, in rising to move the following clause:—

"It shall be lawful for Her Majesty, on an address presented by either House of Parliament, to declare by Order in Council that this Act shall, from and after a date to be specified in such Order, cease to have any effect; and thereupon this Act shall, as from the date so specified in such Order, become null and void in like manner as if it had been repealed by Act of Parliament,"

said: I do not wish to stand between the House and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Mr. John Morley), who has an Amendment on the Paper to limit the operation of the Act to three years. I only wish to interpose for a few moments to state the reasons why I have not been able altogether to accept his proposal, and why I have ventured to offer this clause to the House as a possible compromise between the position which, as I understand, has been taken up by Her Majesty's Government on the question of the duration of this Act and the position which is taken up on this side of the House. I must, in candour, admit that there is a good deal of force in what is said on behalf of the objects of the Government in proposing that this Bill be not limited to a fixed period of years. They have some reason to argue that they ought not to be called upon, and that Parliament ought not to be called upon—and here I believe that the country will support them—that Parliament ought not to be called upon at short intervals to give up practically an entire Session to be wasted in passing a Coercion Bill for Ireland. We hear that this Bill will be tantamount to coercion for ever and ever. I do not believe there is much force in that cry. This Bill will no more be perpetual than any other Act of Parliament will be. It will no more be perpetual than the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland. Our real objection to the Bill is this, and I shall state it frankly and at once—namely, that by the Bill as it stands you are giving to the House of Lords the power of perpetuating this Act, it may be, in defiance of the wishes of the House of Commons. This Bill is in its nature an exceptional Bill. By the whole of Parliamentary practice heretofore, Bills of that sort have been temporary Bills, and you are introducing an innovation in proposing this Bill without naming a fixed period for its duration. I say that a Bill of this character, exceptional in the circumstances that justify it, and temporary in its intention, ought not to be perpetuated except by the authority of both Houses of Parliament. I do not admit that it is any answer to this contention that a change of Government would make the Act a dead letter. That is not true as a matter of fact, because there are many clauses in this Bill of a substantive character, and which do not depend for being engrossed upon the Statute Book whatever the Administration in power may be. There may be no disposition on the part of a Liberal Government to repeal them. Irish Members will not forget that there have been Liberal Coercionist Governments before, and Liberal Governments may be coercionist again. This Bill will enable a future Government, Liberal or Tory, to excuse itself from repealing this measure on the ground that repeal is unnecessary, or that, in view of the opposition of the House of Lords, it is not worth while to sacrifice the time. The essential point is that the repeal of this Bill will require the consent of both Houses, and, therefore, that one House can perpetuate the Bill; and that, in view of the exceptional character of the Bill, is a hardship. I can conceive an objection to this clause on the ground that it is a novelty. It may be alleged that it is unprecedented. I do not conceive that such an objection can for a moment come from Members of Her Majesty's Government, who have been exhibiting all through this Session the most complete—and, to my mind, most wholesome—disregard for precedents. Their course in regard to this Bill is unprecedented. They make it perpetual. But there are three proposals within the four corners of the Bill itself which justify my proposal. The Government, in the first place, propose to give the Lord Lieutenant the power by Proclamation to make law in Ireland, and to make law of a very exceptional and hazardous character. They propose to delegate to the Lord Lieutenant the power of legislating. In the second place, they give to the Lord Lieutenant the power of repealing the legislation which he has brought into existence, because they enable him to revoke his Proclamations. In the third place, they reserve to a particular House of Parliament the power to put an end to a law created by both Houses of Parliament. I have therefore within the Bill itself precedents for the course which I propose in this Motion. My object is to prevent the House of Lords keeping this Act upon the Statute Book in defiance, it maybe, of the wishes of a future House of Commons. If Her Majesty's Government will not accept this clause, I think the inference will be undeniable and irresistible that it is their settled intention to bring about the result of keeping this Bill upon the Statute Book irrespective of the wishes of the Representatives of the people, and thus to place in perpetuity a stigma upon the whole of the Irish people. In conclusion, I beg to move the clause of which I have given Notice.

Clause (Act may be repealed by Councils),—( Mr. E. Robertson, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."

said, he hoped that the hon. Member would forgive him if he did not go into the general question of the duration of this Bill upon the present Amendment. He agreed with the hon. Member as to the inconvenience of wasting the time of Parliament in discussing the provisions of Criminal Law for Ireland; but he failed to discover how the proposal of the hon. Member met the difficulty. If this Bill were brought to a summary termination by an Order in Council, and after that it became necessary again to pass a Criminal Law for Ireland, the whole weary round would again have to be gone through. The hon. Member had said that his object was that the House of Lords should not be able to interfere with the intentions of the House of Commons as to the repeal of the Bill. For his own part, he quite admitted that it was now impossible for the House of Commons to repeal the Bill of its own Motion; but, if it wished to do so, it was possible for the majority in that House, by placing a Ministry in power which possessed its confidence, to prevent this Act from being operative over a single square mile; but, in his opinion, more violent and extraordinary interference with the machinery of legislation had never been suggested. The proposal of the hon. Member to allow the repeal of an Act by the means which he proposed, was an extraordinary violation of precedent. The repeal of a law was as much a legislative act as the enactment of a law, and if they started the precedent that by an Order in Council an Act of Parliament could be repealed by the Government of the day, what security had they that this would not be extended in the future to the enactment of Acts of Parliament as well as to their repeal? In principle there was no difference between the two cases. For these reasons, the Government felt it impossible to accept the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman.

Question put, and negatived.

, in rising to move—

"That this Act shall be of no force and effect after the expiration of three years next after the passing thereof,"

said: I cannot agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Robertson) when he applauded the Government for taking an unprecedented course. It appears to me that in legislation of this kind precedent is a very valuable guide; and my first argument in favour of the clause which I propose, is the argument based upon precedent and on the fact that no Bill of this description has ever before been proposed to Parliament without a limitation in point of time. This is the first Government that has had the courage—I am afraid I must say the shameful courage—to propose exceptional legislation without providing that that legislation shall be temporary in its duration. I may notice that even in this Bill Section 8 limits the operation of the Arms Act which is now in force, to a period of five years, while no part of the Bill is itself so guarded. I may point out that even in the most highflying Tory times of 1819 and 1820 the most stringent of the Acts of that day were guarded in point of time. Now, why has the Legislature hitherto always been so careful to provide that these Acts should be only temporary in their duration? It is because that up to the present time the Legislature has wisely felt that it was essential and indispensable that in any legislation of this kind it should be necessary and compulsory that Parliament should at the earliest possible time review and reconsider the conditions under which that legislation was passed. It was felt by Parliament and and the Government that though circumstances might justify—and I never denied that it may be the case—whether in Ireland or in England, concession of exceptional repressive powers, yet this departure from the regular path of administration and justice, this exceptional restriction of civil rights, was a thing so serious and so grave that Parliament should have no choice in the matter, but should be appealed to and compelled from time to time to consider whether the circumstances which had originally justified that legislation still existed and still justified it. This will be the first Parliament and the first Government which has cast to the winds the old fashioned wise regard for the liberty of the subject and of jealous care that exceptional repressive legislation shall not endure one day after it is practically demanded by circumstances. I say that all departures from ordinary law ought to be temporary and difficult; and I disagree again with my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee. I say that Parliament ought not to grudge one minute of time for the consideration of such questions when it may become necessary. What are the arguments of the Government in favour of this measure? The right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary (Mr. A. J. Balfour), who is a metaphysician, gave us what I thought was a very metaphysical reason for acquiescing in the provisions of this Bill. He reminded us of the fact that this Bill, though unlimited in duration, is not necessarily applicable over the whole of Ireland, and laid down the doctrine that the limitation of space compensates for the absence of limitation of time. Metaphysicians have said many strange things about time and space before now, but none stranger than this. In what sense a limitation of space gives compensation for the absence of a limitation of time it passes my powers of distinction to recognize. Then there were some remarks upon this subject which fell from the Attorney General for Ireland (Mr. Holmes) and from the right hon. and learned Gentleman the First Commissioner of Works (Mr. Plunket) in defence of this peculiarity of the Bill. The Attorney General for Ireland stated, during the Committee stage, that there was no such thing, in the proper sense of the word, as a perpetual Act of Parliament; that every Act of Parliament can be, and ought to be, repealed when the necessity for it exists no longer; and that that is the measure of the continuance of a Statute. I notice that this argument answers another argument that seems to find favour with hon. Members opposite. It is said that the reason of the failure of previous Coercion Acts in Ireland is that they were temporary in character, and not perpetual. But the language of the Attorney General for Ireland is an answer upon that point. You first say that the Act ought to be perpetual; then you say no Act is perpetual. You first say that this Act ought not to be temporary; then you hurry to show that all Acts are temporary. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the First Commissioner of Works said that it was perfectly possible for the Lord Lieutenant to reduce every word in this Act to the position of a dead letter by one stroke of the pen, and the Chief Secretary tells us that a Parliamentary majority can prevent its being operative over a single square mile. But that is our charge against it. It is that by it you have devolved acts of power which Parliament ought to keep in its own hands upon the Lord Lieutenant. We say that this Act will be no law in the true sense of the word; it is a list, an inventory, a catalogue of arbitrary powers to be used or disused at the goodwill and pleasure of the Lord Lieutenant. Now, Sir, I submit that that is what neither jurists nor politicians have ever meant by permanence of the law either for Ireland or anywhere else. It is not what the Prime Minister meant when he said that the failure of our government was due to changes of temperature at Westminster, rather than changes of temperature in Ireland. The Criminal Law in Ireland is to change and shift, and move up and down, be one day more stringent, and the next day not stringent at all, exactly as the Office of Lord Lieutenant is held, one day by the Representative of one Party, and the next by the Representative of another Party. The Bill also creates new offences. That is no longer denied—the Attorney General for Ireland admitted it the other night. But these acts will be, or will not be, offences at law just as the Lord Lieutenant, and not as Parliament, pleases. The question of the legality of association, a subject which is of the utmost importance, is withdrawn from the proper legal tribunals and is declared to depend solely upon the will of the Lord Lieutenant. How do you suppose the people of Ireland, under these circumstances, are going to have a new-born respect for the dignity, impartiality, and majesty of your law? I do not care what jurist the right hon. Gentleman appeals to. He shall appeal, if he likes, to Mr. Dicey, to Professor Pollock, to Sir James Stephen, and others, all of whom are with him and against us on the question of Home Rule, and I will undertake to say every one of those high authorities will tell him that to place for an indefinite time the Executive power in England, Ireland, or anywhere else in a position to decide and declare what the Criminal Law shall be, what the Criminal Law Procedure shall be, when the ordinary securities of what foreigners call the Constitutional guarantees—when those securities shall be operative and when suspended—I say, all will tell him that it is the essence of tyranny, and that it makes all the difference between a free Government and an arbitrary despotism. Sir, I know very well that this Bill when it becomes law may be repealed; but looking at the matter from a practical view, I think no Gentleman in the House will deny that there is all the difference in the world between a compulsory lapse and possible repeal. I will not dwell upon the probable difficulty of persuading noble Lords in "another place" to acquiesce in that repeal. I will not dwell upon the great difficulty which Parliament and any Government will feel in taking up any subject that it is not positively compelled to take up. Everybody knows that a Government will think twice, thrice, aye, a hundred times—especially a Government with so deep-rooted a conviction as you have on this matter—before it proposes the repeal of this Act. My imagination fails to conceive Her Majesty's Ministers—whatever changes may take place in Ireland—coming to this House in two or three, or any number of years from now, and asking us to repeal the Act which they are now asking us to pass. And let us come to the point in this matter. The Bill of the Government as it stands shifts the burden of proof of the necessity for exceptional legislation in a manner which makes the difference between their method and mine vital. By my proposal, and by the method invariably followed hitherto, the burden of the necessity for exceptional legislation falls where it has always invariably fallen—on the shoulders of those who maintain the necessity for exceptional legislation. Now, that is a very proper thing, in my judgment. It has been the invariable condition of exceptional repressive legislation. But the Bill of the Government pursues the very opposite method; those who ask for a repeal will have to prove a negative, which is an extremely difficult thing to do to the satisfaction of any majority who do not agree. The Government say they will be willing to allow the Bill to be repealed when the necessity for it has disappeared. I want to know how you are going to test necessity. Now, since we last discussed the Bill, we have had a Return which shows what appeared before, that the necessity now is as low, as far as we can test it by figures, as it is ever likely to be, and lower than it has been in other days when coercion has been enforced. To illustrate the difficulty of showing when necessity exists and when it does not, I should like to refer to the figures in the Return which has been laid before Parliament since we last discussed the Bill. The Chief Secretary pooh-poohs those Returns, yet they are the only positive test, distinguished from vague assertion and anecdotes, on which we can rely. In April, 1887, the total number of reported outrages was 86; in May it was 62. If you deduct in each case the threatening letters, the balance for April of reported outrages is 49, and for May only 33. Now, in order to measure the significance of these figures, I would ask the House to remember what were the figures in the earlier part of the year. In January, the figure which now is 62, was 65; in February, the figure, now 62, was 77; and in March it was 99. Therefore, you have a decline of something like 50 per cent between March, 1887, and the date of the last Return. Comparing the last two months with the two months previous there is a decline from 176 to 148. But I should like to go back to May, 1885. The five months of 1887, for which we have Returns, give the reported outrages at 389, whilst for the five months up to May, in 1885, the number was 474; and yet when the reported outrages in 1885 were 474 for the five months, the present Members of the Government assured the country and assured Parliament that reliance on the ordinary law was a great success—and, yet, now 389 outrages prove that a resort to extraordinary law is a dire and pressing necessity. I know the Chief Secretary will tell us that this is due to the shadow of his Bill. Well, I hope for the sake of the government of Ireland the right hon. Gentleman, on reflection, will know better, for he must know that the shadow of this Bill has nothing whatever to do with the decline in the number of outrages. Another test of the alleged necessity for this Bill is the state of opinion recorded by the chief organs of opinion in Ireland. We are not left in the dark there; and I am at a loss to imagine a state of things arising in Ireland three years hence, or at any other time, when that opinion will be more unanimous against this legislation than it is to-day. Mr. Knipe, the only Representative of the tenant farmers on the Cowper Commission, tells you that any attempt to meet crime and outrage by coercive legislation will not only fail to secure tranquillity, but will aggravate disorder. Beyond that, since we last discussed the Bill, the Archbishops and Bishops of the Catholic Church in Ireland have met again, and have again re-affirmed what they affirmed in April last—first, that this Bill will not check outrage in the limited area where it prevails; secondly, that it will provoke opposition to the law in the area which is now tranquil; thirdly, that it will substitute secret societies for public and Constitutional agitation; and fourthly, that it will still further embitter the relations, already bitter enough, between coercing landlords, for whom the Bill is framed, and the tenants against whom it will be administered. That is what the clergy say, that is what the Representative of the tenant farmers says; and I need not remind the House that it is what five-sixths of the Irish Representatives say. Therefore, it comes to this—that when you announce that you will keep this Act on the Statute Book until its object has been attained, you will keep it to a date which, according to all the great influential and representative organs of opinion in Ireland, is a date which will never arrive on this side of Doomsday. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, in an interjectory remark, that this was an emancipating Bill. [ Laughter. ] Yes; it is a Bill for emancipating the population of Ireland from the clergy, from the Bishops, from the constituencies, from their chosen Representatives. Now, permanence goes to the very root of the whole policy upon which this Bill rests, because no Act ever passed by Parliament is made permanent unless the evils against which it is directed are in the contemplation of Parliament and the authors of such legislation permanent. Yes, I believe this is a sound Parliamentary doctrine, that the permanence of an Act implies the permanence of the evils against which the enactment is directed. You, therefore, by omitting the customary restrictions in point of time, are admitting that you do not expect any other legislation that you have in store to put an end to the evils which this Bill professes to be directed against. By the absence of provisions for restriction of time, you are branding British citizens in Ireland —for that is what they are—with the stamp of unfitness for civil rights which are enjoyed by all British citizens in England and in Scotland. The Government will not pass such a measure for England, because they say it is not required. But there is not one of those who advocate the permanence of enactments affecting criminal procedure who does not at the same time couple with that recommendation another, that such legislation shall not only be permanent, but that it shall be uniformly applied for England and Scotland as well as Ireland. Refer to Mr. Dicey again, or any of the legal and juristical authorities, and they all say it must not only be permanent, but uniformly applied. Why is it not? You say because it is not wanted here. But then the Chief Secretary has admitted, and all right hon. Gentlemen on that side have admitted, that it is not wanted in a great many parts of Ireland either, but only for a very small part. The reason the Government do not make the measure to apply uniformly to England and Scotland as well as to Ireland is because they dare not. Had they done so, before the Bill had reached its second reading they would have been swept out of existence as a Government. I do not argue that you ought to extend these new provisions of criminal procedure to England; what I do argue is that the fact that you do not extend those provisions to England shows that you regard your legislation as what it is—special, exceptional, and peculiar. Well, if it is special, exceptional, and peculiar, if it is designed to meet an extraordinary set of circumstances, then I say that that is in itself a proof that it ought to be limited in point of duration of time. It is, then, folly to talk of equal political rights between England and Ireland, where there is an inequality such as this Bill will establish—an inequality of civil rights. This Bill will put the Irish citizen in a far worse position in respect of civil rights than he was when the Franchise Bill or the Catholic Emancipation Act changed his position for the better in respect of political rights. It does far more to lower his civil rights than those Acts did to raise his political rights. The administration of justice, it will not be denied by any lawyer on that Bench, is the most important of all the Departments of State. It is that Department upon which the most valuable elements of civil life depend. And what you are going to do in Ireland by the passing of this Act is to bring it about that a generation will grow up to whom the bare existence of this Act will be a symbol and a stigma of inequality and inferiority. That will be a constant and standing reason—and a good reason—for hating the Government and the Parliament which imposes and which retains it. I am not particularly fond of referring to the Act of Union; but I venture to say that it is the Unionists who, by this Act, and especially by this provision of the Act against which my clause is directed, are dealing as heavy a blow as I can imagine at the Act of Union. Exceptional measures and temporary measures of repressive legislation might possibly be reconciled with the spirit and policy of the Act of Union; but no ingenuity and no sophistry can reconcile with the Act of Union that which places the population of Ireland for an indefinite and unlimited and unmeasured time against the will of the vast majority of the Representatives of Ireland, in a position of civil inferiority with the population of Great Britain. What becomes of the very foundations on which Mr. Pitt desired the Union to be established? The illustrious author of the Act of Union was answering the charges of various assailants, and he said—

"Does our union, under such circumstances, by free consent and on just and equal terms, deserve to be treated as a proposal for subjecting Ireland to a foreign yoke? Is it not rather the free and voluntary association of two great countries which join for their common benefit in one Empire, where each will retain its proportional weight and importance under the security of equal laws, reciprocal affection, and inseparable interests."

What has become of reciprocal affection? The Government are doing their best, by such an Act as this, to extinguish reciprocal affection on the part of Ireland. What has become of the equal laws? You are casting the idea of equal laws to the winds by such legislation as this, and it is, I think, a fatal blow to the whole spirit of the policy of the Act of Union, a flagrant innovation of all that that Union was meant to accomplish. The clause will, no doubt, be rejected—our protest will, no doubt, be an unavailing one—but I can only say that for some of us, whatever may be our political fortunes or the fortunes of our Party, we shall never cease, we shall never refrain, from protesting, in season and out of season, against a measure of this kind, which in this one particular, as in so many others, is a flagrant violation of all the free principles of English Government, and of all the greatest traditions of this Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the clause of which he had given Notice.

Clause (Duration of Act,)—( Mr. John Morley, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."

said, it would be evident to those who had listened to the right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. John Morley) that he had made a second reading speech against the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman stated that all the Coercion Bills which had been passed had been limited in their duration. But no previous Coercion Bill had been framed with the same safeguards or with the same power of Parliamentary revision as the present measure. It was not only a question of repeal or the bringing in of an Act to repeal the Bill; it was a question of the safeguards which were contained in the Bill itself. It was a question as to the necessity of the matter being submitted to the opinion and criticism of the House of Commons. The Government had been taunted with showing "shameful courage" in introducing the Bill—might it not rather be a boldness which should be commended? The real question for consideration was whether or not the Bill was a measure against crime. Over and over again, if not by direct misrepresentation, at least by language capable of being misunderstood, hon. and right hon. Gentlemen had said that the Bill was directed against bonâ fide political associations, and was not intended to repress crime. It was, therefore, important in considering whether such a Bill should be perpetually operative to understand thoroughly what its provisions were and against what it was directed. He did not think the right hon. Gentleman did justice to the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. A. J. Balfour), when he ridiculed his distinction as to the limitation of space as distinct from the limitation of time. In fact, there was in this Bill a limitation of space and a limitation of time. On the first point, it had to be noted that, saving one small exception, no part of the Bill came into force at all except in a proclaimed district. He denied that the Executive Government would proclaim districts without cause, or without carefully considering whether in the House of Commons they could justify their action. It was not just criticism of such a measure as this to assume that the Executive would proclaim districts wholesale or without having a case to lay before the House of Commons. In his opinion, a more unfair imputation could not be made than to say that the Government would proclaim districts in order to favour a class which was not directly benefited by the provisions of the measure. Criticisms had been made on the fact that the provisions of the Bill were made to depend on the action of the Lord Lieutenant. The right hon. Gentleman had referred to the dicta of jurists. There might be two opinions as to whether the passages were directed to the state of circumstances intended to be met by this Bill. Their case for the Bill was this. There was now in Ireland a state of things which justified the introduction of such a Bill, and in this belief the House had agreed when it decided to allow the Bill to be read a first and a second time. What were the considerations that ought to affect the House in deciding whether the Bill should be permanent in duration but limited as to space, so that the area to be proclaimed might be carefully considered? In the opinion of the Government, it was in considering the forces which were at work, and which might produce in Ireland in the future the same state of things which existed in Ireland at the time of the introduction of the Bill. The Government said that there had been proceedings in Ireland which were not lawful nor the spontaneous outcome of the feelings of the Irish people. They also said that there had been at work in Ireland forces closely connected with associations of the worst character, and that those forces had been supported not by the internal resources of Ireland, but by large sums of money coming from another country. They said, further, that the possibility of that kind of support and assistance, coming from the avowed enemies of England, was as great in the future as in the past. The Executive must be to a great extent—indeed, he thought, must be solely—the authority to determine whether that kind of crime existed in Ireland. It was because they had to deal with forces of that character, which worked in secret and by illegal means, and which might at any time produce in Ireland a state of things perfectly abnormal, that the Government thought that, although the provisions of the Bill had to be carefully considered, it was most important that the Executive should be in a position to deal promptly and rapidly with such a state of things as existed, at the time the Bill was introduced. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Mr. John Morley) had informed the House that the state of Ireland had improved during the months of April and May. Nobody could be more glad to hear that, and nobody would be more glad to know that it would never be necessary to put the provisions of this Bill in force, than the Members of Her Majesty's Government. But when they were arguing the question as to whether or not the power of putting the provisions of the Bill in force should be permanent, they ought not to shut their eyes to the possibility of the sudden operation of some illegal power with which the Executive Government ought to be in a position to deal rapidly. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne) seemed almost to wish that there should be, at least triennially, a discussion as to whether or not a Bill of this kind was necessary. The Government hoped that, assuming they had inserted proper safeguards in the Bill—[An hon. MEMBER: Safeguards!]—proper safeguards to prevent its abuse, they had made the Bill a good working Bill, and that there would be no necessity for this constant re-debate, as to whether or not such a measure should be upon the Statute Book, because the very fact of the existence of the Bill, the knowledge that there were stringent powers that could be put in force, would deter, not the oppressed tenants, but those outsiders from coming to Ireland and stirring up agitation. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for New- castle-upon-Tyne had given him an opening which he did not expect. He had said that the permanent nature of the provisions of this Bill was an admission that the other Bill the Government were about to produce would not meet the evils this Bill intended to cure. But he would point out to the right hon. Gentleman that that Bill was not intended to deal with the evils which this Bill was intended to cure. The Bill which the Government were about to produce was introduced for the purpose of improving the relations between landlords and tenants, for the purpose of putting an end to those scenes of eviction which had given rise to so much complaint in the House; and it was because the Bill now before the House had been framed with the honest intention of placing on the Statute Book a measure which would deal with crime, illegal conspiracy, and that infamous bane Boycotting, that the Government were able to stand up and say—"Your accusation against us that we do not want this Bill for suppressing crime, but for aiding the landlords, is unfounded." He was sure the right hon. Gentleman did not wish him to refer to the particular clause in the Bill which he had in his mind when he spoke of safeguards—namely, that which provided that an Address might be presented to Her Majesty by either House of Parliament against any Proclamation issued by the Lord Lieutenant. Of course, hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway might not consider that a safeguard; but the Government did consider it so, and believed that they thereby put a powerful limit on the unfettered control of the Executive. The Government hoped that with the spread of education, and with the improvement of the condition of things in Ireland, and with a knowledge on the part of the tenants that their grievances would be redressed on the floor of the House, it would be unnecessary to put the powers of the Bill into force. He must enter his most emphatic protest against the statements of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne and of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone) as to the scope of the Bill. He presumed that if he could satisfy those right hon. Gentlemen that this was a Bill for the repression of crime, and would be honestly worked for that purpose, the main argument against perpetuity would be gone. The real sting of the right hon. Gentleman's argument was that this Bill was framed to assist coercive landlords. He had challenged the right hon. Gentleman more than once to read any clause of the Bill which would bear that construction, and he now again protested against words being introduced into the Bill which were not to be found there. This same charge, at a celebration in the other Principality which had been invited to go in for Home Rule, took a somewhat extraordinary shape. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian, speaking in Wales, said that this Bill was not directed against crime nor against illegal associations, but was directed against those associations which in England were called trade unions. Did it occur to the right hon. Gentleman when he made that statement to tell the audience he was addressing—not an audience in that House, but an audience that would take everything from him as stated with the most perfect moderation—that there was in this very Bill a clause which in express terms excluded trade unions from its operation? To say that this Bill was directed, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne said, in favour of coercive landlords or against those societies which in England were called trade unions, was, he humbly submitted, the language of misrepresentation with a meaning which was intended to be misunderstood. All he (Sir Richard Webster) said in conclusion was this—the Government did believe and hope that the mere existence of the Bill would have this salutary effect, that it would check the coming into Ireland of persons who had not got the interest of the tenants at heart, but had only their own interests to serve. Moreover, they hoped that the measure would affect those societies which were supplied with money and vigour by persons who were the professed enemies of England. They trusted and hoped that the Bill would have that effect, quite apart from its action upon the peasants and tenantry resident in Ireland. They also hoped that that kind of agitation which had led to the abominable tyranny of Boycotting would be put down speedily, and that all those who desired to be loyal subjects of the Queen should be able to go about in Ireland without let or hindrance from those who desired to benefit, not the tenants, but themselves. They would not be satisfying themselves if, after inserting proper safeguards in the Bill, they were to say that they would make this only a temporary measure. If there should arise in England an agitation which would have an effect similar to that which the agitation in Ireland had produced, the Government would not hesitate to bring forward a similar measure for this country. The Government considered that, as far as the best interests of Ireland were concerned, they had taken a wise step in making this Bill permanent. They trusted that it might be seldom necessary to put its powers in force; but they also believed that the mere existence of it in the Statute Book would be a terror to the evildoers and an encouragement to those who did well.

I am sorry that the hon. and learned Gentleman has thought it necessary to include, in the speech in which he has stated the case of the Government against the clause of my right hon. Friend, so much matter which is strictly and indisputably in the nature of what he himself denounced—namely, a second reading speech. My own speech, in another part of the country, to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred, had nothing whatever to do with this clause; and the invitation of the hon. and learned Gentleman to read out of the Bill certain portions in order to sustain the allegations which, on other occasions, we have justly and properly made is an invitation unnecessarily to prolong this debate in a manner of which I must say an example has very frequently been given by the Members of the Government itself. I will only say two things in order that I may not follow the bad example of the hon. and learned Gentleman, and I will do what I can to economize the time of the House. In the first place, I will sustain strictly on a proper occasion what I have said in South Wales or elsewhere as respects the special object of this Bill—not the exclusive object of this Bill—for I have never denied that crime was within the purview of this Bill; but I have said that its special object is to strike at that which is now not crime, either by bringing it within a new definition of crime, or else by placing civil rights under the discretion and control of the Executive Government. And then the hon. and learned Gentleman asks me to read certain portions of the Bill in order to sustain the argument. I will simply say that, in my opinion, as far as regards the creation of these new crimes, which appear to me to form the special object of the Bill, together with the 6th clause and the forfeiture of the civil rights now enjoyed—I refer, of course, to the first sub-section of the 2nd clause of the Bill—I will say I will make this admission to the hon. and learned Gentleman—that we have no right to stand upon any argument in this debate which, in the slightest degree, contravenes the previous decisions of the House. It appears to me that the hon. and learned Gentleman and the majority of the House ought to be very well satisfied. They have obtained the affirmation, by a large majority, of the provisions which they term moderate and necessary, and which we term violent and unprecedented. There is no question of objection being taken to those provisions by us further than to this very limited extent, and in these general terms—that the particular character of the enactments in this Bill is a special reason for giving it only a temporary operation. But we are not attempting in any way to sap or undermine the position of the majority or the position of the Government with respect to the measure. I did not intend to say a word further than to make a simple reference to these subjects, and I will avoid entering upon them now; but I will take the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman in that very limited portion of his speech which seemed to me to apply to the subject - matter immediately before us. The hon. and learned Gentleman says this is a very good arrangement for the time of the House. It is alleged that this Bill has occupied a Session. Well, Sir, why has this Bill occupied a Session? When we come to the discussion of that matter, which I shall not enter upon now, I shall show the reasons why it has occupied a Session. For the present it is enough to say that this is the first Coercion Bill ever submitted to Parliament that has occupied a Session. In 1881, when we had a Bill of a most stringent character for coercion—namely, the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, we likewise passed one of the most complex, most comprehensive, and most laborious measures ever submitted to Parliament. In 1882, when a new measure of coercion was introduced, it was not found incompatible with the passing of other important legislation. I decline, therefore, to admit that if this Bill be made temporary, the provisions which might be produced at the close of the term would occupy a Session, or that you have a right to take considerations of that kind into view in determining a case so grave as this is in point of Constitutional principle. What is the main contention of the hon. and learned Gentleman? Undoubtedly he is generous to admit that of the 56 precedents—or whatever they are—every one runs against him. But then he says—"We have introduced in this Bill the most wonderful safeguards." In broad contradiction to that statement, I say that he has introduced into it no safeguard whatever, so far as the whole subject-matter of Coercion Acts is concerned. He has, it is true, introduced an inefficient safeguard in the particular case of the 6th clause—that is to say, he has introduced as one portion of the novelties of this Bill a certain safeguard; but he has not introduced that safeguard in regard to the Bill at large. There is nothing of the kind in regard to the Bill at large, and the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman as bearing on a comparison between this Bill and other Bills is of no force whatever, for his safeguard applies only to what is a novelty in this Bill, and not to any portion of the subject-matter which has been in former Bills of the same kind. What, then, comes of the argument from safeguards as a reason for pursuing a course entirely different in this instance from the course pursued by every Government on former occasions? I think it is very desirable to bring to the minds of the Members of the House a dispassionate consideration of some of those points which I do not think are in contention. It is admitted to be desirable that if Ireland is not to have a Legislature for the management of her own concerns she should be governed by equal laws. Down to the present time that principle has been recognized, at east to this extent—that when Parlia- ment has thought it necessary to make laws for Ireland which were unequal, Parliament also has carefully made them temporary, thus showing that equality is the rule upon which you propose to proceed with respect to Ireland, and that inequality is to be occasional and exceptional. That has been recognized by provisions which would compel Parliament to resume the consideration of the subject, and which would afford every security that no Bill of restraint should be enacted against Ireland except upon positive proof of a present and actual necessity. It is often said, and I suppose it is admitted, that the great and fundamental evil in Ireland is the want of sympathy between the people and the law. Do you really think that the effect of this Bill will be to produce greater sympathy? Is this not the very method to increase and give intensity to that alienation and estrangement from the law which is the radical and fundamental evil of the social condition of Ireland? An hon. Friend of mine stated a fact, and gave his opinion upon it this evening. The fact which he stated was that the whole of the proceedings of the Government since the beginning of the Session with respect to this Bill and to many other matters have been in continuous contempt of usage and precedent. It appears to me that usage and precedent in this matter are on our side, and it is strange that those who are accused of going to dangerous extremes in Liberal principles should have to impress that truth upon a Government which calls itself Tory or Conservative. However that may be, in this case we stand not only on a course of precedent unusually long and unusually authoritative from the fact that it has received assent and support under a variety of circumstances, and from a variety of persons and parties, but that that precedent has stood on high and conclusive principles. I have shown with regard to safeguards that the allegation of the hon. and learned Gentleman does not cover the ground. It covers no part of the ground, except that portion of the innovations which he proposes to introduce into the law. A large part of these innovations in Sub-section 1 of the 2nd clause and all the old coercive matter are entirely untouched. The general character of this Bill—I admit the ne- cessity—the general character of such a Bill as this is, and ought to be, to place legislative powers in the hands of the Executive Government. Under this Bill—and I am not making this a matter of blame; I am simply going to urge it for the purpose of illustrating the Motion of my right hon. Friend—under this Bill the condition of laws under which an Irishman lives is liable to be, and will be, vitally affected from time to time at the discretion of the Executive. Our pride and our joy and our satisfaction are and our hope is that we live under law and not under the discretion of a public Executive; and that, Sir, is why Parliament, not from blind superstition, and not from a mere feeling of sympathy with Ireland—although I think that feeling of sympathy ought to have led to the same conclusion—but that is the reason why Parliament has wisely, justly, and necessarily fixed periods to legislation of this kind, because it is legislation which essentially and of its nature goes to substitute Executive discretion for the action of the established and safe rule of law. Now I want to know the answer of the Government to that argument. There is nothing in the Attorney General's speech to touch it. Sweep away his statement about safeguards, which only touches one portion of the case, a portion of which, he and his friends have the merit of being the authors and inventors. The whole argument remains upon the same ground as it did on former occasions, when it has invariably led every Government, Tory or Liberal, every Parliament, reformed or unreformed, in the days when borough-mongering was supreme—in the days when half the Members of this House were returned at the dictation of a number of gentlemen who might always be counted on the fingers, or, at all events, in a very few minutes—so formidable in those days even was the step thought of placing in the hands of the Executive such a discretion, that invariably the rule was adopted of fixing a period of time, so that the Government should come back to Parliament from year to year, or every two years, to prove that a real necessity for such legislation had existed and continued to exist. I have understated the case, because I have been speaking as if this Bill were a Bill analogous to other Bills; whereas it differs from other Bills in two respects, essentially and pro- foundly. I am not now going to say a syllable of condemnation. If I were to enter upon a description of the Bill, I am afraid that I should have to restrain my faculties, such as they are, and to exhaust the dictionaries to find words adequately to express what may be said about it. But that is not the matter in question. I am assuming that an adequate necessity exists, and granting that to be the case, upon your own principles, unless you are ready with a new set of principles and a new set of innovations, you ought to consent to the Motion of my right hon. Friend. The argument which was conclusive on the occasion of former Coercion Bills has acquired far greater force now, and why? For two reasons, perfectly definite in themselves. The first is the absence of agrarian crime in the country. I am glad there is no denial of that; it is too late to deny it. In a passage of the speech of the Attorney General for Ireland which I took down, in which he enumerated the liabilities of subjects, he said that nobody would be liable to be proceeded against under this Bill, except for some act which is now a felony, or which is now a misdemeanour, or some acts constituted an offence by the 2nd clause.

Not by the 2nd clause.

The Attorney General for Ireland said, "by the clause of this Bill against intimidation." That is the 2nd clause.

I think the right hon. Gentleman is not quoting the Attorney General for Ireland quite correctly. That is not my recollection of my right hon. and learned Friend's statement.

Will the Attorney General, then, be good enough to correct me? Whether the Attorney General for Ireland used the word "second" or not I will not say; but he said that a new offence was constituted by the Bill—and he said by a clause—either the 2nd clause or the clause against intimidation, and that is the 2nd clause. But I will give the Attorney General the whole benefit he can take from his criticism. New crimes are created by this Bill which were not crimes before. Besides that, what you are now doing, even with these safeguards, is of the greatest magnitude and novelty, and of a most critical and perilous character. You are handing over the rights of the subjects to a free trial in open day to be disposed of secretly and silently at the discretion of the Lord Lieutenant, whenever he thinks fit to proclaim an association. I admit your safeguards; but with these safeguards this is of itself a tremendous extension of legislative power, and granting for a moment—though I cannot grant it for any other purpose—that you have sufficient cause for these tremendous innovations, yet their character as innovations, the constitution of new crimes, and the withdrawal from the ordinary tribunals of questions affecting the rights and liberties and property of subjects—these are reasons which give an immense additional force to these arguments, which on every other occasion have been deemed to be conclusive, for attaching a limitation in time for the Bill which you are about to pass. Well, Sir, I am at a loss to know what the Government have to urge in answer to these considerations. But this I will venture so say, with great respect for the ability of the Attorney General (Sir Richard Webster), who never fails to make the best of what can be said for the case he has in hand—there is not one word in the speech which he has delivered which in the slightest degree affords an argument against my right hon. Friend. But I hope there may be some minds—possibly some minds on this side of the House—I am not over sanguine—past experience has corrected that defect, which existed in me at the beginning of the Session—to whom arguments are arguments and facts facts, and precedents are precedents, and precedents made on strong Constitutional grounds become arguments of enormous force, and the appeal to arguments so constructed supplies a touchstone to the feeling of the British House of Commons and the means of judging whether we still retain that love of liberty and of public right, the safeguards of law which were dear to the hearts of our forefathers and which has made this country great.

Much, Sir, has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. W. E. Gladstone) which is not new to this House. But I listened to one or two of his arguments with unmixed and unfeigned astonishment and sorrow. The right hon. Gentleman dealt with the very grave question of the enormous expenditure of time that has taken place over this Bill, and he had the courage to insinuate—

Not to insinuate, but to state.

I accept the correction. The right hon. Gentleman had the courage to state that the persons responsible for that expenditure of time were Her Majesty's Government. But his courage did not end there, for he drew a parallel between the expenditure of time in this Session and the time taken over Coercion Bills in 1881 and 1882. But does the right hon. Gentleman recollect the circumstances which make the greatest considerable difference between 1881–2 and the present year? To begin with, the Coercion Bill of 1881 consisted of one clause, or very little more. It was an ineffective and monstrous Bill, which did little or nothing to restore law and order, but did interfere with the liberty of the subject. Then, in 1882, the right hon. Gentleman had the advantage of getting rid of all the Irish Representatives at an early stage of the proceedings. They were all turned out of the House; and it was in these circumstances that the right hon. Gentleman was able to pass his Bill so rapidly. But that is not all—and this is, perhaps, the greatest difference—in 1881–2 you had an Opposition which thought it their duty to support the Government when the Government came forward with proposals for the restoration of law and order in Ireland. We are not, as a Government, so fortunate now; and, therefore, I do not think we are the people who deserve the reproach for the delay that has taken place over this measure. The right hon. Gentleman then went on to deride the safeguards which we have included in this Bill.

I did no such thing.

I believe what the right hon. Gentleman did say was that the only safeguard that existed in the Bill was the one which affected the 6th clause of the Bill, and that that safeguard was limited in its operation. It is perfectly true that there was a safeguard with respect to the proclamation of a district under the Act of 1882. But it was limited in its operation. We ex- tend that safeguard to every single clause, and every single part of every clause in this measure. How, then, can it be maintained with any show of plausibility that we have not been more careful to fence round our proposals with safeguards than our Predecessors were when they had to face the same difficult problem? Then the right hon. Gentleman says that our Bill creates now crime. The first sub-section of Clause 2 is, I understand, the part of the Bill to which the right hon. Gentleman specially refers. But this sub-section obviously does not create new crime. How does it begin?—

"Any person who shall take part in any criminal conspiracy now punishable by law."

These are not the words of a clause constituting a new offence; and yet this is the sub-section which the right hon. Gentleman chose as the illustration of his proposition that this Bill is a measure that creates new offences. The right hon. Gentleman also quoted some words attributed to the right hon. and learned Attorney General for Ireland (Mr. Holmes) to the effect that Clause 2 created new crimes. Now, no one on this Bench heard the right hon. and learned Gentleman say that, and we, who have been in constant consultation with my right hon. and learned Friend, know that not a single word in Clause 2 does create a new offence. It is true that in one sense the words of the 6th clause do create a new offence, for they enable the Lord Lieutenant to proclaim an association. But the Act of 1882 did precisely the same thing, and the same thing is done whenever the Riot Act is read; and we have virtually asked for the same power in this Act. I deny that Section 2 of the Bill creates a new offence, and a new offence is merely created in the technical sense in which I have described it. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. W. E. Gladstone) and the right hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment (Mr. John Morley) described the result of this Bill as being to brand Irishmen for all time with the stigma of unequal and exceptional legislation. Well, I, for one, admit that all Coercion Bills are to be regretted; but I should have thought that the insult inflicted by this measure—if insult there be—was far less than the insult inflicted upon Irishmen by those other Acts which the right hon. Gentleman quoted as prece- dents, and which applied to the whole of Ireland, to the parts which were quiet as well as to those which were disturbed. When those Acts have been in force there have been parts of Ireland as law-abiding as Hampshire is at this moment. These hon. Gentlemen, who are so sensitive lest an insult should be inflicted upon the law-abiding population of Ireland, are the very people who passed repressive measures applying to the whole of Ireland, while we only ask for a measure which shall apply where necessity appears to demand its application, and which will not apply where no such necessity exists. The right hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne tells us that the essence of tyranny is the application of uncertain and unequal laws to any part of the Kingdom.

That was not what I stated. What I said was, that it was the essence of tyranny to have the Criminal Law one thing to-day in Ireland and another thing to-morrow at the discretion of the Executive power.

I do not think that those were the exact words of the right hon. Gentleman. But we do not apply an uncertain Criminal Law in Ireland. We leave the Executive an alternative between two certain laws. In that there is nothing of the arbitrary character of tyranny, which creates its own laws to punish what it chooses at any moment to consider an offence. The right hon. Gentleman brought forward the names of eminent jurists to support his contention that to pass a law like that under consideration was the essence of tyranny. Then the right hon. Gentleman opposite relies upon precedents, and says—"You have unbroken precedents for making these Acts temporary." If the right hon. Gentleman appeals to precedent, may not we appeal to experience? You have had these Bills one after another, following one another in melancholy succession since the Union—aye, and before the Union. Has your policy of restricting beforehand the period of the operation of these Bills proved a success, or has it not? Does not the right hon. Gentleman see that if Parliament laid down that at the end of three, four, five, or six years, a Bill of this kind shall ipso facto lapse, it takes upon itself an infallibility of prophecy which the very nature of the circumstances shows to be fallacious? You cannot foresee for how long your Bill will be required. If it succeeds in repressing crime its very success is quoted as a reason for its repeal, although it may itself be the sole cause of the improvement in the state of the country, which is seen. This difficulty will be avoided by our Bill, for if the Government of the day is of opinion that a part of Ireland where the measure is in operation has become peaceable and law-abiding, it can withdraw the Proclamation with the knowledge that, if necessary, it will again be able to use the measure for the repression of crime in the same locality without having, in the first place, to come to Parliament and to spend an immense amount of time in debate upon the expediency of legislation. Then, ought we not to consider England, Scotland, and Wales in connection with this matter? Does the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Mr. John Morley) really think it a proper and appropriate thing that every four or five years Parliament should be occupied for a whole Session with the same subject—a subject which blocks all other Business, and prevents the passage of salutary measures, not only for England, Wales, and Scotland, but actually for Ireland herself? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian and his Colleagues in 1885—when the then Conservative Government declined to renew the Coercion Bill—did not hesitate to declare that they adopted that course from electioneering motives. When they made that accusation they either believed it or they did not. If they did not believe it, did they not stretch the licence of political criticism beyond the limit which even their elastic consciences can approve? But if they did believe it, do they not think that it is highly expedient to remove this stumbling block for ever from the path of Governments in this country? Right hon. Gentlemen opposite, I suppose, are of opinion that their virtue is of so robust a character that were the temptation to which they allege we yielded presented to them they would thrust it aside with Spartan firmness. They say that our virtue is of a far weaker character; but, nevertheless, by this Bill we are endeavouring to remove a blot from the working of political and Constitutional government in this country. Can they not, then, have some regard for our weakness, and would it not be wise to remove the temptation whether it has been yielded to or not—the temptation to purchase Irish votes by the sacrifice of Irish law and Irish order? The right hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne has told us that though our Bill was in one sense permanent it would not really be permanent, because this and that Administration would limit its operation and so break that continuity which Lord Salisbury has shown to be the elementary condition of good government in Ireland. Well, the Bill will not have that cast-iron permanence which would compel every succeeding Government to apply it to every part of Ireland, whether the state of the country required it or not; but it has this far more important quality—we shall know that until this Bill is repealed no individual party or association will be able in any part of Ireland to propagate opinions.

You have let the cat out of the bag now.

To propagato opinions for the encouragement of crime. It will be known that the Government of the day has at its hand an instrument by which without delay, without pause, such efforts may be counteracted. That is why we regard it as a vital and essential element of our Bill that it shall not be temporary in its operation. We hope that the area of Ireland over which it will ever be necessary to use it will be but a small part of the country; we hope that for years together it may be possible to allow the Bill to remain quiescent; but we do not think that we should be doing a good service to our Successors in Office or to the Parliamentary Constitution of this country, or to the true interests of Ireland, if, yielding to the pressure of right hon. Gentlemen opposite, we were to accede to the proposal to introduce into the Bill the clause proposed by the right hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

said, he must congratulate the Chief Secretary for Ireland on having made a much better speech than usual. But, good as it was, it did not satisfy him. Now they had got the Jubilee over, they ought to regard this as a day of humiliation for the House and the country, because by the present Bill they were called upon to say that Parliamentary government, of which they professed to be so proud, was a failure over a considerable portion of Her Majesty's Dominions; that Irishmen were irreconcilable foes; that their attitude towards Ireland was to be one of war; and that they were to rule that country by the power of 30,000 bayonets instead of attending to the views of her freely elected Representatives. That was a humiliating state of things, but it was still more humiliating to be told by the Government that that state of things was to be permanent. In the words of Sir George Trevelyan—"To place at the disposal of the Irish Government, constituted and advised as it is, the powers contained in the 6th and 7th clauses, was to lay Ireland bound hand and foot as it had never been in our day at the mercy of the Party of ascendancy in Ireland, which Party never governed justly and mercifully and never will." If, after that statement, any Liberal voted against the clause of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle every rag and remnant of Liberalism would be torn from him, and he would stand before the country naked and deformed as a Tory. There was an old saying that experience was a dear school, but it was the one in which fools would learn. What he was going to say was that some people were so extremely foolish that they did not even learn in that school. All the experience they had had in Ireland had taught the Tories nothing. A gentleman passing his stable one day heard a noise inside, and on looking in and inquiring the cause he was informed that the mare would not have the harness put on her, and the groom was pacifying her with a pitchfork. They were trying to do that with Ireland, but they would never pacify her with a pitchfork. As to this Bill being repealed, they must remember that they had to reckon with the House of Lords, which was nothing but a great trades union of landlords. There had been no national verdict on this coercive policy of the Government, and it was the duty of Liberals to do all in their power to secure such a national verdict. The noble Lord the Member for Rossendale (the Marquess of Hartington) said—"Let this Bill pass, because we shall have a National Party."

rose to Order, and asked whether the observations of the hon. Baronet were germane to the point under discussion?

I do not think the hon. Baronet has been keeping closely to the Question before the House.

said, the duty of those who were called Gladstonians was to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Irish Members, to stick to them, and to make the Union firm and strong—strong as the union existing between the Tories and the Unionists. They intended to fight the Bill at every stage; and, though beaten on this occasion, never to flinch from the policy of conciliation to Ireland, which was the only hope for this country, and which would do more than anything else to promote the safety, honour, and welfare of the Empire.

said, that the Chief Secretary for Ireland had let the cat out of the bag when he said that after this Bill was passed it would no longer be possible for any association or party to go about Ireland propagating their doctrines. That was exactly what the Bill was framed for. It would leave crime untouched, and put down the political organization which had done everything to lead the people from the paths of crime. The Government wished to strike at the National organization which had united the Irish people in their demand for independence. The right hon. Gentleman had qualified his statement by adding the words "by the encouragement of crime;" but it was a foul calumny to say that the National League had ever encouraged crime. They had the testimony of Lord Spencer and Sir George Trevelyan upon that point, as well as the testimony of the Irish Members. The National League had done more to check crime and outrage than all the Coercion Acts passed since the Union. He believed that if crime were to break out to-morrow in Ireland the Government would be well satisfied. The refusal of the Government to accept the clause of the right hon. Member for Newcastle would have the effect of showing the people of England and the civilized world generally that it was not the intention of the Government to conciliate, but to coerce and drive the Irish people down at all times and under all circumstances and under all Governments. The action of the Government that night would sound the death-knell to the hopes of the Irish people ever getting anything that would satisfy them from that House, or rather from that Government, because it showed that the beginning and the end of their policy was coercion, and permanent coercion. He looked upon the Bill as a declaration of permanent war between England and Ireland, and he believed that the great bulk of the people of Ireland would look upon it in the same light. They talked in this Jubilee time about uniting the bonds of the British Empire, of drawing closer to the Throne those various peoples who composed the mighty whole of the British Empire; but did they think the Irish people were going to be made more loyal by a Jubilee Bill like this—a Coercion Bill which was to last for all time? He wished to God the Irish people had the means of opposing this Bill as it should be opposed. Where in the history of tyranny was there an Act more calculated to make the blood of men boil in madness in their veins than this attempt to saddle on the people of Ireland a Bill which deprived them of all the rights dear to Irishmen? The English-blooded Colonists of America, for less than this, threw off the yoke of England; and was it a pleasant thing for the English Government to know that there was a spirit amongst the people of Ireland which would induce them, if they had the chance, to oppose the measure with arms in their hands? He believed, for his part, that life in Ireland as a Nationalist, under the Coercion Bill, would become a degraded thing. Death would be much preferable to life under such a measure. If the Government were not cowards as well as tyrants they would give the Irish people the chance of fighting for their liberties with arms in their hands, and of showing that their feeling against this Bill was not only a feeling that found expression in words, but a feeling that stirred the lion heart—the Irish heart—to a flame, and to meet England, if there was anything like equal odds, on the battle field, and die rather than live in a country trampled under by such infamous laws. By this Bill the Government were trying to make bitter the feelings of hatred which had always been entertained by the people of Ire- land towards England, and were trying to undo the good work for Ireland undertaken by the right hon. Member for Mid Lothian and other English gentlemen, who had stepped out of the ranks of bigotry and ignorance to endeavour to do justice to Ireland. He (Mr. W. Redmond) had been second to no man in his hatred of England, and though on the head of the Government the blood would rest if there were crime in Ireland as a result of the Bill, he appealed to the people of Ireland to refrain from violence and continue to trust in the goodwill of right hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House, who were determined that justice should be done to Ireland. The Chief Secretary for Ireland had made statements regarding Ireland which were baseless and without the slightest foundation.

That is characteristic of him.

Order, order! Do I understand the hon. Gentleman to have used the expression, "That is characteristic of him?"

Yes; I said characteristic.

Then the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the expression.

Well, Sir, of course, if it is not in Order I will withdraw it.

Order, order! When I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw, I expect a withdrawal in the manner that this House is accustomed to.

If you order me to withdraw it, Sir, I will withdraw it.

, in conclusion, said, the Irish people would continue to believe in the ultimate triumph of the principles of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian; and, permanent though the Coercion Bill might be, still more permanent was the determination of the Irish people to get the management of their own affairs.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 119; Noes 180: Majority 61. [7.58 P.M.]

, in rising to move that the following Clause be added to the Bill:—

"A person convicted by a special jury or by a court before which his trial has been had by virtue of an order made under section four of this Act may appeal either against the conviction and sentence of the court or against the sentence alone to the court of appeal on any ground, whether of law or of fact; and the court of appeal shall have power after hearing the appeal to confirm the conviction and sentence, or to enter an acquittal or to vary the conviction and sentence: Provided that—

"( a ) The conviction shall not be varied save by substituting a conviction for some less offence, for which the court by which the trial was had, had jurisdiction to convict the appellant; and

"( b ) The sentence shall not be increased,"

said, that in the Act of 1882 there were three Judges whose conduct could be inquired into by that House; and although those three Judges might be unanimously in favour of a conviction in any case under the Act which was brought before them, it was thought right to give a prisoner the right of appeal. Under Clause 4 of the Bill the Crown had the power to transfer the trial of a prisoner from one county to another at the very last moment; and he had no doubt the provision would be exercised when the Crown would be in a position to know they would be able to get a Judge in a certain district of the kidney of Judge Lawson or Judge O'Brien who might be relied upon to convict by hook or by crook. It was absolutely necessary there should be some right of appeal; and he did not see how the Chief Secretary for Ireland could decline to accept a clause of such a simple and effective character as the one he had moved.

New Clause (Appeal to lie in certain criminal trials,)—( Mr. Chance, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."

said, it was not possible for the Government to accept this clause. So far as this Bill was concerned, no change of tribunal was contemplated, that being reserved for the new Bill which the Government intended to introduce. If the hon. Member referred to the Act of 1882, it would not be found to support his proposition. He was of opinion that no case had been made out to induce them to grant this right of appeal. Where trial by jury was not possible the Government might contemplate trial by another Court, and when that proposal came before the House it might then be proper to raise this question of appeal.

said, it was very gracious of the hon. and learned Gentleman to arouse the interest of the Irish Members in the new Coercion Bill. Probably he thought they would petition for an Autumn Session. He would remind the Attorney General that when the Grand Committee on Law had a measure for the amendment of the general Criminal Law of England under its consideration a proposal for giving a right of appeal in all serious criminal cases received the support of the previous Law Officers of the Crown and other high legal authorities. Again, the Court of Cassation in France corresponded very much to what was now proposed under that new clause, and in several of the United States of America a similar kind of appeal existed. The request which the Irish Members now made was a very moderate one; but the Government apparently did not care for any Irish public opinion, and thought they might safely override it, relying on what the London newspapers described as the rising wave of English public opinion. They would, however, perhaps discover before very long that the sentiment of the English people was really against their coercive policy.

said, that the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Colonel Nolan) was entirely in error in supposing that an appeal similar to that proposed by this clause was given in France to the Court of Cassation, There was no appeal from any Court of Assize in France to the Court of Cassation on any matter of fact; but the appeal was entirely on a matter of law, and there was no power to vary the conviction or the sentence. The Court of Cassation could only say that a mistake had been made on a matter of law or of form, and send the case back to another Court of Assize that it might be tried over again, with the direction on the matter of law which was given by the Court of Cassation.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,

said, the hon. and learned Attorney General was scarcely dealing with the arguments of his hon. Friend (Mr. Chance). On his main argument he did not venture to say a single word. It was quite true that the analogy of the Crimes Act was hardly in point in moving this clause, seeing that the right of appeal under the Crimes Act was only given in the case of trials which were had before a Commission of Judges. What his hon. Friend mainly relied on was the provisions of the Criminal Code which successive Governments had supported in the House, and which contained a provision similar to this. It was within his recollection that a Bill embodying the principle of a Court of Appeal in all criminal cases actually passed through both Houses, and was only abandoned because the Government regarded it as the complement of another Bill which they failed to pass through the House of Commons. The proposal contained in the clause was most reasonable, and he hoped it would be enacted as some mitigation of the provisions of the Bill. Such a provision as that now before the House would have prevented the alleged miscarriage of justice in the Maamtrasna and other cases.

supported the Amendment, and expressed his opinion that if even now there were an appeal in the Crossmaglen, Barbavilla, and Maamtrasna cases the verdicts of the juries would be reversed, and such men as Bryan Kilmartin and others now suffering an unjust imprisonment would be set at liberty.

said, they believed in Westmeath that if a Court of Appeal existed they could con- clusively prove the innocence of the Barbavilla prisoners. Evidence establishing the innocence of an accused person often came to light after his conviction. Why was this Amendment refused? Was it because the Government feared exposure of the means by which they had procured convictions? The Barbavilla prisoners, he believed, were convicted because they were Land Leaguers. One of these gentlemen, Mr. M'Cormack, who held 300 acres of land, happened to be secretary to the Land League; and he (Mr. Tuite) and the people of the County Westmeath were convinced that he was sent to penal servitude for no other reason. He advised the Government not to reject the Amendment, as the result of rejecting it would be to condemn many innocent men to waste their lives in prison.

said, that the object of this Amendment was to make provision for the better administration of the Act, and to provide that persons who had serious, solid, and earnest grounds for appealing against decisions which they considered unfair and unjust might have the right to have those decisions reviewed in the ordinary course before a Court which would command more respect than a tribunal of Resident Magistrates of the class and calibre of Captain Plunkett.

said, the Government refused to give persons brought before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction the right to appeal; and yet they had at the present time, when no Coercion Act was in force, examples of the utter incapacity of certain Resident Magistrates to discharge their duties in a fair and impartial spirit.

said, that the Amendment only referred to trials by jury, and Resident Magistrates could not try cases with juries.

said, that the power of pardoning which the Home Secretary possessed in this country, in Ireland belonged to the Lord Lieutenant, who was a political officer, and would be bound to act under the advice of the Chief Secretary.

said, he would appeal to the Government—if they could not accept the pre- sent Amendment—to bring up some clause giving the right of appeal in the class of cases referred to in the Amendment. He thought that justice would be more effectively carried out if the tribunal before which the case first came was conscious that there existed a right of appeal.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 96; Noes 145: Majority 49.—(Div. List, No. 260.)

, in moving the following Clause:—

"(1.) The evidence taken on a trial before a special jury, under section three of this Act, or at a court of assize at which such trial has been ordered to be had, under section four of this Act, the charge to the jury delivered by the judge, and the applications (if any) made on behalf of the accused to the judge, together with the judge's replies thereto, shall be taken down by a shorthand writer, who shall be sworn to take the same accurately, to the best of his ability.

"(2.) The original shorthand notes so taken may be used as evidence in any proceedings in error or in appeal.

"(3.) A true transcription of such shorthand notes or any part thereof shall be supplied to the accused or his solicitor on payment of the sum of twopence for each folio of seventy-two words in the same,"

said, that if the necessity existed in the case of the three Judges of keeping an accurate record of the proceedings at these trials, there was a double necessity in the case of proceedings in connection with a trial before 12 irresponsible jurors who would rejoice in the chance of convicting a Nationalist. Several Irish Judges had the fullest confidence of the Irish people. He would quite admit that no necessity would exist for keeping such a check on the proceedings of the Court of a Judge like the Chief Baron or Baron Dowse or Justices Andrews or Harris; but he must recollect that that was a permanent Bill, and there had been Judges on the English Bench such as Scroggs and Jeffreys, and there might be Judges in Ireland who would creep into their position on the Irish Bench through the back stairs of Dublin Castle, and who would be anxious to acknowledge their reward by complaisantly carrying out the behests of the Executive.

New Clause (Proceedings on certain criminal trials to be reported in shorthand,)—( Mr. Chance, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."

said, it was impossible for the Government to accept the Amendment, which was really consequential on the one just decided. The only reason which could render the Amendment necessary would be if an Appeal Court was constituted. But the House had disposed of that subject. It might or might not be a desirable thing to have shorthand notes; but he would call the hon. Member's attention to this fact—the present Bill was not a Bill to alter the general law of the country, but it was a Bill to carry out certain necessary provisions to make the Criminal Law effective in particular cases in which the Lord Lieutenant had thought it necessary to issue a Proclamation. To limit the shorthand note to cases where the Lord Lieutenant had issued his Proclamation, or where the trial was held where there had been a change of venue or a special jury, would imply that the tribunal the Government had selected was the very tribunal which, in the opinion of that House, required its proceedings to be checked by a shorthand note. That was a view which would make it utterly impossible for the Government to support it, because the very reason they had added Clauses 3 and 4 was to get an independent and fearless tribunal not influenced by partiality or terror. For these reasons the Government found it impossible to accept the Amendment.

said, the hon. and learned Gentleman had entirely failed to meet the case made out by the hon. Member for South Kilkenny. There were several cases in which a record of the proceedings at a criminal trial would be desirable, and they had a number of precedents for the employment of a shorthand writer. The proceedings of the Chief Land Commission Court in Ireland had always been reported by a shorthand writer, and that House had from time to time ordered Returns founded on the shorthand writer's notes. If the Government acceded to that Amendment, it would enable the public to form a correct opinion on the points involved when any discussion arose as to the adminis- tration of that Act. He ridiculed the argument of the hon. and learned Solicitor General that the acceptance of the Amendment would imply that the Government had no faith in their own tribunals, and he thought that Members on the Government side of the House ought to admit the reasonableness of the contention of the Irish Members, and provide against the mischiefs which they pointed out.

said, the right hon. and learned Attorney General for Ireland had stated that the Government did not intend to administer that Act unfairly; and if the right hon. and learned Gentleman were really serious in that statement, he could not do better than accept the Amendment. The clause proposed by his hon. Friend was an undoubted safeguard, and yet it was opposed by the Government.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 135; Noes 196: Majority 61.—(Div. List, No. 261.)

said, he rose to move the insertion of the following Clause:—

"A sheriff or sub-sheriff uttering or returning any panel of jurors in violation of any provision of 'The Juries Procedure (Ireland) Act, 1872,' shall he guilty of a misdemeanour, and upon conviction he liable to pay a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds, or be imprisoned as a misdemeanant of the first division for a period not exceeding two years from the date of his conviction."

In his opinion, nothing tended more to undermine the confidence of the people in the administration of justice than any interference with the jury panels. But they knew that such interference had frequently occurred in Ireland, and always without entailing any punishment upon the Sheriffs. The hon. Member instanced two recent cases—the trial of the Woodford prisoners at Sligo and the trial of Mr. Dillon and his Colleagues for criminal conspiracy, in Green Street—in which a gross misfeasance had taken place, and in which the Sheriffs had entirely escaped punishment. The insertion of such a clause as this was, therefore, he contended, absolutely necessary.

New Clause (Certain violation of the Juries Act a misdemeanour,) — ( Mr. Chance, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be now read a second time."

said, he must decline to accept the Amendment. This was not a Bill for amending the general Criminal Law of Ireland, but a Bill intended to serve a particular purpose. In the cases alluded to by the hon. Member it had been decided that the Sheriff had been guilty of no fraud or partiality whatever. The Jury Law of Ireland was extremely complicated, and if the Amendment were adopted a Sheriff who committed some mere technical error in connection with the jury panel would be liable to the punishment of a heavy fine. Under the law as it now stood, if a Sheriff, from wilful, corrupt, or partial motives, violated the provisions of the Acts for the empannelling of juries, he would be guilty of a misdemeanour; but that every slip, however innocent, which the Sheriff might make in the case of a complicated Code should be visited with criminal consequences was a proposal which the Government could not accept.

said, that as the Bill created new crimes heretofore unknown to the law, greater care in the administration of the law was required. The hon. and learned Gentleman could hardly suppose that any sane man would propose to punish a Sheriff for what was a mere technical and unintentional error. No such punishment could take place, because no real offence would have been committed under those circumstances, and yet this was the ground gravely put forward by the Solicitor General for refusing to accept the Amendment. The object of this Amendment was to protect the people of Ireland from such gross misconduct in connection with the jury panels as George Bolton had practised for such a long period in Ireland.

said, that Mr. Bolton had nothing whatever to do with the Sheriffs in the discharge of their duty.

said, that perhaps the objection of the Solicitor General for Ireland might be removed by inserting the word "knowingly," so as to make the clause read—

"Knowingly uttering or returning any panel of jurors in violation of any provisions of the Juries Procedure (Ireland) Act, 1872."

said, that the errors of the Sheriffs were always against the prisoners, and the House ought to intervene to prevent the miscarriage of justice which from time to time occurred through their action. It was absolutely impossible for prisoners to prove that the Sheriff acted with partiality, fraud, or wilful misconduct, because all the material on which such a charge could be made was in the possession of the Sheriff. Mr. Davys, in Sligo, did not make the plea that the Jury Laws were too intricate for his great mind. Not at all—he admitted that he never read them. The Jury Laws were not by any means so complex as the Solicitor General said. They were only intricate for the purposes of argument in the House; and he was sure that if the Irish Members introduced a Bill to amend them they would be told that the Jury Laws were perfectly plain. In any case, whether they were simple or complex, the Sub-Sheriffs were paid for understanding them.

said, the refusal of the Government to accept a clause framed in a fair and just spirit would do much to intensify the contempt for the law which at present existed in Ireland. He must strongly protest against the injustice which would be done to peasants under the Bill by increased burdens and redoubled coercion.

said, he felt bound to protest against the conspiracy of silence on the Government Benches. Was the refusal of the Government to accept this Amendment meant that they desired to shield the Sheriffs and Sub-Sheriffs, who were found guilty of violating their duties?

said, the Irish Members from their childhood had had experience of the malpractices which they now denounced; and all they asked, as the Act was to be administered by officials who hated the people, was that if these officials did more than the letter and the word of the Act permitted them to do, they should be punished according to merit.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 107; Noes 221: Majority 114.—(Div. List, No. 262.)

I do not propose, Sir, to move the clause which I have on the Paper by which I proposed to provide that on convictions in criminal trials the juries should decide as to the punishment of the accused. I proceed to move the next clause which stands on the Paper in my name, and which has reference to the procedure on prosecutions for intimidation. In moving this clause I feel under some considerable disadvantage, because we have already in the body of the Bill agreed to a definition of the word "intimidation," without Amendment, discussion, or argument, That definition occurs in Clause 19 which, by the Rules of the House, was put to the Committee without any Member having an opportunity of discussing or moving Amendments to it. We are, therefore, in this difficulty—that we are discussing a new clause without having previously discussed that part of the Bill to which the new clause relates. My clause is in two sections; the first part of it says—

"No conviction shall be had under section two of this Act, in respect of intimidation, unless the summons or warrant originating criminal proceedings in respect thereof specified by name the person or person alleged to have been intimidated."

Section 2, to which reference is here made, the House will remember is the summary jurisdiction section of the Bill. The second part of my clause provides—

"No conviction under section two of this Act shall be had or maintained in respect of intimidation if the person alleged to have been intimidated on oath declares that he has not, by such alleged intimidation, been put in fear for his person, property, or reputation."

I must confess that the second portion of my clause really does provide that which is, to some extent, inconsistent with the definition of the term "intimidation" in the Bill. In dealing with the first portion of my proposal, I will not detain the House any length of time. Up to the present where an offence is alleged under Section 2 of the Bill, a person may be prosecuted and convicted without the summons or warrant originating the criminal proceedings specifying the name of the person or persons alleged to have been intimidated. It is necessary that in criminal proceedings, in respect to murder or assaulting the person, that the person alleged to have been murdered or assaulted shall be specified, and I do not see why the same should not be necessary in regard to the offence of intimidation. I can draw no distinction in this respect between the offences I have mentioned and the offence of intimidation—they are all personal offences. Obviously, the reason the Government have drawn up their Bill in the form in which it stands is that they desire to punish people for intimidation where no person has been intimidated. That would be prevented by the simple clause I move. If any individual should be so seriously intimidated as to render it desirable for the Criminal Law to interfere, the Government, with all their resources, should be in a position to say who it is has been intimidated. If they are not able to say that I am curious to know why they should be allowed to institute a prosecution against any person in respect to the offence of intimidation. In respect to the second section of my clause, I think it is extremely reasonable, and that the Government would have nothing to fear by adopting it. They will hardly maintain that a person alleged to have been intimidated will come forward and commit perjury when that allegation is made if it is a real and true statement of the case. The Government have taken up the time of the House now for a considerable period by the passage of their Criminal Law Amendment Bill, and they have declared that the powers they are taking are ample to protect the law-abiding, and to put down disorders of every kind. If that be so, how can it be for a moment held that intimidation may exist to such a terrific extent that persons alleged to have been intimidated, when called upon to give evidence, will perjure themselves in denying the truth of the allegation? The Government want to have power, under any circumstances, to insist that a person has been intimidated whether it is true or not. Under the old Crimes Act, the Government frequently declared a person to be intimidated, and whether he liked it or not put him on oath. Under such circumstances, persons have been frequently convicted. I can conceive nothing more monstrous, and it is for the purpose of preventing that that I move this Amendment.

New Clause (Procedure on prosecution for intimidation,)—( Mr. Chance, ) brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."