, in rising to move the following Amendment:—

"Humbly to pray Her Majesty to direct Her Ministers, in the interests of freedom and commerce, and for the security of Egypt, to efficiently support General Gordon in establishiug a stable and civilized Government at Khartoum,"

said: The debate on the Address has already occupied 10 days, and of this time not two clear days have been given to the consideration of Imperial questions. Five and a-half have been taken up with debate on the administration of Criminal Law in Ireland, against which consumption of time the Government have made no serious protest. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Oh!] It was only the night before last, on the fifth evening, that the Prime Minister objected to the prolongation of the debate; but that objection was a very perfunctory one. The fact is, the Government are too fearful of the Irish Party to oppose any serious resistance to them. One night has been given to the consideration of the all-important subject of trade, and this the President of the Board of Trade actually described as "a waste of time." One night was taken up by a debate upon the revolutionary incitements of the same Minister. Moreover, the Government now propose to monopolize every day, and thus render it necessary to debate Imperial questions upon the Address. With this explanation I hope no Radical organ will have the audacity or the unfairness to blame me for bringing forward the subject of this Amendment. The House was considerably surprised, and not a little amused, at the references of the Prime Minister on the first night of the Session to the Egyptian policy of the Government. Had our information been limited to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, we might well have concluded that little or nothing unsatisfactory had taken place in that country; that General Gordon and the Ministry were lost in admiration of each other; and that the costly Expedition of Relief which is now toiling its weary way towards Khartoum had been despatched at the right moment, with the utmost forethought, and without a day's hesitation or delay. What are the facts with regard to Her Majesty's present Ministers in Egypt? Their conduct of affairs in two years and a-quarter has cost Egypt and England 50,000 human lives. It has caused an expenditure to Egypt and to the British Empire of close on £10,000,000 a-piece. That enormous sum of £20,000,000 might just as well have been thrown into the deep sea for any benefit that any people, creature, or interest has derived from it. Neither England, nor Egypt, nor Europe, neither Fellaheen, nor Soudanese, nor British are any the better for this deplorable waste of resources and of human life. General Gordon has been cruelly deserted and left to the chance of fate during six perilous months. Our old ally of Constantinople has been alienated by the injustice and persecution of the present Government. Germany and Austria have been driven from us by the affronts and blunders of our Ministry. France, their boasted friend, for whom they sacrificed everything, has been turned into bitter hostility towards us. And, most remarkable Nemesis of all, the inventor of the Concert of Europe, now sees the nearest approach to that European combination directed against himself. Continental Europe has united in an act of vigorous protest against the financial repudiation which the advice of the British Cabinet has lately forced upon the Khedive. That protest has right on its side. For the first time in English history the name of this country has been associated with an act of public dishonesty. The Khedive has, by the advice of the Ministers of England, violated a solemn and International Treaty. The puppet of the British Cabinet has broken its formal and binding engagements with the Bondholders and with the States of Europe in order to find the means to meet the liabilities in which the blind and blundering policy of the same British Cabinet has involved Egypt. The £8,000,000 or more of extra Debt, which that country has incurred since July, 1882, are due to the mistakes of Her Majesty's present Ministers, and to them alone. £4,000,000 are owing to the Alexandria indemnities. That liability was incurred because the British Government neglected the dictates of common sense, and the warnings of those who knew Egypt, and refused to provide a landing force when Alexandria was bombarded. A little foresight and courage would have preserved the city, and ended the war then and there. The remaining £4,000,000 are due to the half-hearted and ever-shifting policy our Ministers have pursued with regard to the Soudan. The horrible sacrifice of human life, the 40,000 and 50,000 human souls that have been there untimely slain, the millions that have been sunk in that abyss might, for the greater part, have been saved, had the Indian Brigade been, as Sir Charles Wilson advised, sent to Khartoum after Tel-el-Kebir. All Europe knows these facts. Every Government, every organ of public opinion among the nations, has been crying shame upon the British Cabinet for the black scene of carnage and ruin that has overwhelmed Egyptian territory since their blasting touch fell upon that unfortunate country. When, in addition to the disastrous mismanagement in Egypt and the Soudan, the Khedive was directed to break his pledges, and violate the International compacts to which England also was a party, in order to pay for the losses that British policy had inflicted upon Egypt, there came a general and unanimous protest. Other Governments still deem the pledge of nations as sacred as the word of a gentleman, though Her Majesty's present Ministers hold the pledges of England at a very different estimate. But the details of the Prime Minister's statement are even more extraordinary than its general purport. The Government were long "silent with regard to General Gordon, because they had nothing to say." They had nothing to say because they were willing to do nothing; because, from the beginning of March to the end of August, they had not the courage to make up their minds to take any step in support or to relieve their gallant agent. According to the right hon. Gentleman, General Gordon is deeply grateful to the Cabinet for the aid they have given him. Was there ever such an astonishing perversion of the facts? Not on April 8, as the Prime Minister said, but on March 11, or barely three weeks after his arrival at Khartoum, before he had received an answer to his suggestions and advice, it was that General Gordon sent a formal message of thanks to Sir Evelyn Baring and Her Majesty's Ministers. There his gratitude abruptly stopped. Nor did he after that message of March 11, change his policy and recommend Zebehr, as the Prime Minister asserts. Seven weeks before April 8, the right hon. Gentleman's date, and three weeks before March 11, had General Gordon advised the despatch of Zebehr. From the 11th of March to this day the Prime Minister and his Colleagues have received from General Gordon nothing but indignant contempt and most richly-deserved reproaches for their shuffling, their desertion, and their unworthy suggestions that he should meanly abandon those whom he was sent out to save. On the 16th of April, General Gordon told the Government that henceforth he would act for himself—

"I leave to you," he added, "the indelible disgrace of abandoning the garrisons, with the certainty that you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi under greater difficulties."

That certainly every man of sense has long foreseen; and it is now at hand. In August once more, the veil that for five months concealed from our knowledge those most heroic struggles and the perils and sufferings of that terrible siege was lifted. For a moment the story of the terrible dangers, the daily assaults, the marvellous resources of that great spirit was unshrouded. Another message from Khartoum reached the Government. Again the biting words of truth come from the Christian hero, whom you have sent out unprotected to cope with—

"The tremendous dangers that affected the whole of Egypt, and countries beyond,"

and whose every warning you have treated with contempt.

"You are the cause of all the evils that have befallen Egypt;"

and—

"If the rebels kill the Egyptians their blood will be upon your heads."

The Conservative Party maintained, during the debates in April and May, that General Gordon was shut in by the Mahdi's hordes, and unable to leave Khartoum. It was, indeed, clear from all the intelligence that came from the Soudan, and especially from Mr. Power, that, owing to the neglect of the Ministry to notice any of General Gordon's warnings, the storm he predicted on March 1 had burst upon him, and that he was completely beleaguered in Khartoum. The Prime Minister deliberately took a contrary view in face of the clearest evidence. Thus he stated on April 3—

"General Gordon is under no constraint and under no order to remain in the Soudan. Neither is he under any inability to leave the Soudan at this moment."

A British officer sent out to rescue 60,000 human beings, under no constraint of honour or duty not to stand by those he went out to save! Now, we have in the latest Blue Books the fullest evidence that the Prime Minister was absolutely wrong, and that he had no evidence whatever in support of his statements. Thus, on July 31, Gordon writes emphatically—

"Reading over your telegram of the 5th May, 1884, you ask me to state cause and intention in staying at Khartoum, knowing Government means to abandon Soudan, and in answer I say I stay at Khartoum because Arabs have shut us up and will not let us out. I also add that even if the road were opened the people would not let me go unless I gave them some Government or took them with me, which I could not do. No one would leave more willingly than I would if it were possible."

With reference to the incredibly mean suggestion of the Government, that he should desert those whom he was sent out to save, repeatedly made by Ministers in April and May, he says—

"I shall not leave Khartoum till I can put someone in. I will not leave these people after all they have gone through."

And to stamp his sense of the shabby parsimony of the Government which denied him all the support he asked for, though it is now involving the expenditure of millions in a Relief Expedition, Gordon says—

"The only reinforcements the Soudan has received since the 27th November, 1883, date when Hicks' defeat was known at Cairo, is seven persons, including myself, and we have sent down over 600 soldiers and 2,000 people. The people here and Arabs laugh over it. Not one pound of money you gave me got here. It was captured at Berber."

And, after telling the Government that he is making some decorations to distribute among his faithful soldiers in honour of the defence of Khartoum, he adds these stinging words—

"You will not be asked to pay for them."

The House will remember the efforts that were made by some Members on this side to induce Her Majesty's Ministers to send relief to Berber before it was too late. The appealing telegrams that came from the Governor and the residents of that unfortunate place during April last are well known. I will only quote one out of a dozen. Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed a message on April 23 from Berber—

"We are in great danger. …. We have only 60 cases of ammunition. Pray send am munition and troops. If Berber falls there is no longer any hope for Soudan."

The Prime Minister was then able, in face of the strongest evidence to the contrary, to state that there was no risk of Berber sharing the fate of Sinkat, and, moreover, that—

"The fall of Berber would make no essential change in the position of Khartoum."

All help was cruelly refused, and within six weeks Berber fell. General Gordon tells the result in these words—

"According to all accounts, 5,000 were massacred at Berber;"

and he says—

"Had not Berber fallen the route from Wady Haifa along the Nile would have been a picnic."

Thousands of women and children were carried off into slavery by the Arabs. What have the Government done to rescue these helpless victims of their laches and delay? Like the wives and families of the brave garrison of Sinkat, they have been abandoned to a most atrocious servitude. At last the decision was taken, late in August, to make tardy preparations to do that which should have been done in March and April. How Ministers were able to make up their minds, even in August, Heaven only knows! But I shrewdly suspect that pressure from Foreign States had much to do with it. Other Governments did not regard the devastating invasions of the barbarous fanatics and slave-hunters from the Soudan as the efforts of "peoples rightly struggling to be free." What has this delay cost England? Last March, Gordon asked for the mere prestige of 200 British soldiers at Wady Haifa. Then the fate of great districts was trembling in the balance. With his vast and intimate knowledge of the Soudanese, Gordon said the prestige of those 200 men at Wady Haifa, and five officers, would cause the swelling revolt to collapse. This request, and every other suggestion General Gordon made, was treated with indifference and scorn. The five officers were not sent, the 200 bayonets at Wady Haifa were refused him. His urgent representations, those of Colonel Stewart and of Sir Evelyn Baring, as to Zebehr, were rejected. The £200,000 and the 2,000 Turkish troops, with which he offered to restore order in the Soudan, were also denied him. No Indian troops were sent to Berber. General Graham's gallant Army was not allowed to open the Berber road in March. That bloody and wanton Expedition was hurried back from Suakin to Cairo without any results except the fruitless slaughter of 6,000 Arabs. For six months Gordon was deserted, abandoned, and betrayed. Alone in that remote and desolate region—left to face treachery within and the furious hordes without, with no resources but those of his own heroic soul, and his sublime confidence in the Almighty. And now, at the twelfth hour, not 200 British soldiers, but 6,000 bayonets, are on their way to Khartoum. Not the £200,000, for which Gordon asked in March, are being spent, but over £2,000,000 are the outcome of five months of shirking and delay. The Prime Minister stated that no disparaging or questioning word as to General Gordon had passed from the mouth of any Member of the Government. I remember how that cruel and heartless despatch of April 23, which conveyed from the Cabinet their message of abandonment to General Gordon, imparted to him a change of purpose, and a deliberate perversion of his mission—

"Tell Gordon we do not propose to supply him with Turkish or other forces for the purpose of undertaking military expeditions, such being at variance with the pacific policy which was the object of his mission."

That was the message sent to a man who the Ministry knew to be in deadly peril, who was surrounded by savage foes, who had nothing but worthless and beaten troops at his back, whose chief lieutenants had proved faithless to him, who was cut off from all communications with the outside world, who had warned Ministers repeatedly and in vain of the coming storm, whose advice and requests they had constantly rejected. Gordon's last message in March through a faithful and trusted companion was—

"We are daily expecting British troops; we cannot bring ourselves to believe that we are abandoned by the British Government. Our existence depends upon England."

Notwithstanding this, and the full knowledge of his dire peril, the Cabinet sarcastically asked for more information, and told him that no support would be sent to enable him to meet "the tremendous danger that affected Egypt." There has been no change, no inconsistency on Gordon's part. You sent him out on a definite mission. That included the withdrawal of the 22,000 Egyptian soldiers and the 40,000 civilians in the Soudan. Besides, he was to establish an organized Government if possible. He exhausted pacific means. He even told you it was necessary to recognize slavery. He sent a message to the Mahdi. His overtures were repulsed with insult. Then he warned you of what was coming—not once, but 20 times. On February 29, General Gordon said—

"There is not much chance of improving, and every chance of getting worse."

He told you that the

"Peaceful two-thirds of the population were terrorized over by the Communist, one-third incited by the Mahdi."

And he asked for the prestige of 200 British troops at Wady Haifa. Sir Evelyn Baring strongly emphasized this on the 16th and 24th of March—that is, just after Graham's victories at Teb and Tamasi had made it easy to open the Berber road. I have given these hurried quotations—and many more could be given—to show how consistent Gordon was; how constantly and sensibly he warned you of his position, and how, after refusing to do one single thing that he advised, you left him alone to face the storm which burst as he predicted, and which has been surging and raging around him and his gallant companions ever since. The most cruel and reckless act of all was the withdrawal of General Graham's force just when it might have been of use. That was done in defiance of the direct advice of Gordon, of General Graham, and, I believe, of the highest military authorities at home. Yet with all this information as to Gordon's perils, need, and request for help, and with his last indignant message of indelible reproach in his pocket, the Prime Minister was able to tell Parliament on the 24th of April that there was "no military or other danger threatening Khartoum." He is still, with light heart, able to forget all that has happened since March 11—the long betrayal, the indignant reproaches of Gordon; and he dwelt upon the fact that Gordon, with premature gratitude, thanked the Ministry eight months ago for support they never gave him. Ask General Gordon now his deliberate opinion of your conduct, and then publish it if you dare. Further, the Prime Minister affirms that the policy of the Government has not changed with regard to Khartoum. If that means anything, it means that Khartoum is to be abandoned to a fanatical and aggressive barbarian. It means that a great commercial emporium and military position of the first importance for Egypt and the countries beyond, is to be given up to the Mahdi's hordes and to ruin. It means that the great trading interests of Egypt in the Soudan, the prospect of opening up and civilizing the vast regions between the Red Sea and the Nyanza Lakes, is to be abandoned. It means that for the first time in our history, under the blighting influence of a craven English Ministry, civilization and order are to recede before anarchy and barbarism; that millions of suffering people are to be given over to black superstition, and to the cruellest form of slavery. Give up Khartoum to the False Prophet and to anarchy, and you will be forced to send expeditions up the Nile every few years in order to defend Egypt. Early in this Session I ventured to submit to this House a Resolution protesting against this cowardly and disastrous abandonment of so commanding and valuable a position. The policy of the Government has directly encouraged slavery, for the abandonment of the Soudan means the development of slavery. General Gordon warned the Ministry last February of what must happen, when he said, on February 21—

"I answered (questions regarding the liberation of slaves) that the Treaty of 1877 would not be enforced in 1889 by me, which, considering the determination of Her Majesty's Government respecting the Soudan, was a self-evident fact."

Sir Evelyn Baring also writes on the same date to Earl Granville—

"It was obvious from the first that a revival of slavery in the Soudan would result from the policy of abandonment. Knowing that he is powerless to stop slavery in the future, General Gordon evidently intends using it as a concession to the people, which will strengthen his position in other ways."

So that in addition to all the other human misery which the Government policy has caused, "a revival of slavery" is its clear and proclaimed result. What could be more distinct than these statements. As in South Africa so in Egyptian territory you have developed slavery. Have the Ministry ever considered that it is in the ability of a Power established at Khartoum to abso- lutely ruin Egypt? I have it on the authority of Sir Samuel Baker, who knows the country better than anyone else, except General Gordon. Sir Samuel Baker states that any Government could dam the Nile at Khartoum, divert its channel, and thereby make Egypt absolutely sterile. Egypt is the Nile. All its fertility and its resources depend upon that great river. What could be done if the course of the Nile was diverted for six months, and its fertilizing flood turned away? Khartoum is a great commercial position. The trade with the Soudan amounts to many millions. A deputation of Egyptian merchants waited on the British and French Consuls not long ago, and this is what they said—

"Is there any example in history of a civilized nation retiring before savage tribes? … To abandon the Soudan would be to give it up to barbarism. … Importation in the Soudan Provinces, represents a value of nearly £2,000,000. There are in the Soudan more than 3,000 Egyptian commercial establishments, and more than 1,000 Europeans. There is at present in Cairo £500,000 worth of goods destined for the Soudan. Is all this to be lost?"

A civilized Government at Khartoum could really maintain order and repress slavery in the vast regions east of the White and Blue Niles, and between Abyssinia and Khartoum. Armed steamers on the Niles would effectually prevent any large force from crossing from Kordofan, and could cut off the slave caravans. If the traffic with the North and East is destroyed, the Slave Trade must die out. If you abandon Khartoum to these marauding hordes, whom the Prime Minister exalted into the character of "peoples rightly struggling to be free," slavery must prevail throughout the Soudan. There never was such a figment of the imagination as the idea that this fanatical slave-dealer, who kills and enslaves his prisoners and who offers his victims the choice of the Koran and the Sword, is the leader of "peoples rightly struggling to be free." We were told on the first day of this debate by the Prime Minister that General Gordon's heroic struggles against the Mahdi had averted—

"Tremendous danger from Egypt and the neighbouring countries."

A very different story were we given all last Session. Then the Mahdi was an innocent patriot. "This movement was overrated," the danger was slight. Now, the Prime Minister had forgotten all his old statements. Naturally, even his marvellous memory cannot carry itself through all the evolutions and variations of his policy. He now affirms that the Mahdi is and has been a

"Tremendous danger to Egypt and the neighbouring countries."

What a commentary this confession is upon the long inaction of the Government and their six months' desertion of General Gordon. As to the starting of the Expedition, the Prime Minister would have us believe that there has been no delay, and that a delicate consideration for the health of the troops has prevented them from moving earlier. Would he venture to call the Commander-in-Chief in support of such an assertion? Is it not a fact that the preparations were undertaken six weeks, if not two months, later than they ought to have been; that the most precious season of the year for ascending the Nile was lost owing to this decision of the Ministry, and that the Nile transport alone has cost an extra £100,000 in consequence of the delay? Had we not information that Khartoum was only provisioned up to the end of September, and that but for a miracle its gallant defenders must have been starved out months before the arrival of this costly Expedition? So much for the Egyptian policy of the Government. Once more I ask, whom has it benefited? No one knows when this bloody and costly farce will be ended. I say "farce," for what has it accomplished? What benefit has the action of the British Government in Egypt been to any people, interest, or creature in this wide world? Are we more respected among the nations? Are our interests more secure? Has our trade been increased? Is our military, administrative, or political repute higher. Are the British people better off? Are the Fellaheen of Egypt more prosperous or contented? Have the divers races of the Soudan derived any advantage from the policy of the British Ministry? Will even the Mahdi in the long run be the better for it? I trow not. The British Cabinet, their policy and their blunders, are by turns the laughing-stock and the cause of bitter indignation throughout Europe. Every Government is protesting against the act of financial dishonesty that the English Government has forced upon the Khedive, and is crying shame upon the black scene of carnage and ruin that marks our occupation of Egyptian territory. So far from preserving the precious waterway to the East for our trade and forces—the Canal in which our interests are greater than those of all the rest of the world together—the Prime Minister has actually offered it to any and every Power that would accept the gift. He has proposed to neutralize Egypt and the Suez Canal in favour of our rivals and our foes, and has put it in the power of any hostile and unscrupulous enemies to block or to destroy the shortest route by which our ships and our reinforcements go to India. We have lost the trade with the Soudan, and our traffic with Egypt has been injuriously affected by the disturbance and disaster of the last two years. Is Egypt better off? Egypt owes at least £8,000,000 more than it owed in 1882, and has just committed, under the Northbrook-Tewfik Decree, an act of financial repudiation. The resources of the country have been diminished. The valuable trade with the Soudan has been cut off. The Fellaheen are burdened with debts, and the so-called reforms in the administration have, owing to their half-and-half and hesitating character, been more vexatious than beneficial. A thorough British supervision of the whole Administration might have been easily established in 1882, directly after Tel-el-Kebir. Had this been done, Egypt long since would have had a truly beneficent Government, and we should have now the blessings, instead of the curses, of her long-suffering people. But the British Cabinet had not the courage or statesmanship to accept the responsibility which their own acts threw upon them. The result is now evident in the waste of millions of treasure and the slaughter of scores of thousands. As for the pandemonium in the Soudan, the cruel and needless butchery, the vacillating and imbecile incapacity to grasp or to let alone, the cowardly desertion, the chances thrown away, the tardy and costly Expedition of Relief, the perils, the heroism, the indelible reproaches of the chivalrous Gordon—who could think of all this hideous congeries of pusillanimity and woe without indignant disgust? It is like a horrid nightmare; yet it is all too real for the wretched victims of British ineptitude, and for the fame of this ancient land. Arabi was turned into a national hero because the Ministry shut their ears to the warnings of all who knew Egypt. Alexandria was ruined, and £4,000,000 of indemnities incurred, and Tel-el-Kebir rendered necessary, because the British Cabinet would not, in July, 1882, send 2,000 bayonets to act with the Fleet. The Soudan was given over to the Mahdi, and 40,000 lives sacrificed, because the Ministry shirked responsibility, and would not despatch the Indian Brigade to Khartoum in October, 1882. General Hicks and his 13,000 men were sent to their doom, because the British Government, that had smashed the Egyptian Army to pieces, had too little courage to telegraph six words of direction, or even advice, to Cairo. Baker's 2,500 conscripts were hurried to a like butchery for the self-same reason. Tewfik Bey and his brave garrison were left to perish within gun-sound of the British Squadron, because the same shuffling Ministers could not make up their minds a fortnight sooner to send out General Graham. That brave officer and his efficient little Army were allowed to slay 6,000 Arabs without rhyme or reason, or result, and then recalled in hot haste back to Cairo, just when their bloody victories promised good fruit. The Berber road might have easily been opened by General Graham in March, and Khartoum then relieved. But the chance, like a hundred others was thrown away, in deference to a feeble little splutter of Radical agitation at home. Berber itself was left to fall, and 3,500 human souls allowed to perish, because the Government could not in April last decide to risk one-tenth of what they are now, at the twelfth hour, doing. That delay is costing the country Lord Wolseley's costly Expedition. For the Government now to throw away all the results and fruits of the efforts of our soldiers and the heroic struggles of General Gordon would be an act of impolicy, of surrender, of moral cowardice so pernicious and so discreditable to this country that it is impossible for Parliament and the country to protest against it sufficiently.

seconded the Amendment.

said, that the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had thought it necessary to explain why he interrupted the course of Business on the present occasion with a speech on Egyptian affairs. That explanation was due not so much to Members on the Liberal side as to Members on the opposite side, because it was a matter which was notorious to everybody that the general feeling of the House, quite irrespective of Party, had been and still was that whatever discussion might take place on Egyptian affairs had very much better take place at a later stage when the House had those proposals before it for the grant of money alluded to in the Queen's Speech. Hon. Members had, therefore, cause to complain of the course pursued by the hon. Member for Eye, who had thought fit to interpose between the House and very important Bnsiness. In the few observations which he should make in reply to the hon. Member he should not follow him over the extensive ground, which more suo, he had covered. The hon. Member had alluded to almost every subject under the sun—for example, to the evacuation of Candahar, the Bulgarian atrocities, and the war in the Transvaal, and to many other subjects not connected with the Question before the House. In fact, the hon. Member had made a speech which was really only distantly connected with the Amendment before the House. The Amendment contained a clear proposal, and why the hon. Member should have considered it necessary to introduce other matters, some of them of detail with which the House was frequently occupied last Session, rather puzzled him. He regrettted that the hon. Member had not followed the example set by the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Marriott), who had placed an Amendment upon the Paper, but had refrained from proceeding with it out of deference to the feelings of Members on both sides of the House. The hon Member for Brighton during the Recesstravelled from Brighton to Alexandria and back again, and embodied the results of his observations in a pamphlet, copies of which he had sent to all the Members of that House. He regretted that the hon. Member for Eye had not followed that example, and embodied the result of his study of the Egyptian Question in a pamphlet, and distributed it amongst Members, so as to allow the House to proceed to the consideration of the Franchise Bill. But, though he had gone over a great deal of ground, the hon. Member had not taken the trouble to quote the most recent information which had been before the House. If he had read the last Blue Book he would have seen that there was important information upon the subject in the instructions to Lord Wolseley. One might imagine, from the hon. Member's speech, that the Government had never intended to try to establish, either in communication with General Gordon or without such communication, a stable and civilized Government in Khartoum and the Eastern Soudan. Now, it was notorious that in the original instructions to General Gordon the desirability of establishing some form of stable Government at Khartoum was strongly pressed upon him. The hon. Member would recollect that in the Blue Book, Egypt, No. 2, there were instructions to General Gordon, and in a subsequent Blue Book, No. 7, there was a memorandum of General Gordon, a portion of which partially reproduced those instructions in which the desirability of not leaving those countries in a condition of anarchy was pressed upon him by the Government. And in the instructions to Lord Wolseley a most striking and important passage at page 113 appeared to have escaped the hon. Member's attention. [Mr. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: No.] If it had not escaped his attention, why did not the hon. Member allude to it? He supposed it was because such an allusion would not have chimed in with the indictment the hon. Member had made against the Government. He was, however, astonished that the hon. Member, knowing those Papers were in the hands of everyone, should have passed the matter by altogether. The passage in question was this—

"As regards the future government of the Soudan, and especially of Khartoum, Her Ma- jesty's Government would he glad to see a Government at Khartoum, which, so far as all matters connected with the internal administration of the country are concerned, would he wholly independent of Egypt. The Egyptian Government would be prepared to pay a reasonable subsidy to any Chief or number of Chiefs who would be sufficiently powerful to maintain order along the Valley of the Nile from Wady Haifa to Khartoum, and who would agree to the following conditions:—1. To remain at peace with Egypt, and to repress any raids on Egyptian territory. 2. To encourage trade with Egypt. 3. To prevent and discourage by all possible means any expeditions for the sale of and capture of slaves. You are authorized to conclude any arrangements which fulfil these general conditions. The main difficulty will consist in the selection of an individual or of a number of individuals having sufficient authority to maintain order."

With regard to the details of the plan, Her Majesty's Government relied very much upon the information they might receive from Lord Wolseley, who was on the spot; and he was in a position to say, from recent letters received from Lord Wolseley, that this matter was occupying his attention. Beyond that he was not at present disposed to go, and the House would feel that to give premature information on the subject was not desirable. But he must protest against the fundamental error which ran through the hon. Member's speech that Her Majesty's Government, neither at this nor at any other time, attached any importance to establishing a stable and efficient Government at Khartoum, but simply desired to withdraw as rapidly as possible, regardless of consequences. One word more upon a certain portion of the hon. Member's speech. The hon. Member alluded to the Slave Trade, and one would imagine from what he said that Her Majesty's Government did not at all realize the importance of that matter. It would be easy for him (Lord Edmond Fitz-maurice), if he choose to dive into Blue Books, to weary the House with one quotation after another, showing that this question of Slavery and the Slave Trade had never been absent from the mind of Her Majesty's Government. But those very instructions to Lord Wolseley contained a prominent mention of the Slave Trade. He had just read one of them, which was—

"To prevent and discourage by all possible means any expeditions for the sale of and capture of slaves."

He was quite aware that the questions of domestic slavery and the Slave Trade, though closely connected, were in some respects distinct. It struck more at the roots of the habits and custome of the people to do away with domestic slavery than if any number of Firmans were issued to-morrow abolishing the Slave Trade. He was sure the House would recognize that Her Majesty's Government had not neglected these questions, and that they would believe that everything possible would be done, though the Government had not attempted to deceive the House as to the real difficulties of the task they had undertaken. He had thought it right to address these few observations to the House; but he did not believe it was the desire of hon. Members opposite themselves that he should attempt to follow the hon. Member for Eye over all the ground which he had travelled. The hon. Member had argued in every direction; and if he were to attempt to follow the hon. Member, he should have to detain the House at very great length. The condition of the Benches opposite was a proof that he was right in believing that it was not the intention of the House to-day to enter upon a debate on Egyptian affairs. He had, nevertheless, thought it his duty to protest against the attack of the hon. Member; and he had now only to thank the House for the attention with which they had listened to him, especially as he was labouring under a physical difficulty in addressing the House.

I do not think it necessary to detain the House at any great length; but, after the observations of the noble Lord, it may be desirable to say a few words in justification of the course taken by my hon. Friend. The noble Lord has made it a matter of complaint that my hon. Friend has, in the course of his speech, dealt with a considerable number of topics, and taken a wide view of the conduct of Pier Majesty's Government not only in Egypt, but in South Africa, Afghanistan, and the Soudan, and the noble Lord implied that that was rather wandering from the subject. But the case, as it presents itself to the mind of my hon. Friend and of a large number of persons in this House, and in the country, is that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in these matters must be taken as a whole, and as throwing light upon each portion of their action; and when the question is raised as to whether any steps ought to be taken for facilitating the establishment of a stable and civilized Government at Khartoum, it is reasonable for anyone raising the question to point to the conclusion that, from the experience we have had of the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government, we have no reason to think that they have any intention to do anything at all. Therefore, my hon. Friend is right, and is perfectly consistent with himself, in drawing attention to these matters. The noble Lord said just now, with regard to the establishment of stable government at Khartoum and in the neighbourhood, that if my hon. Friend had quoted the despatches in the last Blue Book, it would be seen that instructions to do so had been issued. But these instructions were of the loosest character, and we require something more in order to see whether there is substance or consistency in them. There is one portion of the despatch which impresses on the Commander of the Expedition that he is not to go to Khartoum if he could possibly avoid it, and another in which permission is given him to assist, or to give encouragement, in the establishment of any Government, whatever it may turn out to be, which will present some appearance of stability, and will enter into some agreements with regard to the Slave Trade and other matters. That is really, after all, very little more than that pretence of doing a thing which has been so severely commented upon in the Scriptures—"Go in peace; be ye warmed, be ye filled," without doing anything to assist the needy. My hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, as the noble Lord truly remarked, put down a Notice of Amendment which raises in a broader and larger form the question of our Egyptian policy as a whole, and has not thought it expedient to bring it forward. My hon. Friend thought it would be better that a serious debate of that character should take place when we have full information, which we shall get when the Government bring forward their Estimates, and explain what the cost of their policy may be. But we do not know when that may be done. We know, as we have just heard, that the Franchise Bill is to have precedence of everything; and we do not know when we shall have an opportunity of discussing those Egyptian matters. In the meantime, my hon. Friend observes that since the first night of the Session, when there was some conversation on the subject, new Papers have been laid before us; and very naturally, considering the amount of information he possesses on the subject, he has claimed the right of calling attention to the matter, and has expressed very clearly and with great ability his views of what has been done with regard to Khartoum. I agree with the noble Lord that for a full discussion of the subject the time will come best when we have before us the Vote which the Government are going to propose, and which must be accompanied by a full explanation of their policy. Looking at the fact that every day is of importance in these matters, and that the Government may from day to day commit the country to something which we should be sorry to see it committed to, I do not think it all unnatural or to be regretted that my hon. Friend should, before parting with the Address, have taken the opportunity of making some observations upon this very important subject.

said, he agreed that this was not a fitting occasion on which to debate the Egyptian Question. The greater part of the speech of the hon. Member for Eye was devoted to a glorification of General Gordon at the expense of Her Majesty's Government. Against General Gordon's motives and intentions he (Sir George Campbell) had not a word to say; but he thought it was patent on the face of the Blue Book that General Gordon's conduct was a mass of contradictions and inconsistencies, and the Government were quite justified in taking notice of these inconsistencies and contradictions when General Gordon urged upon them particular courses, and reproached them for not complying with his wishes. He was thoroughly convinced that the garrison of Khartoum would have been very much better without Gordon, and that they might have made their own terms with the rebels. There was no reason to suppose they would have been massacred, as there was no instance of the massacre of those who submitted to the Mahdi. General Gordon said he dare not leave Khartoum, because he was afraid the garrison would follow their natural bent and join the Mahdi. If that were their natural bent, there was no reason why they should not follow it. His belief was that it had been an unmitigated misfortune that General Gordon was ever sent to Khartoum at all; but being there, the Government were bound to do their best to get him away. He principally rose to declare his individual opinion that the instructions issued to Lord Wolseley were the best that could have been issued under the circumstances. The Government accepted the obligation to get General Gordon out of the scrape he had got into, and incidentally to do the best they could to enable the Egyptians shut up at Khartoum to get away. Looking to the career of Lord Wolseley, we might have confidence that he would not, for the sake of any glory to be got by fighting, carry the Expedition one step further than was necessary, and that he would bring it back as quickly and cheaply as he could, and with as little loss of blood as possible. The question of the administration of Khartoum was one of the impossibilities of the situation that we had brought upon ourselves by going to Egypt at all. We were not bound to spend blood and treasure for the purpose of holding territory which did not belong to it. If we could set up a decent Government there, we might do it; but, if we could not do that, we could not help it The tone in which the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) spoke of slavery indicated a sense of the difficulty of doing anything to diminish it, rather than a zeal for the mitigation of slavery. By the Law of August, 1884, slavery was made illegal in Egypt Proper, and severe penalties were attached to the infraction of the law. It might surely have been said that something had been done to give effect to the law, and to insure that it did not remain a dead letter.

said, he considered the instructions given to Lord Wolseley were such as had never been given to a General before. It was a most extraordinary thing that Lord Wolseley's instructions should have been, in part, drafted by himself. The form in which they were drawn up implied that General Gordon would retire from Khartoum to meet Lord Wolseley, and leave his garrison behind to be butchered by the Mahdi. That was an imputation which ought not to be cast upon General Gordon, and ought not to have appeared in the instructions. We knew that Gordon would not come away and leave those who had stood by him to be butchered. He knew from the character of General Gordon that he would remain at Khartoum to the bitter end. It was said that further instructions were to be sent through the Consul General at Cairo, and if such instructions had been sent, he desired to know how they had been worded? He felt convinced that Wolseley must go to Khartoum, because Gordon would not leave the garrison. If steps were to be taken to insure the safe retreat of the soldiers, the civil employés, and the women and children, who had been estimated to number from 8,000 to 15,000, had the Government thoroughly weighed all that was implied in such a retreat? That of Moses and the Israelites would be nothing to it, surrounded as the fugitives would be by the forces of the Mahdi. They could advance only at the rate of fives or six miles a-day, and the furnishing of water and supplies would be a great difficulty. General Gordon could succeed only by remaining at Khartoum; by facing the Mahdi, beating him off, and scouring the country for miles round. Therefore, the orders that were given to Lord Wolseley required him to do a thing that was almost impossible. It was quite possible that General Gordon might be sent down to the Equator as a prisoner, unless the Government looked ahead. Unless a definite course was adopted and carried out by the Government, he much feared that before long we should hear of a great catastrophe.

said, he had no inclination to protract the debate unnecessarily; but the subject introduced by the Amendment had such urgent, pressing claims on the attention of the nation, that it must be considered of a most important character. If anything were wanted to justify the Motion made by the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), it would be found in the speech from the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice); and, listening to that speech, a curious effect must have been produced on the minds of hon. Members who remembered an answer given by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) last Session. The only two Members of the Government present during the speech of the hon. Member for Eye distinctly contradicted each other on a simple matter of fact—namely, the instructions to General Gordon to establish a settled Government at Khartoum. The words used by the noble Marquess opposite, on the 5th of August, were—

"It is probable that General Gordon, before retiring from Khartoum, might desire to establish a settled form of Government. That, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, would he exceeding his instructions. His mission, and his primary object, were to evacuate the Soudan. Certainly, no instructions were ever given to General Gordon to establish a settled form of Government." — (3 Hansard, [291] 1787.)

Then what said the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his speech, in which he disclaimed any intention to reply to the hon. Member for Eye? He said the fundamental error of the hon. Member was that he ignored the fact that Her Majesty's Government had said they would establish a Government in Khartoum. Diametrically opposed to this was the statement of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, which was that no such instructions had been given.

I quoted the instructions given to General Gordon from the Blue Book, Egypt, (No. 2).

said, he would accept the explanation, or admission, of the noble Lord. The hon. Member for Greenwich (Baron Henry de Worms), when the noble Marquess made the statement in August last, quoted the following from the instructions given to General Gordon—

"We trust Your Excellency will take most effective measures to establish an organized Government in the different Provinces of the Soudan, for the maintenance of order, and the suppression of the incitement to revolt."

On the face of it, therefore, he (Mr. Finch-Hatton) was rather inclined to the opinion of the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but the fact that there was this very divergence of opinion between two Members of the Government, amply justified the Amendment which had been brought forward. The noble Lord had accused the hon. Member of travel- ling over a very wide field of discussion; and, no doubt, he did so, and it must become more wide as they considered the manner in which the Government had dealt with difficulties in different parts of the world. He (Mr. Finch-Hatton) would not attempt to follow the hon. Member; because, so far as he was aware, no apologist had successfully defended the course pursued by the Government, and, until that was done, it was not worth while to attack where there was no defence. There was no necessity to slay the slain. But it should be noted that the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State diverged equally wide of the Amendment, when he brought in the inevitable question of the Franchise Bill again as a block to proceeding further in this matter. Now, he (Mr. Finch-Hatton) failed to see what the Franchise Bill had to do with the policy of the Government at Khartoum, or the establishment of one in the Soudan. The noble Lord had, however, followed an illustrious example when he interposed this screen of the Franchise Bill. The Prime Minister in that speech, which would long remain memorable, when he spoke of the obstruction of the Opposition, reminded the House that there had been 17 nights of Egyptian debate, and expressed his astonishment, saying the question of Egypt was not one of pressing vital importance, but that one would have thought from the protraction of the debates that "Khartoum was in Yorkshire, and the Soudan in Caithness." Well, if that were the case, perhaps General Gordon might come within the sympathies of the right hon. Gentleman under the new centrifugal theory—"bringing people at a distance within the range of your sympathies;" or, perhaps, that theory was not for general application, but only to be applied when it was required to secure a disloyal Irish vote; but he considered this was a question of instant importance, for there was no knowing when it would have to be decided—perhaps, by telegraphic instructions—and there was no knowing, especially after the suppression of the debate promised towards the close of the Session, when the House might have the opportunity of discussing it. Therefore, there should be placed before the country the opinion of the House; and, if it could be obtained from Her Majesty's Government, a statement of their views whether or not, on leaving Khartoum, they intended to establish a stable, settled Government there. With regard to leaving Khartoum, so far as its continued occupation by British troops was concerned, hon. Members on both sides had made up their minds; but if General Gordon was not remaining there in order to provide for the establishment of such a Government, then what, in Heaven's name, was he waiting there for, and why did he go to Khartoum at all? The Government might reply, in the words of General Gordon, that he was waiting to get out; but if that was the case, why did he ever get in? Would it not have been much better to have kept him in this country than to have sent him to Khartoum, in order that after a certain time he might be got out again? If that was the case, we had wasted money with no object. Should it be said, in a couplet similar to that used about a King of France—

"The British Chief, with many thousand men, Went up the Nile and then came down again?"

It was surprising that the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State did not accept the Amendment, if the facts were as he stated them. The noble Lord laid stress upon the instructions given to Lord Wolseley; but, summed up in a word, they were all you "may" and not you "must." There were no instructions for the settlement of a Government in Khartoum. Her Majesty's Government, it was said, would be glad to see a settled Government there; and, no doubt, it would be a relief from several embarrassing questions. They were told that the main difficulty would consist in the selection of an individual, or a number of individuals, having sufficient authority to maintain order. What did the abandonment of Khartoum without the establishment of a settled Government there mean? It meant the loss of the whole of the money and lives which had been sacrificed ever since General Gordon set out from these shores. It meant the loss of millions of money to this country without a single counterbalancing result of any kind whatever; and, further, it meant the undoing of the work of the last 30 years carried out by such men as General Gordon in the interest of freedom and civilization. The only people who would benefit by the aban- donment would be the slave-dealers, who would be free to follow their infamous trade. There must be many Egyptians, and perhaps Europeans, in the different garrisons to the south of Khartoum who were looking to England for help, but who, if Khartoum were abandoned, would be the first to be sacrificed. Let not the House or the country forget that if Khartoum and the Soudan were abandoned without a stable Government, they would abandon a country which had been for some years under a civilized form of government. He would ask whether history recalled a single instance of anything of the kind being done by a Power which claimed to be in the position of England; and whether, if it did recall such an instance, the perpetrators ranked among the benefactors of mankind? But there was another aspect of the case well worthy of the serious consideration of the House. Egypt at that moment was indebted to the amount of £8,000,000, and we should be expected either to find the money or the security. If we abandoned Khartoum without a settled form of Government, any Power which chose to take possession of it would be absolutely master of the Nile, able to divert its waters into the surrounding desert, and by so doing to turn the fruitful fields of Egypt into a barren wilderness in less than a month. If that were done, what would become of the security for our money? From a military point of view, Khartoum must always exercise very great effect upon the destinies of Egypt; and from a commercial point of view, it was the great emporium of the trade between Egypt and the Soudan; in fact, no one could go through the bazaars of Cairo without finding that the name of Khartoum was in every mouth. He wished that the House would give very careful attention to this Amendment, and that all hon. Members would think it their duty, on that occasion at least, to prefer the interests of their country and Empire to those of their Party. He trusted the House would think, with the hon. Member for Eye—to whom he (Mr. Finch-Hatton) thought the thanks of the House were due for having brought the subject forward—and many others, that, at any rate, the country ought to have a decided and definite statement from the Government whether or not they meant to establish a responsible Government in Khartoum when the British troops left the town.

said, that before the Report of the Address was passed, he would call attention to a very remarkable statement of facts which had just come into his possession. The statement was made by a young Irishman—who, with his father, had been arrested on suspicion of being accessory to the murder known as the Ballyforan murder—and who had been deprived of his means of living by certain agents of the Crown in Ireland. It was the statement of Thomas Nolan, late prisoner in the Ballyforan murder case, and made in Boston, U.S.A., and was as follows:—

"Statement of Thomas Nolan, late prisoner in the Ballyforan murder case, made at Boston, U.S.A.—

"I was arrested in connection with the Ballyforan murder case 24th February, 1884, one month after my father was arrested as an accessory to the same murder. I was arrested as I was leaving the Courthouse after the investigation on the evidence of a young man named M'Donnell, who swore he saw me on the road about a half-mile from the supposed scene of the murder. That evidence was false, and the young man who swore it could have no motive for so doing unless he was prompted and paid for it by the Crown. He further swore he saw my father, John Nolan, on the night of the murder speak to Michael Tansey, another prisoner. My father is still in prison on this false evidence. Neither my father nor myself could have any motive for being accessories to that unfortunate man's murder. We were always on the most friendly terms with him. But on account of our house being next to the supposed scene of the murder the police said we must know something about it, and for that reason procured false evidence against us in order to drive us to swear falsely against the other prisoners. On the night I was arrested I was visited by the Governor of the prison, Captain Mason, who asked me how I got into the hobble; he also asked me, if I knew anything, to turn round on the others and liberate myself and my father. I told him I knew nothing at all about it. Three weeks after I was arrested Sergeant O'Brien, of Ballyforan, asked me to give evidence against the others, and told me I should have the support of the Government. I told him I could give no evidence unless it was perjured evidence. This was in the grand jury room of County Courthouse, Galway. Four weeks after I was arrested (22nd March), the four other prisoners—namely, Tansey, Kennedy, Hannon, and my father, John Nolan, were brought out into the office of the gaol, and Mr. Bolton told them I had turned approver, and Sergeant O'Brien said he expected to get evidence from me. He had no reason whatever for saying it, unless it be to frighten Thomas Kennedy to turn round and swear against all, as they promised to save him if he turned approver. On this day (22nd March) I was taken out by my warder (Simcox) after the other prisoners. He was not in the plot. Just as I was going in on the office door, Sub-Inspector Joyce and the Deputy Governor ran out, and Joyce said 'For God's sake take him back, or the whole thing will be spoiled.' I knew then how the ground lay. Mr. Bolton was at work, others on the inside, tolling them I was an approver. I was taken in and locked in my cell. I asked to be allowed to see Mr. Bowler, the solicitor for the defence; but I was denied the privilege, though he was in the prison office at the time. They told me he was gone. My mother called to see me that day and the next and was denied admission. After Mr. Bowler was gone I was taken out alone, and Mr. Paul, R.M., addressing me, said, 'Consequent on what Sergeant O'Brien has sworn you are remanded for further evidence.' I did not know what he swore: they did not tell me. I did not know what they told the other prisoners. I was hurried away again into the prison without being given time to ask a question. This was the fourth time I was remanded without any evidence being given against me. On the following day (Saturday, 23rd March), Sergeant O'Brien came into the prison, and himself and the Deputy Governor asked me would I not do something for the Crown that was paying me, saying I must know something about the murder. I told him I should have his conduct and that of the Deputy Governor Evans brought before the notice of Parliament in not allowing me to see Mr. Bowler, the solicitor who was employed for me, and making it appear that I turned an approver. Sergeant O'Brien again visited me in the prison on Sunday, 24th March. I asked him would he be satisfied if I swore to the truth. He said I would not be sworn unless I made a statement criminating the prisoners. I then handed him a written statement as follows:—

"'I know nothing whatever of the circumstances connected with the murder of William M'Mahon pro and con.'

"I told him to keep that, and that it was the truth, and that I should swear to no other statement. I asked them several times to put the book in my hand, and that I would tell the truth, but they wanted me to give evidence against the other prisoners, and swearing the truth would be only contradicting the witness Thomas M'Donnell. I was brought up by myself on the 5th day (Friday) of my incarceration, about 7 o'clock in the evening, and Mr. Paul, R.M., read a long piece of swearing done by Sergeant O'Brien against me in order to frighten me, and told me he must again remand me. Mr. Bolton, Crown Solicitor, said I must be sent for trial along with the others, and that I would not be discharged till both myself and my father should go before the judge and jury. During that week and the following I was kept in a cell separate from the other prisoner; though I requested to be allowed to go to exercise with the other prisoners I was denied leave to do so. I was several days without exercise. Now I always told the Crown I had neither hand, act, part, or knowledge in that murder. One of the warders (M'Ardle) used frequently to tell me that he was instructed by Sergeant O'Brien to tell me that I would be kept there until I would be either sent for trial or made a statement criminating the other prisoners. He also told me that it was no harm to swear false, that it was done every day, and the Crown did not care right or wrong. On the 4th of April I was taken out of the prison to the County Courthouse. Sergeant O'Brien came to me and said, 'I suppose you have heard that your school is gone?' 'Yes' said I. 'Well,' said he, 'the best thing you can do now is to turn round with the Crown. You have no business home.' He was sent to make offers to me by Bolton and Joyce. I repeatedly told him I knew nothing about it. 'Well,' said the magistrate, we are now going to send you for trial.' I was discharged shortly afterwards when they saw all their badgering was of no avail.

"After coming home from prison the children were being kept at home from school by their parents till I would be reinstalled. My mind was disturbed both while I was in prison and after getting out, and the inspector and manager agreed to reinstate me when I should get better. I was so bad at this time that it was deemed necessary either to send me to the asylum or somewhere; so I resolved to come to America, as I was told the Crown were prompting Kennedy, one of the men in prison, to turn round and swear against me. Shortly before I left a report was circulated that I was going to swear against 100 men in the country for committing outrages, and belonging to secret societies. Four young men secretly left the country at the time. One of them was none other than a Government spy, and never belonged to a secret society, and I believe he was paid by the Crown for running away, and making it appear that it was from me he was running away. I met two of the young men here. They told me they were told by the parish priest to run away. He told them he was informed of all through the Crown. The plot was got up by the Crown in order to prevent me from being reinstated in the school, in order, as Sergeant O'Brien said, of leaving no resource to fall back on but to turn round and become a perjured informer."

After the debates which had recently taken place in that House, he should not delay the House by offering a single word of comment on this statement. He left it to the judgment of the public, and he asked the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland (Mr. Walker), Whether, considering the additional light thrown by this statement on the character and practices of the person lately restored to the office of Crown Solicitor of Ireland, and considering the inferences it enabled them to draw as to the methods by which convictions were obtained in certain cases in Ireland—whether the Government would at once cause an independent inquiry to be held into the truth of the statement he had read?

said, as far as he could follow it, the statement read by the hon. Member for Sligo (Mr. Sexton) was the statement of the son of a man who was in gaol charged with murder. The statement charged four or five officials with attempting to procure this man's evidence. He had no information as to this statement. The man appeared to have gone to America, whore in his safety he had written a statement which, under the circumstances, would be received with a considerable amount of distrust and suspicion.

After he had been released by the Crown in Ireland.

, continuing, said, it was quite open to the hon. Member to send in the statement to the authorities, who would consider the matter.

said, the reply of the hon. and learned Solicitor General for Ireland seemed to him to be an exceedingly lame one. The hon. and learned Gentleman said if the statement was sent in to the Government, they would make an inquiry into the case; but his hon. Friend (Mr. Sexton) had read charges of a very severe nature, which only corroborated what had been said before with regard to the administration of justice in Ireland. It had been proved, on the most complete evidence, that what passed for administration of justice in Ireland was nothing but a farce, and the Government seemed to be heartily ashamed of it; but, at the same time, did not wish at present to confess their guilt, because they thought it would injure them in the eyes of the English electors, who would shortly have an opportunity of declaring on their character and conduct. His hon. Friend had very clearly pointed out the state of the case—namely, the system of trying to force men to swear falsely. He held very firmly the opinion that the Government were responsible, morally speaking.

I must point out to the hon. Member for Cavan (Mr. Biggar) that it is not regular at this stage to bring on an ordinary debate. The principle of relevancy applies. The Question I have to put to the House is, "That this House do agree with the Committee in the said Address to be presented to Her Majesty;" and it would be contrary to the general principles of relevancy to allow a debate on the administration of justice in Ireland to arise on that Question.

I will not pursue the subject further; but on the question of relevancy to the Address, I am of opinion that the Address does not—

I have ruled that to be the case, and I must put the Question.

said, he regretted very much that the Government was not in a position to make any more definite declaration than that made by the hon. and learned Solicitor General for Ireland with reference to the very serious statement read by his hon. Friend (Mr. Sexton). He must say that he heard that statement with feelings of astonishment.

The hon. Gentleman (Mr. John Redmond) is now repeating what I have ruled to be out of Order in the case of the hon. Member for Cavan (Mr. Biggar). I shall put the Question to the House, "That this House do agree with the Committee in the said Address to be presented to Her Majesty."

, in rising to move that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that this duty would not impose upon him the necessity of delivering anything in the shape of a long speech. He would begin by saying frankly that he and his hon. Friends laboured under a disadvantage in presenting the Bill to the House, inasmuch as it was not at present in the hands of hon. Members. He would admit that, in the case of an ordinary Bill, that might be a fatal objection to proceeding with the second reading; but he submitted to hon. Members that, in regard to this Bill, such an objection was not a fatal one. What was the history of the Bill? Time after time it had been introduced in the House, and over and over again its principle had been admitted. Last year, when it was introduced, it was greeted with the well-nigh universal approval of the House, and it commanded the support of Irish Members of nearly every section. The hon. Member for Tyrone (Mr. Macartney) had criticized several parts of the Bill; but it was finally, upon second reading, carried unanimously. It was amended in that House in Committee, and Amendments were made in accordance with the wishes of the Government, so that, finally, the Bill was moulded in such a manner as to meet with the unanimous approval of that Assembly. He would now appeal to the Government not to press a technical objection against the present Bill, because it was not in the hands of Members. In the eyes of the Government it should not be considered a fatal objection, because they themselves last year expressed, in an emphatic manner, their urgent desire to get this Bill as it stood passed into law. The people of Ireland would regard that declaration on their part with great scepticism if they now opposed the second reading on the merely technical ground that the Bill had not been printed and placed in the hands of Members. The Bill was identical in every particular with the measure which left the House of Commons last year with the approval of all sections of the House. He therefore did not think it necessary to dwell upon its principle, which had been explained over and over again. It introduced into the election of Poor Law Guardians the system of election by ballot, to which there could be no valid objection, as the system had been already adopted in Parliamentary elec- tions. It also provided for the abolition of proxy voting, and the diminution of the relative number of ex-officio Guardians on the Poor Law Boards. The system, as it had existed up to the present time in Ireland, had been worked in such a way that the landed interest in the country were able to exercise an influence which was neither right nor just. First of all, by the system of open voting, the landed interest of the country was able to exercise an undue influence on elections; secondly, by the system of proxy voting, a number of absentee landlords were enabled to hand over their proxies in a bundle to their agents, who were allowed to fill them up as they choose, and in this way to exercise a baleful and unjust influence in elections. By the system which prevailed in Ireland the ex officio Guardians formed at least one-half of the Boards of Guardians throughout the country; while, by the system which prevailed in England, the proportion of ex offiico Guardians was only one-third. He could assign no reason why the proportion should be larger in Ireland than it was at present in England. He ventured to appeal to the Government, especially after the action which they had been obliged to take—he presumed in the interests of their Party—in regard to Irish affairs, not to press a mere technical objection to the Bill; but having declared their warm approval of its principle, and their indignation because it was defeated in "another place," to assent to the second reading of the measure. He had felt the great disadvantage under which the right hon. Gentleman the new Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) had laboured in being obliged to remain mute for the last few days. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman's first speech, in which he stated that an odious official for Ireland had been reinstated, was calculated to make a bad impression. He (Mr. J. Redmond) would, therefore, be glad if the right hon. Gentleman would take the opportunity of mitigating this bad impression by allowing this Bill to be read a second time, and he would now move that it be so read.

said, that if the Bill was in the House, he would be the last to propose any technical objection to it, seeing that it was discussed upon a former occasion when introduced into the House by the hon. Member who had just spoken (Mr. John Redmond). It was, however, quite obvious that there were a number of important matters to be considered in connection with the Bill which were not before the House; and he would, therefore, move the adjournment of the debate.

said, he rose for the purpose of seconding the Motion. He had called the attention of the House last Session to the practice of bringing in a Bill without its being printed, which, he thought, most dangerous and objectionable. He was ready to take the word of the hon. Member for New Ross (Mr. John Redmond), that this Bill was identical with the Bill of last Session; but, as a matter of principle, measures ought not be read without the House knowing what they were reading, and they ought to be careful not to establish dangerous precedents. Moreover, the House was put in a false and even ridiculous position by being asked to read what they had not actually before them.

, in supporting the Motion for the second reading, said, that by the happy accident of the early close of the discussion on the Address, the Irish Members had obtained a chance of bringing on the Bill that day, and he hoped that the Government would show itself in earnest by supporting them upon so extremely important a measure, which had been passed almost unanimously by that House, and thrown out by the House of Lords last Session in company with the Franchise Bill. The hon. and learned Member for Bridport (Mr. Warton) urged that they ought not to read the Bill until it had been printed; but he (Colonel Nolan) presumed that as soon as it was in print the hon. and learned Member would, as usual, immediately put a block on it. After the second reading, Irish Members would undertake not to press the Committee stage until the measure had been printed If it was absurd to read a Bill before it was printed, it was an absurdity which was committed every day, for Bills were always read a first time before they were in the hands of Members.

said, that the hon. and gallant Member for Galway County (Colonel Nolan) had called on the Government and the House to show the people of Ireland that they were in earnest about that Bill; but the hon. Members who were in charge of it had not shown that they were themselves particularly in earnest about it, inasmuch as though that was the 14th day of the Session, the Bill was not in print. If they had been they would have had it printed before this. It was impossible to ask the House to proceed with legislation when they had not a single line of the Bill before them, and having merely to rely on what occurred in debate last Session at 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning. It was not quite correct to say that the Bill last Session left that House having the unanimous approval of all sections of the House. No doubt, some of its important provisions were not then objected to; but there were many other provisions contained in it, some introduced on Amendments, which were seriously and strongly opposed, and they would probably be as strongly opposed again. It was unreasonable to expect the House to proceed with the discussion of a Bill with which they were not acquainted; and it was nothing to the purpose to tell them that before its next stage they would have the Bill before them. They could not now proceed gravely to its second reading without setting a most serious and lamentable precedent. He did not disparage the importance of the measure, or the way in which it had been presented by the hon. Member for New Ross; and he should himself be ready to discuss it with perfect fairness whenever it came properly before the House; but he was not in a position to do that now, and he presumed that those who were responsible for the conduct of the Business in the House would join him in supporting the Motion for Adjournment.

said, that, when a similar Bill was brought forward last Session, they were told that it was identical with a measure which had been proposed in the previous year. Nevertheless, there were several rather serious differences between those two Bills, and the opponents of the second reading were then able to point those differences out. But they were not in a position to do the same now, the present Bill not being in print. It was all very well to take things on trust; but that was not the way to do business either in the House or out of it. In a matter of this importance it was necessary that they should have the Bill before them. He supported the adjournment, contending that the Prime Minister had stated that no Business would be taken between the conclusion of the Address and the second reading of the Franchise Bill. Had he (Mr. Macartney) been present when the Bill was before the House last Session, he would have opposed it tooth and nail. There were hardly any Members of the Conservative Party present to discuss the question; because, on asking at the Vote Office, they had learnt that the Bill was not printed. Seeing, therefore, that they had gone away with the conviction that it would not come on that evening, it would be most unfair to proceed with the discussion now.

said, it was useless for any hon. Member to pretend that he was unacquainted with the provisions of the Bill, for he (Sir Joseph M'Kenna) held in his hand a copy which had been taken from the file which contained the Bill as it was sent up to the House of Lords last Session. He, therefore, hoped it would be permitted to proceed.

said, that he sincerely and deeply regretted the circumstances under which the second reading of the Bill had been moved, nor could he well see why they had been allowed to arise. The Bill had been introduced some days ago, and if it was an exact reproduction of the Bill before the House of Lords last Session, it would have been all the easier on that account to have had it printed. In spite of this, not only was it not in the hands of hon. Members, but it was not yet in the hands of the printer; at least, it was not when he last made inquiries. This was a Bill which the Government regarded with not only a great, but with a benevolent, interest. They were in favour of the main principles of the Bill; they had supported them last Session, and were prepared to do so again; and it would have given him personally and the Government the most sincere pleasure to have supported it at this and at every other stage, so far as they found the Bill of this Session carrying out the provisions of the Bill of last Session. But, as far as his experience went in that House, and it went back a good many years, he believed it to be the invariable practice of the House to refuse its assent to the second reading of Bills which it had not seen, and which had not been printed. There might, possibly, be one or two exceptions to that rule; but, if there were, it would be found that they were in the case of small Bills of one or two clauses, and not in the case of a measure of such a large and comprehensive character as this. He must confess that, in his opinion, that rule was a salutary and proper one; and, as a general principle, he thought that the House would agree that they should not be called upon to pass the second reading of this Bill, which they had not seen. He was sincerely anxious that this Bill should pass, as his Predecessor had been, and the Government were themselves so disposed to meet the views of the hon. Gentleman who proposed it, that they would not themselves have thought of raising this objection. It had, however, been raised, and it was in accordance with the almost invariable rule of the House. In these circumstances, he had to consider what was the invariable practice of the House with regard to Bills of this importance, and he must most reluctantly say that he could not support the Motion for the immediate second reading of the Bill. The blame was on the shoulders of those who were in charge of the Bill. It was a Bill that would have been very easy to get printed, and at the time there was no pressure on the printers.

said, the hon. Member for Tyrone (Mr. Macartney) had used a childish argument. It was perfectly apparent to anybody who looked at the Votes that morning, that the Poor Law Guardians (Ireland) Bill would be reached, and therefore there was no excuse for the absence of the Tory Party. He (Mr. Sexton) had noticed that fewer Tories were present on more important occasions. There was a certain convenience apparent now for the second time in the recent changes in the Office of Chief Secretary for Ireland. It would have been very difficult for the right hon. Gentleman who last held that Office (Mr. Trevelyan) to have made the speech which had just been delivered. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) seemed to be ignorant of the fact that the Government accepted last Session not merely the main principle on the second reading, but in Committee, and on the stage of Report, the Government went much further, and assented to every clause, every word, every letter, and every comma in the Bill. There were several copies of the Bill of last Session which could have been seen, and that Bill was identical with the present one, and it had the full support of Irish Members, irrespective of the side of the House they sat upon. The fact of its not being printed was a matter of the purest inadvertence, and he was sorry to see the Government taking advantage of it. He also regretted, for the sake of the reputation of the Chief Secretary for Ireland, that he had been so ungenerous as to shift the blame for its rejection from the shoulders of the Government to the shoulders of the Irish Party. The Irish Party could not possibly have foreseen a few days ago that the Bill would come on that evening. This was rather an unpromising beginning for the right hon. Gentleman. It was very unfortunate that, on the second or third day of the appearance of the Chief Secretary for Ireland, he should take the course which he had adopted. He first opened his official career by restoring to official employment a most obnoxious person; and, in the second place, he endeavoured to shift on to the Irish Members the blame of causing the rejection of a Bill, the value of which was admitted by the Government with which he was connected. The right hon. Gentleman stated in effect that he was in a dilemma; and, indeed, he was to be commiserated with, for he accepted a most difficult Office, and yet, on the second day of his appearance, he confessed that he was in a dilemma. That being so, he (Mr. Sexton) believed that the day was not far postponed when he would be in a position of disaster.

, in supporting the Motion for the adjournment, said, he had never heard a more unfair speech than the one just delivered, and he must, therefore, take the oppor- tunity of stating his opinion that the right hon. Gentleman the present Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) deserved to receive at least a little consideration and fair play. He (Mr. Mitchell Henry) would just refer to one point that had been alluded to on the other side of the House. Mention had been made of the re-appointment of Mr. George Bolton, an incident which he, for one—

The Question before the House is the adjournment of the debate, and not the appointment of Mr. George Bolton. I must ask the hon. Member to adhere to the Question.

said, he should not have alluded to that subject except in reference to what fell from the hon. Gentleman opposite, and all he wished to say about it was that he did not support all the acts of the Government, or of the right hon. Gentleman who lately assumed the Office. He had frequently stated elsewhere and in the House of Commons that, when the Irish Members endeavoured to get legislation through, they should conform to the requirements and Rules of the House. The requirements of the House must be adhered to. That was not the first time that Irish Members had failed to get their Bills printed; and it was their own fault if they could not proceed with this measure, owing to their not having complied with the Forms of the House. Last year, in the case of the Labourers' (Ireland) Bill, a similar thing took place, and, whilst not saying a word against the measure now in question, he desired to express the opinion generally to which he had now given utterance.

said, he could not congratulate the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) on the championship which he had just won. He (Mr. R. Power) was disappointed with the speech of the Chief Secretary for Ireland, and he regretted that instead of taking, as he had, a technical objection, he had not frankly and generously allowed the second reading. It was nothing less than absurd that hon. Gentleman should get up and say that they were perfectly ignorant of the provisions of the Bill. It was the same Bill as was before the House last year, and everybody knew what its principles were. They had a limited number of copies of the Bill. They could explain the principles and the provisions of the Bill in a short space of time, and he would, therefore, appeal to the Government to yield the point, and permit the Bill to be read a second time.

Can the noble Lord the Member for Flintshire (Lord Richard Grosvenor) say when he intends to move the reappointment of the Labourers' (Ireland) Committee?

I will confer with the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland, and it will be his duty, I believe, to move it.

Can the hon. and learned Gentleman answer now?

I will move it to-morrow.