, in moving the insertion of the following clause, after Clause 4—

"On the trial of any person by a judge and jury for any criminal offence under the provisions of section three or section four of this Act, such person shall be entitled on the first calling of the jury panel to require a juror to stand by until the panel is gone through in like manner and to the same extent as the Attorney General or other persons conducting the prosecution on behalf of the Crown is so entitled."

said, it was true that the law on the point of ordering jurors to stand aside was the same in England as in Ireland, but the practice was quite different in each country. In England what was done was that counsel for the prisoner and counsel for the Crown submitted to each other a list of jurors who should not be asked to go into the jury box, and so by a mutual consent practically an equal number of jurors objectionable to the prisoner and to the Crown were excluded from the jury. But in Ireland, owing to the unlimited right to order jurors to stand by which was exercised by the Crown, the Crown had the composition entirely in its own hands. The object of his clause was to put the prisoner and the Crown on the same footing during the empannelling of a jury.

Clause (Accused person entitled to require juror to stand by,)—( Mr. Maurice Healy, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Clause be now read a second time."

said, that the theory of their Criminal Law had been that this right should be given to the Crown on the ground that it was independent, and would act in accordance with the dictates of justice. What was now proposed by the Amendment amounted to this—that the prisoner's right of peremptory challenge should remain, and that he should otherwise be put on a footing of perfect equality with the Crown. If the prisoner was allowed the same right of challenge as the Crown all the panel would be gone through and a jury not obtained, so that some of the men ordered to stand aside would have to be retained when the panel was gone through a second time, with the result that no verdict would be obtained. It was impossible for the Government to accept an Amendment which in effect indicated that they would not act in a spirit of perfect fairness and justice in the administration of this Act of Parliament. The Act would be administered by those who represented the Crown in exactly the same spirit as the Criminal Law was administered throughout the Kingdom. The Irish Members always regarded the Crown with suspicion; but he was sure they would agree that in Ireland it was difficult to get a fair and unbiased jury, and without the action on the part of the Crown to order jurors to stand aside it would be impossible to carry out the law. For these reasons the Government could not accept an Amendment which he could not believe had been proposed with any serious purpose.

said, the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland (Mr. Gibson) seemed to be extremely anxious for the good character of the Crown prosecutors in Ireland, but it would be far better if he showed that anxiety not by speeches but by a course of conduct adopted in carrying out the Criminal Law in Ireland. The argument of the right hon. Gentleman, that the Government would not accept any Amendments which reflected on their good intentions, was preposterous. What was the basis of all agitations for alterations in the Constitution but a distrust in the actions of the Executive Government. It was the height of absurdity for the hon. and learned Solicitor General for Ireland to talk at this time of day in high flowing language of the purity of the hands of the Government injury packing. There was not a man, woman, or child in Ireland who did not know that jury packing had been the right arm of the Government in Ireland for the past century. Even The Daily Express, the accepted organ of the Party to which the hon. and learned Gentleman belonged, had declared recently that since the beginning of English rule in Ireland trial by jury had been a make-believe and a pretence in the country, and that some other dodge should now be adopted. Seeing that the Executive were to have large additional powers against the prisoner, he failed to see why the Government should not concede a small modicum of additional right to the prisoner as against the Crown. He protested against the system of persistent insult against the Catholic jurors of Ireland which had been adopted by some of the banditti of the Castle in imputing to them sympathy with crime. The hon. and learned Solicitor General stated—for that was what his argument amounted to—that there were 75 jurors who in the case of the Phœnix Park murders would not have given a verdict according to the evidence. He (Mr. Dillon) utterly denied such a statement. Would the hon. and learned Gentleman point out one of the Phœnix Park murderers against whom there was evidence who was not convicted? The Crown prosecutors, it was true, stood 75 men by, thereby deliberately placing on those men the stigma that they smpathized with the murderers, but what right had these lawyers to say that those 75 jurors would not give a fair verdict? Was there a single failure of justice in these cases? Every man against whom there was evidence was convicted, and yet the hon. and learned Solicitor General came down to the House and said because a Crown lawyer chose to insult the Catholic citizens of Dublin he was entitled to say they smpathized with the murders in the Park, and refused to give a verdict acording to the evidence. Such a statement as that, if made outside, would be treated as a scandalous libel, for which the hon. and learned Gentleman would be made to suffer the consequences. That was a system of deliberate insult against the Catholic jurors of Ireland deliberately adopted by some of the banditti of the Castle in the shape of lawyers. It was the instrument and means by which one of the most infamous lawyers who ever lived in Ireland had climbed into office and power. This hon. and learned Gentleman, by insulting his Catholic fellow-countrymen, had recommended himself to an alien and infamous Government, and it was no wonder they found lawyers in Dublin who pretented to think it their duty and who feel it to be their pleasure and privilege to take advantage of their position, which saved them from the consequences of their acts, to insult their Catholic fellow-countrymen. He denied that the hon. and learned Solicitor-General had the smallest right to say the Catholic jurors in Dublin sympathized with the Phœnix Park murderers, and refused to give a verdict in accordance with their oath and with the evidence. It was the conduct of the Crown lawyers which produced the deplorable and disastrous change which came over public opinion. If the Phœnix Park murderers had got a fair trial there would not have been shown the demonstrations which afterwards took place, and if certain officials in Dublin were subjected to public contempt and unpopularity on account of the part they took in the trials it was not because they had brought the murderers to justice, but because deep down in the heart of every man there was a feeling against seeing men done to death, even though they were murderers, by foul and dishonourable means, and the feeling which arose in Ireland after the trials was owing to the methods which were employed by the Crown officials, and the feeling that such dishonourable acts ought not to be employed against any creature in human shape. These were the deeds which brought the law into contempt in Ireland, and instead of learning wisdom from the past, the Government were going to plunge on the same road again, and go on packing juries more than ever. What was the machinery under which a fair and impartial jury was to be brought against the prisoner? A Return had been issued a short time ago showing the number of special jurors in Ireland. In the County of Dublin the number of qualified Parliamentary electors was 23,662, and the number of special jurors 960. It should be remembered that men were to be brought from every part of Ireland to be tried before a body of men selected from this number, and yet the hon. and learned Solicitor General for Ireland told the House that the jury was to be an impartial one. Those 960 special jurors had been selected with the view of excluding every man of the class who sympathized with Nationalist views. The Government had manipulated the rating of the County of Dublin so that they might have a jury list more than half of which were men the bitter opponents in politics of the Nationalists, and because the Irish Members asked that when a man was brought before an already packed panel he should have a decent chance of challenging his enemies who were thirsting for his blood, they were told that their desire was to interfere with the course of the administration of justice in Ireland. The refusal of the Government to accept this moderate Amendment plainly showed their intentions. Their intention was to have a perfect system of jury packing, so that jury trial for the future in Ireland would be a fraud and a sham. Personally, he would sooner go before the three Judges than a tribunal selected in this manner. The Government intended to have a set of men who would take their directions from the Crown, and who would arrive at a verdict before listening to the evidence. To any man who should be brought before such a select tribunal, his advice was to tell the jurors that they were perjurers, and not to waste his time or money on the trial.

said, he supported the clause, because he thoroughly believed the Government of Ireland would not act fairly in political cases between man and man, and he was fortified in that opinion by cases in his own experience and by the evidence of history. The right of ordering jurors to stand by was never exercised in England, but in Ireland it was the favourite device of the Crown for securing convictions. Trial by jury as at present constituted in Ireland was a fraud, a mockery, a delusion, and a snare. Those were the words used by Lord Chief Justice Denman in reference to the trial of O'Connell.

said, the statement that the power complained of existed in England as well as in Ireland was most misleading, because the implication was that it was sometimes exercised in England as well as in Ireland in the interest of the prosecution; whereas, he believed it was the fact that if it was ever exercised in England at all it was exercised in favour of the prisoner and not against him. One fact of considerable weight in support of the Amendment was that under the present system in Ireland, while men of the highest character and respectability, fit to sit on any jury, were ordered in every case to stand aside, it was, at the same time, the practice of the Crown to put the same men on several successive juries in cases in which the question at issue was substantially the same—

I must point out to the hon. Member that jury-packing is not the subject of the Amendment before the House.

went on to point out that at the last Winter Assizes in Cork and in Sligo 13 jurors served three times and two jurors twice. They wanted to give power to a prisoner to prevent the Crown, from putting on successive juries the same men who had already served upon a jury and had come to a particular conclusion on what was substantially the same case.

That is not the subject of the Amendment.

said, in his opinion if the Crown was to possess this exceptional power of stand by, and if the prisoner was to be left without it, they would run the risk, and deservedly run the risk, of further widening that want of sympathy with the administration of the law which already existed in Ireland.

said, all they wanted simply was that the prisoner and the Crown should start on equal terms, and should possess the same right of challenge on first going over the panel, and that on going over the panel a second time, the Crown or the prisoner should be compelled to show cause for each challenge. He contended that this Amendment would bring the law of England and Ireland as to the right of the prisoner to challenge practically on all fours. Were Englishmen prepared to allow a continued challenge to the Crown while the accused was only allowed to challenge a very small number? Unless the Amendment were accepted, the right of trial by jury in Ireland had better at once be abolished. He, for his part, would infinitely prefer to be tried before any three Judges on the Irish Bench than before a jury—packed as it would be by the officials of the Crown—of his avowed enemies.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 130; Noes 208: Majority 78.—(Div. List, No. 265.)

, in moving the following clause—

"On the trial had pursuant to any of the provisions of this Act, of any accused person by a judge and jury, the accused shall not, unless with the consent of the prisoner, be tried by a jury exclusively composed of persons of a different religious belief,"

said, it had often been said by Crown lawyers that in ordering jurors to stand aside they were not actuated at all by religious prejudices, but actions of this kind could only be judged by the result, and when it invariably happened that all the jurors ordered to stand aside by the Crown were Roman Catholics who could blame the Irish people for supposing it was because of their religion they were considered by the Crown as unfit to act as jurors? If Roman Catholics were unfit to discharge the important duties which the Constitution cast upon them, let the Government declare it openly and provide for it in some express terms in the Act. The action of Crown lawyers practically repealed the Act of Catholic Emancipation, which was supposed to have placed Catholics on the same footing as Protestants as regards civil rights.

Clause (No juror to be ordered to stand by because of his religious belief,)—( Mr. Maurice Healy, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Clause be now read a second time."

said, he could not believe that the hon. Member was serious in moving the clause, and he could not but express his regret that the time of the House should be taken up in discussing Amendments wholly absurd and impracticable. The Crown had never challenged a juror merely on the ground of his religious belief, and a citizen was never asked by the Government what his religion was. Did the hon. Member propose that a Judge should examine every member of a large panel, containing perhaps as many as 200 gentlemen, as to the nice differences between their creeds? At present the law did not require any citizen in any circumstances to state the nature of his religion. If the clause was adopted how did the hon. Member suppose it could be worked? Suppose, for instance, one of these secret organizations brought over a Mormon as a member, how could a jury of Mormons be obtained to try him? Or take even the case of a Unitarian; he believed it would be impossible in many counties in Ireland to get a dozen men of that religion. He could hardly think that so eccentric a proposal could have been made with a serious intent, and unless it were withdrawn he hoped the House would reject summarily an Amendment which would subject jurymen to a religious inquisition.

said, that those who knew about the working of the jury laws in Ireland viewed this clause as a serious and important one. The Chief Secretary had met it by imagining a state of things which could not possibly exist. This clause meant Roman Catholics and Protestants, and nothing else. The right hon. Gentleman, in his flippant remarks, was merely begging the question. He well knew that the men who were excluded from the jury-box in Ireland were Roman Catholics, and that the clause aimed at meeting that state of things. Nothing was more disgraceful in the history of Ireland than the system of jury-packing which had existed there and still prevailed.

said, the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland was the most absurd he had ever heard made in the House. The assertion of the right hon. Gentleman that it was not the practice of the Crown to inquire into the religion of any citizen was an insult to the intelligence of the House. Every policeman in Ireland, every soldier, and every sailor had to state of what religion he was. The Lord Chancellor in England and the Lord Lieutenant in Ireland were bound to be Protestant, and if the Queen were not a member of the Church of England the hon. Member for South Belfast (Mr. Johnston) would head an armed insurrection. If the religion of the jurors had not been taken into account, it was very strange how Catholics had been systematically Boycotted. It could not have happened by accident. On six juries at the last Sligo Winter Assizes, 60 were Protestants and 12 Catholics; that was five Protestant jurors to one Catholic, although the population of the county was nine Catholics to one Protestant. Law and order, owing to the practice of the Crown, had become mere bye words in Ireland; but still the Tories and Liberal Unionists seemed anxious to perpetuate the practices of the past.

Question put, and negatived.

, in moving the insertion of a clause—

"On the trial of any accused person had pursuant to any of the provisions of this Act by a judge and jury, if such person shall not speak the English language, at least half the jury shall be composed of persons able to speak the language of the prisoner,"

said, his object was to provide that in cases where there had been a change of venue the prisoner should be brought to a district where his language was understood and spoken.

Clause (Constitution of the jury where prisoner does not speak English,)—( Mr. Maurice Healy, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Clause be now read a second time."

said, that it was no novelty to the Criminal Law of England, as the Courts not unfrequently had to deal with a prisoner who could not speak English, and no inconvenience arose. His experience in England was—and he believed those acquainted with the administration of the law in Ireland would say the same—that in such cases the Judges were particularly careful to see that justice was done, and that no inconvenience or disadvantage was sustained by a prisoner in consequence of his not being able to understand the language. On the ground of general principle the Government could not consent to a provision to the effect that half the jury should be composed of persons knowing the language of the prisoner. To do so, besides, would make the trial of such persons in Dublin quite impossible, where the jurors all spoke English. It was an innovation in the law which he could not recognize, and the necessity or expediency of which could not be shown—namely, that Her Majesty's Judges sworn to administer justice, would act otherwise than fairly by a prisoner in the circumstances described.

said, that the clause would meet a real grievance, and it should be adopted. If the Government refused to accept the Amendment, it would be because they were desirous that all these trials should be held in the County Dublin. In times past prisoners had been convicted and hanged in Ireland who did not understand a single word of the language in which the proceedings were conducted.

said, the hon. and learned Attorney General (Sir Richard Webster) objected to this Amendment because it was an innovation. But by his references to the practice in England when trying foreigners and in Wales when trying a Welsh speaking prisoner the hon. and learned Gentleman showed that it was not an innovation at all. No doubt the Judge would do his best to obtain substantial justice, so far as he could, to any Irishman put on trial before him; but something more than this was wanting. They desired to persuade the prisoner that he was receiving substantial justice. Considering that this was a most drastic Coercion Bill, and that there would be a feeling in Ireland that justice was not being obtained by prisoners, the Government ought to stretch a point, and make a third, a fourth, or any proportion of the jury composed of men who understood the Irish language.

Question put, and negatived.

, in moving to insert the following new clause:—

"Upon any trial held under the provisions of sections three or four of this Act, a copy of the panel, from which the jury to try the case is to be drawn, shall be served upon the accused, or his solicitor, at least twenty days before the day of trial, and the solicitor and counsel for the accused shall be entitled to examine and copy, at all reasonable hours, all documents and books in the possession of the sheriff of the county in which such trial is to take place relating to the jurors, jurors' lists, and panels of jurors of that county,"

said, that in order to show the necessity of such a clause as the one he proposed, it was required to investigate the proceedings in connection with several recent trials in Ireland. Whether Sheriffs acted fairly or unfairly, a great many people in Ireland thought they acted corruptly and wrongly; and when they appointed sub-sheriffs, such as the sub-sheriff of the County of Dublin, who had been scheduled in a Report to that House for bribery and corruption, to act in political trials, it was no wonder the people should have some suspicion in regard to them. He considered, as a matter of justice, that the Government ought to accept the clause.

Clause (Right of accused person to receive copy of jury panel and inspect jury books,)—( Mr. Chance, )— brought up, and read a first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Clause be now read a second time."

said, he was unwilling to make any alteration in the existing law with regard to the empannelling of juries. If such abuse as jury packing existed to the extent alleged, there was abundant power to deal with it under the law as it stood. This was not a proper way to deal with the matter; it should be dealt with by a rule, and not by a clause in a Bill. It was a matter of procedure, and it might depend to a great extent upon the place to which, or the time at which, a trial was to be removed. He declined to believe the assertion that jurors had been "got at" by the Crown, or that they had declared their intention to convict before they went into Court. If these things did go on at all, they ought to be dealt with under the general law relating to juries and not in a Bill of this character.

said, that some such provision as this was an an absolute necessity in Ireland, having regard to the past experience of the working of the jury system there. There was nothing unreasonable in this proposal, and he was amazed at the Government attempting to defend the present system. There would be a special necessity under this Bill to give a defendant a copy of the jury panel some days in advance. If 20 were too many, let the Government say 10, or any number that was sufficient for the purpose.

said, he merely rose for the purpose of continuing the debate, because the Government had shown a determined disposition to reject every Amendment, no matter what arguments might be produced in its support. He congratulated the Government upon the stern and un-deviating course they were following in rejecting every proposal made by the Irish Members. He sincerely hoped that the line they had adopted would not lead them into such an abyss of infamy and degradation as he was afraid it ought to do. He could give 20 instances in which the special jurors in Cork had openly avowed their bias against accused persons, and stating, before they heard the evidence, that they intended to convict. He had seen the jury lists circulated in clubs before they were given to the public, for the purpose of finding out who and what was the character of the men who were going to serve on the jury. Why should they not afford the same assistance to the prisoner's counsel as they afforded to the counsel for the Crown? "Down with the prisoner and up with the Crown" was the cry of the Government.

said, that nothing could be more tyrannical, cowardly, and cruelly insulting than the way the Government met the Amendments proposed by the Irish Members. It was enough to make them disgusted with the place. If the Members of the Government were tyrants, they might still be smiling tyrants, and not solemnly sit there all in a row, great functionaries of the British Empire, staring at the Irish Members who were appealing to them, without paying the slightest attention to what they said. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer—

Order, order! The hon. Gentleman must address himself to the clause.

said, he contended that the Amendment was a reasonable one. The First Lord of the Treasury sat with both legs crossed at the Table, and took not the slightest notice of what was said by the Irish Members. It was absolutely infamous that they could not get a reply from the Government to anything they said in that House. The object of the Government was not only to pass a Coercion Bill, but to pass it in the most offensive way possible, and to drive the Nationalist Party from the Constitutional position which they now occupied in that House and in the country. The action of the First Lord of the Treasury reminded him of—

Order, order! The hon. Member's remarks are very personal, and have nothing to do with the clause. For the second time, I must warn the hon. Member.

The whole object of my remarks, Sir, was for the purpose of showing—

called the attention of the House to the continued irrelevance on the part of Mr. William Redmond, Member for North Fermanagh, and directed the hon. Member to discontinue his speech.

said, he thought the case of Woodford and the malpractices which occurred at the last prosecution in Dublin afforded an irresistible reason for this Amendment, which he considered as only fair and reasonable. To his mind, its mere rejection by the Government without any reason assigned would answer the purpose of the Irish Members.

said, that he would ask hon. Members to bear in mind the protest of the Protestant jurors in the Sligo case; and he would like to know whether the object of the Government was to continue to maintain the system against which those men protested, and to perpetuate discord between the different classes and creeds in Ireland. The great difficulty the Irish Members had to contend with was, that they were arguing with people who knew nothing about Ireland. The clause would only insert in the Bill a safeguard against the conviction of an innocent accused; and if the Government did not accept it, some Member of the Government ought at least to get up and give their reason.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 81; Noes 107: Majority 26.—(Div. List, No. 266.)

, in moving to insert the following clause:—

"On the trial of any person or persons by a judge and jury for any criminal offence under the provisions of section three or section four of this act, the judge shall, if so required by or on behalf of such person or persons, reserve any question of law arising on such trial for the decision of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved in Ireland,"

said, in trials of this kind, when questions of law arose, they were only discussed by the counsel and decided by the Judge in a very perfunctory manner, and the decision which the Judge gave under those circumstances would not be one which would be received with any degree of respect or be quoted as a precedent. Under these circumstances, he trusted the Government would accept the Amendment.

Clause (Judge on trial to reserve questions of Law for Court for Crown Cases Reserved, if required,)— Mr. Maurice Healy, )— brought up, read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be now read a second time."

said, he must oppose the Amendment as impracticable, and one which would interfere with the due and proper and speedy administration of justice. It was also alien to the law of the country. As the law now stood, the Judge who presided in the Court had the responsibility of listening to and deciding points of law, and in so doing he was discharging his duty in the face of the public and of the Profession to which he belonged, and under the correction and opinion of that Profession. Decisions at Nisi Prius were not, as had been said by the hon. Member, in any case looked upon by lawyers with disrespect; but, in a criminal case, the Judge would naturally exercise even greater care in his decision, on account of the grave consequences which might follow it. If the Judge should think that a point raised by the defence was really one requiring argument, he could reserve it for consideration by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. But to compel him to refer to that Court every matter, whether serious or frivolous, which might be raised in the guise of a point of law would be to render the whole administration of the law ridiculous. The Government could not accept the Amendment.

, in supporting the Amendment, said, he felt that the arguments of the hon. and learned Solicitor General were absurd. In England, at the present time, a defendant could require a magistrate to state a case as of right, whether the magistrate liked it or not, and he (Dr. Commins) did not see why the same provision should not be made to apply to Judges, so that a person charged with a serious offence might have the same privilege. Judges in Ireland had not one-sixth of the work that English Judges had to do, and there would be no difficulty or inconvenience in forming a Court of Crown Cases Reserved. In this country, in spite of all the Justices' justice of which they heard, the number of cases that came up to be dealt with by such a Court was very small, and the same would be the case in Ireland. No one would take the trouble and expense of going to Dublin to have a weak point argued. He thought, therefore, that there was no force in the arguments raised by the Solicitor General. The hon. and learned Gentleman said the Judges gave their decision in the face of public opinion; but, in Ireland, the Judges had no respect for public opinion, but rather seemed to delight in every opportunity they had of outraging it.

said, that while admitting that the question of reserving points of law for the consideration of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved was decided by the Judges without temper and with a desire to do what was best in the interests of justice, he joined in urging upon the Government the reasonableness of this clause. He did so because he welcomed it as the first dawn of legislation which he hoped before long would be enacted in this country—namely, to make criminal appeal more general, if not universal. He certainly could not see that there was anything in the adoption of this clause which would make the administration of justice absurd, or cast any blot upon it. He thought that the hon. and learned Solicitor General had unintentionally laid too much stress upon the necessity for the speedy administration of justice. For his own part, while in no way wishing for delay, he desired, above all things, that justice should be done. With regard to the contention that this clause was at variance with, and alien to, the general tone of criminal legislation in this country, did not the Bill itself contain provisions which were alien to the practice of the Criminal Law of this country? There had undoubtedly been cases where the decisions of learned Judges upon points taken before them at criminal trials had not given such satisfaction to the public as to make them fully accept those decisions. On the ground, therefore, that this was an opening in the direction of general criminal appeal, and also for special reasons connected with this Bill itself, he intended to vote for the clause.

said, that in their view the scope and object of the Bill was to direct all its terrible machinery, not against criminal combinations, but against all combinations in Ireland. It would be very advisable to have what would amount to the right of appeal, if this clause were adopted, so far as Sections 3 and 4 were concerned. They should remember that the Government would have not only the power of changing the venue under this Act, but the right, practically, of selecting the Judge and the reservation of questions of law, for the Court for Crown Cases Reserved would be entirely at the discretion of the Judges. The Irish Judges, unlike the English Judges, were selected for political considerations, and no matter how just or honourable they might be, they would find it impossible for them to divest themselves of their political leanings on the Bench, especially when they were asked to adjudicate by a Government under which they might be under very great personal obligations. Under these circumstances, it was unsafe to leave in their hands the fate of a political prisoner, without such a safeguard as the proposed clause provided. Prior to 1828, when Lord Brougham made his famous speech on Law Reform, English Judges were selected precisely in the manner in which Irish Judges were selected now; and Lord Brougham, speaking of their action in political trials, said that he and his friends in consultation were able to tell to an iota, not possibly the reasons on which the judgment of a Judge would be given, but what the judgment would be in any political case. Having regard to these considerations, and the fact that this was a Bill "for ever and ever," designed, as they conceived, to cast Irish Nationalist Members into the ditch as politicians, and to ruin a certain political organization, he submitted that a like safeguard should be given to a prisoner under this Bill which would be given to the meanest offender in connection with a bill of exchange.

contended that there was no provision at present existing, either in the Common Law, or in the Act of 1848, giving the Court of Assize the power of reserving a question of law, arising after venue has been changed, to the decision of the higher Court. Unless this clause, or some other similar clause, were inserted in the Bill, prisoners who would be tried under this section would be in a worse position than a man who was tried for petty larceny in the ordinary course.

said, the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General seemed to consider that the large discretion vested in the Judge, at present, as to reserving or not questions of law arising at the trial was satisfactory. In support of his contention that this arrangement was not satisfactory, he (Mr. Pickersgill) would quote four great lawyers—Lord Blackburn, Mr. Justice Lush, Lord Justice Barry, and Sir James Stephen. These lawyers constituted the Criminal Code Commissioners in 1879; and they considered that the absolute discretion of the Judge as to reserving or not questions which arose at the trial ought to be modified. Two remedies were suggested by them. In the first place, they proposed that if a Judge declined to reserve a question of law raised by counsel, he should be compelled to take a note of the matter; and, secondly, that the prisoner should be given the power to apply to a Court of Appeal for leave to appeal, the consent of the Attorney General being previously obtained. He desired, therefore, to force this subject on the attention of the Government, and to ask them to give in some shape or another a power of appeal, either with this condition or without it, and thus to curb the large discretion now vested in a single Judge.

, in supporting the Amendment, said, he wished to bear testimony to the cogency of the arguments advanced in support of it, and, in that view, would point out as a curious spectacle that the Attorney General and the Solicitor General for Ireland would be Judges in a few weeks to exercise the discretion of reserving points of law under the Act. The mode in which Judges were manufactured in Ireland was scandalous; for instance, the latest candidate for the Bench (Mr. Sergeant Peter O'Brien) was as unfit a scoundrel for the position as could be found in Europe.

warned the hon. Member that he was wandering from the subject of the clause before the House.

, continuing, said, that looking as they did upon the Judicial Bench in Ireland as the culmination of a series of corrupt political services, they could not divest their minds of the fact that these Judges might have in them a remnant of the old political feeling which had brought them into the position in which they found themselves.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 84; Noes 114: Majority 30.—(Div. List, No. 267.)

, in moving to insert the following Clause:—

"A writ of error in any criminal cause or matter tried under the provisions of section three or section four of this Act may issue on the certificate of counsel, notwithstanding that the Attorney General's fiat for same has not been obtained,"

said, that if it were decided that in a civil action a defendant could not appeal without the consent of the plaintiff, such an arrangement could be considered suitable only to the region of the burlesque stage; yet the case in criminal matters was even stronger.

Clause (Writ of error to issue without Attorney General's fiat, )—( Mr. Maurice Healy, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Clause be now read a second time."

I listened with close attention to the remarks of the hon. Gentleman; but I am sure the House will agree with me, if hon. Members followed all that he said, that he did not adduce one single argument in favour of his suggested alteration of the law being introduced into the present Bill. I have not the slightest objection to Amendments being proposed by hon. Members below the Gangway opposite, and I am quite ready to discuss all their arguments; but I do respectfully protest against the time of the House being taken up by debating Amendments which have no real connection with the Bill. Speaking of this particular Amendment, I may say that the hon. Member who moved it has himself said that there is no particular reason why it should be submitted in regard to the present measure. He told the House that he availed himself of the opportunity of bringing it forward, because we are now proposing a change in the Criminal Law of Ireland. But if that is a fair argument, it might be applied to 50 or 100 other Amendments which might be proposed for the alteration of the whole of the Criminal Law. For more than 200 years it has been the practice that Writs of Error should only be issued under the fiat of the Attorney General. I can quite understand the contention that those who hold Office in England or Ireland may be actuated by political motives, or may not discharge their duties according to their consciences when they have to deal with matters of this kind; but all I can say is this—I have not filled my present Office very long, but I have seen a variety of cases where this duty has been exercised by the Attorney General for England and the Attorney General for Ireland in years gone by, and I can say that no Attorney General, to my knowledge, has ever declined to issue his fiat for a Writ of Error on political grounds. That fact, coupled with the other fact that the hon. Member has not supported his case by pointing out any defect in the provisions of the Bill, prevents the Government from accepting the Amendment. If the hon. Member could have shown that any provision of the Bill necessitates a change in the practice requiring the authority of the Attorney General for the issue of a Writ of Error, I should have been prepared to meet him; but I decline to discuss the matter as he has put it. A mere suggestion that the Attorney General has been, or may be, actuated by political motives in granting his fiat is no argument. I repudiate the suggestion altogether; and I say, in conclusion, that this is neither the time nor the place for dealing with such an Amendment as that proposed by the hon. Gentleman. I certainly see no reason why the usual practice which has prevailed for so many years should be departed from at the present moment.

The hon. and learned Gentleman omitted to tell the House that, so far as the practice in England is concerned, the issue of the fiat of the Attorney General for a Writ of Error is never refused.

The hon. Gentleman is quite wrong.

No doubt, the experience of the learned Attorney General is greater than my own; but I have certainly heard of cases in which the fiat of the Attorney General has been applied for, and I never yet heard of one in which it was refused. Let me ask why, of all the officers connected with the Executive, the Attorney General is the one, par excellence, who, like Cæsar's wife, must not only be beyond reproach, but above suspicion? The position of the Attorney General in England and in Ireland is so different that I expected the hon. and learned Gentleman would have addressed himself to that point. In Ireland the Attorney General occupies the position of actual prosecutor, and in that capacity he may shut out a defendant or a convicted prisoner from a Writ of Error. He rules the course of procedure, directs a change of venue, if he thinks fit, makes provision for the empannelling of a special jury, and has entire control over the matter. Such a state of circumstances cannot possibly occur in England, because the Attorney General does not take that personal part in prosecutions in England which he takes in Ireland. There is another matter which, I think, deserves the notice of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. Here, in England, and in Ireland too, the issue of a Writ of Error is to be regulated by the mere certificate of counsel. If counsel goes over the record, and is able to point out an error in it, his certificate that there is an error and that it is a proper case for the grant of a Writ of Error is quite sufficient, and an appeal to the House of Lords, where the costs might amount to thousands upon thousands of pounds, is permitted. If a defendant happens to be a pauper lunatic he has that power given to him. There is another class of cases also which is equally important, and in which a certificate of counsel is held to be sufficient, although it is equally capable of inflicting great inconvenience, if not absolute injustice, upon the other side. I refer to the right of litigation in formâ pauperis, which right depends upon the certificate of counsel. If counsel gives a certificate that a particular person has good cause of action, no matter what it may be about, he can bring his action, and can put the defendant to a great amount of expense, worry, and anxiety. Now, the fact that proceedings are allowed to be taken in these two instances affords, I think, a sufficient guarantee that there is no abuse of the right of bringing an action. I believe that the right of obtaining a Writ of Error will also be safeguarded in a man- ner quite sufficient to prevent abuse. Before the issue of a Writ of Error it must be shown that there is an error on the record; the proceedings must have gone wrong in some way. It is not a revision of the judgment of the Court that would be asked for, but there must have been some error in the procedure itself. We have heard a great deal about the packing of juries in Ireland. At all events, many suspicious things have been done, and perhaps that is the secret reason why this alteration is opposed. It is probably felt that it might drag to light some proceedings in connection with the empannelling of juries which are not altogether creditable. Under all the circumstances, I think the Amendment is a very proper one, and that it is quite germane to the Bill—especially when we have regard to the fact that this Bill is undoubtedly a Bill for a political object, and a measure that will be used for political purposes—a Bill in regard to which all the chicanery of the Sheriff's office will probably be put in operation in order to regulate the nature of the proceedings before the Court.

The hon. and learned Attorney General cannot possibly identify his Office with the similar Office in Ireland, except that they are both called by the same name. No two posts in Her Majesty's Dominions could be more distinct. The Attorney General for Ireland occupies a position somewhat resembling that of a Political Resident in some semi-Sovereign State in Europe rather than that of the high legal functionary who holds that position in England. We are of opinion that the fiat of the Attorney General should never be refused whenever a Writ of Error is necessary. The fiat of the Attorney General can only be required in cases where an error is apparent on the face of the record itself. Whether there has been an error will, of course, have to be decided ultimately by the Bench of Judges. The Attorney General, in giving his fiat, acts in a semi-judicial capacity. At any rate, he ought so to act, and if he acts in a semi-judicial capacity there can be no harm in calling upon him to give his fiat or to withhold it in an ordinary case. But where a political question is dealt with, the circumstances are very different. The Attorney General is himself a stimulating agent in political cases. He is the person primarily responsible for launching the proceedings, and he has a tremendous temptation to prevent their failure by the refusal of his fiat. The Attorney General says that the law is the same in England as in Ireland; but in England, as far as I am aware, a Writ of Error has never been refused in an arguable case. But how do matters stand in Ireland? I think the hon. and learned Attorney General has fallen into a slight error in not showing that the clause now proposed to be read a second time ought to be read in close conjunction with Clauses 3 and 4. Clause 3 gives to the Attorney General the power of empannelling a special jury, and Clause 4 regulates the place of trial. These clauses must be read together, and if hon. Members will glance their eyes down Clauses 3 and 4 they will see why the fiat of the Attorney General should not be final—namely, because he, or his agent acting on his behalf, is the stimulating party to these prosecutions. It is quite clear that the Attorney General or anyone representing him can go before the High Court of Justice—which is the Queen's Bench—and practically order and command a mandate from the High Court to change the venue and likewise empannel a special jury. The Court itself has no discretion in the matter, and I can call to mind nothing analogous to this power in the entire course of the jurisprudence of Ireland; because, be it remembered, the gentleman who is to take these exceptional measures must, in the first instance, have formed a strong opinion upon the merits of the case, and yet if an error should appear, or be supposed to appear, on the face of the record he has the tremendous temptation given to him of burking, stopping, and completely abrogating an appeal, and by that means he is able to secure that the verdict, however it may have been arrived at, shall be irreversible. I maintain that if there has been any error in the procedure the Court alone ought to settle it. Why should the person who is most deeply interested be able to stop the further elucidation of his own case? Sir Fitzjames Stephen tells us that in England a Writ of Error has never been refused in an arguable case; but in Ireland I have known many instances in which it has been refused in arguable cases, when the man who was refused it was a party to the case himself. I remember one case distinctly arguable in which the fiat of the Attorney General was refused. In that case, after the refusal of a Writ of Error, I waited upon Mr. Butt—the greatest lawyer of his time. I think it was in 1878, and I asked him whether the refusal was legal? Mr. Butt told me that he himself, in a case in which he was personally concerned, had applied for a Writ of Error, having formed a strong opinion that the fiat of the Attorney General, for which he asked, ought not to be withheld. It was withheld, however, and he went from the Attorney General to the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor did not dispute his Constitutional power to revise the decision of the Attorney General; but he declined to do anything that would neutralize the Attorney General's decision. I think this one instance will show that there may be very severe heart-burnings produced by the way in which the Attorney General exercises this power. Of course, it is quite possible, when any case is taken before the Court, that the Writ of Error cannot be sustained; but still a counsel has full justification, especially in a matter of life and death, for doing everything in his power on behalf of the unfortunate person accused. In all these cases I think that what I must call the scandal of having an Attorney General at one and the same time the litigant, the judge, and the stimulator of action in his own case should be avoided, more especially when it is considered that the Attorney General is the political agent of the Government.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 82; Noes 121: Majority 39.—(Div. List, No. 268.)

I have now to move, after Clause 9, to insert the following clause:—

"On the trial of any accused person had pursuant to the provisions of this Act by a judge and jury, the prosecutor shall have no right to address the jury in reply where the accused person has tendered no evidence."

The hon. and learned Gentleman the English Attorney General has complained because hon. Gentlemen sitting on these Benches have not restricted their Amendments to particular points included in the present Bill. Now, I think that that is hardly an intelligible principle to lay down for the opposition to any measure. No doubt it would be highly convenient to Her Majesty's Ministers if hon. Members who condescend to oppose the measures of the Government would limit themselves to the particular points to which the Government desire to confine them; but I doubt whether, if that principle were adopted, any very effective line of opposition could be taken. What I maintain is that, when a Government introduce a Bill, they must take all the responsibility which attaches to its introduction; and one of their responsibilities is that it must inevitably give rise to a number of discussions, more or less germane to the provisions of the Bill, which may or may not be convenient to the Government, but which, nevertheless, it is their duty to meet. So it is with regard to the Amendments we have been moving. They are all of them Amendments touching the Criminal Law; and, although they may not touch any absolute provision within the four corners of the Bill, at any rate they relate to questions of the highest importance which we should have no other opportunity of bringing under the attention of the House. The clause which I now move is a clause intended to assimilate the law in criminal trials to that which exists in civil trials. In civil trials, if the defendant produces no evidence, the prosecutor has no right of reply. That is a reasonable state of affairs, and I do not see why the same course should not be adopted in criminal trials, which are of far more importance in their results to individuals than any civil trial can be. There is not the slightest reason why the Crown in a criminal prosecution should have any advantage over a plaintiff in a civil action. As far as I am acquainted with the law on the subject, I believe it is the same in England as in Ireland, and that in both cases the Crown has a right of reply, although the prisoner may not call evidence. It is the right of the Crown to address the jury upon the evidence by way of summing up. That right, I believe, was established in Ireland in the trial of Robert Emmett, when the prosecutor's counsel, who afterwards become Lord Plunket, insisted upon his right. Con- sequently, the present state of the law is of long standing; but that fact, I respectfully submit, affords an additional reason for a revision of the law, and for remedying a mischief which has gone on for so long a time. Having regard to the persistent manner in which the Government have met all our Amendments, I cannot hope that I shall be successful in inducing them to accept this; but, at any rate, I cannot admit that the mere fact of the Government having made up their minds to refuse all our Amendments furnishes any reason for inducing hon. Members on these Benches to refrain from pressing reasonable and proper Amendments on the attention of the House.

Clause (Right of prosecutor to address jury,)—( Mr. Maurice Healy, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be now read a second time."

I hope the hon. Gentleman will withdraw not only this, but the next Amendment, which provides that the Judge is not to charge the jury upon the evidence. The Government cannot admit the cogency of the case which has been presented by the hon. Member for this clause, and I am satisfied that it will not commend itself to the assent of the House generally. The suggestion is that the Attorney General should not, in any case, exercise his right of reply. The Attorney General, at present, has a right of reply by himself or by the counsel who represents him, although the prisoner may not call evidence. No doubt there are many unimportant cases in which the prosecuting counsel does not think it necessary to exercise a right of reply; but in cases of considerable importance, where the jury might be misled, in the event of the speech of the prisoner's counsel remaining unanswered, the Attorney General has always exercised his right if he deems it desirable, and in the interests of the administration of criminal justice I do not think that any proposal to get rid of that right ought to receive the sanction of the House. I do not think it necessary to waste further time in discussing the Amendment, and I hope that the House will dispose of it at once either by rejecting it, or by the hon. Member withdrawing it.

The Attorney General for Ireland has always exercised the right of reply, or rather he has always claimed the right, and has very frequently exercised it. It has also been held that any other counsel prosecuting under the direct instructions of the Attorney General can also exercise the Attorney General's right. This clause, however, applies to ordinary prosecutions, as well as to those which are undertaken by the Attorney General. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland assumes that in every prosecution under this measure the Attorney General will prosecute. I should be very sorry to think that he will do so. On the contrary, I hope that the Executive will distribute the patronage of the Castle a little more liberally than by confining all prosecutions to the Attorney General or the Solicitor General. I take it that this clause, if accepted by the House, will not touch the case of prosecutions by the Attorney General, but only the case of an ordinary prosecution carried on under the provisions of the Bill. The clause itself says—

"On the trial of any accused person had pursuant to the provisions of this Act by a judge and jury, the prosecutor shall have no right to address the jury in reply where the accused person has tendered no evidence."

That would not, I take it, include the Attorney General where he prosecutes, but would leave him the same right he has always had, although it is an invidious right, and altogether strained. In England I believe the right of reply is never exercised, except where the accused calls witnesses. Under the Criminal Law Amendment Act it is taken away altogether, and except in the case of the Attorney General himself the prosecuting counsel has no right to reply at all. He has the right of summing up the evidence; but the right of reply is a right which is never exercised, except in a case where the prisoner or the accused person calls evidence. I remember a severe rebuke being administered by the late Mr. Justice Mellor to a counsel who did sum up the evidence in an undefended case. That learned Judge said that it was a most improper proceeding, and one which was altogether inconsistent with the spirit in which the Criminal Law should be administered. He added that an undefended prisoner who called no witnesses was almost sacred, and he expressed a hope that he would never see such a thing done again. But in Ireland the prosecuting counsel, in every case, sums up the evidence, whether the prisoner is defended or not, and the right of reply is exercised whether the prosecutor is the Attorney General or not. I support the Amendment, because I think it would do something, however little, to restore the confidence of the people of Ireland in the administration of the law, and that confidence, at the present moment, has been very severely shaken.

The Solicitor General for Ireland, in speaking against the Amendment, pointed out that the right of reply has been found to be necessary for the purpose of securing law and order, and to prevent the jury from being misled owing to a speech of the prisoner's counsel remaining unanswered. Nevertheless, I must point out a private prosecutor does not enjoy that right; but it is only exercised by the Crown, although the Crown is placed at a great advantage as compared with a private prosecutor, seeing the enormous forces it has at its command, and the bribes it is able to offer to members of the Bar to induce them to conduct its business. Not only can the Crown offer a Judgeship to gentlemen practising at the Bar, but there are other appointments to offices of profit which they can offer to relatives and friends. Nor is this a mere question of theory; it is a matter of ordinary everyday occurrence in Ireland. With all these "resources of civiliaztion" at their command, with the power of catching witnesses and bringing them to the depôt outside Dublin, where they are trained to give evidence—with all these privileges conferred upon them, they find themselves in such a weak and delicate position that they are obliged to claim in every trial the right of a reply, although the prisoner has none, and although, in my opinion, considering the present position of law and order in Ireland, the prisoner ought certainly to have the last word. I cannot conceive why the Government should provide that the last word should be had by the prosecuting counsel. Is it the opinion of the Government that there would be no sufficient safeguard for law and order without affording the opportunity for a great forensic display on the part of the Attorney or Solicitor General? Perhaps, however, the real reason which induces the Government to adhere to this privilege is that, as a matter of delicacy, they desire to save the Judges from the necessity of launching into violent and passionate political tirades when it becomes their duty to charge the jury. I remember taking an English visitor into one of the Irish Courts, presided over at the time by Mr. Justice O'Brien, who, in the course of the proceedings, delivered one of those political harangues for which he is famous. My friend, who had listened with eyes and mouth wide open, drew a long breath when he reached the outside of the Court, and exclaimed—"Why, this man is a political partizan." I confess that, having been trained in the ways of criminal prosecutions in Ireland, I was unable to feel the same surprise. In Ireland we find that the Crown cannot rely upon the preservation of law and order, unless they are able to inflame the minds of such juries as those we have seen in the counties of Down and Antrim by embittered and underhand attacks such as those we have long been accustomed to hear from Gentlemen who have occupied the position of Attorney and Solicitor General in Ireland.

I regret that, instead of meeting the Amendment in the manner which we on these Benches expected, we have simply heard from the Government, through the mouth of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General, the stale and hackneyed phrase, non possumus, although no arguments to show why that is so have been forthcoming. It has always been recognized, during my experience, which has extended over nearly 13 years of practice in the Profession to which I belong, that where no evidence has been tendered or produced on behalf of a prisoner there is no right of reply. There was formerly a Member of this House who was a distinguished ornament of the Legal Profession of Ireland in his time, and one of the oldest advocates in that country. I refer to the late Mr. M'Carthy Downing. On one occasion, in a criminal prosecution, where Mr. Downing defended the prisoner, relying upon the weakness of the case for the prosecution, he tendered no evidence, and yet the right of reply was claimed by the prosecuting counsel. Mr. Downing argued that there was no such right; that not having called a witness, and not having given evidence, but the information having formed the basis of the trial, no reply lay in the mouth of the prosecutor. The Judge held with Mr. Downing, and the matter, on being referred to a higher tribunal, was decided in his favour. The decision was that in that particular instance the principle was sound; that no reply could be had; and that, in fact, no reply was admissible where no evidence had been given. The Amendment, as it appears on the Paper, says—

"On the trial of any accused person had pursuant to the provisions of this Act by a Judge and jury, the prosecutor shall have no right to address the jury in reply where the accused person has tendered no evidence."

Now, we know very well how these provisions are adopted in Ireland. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland said that the right of reply is one of those rights which are inherent in the Attorney General. But the Attorney General does not prosecute in every case. It may happen that in a prosecution under this very measure the person who will represent the Attorney General may be some Crown Prosecutor at a Court of Quarter Sessions, or a junior barrister at some Assize Court. As is very well known, there are many of these gentlemen who are anxious to win their spurs, and to show what their forsneic eloquence is; and, having the mantle of the Attorney General thrown over them, they will consider it their bounden duty to make long speeches to the jury, in order to show what manner of men they are, so that they may establish their claim to consideration when positions of emolument become vacant hereafter. These gentlemen will be tempted to pose as the Solicitor Generals and Attorney Generals in futuro. What I contend is that gentlemen occupying that position, and acting as nothing more than Crown Prosecuters, have no right to arrogate to themselves such rights and privileges which, undoubtedly, their ability, character, and standing would not justify them in demanding. In a case where no evidence has been given or read, and where no information is put in, and where the advocate of the accused merely relies on the weakness of the Crown case, nothing could be more fair or reasonable than to exclude the Crown from the right of making a reply to the case put forward on the part of the prisoner. Evidence may be given which it has been necessary to translate from the Irish into the English language by means of an interpreter. Some of these clever gentlemen, because a witness happened to be illiterate and unsophisticated, and because he gave his evidence in some hesitating way, would avail themselves of the opportunity of making a long and probably a strong speech to the jury. The witnesses would have given their evidence for what it was worth; but these gentlemen, representing the Attorney General, would endeavour to detract from the weight of the evidence, and place it before the eyes of the jury in an altogether different aspect from that which, under other circumstances, it would bear. Where no evidence has been given, it has always been laid down that the case should be allowed to go to the jury plainly and simply upon its merits; that the Judge, if he likes, may sum up the evidence, but without note and without comment; and I think it would be straining the punitive character of this measure to its utmost tension if the Attorney General and those who represent him are to have the right of turning the evidence upside down in order to induce a jury to bring in a verdict of guilty per fas et nefas.

We cannot hope that any words of ours can have the slightest effect upon the Treasury Bench; and it is a waste of time for Irish Members to press any clause upon the Government, seeing that they obdurately refuse to listen or to accept any Amendment we propose. But I believe that the great tribunal outside this House, the mass of the English people who are looking on at our proceedings, will, when the proper time arrives, treat us as we think we are entitled to be treated. The hon. Member for Cork (Mr. Maurice Healy) has told the House that this innovation, in giving the Crown Prosecutor a right of reply, was first introduced in the trial of Robert Emmett. Who was the Judge who tried Robert Emmett? It was Lord Norbury, whose name and acts are execrated by every honest Irishman. At the present mo- ment, the Crown Prosecutor knows full well everything the Crown witnesses are able to prove; and in opening his case he can address the jury on all the evidence he is about to lay before them. Having addressed the jury to his heart's content, I think he should be satisfied with the examination of his witnesses, and then permit the solicitor or counsel for the defence to address himself to the evidence which has been proved before the jury. That is all that the Government are fairly entitled to ask on behalf of the Crown Prosecutor; and, under the circumstances, I think it is scarcely decent for them to refuse to accept this clause. I think they should be satisfied with having put their case before the jury in an opening address from the Crown Prosecutor, and with calling their witnesses. If anything is then wanted, it would, no doubt, be supplemented by the charge of the Judge. The Attorney General has now got his special jury, and is able to get the venue changed; and I do not see why he should wish to confer further rights and privileges upon the Crown. Under this Bill the Government have all the power and the people have none. Indeed, the measure has been well defined by a very high authority as an act of pure despotism.

I cannot help expressing some regret that we should constantly hear from the Treasury Bench the same reply to all the Motions which are made on this side of the House. We have been anxious, if possible, to hear from the Solicitor General for Ireland some argument against the clauses which have been put on the Paper by my hon. Friend; but we have not yet had a single instance in which he has brought forward a valid argument against any Amendment which has been proposed. What is our position in regard to the Amendment now before the House? The Amendment says—

"On the trial of any person accused had pursuant to the provisions of this Act by a judge and jury, the prosecutor shall have no right to address the jury in reply where the accused person has tendered no evidence."

I venture to assert that the adoption of the Amendment would simply insure the adoption in Ireland of the same practice as that which at present exists in England. We all know that not only in theory, but in practice, the right of reply is conferred on the Crown in criminal cases provided the Attorney General is prosecutor. But in what cases does he prosecute in England? He only prosecutes in the gravest and most important criminal cases—in trials where the crime has attracted universal attention. In fact, nothing but a crime of appalling magnitude would warrant the intervention of the Attorney General or his deputy. In such cases he has the right of reply, and is perfectly entitled to exercise it. But how does the Attorney General act in Ireland? His functions there are not limited to crimes of grave importance, but he is accustomed to prosecute in cases of the most contemptible character, which would not receive the attention of any man of standing at the English Bar, yet every case of this kind calls for the intervention of the Attorney General for Ireland, and if he does not act himself he appoints a deputy. Let me take the case of the ordinary Public Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor can always act for the Attorney General; but in cases where he does not act for the Attorney General he would have no right of reply whatever. Then, I should like to know why the Attorney General and his friends should be placed in any better position in regard to the conduct of criminal cases in Ireland than the Public Prosecutor? The Public Prosecutor in England is deprived of the right of reply, at any rate, where no witnesses are called; and I wish to know on what principle of justice the privilege is to be extended nominally to the Attorney General for Ireland, but really to some minor lawyer belonging to a class of men who never stop at anything for the purpose of carrying their point and securing a conviction by hook or by crook? They receive their instructions from Dublin Castle, and they care very little whether the persons they are prosecuting are guilty or innocent. These are the men who have distinguished themselves in the past, above all others, by the outrageous extravagance of the conduct they have pursued in the Courts of Ireland, and who, in 99 cases out of 100, are not only tolerated but smiled at and approved by the Magisterial Benches appointed by the officials of Dublin Castle.

Question put, and negatived.

I beg now to move, after Clause 9, to insert the following Clause:—

"On the trial of any accused person had pursuant to the provisions of this Act by a judge and jury, the judge shall not charge the jury upon the evidence, but may address to them any statement as to the Law bearing on the case which he may think necessary."

We have heard a great deal, in the course of our debates on this Bill, about the Scotch law, and last night an hon. Member introduced into the discussion the principles of the French law. For the sake of variety, I hope I may be allowed to make an incursion upon American law in connection with this clause. Of course, I am aware that in the American judicial system the law varies in different States; but I think I am correct in saying that in the majority of the United States of America the existing law is in the position in which the clause I now propose would place the law in Ireland. There was a famous case tried in America some four years ago, in which a man named Guiteau was tried for the murder of President Garfield. In that case the Judge was not allowed to sum up the evidence, and it went to the jury simply upon the evidence as it was derived from the witnesses themselves. I would ask what valid reason can be urged against the proposition I make? Why should a Judge take upon himself the function of reproducing the evidence as he has taken it down from the witnesses, and redelivering it highly coloured, and to some extent tainted by the peculiar medium of his own mind? In my opinion, it should be taken by the jury at first hand from the witnesses themselves. That is what the jury ought to do; but, unfortunately, the experience of most people in Ireland is that the result of this practice of permitting Judges to sum up the evidence is that the jurors in a great many cases sit with their hands before them, and do not pay the smallest attention to the case until the Judge commences his charge, and then they accept everything that drops from him as gospel truth. The position I take is that there is nothing that an intelligent juror, desirous of doing his duty in a proper manner, can get from the Judge's charge which he could not get a good deal better from the evidence which fell from the wit- nesses. I ask why should the Judge be permitted to colour the evidence and pervert the accounts given by the witnesses according to the peculiar cast he may think fit to give in the summing up? Why should the Judge have the power of mimimizing the evidence? Why should he, in his charge to the jury, set off the evidence of one witness at considerable length, and pass over that of another in a summary manner? It seems to me that the whole system of Judges' charges is simply an excrescence which has grown up in the English judicial system, and which should long ago have been rectified as a gross abuse. If this system of permitting the Judges to charge juries, and to deliver under the guise of a charge their own view as to what decision the jury ought to pronounce—if this practice generally is objectionable, then it is particularly objectionable in Ireland. I have no desire to cast any reflection upon any class; but I think it will be admitted by right hon. and learned Gentlemen who sit on the opposite Bench that among a large section of the Irish people there exists a strong impression that some of the Judges do not bring to the discharge of their duties that spirit of fairness and impartiality which it is desirable, in all matters between the Crown and its subjects, should animate the administration of justice. That being so, there exists special reasons in Ireland why this anomaly of the Judges' charges should be got rid of. Of course, I know what the reply of the hon. and learned Solicitor General will be. He is dead against the Amendment, and I have no doubt, when the proper time arrives, he will resist it without argument and without explaining his reasons. It appears to me that it is an Amendment which raises a question of considerable interest and importance. It is an Amendment which well deserves the consideration of right hon. and learned Gentlemen sitting opposite, both now, in relation to this Bill, and hereafter in relation to the ordinary procedure in criminal cases, as well in this country as in Ireland. I trust that although they may not receive the present Amendment with favour they will bring their minds to bear upon the subject, and will be induced to consider the importance of the question I have raised. Although I do not hope, in the present case, to receive from them any consideration of an impartial character I trust I may expect on some future occasion, when the amendment of the Criminal Law generally is under discussion, that this point will not be lost sight of.

Clause (Judge's charge to jury,)—( Mr. Maurice Healy, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Clause be now read a second time."

I do not propose to lengthen the discussion of this clause by more than a few sentences. I confess, however, that the clause appears to me to put a climax on the series of absurd propositions by which the time of the House has been wasted throughout the evening. It is sufficient to read the words of the clause to justify my astonishment that any hon. Member should have placed such a proposition on the Paper, and called it an amendment of the Criminal Law. The Amendment says—

"On the trial of any accused person had pursuant to the provisions of this Act by a judge and jury, the judge shall not charge the jury upon the evidence, but may address to them any statement as to the Law bearing on the case which he may think necessary."

If the complaints we hear made on the other side of the House as to the character of the juries by which these cases are to be tried have any foundation whatever, this Amendment would have the effect of striking away the very safeguard of the defendant in the administration of justice. A jury may be sitting for hours, or may be more than one day listening to the evidence, which evidence they have not had the means of taking down. The jury, moreover, will probably consist of persons who are unused to the consideration and sifting of evidence, and they would be almost helpless when they come to deal with the case if it were not for the assistance given to them by the trained lawyer who presides at the trial, and who enables them to recall to their minds the salient points of the evidence already given. This Amendment forbids the Judge to say anything to the jury upon the evidence; but it does not condemn him to absolute silence, because it goes on to say that he may address to them any statement he may think necessary as to the law bearing on the case. Is it suggested that the Judge may read passages from a treatise on law, but that he must not address the jury upon any of the facts of the case, or refer at all to the case itself? How is he to tell the jury what the law is by which they are to be bound, unless he is entitled to charge them as to the facts as well as the law, in the sense in which any Judge who charges a jury upon facts does so for the purpose of recalling to their mind the important statements of witnesses upon oath? The Judge reminds them of admissions and omissions which have been made which may shake the authority and credibility of the evidence; and his charge, in fact, is the means of informing them of the points which it is their duty to take into consideration. To adopt an Amendment of this kind would make the conduct of a criminal trial ridiculous, and I cannot conceive that in making the proposal any other effect could be anticipated than that of occupying an extra 15 or 20 minutes of the sorely burdened time of the House.

I have no wish to enter into the merits of the Amendment, nor am I quite certain as to the course which ought to be taken in regard to it; but when the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General gets up and says that an Amendment is the climax of the absurd propositions put before the House by the hon. Member for Cork (Mr. Maurice Healy he only shows how utterly unfit lawyers are to legislate upon anything brought before this House. It was predicted that evil results would be produced by the French Revolution when it was perceived how many lawyers were in the National Convention. In this case, the hon. and learned Gentleman seems to be under the impression that everything which occurs in England with regard to the law must be right. Now, what is there absurd in my hon. Friend bringing forward a change of procedure which is accepted by 16,000,000 Anglo-speaking people? [Sir EDWARD CLARKE: Where?] In America. I was about to say that I was surprised at the ignorance of the hon. and learned Member; but I am certainly not surprised at it. What I maintain is that the hon. and learned Gentleman has no right, instead of answering fairly the Amendment brought forward by my hon. Friend, to bring these general accusations, which are the outcome, if he will excuse me for saying so, of his own legal ignorance.

It seems to me that the speech of the hon. and learned Solicitor General has put the climax of absurdity upon the proceedings of the Treasury Bench, as they have been carried on in connection with this measure for so long a period. I believe my hon. Friend (Mr. Labouchere) is perfectly right when he says that in the States of the American Union—perhaps not in all, but certainly in the State of New York, and I believe in others—a Judge cannot charge a jury with regard to the evidence, but he can only charge them with regard to the law. He cannot comment upon the evidence; he cannot deliver anything in the nature of a speech either for or against the prisoner; he can only charge the jury as to the law. He can state the law, and he does so, although the Solicitor General asks how he can state the law without going into the facts of the case? I think the hon. and learned Gentleman ought to see that the two things are totally distinct, and that it is not necessary to go into the facts of a case for the purpose of explaining the law to the jury. The hon. and learned Gentleman says that the jury will consist of untrained men; that they will have no opportunity of taking down the evidence; and that at the end of two or three days they will have forgotten what the evidence was. But what is counsel retained for? He has the right of summing up and summarizing the evidence, and as the jury are supposed to be intelligent men it is for them to judge what the merits of the case are from the speeches of counsel, and not afterwards to rely, as so many of them are undoubtedly in the habit of relying, almost entirely upon the charge they receive from the Bench. I believe that a fairer principle would be to allow the jury to act upon the proposal contained in the Amendment of my hon. Friend, and I am satisfied that justice would be much better administered than it is at present.

I will not trouble the House with more than one or two observations, but I think that the Solicitor General did not quite comprehend the clause. He has not properly given what the idea of my hon. Friend was in proposing the Amendment. The idea of my hon. Friend is clearly this—that the Judge, as in America, should be entitled to read all the evidence over, but that be shall not criticize it or argue upon it. So far from that being an absurd proposition, I think it would be a very valuable alteration of the law. At present the Judge becomes the critic of the evidence, and, instead of giving the evidence as he has taken it down, he is in the habit of delivering a kind of homily upon it. I have myself heard Judges sum up what they called the evidence when the summing up has been altogether different from the evidence. And they are not always strictly impartial; but they not unfrequently impress their own personality in the point of view which they place before the jury, putting all the force they can into it in their summing up of the evidence. In some cases the Judge's summing up is a mere parody of the evidence, and nothing is more common than to have a verdict set aside because the Judge did not put a material part of the evidence to the jury. Very often the Judge suppresses evidence that would tell against his own opinion, and he endeavours to impress the rest of it in the strongest way upon the jury. So far, then, from this Amendment being an absurd alteration of the law, I believe it would be a very valuable addition to the law to confine the Judge to the mere reading of the evidence as he has taken it down, without allowing him to criticize it or warp it in the direction of his own view.

Question put, and negatived.

I beg to move, after Clause 9, to insert the following clause:—

"In the case of any order or decree made by the High Court in any criminal cause or matter, in relation to any of the provisions of this Act, an appeal shall lie in respect of same to Her Majesty's Court of Appeal in Ireland."

I must say that I am not prepared to accept the dictum of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General, that any particular proposition is absurd because that hon. and learned Gentleman thinks fit to say so. All this clause provides is, that in the case of any order or decree made by the High Court, in a criminal case, in relation to the provi- sions of the Bill an appeal should be to Her Majesty's Court of Appeal in Ireland. The hon. and learned Solicitor General will not, I presume, make any attack upon that Court. I think, if the hon. and learned Gentleman will take the trouble to go through the whole body of learned gentlemen who compose that Court, he will come to the conclusion that it is a tribunal which, from his own point of view, may be relied upon to administer the provisions of this measure fairly. That being so, is there any reason, if we are to have an appeal at all, that the subjects of Her Majesty ought not to have the right to go to that tribunal when their lives and liberties are in question in connection with some proceeding under this measure? Let me take Clause 4 of the Bill. Clause 4 casts an important duty on the High Court of Justice—namely, the duty of deciding an appeal in reference to a proposal to change the venue. An offence may be committed in a particular district—say, for instance, the County of Cork, and Cork County would be the appropriate venue in which the case should be tried. Her Majesty's Government, however, are not content with that state of the law; and by this Bill it is open for the Attorney General, by his certificate, to appoint any other venue in Ireland, and to remove the trial there ipso facto, unless the defendant succeeds in convincing the Court of Queen's Bench that there is some other venue where the trial may be more satisfactorily had. I do not think that the Government will venture to say that that is not an important duty, and that a decision come to on a matter of that kind is not one that might fairly be submitted to the highest judicial tribunal in Ireland. Let me take a particular prosecution which may be instituted in Ireland. Suppose it is alleged by the Crown that in the County of Cork there is a conspiracy under the Plan of Campaign, and the Attorney General is of opinion that a fair trial cannot be had in the County of Cork, but that the County of Antrim is the best place in which to hold it. Thereupon the defendant demurs, and he appeals to the Court to set the Attorney General right by declaring that the County of Antrim is not a proper place in which to try charges against persons of particular political views. The Court of Queen's Bench is com- posed of a number of learned gentlemen against whom I desire to say nothing, but who are, I am afraid, for the most part politicians holding views which are hardly likely to enable them to form an impartial opinion upon in a case of this kind. That being so, I ask why the Court of Queen's Bench, constituted in that peculiar manner, should take on itself the duty of deciding against the accused, and of upholding the decision of the Attorney General? If the Court of Queen's Bench comes to such a decision as that, would it not be monstrous to prevent the litigant from going to the Court of Appeal—from exercising the right allowed to other litigants? If I bring an action against a person for a sum of £20, and I ask for a change of venue in the Court of Queen's Bench, if my application is refused, I have an appeal to the Court of Appeal—and appeals of this kind latterly have become extremely common. I challenge the Government to give this point their consideration. It is, perhaps, useless to do so; they do not give much attention to our arguments; but for the mere novelty of the thing let them do so now. Let them address themselves to the proposition I put, and explain why it is that an ordinary litigant whose rights are only affected to the extent of £20 or £30 can have an appeal to the High Court of Justice on a question of change of venue, and a man who is charged, it may be, with a capital offence, is to rest content with the decision of an inferior tribunal. If the Court of Appeal is to exist at all, it is exactly in regard to such cases as those to which I refer that it should exist. The last class of cases which should be excluded are cases of the kind to which I allude. Questions might arise under the 1st clause of the Bill, for instance. A prisoner or a witness may be examined on a secret inquiry, and if he refuses to answer certain questions put to him which he may allege to be improper questions he may be sent to prison. He may question the warrant of committal in the Court of Queen's Bench on a writ of habeas corpus or a writ of certiorari, but no appeal will lie from the Court of Queen's Bench. The case being a criminal one, the unfortunate prisoner shut up in gaol would have to be content with an appeal to the lower branch of the Court of Judicature, though, as I have said, he would be en- titled to go to the Court of Appeal if it were only his pecuniary interests which were affected to a very small extent. It comes to this, therefore—that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government a man's liberty is of far less importance than a trumpery question of a few pounds, which may be put in issue in a civil action. I venture to say that the Government will find it extremely difficult to justify this by reason or argument. The present state of the law on this point arises out of one of the provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, passed in 1877, which provided that we should have no appeal in criminal matters from the Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal. For my own part, it seems to me that a provision of that kind is nothing more nor less than an absurdity. I know of no principle in reason or justice on which it can be defended; and, so far from regarding the enactments of the Judicature Act on that point as in any sense precluding me from raising this question, I say that the sooner this monstrous absurdity is put an end to, and the sooner a man put on his trial for his liberty or his life gets the same right as the ordinary litigant, the better. I move, Sir, the clause which stands on the Paper in my name.

Clause (Appeal from High Court of Justice in criminal matter,)—( Mr. Maurice Healy, )—brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Clause be now read a second time."

I must say that, looking at the state of the House and the deserted condition of the Benches opposite during the past five hours, it does not appear that this debate has attracted much attention on the part of what is called the legitimate Opposition. For the past five hours there has been no one on the Front Bench opposite, and for the last four hours there have only been four Members of the Opposition present—two Unionists and two Gladstonian Liberals. I propose to discuss this clause which has been moved by the hon. Member opposite. The hon. Member, I must say, deserves to be congratulated on the ingenuity he has displayed and on his powers of endurance, for this is the ninth Amendment which he has moved and the ninth speech which he has made. The change in the law the hon. Member wishes to introduce by this clause is quite contrary to the decided opinion expressed by Parliament within recent years. It is a change which Parliament refused to sanction when the Judicature Act was passed in 1873. It was then distinctly provided that there should be no appeal whatever in criminal cases, and again in 1877 Parliament laid down the same rule in the Irish Judicature Act; and, so far as I am aware, no attempt has been made to bring about any rescission of that decision of Parliament, which appears to me to have been founded upon considerations of wisdom and expediency.

It only has reference to criminal acts, the right of appeal being allowed in civil actions.

The acceptance of such a clause as this would make the 3rd and 4th sections of the Bill an absurdity. What is the 3rd section of the Bill? Why, it provides that the Attorney General coming into Court is entitled to an order as of right and as of course, allowing a special jury; and yet, though that order is to be made by the Court without the exercise of any judicial discretion on the mere invitation and requirement of the Attorney General it is said that that act, as a ministerial act, is to be a question of appeal.

I did not mention Section 3 at all in my remarks. I did not say that there should be any appeal against the powers of that section.

I do not say that the hon. Gentleman distinctly mentioned the 3rd section; but I am construing the Amendment. He alluded to criminal cases such as would come under that section.

Certainly not.

Well, I say, that an order under Section 3 is a ministerial order which the Court must make on the request of the Attorney General as a matter of course, and that the hon. Member's clause would give an appeal to the Court of Appeal, who are to exercise a judicial function in the matter, notwithstanding that the Court below has exercised no judicial intelligence in the matter. If that is not so, then the Court of Appeal is to be a mere registering tribunal as is the Court of Queen's Bench in the first instance. The hon. Member used an argument as to Section 4 of the Bill. Under that provision the Attorney General for Ireland will be empowered to get an order for a change of venue as of course in the first instance—a change of venue to such county or district as he may desire—and the defendant, if he feels himself aggrieved by that order, may make an application in a certain qualified and limited way to the Court of Queen's Bench. No doubt, the hon. Member is right in describing the tribunal to which the appeal in that case is made as the Court of Queen's Bench. As I understand the argument of the hon. Member, he puts it that there should be an appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench for the reason that he is not able to trust the Judges of that Court. Well, all I can say is, that upon such an argument as that the Government cannot proceed. The Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench are as experienced, as upright, and as much respected as the Judges of any other Court in Ireland. It would be impertinence on my part either to eulogize or to defend these Judges; but I do say this—that if those Judges are, in the opinion of hon. Members below the Gangway opposite, unfit to exercise the functions with which they are entrusted by this Act, why do they not take the ordinary course of proposing a Motion for an Address to the Crown for the removal of these Judges? But I am really not going to discuss this matter as one seriously deserving of criticism; because it appears to me that it is put forward as a not very interesting subject of forensic ingenuity and speculation, and I do not believe it was intended to attract serious attention in the House. I would ask the House at this late hour—at five minutes past 12—to proceed at once to a Division upon this clause.

I do not know how to account for the refusal of the hon. and learned Gentleman seriously to consider this question. It does not appear in his speech, unless it be that the too ready eloquence of the hon. and learned Gentleman makes it impossible for us in this quarter of the House to catch all he says. He seems to have failed to meet the observations made by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Cork. My hon. Friend pointed out that an appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench is allowed in civil actions; and he asked why, therefore, appeals should not be allowed in criminal matters, which are infinitely more important so far as the individuals interested are concerned? Surely it is a much more serious thing to be tried for your life than to be prosecuted for a debt of £20 or £50. In the case of a civil suit for £20, if the defendant objects to the venue he can appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench, and carry his appeal from that Court to the Court of Appeal. Well, if a man is being tried for his life, add if the venue has been laid in Antrim from Cork, if he objects to being tried in Antrim and appeals, he cannot go beyond the Court of Queen's Bench. Well, I do not wish to question the honour and uprightness of the Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench. That is beyond the question before us; but, while we do not impugn the integrity of those officials, what we claim is, that the Judges of that Court are liable to be mistaken and to be in error like all other mortals. It must be remembered that the Judges to whom we wish to have an appeal are not less distinguished as lawyers or as men of experience than the Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench. The proof of that is this—that the Judges of the Court of Appeal are the flower of the Irish Judicial Bench. It has been said that Parliament has refused to accept the principle of appeal in criminal cases; but I would remind the House that some of the most distinguished lawyers in this country have advocated that principle. It was advocated by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, and by those who drafted the Criminal Code Bill—and Sir James Fitzjames Stephen since then has become Lord Justice of Appeal. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland stated that Parliament has twice—both in the English Act of 1873 and the Irish Act of 1877—distinctly refused to yield to this principle of allowing a prisoner to appeal in a criminal case. The hon. and learned Gentleman knows very well that in the draft Code of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen and the other three Judges one of the most important proposals in the codification of the English Law was this right of appeal in criminal cases. That principle was distinctly recognized; it was the most valuable principle in the whole of the new draft Code. I contend that it is owing to the inability of Parliament to deal in a proper way with the Business of these two countries that that draft Code Bill has not long since become the law of the land. If Parliament were capable of dealing with the Business that comes before it, it would long since have sanctioned the principle of allowing a prisoner a right of appeal in criminal cases; and I believe that if I appeal to the lawyers in the House, they, without exception, will say that they are in favour, in the abstract, of the principle of such appeals. I have not heard recently of any lawyer refusing to accede to that principle; on the contrary, I have heard almost every lawyer distinctly declare himself in favour of that principle.

I will not detain the House more than two minutes from going to a Division on this question. I think it is rather late in the day to discuss whether or not the granting of an appeal to a prisoner in a criminal case is a right principle to accede to. That matter has been decided years ago. It has been decided in the same way in every civilized country in the world except England, by every legislative authority that presides over the trial of prisoners. The arguments of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland (Mr. Gibson), as a matter of fact, do not touch the arguments of the hon. Member for Cork. My hon. Friend's arguments were these—if you allow an appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench in civil cases, why should you not do so in connection with interlocutory orders which may be made under this Act? The hon. and learned Gentleman's answer to that is very funny; he says the Court of Queen's Bench is composed of honourable and respectable men, and that it would be a kind of insult to them if you were to give the power of appeal against their decisions under the provisions of this Act. Why should it be an insult to give the power of appeal in cases of this kind when it is not an insult to give that power of appeal in regard to any little Nisi Prius case? The hon. and learned Gentleman says that by asking for this appeal we do not trust the Court of Queen's Bench, and that we should demonstrate our want of trust in those Judges not by moving clauses of this kind, but moving an Address to the Crown, asking for their removal. I would answer him by saying why not do that on the Treasury Bench? If it is a matter of trust, then the Government of this country have shown a want of trust in the Court by providing for an appeal in civil cases. I say, therefore, why do not the Treasury move for an Address to remove the Judges? The hon. and learned Gentleman must see that an argument of that kind cuts both ways—that, in fact, it is not an argument at all. Then the hon. and learned Gentleman made some remark about the absence from the House of the friends of the Government, the Liberal Unionists. These Gentlemen, Sir, are probably not present because they feel they can rely upon the Treasury Bench to carry out their views. The hon. and learned Gentleman also remarked upon the absence of the Liberal Members; but why should these Members be present?—they cannot suffer from this Bill. The people who will suffer from this measure are the people of Ireland, and it is the Representatives of the Irish people who have been watching this Bill, and who are watching it now, so carefully and assiduously. The Treasury Bench has its mind made up upon this matter, no doubt; but yet they and, indirectly, the Court of Queen's Bench will have to hear the arguments which we feel bound to adduce. Though our arguments may have no immediate effect, they are bound to have effect in the long run. They are based upon principles of right and justice, and they will be productive of good. They will, at any rate, arouse public opinion, which will lead to valuable improvements in the Criminal Law, not only in Ireland, but in England also.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes 74; Noes 140: Majority 60.—(Div. List, No. 269.) [12.20 A.M.]

The Amendment which I now propose has for its object to remedy an extraordinary omission in the existing law. It has been held, where a person is called upon to enter into a recognizance to keep the peace or be of good behaviour, that the defendant has no right whatsoever to call evidence to disprove the statements made in the affidavit on which the writ is obtained, and it is against that that this Amendment is directed. The second part of my Amendment is consequential, and will enable a person accused to deny that he has done the act alleged, and to call witnesses to prove, if he can, that the allegations made against him are untrue. I propose, after Clause 9, to insert the following clause:—

(Procedure on application for sureties of the peace.)

"(1.) No person shall be bound in recognizance to keep the peace or be of good behaviour unless it shall be proved that such person has committed a criminal offence.

"(2.) Upon the hearing of any such application to bind a person in a recognizance to keep the peace or be of good behaviour, the person accused shall be entitled, by evidence upon oath, delivered either by witnesses in person or by affidavit, to rebut the accusation of crime made against him."

Clause (Procedure on application for sureties of the peace,)—( Mr. Chance, )— brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be now read a second time."

There are two considerations which compel me to oppose the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman. The first is, that it has no connection whatever with the scope of that particular portion of the Criminal Law which is dealt with in this Bill. If on any Bill dealing with a part of the Criminal Law it were competent for any hon. Member to draft and bring in a clause to alter the Criminal Law generally, it seems to me that no Bill dealing with a portion of the Criminal Law could be dealt with within the limits of a single Session, because each day might see fresh Amendments on the Paper, the discussion of which would require one or two nights for their decision—a fact which is obvious, for the Criminal Law is one that cannot be lightly altered. My second objection to the Amendment is, that it supersedes the existing law as to giving recognizances for good behaviour or to keep the peace. It has always been laid down in our law-books, and by our best lawyers, that it was desirable to have laws to prevent as well as punish. It is upon the former that the whole theory with reference to good behaviour is founded; and there has, consequently, existed a preventative jurisdiction in Courts of Summary Jurisdiction for binding over persons to be of good behaviour and keep the peace.

I must direct the attention of the House to the extraordinary proposition laid down by the hon. and learned Solicitor General for Ireland (Mr. Gibson) in his reply on this Amendment. The title of this Bill is a Bill to amend the Criminal Law (Ireland); and, that being so, I want to know on what ground the hon. and learned Solicitor General for Ireland considers he has a right to challenge any proposal to amend the Criminal Law of Ireland? If the Government desire to confine the scope of their Bill to particular lines, why do they not put a Preamble to the Bill to explain the particular principles of the Criminal Law to which the Bill applies? If they had done that, it would have given them some shreds of excuse for saying it is an extraordinary and objectionable course on our part to seek to alter the Criminal Law. The hon. and learned Solicitor General for Ireland says that it is for the Government to bring in a Bill to amend the Criminal Law of Ireland, but that hon. Members of this House are to be confined in their Amendments to the particular alterations of the law which the Government choose to deal with in their Bill. As far as we have been able to judge, the real ground and the only ground of the objection which the hon. and learned Solicitor General and his Colleagues have to this Amendment is this—that whereas every single Amendment to the Criminal Law, as they choose to call it, is an Amendment in favour of the Crown and against the prisoner, the head and front of our offending in introducing, or attempting to introduce, this clause, is that we dare to propose an Amendment which I believe is, to a certain small and limited degree, in favour of the prisoner. The proposition of the Government is this—that they have introduced a Bill which bristles with enormous and extensive alterations of the Criminal Law, against the subject and in favour of the Crown, and it shall not be competent for any hon. Member of this House to propose any alteration of that Bill which would introduce some provision favourable to the prisoner as against the Crown. What is our contention? We say that whereas an enormous, and far-reaching, and complicated alteration of the Criminal Law is being introduced by this Bill, it is perfectly germane to the subject and competent for us to propose that when the Government is being armed with enormous fresh powers they should part with obsolete and ill-defined powers, which have been grossly and frequently abused in Ireland recently. I defy anyone to deny the reasonableness of such a proposition. What we ask is that, having got these enormous powers, enabling them to imprison all those whom they are pleased to call criminals in Ireland, they shall consent, in the same Bill, to part with powers they sought to use against us last winter, and which have been abused in the grossest possible manner. This Amendment I regard as an extremely modest Amendment; and what does it ask? It asks that the prisoner, who is locked up on certain affidavits, and called upon to be of good behaviour, may have some opportunity of proving that he has not been of ill-behaviour, and that there is no ground on which those charges can be made against him. What is the present course of procedure? A man is summoned before the magistrates or the High Court, and he is put to the ignominy and disgrace of being held under heavy bail to be of good behaviour, and his mouth is shut. He is not allowed to offer a single witness or to have an affidavit sworn in his own defence. Perjured affidavits are brought against him. Affidavits are drawn up in Dublin Castle, sworn to order, and the men who swear them perjure themselves in numerous instances, and the prisoner at the bar is held to bail to be of good behaviour, and he is pilloried before the country, just in the same way as the prostitutes and the people lying about the streets are. It was against prostitutes and other dissolute persons that the power to hold to bail was originally granted; but it is under this power that the men of Ireland are to be pilloried before the country—as I was recently—without being able to open their mouths. Men have been held to bail in Ireland to be of good behaviour without being allowed to make the smallest defence or retort. The affidavits in every single instance have been perjured—they have been sworn to by salaried officials of Dublin Castle. I maintain that this is a perfect travesty of justice, and that it is a most reasonable and fair demand on our part that when this enormous alteration of the Criminal Law in favour of the Crown is being made, the Government might grant this small concession to the people of Ireland. This power, which is an old and utterly obsolete power, was never intended by the men who originally granted it to be used against men of decent repute, much less to be used against hon. Members of this House; but, as anybody can ascertain for themselves by consulting the law-books, was intended to be used against a class of persons who, by their known repute and proceedings in the roads or streets, might be expected to commit grievous assault or robbery, and who could be looked upon naturally as disturbers of the public peace. What is the spirit of these Acts according to the old law-books? I will tell you what it is. It is quite evident that the spirit of the old Acts is this—that where in those days—the days before the Poor Law, and in the days of the Civil Wars—men wandered about the country to a much greater extent than now; men from whom it was notorious the peaceful citizens might shrink; men who would sack houses and take away life—for such a state of things there is no parallel now. The evident spirit of the law and of the Legislature was this—that these men could be prevented from committing great crimes because nobody could be found to go bail for them. It was never intended, as I have already said, that this old right should be used against people of good repute, people who could produce heavy bail. When it was found, as civilization advanced—when it was found, in the days of the Stuarts, that men of good repute were placed under heavy bail, laws were enacted to check, to a certain extent, this power. What do the Magistrates and Justices of Ireland do? They go behind these laws; they lay down from the Bench the doctrine that they in acting as they did in my case and in other cases acted upon the intention of the Common Law of England, and upon decisions of Judges anterior to the days of the Stuarts and of Edward III. When we challenged them to produce a single precedent for their conduct they were dumb. There is not a single precedent in English books of this system which we wish to put a stop to in Ireland. The real point and essence of the hon. and learned Solicitor General's speech is this—that while the Government are prepared and are asking this House to make most sweeping and enormous changes in the Criminal Law of Ireland as against the subject, and in favour of the Crown, they deny utterly our right to ask for any alteration which shall take away from the Crown a single power, no matter how obsolete, and no matter how scandalously it has been abused in the near past. That is the position which I think has been persistently maintained by the Law Officers of the Crown throughout the discussions on this Bill. To my mind it is a most scandalous position. In point of fact, the whole conduct of this debate on the Government side of the House has been such as I have never witnessed in this House. We have endeavoured to carry on this debate in a fair spirit; but we have not been allowed to do so, because the entire party forming the majority of the House sit opposite and are determined to force through this House a Bill for which there is no precedent—to force through the House this Bill without observing even the decencies of debate, and without attempting to reply to a single argument which is put forward on behalf of the people against whom this Bill is aimed. Hon. Members speak in condemnation, of our continuance of the debate. Of course, we continue the debate; we are bound as long as we are allowed to stand up in this House to continue the debate, in order to expose, at all events, if we cannot mitigate the brutalities of this Bill, and to make plain the way in which it is being forced through this House by men who positively hate our people. We say we are bound to continue so long as we are allowed to stand up in this House to expose the tactics adopted by the majority of the House, and to do everything in our power to discredit the Party responsible for the introduction of such a Bill. Now, the hon. and learned Solicitor General wound up his speech by saying that it was intended to put under their recognizances to be of good behaviour men who had committed crime. The Amendment is not intended for anything of the sort, and that is a totally false statement of the purport of the Amendment. The hon. and learned Solicitor General knows perfectly well, everybody, of course, knows perfectly well, that in Ireland and in this country it is the common practice of the magistrates, when a man has been proved guilty of an offence, and when, taking into consideration the nature of the offence and of the circumstances surrounding it, they do not choose to commit the man to gaol, they put him under recognizances to be of good behaviour. The first part of the Amendment provides that a man shall be proved to have committed offence, no matter how trifling. You must read the Amendment in conjunction with the Bill, and remember you will only have to prove a criminal offence such as this Bill creates. The other section of the Amendment provides that a prisoner shall be entitled to make some attempt to justify himself, and if he has been held to recognizances on perjured affidavits of police officers, unsupported by an atom of independent evidence, he is to be entitled to put in evidence against that perjured testimony. Now, Sir, the answer even to that proposal, which is an independent proposal and different from that in the first section of the new clause, is "No, we shall not agree to it." Now, I leave it to any man, who has any reason at all, to say whether this is not a reasonable proposal? You will not consider the merits of this question at all, you are determined to go on blindfolded and accept whatever the Government proposes, provided it is against the Irish people, and to reject whatever we propose provided it is in favour of the Irish people. No matter how trifling the advantage on the side of the Irish people a proposition of ours may be, the Conservative Party set their teeth against it. This disposition on your part is accountable for the position we have taken up during this debate. If we are irreconcilable, it is because you were irreconcilable first, and have carried on this discussion from the very outset in a spirit in which no discussion has ever been carried on in this House before. Now, the refusal of this proposal in the face of the gross abuses which have taken place in Ireland during the last few years is only a fresh lesson of the way in which this Act is proposed to be carried out. I do not think that there is the least use in adding any arguments in favour of this clause; but if argument were of avail, it surely ought to influence some hon. Members when they remember what the Government attempted to do last winter. They attempted to force a man under bail certainly, as they themselves admitted, without any precedent in English law for upwards of two centuries, with the deliberate intention of estreating his bail, which they knew, if estreated, would utterly ruin him, and leave him a beggar. They attempted to force this man under heavy bail by the grossest abuse, as we contend, of the law with the deliberate intention of estreating the bail. They endeavoured to estreat the bail, and it was only because they could not pack a jury that they failed to do so. We are entitled to infer from this action on the part of the Executive in Ireland that they are determined to abuse these powers as far as they possibly can.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—( Mr. Clancy. )

I hope that after the very protracted discussion this clause, at least, will be disposed of to-night. The hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) just now admitted that no further argument could be of any avail. [ Cries of "Oh, oh!"] These are the hon. Gentleman's own words. I expect hon. Gentlemen to respect their own language, and, as they appear to think that no further argument can be of avail, I hope they will allow the decision of the House to be taken upon this clause.

I certainly think that one Minister, at all events, ought to answer the powerful speech of the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon). If the debate were adjourned now, a reply to that speech may be given to-morrow, and a Division taken at an early hour. It must be remembered that this Amendment raises a very important question which ought not to be disposed of in the very summary manner desired by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House.

I sat near my hon. Friend (Mr. Dillon) during the whole of his speech, and I can assure the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury that he did not say we had exhausted all the arguments in favour of this clause; but that he saw there was no use in pressing further arguments on the attention of the Benches opposite, because they would pay no attention to those arguments. I certainly think that, if we were now discussing the Amendment and not the Motion for the Adjournment of the Debate, I could enumerate cases occurring in the County of Kerry which would have some influence possibly on the votes of hon. Members opposite. I do not wish for a moment to stand between the House and its decision upon this particular question; but, so far as I can, I would impress upon my hon. Friends beside me the importance of speaking to this Amendment. I regard it as the most important of the clauses which it has yet been attempted to import into the Bill, and it would be a mistake to forego any weapon we may have to-night without insisting on dealing with such a subject.

I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be merciful to us. He may think it possible to dispose of this clause in a few minutes; but I would remind him that on another occasion a subject which it was supposed would be finished in five minutes occupied five hours.

I will not contend with hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway, nor take a course which may have the effect of further wasting the time of the House on the question of the adjournment of the debate. I therefore assent to the adjournment.

In the Committee stage I moved an Amendment which would require the period during which a Proclamation should lie on the Table to be 14 effective days. I remember the Attorney General (Sir Richard Webster) favourably considered that Amendment; but, subsequently, it was withdrawn on the ground that he would consider whether it was necessary to adopt it in the form in which it was drawn. He assured me that if eventually he considered it necessary he would move its insertion. I do not see it on the Paper, and, if I am in Order, I should like to ask the hon. and learned Gentleman whether he has come to any decision upon the point?

The matter has not been lost sight of. I will promise the hon. Member to give my attention to it.

Motion agreed to.

Debate adjourned till To-morrow.

I think, after the discussion that has taken place both last night and this evening, the House will be prepared for a Notice I am now about to give of a Motion which I will move on Thursday—

We shall not be surprised at anything.

Several hon. MEMBERS: The gag.

I wish to give Notice that on Thursday I will move—

"That, at Seven o'clock p.m., on Monday, the 4th day of July, if the proceedings on the Consideration of the Report of the Criminal Law Amendment (Ireland) Bill be not previously concluded, the Speaker shall put forthwith the Question or Questions on any Amendment or Motion already proposed from the Chair.

"Thereafter, such Amendments only may be moved as, being otherwise in order, were printed in the Order Book when public notice of this Order was given, and the Question on such remaining Amendments, if moved, should be put forthwith.

"Mr. Speaker may, at his discretion, take the Vote of the House, after the lapse of two minutes as indicated by the sand-glass, by calling upon the Members who support, and who challenge this decision, successively to rise in their places; and he shall thereupon, as he thinks fit, either declare the determination of the House, or name Tellers for a division.

"From and after the passing of this Order, no Motion of Adjournment shall be allowed unless moved by one of the Members in charge of the Bill, and the Question on such Motion shall be put forthwith."

here rose.

There is no Question before the House.

As a point of Order, I wish to ask whether we may not be permitted to ask Questions of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House in reference to the Notice of Motion he has just given?

It would be quite contrary to Order.

Might I ask, as a point of Order, on what Question the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury spoke when he gave his Notice?

Order, order!

I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury, before we agree to this Report, a question as to the Motion he gave Notice of for Thursday. It seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman selected an extremely inconvenient time to give Notice of this Motion. I should have supposed that, in accordance with the usual custom, he would have given Notice of the Motion on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House, or, if not, at any rate, at half-past 4 o'clock to-morrow. I cannot catch from the right hon. Gentleman's statement whether he proposes in this Resolution—

It is quite out of Order to discuss the Notice which has been given. The hon. Member will see it on the Paper to-morrow. On Thursday the question will come up for discussion in the House, and the hon. Member will have an opportunity of saying anything he wishes to say on the subject.