraphed to Sir Henry Bulwer, asking him what would be the expense of extending the Reserve Territory, and the latter replied that for the first year, it would be about £6,000, and after that there would be no further expense at all. Since that time they had heard nothing more on the subject of the extension. £6,000 for putting an end to all this savagely and bloodshed! Why, it would probably save the country a hundred times the amount in future. £6,000—only three times greater than the amount of expense entailed upon the country by the determination of our æsthetic Government to banish the statue of the Great Duke from Hyde Park Corner to its place of exile at Aldershot. It was true that, at the same time, they got rid of a somewhat unpleasant subject of reflection and comparison. The cost of moving round troops from Cape Town to Natal alone, on account of these disturbances, went far to reach this total of £6,000, which it was said this extension would cost; and Sir Henry Bulwer pointed out in that letter which he had referred to, but not read, that the expense would be just as great, whether the troops were employed to extend the Reserve to protect the Reserve, or to ultimately protect the borders of our own Colonies from the victorious Usutus. In conclusion, he would point out—and it was a lesson which the Government should by this time have learnt by heart—that the longer they delayed, in the folly of their misplaced economy, to take that one step, which sooner or later they would be forced to take, the heavier would be the expense which this "penny-wise and pound-foolish" policy would lay on the British taxpayer, the more prolonged and cruel would be the bloodshed which they would entail on the Zulu people, and the darker and more inexcusable would be the guiltiness for that blood which would lie at the door of the Government, and of the Party which supported them in their misused or wasted power. He begged to move the reduction of the Vote by £300.

said, he rose to second the Motion for the reduction of the Vote; but in doing so he wished to explain, as his hon. Friend the Mover of the reduction (Mr. Guy Dawnay) had done, that he did not, of course, desire the reduction itself; but that was the only way left to them to protest against the policy of the Government in Zululand. He would have been glad if the question could have been discussed on the Resolution which he had placed on the Paper, but which he had now been compelled to withdraw, as it would have been discussed in the House, and not in Committee, and would have afforded a larger basis for argument. That Resolution contained the view which he now desired to bring under the consideration of the Committee—namely, that, looking to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and the responsibilities which the country had incurred, owing to that policy, the Government and the country could not get rid of, or properly meet, those responsibilities by merely maintaining, as by the telegram of May 16, 1884, they had decided to do, "the integrity and peace of the Reserve." He desired to get the Committee practically to affirm that the Government were bound to endeavour to restore some kind of peace and order in the part of Zululand beyond the Reserved Territory. In that way the hands of the Government would be strengthened in any forward action they might take to restore peace in that unfortunate country, to which our interference had been so fatal. It was not necessary for him to go back to the original Zulu War. He would content himself with saying that he had always considered that war to have been unnecessary, and therefore unjust—so unnecessary and so unjust, that he had felt himself compelled both to speak and vote against the late Government, because, though they disapproved of the war, they had not, in his opinion, sufficiently condemned the policy of Sir Bartle Frere. He could not mention the name of Sir Bartle Frere without expressing, however imperfectly, his sense of the loss this country had sustained by the death of so zealous a servant of the Crown. We could never forget his able administration in India; we could never forget the splendid service he rendered in the time of the great Mutiny, in denuding of troops, at considerable personal risk to himself, the Province over which he presided, in order to assist the efforts of Sir John Lawrence. And with regard to his policy in South Africa, those who, like himself (Sir Henry Holland) differed entirely from it, had never doubted but that it was adopted from most conscientious motives, and in the belief that it was necessary to save Natal from a great and impending danger. The argument which he desired to lay before the Committee, and which he would afterwards support by proof, was briefly as follows:—That after the termination of the war, Zululand, its Chiefs, and people, were at our mercy; and that it was our duty, more especially if the war was an unjust one, to endeavour to restore peace and order in that country; that the Settlement of 1879 made by Lord Wolseley, by which the country was divided and placed under 13 appointed Chiefs, was the best that could then have been made; that it was effectual in fairly securing peace and order; not absolute peace and order, for that could not have been se-cured in a country so lately devastated by war, and with Natives whose feelings had been embittered by the contest, and who were hostile to us, but a fair amount of peace and order; that it was certainly beneficial to the Zulu people, and appreciated by them; that certain defects in the working and administration of that Settlement could have been remedied, he would not say without difficulty, but with the exercise of a little tact and judgment, and by our willingness to take upon ourselves a little more direct and guiding authority; that this could have been done without the employment of British soldiers, and without the expenditure of British money; that the unfortunate and ill-judged restoration of Cetewayo destroyed this Settlement of 1879; and that as that policy proceeded entirely from this country, and was against the wishes of the majority of the Chiefs and Zulu people, as he would prove later on, we were bound morally to protect the Zulu people against any evil consequences resulting from the failure of that policy; that the scheme failed, mainly owing to the conduct of Cetewayo himself; and that, therefore, our responsibility attached, and we were bound to endeavour to restore to the Zulus such peace and order as they enjoyed under the Settlement of 1879, and which they would probably have enjoyed to a still greater extent, if the Settlement, instead of being destroyed, had been confirmed and strengthened in the manner which he had already indicated. He must add, further, that the settlement of the Boers in Zululand, while greatly complicating the case, made it still more necessary for the Government to take some action beyond the Reserved Territory in order to protect the Zulus against the Boers. That was the argument he desired to press upon the Committee, and he would now endeavour to support it, by reference to the evidence contained in the Papers presented to Parliament. For that purpose he had read and re-read those Papers with care; and if he had arrived at a wrong conclusion, he could conscientiously state that it was not from want of study of them. But a difficulty arose from there being so great a mass of Correspondence, and the necessity of dealing with it as a whole, because many stories of misconduct of Chiefs, and acts of cruelty and hardship, and cases of disturbance which were relied upon in the earlier stages of the Correspondence, and which were brought forward as proof against the working of the Settlement of 1879, were contradicted, or explained away, or materially weakened, in a later stage; and he would give an instance of that later on, in connection with complaints brought against Chiefs. His first point was that the Settlement of 1879 was the best that could have been then made; that, on the whole, it had worked well; and that it was beneficial to the Zulus, and appreciated by them. It was the best that could then have been made, because Her Majesty's Government, rightly as he ventured to think, had decided not to annex Zululand, and govern it as a Crown Colony. They had determined, and wisely determined, that the country should be governed by Native Chiefs, under Native laws; but the defect in the scheme was that it did not retain any direct and guiding authority. That it worked well, upon the whole, was shown by the following facts:—In August, 1880—that was something like a year after the making of the Settlement—we find Sir Pomeroy Colley reporting that—

"The conditions are sufficient to shield the people from serious injustice and abuse of power on the part of the Chiefs;"

and Mr. Brown, the Resident, reports that "order and quiet prevail." Indeed, as stated by Sir Evelyn Wood, in his address to the Legislative Council of Natal, in October, 1881, peace prevailed in Zululand till July, 1881. The Sitimela outbreak then occurred; but, as shown by his hon. Friend (Mr. Guy Dawnay), Sitimela was an impostor, and he was soon put down—and to this fact he would call the special attention of the Committee, as bearing upon another point in the case—by John Dunn and Native levies. In truth, as Sir Henry Bulwer says, this case of Sitimela "can scarcely be said to bear upon the Settlement." It was true that, in April, 1881, cases of oppression against two out of the 13 appointed Chiefs were brought forward. But they were brought forward by the ex-Prime Minister of Cetewayo, and by two brothers of Cetewayo, and not sustained by the decision of Sir Evelyn Wood, to whom all the parties agreed to refer their differences. He would venture to call the attention of the Committee to this fact, as showing the readiness of the Chiefs to submit their differences to the decision of the British Governor of Natal. Order was certainly restored before December, 1881, for Mr. Osborn then reports that "the country is at present perfectly quiet in every part." The Settlement of 1879 worked then, upon the whole, peacefully up to and well into the year 1882. But then came the rumours of Cetewayo's intended visit to England; and thence arose agitation and doubts in the minds of the Natives as to the continuance and permanency of the Settlement. These rumours also afforded a ground to the discontented members of Cetewayo's family to agitate for his restoration. But what he (Sir Henry Holland) wished to impress upon the Committee was, that all this agitation, excitement, and disturbance arose, not from any internal defect in the working of the Settlement, but from causes outside that Settlement; and, indeed, it might be said outside the country itself. That the Settlement worked beneficially for the Zulu people, and was appreciated by them, could hardly be doubted. He would give one very conclusive proof. In the latter years of Cetewayo's reign, hundreds of families fled from Zululand into Natal; fugitives from a cruel despotism, under which no man's life was safe; but, in 1881, permission was given to no less than 1,630 Natives, men, women, and children, to return from Natal into Zululand. Surely this fact showed conclusively two things; first, that Cetewayo's rule was feared; and, secondly, that the change from his rule was acceptable, and that the working of the Settlement was appreciated by the Natives. But there was further proof of this feeling, for Sir Evelyn Wood reports in April, 1881—

"There can be no doubt that the bulk of the nation already appreciate its improved condition;"

and, again, in September, 1881, after he had traversed a large part of the country, he reports—

"Every Zulu whom I met alone in my ride through Zululand told me, in the course of conversation, that the Zulus would not willingly go back to the old system which obtained under Cetewayo, preferring the present system."

No doubt, there were stories of Chiefs "eating up" and ill-treating their people, and those had been relied on; but, as he had already pointed out, many of these were afterwards proved to be much exaggerated, or without foundation. Some were clearly disposed of by Sir Henry Bulwer, in his Report of August 25, 1882, with which, of course, he would not trouble the Committee; but he would venture to read a few words, in which Sir Henry Bulwer sums up the ease. He said—

"I, at least, must do them justice, and acquit them of the great crime, so wrongfully and unjustly charged against them;

and, finally, in his Report of February, 1883, in which he reviewed, after full consideration, the state of Zululand, he wrote—

"The Settlement of 1879 had conferred great benefits upon the Zulu people, benefits which every true friend of the Native races ought to rejoice at."

He (Sir Henry Holland) could have added to those proofs, had there been time; but he trusted that he had established the first point of his argument. Now, as to the second point; he had admitted that during the working of the Settlement certain defects became manifest, and he had indicated the nature of the chief defect—namely, the want of a more direct and guiding authority on the part of the British Government. That defect had early been pointed out by Sir Henry Bulwer and Mr. Osborn; but Her Majesty's Government had declined to exercise it, on the ground that the exercise of it, if it did not amount to annexation, would, of a certainty, lead to annexation. He thought that the Government were wrong in this view, and in their fears. They were exercising this authority through their Resident in Bechuanaland, but they had not annexed that land, nor would they have to do so; they were exercising that authority in the Reserved Territory, and, as yet, they had not had to annex it; and if they had to do so, it would be on account of the Boers, and not on account of any authority exercised over the Natives in that territory. It was very desirable that immediate rule should be carried on by the Native Chiefs over their people, and it would have been unwise to have deprived them of that power; but a direct and guiding authority was necessary to maintain that power to them; to prevent these Chiefs from quarrelling among themselves; and to check in the bud intertribal disputes, before they had attained to such a size as to render it difficult to repress them without bloodshed and expense. There could be no doubt that the Zulu people themselves expected the exercise of such a paramount authority. It was characteristic of all Natives to expect that the victors in a contest would not retreat, but would continue to hold and exercise the power they had won in battle. This authority, he contended, might then have been secured and exercised without fear of annexation, and without the employment of British troops, or British money, by the appointment of Residents and Sub-Residents, exercising certain judicial and quasi -political powers. There was a remarkable consensus of opinion in favour of the appointment of Residents by men most competent to form an opinion. He would cite the names of Sir Henry Bulwer, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Mr. Osborn, Bishop Douglas, Mr. Robertson, and John Dunn, men of very different views, of very different characters, looking at the question from very different sides, and yet all agreeing upon this point. That the Zulu Chiefs would have been ready to yield to such authority was shown by their readiness to refer their disputes upon the occasion to which he had already alluded. That no British troops would have been required was the opinion of Sir Henry Bulwer in his Report of February 15, 1883; and they could probably have engaged all the Chiefs to assist in putting down quarrels at the request of the British authority. Upon that point he would refer to the telegram of Sir Evelyn Wood of September 2, 1881—

"All Chiefs agree to combine for the repression of rebellion, if advised to do so by the Resident;"

and to the fact, before alluded to by him, that Sitimela was put down by Dunn and Native levies. The Chiefs would have been ready to recognize that the primary obligations of maintenance of territory and maintenance of peace rested upon them and their people, acting in concert with the Residents. Upon that point also, he would add that a Hut Tax, or some other tax or contribution of a like kind, would have covered the expenses. If these steps had been taken in this direction, be believed that the Settlement of 1879 might have been strengthened and continued, and the good effects of its working would have been largely increased. It might be said that this was, after all, a matter of speculation and conjecture; but the view was supported, as he had shown, by the actual working of the Settlement till 1882, and by the opinions of men best acquainted with the state of affairs, and with the wishes and views of the Zulu Chiefs and people. But if this were matter of speculation, there could be no doubt at all as to the absolute failure of the alternative plan adopted by Her Majesty's Government—namely, the restoration of Cetewayo. From that plan he entirely dissented; it put an end to the Settlement; it was a violation of our pledges to the Chiefs and people; and it was, he believed, against the wishes of the great majority of the people themselves. The first unfortunate step was the visit of Cetewayo to England. The announcement of the proposed visit had given rise in Zululand, as he had already pointed out, to agitation, and uncertainty and doubts as to the continuance of the Settlement of 1879, and all the disturbances in 1882 were traceable to this cause. It was clear that Cetewayo himself looked upon this visit as the first step towards his restoration; and no less clear that the Zulus took a like view. And it was to him most extraordinary that Her Majesty's Government did not seem to have foreseen, or suspected, that agitation would arise in Zululand when the reports of the proposed visit reached that country. They seemed to have been taken by surprise when they had temporarily to postpone the visit upon receiving a strongly worded Report from Sir Henry Bulwer in May, 1882, that the intended visit had—

"Led to the report of his restoration, and had been the cause of the recent demonstration of the ex-King's brothers, and was producing uneasiness in Zululand, and interfering with the settlement of that country."

He (Sir Henry Holland) was justified in assuming that Her Majesty's Government were thus wanting in foresight, because no steps were taken in Zululand to explain the state of the case to the Chiefs, and to prevent any uneasiness and agitation, nor were any instructions to that effect given to Sir Henry Bulwer. Well, the restoration was decided upon; it was decided upon against the strongly expressed opinions of hon. Members on that (the Opposition) side of the House, and, if he remembered rightly, on the other side also. He himself had ventured to point out the almost certainty of the failure of such a scheme. It was decided upon against the views of Lord Wolseley, who protested against it on the ground of danger to Natal; of causing serious trouble and bloodshed in Zululand; and as being in direct contravention of the guarantee given to the 13 Chiefs that, under no circumstances, should Cetewayo be allowed to settle again in the territory. It was against the views of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who thought it would "be certain to produce the most disastrous consequences." It was against the views of Sir Henry Bulwer, who strongly op-posed the scheme, and only yielded when he was informed that Her Majesty's Government had decided upon it, and when he was instructed to take the necessary steps to prepare the country for the return of the ex-King. It was against the views of the Colonists of Natal, if we might judge from a protest of the Legislative Council of that Colony, and from resolutions passed at such important places as Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and Newcastle. And, lastly, it was against the wishes of the majority of the 13 appointed Chiefs, and of the bulk of the Zulu people. As regarded the Zulu people, he had shown how entirely satisfied they were with the working of the Settlement of 1879, and there was no reason to suppose that the bulk of the people had altered their views. No doubt a certain number of the people, who had been most intimately connected with Cetewayo and his family, were interested and excited by the prospect of his restoration; but, even when he came back, their number was so limited that he was almost alarmed at the want of enthusiasm. It was true that no direct protest was made by the people against the return; but, at all events, there was no Petition in favour of it; and whatever advances in civilization the Zulus had made it might be admitted that they had not advanced so far as they had in this country in the art of getting up and presenting Petitions. And it must not be forgotten that Natives very readily fell in with the decision of higher Powers, when once made, however much they might dislike it, from fear of opposing it. And when they were considering the feeling of the people, they could not but treat the protests of the Chiefs and Headmen as representing, to a considerable extent, the views and wishes of their followers. Now, how did the case stand as regards the 13 appointed Chiefs? In October, 1882, five only were disposed to acquiesce in the restoration, while eight were opposed to it; and even after the decision was an- nounced, 7 out of 13 expressed dissent. It was to him somewhat surprising that, after the determination of Her Majesty's Government was made known, so many Chiefs were bold enough to protest, because the Chiefs might naturally have feared that further opposition would draw down on them the hostility and vengeance of Cetewayo when he returned to Zululand, backed up by the power of the British Government. And, again, as late as January, 1883, they would find 30 Chiefs and Headmen protesting; and the tone of their complaints was so simple and touching that he would venture to read it to the Committee. They said—

"Is it true that you White people now find that Cetewayo has done no wrong? What wrong have we done that we are to be driven from our homes? We cannot live under Cetewayo again. We look to the Government to protect us, and to allow us to occupy the country to which we belong, and which we must leave if Cetewayo is put over us."

Sir Theophilus Shepstone also reports that

"All complain bitterly of the changes now made without in any way consulting their feelings."

The restoration was made, as he thought he had shown, against the wishes of the majority of the Chiefs, and, therefore, against the pledges given to them in 1879. It had been urged that, in partial redemption of those pledges, the Reserved Territory had been set aside for such Chiefs as did not wish to serve under Cetewayo. But when one came to look at it, this offer was little bettor than a mockery. There would be a very natural reluctance on the part of the people to leave their property, and homes, and settle down in a new territory; and, unless the people would move, it was hopeless to suppose that the Chiefs would separate themselves from their people, and power, and property. He believed that, in fact, not a single Chief had up to this time availed himself of the offer, with the exception of Usibepu, who, after his total defeat by Boers and Usutus, had no other place of refuge. The result of the restoration was, as predicted, disastrous. The scheme failed, and mainly owing to the conduct of Cetewayo himself. He returned to his country dissatisfied with the conditions imposed upon him; sore that so large a portion of the country had been separated from his rule; and especially sore that the Chief Usibepu, his "dog," as he called that Chief, had been allowed to retain his separate power and territory. He began at once to assume power over the Chiefs and Natives in the Reserved Territory, in spite of repeated warnings from Sir Henry Bulwer and Mr. Fynn; he soon commenced hostilities against Usibepu—an attack utterly unprovoked, and characterized by Sir Henry Bulwer as " another direct and most serious violation of the conditions." Cetewayo was defeated, and died, and the scheme of the restoration failed, after destroying the Settlement of 1879. He (Sir Henry Holland) believed that he had so far proved his argument that this country had incurred a responsibility to the Zulu people that they should not suffer—he would not put it higher—from the failure of a scheme which they did not desire, and which was forced upon them by the policy of Her Majesty's Government. They should be restored, as far as possible, to the state in which they were under the Settlement, and which they would still have been in had not that Settlement been destroyed. Her Majesty's Government had, however, declared that they would not extend British authority or protection over Zululand, but would only undertake to preserve the peace and integrity of the Reserved Territory. He quite admitted that it was absolutely essential to protect this territory. It was essential in the interest of the Colony of Natal, and it was essential not only in the interest of the Natives within that territory, and who proposed to remain there, but for the interest of those without the territory. The pledge that was given originally, that this territory should be reserved as a place of refuge for those who did not desire to remain under Cetewayo's power, must certainly be held to continue in full force for those who desired to fly from the fighting and bloodshed which had followed upon the failure of the scheme of restoration. It was not easy to know exactly what was going on in the Reserve, and what danger there was of an attack upon it; but as British troops were employed there, he could not conceive that there would be any substantial difficulty in maintaining it. The difficulty—and a very grave and serious difficulty it was—with which we had to deal, arose from the state of things out- side the Reserve. Here, again, it was not easy to ascertain what was the exact state of things, as the conditions were constantly changing. We knew that the Chiefs had been fighting amongst themselves; we knew that Usibepu had been attacked and defeated by a united force of Boers and Usutus; but the state of things had been undoubtedly complicated, and the difficulties greatly increased, by the introduction of the Boer element. The Boers were like stormy petrels. They scented storms from afar, and were always to be found East or West of the Transvaal, wherever Native quarrels arose. They combined also the rapacity of vultures, for they always got good pickings from the battlefields where Native quarrels were fought out. Their mode of proceeding was simple enough. They began by settling down in small numbers on the land which they desired to have. They created or fostered tribal disputes, and they took one side or the other in consideration of concession of land; and then, when the time was ripe, and the Natives were sufficiently weakened by fighting each other, they threw off all disguise and annexed the land. That plan had been pursued with great advantage to themselves on the West of the Transvaal, and that plan they were pursuing on the East of the Transvaal; and they would succeed unless we interfered, which, apparently, we were not going to do. We found them negotiating with the Usutus in 1882, and we learnt in 1884 that a large number, from 400 to 800, armed Boers had entered the territory, and had made Dinizulu King, in return for territorial concessions. He would venture to read to the House Sir Henry Bulwer's remarks upon this Boer invasion or settlement, as they seemed to him to carry great weight. Sir Henry Bulwer said—

"The situation is very grave. If we allow the Boers to interfere and make Dinizulu King, it will be a most serious blow to British power in South Africa. They will also become masters of Zululand, to the permanent loss of the Zulu people, and to the great injury of Natal, to which will resort refugees, for whom there is no room and no future outlet. The Native question will be thereby gravely complicated. In the Reserve, also, we should probably have immediate Usutu contests."

Those fears were probably well founded. What, then, had been the result of the policy of the Government in Zulu- land? They had destroyed the power of the Zulu people, and now it was proposed to leave them in the hands of their most hated enemies, whom, in Cetewayo's time, they could easily have conquered, and would have conquered but for our remonstrances with Cetewayo. What policy had been suggested to meet the difficulty of the case? Sir Henry Bulwer had suggested an extension of the Reserved Territory; but this suggestion was made before Usibepu was defeated, and if any extension were now to be made it would have to include all Zululand. He did not know whether Sir Henry Bulwer would recommend such an extension; but Her Majesty's Government had, at all events, declined to he parties to any extension beyond the Reserved Territory, and he was not prepared to find fault with that decision. It was not for hon. Members on that side of the House to state what policy the Government should pursue. They had not the Papers and the confidential information which the Government had, and were not in a position to advise. But he ventured, with very great diffidence, to submit to the Government a course of policy which he thought was worthy of consideration, which was quite distinct from annexation, but which, if practicable and acted upon, might even now restore peace and order in this unfortunate country, and relieve us of much of the danger and difficulty surrounding the present position. He would endeavour to treat the country again as we treated it in 1879; in other words, he would endeavour to revert to the lines of the Settlement of 1879, and to govern the people by Native Chiefs; but, at the same time, to strengthen the authority of those Chiefs by the retention and exercise of a direct and guiding authority through Residents who should have judicial and political powers. It might be asked, how could this plan now be put in operation? He would suggest that Sir Hercules Robinson, or Sir Henry Bulwer, or someone in whom the Chiefs had confidence, should be deputed to summon the Chiefs to meet at some point outside the Reserve Territory. The Chiefs should be asked to appoint, or to allow the British Government to appoint, some single Chief, or as many Chiefs as they desired, under whom they would serve. The Chiefs should be required to agree, as Sir Evelyn Wood suggested, to combine to put down any fighting or disturbance at the request of the British authority. Residents should be appointed with judicial and political powers. An appeal should lie to the Lieutenant Governor of Natal in all intertribal disputes; and provision should be made against the sale of land to White men. Of course, he did not conceal from himself the difficulty arising from the Boers. A firm hand would have to be kept on the Boers who had settled down in Zululand. They must be called upon either to assent to the authority of the Chiefs and the British authority—and they might be induced to do that if their titles to the lands which they now held were confirmed to them—or to retire. Some might be disposed to take the latter course, if their hopes of further gain, and of establishing a Boer Republic, were thus taken from them; and he would not be disinclined to give them some compensation for the land they gave up. Compensation, he knew, was an ugly word; but he believed any amount of compensation would be well spent if, by giving it, we could once get the Boers out of Zululand, and thus free the Zulus. Then, as regarded the prevention of further encroachments, be did not believe we should have much difficulty if the Government would have the courage to act firmly with the Transvaal Government—a quality in which they had been deficient up to this time. The Government should call upon the Transvaal Government to act upon the Second Article of the recent Convention. By that Article it was provided that

"The Government of the South African Re-public will strictly adhere to the boundaries defined in the First Article of this Convention, and will do its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making any encroachments upon lands beyond the said boundaries. The Government of the South African Republic will appoint Commissioners upon the Eastern and Western borders, whose duty it will be strictly to guard against irregularities and trespassing over the boundaries. Her Majesty's Government will, if necessary, appoint Commissioners in the Native territories outside the Eastern and Western borders of the South African Republic to maintain order and prevent encroachments."

He had read this Article in full to the Committee, because, a short time ago, in answer to a Question, the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) said that they could not well call upon the South African Republic to appoint a Commissioner until Her Majesty's Government had appointed one themselves, which they had not determined to do; but it was clear from the terms of Article II. that, while the Boers were bound to appoint Commissioners, the British Government were only required to do so if necessary. [Mr. EVELYN ASHLEY: The Convention has not been ratified.] That was true; but he (Sir Henry Holland) thought that if this Article could not be legally enforced, a compliance with it might be pressed upon the Boers, or that the Boers might be required to take such a step under the former Convention. We were bound to settle this Boer question; and so important was it to prevent any further trespassing that he would be ready to make further concessions to the Transvaal Government—as, for example, the abandonment of the large debt now due to this country—if he could thereby obtain an honest and bonâ fide security that the Republic would prevent any further encroachments. He had ventured to suggest some policy of this kind for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government; but he did not ask the Committee to affirm this or any other special course of action, but only to affirm that, under all the circumstances of the case, this country had incurred obligations and responsibilities to the Zulu people outside as well as inside the Reserved Territory; and that the Government ought to endeavour faithfully to meet those obligations and responsibilities, and to secure some kind of peace and order in this unhappy Zululand. He must apologize to the Committee for having detained them so long, and for having gone so far back into the history and details of this case. His excuse was that he had to contend with the very natural reluctance of this country to engage in further expeditions and further expenditure in Zululand; he had to contend with the still more natural reluctance to engage ourselves in further complications with the Boers; and he had to contend with the desire to limit our responsibilities, instead of extending them, and to content ourselves with maintaining peace in our own Colonies. He had been compelled, there-fore, to make it clear that we had, by our policy, incurred duties and responsi- bilities towards the Zulu people. If he had convinced the Committee that that was the case, he could not doubt that this country, however unpalatable the task might be, or however expensive and difficult, would support the Government if they firmly, manfully, and honestly endeavoured to perform those duties and responsibilities.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That a sum, not exceeding £38,567 (including a Supplementary sum of £30,000), be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1885, for certain Charges connected with the Orange River Territory, the Transvaal, Zululand, the Island of St. Helena, and the High Commissioner for South Africa."— (Mr. Guy Dawnay.)

said, he did not propose to follow the hon. Baronet (Sir Henry Holland) in his vindication of the Wolseley Settlement, nor in his observations adverse to the restoration of Cetewayo. He would confine himself exclusively to the present state of affairs in Zululand. He never heard the hon. Gentleman the Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Guy Dawnay) speak of the affairs of these distant territories, which he knew so well, and on which he was so well entitled to speak, without regretting that the weight and authority which would naturally attach to his words were marred by that exuberant animosity against Her Majesty's Government which seemed to inflame all he uttered. But he fully shared the hon. Member's (Mr. Guy Dawnay's) sense of the gravity of the situation in Zululand, and of the need of prompt and decided action there. It was time for a more direct and determined exercise of authority on the part of Her Majesty's Government. We could not, without discredit, ignore our obligations to the entire Zulu people, whether they were in the Reserve or beyond it. The hon. Member for the North Riding for bade them, if he (Mr. Wodehouse) might say so, to allude to the Zulu War. But they must allude to it, because that war was the origin of our responsibility for the present distracted condition of Zululand. Until that war the Zulus were a strong and compact Native race, more than able to hold their own against the Boers. We shattered their strong cohesion, and left them a prey to the greed of the Boers. He must remind the Committee that when Her Majesty's Government were negotiating the Pretoria Convention, through their Commissioners on the spot, they proposed to sever from the Transvaal a strip of territory on its Eastern border; but the Boers objected, and Her Majesty's Government gave way to them on this point. From this decision, however, one of the Commissioners, Sir Evelyn Wood, dissented, on the ground that the separation of the Transvaal from Zululand was essential for the prevention of intrigues which would be fatal to the peace of Zululand, and might even menace the safety of Natal; and certainly the sequel of events had tended to prove rather than disprove the accuracy of Sir Evelyn Wood's foresight, We must anticipate sustained aggression on the part of the Transvaal Boers, in whatever directions they were free to advance. Some check had been put on their encroachments on the Western side of the Transvaal by the appointment of Mr. Mackenzie as Commissioner in Bechuanaland; and he wished that some similar action were taken to check their advance on the Eastern border. It was vain to suppose that the Transvaal Boers would observe any boundaries fixed by Treaty or Convention. They would violate without scruple the most solemn assurances and the most formal engagements; and they were more than ever likely to do so now. He would tell the Committee why. When the Transvaal deputation were over in this country negotiating the recently-made Convention, their ostensible organ and advocate in the London Press was The Times; and The Times argued throughout that, as we had no intention of undertaking military operations against the Boers in any case, we had better accept at once whatever terms they might be graciously pleased to offer. Now, if the Transvaal deputation had carried back to their countrymen the information that, do what they would, England would never fight them again, why should they observe inconvenient engagements? But that was not all. The Transvaal deputation made a tour on the Continent, and visited some of the principal capitals of Europe. In Paris and Berlin, every newspaper that wished to be spiteful to this country flattered them about their military prowess, which had thrice defeated British arms. In Berlin they were received with effusive honours by the German Emperor and his Chancellor; and they were further gratified by the Imperial patronage of the German settlement at Angra Pequena. Now the reports of all these things had gone out to South Africa, and were circulating through every Dutch farmhouse, inflaming the vanity and self-assertion of the Boers, and giving a fresh impulse to their restless aggression. Again, there was another circumstance which pointed in the same direction. There had recently been a change of Ministry in the Cape Colony, and the new Ministry could not stand without support from the extreme Dutch Party. Moreover, these new Ministers were the very men who forced the Basutos into rebellion by their disarmament policy, and who would have confiscated Basuto territory, if Her Majesty's Government had not intervened. And what was the first declaration of policy made by them after taking Office? Why, that they intended to keep a firmer hand on the Natives than their Predecessors had done. Every Native in South Africa would understand the meaning of that declaration. All these circumstances pointed to the likelihood of self-assertion and increased aggression on the part of the Dutch farmers, and a corresponding increase of alarm and uneasiness on the part of the Natives. Now, whether we had to deal with trouble in Zululand, or Swaziland, or Basutoland, or Bechuanaland, one dominant consideration always lay at the root of the question; and that was, did England intend, or not, to be, in fact, as in name, the paramount con-trolling and guiding Power throughout South Africa? The Transvaal deputation made no secret of their views as to the proper position of England in South Africa; they would leave to England neither place, nor power, nor duty there, except the single duty of guarding those territories from transmarine invasion. Happily, these pretensions met with no countenance from Her Majesty's Government. They had rescued the trade route through Bechuanaland from the Transvaal Boers; and they had got rid of the Sand River Convention. That Convention being gone, we were free, if we thought proper, to enter into friendly relations, by Treaty or otherwise, with Native Tribes all round the Transvaal, and free also, if ever we found it expe- dient, to supply the Natives with arms and ammunition. Moreover, Her Majesty's Government had reserved to themselves the right of veto upon all Treaties concluded by the Boers with Foreign States. They had put a British Commissioner in Bechuanaland, and had also resumed Imperial administration in Basutoland. All these acts were clear recognitions of Imperial duties and responsibilities in South Africa. If, then, these duties and responsibilities were recognized—if this line of policy was deliberately chosen, he hoped that whatever was done might not be marred by procrastination and half-heartedness. Whatever we meant to do let us do it quickly, because every hour of delay raised fresh obstacles in our path. We ought to do our work well, or else we had better leave it alone altogether. He made these observations because he gathered from the language of the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby) that he regarded the resumption of Imperial rule in Basutoland, and the appointment of Mr. Mackenzie in Bechuanaland, as measures of a tentative and experimental character. He (Mr. Wodehouse) strongly deprecated such language. It carried misgiving and uncertainty to the minds of all friends of English policy in South Africa, and was a direct incentive to its enemies to plot and intrigue to make the policy a failure. If these qualifying phrases were intended to diminish Imperial responsibility, or to provide paths of escape from future embarrassments, they were futile; they would not lighten the burden of our responsibility by the weight of a single grain, nor shorten its duration by a single hour. This was not a time to temporize and minimize in South Africa. Things would not settle down, if left to themselves; but they would go from bad to worse. In addition to the aggression of the Transvaal Boers, we had to reckon with the fact that, owing to the discovery of the Diamond Fields, and all the recent wars there had been, South Africa swarmed with adventurers of the worst kinds, who fostered all intertribal quarrels and family feuds of Native Chiefs for their own sordid advantage. He therefore hoped that Her Majesty's Government would grasp the situation in Zululand and elsewhere with vigour and decision, and that they would not shrink from appointing Represen- tatives of Her Majesty, wherever the peace of South Africa demanded the presence of such officers. It would be better for us to make an abrupt and complete repudiation of all our obligations to the Natives, and extricate ourselves by a sudden wrench from every quarter of South Africa, except Simon's Bay and Cape Town, rather than linger on the scene while we suffered the name of the Queen, which had been to the Natives in the past a symbol of fidelity to Imperial obligations and the pledge of national honour, to fade into a mere delusive phantom, and be known to them only as a broken reed to lean on.

said, he had listened with great interest to the speech of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Wodehouse). The hon. Gentleman had given them a very graphic description of the position of things with respect to the Boers at the present moment. With all the re-marks of the hon. Member he cordially agreed. He had had an opportunity of speaking on this subject during the present Session, and he did not propose to trouble the Committee at any length. They had listened to a very remarkable speech from his hon. Friend the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland), and they knew that everything the hon. Baronet said in that House was al-ways worthy of the utmost attention, and on this question particularly everything which fell from the hon. Baronet deserved the greatest consideration. He (Mr. R. N. Fowler) approached the matter, however, from a different point of view to his hon. Friend. The hon. Baronet was a consistent opponent of the restoration of Cetewayo; but, so far as an humble Member like himself could, he (Mr. R. N. Fowler) took the responsibility of having recommended that restoration. His hon. Friend seemed to think that, in 1881, under the Settlement of 1879, the condition of Zululand was as nearly that of a paradise as it could well be. His (Mr. R. N. Fowler's) recollection of the condition of Zululand, so far as be could gather from what he heard when he made a personal visit to the Cape and Natal in November, 1881, was that Zululand was not in the very peaceful, and happy, and Elysian state described by his hon. Friend. At that time many people were recommending that John Dunn should be made King of the Zulus, vice Cetewayo deposed. John Dunn himself was certainly going about recommending that there should be a Paramount Chief, and suggesting that he was the man who would best promote the peace of the country by assuming that position. He rather thought that his hon. Friend the Member for the North Riding (Mr. Guy Dawnay), judging from his speeches at the time, was an advocate of that course; at all events, the hon. Gentleman was not very much opposed to it. Well, therefore, they had the evidence of that well-known character, John Dunn, that the state of Zululand at that period was not as peaceable as his hon. Friend the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland) had represented. Her Majesty's Government thought it proper to restore Cetewayo. Those of them who recommended that course might be twitted for having given such advice, inasmuch as it had failed; but, in the first place, he ought to say the course the Government took was not altogether the course he and others recommended. The restoration of Cetewayo was done in a half-hearted manner. Cetewayo was only restored to a portion of his Kingdom. Though, no doubt, Her Majesty's Government thought he ought to be very grateful for what they had done, Cetewayo and others thought he had not received full justice; and, therefore, there was a misunderstanding in that respect. Again, although Her Majesty's Government sent back Cetewayo in accordance with their own policy, that policy was very strongly disapproved of by the Government of Natal. The Government of Natal, as a matter of fact, took a very different view to that taken by Her Majesty's Government; and he asked anyone what was the chance of the policy being successful, when it was carried out by an agent who utterly disapproved of the views of his superiors? What chance was there of the success of the policy, when Sir Henry Bulwer, who was the agent appointed to carry it out, disapproved of it? He did not mean to say that that distinguished man would not do his best to carry out the orders of the Government; but still they knew that when a man had to carry out a policy which he considered was foredoomed to failure, that policy was sure to be carried out in a half-hearted sort of way; all sorts of difficulties were sure to be raised; and it seemed to him (Mr. R. N. Fowler) that, under such circumstances, the policy of Her Majesty's Government, which was urged upon them by Members on both sides of the House, never had a chance of success. If the Government wished their policy to succeed, they had only one course to pursue, and that was to promote Sir Henry Bulwer to some other Colony, and place in Natal a Governor who was prepared to carry out their views. He would remind the Committee that the position of things at Natal had altered very considerably of late; there was a great alteration in the condition of things at Natal in the beginning of 1882. Her Majesty's Government at that time proposed to revert to the old system, by which Natal was administered by a Lieutenant Governor, subordinate to the Governor at the Cape. When Lord Kimberley had appointed a gentleman to take the place of Lieutenant Governor, under Sir Hercules Robinson, Natal raised considerable opposition. Her Majesty's Government altered their plans, and appointed Sir Henry Bulwer as full Governor. Whether that proceeding had answered was open to question. A point had been made about the disturbance before Cetewayo's return, and it had also been said that Cetewayo promoted disturbances amongst the other tribes. The Bishop of Natal (the late Dr. Colenso), however, in a letter, had said—

"At the present moment there is no evidence that Cetewayo has had anything to do with these disturbances; they seem to be the outcome of Sir Henry Bulwer's Settlement."

He quoted this extract to show that it was just possible that Cetewayo was not open to the charges brought against him by the hon. Baronet (Sir Henry Holland). He did not quite understand what his hon. Friend's (Mr. Guy Dawnay's) view was as to the Motion he submitted to the Committee. He thought it was as well they should have a discussion on this very important question, and for that reason he was glad his hon. Friend had initiated the debate; but, at the same time, he did not quite understand what was the exact question they were to decide by a division. As he had already said, the policy of Her Majesty's Government had failed; and he (Mr. R. N. Fowler) was as much responsible as a private Member could be for the adoption of that policy. If his hon. Friend meant, by proposing to reduce the Vote, to censure the Government for the restoration of Cetewayo, he (Mr. R. N. Fowler) certainly could not support him; but would be obliged to go into the Lobby against him. He did not well see what could be the use of dividing on a question of this kind; certainly, if his hon. Friend did go to a division, he ought to tell the Committee more clearly than he had yet done what his object was.

said, he did not propose to follow the Lord Mayor (Mr. R. N. Fowler) into the question of the restoration of Cetewayo, because be thought, in the short space of time they had at their disposal, they ought to direct their attention specially to the future; he did not think they need go at all into the past. If he were to venture upon a discussion of what had taken place, he certainly should condemn the late Government; and he was not quite sure also that he would not have something condemnatory to say about the present Government. But that was not the point. They were placed in circumstances of great difficulty, occasioning great anxiety; and the real question was, what was to be our policy. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bath (Mr. Wodehouse) had made a speech, in which he advocated what might be called the Imperial spread-eagle policy. The hon. Gentleman had said that we must have a substantial and real Suzerain power over the whole of South Africa. What did he mean? Did he consider that two-thirds of the White inhabitants of South Africa were Dutch, and that the remaining population, for the most part, consisted of various African tribes? Did he remember that British Imperialism was represented by a comparatively small number of Colonists, and by the red coats of the British Army; and did he wish the Committee to understand that the policy he was prepared to recommend to Her Majesty's Government was that that small handful of British Colonists should be backed up by all the force of the British Army, in order to compel the Natives to submit to the Imperial Suzerainty of England? Did the hon. Member propose that? because, if so, he was only proposing what had been tried again and again, and the consequence of which had been that we had caused bloodshed and misery over many parts of Africa. We had entailed upon the British taxpayer large burdens, that had gone on increasing from year to year, and for which they had actually nothing to show. He recollected reading, some years ago, a book by Anthony Trollope, in which the writer commented upon the fact that, when he was in Natal, he saw very few Whites who did not wear red coats. It struck Mr. Anthony Trollope that these red coats were doing the work of the Natal Colonists, but were not paid by the Natal Colonists, but by the British taxpayer at home; and he said he could not help fancying that he saw each of these red coats being carried on the back of the struggling operatives of Lancashire. And so it was with these Colonies. He (Mr. Rylands) knew precisely what the motive of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the North Riding (Mr. Guy Dawnay) and his hon. Friends was. What they wanted was that we should take an active part in Zululand; that we should stand all the burden; and that the Natal Government should have any advantage that might arise from our endeavours and exertions. Were the Natal Government prepared to pay for any operations that might be undertaken? No; they would not pay the miserable amount that was now owing to us, and we had a number of soldiers in Natal, for whom they did not pay anything at all. Why should we protect these Colonies if they would not do anything to protect themselves? Hon. Gentlemen argued that it was important we should take care that all the tribes who were fighting with one another should be bound over to keep the peace. How bound over to keep the peace? Were we to occupy that enormous territory by our soldiery; were we to decide between the tribes; and were we to use our power to crush any portion of the Natives we thought were doing wrong? We had done all that before; and he ventured to say that, whenever we had intervened amongst the Natives—no doubt we had done so with the best motives—we had produced evils that had been absolutely greater than those we sought to suppress. Hon. Gentlemen who had been accustomed to read South African Blue Books, as he had for several years, could not fail to have noticed the sameness in the story. They might take up a Blue Book published 10 years ago, and, while probably they would not be familiar with the names of the Chiefs and, it might be, the districts of South Africa there mentioned, they would find that the course of events was so similar, one time with another, that they might say that the whole history of South Africa ran upon the same line. There were constantly men, on the verge of civilization, who oppressed the Blacks. These men were all of the same character; they had few scruples; they were men, perhaps, of enormous energy, and of little fear; they pressed upon the Blacks, and by-and-bye there was a larger range of the disputes; certain Chiefs took one side, and some the other; the White men allied themselves to some or other of the Chiefs; and so gradually the White men were involved in the conflict. The Chiefs were sometimes loyal, and sometimes not; they were barbarians, and were influenced at the moment by what they thought would promote their special interest. Such was the course of South African events. But of all the schemes he had heard of for the settlement of South African affairs, the scheme of the hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland) was the most untenable. What was the hon. Baronet's scheme? Why, that we should take possession of Zululand to that extent that we must become actually the Suzerain Power, and get rid of the Boers. But how were we to get rid of the Boers? By buying them off! Now, he thought that was about the most unwise suggestion that could possibly be made. His hon. Friend (Sir Henry Holland) actually said that the British Government were to go to the Boers, who had invaded a certain portion of Zululand, and out of the taxes of this country buy them off. He (Mr. Rylands) thought that that would not only be an unwise policy, but that it would be a policy which would altogether fail. His hon. Friend also suggested that we should go to the Boer Government, and say to them—"We will give up our charge against you—that is, the debt you owe to us—on condition that you pledge yourselves to leave the country." Why, if we did do that, and the Boers consented to those terms, in five years' time there would be a new race of Boers ready to enter the district. It was really no use attempting impossibilities, whether it was from the Imperial sentiments of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Bath, or the Natal sentiments of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire, or the philanthropic sentiments of some of his (Mr. Rylands's) Friends; it would be useless to adopt the suggestions which had been made. He feared that hon. Gentlemen would drag us into a policy that past history had proved to be a bloody and wicked policy. It was impossible to interfere in these things from a philanthropic point of view. We could not interfere in these affairs with any good effect; and he would recommend to the Government that they should, as far as possible, narrow their obligations with regard to South Africa. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bath had admitted that the new Ministers at Cape Colony were obliged to rest for a certain amount of support upon the Dutch element. It was an undoubted fact that the Government of the Cape Colony must always rest upon the Dutch element to a great extent. He (Mr. Rylands) well recollected that at the time the question between the Transvaal and ourselves was to the fore, he was told by a very high authority from the Cape whom he happened to meet—it was the Speaker of the House of Assembly of the Cape of Good Hope—that if the Government pressed on their views with regard to the Transvaal, that which appeared so simple a thing in the beginning would develop into a very large and difficult question, and he feared that the Free State would be dragged in in the first place, and that subsequently there would be dragged in the sympathy of the entire Dutch population of the Cape, who would feel it was their duty to prevent any action of the British Government as against their brethren in the Transvaal. He (Mr. Rylands) considered that if the Government of the Cape, representing, as it did, a large Dutch element, chose in any way to sympathize with the action upon its borders, we had no right to step in with our Imperial authority, in order to put a stop to that action. We ought not to allow the Natal Government to drag us, at our own cost, into their quarrels; if we did, the only effect would be that more mischief than good would be done, and many lives sacrificed.

said, it was refreshing, in discussing the very thorny and difficult question of South Africa, to encounter a speech like that of his hon. Friend the Member for the North Riding of York shire (Mr. Guy Dawnay), couched, as it was, in such eloquent terms, and showing that there was, at least, one hon. Gentleman with no doubt or hesitation as to what was the right course to pursue. He (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) must confess he was not in the happy position of the hon. Gentleman, and he was consoled to see that his hon. Friend the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland), tempered as he was by official experience, was more moderate and more hesitating than the Mover of the Amendment. He fully appreciated the earnestness of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the North Riding; but he was bound to say the hon. Gentleman failed to make any practical suggestion for the solution of the difficulty. The hon. Gentleman certainly suggested that we should annex Zululand; but this the present and also the late Government had persistently refused to do. Anybody who took up the map of Zululand would see that if the proposal of the hon. Gentleman were adopted, there would be nothing left of Zululand proper, except a very small strip of territory. Briefly, he would say to the hon. Member that the annexation of Zululand was what Her Majesty's Government had declined, and what they still declined to do. In their opinion, the proposal of the hon. Gentleman would be tantamount to the annexation of Zululand. Let him come to the more detailed, and, he might say, the more plausible suggestion of the hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland); and he must ask the Committee to allow him, very shortly, to follow the hon. Baronet in what he had said. It was necessary to do so, although he respectfully protested against the question being again raised in the House as to the rights or the wrongs of the restoration of Cetewayo. He ventured to submit that that belonged to ancient history, although it was legitimate in the course of argument for the hon. Baronet to point out that that restoration had caused this or that evil, and had involved this or that responsibility. The hon. Baronet had done more than that, for he had dis- cussed at length the advisability or the non-advisability, under the circumstances then existing, of the restoration of Cetewayo. He (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) was not prepared to follow the hon. Baronet into the details of that question, inasmuch as he did not expect that the question would be started to-day; furthermore, he was not prepared to follow the hon. Baronet in detail as to his statement that, at the time of Cute wayo's restoration, Zululand was in a state of tranquillity and quiet. He could have armed himself with passages from the Blue Books to prove the contrary if he had expected that the hon. Baronet would have raised the point.

said, he was sure the hon. Gentleman did not wish to misrepresent what he had said. He did not say that Zululand was in a state of tranquillity and quiet at the time of Cetewayo's restoration; but that it was in a fairly peaceful condition until it was rumoured in the country that there was a probability of Cetewayo being restored.

said, he thoroughly understood the hon. Baronet to mean that the rumours of Cetewayo's restoration, which were subsequently fulfilled, were the cause of the disturbances that existed in Zululand. As he had said, he was not prepared to answer the hon. Baronet's allegations in detail, although he was sure he could have brought sufficient evidence to show that his assertions were not correct, had he known that the question would be raised. The right hon. Gentleman the Lord Mayor of London (Mr. R. N. Fowler), who took considerable interest in the restoration of Cetewayo at the time, had told them that, in his opinion, Zululand was in a very unsatisfactory state at the time the King was restored; and the hon. Baronet himself delivered a speech in the House in April, 1882, in which he said—

"He would admit it to be probable that the arrangement made at the conclusion of the war had not worked in an altogether satisfactory manner, and that acts of bloodshed and cruelty had been perpetrated."—(3 Hansard, [268] 778.)

He quite agreed with the hon. Baronet, who, in the passage quoted, acknowledged that Zululand was not in a satisfactory condition at that time. It was not in open revolt, because of the very uncertainty as to whether Cetewayo would return or not; but if it had become certain that Cetewayo would not be restored, it was very probable that the people would have broken out very much in the same way as they had done at present. Her Majesty's Government finding it was universally acknowledged that the Settlement was an unsatisfactory one, there were only two alternatives before them; and if the hon. Baronet would look at the Papers, and the information laid before the House at the time, he would easily see what those alternatives were. One alternative was the restoration of Cetewayo; and the other alternative was annexation. The hon. Baronet said just now, very accurately, that the fault of Sir Garnet Wolseley's Settlement was the want of a paramount authority. He (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) quite agreed with the hon. Baronet; but how was that paramount authority to be supplied? It could only be supplied by the restoration of Cetewayo, or by the substitution of the paramount authority of this country. The hon. Baronet, speaking in the House of Commons in 1882, said—

"If the state of things described continued, it would undoubtedly be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to interfere and put an end to it—by deposing those Chiefs who behaved in this outrageous manner; by strengthening the hands of the British Resident; and by appointing, if necessary, more Residents and Magistrates."— (Ibid.)

But to appoint more Residents and magistrates was virtually to annex the country; and he (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) would, in a short time, when they approached the question as to the present condition of the Reserve, show that we were, in spite of ourselves, approaching very rapidly the condition where its annexation might become necessary. Well, then, as he had said before, the Government had before them, by universal consent, only two alternatives, and they chose the alternative which he believed the nation thought the wiser—namely, that of restoring Cetewayo, and creating a permanent Native power, in preference to annexing Zululand and making British rule permanent. It was said that the restoration of Cetewayo was a mistake, and he did not deny that it had failed to restore peace and order to Zululand; but he confessed, at the same time, that it was a far happier solution of the question that Cetewayo should have returned to his own country and fallen, as he had done, a victim to his own impetuosity, than that he should have died a captive in our hands. We had, at all events, escaped the obloquy that would have attached to his dying in captivity. But had the Settlement failed by any fault of the English Government, or was it a Settlement manifestly foredoomed to failure, and a Settlement that no set of reasonably wise men would have proposed? He maintained that it was not a Settlement that had failed owing to the action of the British Government, and that it was not an experiment absolutely foredoomed to fail. The hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst told them that he condemned the Zulu War, and always had done so; and in his speech on the 17th of April he said that Cetewayo never broke his pledges, but constantly sought the assistance and advice of the Lieutenant Governor of Natal and of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and almost always acted upon the advice they gave.[Sir HENRY HOLLAND: That was before he was deposed.] Yes; but they should judge of a man's character by his antecedents. Such was the character given Cetewayo by the hon. Baronet himself. It was naturally supposed that his captivity, instead of destroying those good qualities, would have strengthened them. It was the belief of the Government that Cetewayo was capable of taking the good advice offered to him; and he (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) asserted that Cetewayo would have succeeded after his restoration, if it was not that he took the advice of people who pretended to be his friends, but who were not so far-seeing as they ought to have been. He spoke of people whom he would not name, both in this country and in Natal, who seemed, in the case of Cetewayo, to have raked up the old doctrine of the divine right of Kings, and who thought that Cetewayo had a right to rule over Zululand, the whole of Zululand, and nothing but Zululand. They told Cetewayo that he ought to be restored to the whole of his territory, that its reduction was wrong, that the establishment of the Reserve was unjust, and that if he only exerted himself sufficiently many friends in this country and elsewhere would assist him in regaining the whole of his old Kingdom. He (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) maintained that it was this advice which led Cetewayo astray. If it had not been for these voices, which Cetewayo mistook for the voices of more important people, he would have been content with the territory over which he was placed. But while he said that the Government had no reason to suppose that the experiment they were going to make was foredoomed to failure, he owned it did fail; it failed entirely by the spontaneous action of Cetewayo himself. Usibebu was left in the North-Eastern corner of Zululand, for a very good and practical reason, and people dealing with public affairs must take a practical view of them. The practical reason in this case was, that Usibebu had so esconced himself in his position, that he could not be removed without the use of considerable force. The Government, therefore, recognized Usibebu. But the fact was, that Cetewayo was not only misled by officious friends and others; the savage nature of the Zulus also came to the fore, and the people were bent upon revenge. It was a most singular thing that not one of the speakers that day, who had dealt with the question of the invasion of the freebooters, had pointed out what was the turning point of the matter, when it was considered from the Government's point of view. The turning point really was that the Boers had come there at the pressing invitation of the inhabitants of Zululand themselves. It was not an invasion, in the strict sense of the term, although he very much believed that the Zulu people would suffer just as much as if it had been an invasion. The Boers received a deliberate invitation, and the majority of the Zulu people living in the centre of Zululand distinctly made up their minds that revenge was sweeter than land, and that they would part with their land, in order to buy the assistance of those who would revenge them on their enemy Usibebu. That was the secret of the whole matter. It was perfectly true that a Government like that of the Transvaal was responsible, to a great extent, for what happened on its frontier; but let him remind hon. Members what were the qualities of the people who engaged in these feuds. We talked about the frontier, but there was no frontier to them; they were a floating population, and were on one side of the frontier on one day, and on the other side the next day, ready to fight wherever profit led the way. What he wanted to point out to hon. Gentleman was, that though we had called on the Transvaal Government to use their authority to prevent the violation of their frontier, and the Transvaal Government had acknowledged their duty in that respect, and had put out proclamations strongly forbidding any violation of the frontier, it must be remembered that the freebooters were not a class of men over whom a Government like the Transvaal Government, which was not well established, and had no abundant means of repressing disorder, could exercise any great control. Well, then, he maintained that the Zulus had, by reason of their own spontaneous action, caused the incursion of Boers. We were, therefore, to a very great extent, absolved from protecting them in any way from the evils which they had so deliberately brought upon themselves. It had been said by some hon. Members to-night that when the death of Cetewayo occurred, we ought to have put the Natives in the position in which Cetewayo's restoration found them—that was to say, that upon the death of Cetewayo, we ought to have endeavoured to reestablish the Settlement of Sir Garnet Wolseley. Whether we ought to have done so or not he would not delay the Committee by arguing; but he would point out that the Government had very little time allowed them by the Zulus to exercise any moral influence, or any guidance, or give any advice, or send any messenger or Commissioner, if they had been disposed to do so. The moment the breath was out of Cetewayo's body, preparations were made to declare his successor. While these preparations were going on, the Usutus proceeded to perform certain rites of burial over Cetewayo, and then proceeded to attack Usibebu without any delay, calling on the Boers to assist them in their attack. There was an account given by Mr. Grant, who was the spokesman of the Usutu Party, which, if he could only lay his hands on it, he should be very glad to read to the Committee, because, on many occasions, the matter had been dealt with as a case in which this country was coercing the Usutus, in consequence of their presence in the Reserve, and most abominably injuring a lamblike and civilized race. Mr. Grant was himself an advocate of the Usutu Party. He (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) could not lay his hand on Mr. Grant's statement; but he could recollect what it was. It would be included in the Papers which would be laid on the Table of the House in the course of a few days. Mr. Grant described the funeral rites of the Zulus, and said it was their habit, directly their King was buried, to go and "wash their spears," as a religious rite, in the blood, usually, of some neighbouring and defenceless tribe; but, as there was no defenceless tribe in this case, they performed the right by attacking Usibebu. So that the attack by the Usutus was a part of the burial ceremonial of Cetewayo. He did not wish to delay the Committee by going at any greater length into this matter. He had brought the case down to this point—that Cetewayo having died, Her Majesty's Government were allowed no time to exercise any moral influence, or give any advice for the settlement of Zulu affairs, for the reason that the Usutus, who were the majority of the Zulu race, at once, contemporaneously with the death of Cetewayo, plunged into an attack upon Usibebu, and called upon the Boers to assist them. This was all very deplorable, and he regretted it in the extreme; and he should like to ask hon. Gentlemen opposite to say at what point they would have had the British Government interfere? Did they mean to say that the British Government should have sent a body of troops to take the side of Usibebu? He admitted that his sympathies were on the side of Usibebu, who had shown himself a good tactician and a gallant man, and had proved himself the friend of England; but why were they to send troops to attack him, and to take part in a civil war taking place in Zululand? He could not follow that; and, short of annexation, he did not see that the Government could have done anything to prevent the state of things brought about by the ferocious spirit and general lack of civilization of the Zulu people, coupled with what the defects in the character of Cetewayo had brought into existence. The question now was, what were the Government to do in the future; and, what had the Government announced as their policy? Well, they had, first of all, declared that the Reserve Territory should be defended and maintained in good order; and he might tell the Committee that there was at that moment a very considerable body of British troops in the Reserve, ready to guard it against attacks from outside. In the Papers which would be laid on the Table of the House in the course of a few days, hon. Members would find recorded the attacks which had been made by the Usutu Party upon certain loyal Chiefs in the Reserve. They would see the means taken by the British Resident to put a stop to these attacks and violations of peace; and they would see that at present, owing to the energetic steps which had been taken, matters wore a much more peaceful and orderly aspect than they had some time ago. The hon. Member who had opened the discussion had made some reference to the defeat of Mr. Osborn, the British Resident. [Mr. Guy DAWNAY: No; to the attack on him.] He thought the hon. Member had implied that Mr. Osborn had been defeated; but, at any rate, the matter was not very important. He did not know what were the arguments which the hon. Member drew from the attack, except that the Reserve was not maintained in that state of order in which it ought to be. He could only say that the attack was made upon Mr. Osborn most unexpectedly, and was the first sign of the real activity of the rebellious element in the Reserve. When Mr. Osborn knew that this rebellious spirit existed he retired some distance, and communicated with the Governor of Natal and the Officer in command of the Forces, who took such steps as succeeded in absolutely coercing and overcoming the disturbing elements in the Reserve. The hon. Member, therefore, might take it for granted that when the House had these things brought before it, it would see that nothing had been wanting on the part of the Government to vindicate the position and authority of England within the Reserve. That policy would be continued in the future. But he would point out to those hon. Members who talked about extending the Reserve, that the question would become one of incorporating surrounding land. We had a considerable body of troops in the Reserve, and very likely they would have to be retained for some time; and he demurred entirely to the statement of the hon. Member for Midhurst, that if the principle of the Reserve had been extended over a very large part of Zululand, they could have acted without any large body of troops.

said, he had not advocated the extension of the Reserve, but a development of the system of Residents, as advocated by Sir Henry Bulwer—the substitution of the guiding authority of Residents for the present system.

said, that would have involved much larger measures, both civil and military, than the Government had thought it expedient to adopt. The Papers which would be laid on the Table of the House very shortly would, he believed, show that as far as the Reserve was concerned the Government had done what they ought to do. As to the Transvaal Border, the Government were still considering whether, under the provisions of the Convention, they should appoint a Resident on the Border or not. Of course, the matter was more difficult and complicated now than it was a short time ago, owing to the action of the Zulus. ["Oh, oh!"] No less an authority than Sir Hercules Robinson had told them that, in the present state of things, the matter was much more difficult to deal with than it was a short time ago. With regard to what was said a little earlier as to calling on the Transvaal Government to appoint a Resident, what he had stated the other day was, that it would be premature to do that at the present moment, for the reason that the Convention had not been ratified by the Volksraad. It would be better to wait to see if the Convention was ratified. When he said that things were now more complicated than they were a short time ago, some hon. Gentlemen opposite had chuckled. His point was, that what had complicated matters during the last three or four months was the action of the Zulus themselves. The Zulus would have followed the same line of conduct, whether a Resident had been on the Transvaal Border or not. They would have sacrificed everything to their desire for revenge against Usibebu. He wished, before concluding, to allude to the speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Wodehouse). That hon. Member, in very eloquent language and largely-extended views, had told them that they must everywhere, and at once, assert the Suzerainty of England in South Africa, if they wanted to maintain the supremacy of this country in that quarter of the globe. He would only say one word on the point, and that was, that the future of British rule and influence in South Africa depended a great deal more, in his humble opinion, upon the action of the Anglo-Saxons, as individuals and communities, than on the action of the Imperial Government. They must remember the very curious circumstances of the South African Colonies. They could not have it repeated too often—because it was the key to the whole of our difficulties in that part of the world—that though, in common language, these Colonies were called "British," yet the British-speaking and British-educated Colonists were in a distinct minority. Not only at the Cape, but in Natal itself, at least half, or more, were Dutch. But he would point out something still more peculiar—namely, that this distinction of race and language was coincident with the distinct condition and pursuits, and, therefore, with the aims and aspirations, of the Colonists, because the British-speaking part of the population would be found almost entirely in the towns, carrying on trades; whilst the Dutch and Africander races would be found in the country districts, carrying on the pursuit of farming. All the crucial, perpetual difficulties in South Africa were owing to the coming together of these different races, holding diametrically opposite views, not only from their habits, but also from their interests. They had, on the one hand, the British element, desiring to see the Native races prosper, and increase, and live in safety, in order that they might carry on trade with them; and, on the other hand, they had the Dutch element, the land seekers and landowners, desiring to see the Native races more or less swept out of the way, in order that they might enter into possession of their land. They had these two elements constantly at variance. Which of the two was to succeed in the long run? He ventured to say that the future of that country must depend upon the British people, quite apart from the Imperial Government. He confessed he deprecated any rivalry of races; but the facts were there, and were not to be got rid of by simply ignoring them. If the emigration from these shores to the shores of South Africa was large, and if the enterprize and perseverance of the Anglo-Saxon race continued to be what it was, then the future was with us; and, in that case, he ventured to prophesy that the Mother Country, what-ever Government might be in power, would not be backward in protecting and maintaining the elements of British influence there. But if emigration from the Mother Country was small, if enterprize fell off, and if the Colonists in South Africa were disposed to look too much—as they were very often—not to their own exertions for the prosperity of the Colony, but to the expenditure of Imperial money, to deliver them from the stagnation of trade; if the men of the Africander and Dutch races increased in numbers and power, while the others remained stationary or declining, it would only be a mistake on the part of the Imperial Government to try to bolster up what would be a dying interest. He was only speaking his own opinion in these matters; but it seemed to him that to engage in such expeditions as had often been advocated by hon. Members of the House into countries which had not yet been occupied by a civilized race, which were far removed from the centres of population—partly abandoning countries not yet peopled for the purpose—expeditions, whether over the Zulu border, the Zwasi border, or the Amatonga border, would entail unfortunate and useless responsibilities, and would not really and truly tend to what hon. Members desired, and what he himself certainly desired—namely, the extension and maintenance of the British name in South Africa. No; let them consolidate what they had got. Let them consider every question put before them which required the acceptance of new responsibilities in South Africa as forming a part of a whole question, and not as new and separate questions. He had no doubt it was perfectly easy to prove that if Zululand were the only place in which we had responsibilities, actual or accruing, it would be an infinitely better thing for Zululand, for Natal, and for this country, that Zululand should be annexed. But that was not the fact. It was necessary to convince men who were responsible for the whole of the Empire, and who had the same call coming from a thousand different places—from New Guinea, Basutoland, Walfisch Bay, Bechuanaland, and elsewhere—that the responsibility ought to be assumed. He ventured to submit that Her Majesty's Government were, no doubt, as Successors of a former Government, responsible for the disturbed state of Zululand; and, before he sat down, he would just answer what had fallen from the hon. Member who made the Motion they were discussing with regard to their saying nothing more as to the heritage of the Zulu War. He could only answer the hon. Member as he had answered a Conservative Friend of his, who had said—" I am sick of hearing you all talk of the heritage left by the late Government." He had replied—"My dear Sir, you are not half so sick of hearing of it as I am of dealing with it." That was the feeling of the Colonial Office on this matter. There was a responsibility imposed on Her Majesty's Government by the heritage of the Zulu War, and the affairs of Cetewayo and the Zulu people; and, he imagined, they had done the best they could, short of taking the step they had declined to take in the past, and must still decline to take in the future—namely, the annexation of Zululand to the Empire.

We have been told, from authoritative sources, that the policy of the Tory Party, at the present moment, is to force an appeal to the people. Certainly, no stronger argument in favour of such an appeal could have been well adduced than the appearance of the House of Commons ever since half-past 12 this afternoon; because, although this is a matter of first-class Imperial importance, as everyone will admit, and although it is a question in which the Liberal Party are supposed, as a whole, to be animated by the strongest and most ardent views—they, in particular, posing as the champions of aboriginal races, and as the friends of nationality—there has not, to my knowledge, since the debate began, been an attendance of 20 Liberal Members in the House. I think if that is the state of the House, at a period of the Session not too far advanced for an important discussion on a matter of Imperial concern—if you cannot get 20 Liberal Members to give the Government the assistance of their counsels—it is not a bad argument in favour of the construction of a new House of Commons, and an appeal to the people. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) has made a speech of some length and immense pretensions. He appeared to me to imagine that he was, for the moment, filling the place of the Prime Minister, and to be making as good an imitation as he could of the manner, the great eloquence, and the variety of expression which that right hon. Gentleman usually exhibits. The object of the hon. Gentleman was excellent, but the performance fell very short of the object. His whole tone appeared to be extremely didactic, but the substance of the speech was extremely feeble. The hon. Gentleman seemed to me to have been studying recently some child's "Guide to South Africa," and to have detailed from it some elementary information about the geography of that country to the House of Commons. There were one or two points in his address which deserve brief notice. In the first place, he freely admitted the total failure of the policy of the Government with regard to Cetewayo. Well, Sir, I do not know what state of mind other hon. Members may be in, but, for my own part, I am getting extremely tired of these confessions of total failure. We have never yet discussed the question of South Africa without the Government admitting that their policy has been "a total failure." Their policy with respect to the Transvaal, Bechuanaland, Basuto-land, and now Zululand, has been admitted by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade and the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies to be a total failure. Five or six times in succession—as regularly as these subjects come before us—it is notified by the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies or by the President of the Board of Trade, at the Table, that the policy of the Government has totally failed. But it is not only on these subjects that the House has had to listen to these confessions of failure. The House has listened to the confession of the total failure of the Government's Irish land legislation, and of their Egyptian policy, before now. For the sake of variety, to say nothing of the credit of the Government, if only once in a way, I could wish they had been able to announce some slight success. The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies was extremely frank, and said—"I admit that our policy with regard to the restoration of Cetewayo was a total failure; but it was not a failure which was foredoomed, or which any reasonable man could antici- pate. The failure was entirely owing to the Liberal Party, and," he said, "especially the advanced wing of the Liberal Party." ["No, no!"] Yes; those were his words, and that was the only interpretation any man of sense could place upon his observations. The hon. Gentleman said the restoration of Cetewayo would have been gloriously successful, and that Cetewayo would have been at this moment King of Zululand, if it had not been for the bad advice given to him by the Liberal Party, especially the advanced wing of the Liberal Party. So far, indeed, is this a cause of failure, that it seems to me to be one—to use a French expression—which "jumps to the eye." You might be certain that the advice given from such a quarter to the King of a historic race would be one that would necessarily lead him to his ruin. The hon. Gentleman used the words—"The policy of restoring Cetewayo was, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, inaugurating a reign of peace;" but, a little farther on, he proceeded to say—"I do not deny that the present condition of Zululand is wretched in the extreme." Now, when we have Ministers getting up at the Table and making statements of that kind, what are we to conclude, except that the whole Colonial policy of Her Majesty's Government is defective, from beginning to end? The restoration of Cetewayo was the subject of a debate in this House some two years ago, and, fortunately, by the kindness of some unknown friend, I have come across an article on Zululand in a highly respectable journal—a journal whose views, I think, on ecclesiastical doctrines, will recommend themselves to the Prime Minister—I mean The Guardian. In this article an expression used by the Prime Minister was quoted—an expression of immense value at this moment. When the policy of Her Majesty's Government in restoring Cetewayo was under consideration, it was said—

"The subject was brought forward two years ago, and the Prime Minister was kind enough to express sympathy with the Monarch in his adversity; but he said that it must be remembered that the peace and welfare of the country ought to be the dominant consideration; and he went on to remark that Cetewayo's release, unless desired by the great body of the Zulu people, would be a new cause of political disturbance and of the extensive shedding of blood. And he said, further, that a restoration bereft of such result would be no relief to the responsi- bility we had already incurred; on the contrary, he thought there would be a very serious addition to that responsibility."

Well, Sir, the Prime Minister, having stated that Cetewayo's release would be likely to produce extensive shedding of blood, shortly after consented to that restoration, and we are now told by the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies that that was a policy which no reasonable man could see was foredoomed to fail. Then the Prime Minister states that the restoration of Cetewayo, if effected, would greatly increase the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government. [Mr. GLAD-STONE: Unless desired.] The article says—

"And he said, further, that a restoration bereft of such result would be no relief to the responsibility we had already incurred; on the contrary, he thought there would be very serious addition to that responsibility."

How do they meet that responsibility? The condition of Zululand is wretched in the extreme, and the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies gets up and states that the policy of Her Majesty's Government will never, under any circumstances and conditions, be a policy which can lead to any extension of British authority in Zululand. I submit to the House that there is a total, obvious, and complete contradiction between what the Prime Minister said two years ago, and what the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies has said to-night. I do not think it at all possible to acquit Her Majesty's Government of carelessness in respect to the carrying out of their policy, because how was Cetewayo restored? He was restored to a small and most barren and unproductive portion of his territory. The British Government took away from him an enormous slice of Zululand, which they called "the Reserve," and gave another slice to Usibebu, and then they expected that this Monarch, who had been dethroned, and had lost his prestige before-hand by being defeated by the British Forces, would be able to assert himself as King of Zululand. They expected this of him, although they had sent him back in that degraded and humiliated and diminished way. I venture to say that if the restoration had been carried out in a larger and broader manner, there is no reason to suppose it would have failed; but the means the Government took to carry out their policy were the means that foredoomed it to fail. Before I leave the speech of the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies I should like to notice one more argument. He said, in the lengthy peroration with which he concluded his remarks, that he regretted to say there were some hon. Members on his own side who were anxious that British Sovereignty should be asserted in South Africa. We know that there are opinions of that kind—heretical, sadly heretical opinions—amongst some Members of the Liberal Party. Only yesterday, some Members of the Liberal Party, under the presidency of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), met for the purpose of advocating a very large extension of British Sovereignty and Imperial rule, and I imagine the Under Secretary of State must have had that meeting in his mind when he spoke so bitterly of people who wished British Sovereignty to be asserted in South Africa. But what was the reason he gave against British Sovereignty being asserted in South Africa? Why, it was that the British Colonists were in a minority. That was the convincing reason why British Sovereignty, instead of being asserted, should rather be withdrawn. Apply that argument to India. How would your British Sovereignty succeed in India if, because you are in a minority, it must not be asserted? Apply the argument, again, to Ireland. How many "British-speaking" and "British-educated" subjects are there in Ireland who are in favour of British Sovereignty? They are in a minority; and I think, therefore, that the great theory of Colonial and Imperial policy, which the Under Secretary of State has laid down, though it may be accepted in his own Department, is one which it will be very useful and advantageous for us, his political opponents, to develop before the enlightened constituencies of the country. I venture to think that in all these matters there are two things which Her Majesty's Government ought to consider, and one thing that they ought not to consider; and the one thing they ought not to consider they have considered, while the two things they ought to have considered they have not given a thought to. In the first place, they ought to consider the interests of the Colony of Natal; and, secondly—and only secondary to that—they ought to consider the interests of Zululand. What they need not consider—the parties whose interests they need not consider are the Boers. Those who have absolutely no claim or title for one moment to their consideration are the Boers and the Boer Republic, for whom they have, up to now, sacrificed almost every shred of their dignity. The whole of our difficulties in South Africa—our modern difficulties, for I decline altogether to go back to what occurred under the late Government, that being, if you like, ancient history—the whole of the difficulties which the Committee is considering, spring from the surrender to the Transvaal Boers which took place in 1881—that utterly disgraceful and cowardly surrender of a British Army, nearly 10,000 strong, admirably equipped, with one of our best Generals at its head, before a parcel of undrilled, plundering, freebooting Boers, whom they could easily have swept from off the face of the earth. That is the origin of all these difficulties. All along the Government has been frightened of these Transvaal Boers. I took down the expression of the Under Secretary of State—"Under the last Convention the Government have a right to appoint a Commissioner-Resident upon the frontier of Zululand and Boerland. But," says the hon. Gentleman, "we cannot appoint a Resident now, because the Zulus"—he ought to have said the Usutus—"have invited the Boers into Zululand; and, that being the case, we can no longer proceed—in fact, we dare not proceed—to put in force an important Article of the Convention just concluded." Therefore, I am right in my statement that, in all these matters, the Government are actuated by fear of the Boers. It seems ridiculous to say it; but you can hardly doubt the truth of it when Her Majesty's Government, with a great Army in the field which could, by no possibility, have been checked, first of all begged for a Convention, and concluded one which was repudiated and broken in every Article by the Boers, then begged for another, and concluded that also—the Boers sending over Ambassadors to negociate it—and when you find the Under Secretary of State now getting up and saying—"We dare not, under the circumstances, appoint a Resident to carry out the Article of the Convention." What is the state of things existing in Zululand? Why the same state of things which existed in Bechuanaland. You have the freebooting Boers there, and you know that the result of their operations in Bechuanaland was that a large part of the country was cut off and handed to them, and that there existed there any amount of slaughter, disturbance, and disorder, and plundering, cruelty, and misery of every kind. The same condition of things is coming about in Zululand, under the eyes of the House of Commons. The Boers, in spite of their Treaty with you, invade the country. How can it be expected that the quibble, the colourable statement, by the Under Secretary of State, that they were invited there, will satisfy the House of Commons? The Guardian says—

"By the help of some hundreds of these Boers the loyal Chief Usibebu, made independent by us, has been attacked with great slaughter and driven from his territory."

And it goes on to say that hundreds of thousands of acres have been taken, and are in process of being taken away, from the Native races who are ruined. I do not think that is a bit too strong. What I want to point out to the House of Commons is this—that the same state of things, which the House of Commons felt so deeply about Bechuanaland last year—and which, but for their great respect for the Prime Minister and the great hold he, personally, had upon them, his own Party would have censured—is coming about in Zululand. It is absolutely impossible that the statement of the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies can satisfy this House. You said you would not undertake the protection of Basutoland. You have been obliged to protect it. You said you would not undertake the protection of Bechuanaland; but that is now under the protection of the British Crown; and so it will be with Zululand. At least, if Her Majesty's Government will not recognize their responsibilities in South Africa, the country will place other persons in their place who will do so.

I will only detain the Committee a short time; and I should not rise at all to take part in the debate, if I did not feel that the speeches we have heard to-day have regard quite as much to the principle on which the action of Her Ma- jesty's Government should be based as to the actual measures which have been proposed, and that some remarks have been made which I could hardly hear without rising to protest against. My hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Wodehouse) made a speech, which I was very sorry there were not more hon. Members present to hear—a speech evidently of great thought, and, as it seemed to me, of remarkable ability, as well as power. He was followed by my hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), who attributed to him and his speech views which he entirely disowned. The hon. Gentleman attributed to the hon. Member for Bath the advocacy of spread-eagle Imperialism. I cannot accept that definition of my hon. Friend's speech; for what I understood my hon. Friend to be advocating was, that where we incurred responsibilities, we should fulfil them; and if we were not prepared to take that line, I understood him to say we had better creep out of the country as soon as possible; and I think he is quite right. My hon. Friend the Member for Burnley evidently thinks it due to the taxpayers of this country, that matters in Zululand should be left alone, and left to take care of themselves, and that we should see that no money is spent on the place, and that no troops, under any circumstances, are sent out there. Well, the whole meaning of that policy is, that we should withdraw from South Africa altogether. If we are to remain in Zululand at all, we must bear in mind the responsibilities we have undertaken. It is said that it is a mere question of pounds, shillings, and pence. if that is the case, we may meet our difficulties there at the present moment by a comparatively small expenditure; whereas, if we wait until these difficulties have increased, we shall have to incur a great and an unknown expenditure. Let us keep to the particular matter before us. I am not going to say a word about past history, or, as my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) calls it, the ancient history of the subject, except in so far as it bears upon our actual position in Zululand at the present moment, and upon the responsibilities which we have undertaken there. I, like many others, was opposed to the original Zulu War, but it was undertaken. The Zulus were defeated, and the King of Zululand was deposed. We did not feel at that time that, in destroying the only recognized Government of that country, we had divested ourselves of all responsibility for the future of the country; and certainly the English Government did not then attempt to take that line, and, had they done so, the people of England would have protested against their action. Whether wisely or unwisely, an arrangement was then entered into with 12 or 13 of the Native Chiefs. The arrangement was open to a great deal of objection. There were grave doubts as to bow far peace and order could be maintained; but the arrangement, upon the whole, worked quite as well as could have been expected, and, perhaps, rather better. Then came the restoration of Cetewayo, and that was a matter upon which I do not agree with many of my hon. Friends with whom I generally act in these matters. I agreed with what fell upon the subject from the Prime Minister—as quoted by the noble Lord—"that we had to consider the peace and welfare of the country." I had grave doubts whether any Chief—above all, any savage Chief—who had been deposed, could be sent back to rule the country with any great chance of peace, especially after the English Government had entered into an arrangement with these 13 Kinglets, under which they had parcelled out the country among them, but which was set aside on the restoration of Cetewayo. It was impossible for Cetewayo to be restored, without infringing on this arrangement. Therefore, I think the arrangement was foredoomed to great difficulty, though, perhaps, not necessarily to failure. It could not be expected that these 13 Kinglets, or any number of them, would willingly subject themselves to the rule of this man whom we sent out. What has been the result of such a policy? I do not want to throw blame upon either the present or the past Government. The Zulu question is difficult and complicated beyond measure, and I think anyone would be most unreasonable who complained of the present or even the past Government, and did not sympathize with their difficulties. What are the actual circumstances of the case? We have to deal with this country, which is in a state of disturbance and disorder owing to our action—a state of disorder for which we are responsible. In consequence of our having set aside our own arrangement, the country is in a state of warfare and bloodshed, and for that state of things we are in some measure, certainly, responsible. It has been remarked that the Zulus have dreadful customs, such as washing their spears in each other's blood. So they have, undoubtedly; but they appear to have washed their spears in rather a more bloody manner within the last two or three years than they did before. How can we regard such a state of things, which has been brought about by our own action, and say, with any degree of self-respect or without shame, that, having got the Zulus into this state, we will leave them to kill one another off in order to save ourselves from further trouble? I do not think that we can safely leave matters there. When the hon. Member spoke about the future of Zululand, I confess, if he will allow me, good-naturedly, to say so, what he told us about the future was very little indeed. His plan for the future appeared to be limited to the protection of the Reserve Territory—which is absolutely necessary. No one would think for a moment about not protecting it. His plan, however, appears to be limited to the protection of the Reserve, and the production of some fresh Papers. I do not think he gives us an idea as to how we are to deal with these difficult circumstances. Difficult, however, as they are, the Government will have to deal with them, and to feel that they have some responsibility for the warfare that is going on in Zululand, and that it is their duty to try and see how it can be stopped. I believe it will be found, in the long run, that duty and expediency go together, and that the fulfilment of our responsibilities is, after all, the most economical course. As regards the actual matter, what is likely to happen? In consequence of having left this country entirely to itself, after having, by our arms and by our arrangements, utterly disorganized it, freebooting adventurers are coming over from both borders—not only from the Transvaal, but also from Natal—and fermenting disorders, and the opinion of those in South Africa best fitted to judge is that the danger will not be confined to Zululand, but will spread to Natal itself. The instant that danger is realized, economy will be no longer considered, and we shall send over a Force which will probably cost 10 or 100 times the sum for which Lord Derby is informed the whole difficulty can now be settled. I must acknowledge that I am not sufficiently acquainted with the subject to take upon myself to recommend to Her Majesty's Government the adoption of any particular course; but I am convinced of this, that, whatever be the difficulties, the Government cannot rest contented with merely protecting the Reserve Territory, but must feel that it is their duty to try and restore that peace and order which we, by our arms first, and then by our diplomacy, and next, and lastly, by our change in that diplomacy, disturbed.

I think the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. W. E. Forster), in the speech that he has just made, and to which we have attentively listened, has merely emphasized the difficulties which have been brought into view in the course of this debate; and his observations go to show that there are only two alternative policies which can be adopted by this country in reference to Zululand. In the first place, there is the policy which has been adopted and defended by Her Majesty's Government—that of interfering as little as possible with the internal affairs of Zululand. We have come to the decision to abstain from all such interferences, and to accept the policy of our Predecessors, so far as to refuse any proposal in any shape or form for the annexation of the country. That policy has been condemned as strongly as possible by the hon. Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Guy Dawnay). The hon. Member made us a very eloquent and very interesting speech at the commencement of this discussion, and the only criticism that I shall make upon it is to say that it was too emphatic, and rather too full of superlatives. The hon. Member described our policy as "ghastly," "vile," "infamous," "consummate folly," "murderous," and as "dictated by fear of the scoundrelly and infamous Boers." I admire very much his command of invective and adjectives; but I followed with still greater interest his subsequent remarks, in which he proposed an alternative policy for our acceptance. I find that the hon. Member was in favour of what is called "expansion of the Empire." He was in favour of a policy which practically would amount to the annexation of the whole of Zululand—of a policy which would have entailed the annexation of the Transvaal. If I were to imitate the style of the hon. Member, I should be entitled to say that that would be a blundering policy, a plundering policy, a policy of pickpockets, filibusters, and brigands. At all events, without developing the argument any further in the style of the hon. Member, I would say that, while I am prepared to accept the statement just made by my right hon. Friend (Mr. W. E. Forster), that this country is bound to fulfil the responsibilities which it has undertaken, I am also of opinion that it is bound to look all round to see whether it has not responsibilities at home as well as in these distant places, and to inquire whether it would be wise and judicious to undertake new responsibilities from which so little advantage can possibly be expected to result to anyone. Well, Sir, I think the House listened with some amusement to the rather extraordinary speech of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill). The noble Lord commenced his observations by referring to the state of the House when he was addressing it, as a proof of the lack of interest taken in the question. I do not think there is any lack of interest in it, either on the Liberal or Conservative side; but I think, perhaps, it is rather natural, at this late period of the Session, and when the House has been sitting until 3, 4, or 5 o'clock in the morning on previous nights, that no very large attendance should be brought down on a Wednesday afternoon to listen to a discussion that is understood to be somewhat hollow in its character, and, above all, to listen to the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock, when—to use an expression of his own—"careering" about a subject with which he has the smallest possible amount of practical acquaintance. The noble Lord says that I and my hon. Friend (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) on this and on previous occasions have admitted the failure of their policy. I confess I do not plead guilty to ever having made any such admission, and I certainly have not heard such admission made by the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies. What my hon. Friend really did say was, that the state of Zululand was not, at the pre- sent time, entirely satisfactory. It would hardly be expected that the policy of the Government, or of anyone else, could secure a perfectly satisfactory state of Zululand in the course of a few months. The state of Zululand is now very much what it has been ever since the country was disturbed by the policy of the late Government, and by the policy of the Zulu War. From that time down to the present day, the state of Zululand has been unsatisfactory. All that can be said of us is, that our policy of non-intervention has not resulted in a satisfactory state of things. The noble Lord went on to say that the condition of affairs in Zululand was owing to Cetewayo having been left with a miserably small portion of territory when he was restored. The noble Lord is perfectly aware that two-thirds of the whole territory ruled over by Cetewayo was restored to him. [Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: No, no!] That is perfectly true, as the noble Lord will see if he will study the map on a large scale. The fact is, that if the whole of the country was not restored to him, it was because we took the view which has been put before the Committee by the right hon. Member for Bradford, that having come under obligations to the Kinglets, by reason of Sir Garnet Wolseley's Settlement, we did not think it right to hand them over, against their will, to the restored Chief. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford made a statement, in which he followed, I think, the hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland). .He said that, after all, the arrangement with Sir Garnet Wolseley for setting up these Chieftians was working satisfactorily, when the restoration of Cetewayo was contemplated by the Government. Nothing could be further from the truth than that statement. In this House, on the occasion of the last debate, there was not a single Member who did not admit that the state of the country was wholly unsatisfactory; that the Settlement made by the late Government, or by Sir Garnet Wolseley, under their instructions, had absolutely and entirely failed. In order to be quite certain about this, let me ask the Committee to listen to two quotations giving an account of the state of the country before the restoration of Cetewayo. The first, which I take from the Blue Books, is this—

"The relations between Ohamu and his too powerful subject Umnyamana, which were, from the first, unfriendly, became this year strained almost to the point of war. Ohamu was also defied by the tribe of the Amaquilisi, living in the north of his territory, who, no doubt, acted under the influence of Umnyamana. The authority of Usibebu, another of our 13 nominees, was persistently resisted by Undabuku and Usiwetu, two of Cetewayo's brothers. Umlandela, another of our nominees, was driven out of his territory by Sitimela, a grandson of Dingewayo, Chaka's Predecessor; and Sitimela, who perhaps aspired to reunite Zululand under his own rule, was joined by Somkeli, himself one of the nominated Chiefs. Three other selected Chiefs, Chingwayo, Seketwayo, and Unfanawenahlela, reported at different times that they were being opposed by their people, whom they could not control—the reason being apparently in some cases that they had been imitating the tyrannies which popular belief ascribes to Cetewayo."

In fact, according to this statement, and to other statements which will be found in the Blue Books, there was hardly a single portion of the territory that was not, at the time of the restoration of Cetewayo, the scene of tumult, disorder, and massacre. In April, 1882, speaking in the debate on Zululand in this House, the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), I think, quoted a passage from a letter dated October 27th, written by the Rev. R. Robertson, in Zululand. The hon. Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Guy Dawnay) has told us that the policy of Her Majesty's Government had led to inter-tribal slaughter, which exceeded anything ever known since Zululand was annexed. I beg to call attention to this statement by Mr. Robertson, who is one of the missionaries in Zululand—

"You have heard, no doubt, of the recent slaughter of the Abagulusi. I am told it was greater than that of Isandlana. I fear there will be more yet. In fact, I am expecting every day to hear that the Usutu (Cetewayo's own tribe) have broken out. Their patience has been severely tried, and it needs just a little more provocation to bring about another crash. Maduna is strong enough to make mincemeat of Hamu and Zibebu any day. What he will end in doing, I know not."—(3 Hansard, [268] 766.)

What is the date of the letter?

October 27th, 1881.

What I said was, that the greatest slaughter ever known in Zululand had been during the last 18 months.

My object is absolutely to deny the statement of the hon. Member. I say that the disturbances previous to the restoration of Cetewayo were quite as serious as any that have since occurred. And let me say that, although Sir Henry Bulwer has been referred to several times as being opposed to the restoration of Cetewayo, his opposition was based, as his despatches show, entirely on the fear that, if Cetewayo was restored, the military power of the Zulus would be recreated, and great danger would arise in consequence to Natal. He admitted that the state of Zululand could not continue as it was previous to the restoration of Cetewayo, and he put before the Government in effect two alternatives. He said—

"Either you must consent to exercise paramount authority over the thirteen Chiefs, or you must endeavour to carry out the policy you prefer and restore some kind of Native authority."

Her Majesty's Government declined, without due consideration, to accept the suggestion of Sir Henry Bulwer to assume paramount British authority in Zululand, because they were convinced by all past experience—and subsequent experience has shown that they were right—that the creation of this British authority in Zululand would necessarily result in the practical annexation of the country. But having decided against that policy, then I think it was impossible to avoid the conclusion that, at all events, the restoration of Cetewayo was an experiment that ought to be tried. If the Zulu War was, as is admitted by the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Henry Holland), so unjust and so unnecessary, then common justice required that Cetewayo should be restored, as far, at least, as was consistent with the engagements into which we had entered with the other Chiefs. But there is another reason—the reason of policy. Cetewayo's name, was, at all events, the most powerful name in Zululand, and the probabilities were more in favour of a peaceful settlement of the country under his leadership, than under the leadership of any ether single Chief; and I entirely agree in what has been said by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley), that if he had been well advised, in all probability that Settlement might have been a lasting and satisfactory one. The proposals now made to us vary very much. The proposal of the hon. Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire is that we should extend the Reserve Territory to the Black Umvolosi. That would practically be to assume absolute control over two-thirds of Zululand. The proposal of the hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst, although a little more specious, comes to practically the same result—that is, that we should exercise paramount authority over the country by means of British Residents and Magistrates. But who is to enforce that authority? It is absurd to tell us that the Zulu people would welcome these gentlemen among them. We know, from all past experience, that friction would inevitably arise, and then we should be called upon to defend the authority of the servants of the Crown by a British Army, and when we heard of bloodshed, we should be told that we were responsible for it. But suppose we adopted the plan of establishing authority on the Black Umvolosi, or extended the Reserve up to that line, there would still be Natives beyond that frontier, and Boers outside it. There would still be freebooters, and all the difficulties we have had we should be called upon to encounter still further away. What we have done has been to reserve the least possible amount of territory under our control which, in our opinion, was consistent with our obligations to those Chiefs who were unwilling to accept the rule of Cetewayo. We have reserved the territory of John Dunn, and have allowed fugitives from other parts of the country to come in and find security within that Reserve. The formation of this Reserve border is a protection to Natal. Either the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) or the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) declared that the result of the Government policy had been to create danger to the Colony of Natal; but, as a matter of fact, on the contrary, a band of neutral and protected territory has been interposed been Natal and the country of the Zulus. Then there only remains the question of what responsibility falls upon this Bench with reference to the territory which is beyond the Reserve—the territory inhabited by the Basutos. The position there is truly and entirely due to those from whom we have inherited it. I agree with the opinion expressed by Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner. He is the best authority on such a subject; and while, as he says, he is reluctant to offer advice upon a matter which is not within his High Commissionership, he gives this opinion—

"I think it right to say that, in my opinion, we shall be spared future complications and questions if we define without further delay the precise limits of our obligations in relation to the Reserve Territory. Nothing short of a Protectorate over the whole of Zululand, supported by force, can prevent the eventual occupation by the Boers of a large portion North of the Reserve. I confess I do not see that we are bound to incur grave trouble and expense to save those outside the Reserve from the consequences of their own folly and misconduct."

Now, that is exactly the state of the case. The condition of affairs North of the Reserve is due to the folly and misconduct of the Chiefs in that part of the country. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Randolph Churchill) says it was a rotten pretext to pretend that an invitation was sent by the Basutos to the Boers; but there is most distinct evidence of invitations addressed to the Boers, probably by both parties, and certainly by the Basuto Party, and there is no doubt that portions of land have been awarded to these fortune-hunters. That is the commonest thing in South Africa. There is never a tribal conflict in which the Chiefs do not get the Whites in their neighbourhood on their side. Usibebu himself, who is now suffering from the interference of the Whites, had previously received assistance from the Whites against Cetewayo. Under these circumstances, it would be monstrous that we should involve the English taxpayer and the English people in responsibilities in order to prevent a state of things brought about by no fault of our own, and for which we are not in the slightest degree responsible. I will go further, and say that I am certain that we could not bring about a state of things which would offer a better chance of the settlement of this matter than the present system. Disturbances there must be, after such a war as that which destroyed and broke the power of the Zulu Chiefs; but it is absolutely untrue to say, as the hon. Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire said, that the rule of the Boers over the Natives has been brutal and tyrannical. The proof is, that the Native population in the Transvaal has increased enormously and multiplied many-fold by the voluntary migration of the Natives into the Transvaal.

I never said anything of the sort.

I should be sorry to misrepresent the hon. Member; but when he comes to read the report of his speech, he will find it was one of his contentions that we ought not to leave the country to the incursions of the Boer freebooters, because they were people of a low and barbarous civilization who had brutally ill-treated the Natives.

; I entirely agree in that; but I never said it to-day. The right hon. Gentleman is putting into my mouth words which I never used.

I am sorry to misrepresent the hon. Member. Will he state what he did say?

The only expressions I used in reference to the Boers were applied to the Boer freebooters; those I called "infamous" and "scandalous." I never said a word about their ill-treating the Natives in the Transvaal.

I can assure the hon. Member that he does injustice to his own graces of oratory. He used, I think, many words equally abusive, and I am certain he will find that he did accuse the Boers of having ill-treated the population under their rule. But it is not necessary that I should say more about that, because I understand that the hon. Member admits that, if he did not say that to-day, he did say it on a previous occasion. Whenever he did say that, he was entirely mistaken as to the facts of the case. So far from the rule of the Boers being brutal and barbarous towards the Natives, it must be a very much better rule than the Natives have been accustomed to; otherwise, they would not have migrated in these enormous numbers into the Transvaal Territory. Although I do not pretend to say that the government of the Transvaal State is to be compared with the European civilization, I have no doubt it is an immense improvement on anything to which the Natives have been accustomed; and even if the result of this should be that the Boers acquire some footing in Zululand, I am not certain that that will constitute any disadvantage to the Natives, and certainly it will not cause any danger to British rule in South Africa. At any rate, it is a problem much too doubtful for us to undertake the responsibility urged upon us by the hon. Member; and, under no circumstances at present, can we indefinitely extend British rule in this part of South Africa, for such an extension would involve enormous additional responsibilities, and entail very serious fresh demands on the treasure and resources of this country.

Sir, I do not feel myself competent to decide the question between the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down (Mr. Chamberlain) and my hon. Friend the Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Guy Dawnay). Although I heard a considerable part of my hon. Friend's very spirited speech, I did not happen to hear the portion which has given rise to so much controversy. It is quite clear, at all events, that between the opinion which my hon. Friend entertains of the Boers, and that which Her Majesty's Government, as represented by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, hold, there is a very considerable difference, and a large amount of latitude. I am not going to trouble the Committee with a discussion of the question as to the precise mode in which the Boers have been in the habit of treating the Natives of this country. If they really deserve all the commendations which have been bestowed upon them by the right hon. Gentleman, I must say our position is very much more simple, and much less difficult, than I supposed; but I fear the general impression under which we have laboured for a long time is very different from that rather rose-coloured view which the right hon. Gentleman has taken. What I wish to call attention to is the barrenness and meagreness of the statements on the part of the Government with regard to the policy they have pursued. Whatever may be said about the past history of the Zulu question, and whatever charges may be made on the one side or the other with regard to particular events, there is no doubt that the matter has now come to that position in which we are, as a nation, deeply responsible for the condition of that country; and it is important that we should really have some assurance on the part of the Government that they are pursuing a policy which is likely to be for the benefit and safety both of our own Colony of Natal and of the Zulu people, in whom we have, or ought to have, great interest, and for whom we ought to entertain a sense of responsibility to a great extent. As far as I can gather, the policy of Her Majesty's Government was summed up by the right hon. Gentleman when he said it was their intention to interfere as little as possible with the internal affairs of the country. Accepting those words literally, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that we ought to interfere as little as possible with the internal affairs of Zululand; but we have to take into consideration, and in connection with those affairs, the admission of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) that we have responsibilities which we cannot get rid of, and that it is our duty, and part of the policy of the Government, to protect the Reserve Territory. If you have to protect the Reserve Territory, then you have to consider in what manner that it is to be done. It is all very well to say, as the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) said, that these are matters which will involve great questions and very great responsibilities on the part of this country. If you are to accept the view of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade in regard to the character of the Boers, and if you are to carry out the views of the hon. Member for Burnley, I suppose we might solve the whole question by retiring from the country and leaving everything to take its chance. But if we are not to leave things to take their chance, if we are to recognize certain responsibilities, and if we are to make ourselves responsible for the protection of the Reserve Territory, then it becomes a serious question whether we have such a policy as will reduce this responsibility to a minimum, and enable us to discharge the duties which devolve upon us in a manner which shall be the simplest, the easiest, and the best; and, therefore, it is a question, not whether we ought to interfere, but on what lines we ought to fulfil the duties which we acknowledge. My hon. Friend the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland), in the very temperate and able speech which he made this afternoon, and which I am sorry there were so few Members present to hear, laid down on broad lines, and, of course, avoiding questions of detail, what he considered to be the right policy to pursue—and that was to the effect that we ought to fall back on the lines of the Settlement of 1879; that we ought to take that for our main guidance, but in connection with that we ought to establish a Resident and Sub-Residents who should have certain powers with regard to the affairs of the Transvaal. But my hon. Friend said he would not interfere with the details of local government, and that his view was that we should hold a meeting of Chiefs; that those Chiefs should be in communication with us, and should establish the lines of a home policy which they would pursue, and to them should be left the administration of the country which belongs to them. It was not my hon. Friend's proposal—it was, as far as possible, from his intention—that we should accept or claim for ourselves anything approaching to annexation or a Protectorate. His object was that we should insure and guarantee to those Chiefs the right to administer their own affairs, and that we should maintain ourselves in a position which would give us authority, and enable us to settle questions that might arise. These questions are of two classes—questions which will arise among the Zulus themselves—quarrels among themselves, and disputes between the tribes; and then you have the difficulties that may arise between the tribes of the Zulus as a whole, and the Boers, their neighbours. Now, with respect to both the one and the other of these classes, I do not venture so much as to give my own opinion; I am rather speaking of what I understand to be the opinion of my hon. Friend, who is so well qualified to speak on these matters; and his opinion is, that you would prevent a great deal of difficulty from arising—which difficulty, if you do not prevent it, will arise sooner or later, and put you to much greater expense than you would otherwise incur—by being wise and firm in time. That is really the whole of the contention between, I will not say the two sides of the House, because there are several hon. Gentlemen on that—the opposite—side of the House, who take the same view, and who have expressed it extremely well, such as the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Wodehouse) and the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), who have indicated that these are their opinions. Those are the two views of the subject, and I venture to think the experience we have had so far is decidedly in favour of that general policy advocated by my hon. Friend behind me (Sir Henry Holland), rather than that which is now indicated by Her Majesty's Government; and when we talk about these questions of the restoration of Cetewayo and other matters, we talk about them in order to show that, in the policy which Her Majesty's Government have carried out since they have had charge of this business, they have not been successful. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade was very angry with my noble Friend (Lord Randolph Churchill) for saying that their policy had failed, or that they had admitted that it had failed. The right hon. Gentleman said he had never said that it had failed; only that it had not succeeded. That, of course, is a distinction, and, no doubt, it is one satisfactory to the mind of the right hon. Gentleman; but what we want to point out is, that this policy which has not succeeded was a policy which was not very likely to succeed. At all events, it was undertaken only, as the right hon. Gentleman had said, as an experiment. It was an experiment which the Government may have been justified in trying; but it was an experiment which, when they tried it, certainly ended with a considerable amount of non-success; and it is to be remembered that when that policy was under the consideration of the Government, and before it was adopted, the Prime Minister himself pointed out to the House, as a reason for being slow in adopting such a suggestion, that if we did so, and the policy was not successful, the Government and the country would have incurred a large addition to their responsibilities. That is so. They adopted that policy, and they have incurred that additional responsibility, I will not say through any blameable motives, they were doing that which they considered was, on the whole, the best thing to do; but, undoubtedly; they did incur that additional responsibility; they did disturb and destroy the system which had been established but a very short time before, and which there was every prospect they might have maintained and improved. ["No, no!"] We say that this is the view we take, and my hon. Friend the Member for Midhurst brings forward the evidence upon which he supports his contention. I am not saying that everything before was perfect, or that when you began to talk of the restoration of Cetewayo, and of unsettling all that had been settled before, that then disturbances would arise; but I am speaking of a time when it was thought that that Settlement was to be maintained; and I think the evidence which my hon. Friend brings forward, as to the numbers of people returning to the country which they had left, seems to me to show very strongly that you were disturbing that which had considerable elements of hope in it, and that you were disturbing that new state of things, the result of which must have been felt to be very doubtful. That was the result at the time; but now we have very clear before us that the result was bad, and no longer doubtful. The result was the introduction of more troubles, more quarrels, and more bloodshed; and all that must be borne in mind in the presence of a further element in the question—namely, the settlement of the question with the Boers. It was not only the question of inter-tribal disturbances in Zululand; it was the encouragement given thereby to the Boer population in the neighbourhood to advance themselves into that country, to disturb the position of the inhabitants, and no doubt to cause a great deal of mischief which we, in our position, had no longer the means to stop or nip in the bud. My hon. Friend (Sir Henry Holland) sees the weakness of the position, as it stood under Sir Garnet Wolseley's Settlement. He sees that something more was required, and he suggested that that something might have been supplied in a manner which would not have involved annexation or a Protectorate, but would have put us in a position which would have enabled us to deal quickly and firmly with the domestic inter-tribal difficulties, and at the same time give us a position in which we could check the incursions and the depredations of the Boers. That is, I take it, the position of the case, and this discussion has been raised for the purpose of expressing dissatisfaction on the part of my hon. Friend (Sir Henry Holland) and others, with the course which matters have taken under the recent administration of the Government—of expressing our dissatisfaction and our uneasiness at the position of affairs there, and to endeavour to obtain, what I am afraid we have not yet obtained from the Government—namely, some more satisfactory statement of the policy which it is their intention to pursue than we have yet been favoured with.

Sir, I do not feel in all respects dissatisfied with the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down (Sir Stafford North-cote). I own myself to have been very considerably alarmed by the high-sounding doctrines of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill); but nothing could be more remarkable, and nothing could offer a more glaring contrast, than the difference between his opinions on this subject, and those of the right hon. Baronet opposite who has just spoken. The whole sense of the noble Lord's speech was annexation and more annexation.

No; I beg pardon, it was not.

The noble Lord says "No." Very well; then I will go a little further into detail. I am not speaking of the noble Lord's words; but I am putting my own construction upon his speech, and as he questions my construction, I want to know what he meant when he said that the restoration of Cetewayo would have succeeded if it had been undertaken on a larger basis, and in a bolder manner?

I meant if you had given back the whole of the country.

Exactly so; so much for the basis; and now what is the bolder manner? To support Cetewayo by force, no doubt. To give him back the whole country—that is the cool recommendation of the noble Lord; but what had happened? We had made a Settlement in 1879. We had set up 13 Kinglets in Zululand. None of those men, so far as I recollect, had been guilty of any breach of faith to us. We had established them, and put authority into their hands. A large number of the people were I think, as was clearly shown to our satisfaction at the time, desirous of the return of Cetewayo; but a portion of them were determinedly opposed to the restoration; and these were the Kinglets whom we had set up, and who had committed no fault against us. The noble Lord says we ought to have deposed them, putting back Cetewayo in their place. That is the manner in which the noble Lord thinks a peaceable restoration might have taken place. That would have been a most gross breach of faith, which it was impossible for us to entertain for a moment, on the part of the Government. The noble Lord adopts a method of proceeding which really involves an assumption by us of authority over Zululand, and, if I understand him rightly, of authority over South Africa in general. That is what I understand the noble Lord to intend.

I did not say so.

I am aware of that, and I am not using the noble Lord's own words; I am simply using every effort to construe what the noble Lord said; and, as I understood his high-sounding words as to the extension of British authority, I understood him to mean that the extension of British authority ought to be exercised over the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, in one form or another. It is in that view that I say the noble Lord is in glaring contrast to the right hon. Baronet. Now, I wish to come to the closing remarks of the right hon. Baronet. He says this debate has been raised for a certain purpose; and I agree with him that it has been raised for a very proper purpose. It was quite right that, in a matter of this kind, an opportunity should be taken before the close of the Session to discuss the difficulties of our position in Zululand; but the right hon. Gentleman says that the Settlement which was set up in 1879 was working in a tolerable manner; that there was something to be desired which ought to be supplied; but that, on the whole, the Settlement was not unsatisfactory, and our fault was that we did not endeavour to improve it. Now, the right hon. Gentleman, I conclude, was not present in this House on April 17th, 1882, when that subject was discussed for a whole evening; for if he had been present, or if he had read that debate, he would have been aware of that which is evidently at present totally unknown to him—namely, that while we debated that subject through an entire evening, while the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) made a very able speech, exhibiting the deplorable condition of, and the almost prevalence of bloodshed and anarchy in Zululand, not only did the Government find themselves obliged to concur substantially with his statements, but there was not a single speaker that evening—I believe I am correct in saying that—who rose while the subject was fully discussed, from all quarters of the House, to maintain that the Settlement of 1879 was in any degree tolerable. That was the state of things in 1882; and permit me to say that when the subject has been debated in that way, as it was in this House—not as a Party question, but with great ability and impartiality from all quarters of the House—it is idle in 1884 to overlook and ignore entirely what was then admitted and demonstrated, and to speak of that state of things as a state of things upon which we ought to have fallen back. I am not prepared to agree to that. The right hon. Gentleman thinks matters are worse now than they were then. That is not my opinion, for what have we to consider? We have to consider two things—first of all, the anarchy and bloodshed in Zululand; and, secondly, the question of danger to the Colony of Natal. With regard to the latter point, I am prepared to contend that that danger has been wholly removed, because a neutral fringe of territory has been interposed between Natal and the disturbed parts of Zululand, where British authority is effectively maintained, where peace prevails, and which serves to hold off Natal from the different parts of Zululand. Therefore, as to that important part of the case, and as to the fact that a large piece of Zululand—about one-fourth or one-third, I believe—is in a peaceful condition, much has been attained, though certainly with an increase—I do not deny it—of British responsibility, an increase which it was absolutely necessary for us in honour to agree to, because we could not for a moment think of the restoration of Cetewayo to the prejudice of those Chiefs who objected to the restoration, and for whom we were bound to find a refuge in what is now known as the Reserve Territory. We adopted the restoration of Cetewayo, not as a measure that was certain to succeed, but as a measure the most hopeful of any before us. In the state of things then existing, it was absolutely necessary for us to find a remedy; and that was the remedy which appeared to offer the least amount of responsibility with the greatest amount of compromise. I am not prepared to admit that a great addition of responsibility has fallen upon us in consequence of the failure of that plan as a remedy. What we said in 1882 was, that if we restored Cetewayo without obtaining, in the first place, competent and sufficient evidence that his return was desired by a large proportion of the masses of the people, then, indeed, we should incur a great responsibility; but that evidence we did obtain; and I have no reason to believe that even now there was an untrue impression of the state of things then conveyed to our minds. I will not now go back to that part of the matter, because the important part of the question is that which is before us. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) has, with great prudence, stated that he holds that we ought to discharge all the responsibilities we have undertaken, and that no benefit is to be gained by shrinking from that duty. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman in that view; but our responsibilities, although they should be acknowledged, ought not to be exaggerated, and, above all things, new responsibilities ought not to be assumed in a hurry, and without sufficient consideration. What, then, is the question before us, as defined by the right hon. Baronet? He says there are two plans. I say there are three, because, unquestionably, a large and distinct portion of the debate has tended in the direction of annexation of territory not now ours; but that is put aside so far as the right hon. Gentleman is concerned. He condemns that policy, as we did; but he says that the hon. Baronet behind him (Sir Henry Holland) has recommended a return to the system of 1879; but the system of 1879, if I remember rightly, was a system under which no authority was assumed over the Chiefs. They were entirely independent; whereas, as I understand the recommendation of the right hon. Baronet it is that some authority should be assumed over the Chiefs in the Settlement which he recommends. My hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) has contended—and we contend—that if you assume partial authority over these Chiefs, that can only end in becoming a complete authority, and, consequently, in amounting to an equivalent of the annexation which has been recommended as the measure to be at once adopted. At any rate, that is not a return to the system of 1879. There is in that no recommendation of a return to the system of 1879. The system of 1879 was essentially different, inasmuch as it fully recognized the independence of the Chiefs, and only offered them any friendly aid, in the way of good offices, that our Resident might be able to give them.

I did not suggest that. I suggested, very diffidently, a return to the system of 1879—that is to say, the government of the Natives by the Native Chiefs, under Native laws; but that the system of 1879 should be so extended that we should exercise a more direct and guiding authority by Residents and Deputy Residents.

The hon. Baronet spoke in subdued tones; but how that is to be done is a most important part of the plan. The hon. Baronet says he made the suggestion diffidently. I have no doubt—nay, I am sure he did, because he is a man of sense and experience; and all those who know South Africa will be apt to make recommendations with considerable diffidence; but one point is this. We do not see how the assertion of authority by us over these Chiefs can possibly end in anything except the establishment of a virtual supremacy. You were very liberal in your system. I do not question that. I am sure that was the intention of the hon. Baronet; but we are not prepared to establish in these portions of Zululand beyond the Reserve a British supremacy, which we feel must amount virtually to that annexation which is disclaimed by us, disclaimed by the late Government, and disclaimed by the hon. Baronet in his speech to-day. I do not, on the other hand, say we wash our hands of all duty whatever with regard to Zululand beyond the Reserve. A friendly interest we should, in any case, feel towards it. The ciroumstances—the unhappy circumstances—under which it was broken up at a former time undoubtedly leave us in a condition in which it is impossible to say we look upon that land as if it were a mere portion of Central Africa; but, at the same time, we are not in a position in which we have any other duty towards that country than this—of doing so far as we can what is best for that country. Now, we are not prepared to say that it is best for that country, or best for South Africa generally, that we should assume authority over it. If the time comes—and it may come—when we can be useful in promoting its peaceful settlement, I think it will be our duty to avail ourselves of such an opportunity; but what we disclaim, under all the circumstances now before us, or which we can anticipate, is the desire to establish British supremacy over that country. The noble Lord used, I think, strong language in his description of the inhabitants of the Transvaal; and the hon. Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Guy Dawnay) does not disclaim having used language which I think would have been exceedingly strong, even if applied to some country with which we were at war, and which I must take the liberty of saying was a great deal too strong for the present occasion. It was described by the right hon. Baronet as interesting; but, in my opinion, it was too strong, especially having regard to the fact that it was applied to people with whom we profess to be on friendly terms; and it is also unjust, in face of the fact that enormous multitudes of the Natives are living under the dominion and auspices of the Transvaal; and in face of the fact that we were content to go to the Cape of Good Hope, where these people had prior possession, and make it so uncomfortable for them that they migrated in large numbers. In face of the fact that we have had indisputable evidence that the Natives have migrated into the Transvaal, on account of the peace and good government they can enjoy there, I must say it is imprudent, impolitic, and hardly consistent with those terms of comity and decency which ought to prevail between people of one State and another, to describe these people in the superlative language used by the hon. Member for the North Riding. I feel that the time is ex- hausted, and that it would be wrong in me to enter into the details of the question, which have been so fully stated by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Chamberlain), and my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley). With their statements I am perfectly content. I am further contented and satisfied with the limited and cautious terms in which the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote) has expressed himself. I may point out to him that our object has been gained by the establishment of the Reserve; and as to the maintenance of British authority, he must be aware that it will be maintained there by the same means as those adopted in other places in case of need, and that there are, I believe, a force of nearly 1,000 men in the Reserve for that purpose. With regard to what is beyond it, I by no means say that that is a country which does not excite our interest; but we see no reason for violent interference in that country. In fact, the people themselves have chosen to invite Natives into the Transvaal to settle there in a peaceful manner, totally different from the proceedings of Bechuanaland; and we decline to be bound by a scheme of policy which we believe to be dangerous, impolitic, and not in conformity with any sound principle, even of morality, by extending British authority over that country.

said, the Prime Minister had rebuked him for having used strong terms with regard to people with whom we were on friendly terms. He denied that we were on friendly terms with these filibustering Boers; and it was to these filibustering Boers, and not to the inhabitants of the Transvaal, that he had referred. He had compared the action of the Boers in Zululand with the action which, so far as he could understand, the Government were allowing the Abyssinians to take with regard to the Soudan, and had said that their civilization was in the same rudimentary condition, and their Christianity in the same fossilized state. He denied that he had advocated a policy of annexation—unless the Government considered—which they said they did not—that the Reserve had been annexed—for he only desired an extension of the principle which applied to the Reserve to other parts of Zululand. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain) had declared that a policy of annexation was, to use the term borrowed from his (Mr. Guy Dawnay's) vocabulary, a policy of filibusters, brigands, and pickpockets; but if he (Mr. Guy Dawnay) had wished to brand such policy in the strongest term, he should not have employed any such feeble words from his own vocabulary, but should have denounced it instead in the right hon. Gentleman's own language as a policy of shipowners. He should ask the Committee to divide, and to express their opinion that the responsibility which the House and the country had incurred owing to the reversal of the policy of the late Government, and owing to the Convention with the Boers, especially with regard to the Articles in relation to the Border Tribes, would not be fulfilled merely by protecting the Zulus in the Reserved Territory in the future, after failing to do so in the past.

Question put.

The Committee divided: —Ayes 99; Noes 155: Majority 56.—(Div. List, No. 197.)

Original Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution to be reported To-morrow.

Committee to sit again To-morrow.