asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the maximum pay of the bank note stampers in the Bank of England is 30s. per week; whether a Petition has been sent by these men to the Directors praying for increase of pay, and why no notice has ever been taken of it; is it a fact that two bank note stampers, who have completed 50 years' service, applied for a pension and were answered that there was "no pension" made for stampers; and, whether he will favourably consider the claims of these men to increased pay and a pension?

(who replied) said: The hon. Member must have asked this Question under a misapprehension. The Bank of England is not a Government Department, and the Government has nothing whatever to do with the management of its staff, any more than with that of any other bank.

asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he expects soon to be in a position to announce a decision on the subject of the commutation of Military and Naval Pensions; and, if he will consider the propriety of providing that such commutations shall not be allowed in the case of officers liable to be called out for service in certain events, and of providing, on the contrary, that these pensions should be conditional on compliance with such Regulations as shall secure the services of those officers in case of need?

In answer to the hon. Gentleman, I have to say that the whole of this subject is under the consideration of the Secretary of State, and I am not in a position to say when a decision will be arrived at.

asked, whether the matters involved in the second part of the Question would receive the consideration of the Government?

replied in the affirmative.

said, that, seeing the Lord Advocate in his place, be wished to point out that hon. Members had been given to understand that this was to be a Scotch day. They were often told that the convenience of Scotch Members was consulted, and that they had accepted this or accepted that. If Scotch Members was consulted, he, at any rate, was not one of those whose opinion the Government were in the habit of seeking, and he had questioned several of his Friends on the subject, and they had assured him that they were in the same category. He should like to ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman what process was gone through of arriving at the feeling of the Scotch Members with regard to fixing days for Scotch Business?

, in reply, said, that if the Scotch Members had not to-day for Scotch Business they would have Wednesday. He would remind the hon. Member that a meeting was held a short time ago at which the hon. Member was present, and that the general feeling of Scotch Members was that a day should be given for Scotch Business. The Government had desired to give to-day; but owing to events which had happened early this week, as the hon. Gentleman was aware, it had been impossible to adhere to the original intention. Therefore, Wednesday was to be given to the Scotch Members. As the hon. Member seemed to have a special grievance, he would point out to him that it was not always very easy to get at Scotch Members in order to direct their attention on these subjects.

said, the right hon. and learned Gentleman had not answered the general question, which was by what process the opinion of the Scotch Members was to be had?

replied that he did not consider he had arrived at the opinion of the Scotch Members until he had called them together, and then he was guided by the general feeling of those Members, and not by the opinion of individuals.

asked, whether it must be taken that the paragraph in the newspapers which stated that the Scotch Members had been consulted and had elected to take Wednesday was without foundation?

hoped that hon. Members would not be guided, as to what had been stated by himself or any of his Colleagues, by what appeared in the newspapers.

asked, whether the Government intended to take the Burgh Police and Health (Scotland) Bill on Wednesday?

replied in the affirmative.

I have to ask the permission of the House to allow me to make a short statement with regard to a subject affecting the Rules and practice of the House. In several newspapers this morning, and especially in The Times newspaper, there appears a statement as to the contents of the Report of the Committee on the Hyderabad-Deccan Mining Company. That Report has not yet been laid upon the Table of the House; but, still, the paragraphs to which I have referred state with some detail what the contents of that Report are. As far as I can judge, the writer who communicated the contents of these paragraphs to the newspapers, who is said to be a person connected with a Press Agency, must have obtained a copy—probably the original draft copy of the Indian. Report—at a stage and time when that Report had not approached completion, scarcely had been considered, and was simply a tentative draft Report. While I cannot, for a moment, say what that Report is, or may be likely to be, it is, I think, my duty to say that the statements as to the contents of that Report which appears in the newspapers are not only insufficient, but are misleading, fallacious, and in many respects entirely erroneous. I do not think that at this stage I ought to suggest any course that should be taken to meet the evil which has been so flagrantly displayed, as I have not yet had an opportunity of consulting with my Colleagues; but I am sure they will share with me the great regret that I feel that such a course should have been taken in regard to the Report to which I am referring. I wish to say, as distinctly and as emphatically as I can, that the statements connected with the Company are false and erroneous; because it happens in this particular instance that the duties of the Committee were to inquire into the affairs of a Company, the shares of which have been largely dealt with—speculatively dealt with—and, I believe, are still being largely dealt with on the Stock Exchange; and it appears to me that if the Report I refer to is not at once contradicted, the result will be—and it may be that is the result which is desired—that the credulous and the unwary will suffer, and that those who do not possess those qualities will benefit.

said, he hoped the Government would avail themselves of the opportunity that would be afforded them in the Bill that had come down from the Lords with regard to the Newspaper Law of Libel to insert a clause that would in the future put a stop to such practices as had been brought before the House by the right hon. and learned Gentleman.

took the earliest opportunity of asking whether, in regard to the Official Secrets Bill, the Government would take into consideration the question of dealing with not only with those who stole public information, but with the receivers of that stolen information?

asked, whether offences of this sort were not constantly being committed by The Times newspaper; and whether it was not the habit of that journal to get information of this kind which was the result of thefts and forgeries?

It is not possible for me to give a direct answer to the Question of the hon. and learned Member for Longford (Mr. T. M. Healy); but I at once take the opportunity of saying that these occurrences have been of late so frequent that it will be the bounden duty of the Government to consider what measures should be adopted to put a stop to them.

said, he was quite sure it was the wish of all those who took an interest in these Votes that they should not, at that time of the Session, discuss them at any length. Therefore, he would content himself with making as brief a statement as he possibly could. He saw his hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the War Department (Mr. Brodrick) in his place, and he would know perfectly well, with regard to remount horses that were purchased, that supposing the First Army Corps were to be mobilized immediately, they would have the greatest difficulty in the world in obtaining the required number of animals. All the batteries which were now at Aldershot, and supposed to belong to the First Army Corps, had nothing like a full complement of horses. He had a full Return with him of what those batteries consisted, and to mobilize any one of them would require 80 horses, or more in some cases. When they came to 80 more horses for each battery, it meant that, in the event of its being necessary to mobilize the First Army Corps, they would have to fill up the gap by taking horses away from other batteries, and so leaving those batteries absolutely inefficient. He believed the Government were endeavouring to carry out the wishes of the House and the country with regard to the First and Second Army Corps; but the country would never believe or be satisfied that they had a First Army Corps until they saw it complete in the field with all the appliances, and especially the proper number of horses and quantity of transport, necessary. His hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the War Department would not get up and say that there was a proper amount of transport for the First Army Corps at this moment; and that if war should arise, and charge, as the horses did not at first that Army Corps might have to march at a moment's notice from Aldershot, it would be able to do so without experiencing the greatest difficulty in the matter of transport. The first thing that was necessary to every army which was likely to be called out was a full and sufficient amount of transport. That should be always provided. Without that we were nowhere, and until that was accomplished it was no use to tell us that we had a First Army Corps. He should like to know what steps had been taken, and in what position we were, both as regarded remount horses, which were absolutely necessary for making not only the Artillery, but also the Cavalry complete; for, as regarded the Cavalry, they had only a small number of horses in comparison with the number of men. It was because he did not wish to detain the Committee at that period of the Session, though the question was of paramount importance, that he asked his hon. Friend to state, so far as he was able, how many more horses were required to fill up both the Artillery and Cavalry, and also what amount of transport was ready for the First Army Corps?

said, he also should like, on this subject of horses, to know on what system the War Office was going to act with regard to the purchase of these animals? As he understood it, there was a fixed limit of price when the horses were purchased in England, beyond which the War Office could not go—a price fixed for Artillery and Cavalry horses. He had been informed, however, that the War Office had been purchasing horses in Canada, and that horses, when purchased abroad, cost a much higher sum than that which the authorities were allowed to pay in England. If this were the fact, he thought it was extremely unjust to the farmers of England and those concerned in the breeding of horses. If the War Office were allowed to give a higher price for horses purchased abroad than for those purchased in England, it would discourage the breeding of horses valuable for military purposes.

said, on this question he should like to say he thought the best place in the world for the breeding of horses was Ireland. Admiral Rous, who was the greatest authority we had had on horses in this country, was of opinion that there was nothing to equal the limestone pastures of Ireland foa the breeding of horses; and he (Colonel Blundell) would strongly impress upon the War Office to take note of that fact. The other point he would urge was this—it was well known that our regimental transport was the best that could be had; but we could not afford to keep it up. He would suggest to the Secretary of State for War that detachments under non-commissioned officers should be sent from each regiment to form part of the transport corps, and to act under transport officers. By doing that, when we wanted to send a force into the field we should always have a transport service ready without additional cost.

said, he agreed that the question which had been brought forward by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North-West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was a most important one. It was one which had occupied the attention of the Government very largely. The Government realized fully that it was absolutely necessary that they should have a First Army Corps in a position to take the field on short notice. The hon. and gallant Member had given special attention to the question of horses, and, in reply to his observations, he wished to say that while up to this moment we had no reserve of horses whatever, this year, for the first time, experiments had been tried in registering horses belonging to private owners at a fixed annual fee of 10s. These horses were available by the Government at a moment's notice, so that the Government, in a single day, could lay their hands upon the whole number of horses so registered. He was glad to say that the experiment had been entirely successful. The whole of the 7,000 horses, for which a Vote had been taken in this year's Estimates, were already available. A further step could be taken by the Government, and it would be possible to increase this reserve if the House would grant a further sum of money next year. The greater number of these horses was available mainly for transport; but a certain proportion of them also would be available for Artillery and Cavalry services. The fee charged for registration was, as he had said, 10s. per annum, and it would be seen that this was not too high a come in quickly. Now, however, they were coming in very quickly, and these horses would be the nucleus for our mobilization. Then, as to what fell from the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Han-bury), he wished to state that the policy now adopted was to buy our remounts in this country. He believed the origin of the hon. Gentleman's remarks was this—that a small Commission had been sent out to Canada to purchase horses and investigate the desirability of adopting Canada as a purchasing field for horses. The Commission being an experimental one, the expense of purchasing these horses was out of proportion to the number of animals procured, and he believed that the expenses amounted to £52 per horse, which was in excess of the sum allowed for horses in this country—namely, £45. One of the advantages gained by the change in the method of purchasing horses was that whereas under the old system the market depended on the uncertain demands of the Cavalry regiments in certain neighbourhoods, now that the officers of the Government engaged in purchasing travelled about the country and adopted centres or depôts, the farmers would know from time to time where to send their horses. By centralizing the organization they were getting better class horses, and the farmers knew that if they brought their horses to a certain place at a certain time they would be purchased for the Cavalry or the Artillery. The hon. and gallant Member for the Ince Division (Colonel Blundell) had inquired as to the regimental transport. That subject had occupied the very careful consideration of the Quartermaster General, and he (Mr. Brodrick) quite admitted that there was a great deal in the suggestion of his hon. and gallant Friend. A nucleus of regimental transport had been formed, and the opinion which the hon. and gallant Gentleman had expressed in connection therewith would be considered—that was to say, the desirability of training a certain number of noncommissioned officers in transport duty. As to bringing up the Field Batteries of Artillery in the Army Corps to their full strength in regard to horses, the question was one on which the views of the Military Authorities would be most carefully considered by the Secretary of State.

said, he begged to ask the hon. Gentleman if he would inform the Committee at what age these Cavalry re-mounts which were bought for £40 or £45 were obtained. Also, what would be the price given for horses if they were taken compulsorily incases of emergency? It would be interesting to the Committee to have information upon these points.

said, that the horses registered would be paid for at a higher price than other horses compulsorily taken in time of emergency. Their object was to buy horses at four years' old if they could, but to some extent horses were bought at a less price and kept for some time before being put into the service.

asked whether, in the event of an emergency, the prices would be fixed prices?

said, that a higher price would be given for horses actually registered if taken on an emergency than would be paid to the owners of horses not so registered. He could not tell the noble Lord offhand what would be the price paid if horses were taken compulsorily.

said, he desired to say a word upon this subject as one who had been long connected with Cavalry. It was possible, no doubt, by the system of registering, and other means, to obtain on an emergency a number of horses fit either for saddle or harness; but it would be absolutely impossible, in any similar way, to supplement the number of Cavalry recruits. It must be borne in mind that while it only took a few days under a system of registration to obtain horses, and only a week or so to train them to stand fire and the use of the sword over their heads, on the other hand, it took at least a year to train a Cavalry recruit so as to make him available for supplementing a Cavalry regiment. When they bore in mind the short period during which modern wars lasted, and how short and decisive modern campaigns were, it seemed to him that it should be their endeavour to maintain in strength and efficiency that portion of our military organization—namely, the Dragoons and Artillerymen—which it took the longest time to train and prepare. They could get the horses in time for modern warfare, but if the Cavalry and Horse Artillery and the other Artillery were deficient in men no power on earth and no wealth in the Treasury could provide the force we wanted. A change had been recently made in the system of remounting our Cavalry, and he regretted that change for one or two reasons. We had had two systems of remounting our mounted forces for many years in this country—one a system in which the Cavalry officers bought the horses and were responsible for their quality; and the other in the Artillery and Royal Engineers, where a selected officer was appointed to buy for the whole corps. Perhaps he might be some what prejudiced in the matter, but he believed that the Army generally would agree with him that the result of these systems was that the Cavalry was better mounted than the Artillery or Engineers, and that notwithstanding that saddle horses in this country were far scarcer and more difficult to obtain than draft horses, and notwithstanding that Cavalry horses were purchased at £5 less per head than Artillery horses. He thought there had been no sufficient reason shown for the change which had been brought about in the system of purchasing, and he very much regretted that it had occurred. He thought it would have the effect of lessening the competition which existed between regiments, and that pride which officers and men took in the breeding of these horses. Moreover, he did not see what advantage was to accrue from it. It had been said by the Secretary of State that the present system would bring into closer connection the breeder and the Government purchaser; but there was a fallacy in that, as the price given for the horses was a fixed price, and it would be the breeder who, by competition of buyers, would get the advantage, and not the contractors. Allusion had been made to Canadian horses, and he (Sir Frederick Fitz-Wygram) had been a Member of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State to consider the question of buying horses abroad. The object was not to obtain horses in peace time, but to test the foreign markets as to the supply which could be obtained and the quality of the animals. On that Committee evidence was given by gentlemen interested in the foreign breeds with regard to the number of horses all fit for the bit and bridle which could be obtained on an emergency in their respective countries, which appeared to the Committee to be very doubtful. For instance, when he was Inspector General of Cavalry, an Austrian and Hungarian Commission came over to London and offered to produce 10,000 or any less number of horses at the London Docks from Austria-Hungary at £38 a-piece, all five years old, and 15–2 in height. The Committee of which he was Chairman recommended that that offer should be accepted as to 500 horses. They had sent out representatives to Austria, who stayed there six weeks, and they came back, not with 10,000 horses, for that number they were not authorized to buy, but with less than 500. They had been unable to buy even that number in that country. Few of those they did purchase were 15–2 in height, many were only 15–1, and a considerable number were under 15 hands high, and, generally speaking, they were four year old's instead of five year old's. Similar statements had been made in regard to other countries, but the result the Committee came to was that the statements made could not be depended upon at all, and that it would be extremely desirable to send out powers to buy a limited number of horses in foreign countries each year, in order to see the state of the market and whether the horses were fit for the work they were required to do. He thought it a good plan to test the foreign market from time to time to see what it was possible to do in the way of purchasing foreign animals. As to Canada, it was stated that 1,000 horses could be obtained there almost for asking, and the Government therefore had sent out a small Committee; but the result was that after travelling in that country for some time, and giving notice that they were ready to buy, they obtained only 75, of which only 50 were fit for bit and bridle; the remaining 25 being utterly untrained. The Canadian horses, such as were obtained, might be very good; but what was wanted was to ascertain whether Canada was capable of supplying a large number of horses. The desire of the Committee was to ascertain whether, in addition to the number of horses bred at home, they could procure the number from abroad which would be absolutely required in case of war. Something had been said about the desirability of encouraging the breeding of horses in this country. He believed that any attempt in this direction in order to establish a large reserve of horses in this country would be utterly futile. They could never in this or in any other country have any considerable number of horses in reserve beyond those required for the trade of the country. They could not do it, for the reason that each horse cost from £20 to £30 a-year to keep, and they could not put horses in stock as they could boots, shoes, and clothes. It was for this reason that the Commission of which he was Chairman felt the extreme desirability of testing how many horses could be purchased in, and in what foreign countries. During the time of the Egyptian War in 1882, the Remounting Commission bought in this country about 1,800 horses in about three months. Well, that demand for 1,800 horses had a sensible effect in decreasing the number of horses which were in the market for purchase. That went to endorse what he said—namely, that the number of horses fit for bit and bridle and saddle, surplus to the requirements of the country, were very few in this or, he believed, in any other country in the world. He believed that English horses were the best that could be got, and that every encouragement should be given to the English breeder, but he would remind the Committee that no encouragement could over cause to be bred any considerable number of horses beyond the number required for trading purposes in the country. When they had drained the country of horses to a certain extent, there would come a time when the owners of horses would require every one they possessed for the purpose of carrying on their trade, and would be unwilling to part with them, however high the price offered might be. He thought the Government had been most fortunate in their selection of their Re-mount Agent, and no doubt as long as Colonel Raven hill presided over the business, the system would be likely to answer. But they must remember that they had not always been equally successful in their buyer. It was a difficult thing to find men who could buy horses of all classes—namely, Cavalry, Transport, and Artillery horses. Generally speaking a man got his eye set upon one sort of horse, and was a good judge of that class, but of no other class. So far as the re-mount system was concerned, however, he believed it would get a fair trial under the President of the Remount Committee. He should not be at all surprised if it did not answer as well as the old system, and if it was found not to answer, the matter should be inquired into to see whether it could not be improved.

said, he had listened with a great deal of interest to the remarks of the hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just sat down, as he was an immense authority on the question of horses, and he could assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that his remarks would receive the greatest attention. He was sorry the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not altogether approve of the change made in the system of procuring re-mounts; but he would point out that the system had been adopted after careful consideration, and that it had worked very well. On the other hand, he (Mr. Brodrick) was glad that the hon. and gallant Gentleman approved of the officer appointed to take charge of this matter of purchasing remounts. It was quite true that the competition of officers of regiments with each other in the purchase of horses might have been a good thing for the dealer, but it was not an equally good thing for the Government, because under that system every horse was bought at a high price.

said, that that consideration made no difference, because the contract price of the dealer was fixed.

said, they were paying below the maximum price in some cases at the present moment, and the hon. and gallant Gentleman would, no doubt, give the new system a fair trial before condemning it.

said, that he desired to ask a question of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, and as he (Mr. Sinclair) was not a military man he would not detain the Committee any length of time on the subject. The question he wished to put was with regard to the First Army Corps. As a non-military man he ventured to say that this question was receiving considerable attention in the country, and that there was an increasing desire on the part of the public generally to see the First Army Corps ready to be sent out directly any emergency should arise. He should be glad, if within the compass of this Vote, the Government could say whether a complete Army Corps in all its departments of Cavalry, Infantry, Ambulance, Transport, and all other things necessary for its mobilization, could be sent into the field on short notice; and, if not, when the Government hoped that the First Army Corps would be in such a desirable position?

said, he thought he was right in saying that the demands made upon the Government up to now for the equipment of the First Army Corps had been carefully attended to. It was the desire of his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War to place the Army Corps in the position indicated by the hon. Gentleman.

said, he should like to ask what was the precise effect of the registration of horses? Could the Government buy the horses registered at a fixed price?

said, that after registration the Government were in a position to have the horses immediately. The price paid to those who had not registered their horses would be somewhat lower than that paid to those who had registered their horses, when their horses were taken under the Compulsory Clauses of the Act bearing upon this subject.

said, he wished to take advantage of this opportunity to renew the protest he had made on previous occasions with regard to the important questions of soldiers' rations. In his opinion, the soldiers' rations were altogether of an insufficient character, and every time he had raised the question during the past three years, he had been told that the matter was under the consideration of the Government, and he must say he hoped it was under consideration, and the prominent consideration it was receiving would in the end have the effect of bringing about a change for the better. Though he had not been able to excite very much interest in this matter by his own advocacy, he was glad to see that the question was receiving attention in other quarters, and that, amongst other people, the gallant officer in charge of the gynasium at Alder shot had de- livered lectures at the United Service Institute on the subject, and on one occasion Lord Wolseley, Adjutant General to the Forces, had expressed a decided opinion that our soldiers were not sufficiently well fed. He had put before the House on many occasions a sketch of a soldier's diet, and he would briefly refer to that point once more. In the morning each man got for breakfast a cup of coffee, to which he might add milk and sugar if he chose to pay for it, and a piece of dry bread, and he might also add butter if he chose to pay for it; at 12 o'clock he got for his dinner ¾ of a pound of meat, including bone, and some potatoes; and at 4 o'clock he got some more coffee and bread. He got nothing between the 4 o'clock meal and breakfast again on the following day. This dietary was extremely badly arranged, especially for the recruit, who was mostly a growing lad from 18 to 19 years of age. They had to undergo hard work of an anxious and difficult character. The men were not well enough fed, and it had been deliberately settled that they should not get more rations, but should get extra pay, in order to enable them to supplement their official rations out of their own pockets. But they knew well what the soldier was, and what was the class of people from whom he came. Colonel On slow also suggested that the cost of giving extra food to the soldier might be recouped to the nation out of the deferred pay. It had also been proposed that the soldier should be given in the middle of the day—12 o'clock—a light meal of bread and cheese, and that the principal meat meal of the day should be deferred until five o'clock. That would give him something to go on until the next morning. There was no doubt that a great deal of crime in the Army was due to the fact that the men went out in the evening, and took drink on empty stomachs. He suggested that the Government should appoint a Committee of some kind to consider the whole question of soldiers' rations; he did not say it should be a Committee of the House; a Departmental Committee would, no doubt, be good enough. In view of the authoritative opinion on the question expressed by no less an important person than the Adjutant General of the Forces, he thought the time had come when the consideration of the sub- ject by the Government should assume some practical form.

said, that the question of rations was one on which there was great unanimity—there was unanimity on the part of the combatant officer, of the head of the medical service, and also of the various medical officers in the Service, that the rations of the soldiers were inadequate. He believed that were the inquiry suggested by his hon. Friend (Dr. Farquharson) made, it would be found that many of the diseases from which soldiers now suffered and the consequent depletion of the effective ranks were, in a great measure, the result of the inadequate amount of food given to the men. He trusted that the question would receive the consideration of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War.

said, they had heard something of the quantity of food which was allowed by the War Office to each soldier; but there was still another point to consider, and that was whether the soldier actually got the quantity allowed. He (Mr. Hanbury) had some doubt whether, either as to quality or weight, the soldier got what the War Office allowed him. He earnestly hoped his right hon. Friend would give his careful attention to the point. From all he heard, it was by no means the fact that the soldier got the food for which the country paid. He was not quite certain that in the different regiments sufficient care was taken by the orderly officers and the Quartermasters to see that the provisions came up to the proper standard. He would like to hear what was the procedure adopted in the inspection of the food. Was the Commissariat School at Alder shot still in existence? What steps were taken that the officers in each regiment, who were responsible not only for the weight, but for the quality of the food, were men in whom full trust could be placed?

said, he quite agreed with the hon. Member for Preston that the supply of rations required close attention, but did not always get it from the responsible officers. Of course, the hon. Gentleman's remarks applied particularly to the supply of meat. The bread ration was always properly inspected; but such was not the case with the meat. The inspection usually took place at 6 o'clock in the morning, and, owing to the early hour, it was often slurred over. Often a large quantity of bone, and sometimes of very inferior meat, was passed. He agreed with the hon. Gentleman the Member for East Aberdeenshire (Dr. Farquharson) that the present rations were inadequate. There were not many old soldiers in the ranks now; but old soldiers did not spend very much in bread, but they spent so much in drink. It was well known that the more beer a man drank the loss bread he would eat. He believed it was the fact that our bread ration was the lowest ration in Europe; the meat ration was not. If there was a strong reason in favour of raising the meat ration there was one reason against it. Meat could not be wasted, and the evidence given before the Committee was, that if the men got over a pound weight, there was no doubt some meat would be wasted. Whatever was done, it was not possible to touch the soldier's pay. The country had made a contract with its soldiers, and, therefore, it was totally impossible to touch any pay of any men at present in the ranks. Upon the question of the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry, he did not think a Departmental Committee would be as good a body for the purpose as a Committee of the House. Members of the House represented the classes from which recruits were drawn, and, therefore, they might be supposed to know the wants of the people.

said, he admitted that the question of rations was one of the greatest importance. After the evidence given before the Select Committee, and especially by a person so responsible as the Commander-in-Chief, that the meat rations were, in his opinion, inadequate, it became absolutely necessary for who ever was in the position of Secretary of State to go into the subject thoroughly. He felt it his duty to look thoroughly into the subject, and to exhaust it before coming to a decision. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Galway (Colonel Nolan) had suggested that it would be best that the inquiry should be conducted by a Committee of the House. There were several difficulties in the way of the adoption of that suggestion. In the first place, the inquiry, such as it was, should take place before the end of the year, or before the next Estimates were prepared, and a Committee of the House could not well sit until next year. He would, therefore, prefer a Committee which need not be purely Departmental, but which should be outside the House, a Committee which should have upon it men of the necessary knowledge and experience to enable a proper judgment to be arrived at. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury) had asked whether the soldier got the amount of meat allowed by the War Office, and whether the quality was as good as it ought to be? He (Mr. Stanhope) confessed that he did not feel himself capable to discuss that subject. He had heard a good many accounts, and some were undoubtedly in the same sense as those the hon. Member had spoken. He would undertake that the matter should come within the purview of the Committee, so that, if they did deal with the meat ration, it should be put on a satisfactory footing.

said, he must earnestly maintain that three-quarters of a pound of meat was not enough for a young soldier. He had been told by officers who had risen from the ranks, that young soldiers got up from the dinner table hungry, and it had often been pointed out by officers of standing in the Army, and also by eminent medical officers, that we did not give our soldiers enough meat. If we wished to make our Army popular, as we ought to do, we should certainly provide them with a better ration. It might be true that some regiments got better rations than others. That might be, because the quartermaster of one regiment knew more about his business than the quartermaster of another regiment. It might also be because the quality of meat differed in different places. But his chief point was, that as a rule, young orderly officers were not competent to test the quality of meat. Could a young officer of 17 or 18 years of age be expected to know whether meat was good or bad, especially when he had to inspect it at 6 o'clock in the morning, often before the break of day? He held that the three leading men of a regiment, the colonel, the quartermaster, and the adjutant, should be held responsible for the quality of the rations supplied to the men. In the Colonies every soldier was allowed a pound of meat, without bone; whereas, in England, a soldier was only allowed three-quarters of a pound, with bone. If it was necessary to give a soldier abroad a pound of meat, it was equally necessary to give him that quantity here, where his work was harder. The sooner we saw that our men were better fed, the better recruits we would get, and the stronger our men would be when they were sent on foreign service.

said, he trusted that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would not go through the long rigmarole of a Departmental Committee, or any other Committee, to remedy one or two points which everyone admitted were flaws in the present system, and which it was quite possible to remedy without much delay. The question whether three-quarters of a pound of meat, with or without bone, was sufficient for the subsistence of a soldier, might be one which a Departmental Committee might decide; but it was abundantly clear that as to the quality of the meat, the testing ought to be entrusted to men who had the knowledge to enable them to form a proper opinion. He, therefore, hoped his right hon. Friend would, without all the delay consequent on the appointment of a Committee, at once see that the testing of the rations of the British soldier was put in the hands of experienced officers, or other experienced persons.

said, he agreed with what had been said by most of the previous speakers. The quartermaster was responsible for the weight of the meat, but it was the orderly officer who was responsible for the quality of the meat, and many orderly officers had no knowledge whatever of what was good or bad meat. On two or three occasions, when he was Assistant Adjutant General at Cork, the meat was rejected, and when complaint was made, the Commissariat officer said, the fact was that the contract was too low. It was no use for the Government or the Commissariat to hope to get good meat for the soldiers, when they knew the contractor could not buy the meat at the price paid him. The soldier suffered. People did not like to complain. It was well known that many times things were passed over, simply because the private soldier did not like to complain. It was the duty of the officer responsible to see that the rations were all right, and it was the duty of the Government, through the Military Authorities, to see that the officers had that technical knowledge which enabled them to perform the duties required of them. He would be very glad if the Secretary of State for War would take some opportunity of seeing for himself the class of meat served out to our soldiers, because then the right hon. Gentleman would understand the question thoroughly. There were many things which the Secretary of State could look into personally, and in regard to which he could put pressure on the Military Authorities to keep their officers up to the mark. He (General Goldsworthy) considered that the rations were very much less than they ought to be, and that the Government ought to do all they could to make the position of the soldier equal to the men's position in private life, and thus do much to prevent desertion.

said, he wished he could be in several places at once and see more of what was going on. He assured the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury) that there should be no unnecessary delay. If lie was satisfied that anything was going wrong, he would certainly not wait for the Report of the Committee.

, said, he could not for one moment admit that the meat supplied to the Army was not properly inspected. He inspected meat for many years, and he certainly had always seen it examined very carefully. He thought, however, that an inquiry was very advisable. If anyone were to go on board one of our ships, he would see that our sailors were given a very much better breakfast than was served out to our soldiers. At the same time, our soldiers got far more meat than any other soldier. It was perhaps as well that the supply should be exclusive of bone. The bread ration, together with the tea bread, was rather more than was necessary; probably a satisfactory re-arrangement of rations might be made.

said he wished to make one or two remarks upon this Vote. His right hon. Friend was perfectly well aware that it was absolutely necessary that some great alteration should be made in many of the barracks in the country. Of course, it was of the utmost possible importance that we should keep our soldiers in a healthy condition; and we could not do that if we housed them in unhealthy barracks, such as the Royal Barracks in Dublin. It was reported that upwards of £40,000 had been expended on the Royal Barracks. Whether that was so or not he did not know, but he had in his hands a letter from a gallant friend of his, formerly a Member of the House, whose son had been seized with typhoid fever in the Royal Barracks. This was early in the year. His informant had gone over there to nurse his son, and he found that there were no less than four officers of the 4th Dragoon Guards who had been struck down by the fever. His informant told him that his son was in what was called the Palatine Square, and on the same staircase poor Mr. Campbell, of the Black Watch, had died shortly afterwards. Cases of fever were perpetually occurring in the Royal Barracks. It had been said, his informant went on to say, that certain works had been commenced and that certain portions of the barracks had been made healthy, but taking the barracks as a whole they were in much the same condition as they were when he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was quartered there. Palatine Square, where the junior officers of Cavalry and Infantry were quartered, had never yet been healthy. He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) thought that, at any rate, the right hon. Gentleman ought to make a great effort to see that the barracks, which were, no doubt, in a good situation as far as strategical and other purposes were concerned, should be made healthy. His informant also told him that the proposed site of the new barracks was between a cemetery and the public abattoir. He put it to his right hon. Friend whether these were not questions which deserved his most serious consideration.

said, the Committee took evidence in regard to the condition of the barracks of the country, and Sir Redvers Buller and many other eminent officers pointed out the great necessity there was for improvement. All the witnesses pointed to the Galway Barracks as being not only the worst barracks in Ireland, but in the United Kingdom. The Galway Barracks were in a shocking state. Many of the buildings were more than 100 years old, and required renewal. He trusted the Secretary of State for War would, if possible, turn his attention to the Galway Barracks without any delay. There was another subject to which he desired to draw the attention of hon. Members. It was a question of general interest, and possibly applied on a much larger scale to Vote 12, which was not to be taken that day. It did, however, apply to the present Vote to a certain extent. He referred to the question of how contracts for stores were given out.

said, that if they discussed the question of contracts upon that Vote very much time would be occupied.

said, the question was one of great importance; but he found the greatest difficulty in getting it taken up. He was greatly in favour of the principle of open competition.

hoped the hon. and gallant Gentleman would keep his remarks within the limits of the present Vote.

said, that what he desired was that all the stores and works under this Vote should be put up to open competition.

The stores are taken on Vote 12.

said, that between £100,000 and £200,000 worth of stores were provided for under that Vote. If the right hon. Gentleman was in a position to say that everything under the present Vote was put up to open competition, he would make no further remarks on the subject of the advisa- bility of putting everything up to open contract. It was of very great importance that there should be advertised contracts. The key of the whole position was, whether the price of the successful contract was disclosed. A circular was lately issued——

The hon. and gallant Gentleman's remarks are not relevant to this Vote, which relates to contracts for buildings.

said, that he would confine his remarks to contracts for buildings. If the whole of the buildings provided for under this Vote were put up to open and advertised contracts, he would——

said, that personally he was anxious that these contracts should be put up to open competition, but there were many difficulties in the way.

said, that if the Department were only to let the Irish contractors compete for the buildings, they would find a very wide area of competition. But he did not bring that forward as an Irish question or an Irish grievance in any shape or form; he brought it forward as a general question. The amount of contracts not put up to open competition was extremely large. He understood that the Secretary of State for War was impressed with the necessity of, at any rate, increasing the area of competition; but, as a general rule, the contracts of the War Department were not put up to open competition.

Order, order!

said, that he meant to confine his remarks to the Vote under discussion. Under this Vote, £200,000 worth of contracts were not put up to open competition, and the price of the successful contract was not disclosed. He did not think they would ever get things as cheap under any system as under that of open contract. The Department could have the work inspected, and they ought to have sufficient confidence in their engineer officers to know that they would get good work. He knew there were many arguments urged against open contracts. He knew that the Trades Unions took a different view of the matter to the contractors who were in the habit of supplying the War Department. He believed that very often they would, under the system he advocated, get things under cost price.

I must again beg the hon. and gallant Gentleman to keep to the question of buildings to which the Vote relates.

said, he was sorry if he inadvertently strayed from the questions covered by the Vote. He put it to the Secretary of State for War, that if he did not disclose the price paid for the buildings, there could be no real competition. He admitted that the successful contractor for a building might not like anyone to know how cheaply he was doing the work; but still, on the whole, the advantages of open competition greatly outweighed the disadvantages. They never would have contracting altogether removed from the suspicion of jobbery until they made jobbery nearly impossible. It could be made impossible, or very nearly so, if they adopted the system of open tender, and of disclosing the price of the successful tender. He did not suggest that the prices of the unsuccessful tenders should be disclosed. The unsuccessful contractors might not wish to show their hands; but the public would hear of it, if the work was given to any but the lowest tenderer.

said, that in answer to his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North-West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), he had to say that it was true strong evidence was given before the Committee with regard to the condition of different barracks. It was proposed to spend £40,000 during the coming year in improving the condition of barracks. He had reduced the sum to that amount on account of the special effort which was being made that year to strengthen the fortifications. He quite admitted that the question of barrack accommodation throughout the country required attention, and that in some particular cases it required early attention. In the Recess he proposed to devote his attention specially to the matter of improved barrack accommodation. His hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) had referred to the condition of the Royal Barracks, Dublin. The hon. and gallant Gentleman was aware that most of the recommendations made by the Committee which sat on the Royal Barracks had been or were now being carried out. Amongst the recommendations there was a proposal that certain portions of the Royal Barracks should be pulled down. The Department were not exactly carrying out the different proposals made by the Committee, but they were pulling down certain portions of the barracks in the hope that the alterations would tend to the better health of the men quartered there. He assured his hon. and gallant Friend that the Department would turn their attention most carefully to the Royal Barracks, because he thought it was a scandal that there should be constant cases of illness arising there. If science could prevent such unfortunate occurrence, every step should be taken. His hon. and gallant Friend referred to the proposed site of the new barracks. He believed, though he was not certain, that the site was between the cemetery and the public abattoir. The subsoil water had been found to be absolutely impure. He was afraid there was considerable difficulty in finding a thoroughly healthy site anywhere in Dublin, and that the illness in the Royal Barracks and other barracks had arisen just as much from the general insanitary condition of Dublin as from any defects in the barracks. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Galway (Colonel Nolan) had spoken of the contracts for buildings. He would like to say at once, that, personally, he was in favour of open contracts, and he should like to see that system adopted as far as it possibly could be. But it was utterly impossible to adopt the system in all cases of buildings. For instance, in some cases, such as fortifications, special work was required, and it could not be obtained through the system of open contracts.

said, he hoped the Secretary of State for War, when considering the question of the improvement of the general barrack accommodation of the country, would turn his attention to the desirability of redistributing some of the troops in the country. At the present moment they were sent to localities which did not require them, because of the buildings that were there. Some of the buildings were not suitable. If we housed the troops worse than the civil population were housed, and without the same sanitary arrangements, we might depend upon it we would not get a good class of men to join the Army.

said, that undoubtedly that was one of the greatest considerations the Government could have to consider.

said, he did not think the statement of the Secretary of State for War, that the unhealthiness of the Royal Barracks was due to the unsanitary conditions of the City of Dublin, could hardly be considered conclusive, because typhoid fever had for years past—certainly for 30 years past—occurred in only one particular square of the barracks. Such cases were not known in the Royal Square, or other squares of the barracks. He believed the reason was that the Palatine Square was closed up on all four sides, whilst the Royal Square and other squares were open. They could not attribute the outbreaks to the general conditions of Dublin, but must attribute them to local and special causes.

said, he had to submit to the Committee a complaint on behalf of the Harbour Commissioners of Belfast against the War Department. The facts of the complaint were disclosed in a Memorial presented by the Commissioners. Some three years ago, the War Department, through the Military Authorities at Belfast, approached the Commissioners and requested them to grant a piece of ground for the site of a submarine mining establishment at Belfast. The application was made not once, but several times. The correspondence extended over two years, and last year the Commissioners agreed to grant, at a nominal rent, a piece of ground for the purpose. The War Department assented. The Commissioners came to the conclusion that the matter was arranged, and, indeed, closed, and they instructed their solicitor to draw up a lease granting a piece of ground at a nominal rent. The solicitor prepared the lease, and nothing remained to be done except the signing of the document. Suddenly, in the month of April last, the Commissioners, to their amazement, learnt from the War Department that they did not intend to sign the lease, did not intend to have the site they originally intended, but had decided to employ a ship as a joint barrack and submarine mining store. The Commissioners found that they could trust no longer to correspon- dence, and accordingly they came to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. The subject was debated, and the effect of the interview was set out in one paragraph of the Commissioners' Memorial—namely,

"A deputation of your memorialists thereupon waited on the Secretary of State in reference to the matter, and he agreed with them that a land establishment would be preferable to a vessel for the purpose, and said that provision had been made in the Estimates for the cost of the establishments."

The right hon. Gentleman would not question that account of the interview. He (Mr. Sexton) was at a loss to understand why the Department, having, as a result of correspondence extending over a couple of years, agreed to take a piece of land and place upon it a submarine mining store, should have suddenly changed their mind. He did not think that the Harbour Commissioners had been either fairly or respectfully treated. They had been put to the trouble of again and again considering the question, and they had been put to some expense in preparing the lease. It was unfair for the War Department to play fast and loose with a public Body because it happened to be an Irish public Body. The Commissioners objected to a ship being made the store. They said it would be impossible, owing to the demand for space for commercial purposes, to provide a quay berth for the vessel except at very heavy expense. The port of Belfast was not a port to be treated in that way. It was the first commercial port of Ireland, and it stood third amongst all the ports of the United Kingdom. London being first, Liverpool second, and Belfast third. The port of Belfast supplied a large proportion of the funds which enabled the War Department to execute its work. On behalf of the Harbour Commissioners of Belfast, he protested against the course pursued by the War Department. There had been an entire failure on the part of the Government to carry out a specific contract with the Commissioners of Belfast. There was no sum of money included in the Vote for the carrying out of the contract, but he would move the reduction of the Vote.

said, the hon. Member would not be in Order in this, because there was no item in the Vote for carrying out the work to which he referred.

said, there were no doubt communications between the Commissioners of Belfast and the War Office with regard to a site for a submarine mining establishment, and the position was that they had got very near a point of agreement. But it turned out that the site was not suitable for the purpose intended, and that a considerable amount of money would be saved by placing the stores upon a ship instead of on land. It was for that reason that a change had been made. The War Office were desirous of protecting the port of Belfast by a proper submarine mining defence, and they now thought it the best course to put a ship there instead of erecting a building on shore. If the Commissioners approached him on the subject, he should be most glad to meet them, and had no doubt that they would be able to arrive at an agreement. He assured the hon. Gentleman that there had been no disrespect whatever shown towards the Commissioners, and the idea that there was must, he thought, be the result of a misunderstanding. No money was taken for this purpose in the present Vote, because it came under the head of Submarine Mining in Vote 12.

said, he was willing to believe that the right hon. Gentleman had stated the matter according to his memory. He had heard the statement of the Commissioners, which could not be readily put aside. Their Memorial said that they waited on the Secretary of State for War, and that he agreed with them that a land store was preferable to a vessel, and that he had stated that provision had been made in the Estimates. That point he could not set aside. He thought that the unanimous testimony of the Commissioners was about as authoritative as anything in the world, and they said it would be impossible to provide a quay berth for the vessel, except at a very heavy expense. But, as the Chairman ruled that his former proposal was out of Order, he would move the reduction of the Vote to be allotted to Belfast by the amount for new works and additions.

said, this was one of those controversies which had been going on for years, culminating in an agreement between the Commissioners of Belfast and the War Office. The Commissioners wanted considerable additions to the defensive works in their harbour; the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had not made a single objection to that, and an agreement was made, and they went to considerable trouble in considering the expense in preparing a lease, and having prepared a lease they were simply told that it was not the intention of the Government to carry out the verbal agreement made with them. Now, he did not think that this was proper treatment to extend to the Commissioners of a port which stood third in importance in the United Kingdom. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War said that it was proposed to place a ship in the harbour in which to store the very dangerous matters that would be required. He altogether objected to the placing of explosives in a ship in a harbour in which there was a large number of merchant ships. It was elementary knowledge that this would be a most dangerous thing to do; and, moreover, as the space required would be very large, it would add greatly to the expenses of the port. It would, therefore, be less dangerous and considerably cheaper to place the materials on land. But, in opposition to the Harbour Commissioners, who were the first people to be considered in this question, and whose views had been stated and adopted by the War Office Authorities, it had been decided to place these dangerous materials on board a ship which was to be moored among the commercial craft in the port. Under the circumstances, having listened to the answer of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War and the remarks of his hon. Friend, he was bound to say that nothing had been advanced to excuse the position in which the right hon. Gentleman had placed the Commissioners, or the placing of a ship in the midst of the shipping in the port having on board these explosive materials.

said, he was sure the right hon. Gentleman did not intend to treat the Commissioners with any disrespect, and it was very far from his intention to imply that he had done so. He understood that the right hon. Gen- tleman positively stated that the matter was one for investigation.

asked, if the Government would say whether they had finally decided against the proposal that Richmond Park should be given up for the annual meeting of the National Rifle Association?

said, he imagined that this was so, but he was not then in a position to make any announcement on the subject.

said, although very unwilling to take up the time of the Committee, he was obliged to call attention to some facts in relation to the Volunteer Forces. Under the localizing of forces scheme, Volunteer regiments of particular districts were placed under the command of officers commanding in regimental districts. He thought the scheme for localizing the component parts of the Army and bringing them together under one head was extremely good. Volunteers were responsible to an officer selected by the Commander-in-Chief for the regimental district; and they were also to be under the command of some new brigadier, whose functions he did not know. There could surely be no good reason for placing them under a dual control. At present Volunteer officers did not know who was their commanding officer. These Rules had been announced with a considerable flourish of trumpets, but he found that many of the appointments made were not calculated to satisfy Volunteer officers. He found that the Government had been appointing Militia officers to the command of Volunteer brigades; but looking through the Volunteer Regulations he could find no allusion whatever to the command of Volunteers being handed over to any other branch of Her Majesty's Auxiliary Forces. He ventured to think that the appointment of Militia officers for these commands was not in accordance with the Regulations; and in the opinion of many officers it was exceedingly unfair to men who had worked so steadily and well for the Volunteer Forces. He found that a noble Lord who was captain and honorary major was to be appointed colonel and have the command of a brigade. He had no doubt that the Secretary of State had power to do this, but he doubted the wisdom of exercising it. Was it because this honorary major was a noble Lord that he was placed over the heads of efficient volunteer officers? He was quite unable to understand the grounds of the appointment. If these appointments were necessary at all, he thought it was absolutely unwise and unnecessary for the Government to appoint officers over the heads of many men who were quite competent to take command.

said, that, so far as he could learn, these appointments had been received with approval throughout the country; but he believed it would also be recognized that they had been made with the strictest impartiality and with the desire of getting the very best men available for the command of the Volunteer brigades. He believed that offence had not been given to officers of the Volunteer Forces, because men had been selected for command upon their merits, because it was the desire that men should be put in command of brigades who had served not merely as Volunteers. He could say that there was no man more likely to make a good brigade officer, or one who was more fitted for the post, than the noble Lord to whom the hon. and gallant Gentleman had referred. He trusted after these statements that the Committee would allow the Vote to be taken, otherwise he felt that he should be obliged to withdraw it.

said, it was desired by the authorities that, whenever possible, the Volunteers should go into large camps; but the difficulty in the way of their doing this was that they were required to send in their applications at so early a period of the year that it was impossible for them to fix the period at which it was possible to go into camp. He hoped that arrangements would be made which would allow a longer time in which to exercise the option of joining in one of the large military camps.

said, the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Tomlinson) had brought forward an important point, and consideration would be given to the suggestion he had made with a view to meeting it.

said, it would perhaps be convenient to the Committee if he were to state what were the reasons which induced the Admiralty to take over this Vote, and also to enumerate some of the difficulties which were in their way in making the transfer. As the Committee would be aware, in the past the system was that the War Office always bore upon their Estimates the sums provided for naval armaments. The system was that the Admiralty should requisition the War Office and that the War Office should present to Parliament the sum which in their judgment was necessary to make provision for naval armaments. He had described the past practice, in order to make clear to the Committee that it was not a very wise system. The Admiralty used to send over to the War Office a statement of the number of guns which they would require to be provided for the ships, and for each gun a certain amount of ammunition, according to a recognized scale, had to be provided. That ammunition was divided under two heads known as "Outfit" and "Reserve." The War Office then estimated the cost of the gun, and also the cost of providing that amount of ammunition which had to be provided according to the recognized scale. The Estimate was sometimes correct, and sometimes it had to be reduced. It went on to the War Office and became part of the War Office Votes, and not un-frequently it was further reduced, and the result was, that although the quantity of ammunition provided was fixed between the two Departments, there was no system by which the amount of money necessary for the provision of the quantities agreed upon was voted year after year. It was in human nature that when the Admiralty had only to requisition the War Office that there should be a tendency to increase the amount of ammunition to be provided for each gun; and, on the other hand, the tendency of the War Office was rather to decrease the amount of the money provision they had to make for another Department. The Government agreed that a transfer should take place under certain conditions. The War Office undertook to do the work of storing and testing both guns and ammunition, and they further undertook to provide the Admiralty with all information concerning stores and other matters upon which the Estimates were framed. There was a greater difficulty in giving the Admiralty that information in past years. Very often the amount of money taken for naval ordnance and armaments was insufficient, and the Secretary of State for War had to take what was necessary from other items. It was almost impossible, however, in reviewing the intricate and complicated transactions spread over a great number of years, suddenly to furnish that detailed information which his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War hoped last Session would be supplied; but they had a very considerable amount of information, and he would state exactly to the Committee in what respect it was full and in what points it was deficient. They had complete information with regard to the stores at foreign stations, and the outfit and reserve guns there were practically complete. As regarded the home stations, the outfit was complete with the exception of the ammunition for firing guns; but very large orders had been placed this year and last year, and they hoped that the deficiency would be reduced before the close of the financial year. But there was a large deficiency in the home stations in reference to the part of the ammunition known as reserve. What the exact extent was he could not state at the present moment; but there was no doubt that it would be largely reduced before the close of the financial year. It had been quite clear to the Admiralty that if there was the existing deficiency at the commencement of the year they ought to make such provision as would reduce it by the end of that year. Of course, it would have been most unadvisable, in dealing with the existing deficiency, to make an insufficient provision and thus create a prospective deficiency. The cost of naval armaments had very largely increased in recent years. He had before him a table which showed the ratio which the cost of guns and ammunition bore to the ship to which they belonged, and the ratio of percentage had largely increased. He would give one or two illustrations. In the case of the Sultan the cost of guns and outfit was 8 per cent of the cost of machinery and hull; in the case of the Devastation, built about the same time, it was 7·8 per cent. Since then there had been a rapid increase, the ratio being in the case of the Warspite 10 per cent, the Benbow 14 per cent, the Camperdown 16 per cent, the Mersey 19 per cent, and the Archer 20 per cent; and even that percentage showed a tendency to increase. He had had a careful calculation made of what would be the cost of providing three guns and the whole of the ammunition, both outfit and reserve, for all the ships now in course of construction, and he found that on the average the cost of providing guns and ammunition was about 33 per cent of the cost of the hull and engines, or, in other words, about one-third. As he had said, the ammunition was divided under two heads, the outfit and reserve, and the outfit was part of the amount in reserve. For the sake of clearness, he would repeat that, including the guns and outfit and reserve ammunition, the cost of providing the guns was one-third of the cost of constructing the hull and machinery of existing ships. Their shipbuilding programme this year represented in money about £2,600,000, and, according to the calculation referred to, the amount of money necessary to make full provision for the armaments of all ships building or in course of construction would be £860,000. Now the actual amount taken was £1,800,000, so that a very large difference existed between the amount which they provided and the amount required. However, from that margin had to be deducted a certain amount for various expenses. He believed, if they could keep the Estimate at its present high level, that they would very shortly be able to largely decrease the existing deficiency. It was becoming clearer every day that it was not wise to accumulate an enormous quantity of stores which were of a perishable nature. What they had to see was, that there should be an ample supply of those articles which could not be made quickly, and that there was a sufficient supply of perishable materials necessary to meet an emergency. But if the reverse system were adopted of accumulating a large amount of perishable material at the commencement of one year, there would be a large quantity of obsolete material at the close of another. The amount of liability on outstanding contracts which had been handed over to the Admiralty was about £700,000, of which about £400,000 had been contracted for, the remainder representing material which came from Woolwich. Last year, owing to the contractors at Woolwich Arsenal not being able to turn out a sufficient amount of work, the Admiralty had to surrender out of the total Vote no less than £665,000 to the Treasury. If the contractors at the Arsenal at Woolwich had been able to earn all this money, the Admiralty would have been practically able to wipe off the outstanding liability. There having been this very unsatisfactory surrender on the part of the Department this year, the Admiralty would take every precaution against the recurrence of a similar surrender, and therefore he had directed that a larger amount of orders in proportion to the money voted should be put out this year than last year. If all those orders were executed within the year, he might have to ask for a Supplementary Estimate, but that entirely depended on the progress made by the contractors. They accepted, as he had stated in his Memorandum, the responsibility for the sufficiency of the money taken so far as guns were concerned, because they had complete information on the point, and because he had the particulars as to every gun of every ship, including the reserve, either building or about to be built, and the orders had been placed. As regarded the ammunition, the Admiralty could not accept responsibility until they had full and complete information. He had no doubt that they should have such complete information before the close of the financial year, and if then the information showed a larger deficiency than was anticipated, he should not hesitate to submit to the House a Supplementary Estimate.

said, he was indebted to the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty for the statement made with regard to the transfer of this Vote. He was very glad that the noble Lord had been able to carry out the policy which had been decided upon by his (Lord George Hamilton's) Predecessor, but he admitted that the late Board of Admiralty had not had time to overcome a good many difficulties connected with the transfer of the Vote. It was not any easy matter, and he was glad the noble Lord had so arranged matters between the Naval Department and the War Office, and that the whole of the responsibility for the Navy would be placed on the Admiralty. With regard to this Vote he thought the Committee had some reason to complain that they had not a sufficiency of information from the Admiralty. In this Vote the sum of £460,000 was asked for on account of guns, but the Committee were not told what was the nature of the guns that the Admiralty were going to give them. It was admitted by the Admiralty and the noble Lord the First Lord himself, that there was delay in delivering guns of over 9 inches in diameter. The present Estimates gave no information as to the number of heavy gnus ordered, or when they were likely to be delivered. Now, there was just as much difference between a 110-ton gun and a Nordenfelt gun as between an iron-clad and a torpedo boat. It would be just as reasonable to ask for money for ships without saying what they were to be, as it would be to ask for this Vote for guns without describing them. The Director of Naval Ordnance prepared a complete Estimate. Why should this not be presented to the House? If the Admiralty could not give them all the information, he trusted that in a future case they would be able, at any rate, to give a little more than was conveyed by simply putting down the sum of £460,000 for guns. But there was one point which was rather disappointing in the speech of the noble Lord. Returns had been presented, moved for by the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford), which showed that the supply of guns was now lamentably deficient. There was one Return of the 25th May, which showed that there were 26 guns short, of over 9 inches in diameter, for vessels built and in course of construction. Then they had vessels coming home from the Mediterranean which would, no doubt, require re-armament. These were the Agamemnon, the Alexandra, the Devastation, the Dreadnought, the Inflexible, and the Thunderer; and he believed that the Orion also would require new guns. Those would require 26 guns of over 9 inches in diameter, and, with a reserve of eight, made a total of 60 guns at least required for the Naval Service. But in discussing the means of producing these guns the Committee would bear in mind that the Navy had to depend upon the same source of supply of guns as the Army. According to the smallest estimate, there were required for the Land Service, and to arm military ports and coaling stations, 100 guns of 9 inches diameter, making, with those required for the Naval Service, a total of 160 guns of 9 inches diameter, which would have to be turned out in the course of three years. Was there any reasonable probability of these being produced in that time? They could only judge by what had been done before. According to the Return presented to Parliament since 1883, our rate of production of guns over 9 inches in diameter had been as follows:—1883–4 we had turned out 12 guns for Naval Service; 1884–5 we had only turned out two guns; in 1885–6, six guns—all for Naval Service—and, admitting that there was a great improvement last year, he found that we had turned out in 1886–7 15 heavy guns for the Navy and five for Land Service. So that in the course of the last four years the number turned out had been 40 guns, or at the rate of 10 guns for every year; but supposing they were able to turn out their guns at the rate of 20 a year, it would take eight years to produce all that was now required to carry out the programme laid down by the Government. He was quoting Official Returns; if they were inaccurate the noble Lord would correct him. Parliament had voted money for military ports and coaling stations, and the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury had told them that these would be completed in three years, and, therefore, the guns, he presumed, must be ordered. If they were to come from the same supply as the Naval guns, he asked, how were they to be obtained? He maintained that it was absolutely impossible for the Admiralty to complete their programme if they were to rely upon Whitworth, Armstrong, and Woolwich. This was an important point. He pointed out to the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty, when the Estimates came forward, that they were not taking enough money for guns, and the noble Lord had replied that it was of no use to take more money, because, if they did so, they would not be able to spend it. But he was very glad to read the speech delivered by the noble Lord at Derby, six weeks ago, when he said that if the existing factories failed to meet the requirements of the Admiralty, they must further develop British enterprize. He was entirely agreed in that with the noble Lord, because in his own judgment that was exactly what they ought to do. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) came down, on the occasion of the debate on the Military Report, and assured the House, in a tone of military determination, "that the time for action had arrived." In his simplicity he imagined that the right hon. Gentleman was going to get up and say that when the private firms could not supply the Army and Navy, they intended to go into the market for their guns. That, he respectfully submitted, was the logical deduction from the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, "that the time for action had arrived;" but it appeared to him that the authorities were not doing anything to procure the guns which they said they wanted. In this matter he thought the true policy of the Government was to develop the resources of the country, not only as a policy suitable for the moment, but as a policy to fall back upon in case of emergency. They had had some very important evidence upon this matter given before the Army Committee. In the Report of the Committee reference was made by the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill) to a very important document bearing upon this question—namely, the Report of the Gun Foundry Board of the United States. The United States Government had sent Commissioners to Europe to inquire into the methods of supplying guns for the European Powers. The substance of that Report was given by Mr. Brand to the Committee on which the Secretary of State for War sat. That well-known Gentleman was a Member of the House and had for some considerable time occupied the office of Surveyor General of Ordnance. He thought that the Report laid down a principle which they would do well to bear in mind. It was rather a long paragraph, but he would like to quote it for the information of the Committee. It ran as follows:—

"As an example of depending alone on Government works, France was a perfect instance before the Franco-German War. During the period referred to, the Government foundries were the sole source of supply of the armament of the country; the officers charged with the work formed a close corporation; their action was never exposed to the public; their ideas were never subjected to criticism; the ingenuity and inventive talent of the country were ignored and resisted, and no precaution was thought necessary to provide a supply in case of need of re-armament. The result is well known; a great crisis came, the Government works were inadequate to meet the additional demands made upon them, and the patriotic efforts of private establishments were inadequate to produce all the material that was needed. How entirely France has now altered her system is shown in a previous part of this Report; her present practice is theoretically perfect, and it has proved to be practically efficient. Her Government establishments are still retained, but as gun factories simply, in which the parts are machined and assembled, but for foundry work she depends upon the private industries of the country, and many of these works have found it to their profit to establish gun factories, which supplement the Government factories to a large extent."

That was the policy which France was enforced to adopt, and it was to be hoped that we should never be similarly forced to its adoption; but he thought we ought to do something to develop the resources of our own country, and not simply rely on Government establishments. He had ventured to say this on a former occasion, and when he ventured to suggest that they might give orders to private firms for some of our large guns, the right hon. gentleman the Secretary of State for War said that they did not give them because it would require the expenditure of a largo sum of money in order to lay down plant. He (Mr. R. W. Duff) admitted that, if they gave an order for three or four guns, this might be the case; but he believed, looking at the demand for guns, that it would not be so, if the Government worn in a position to go into the market and encourage industry by giving an order for 30 or 40 guns. He had been assured by those who knew what they were talking about, some of them Members of the House, conducting large steel factories, that if the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War or the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty would go to the market and give orders for 20 or 30 guns, they would have some of these private firms competing for them. He had not the least objection to communicate the information which had been given to him to either the noble Lord or the right hon. Gentleman, if they liked to have it. He did not want now to go back to any recriminations as to whose fault it was that the ships were left without guns. They found themselves in a certain state of difficulty. He was not blaming the noble Lord or his Predecessors. They came into Office under extremely embarrassing circumstances; they found the supply of guns short, and the supply of ammunition like wise short. Though he was willing to admit so much, he was afraid there had not been sufficient energy used with the object of getting out of the difficulty in which we were placed; and when the noble Lord spoke of taking so much money regularly for the Navy Vote, he respectfully suggested that before he adopted that policy he must overtake the arrears which had accumulated, because, although the Estimate might be sufficient for the Navy, if we once had it in working order, yet there were large arrears, as pointed out by the Director of Naval Ordnance, before Sir James Stephen's Commission, and, until these were made up, he did not think we should be able to reduce the Vote to what ought to be its normal amount. He had heard something about a Supplementary Estimate, and he ventured to say that, so far from the proposal being extravagant, there could be no policy so extravagant or wasteful as that of keeping first-class ships like the Collingwood afloat for two years absolutely at the mercy of any third-rate cruiser with large guns to which she might be opposed. He had never taken the view entertained by the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone as to the insufficiency of the Fleet; but he did maintain that we had not a ship too many, and when the ships that were complete were waiting for guns and were short of ammunition, as he had said, no policy would be more wasteful or extravagant. He trusted that, before the Vote was agreed to, they would have some assurance from a Member of the Government that some energetic step would be taken to supply our deficiencies.

said, he had understood that the Votes to be taken to-day were non-contentious Votes, and the appearance of the House showed that hon. Members thought so too, as they did not calculate upon there being any discussion. He could imagine no Vote either for the Army or the Navy which merited more discussion than that which related to ordnance, particularly as they had before them this more or less scandalous Return which had been presented to the House of Commons. With regard to the remarks which had been made by the noble Lord the first Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton), he (Lord Charles Beresford) was sorry that this Vote had not come before the Naval Estimates Committee, because he was quite satisfied that they would have had evidence with regard to it quite as curious and as extra ordinary as that which had been given on the Shipbuilding Vote before that Committee. Some of the remarks made by the noble Lord were eminently satisfactory. For instance, he thought his determination not to buy a large quantity of stores that were perishable was most excellent. He also agreed with the noble Lord's calculation for the purpose of ascertaining the cost of vessels so far as the armament was concerned, which was also very good; but he would like to be quite clear as to whether he included the cost of reserve ammunition as well as outfit?

We do to a certain extent.

There was no doubt that we were short of guns, as shown by the Return, but the Return did not enter into the question of re-arming, and that calculation, he thought, should be brought before Parliament by a Return which he bad promised to move for next Session. There was no doubt that the greatest extravagance was caused by having ships built and finished before the guns which they required were ready for them. The exact opposite ought to be the case; the ships and the guns ought to be ready together, and the pennant ought to be hoisted directly the guns were in position. Not only that, but every ship in these days with heavy guns, in view of the great increase which had taken place in the charges of powder, should have a reserve, and he hoped his noble Friend would assure the Committee that he had got that idea into his head, and that he saw his way to carry it out. It was most imperative that we should have a reserve of heavy ordnance, for the simple reason that the life of a gun was much shorter now than in former times owing to the heavy charge. One question with regard to ships being kept without their guns. He believed that our guns were being made by two private firms—Messrs. Whitworth and Messrs. Armstrong. Did his noble Friend know of any ship built for a foreign country which was kept without her guns when she was ready for sea? He believed that had been the case with the Independencia, but that was the only case of a contract entered into with a private firm for a foreign Government in which the guns were not ready when she was ready for sea. Would his noble Friend assure the Committee whether or no the firms which had entered into contracts to deliver guns at a certain time were delivering any guns to Foreign Governments in the time during which they had promised to deliver their guns to this Government? If his hon. Friend opposite the Member for Banffshire (Mr. R. W. Duff) looked at the Return, he thought he would find that there were nine ships waiting for guns. We were 78 guns short at the date of the Return, and that was a state of affairs which he could not but describe as a scandal. Some of these guns were 22 months, others 12, and some eight months late on the original guaranteed time. The noble Lord, in his Memorandum, stated that a considerable delay had occurred in the delivery of guns in the programme, and that several iron-clads were now waiting for their armaments, and the Dockyard arrangements had been criticized for these delays. He wanted the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty to tell the Committee who was directly responsible for this state of things, because unless they fixed the responsibility on some one, the Committee had no assurance that the same thing would not occur. Further, he asked his noble Friend if there were any pains and penalties to be applied to those contractors who had not delivered their guns in time, because unless they had some sort of penalty in the contract, there was no security for delivery, and it appeared to him that there was no reason why the Government should not do the same as private firms did when they were making contracts. He would ask his noble Friend to tell the Committee what he proposed to do if no stops had been taken in that direction. There were some ships that had not the latest description of guns, and he remembered to have asked his noble Friend to say what he intended to do in re-arming those ships, so as to make them capable of fighting ships with full armaments, and he would like to have some information on that point. The Committee would notice that in the case of the Anson and Immortalité, there were two guns returned as chase-hooped. He objected to having guns chase-hooped. You never could get the officers or the men to rely on guns that had been doctored in that way. He hoped his noble Friend would get rid of those chase-hooped guns. He knew that if he went out shooting with a gun bandaged up with a lot of hoops he should not feel as happy as if it were otherwise. Again, his noble Friend knew that every ship in the world had got Magazine rifles except their own. Now, it was most important that we should have them too, because, for the purpose of illustration, suppose two ships were coming towards each other at great speed; there was only a moment during which the sights of the rifles could be adjusted to take aim, and it was desirable that during that moment the men behind the rifles should be able to make use of as much ammunition as possible. Every nation in the world had appreciated that, and he now brought it under the consideration of his noble Friend. Then there was the question of smokeless powder. He understood that the French had already smokeless powder for rifles, as well as machine guns. Another point was the question of high explosive, and he again called the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to the Debate of the 8th of March. On that occasion his right hon. Friend rather twitted him on this question of high explosives, and his words were—

"My noble Friend wanted a Royal Commission because the French had got a number of melinite shells."—(3 Hansard, [323] 622.)

It was one of the points he brought forward to show that a Commission should inquire into the facts, and the point was a most important one, because ships of the Admiral class had a very fair chance before this powerful explosive was put into shells. But now the conditions were altogether altered, when a 30lb. shell charged with melinite was said to be equivalent in respect of explosion and dispersion to a 100lb. shell charged with gun powder. That showed how anxious naval men were to get this matter thoroughly tested, and why they thought, if this substance turned out to be a most tremendous invention for the destruction of ships and life, they ought to spend money at once, so as to place themselves on the same platform with any other nation with whom they might be called upon to fight. The French Government had, he believed, spent £1,000,000 on this melinite. They had not got a single shell over 30 lbs. which was not filled with it, whereas we had not a single shell filled with a high explosive at all, and he thought it would strengthen the hands of the Government if the Committee were now to consider that very important point. The Secretary of State for War, at his request, had appointed a strong Committee to inquire with respect to this high explosive, but he had never been able to find out what conclusion they had arrived at, although he was informed that the Resistance had had her features very much spoilt by an experiment, and had been taken into Portsmouth with some canvas screens on her to hide the effect produced. The Admiralty very properly would not tell him what had occurred. It was proved by the Return, which did not include ships which had to be re-armed, that Messrs. Whitworth and Armstrong were totally unable to supply the guns, without reserves, which the country at that moment ought to possess. It was quite true—there was no doubt in the world that, as the noble Lord had said, we must try to develope the enterprize of the country; but he would point out to the hon. Member for Banffshire that he did not think he would get mercantile gentlemen to start the plant for the manufacture of heavy guns on the mere idea that the Government would buy them. He wanted the Government to say to them—"If you put up the plant to produce guns of 9-inch diameter, and with a certain initial velocity and capacity, we will order a good many." That would only be fair to the man who put up the plant, and he was certain that it would further enterprize to an enormous extent. As the matter stood at that moment it was almost nonsense to think that we were going to get guns any quicker, or much quicker, than we were getting them now if the present arrangements continued. It was quite impossible that the two firms at present engaged could produce all the guns required. He asked his noble Friend if he had observed that in the Report it was stated that the guns returned for chase-hooping had been made at the Royal Gun Factory; and if any guns made at Elswick and by Messrs. Whitworth had been returned? With reference to Woolwich he was strongly against increasing that establishment in any way whatever. Woolwich was necessary to us; but it was, to a great extent, badly organized; it had done good work, but he believed that a good deal of money was wasted by the system under which it was worked. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had made a very satisfactory statement the other day when he said he was going to alter the administration at Woolwich; but he (Lord Charles Beresford) objected to its being increased, as he had said, in any way. He would far rather see a larger number of firms engaged in making guns for the Army and Navy, and he was sure it would be very much to the advantage of the country and the Navy to start that plan. With regard to the reserve ammunition, the noble Lord had told them that this was very incomplete. As far as the ordnance stores were concerned which had been put on board the Fleet engaged in the present most interesting manœuvres, which he was sure would do a large amount of good by enabling the authorities to find out what was weak, his noble Friend said that with the exception of the small gun ammunition he was satisfied with the result of placing them on board. He hoped his noble Friend would be careful to give orders that everything that was found short should be supplied within three months. Under the old sys- tem the War Office gave the Admiralty a list of the stores required, but that was a theoretical and he liked a practical plan, and he would therefore express a hope that his noble Friend would assure him that everything that was short should not be put on paper, but actually taken from store and put on board the ship so that the officers might see them in their places. In a great country like this, in which we had so much enter-prize and invention, we ought to have a council of some sort to devote themselves to the examination of inventions, because he was certain that it would save the country a large amount of money. He believed that the country had on many occasions lost the benefit of inventions through being unable to keep pace with what was going on, because we had not a council of this description to recognize this important question. Such a council would cost very little money and would have secured to the country the use of many valuable inventions. He might mention three cases in which a considerable amount of money would have been saved if such a council had been in existence—namely, the case of the Maxim gun, the Whitehead torpedo, and milinite, of which latter the French now had a large quantity. He put that suggestion forward for his consideration. He had been very glad to notice that his noble Friend had not made use of the old statement, that we were better and stronger than we were many years ago, and he earnestly hoped that they would never hear that argument again. We wanted to know how we stood at the moment with reference to the work that had been done. Of course, we were in a better position now than we were years ago, but that was altogether beside the argument. He hoped his noble Friend would not give them any more Returns such as he had given them relative to the Navy of England as contrasted with the Navies of other countries. With that Return he found great fault in many particulars, but most with regard to the way his noble Friend mentioned the Lord Warden and the Repulse as two line-of-battle ships, because, as a matter of fact, these two vessels were in the auction lists to be sold for old iron. He hoped his noble Friend would give them a Return of the different classes of guns we had in the Navy, because there was an enormous waste going on in consequence of the number of different classes of guns, which he believed numbered 79 or 80. We had not only different classes of guns, breechloaders and muzzleloaders, Armstrong's and Whitworth's, but we had different classes of these guns to the number he had mentioned, the result being a condition of things most puzzling, expensive, and altogether wrong. Therefore, he hoped his noble Friend would give a Return showing how we stood at that moment with respect to guns, because he believed it would strengthen the demand for a larger number of firms to supply the wants of the Government. Then, would his noble Friend tell the Committee who was practically responsible for the Armament Vote of the Navy, because even from what he had just said he could not understand whether it was the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War or his noble Friend? If the responsibility was divided he hoped that would be put an end to. Let there be one man responsible for the guns and ammunition for the Navy. The Navy ought to be able to say—"We want such and such a gun and such and such ammunition. We will put the work up for tender, accurately laying down the conditions;" and then they ought to be allowed to get the gun where they liked. But there must not be this divided responsibility, which promoted friction, and could not be for the benefit of the Service. He would recapitulate the points on which he asked for information. What steps were being taken with reference to the use of high explosives; what steps were being taken to provide magazine rifles for the Navy; was anything being done to supply smokeless powder for rifles and machine guns; what was being done to avoid in future the scandal of ships being without their armaments; and was there any proposal for completing the reserve of heavy ordnance for the Fleet? To save trouble he would hand his noble Friend a list of these questions, and conclude his remarks by saying that his great anxiety to see these things dealt with in a right manner was shared by every one of his brother officers of the Fleet, and who were entirely agreed upon the subject.

said, he did not propose to enter into a controversy as to the particular requirements of the Navy with respect to guns at that moment; but he wanted to point out that there had been an enormous increase in this Vote of late years, a fact which was deserving of the most serious consideration by the Committee. He found that in 1881 the Vote was £418,000, and that the average Vote during the past four years was greatly in excess of the average for the preceding years. The Vote for the coming year was £1,700,000 more than the sum anticipated by Lord Northbrook in 1886, yet only £460,000 was to be spent on guns, while £943,000 was to be spent on projectiles. He could not but hope that the time would come when there would be a very considerable economy made in respect of this Vote. He could not believe, whereas in the three yours 1882, 1883, and 1884, £670,000 had been the average yearly sum required, that in the coming year there should be required £2,100,000. It might be desirable to spend the large sum now asked for in order to bring the Service up to a proper point, but he hoped the time was not far distant when there might be a great economy upon the Vote. He quite agreed that it would be better to encourage private firms than to increase the Establishment at Woolwich. There were many arguments against increasing the Government Establishments and in favour of relying more to meet increasing wants on the manufacture by private firms of guns, of ammunition, and other requirements of our great Services, but his main object was to point out the very large growth of expenditure. Most of it, he believed, had been necessary to bring up the Services to efficiency; but the idea should not be allowed to prevail that that was the normal rate of expenditure, and he hoped soon to see a reduction in the amount of the Vote.

said, he did not wish for a moment to deny the increase in late years of the amount of the Ordnance Vote. There were certain years between 1882 and 1885 when the Vote was considerably loss than it was at present; but it was partly because of the reductions in those years that an increased demand became necessary in later years to meet deficiencies. But he did not wish to go into that subject; it was rather a fruitful field of political con- troversy. He would avoid all comment in the direction of apportioning blame or responsibility to preceding Administrations, and he recognized that what the country now required was that some reason should be given in justification of the present demands. Addressing himself to the questions that had been asked, he had first to say as to the share of the responsibility of the Army and Navy Departments in regard to the Vote, that it had been fully explained that responsibility could not be absolute and complete until full information had been collected and put into the possession of the Admiralty; and when the Admiralty was in possession of that full information, as soon they would be, then the Admiralty would be in a position to prepare and to vouch for the amount of the Vote for the armament of the Navy. He was asked what steps had been taken towards the issue of the new magazine rifle? He had already stated the cause of the delay, and was sorry to say the trial issue had not yet been made to the Navy. But he hoped it would only he a few days before rifles were selected and issued. No suggestion had yet been made to lead to the belief that any delay would be necessary for the alteration of sights. Experiments with the new explosive shells had been made, and had been, on the whole, thoroughly satisfactory. Several points remained for decision by the experts who were going on with the trials, and speaking for the Land Services, he could say that the new ammunition would add materially to the power of the guns. As to the smokeless powder, that was not in so forward a condition; but experiments were being made, and he hoped and believed that the Committee now sitting, to which his noble Friend (Lord Charles Beresford) had referred, would before long recommend a smokeless powder which could be used for both guns and rifles. Undoubtedly, the largest question that had been raised was in reference to the supply of guns. That ships should be ready, and no armament to put in them, was a scandalous state of affairs. ["Hear, hear!"] He fully admitted that. To that subject the Government had addressed itself, with the desire, in the first place, of ascertaining all the causes of delay and the endeavour to remedy the causes one by one. The first cause was that guns were not ordered in time. There had been cases in which ships were laid down, and the guns for their full armament not ordered until the building was far advanced.

asked, was not that during the period when the Ordnance Department had not made up their minds as to what the guns should be?

said, he did not know that that was so. He found instances in which a portion of the guns were ordered, but not the whole, though, of course, all would be wanted at the same time. But he did not want to enter into this controversy. They had taken care to remedy that cause of delay by laying down the rule that whenever a ship was ordered her armament should be ordered at the same time. Then, again, in the proving of the guns, there had been a fruitful source of delay. There was little reason for that, because there was a fine space available for the purpose at Shoeburyness. They had provided for enlarging the facilities there, and for a reserve ground for proving ammunition, and had hopes that this cause of delay would be removed. A third cause of delay, and it occurred both with the contractors and with the Royal Gun Factory, was the under estimate of the time required for the completion of guns. He did not think that the one or the other was free from blame in this matter; but when his noble Friend asked whether the Government contracts were postponed in favour of foreign orders, he would say, without going into the matter at length, that all contractors employed by the War Department, or likely to be employed, were and would be impressed with the necessity of giving precedence to the English orders. Delay had also arisen from defects discovered in the liners. Undoubtedly liners had failed in many cases, and the failures had been due partly to errors in design and partly to defective material. The failures had caused delay, but it must be admitted that they were not so serious as a failure in the gun itself; for the gun would not necessarily be rendered unserviceable in actual warfare. Yet, he admitted that it was a reflection on the system of designing that called for the close attention of the Government. He hoped and believed that the difficulty in respect to liners was in course of being overcome; he hoped and believed that they had arrived at a design that in future results, in the manufacture of all guns for the Army and Navy, would not give rise to complaints that had arisen in regard to liners of guns during the last two or three years. In future, the penalty that attached to delay in the execution of contracts would be exacted without distinction, unless reasonable ground could be shown for delay. In the course of the inquiry that had been made, no effort had been spared to arrive at a knowledge of the resources of the country to supply guns for land and sea service. The Committee should be aware that the Government did not depend upon Woolwich, though that might have been gathered from some of the speeches that had been made. On the contrary, a comparatively small proportion was derived from that source. A large proportion was drawn from the Elswick and Whitworth works. Inquiry had also been made into the producing capacity of the country generally, and conclusions had been arrived at as to opening new sources of supply. The Government had now full knowledge on the subject; they knew the capacity at Woolwich, at the Elswick and the Whitworth factories, and the difficulties that attached to the production of guns at each. The Government factory might be able to produce many more big guns but for the fact that it was also a repairing establishment for the Army and Navy, and much interruption was caused to the work of production by the machines being used for guns sent for repair. This had to be reckoned upon in the work at Woolwich, and so they were very anxious not to overload that Establishment, but to increase the production by private firms. To create new sources of supply required an enormous amount of capital. The turning out of big guns required much time and expensive machinery, and after all the Government were by no means sure that the new producer had at command the necessary mechanical ingenuity and facilities for the work. Acting on the information they had acquired, the Government had ordered all the guns required for the Army and Navy, or had invited tenders from all those firms who had expressed their willingness to enter into the manufacture, He did not know that more than one or two would accept the conditions attached to a contract; but they had endeavoured to increase the sources of supply to the greatest possible extent. The work of the Department under this head for the last few years might be described as stupendous. In the present year alone, the amount of ordnance stores the War Department was called upon to inspect equalled a value of between £4,000,000 and £5,000,000 sterling, an enormous responsibility for any Department. It was, however, accepted with an earnest intention to discharge the duty to the fullest extent, and he believed the arrangements made would materially facilitate the work, and that the Committee might rest assured that the obligations of the Department to meet the requirements of the Service should be fulfilled so far as it was humanly possible they could be.

said, the discussion had hitherto been carried on between officials and ex-officials; but he felt sure that if Parliament was to exercise proper control over the Army and Navy expenditure, that outsiders should pay some attention to details. He felt sure that, with the exception of his noble Friend (Lord Charles Beresford), the Committee was not likely to get effective criticism from ex-officials. He would give his attention to two points raised by his noble Friend in relation to the actual condition of the guns in the Navy at the moment. He was not going to speak of the fact that these guns were generally late in delivery, and that after delivery they often burst; he would draw attention to a more serious question than those—to the great number of different sorts of guns in use in the Army and Navy. He believed that, as a matter of fact, there were no less than 170 different sorts of guns in use in the Army and Navy. Without going into this as regarded the Army, in the Navy there were 70 different sorts, and the variety extended over both old guns and the more modern weapons. Taking the old rifled muzzle-loaders, that formed the great bulk of guns in the Navy, there were 22 different sorts, and coming to later manufacture, and taking the modern breechloaders, the astonishing fact in regard to these was that at the present moment we had in the Navy 28 different kinds. That would be bad enough if those 28 differed so markedly that there could be no doubt as to the ammunition required; but, as a matter of fact, in most instances they differed in the bore by such a minute shade that, in time of warfare, there would be the greatest possible danger of mistake being made in the ammunition sent for the guns. In the 12-inch modern naval guns there were five different "marks," as they were called, every one of them requiring different ammunition, and varying only in the slightest degree. What had been said by his noble Friend, a few minutes ago, would prove to be the fact. In the 8-inch guns there were seven different marks; but he would not say here that every one did absolutely require different ammunition. In the 6-inch guns, again, there were five different marks. If that was the state of the case, it disclosed an alarming state of things indeed, and required correction without delay. As to the responsibility for it, he would not raise that question now, it could be better discussed upon the Army Estimates, and in the autumn there must be a serious inquiry, and if it was not possible to trace the responsibility home to any subordinate, then they must go right up to the head of the office, the Director of Artillery himself. Another question raised by the noble Lord was the responsibility for that Vote. When the Estimates were framed, who was responsible for taking this particular sum of £1,800,000, and who was responsible for the Vote or the day it was presented to Parliament? As he understood, the Secretary of State for War still took a certain amount of responsibility. Was that so?

said, undoubtedly he took a certain amount of responsibility. There was no doubt the War Department would continue responsible as to the manufacturing stage of the guns; and, as regarded the Estimates, they would have a certain amount of responsibility for the stores not separated. There had not been complete division between the Naval and other Departments to enable either to take the exclusive responsibility.

said, what he wanted to get at was the responsibility for the sufficiency of the Vote. In the Report of the Committee it was said the Admiralty was responsible to Parliament for the sufficiency of warlike stores for the Navy. If that was the conten- tion, as it was when the Report was presented, and that was still the opinion of the Secretary of State for War, then for the sufficiency of the Vote the Admiralty was wholly and solely responsible. But, unfortunately, that was not the opinion of the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty. For, in answer to a Question on the subject, the noble Lord said the Admiralty had only accepted responsibility in reference to Ordnance stores, of which they had full information, and that position was made clear by the departmental correspondence on the subject. To this, however, the Estimates Committee did not appear to attach much importance when they reported that the Admiralty was solely responsible.

said, that correspondence was not presented until after the Report was made.

said, he wanted to know who was responsible for the Estimates when framed, for, as a matter of fact, the Admiralty had no information on which to frame the estimate for the Ordnance Vote. What was the state of facts when the Estimate was presented? The First Lord of the Admiralty said no complete statement of moneys received and expended had been furnished. What did that mean? It meant clearly enough that the Admiralty at that time did not know how the War Office had expended the money received for naval stores. He believed the difference between the money voted by the House in past years for the use of the Navy, and the amount of guns and other stores, which the War Office could account for at the moment, was something over £1,000,000 sterling. The First Lord of the Admiralty said at the time the Admiralty was supposed to be responsible for the Vote, that he had no complete information as to guns at the War Office belonging to the Admiralty, no information as to ammunition and other naval stores, or liabilities incurred, or guns ordered, or the amount that would have to be paid out of the amount provided by Parliament that year. He would like to ask a further question—Was it a fact that the money was asked for at that moment by the Admiralty, without knowledge of the facts of the case and what were the ordinary requirements of the Navy in times of peace, for the accounts had never passed through the Admiralty—was it the fact that the Admiralty cut down the amount that the War Office told them was necessary for the naval ordnance for the year by nearly one-half? The War Office said considerably more than £3,000,000—he believed £3,400,000 was the sum—would be required; but the Admiralty only asked for a little over £1,750,000. He wanted to know, if that was the case, who was responsible, in the face of the opinion of the War Office and without knowledge, for cutting down the Vote by £1,750,000? Was it a fact that the Director of Naval Ordnance—who, at the Admiralty, was the person mainly responsible—had declined responsibility for the Vote? He asked that, because he put a Question to the First Lord of the Admiralty the other day, and the answer he got was an evasive one. Was it the fact that the Director of Naval Ordnance would not accept responsibility for the Vote if it was kept at its present figure? He wished further to know, was it the fact that the First Lord of the Admiralty had, a month ago, sanctioned the expenditure of nearly £750,000 in excess of the present Vote? If that were the case, then he ought at once to submit a Supplementary Estimate to the House. It would not do to go on spending money out of savings. When the Admiralty made up their mind to additional expenditure—especially when it was to the tune of £750,000—a Supplementary Estimate should be presented at once, that the House might know what was being spent. Even at the present moment, the Admiralty had no information of any value from the War Office as to what stores the War Department had on hand belonging to the Admiralty. He believed, as a matter of fact, they had recently obtained information as to guns—that was to say, the Return as to guns was complete—though he believed the Return was more complete than the guns themselves were, and very few belonging to the Admiralty would be found at the War Department. Of ammunition and naval stores, the First Lord of the Admiralty said he had not got information.

Not complete information.

Not complete information was the official phrase, and the Admiralty would not get it until the 10th September. But he rather gathered that the information would not be forthcoming until the end of the financial year. He should like to know whether the date had been postponed to the end of the financial year? It would seem, from what had been stated in answer to Questions, that no accounts had been rendered of the amounts voted and the actual expenditure of the War Office for naval purposes. A sum had been voted in the Estimates for a supply of Morris's Tubes for the Navy, but when the Admiralty required them, there was not a single one to be had. The money had been voted, the tubes were not in stock, and the Navy had not had them. He hoped some information on matters of this kind would be forthcoming. There appeared to be somebody at the War Office who did not understand his duty in regard to War Office expenditure for Admiralty purposes. One other thing he would mention to show how this difficulty affected, even in small things, the condition of the Admiralty at the present moment. He had asked a Question of the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty, about a month ago, as to what ammunition there was in store for the 111-ton guns in the Benbow, he (Mr. Hanbury) having the best possible information that the ammunition in store for these guns was of a very limited character. He would not go so far as to say that there were only seven shells in existence, but there were not much more, and what there were were of an experimental character. The noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty, in reply, told him that there was an ample supply in store. He desired to ask the noble Lord, who gave him that information? Did it come from the War Office or from the Admiralty? He had reason to believe it incorrect, for within the last few weeks the first contract given out for the ammunition for the guns in the Benbow was given to Messrs. Armstrong, and before that time none whatever had been supplied. He thought it most important that even if they could not fix responsibility upon individuals in the Government Offices, at any rate, when a Vote was presented to this House, they ought to know for a certainty what Department was responsible for it. At the present moment, however, it was utterly im- possible, from what had been said by the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty on the one hand, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War on the other, to tell upon whose responsibility they were going to vote the money. He did not think the time of the House had been wasted in discussing this matter if only they could get out clearly, either from the right hon. Gentleman or the noble Lord, how this matter stood—whether the Admiralty in putting forward this Vote had any information to go upon as to what were the amounts of ammunition in store in the hands of the Navy and War Office? They ought to get some information as to whether it was the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty or the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War who was responsible.

said, he did not think the Committee was in a satisfactory position with regard to the Vote they were discussing. It certainly seemed to him that the observations of the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Charles Beresford) were most justifiable, the Government having no business to bring forward this Vote at the present time. They might have dealt with this as a matter on account, and they had no right to ask the House to vote such a large sum of money straight off. What was the position of the House in this matter? They had been told in debate by the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) that he assumed responsibility for the sufficiency of money for the guns, but not for the ammunition; then, on the other hand, they had the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) telling them that he had been partially responsible for the framing of these Estimates; but, at the same time, they heard from both these officials that they were neither of them thoroughly well aware as to what was the ammunition to which they were called upon to vote, there being at present no reserve in store. It was impossible that satisfactory Estimates could be framed when there was no satisfactory basis upon which to go. It was clear that the information they possessed was sadly deficient. No doubt the Government were doing their best to relieve themselves from the serious difficulties by which they were surrounded; still the position was altogether unsatisfactory. He had been very much interested in the remarks which had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, especially when he turned his attention to the subject of the liners of the coast. He would ask the right hon. Gentleman, in connection with that subject, whether he had considered the possibility of doing without these objectionable liners? He (Sir William Plowden) asked that question because he was given to understand, on high authority, that guns of large calibre were absolutely in use in our Colonies without liners, and that experts were quite satisfied with the condition of those guns. They considered that the liners were a sort of insurance enabling them to look forward to a longer life for the guns; but considering what great demands were made upon our military strength, it was perhaps not desirable that we should look forward to a very extended life for guns of this description, if in order to insure this long life we had to undergo the inconvenience of these liners constantly failing us, not in consequence of the weakness of the guns, but through the fault of the liners themselves. If it was the experience of the Colonies that those large guns could be used perfectly well without liners, he trusted that the responsible officers at home would be able to accept that view. There was another matter to be carefully considered—namely, the insufficiency of our naval armaments and the almost impossibility of supplying the needs we have in the short time which was before us. As he understood the Vote before the Committee, they had now £400,000 and odd to spend on guns, and a much larger sum to spend on ammunition. This £400,000 and odd was not at all sufficient to provide our naval equipment, and a much larger sum than that had apparently been taken, if we were to trust what had been told them just now as to what happened in the Admiralty and War Office—much larger sums than had been estimated for had actually been expended in construction. He hoped that some Authority from amongst those in Office would give them an assurance, first of all, that the ammunition stores now in existence were thoroughly overhauled, and that the Government were fully aware of what their present position was, and, in the next place, they had provided, or were providing now, for the safety of our country, especially in regard to our naval guns.

I beg to move, Sir, that you now report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

called upon Lord GEORGE HAMILTON.

I should like to make a short reply to the hon. Baronet who has just sat down, and the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury). I think that both the hon. Baronet as well as the hon. Member for Preston have been somewhat hypercritical in some of their observations. A great transfer has taken place from one Department to another as to responsibility for this Vote, and the result in that transfer had been to solve a certain number of difficulties and to place other unsolved difficulties in a position in which they are much more likely to be solved than they would have been if the transfer had never taken place. Therefore, we stand in a better position than we should have been in if the transfer had not been effected. But when transfers of this kind take place in a Government Department it is utterly impossible at once to allocate every particle of responsibility to one authority in regard to that for which hitherto two Departments have been held responsible. I do not feel responsible so far as the adequacy of the stores is concerned, for hitherto I have not had full information upon the matter, although I hope to have it by the month of September. The transfer was deliberately made before full information was obtained, because we believe that by making the transfer, even in the absence of complete information, we should be taking a step which would bring about a solution of the difficulties I have enumerated. We have, however, sufficient information concerning the stores to make one thing perfectly clear—namely, that the Vote we are taking is far more than is necessary to meet the normal wants of the year.

As regards stores?

Yes; as regards stores. And we have acquired this further information since the Vote has been under consideration—that the amount of money taken last year was more than Woolwich could earn. That being so, I have taken the course which common sense would suggest, and have given a larger number of orders than last year in order that the contractors may, if possible, earn the sum that has been taken. I cannot yet say that we shall want a Supplementary Estimate. It is likely I shall not; but, if the contractors perform their work more quickly that they did last year, we may want one. Until, however, it is proved that the money will be required, it would be a waste of time to ask the House to vote it. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) is responsible for the manufacture and storage of guns and ammunition, and the Admiralty is responsible for the demands made by the Navy. The hon. Member for Preston has very much over-stated the lack of information from which he says we are suffering. We have complete information concerning everything except the reserve of stores in Home waters, upon which subject, it is true, we have not complete information. We have every gun that is required for every ship built or in course of construction. We have, however, this year, 28 heavy guns, and that number has been in process of construction. Eighteen more have since been ordered, making 46 heavy guns of about 9-inch calibre, and the total number of guns in course of construction is 273, which does not include quick-firing guns. Then what my hon. Friend went on to say was rather to complain that we ought not to have brought about the transfer until we had complete information, not only as to our liabilities, but as to the operation of all moneys voted in the past. But if we had waited for that information, we should have been obliged to postpone the reform which has been brought about for a year. It seemed more practical to us to accelerate the great necessary reform, even though the transfer it involved had to be carried out without complete information as to details. Then I am asked as to the variety of patterns of guns in the Service. The one subject to which the Board of Admiralty and the Director of Naval Ordnance pay great attention, is the desirability of not introducing any gun of a new calibre in the Service unless it is absolutely essential. But what my hon. Friend has called different calibre is really different marks of the same calibre. Many guns, though the same calibre, have different marks of different calibre, so that guns, though marked the same calibre, may not really be the same calibre.

You may put too strong a charge into a particular gun.

Of course you can do that, and, if you did, of course the result might be disastrous. But my hon. Friend assumes that all the charges for these guns are made up according to the calibres of the guns, and that they are conveyed to the ships carrying guns of a certain calibre altogether irrespective of the class or mark of gun supplied. But that is not the case. My hon. Friend has been misled in this matter. There always will and must be different marks to different guns, each mark being supposed to indicate an improvement upon that which preceded it, and, of course, the ammunition is supplied to a gun according to its mark. There are five marks of 12-inch guns, for instance, each requiring a different ammunition. Of course, care is taken when the marks are interchangeable, to see that the ammunition is interchangeable. I endorse all the remarks made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War. We feel that until the Ordnance Vote, both for the Army and the Navy, is finally brought into a satisfactory state, the efficiency of both Services will be seriously impaired. It is our duty to give our constant attention to improving and perfecting the system which is in force. To that task we are giving our best attention, and I am confident that when this Vote comes before the House next year, the statement I will have to make will be more satisfactory than the present.

I desire to make an appeal to the Committee. It will be a matter of very serious inconvenience to the Public Service unless we get these Votes almost immediately, and certainly in the course of the present Sitting. I earnestly, therefore, entreat hon. Gentlemen to be so good as to reserve any further observations they may wish to make upon this Vote, and the others which follow it, until the Report stage, when they will have an opportunity for discussion. Great inconvenience to the Services will ensue if we do not get the Votes this evening. There is an absolute necessity for them; and I, therefore, trust that hon. Gentlemen will assist the Government in obtaining them.

I move to report Progress, in consequence of the understanding entered into with the Government this morning that a certain time to-day should be devoted to the discussion of Scotch Business.

It is possible that the appeal of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury may succeed, and, therefore, it would be unnecessary for the hon. Member to move to report Progress.

said, he understood the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House (Mr. W. H. Smith) to say that hon. Members would be able to go into these matters on Report; and by that he understood the right hon. Gentleman to imply that the Report stage would be put down at an early period of the evening.

Yes; as the Second Order on Monday.

said, he desired to call attention to the manner in which Scotch Business had been conducted in Parliament during the present Session. The country had been told that the present Session was to be an English and Scotch Session; but nobody would deny that practically, so far as Scotch Business was concerned, the present Session had been an absolute and entire blank. One of the measures promised in the Queen's Speech was the Burgh Police Bill, and another was the Universities Bill, and there was also a promise that some action would be taken with respect to the cost of Private Bill legislation. There were several questions also which he thought the Secretary for Scotland ought to have taken in hand. There was, for instance, the question of the rents now being enforced under leases in Scotland. He (Mr. Anderson) had brought that matter before the House; but it was treated in the manner in which most Scotch questions were treated, and put on one side. The Government informed him that, though they sympathized with the tenants, the landlords were also sufferers, and they did not intend to legislate on the question. He referred to the Clanricardes of Scotland, who insisted on carrying out their bonds under their leases, and he was sorry to say there were many of them. On that subject nothing whatever had been done by the Government. They were told that a Scotch Fishery Bill had actually been drafted. He wanted to know why, if that were so, the Bill had not been introduced? In fact, it was promised before Easter. The condition of affairs was very unsatisfactory, because some proprietors were setting up a claim to stop fishing for salmon and trout in the upper waters of rivers, usurping rights which they did not really possess, and were practically denuding the upper portions of the rivers by netting to an extraordinary extent. There was another fishery question which affected the people at large, the prohibition of the fishing for trout in various rivers in Scotland. Considering the enormous rights the proprietors of salmon fisheries had appropriated to themselves, he thought it was a cruel thing for them, where the people had exercised the right of fishing for trout without restriction, to now prevent this very harmless fish- ing. How could it interfere with the privileges of the Duke of Richmond that certain persons wanted to go out on a summer evening to fish for trout at Fochabers? Upon that subject no legislation had come forward. There was another point. Everybody knew that the Scotch Fishery Board had proved an entire failure, and the Government had promised to take that matter into their serious consideration. The number of things the Government had taken into their serious consideration was perfectly wonderful; but the results of this serious consideration were absolutely nil. The First Lord of the Treasury told them months ago that the Fishery Board was to be re-organized; but what had been done? Nothing. The fishermen in England had been more fortunate, because the Government had brought in a measure for the purpose of creating Local Fishery Boards; but they had not made any of the proposals that were necessary for Scotland. Then there was the Crofter Question. The Government knew that the greatest injustice existed in counties which were not covered by the Crofters Act, and it was one of the first duties of the Government to bring in legislation on the subject. He supposed it would be said that the Government had agreed to the Reference of the Committee on Small Holdings being extended to Scotland, and he hoped some good might come of it. But even here the Government was to blame; for why had Scotland not been properly represented on that Committee? So little attention did Scotland get from Government on this subject, that actually it was appointed without a single Scotch County Member being upon it. How did that want of attention to Scotch Business come about? Who was responsible for it? They had a very expensive Staff for Scotch Business. There was the Secretary for Scotland, who received £2,000 a-year, and what did he do? Where were the Bills that he ought to have produced? In that House they never saw the Secretary for Scotland, because he was in "another" and better place. That was one of the disadvantages they laboured under in that House—they could not have access to the Secretary for Scotland by speaking to him and asking him Questions. What happened was that the Executive Business of Scotland, which, of course, was conducted in that House, was entrusted to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Lord Advocate. Let the House think what was the position of the Lord Advocate. Individually and officially he was not responsible for the Executive work in Scotland, and when they asked the Lord Advocate any Question with regard to the general administration of Scotland, all he could do was to act as the mouthpiece of the Secretary for Scotland (the Marquess of Lothian). That was a very humble position for the Lord Advocate to occupy. When Questions were asked they were placed in a great difficulty. The Lord Advocate rose and read out an answer from some Paper which he got from the Scotch Office. When they tried to get further information, the Lord Advocate very often rose from his seat and asked for Notice of the Question. Inasmuch as those were functions of the Lord Advocate, he seriously asked this question—What was the use of having a Lord Advocate in that House?—because, as he understood, the Lord Advocate had very important legal functions to pursue in Scotland. His legal duties were in Edinburgh. He was the Legal Administrator, but the Government went through the form of having upon the Treasury Bench a right hon. and learned gentleman who had no information as to the various matters concerning the government of Scotland, and what he did was simply to read out certain answers sent from the Secretary for Scotland's Office. They had reason for complaint even with regard to the Lord Advocate's legal position. The Lord Advocate had on several occasions during that Session refused to give information on legal questions. He had always understood that the Law Officers should give information to the House upon legal questions; but the position and attitude of the right hon. and learned Gentleman was this—He was satisfied, so far as the administration of Scotland was concerned, that he had nothing to do except read out answers to Questions, and he actually refused to do that which he (Mr. Anderson) contended the right hon. and learned Gentleman was bound to do—give information upon important legal questions involving the public affairs of Scotland. That was the position the right hon. and learned Gentleman had asserted on several occasions, especially in regard to the Crown rights in salmon fisheries. There was a large community to whom that question was interesting; but the Lord Advocate's reply was—"You may read the Act of Parliament for yourselves, and find out for yourselves." That was a monstrous way for the Lord Advocate to treat the Members of the House of Commons. What did they pay the Lord Advocate his enormous salary for? He sat on the Treasury Bench, and it gave them great pleasure to see him in the House; but he represented most truthfully one of the unemployed Members of the Government. Acting in the interests of the ratepayers, he (Mr. Anderson) protested against paying the Secretary for Scotland the high salary of £2,000 a year, and the Lord Advocate was absolutely wasting his time in doing nothing. There was another Member of the Government who was called our David—the Solicitor General for Scotland—what was he doing in the House of Commons? He, no doubt, assisted the Government with very able speeches on Irish Questions; but he did not think they should pay the Solicitor General and the Lord Advocate these high salaries, because their function was to attend to Scotch Business. They had three Officials for Scotland—the Secretary for Scotland, the Lord Advocate, and the Solicitor General—who seemed to combine together to do as little as possible for very considerable salaries. That was a thing that had gone on long enough, and ought to be stopped. Here they were at the end of a long Session, and about to pay these enormous salaries with nothing done, and only vague promises of something in the future. The Government so treated with contempt Scotch Business, that now it was said, as a sort of act of grace, they might have a half-day on Wednesday to discuss those two miserable Bills which were not original, but had been found by the Government on the shelves of their office, when they came into power. His (Mr. Anderson's) object in addressing the House was to place on record his views of the conduct of Scotch Business.

said, he wished to take that opportunity of saying a few words as to the position in which Scottish Business stood in that House at the present moment. He considered that position to be one of the most deplorable character—dishonourable not only to Scotland, but to that House, and to the managers of Business in that House. Making a selection among the offenders in connection with this state of things, he thought that his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Anderson) had been felicitous in fixing upon the Secretary for Scotland (the Marquess of Lothian) and his Coadjutor in that House, the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate (Mr. J. H. A. Macdonald). Now, in speaking on that question, he (Mr. Wallace) did not wish to say one word unkindly or discourteous either of Lord Lothian or the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate. They knew them, and respected them privately as most courteous and honourable Gentlemen. But, setting aside their personalities, and looking at them simply as public characters, he wished to have every possible freedom on the present occasion in discussing them. The fact he wished to fix upon was the general position of Scottish Business at the present moment under the action of the Secretary for Scotland—the most disappointing action, considering the hopes entertained in Scotland when his great Office was created. Under that action Scottish Business, Scottish Members, and Scotland altogether, to his mind, had now reached the very lowest level of contempt. In every deep, it was said, there was a lower still, but that was simply a comparative statement. They must touch bottom some time, and he thought they had very nearly reached it in the present Session. He saw the two Representatives of Scotland on the Government Bench smiling incredulously at that description of matters.

No, no.

said, he was glad that these Gentlemen were in accord with him. Looking at the present state of the House, he asked if it was not the most complete and graphic description of the utter contempt in which Scottish discussions and Scottish Business were held that could possibly be afforded? What were they there? Rari nantes in gurgite vasto, and simply because it was a Scottish discussion that was on. Accordingly, he did not think he needed to file proof that Scottish Business now had really sunk to a level of contempt below which they had, at all events, the melancholy satisfaction of reflecting that it could not descend. At the same time, he thought it was proper, for practical purposes, that they should try and understand the causes and the reasons for this. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. H. Smith), who ought to have been present on that occasion, had often professed an interest in Scotland. Five or six months ago he heard the right hon. Gentleman describe Scotland in a deprecatory tone as an interesting portion of the Empire. Well, it might be so; but it did not seem to be very interesting to the right hon. Gentleman, otherwise he would have been present that day to verify his description. The statement made by the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury yesterday seemed to him (Mr. Wallace), if people would properly understand it, to be an awful one. Scotland was a community of some importance—he would not say in the world, but in the Empire. At all events, the Scottish people were an aggregate of human beings who had ordinary human rights, and who required to have attention paid to their interests, and who, moreover, paid, according to their ability, a considerable portion of the Revenue of this Empire, and, in point of individual responsibility, they really contributed the most highly per head to the Revenue of this country. He wished, however, to move upon a higher level than that of paying taxes. He wished to put the discussion upon what he would call a national level, upon the claims of an historic, important, and progressive nation. The manner in which Scottish Business was treated by the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury and his Coadjutors was most humiliating to the Scottish nation and to those who entered into the full power and feeling of Scottish Nationality. What was it the right hon. Gentleman told them? He told them it was proposed to give them a Wednesday Sitting, and he did so with a gasp of astonishment at his own liberality. And he did not seem to be at all staggered by the fact that what was proposed to be done was not only a discussion of an important reform of the Scottish Law of Bail, but also the carrying of the Burgh Police Bill—a measure which consisted of nearly 600 clauses, with the addition of a waste howling wilderness of schedules, appendices, and regulations which were almost as long as the main body of the Bill itself. The right hon. Gentleman said that that could be conveniently pressed through in the two or three hours which, at the most, remained, if Scottish Members would only be diligent. It seemed to him (Mr. Wallace) that the right hon. Gentleman could not possibly have been considering what he was saying at the time. He had due respect for the upholstery of the right hon. Gentleman's intellect, but one piece that was deficient in it was imagination; and he thought if the right hon. Gentleman had that faculty in normal proportion to his other powers, he would have realized that the thing could not possibly be done. He defied the Clerk at the Table—who occasionally read out with such precise and careful elocution the libels of The Times—to simply read through the Burgh Police Bill in the time that the right hon. Gentleman thought sufficient for them to discuss all the clauses. There was more matter in the Bill than there was in the Iliad, a work which they could not read through in the course of a Wednesday afternoon. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury said the Burgh Police Bill had been considered by a Select Committee, on which there were actually Scottish Members, and that, therefore, they ought simply to pass it without further consideration. That was another illustration of the unconscious contempt with which the Members of the Government regarded Scottish measures and Scottish Members. It showed them quite clearly that, in the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman, if a few Scottish Members were upon a Committee, they carried with them the opinion of all the other Scottish Members. He did not seem to think that there was any individuality in Scottish Members; that they were simply a homogeneous class, like a dozen of oysters, and if they got two or three they had got the substance and the similitude of all the rest. The right hon. Gentleman thought he could sample them like a bag of beans, or a ton of Parnellism and Crime, or any indiscriminate stuff which could be safely recognized by putting in their hand and pulling out an accidental specimen. He entirely disputed the position of the right hon. Gentleman in this matter. Of all Nationalities in the world, Scottish Nationality was distinguished by its individualism. He would not call them national or political Ishmaels, nor would he say that every man's hand was against his brother for evil; but for the purpose of eliciting truth they were the most controversial nation that in the course of his ethnological inquiries he had discovered. It was quite ridiculous to say that because there were on the Committee some Scotsmen undefined and indiscriminate and, in his own mind, utterly unknown with respect to their individuality, that, therefore, this Bill could be easily passed through the House. The thing was utterly ridiculous. And after all was done, he told them he would give that impossible Wednesday only if a certain Irish measure could be passed on Tuesday. Now, his experience in that House had been that when the Irish Members were disposed strongly to contest a measure, it was a very imprudent thing for the Government to make promises on the condition that the performances of the Irish Members would be exhausted on a particular day. His own opinion was that their prospect of getting this ridiculous Wednesday was simply an ignis fatuus. He would make no excuse for detaining the attention of the House on this matter, for he should be untrue to his own proposition if he were in any degree apologetic either in the length of time or the strength of language he might use in considering this matter. He had further to refer to the right lion. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury and the promises which the right hon. Gentleman—he had no doubt bonâ fide—had made, but which through necessities which he did not foresee he would have to retreat from in practice; and he had satisfaction that he could now do so in his presence. It was a practically contemptuous view which the right hon. Gentleman had taken of Scottish Business yesterday. He would not say intentionally contemptuous, because he did not believe that the right hon. Gentleman was a Gentleman who was animated by malice either toward individuals or nationalities. But there was such a thing as personal malice and legal malice, and while he entirely acquitted the right hon. Gentleman of personal malice he could not say that the right hon. Gentleman was not sometimes guilty of political malice, and he thought on this occasion he had been guilty of political contempt towards Scotland. But the right hon. Gentleman was much to be excused in the matter, because he was simply reflecting what was now the attitude of all the Nationalities represented in this House towards Scottish Business. It was perfectly well understood by the Scottish Members, and it was getting gradually to be understood by the Scottish Nation, that they were systematically selected by the three other Nationalities as the nation that was to be despised. [Cries of "No!"] It was very polite of them to say "No," but he went by facts and not by words, and he knew that they were to a certain extent looked upon as the legitimate laughing stock of the Three Nationalities. That was very much owing to the action, or rather the inaction, of the Secretary for Scotland and the inefficiency of his Coadjutor the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate. Whatever the deficiencies of the faculties of Scotsmen might be, they had the usual array of ordinary senses; and he, for one, had the sense of hearing in a pretty average condition of operation, and he could not help hearing what was said, while going about in the Lobbies, about Scottish Business. He could not help hearing it said amongst, he supposed, the wits of the other Nationalities, that when a Scottish discussion was on it was what was called "a haggis debate," and it was called so by persons who he believed could not distinguish between a "haggis" and a "philibeg." He was speaking principally at present of the English section, and he would give a proof of what he said. They had great pride as a nation in the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate personally. They admired the radiant and spacious spectacle of the right hon. and learned Gentleman holding the coign of vantage on the Treasury Bench against all the world, like some Incarnate Judgment in rem. But how were the right hon. and learned Gentleman and those who were associated with him and the Scottish nation represented? How did they appear in English eyes? There was a journal published weekly in this City called Punch. He was told it was a comic journal. He would not have known it himself, but that might arise from a national deficiency. He would accept the description on the faith of those who said they had authority for speaking in such matters. They had heard a great deal about libels directed by The Times against the hon. Member for Cork (Mr. Parnell) and his associates; but, he said, they could not hold the candle to the libels directed by this alleged comic journal against the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate, the Scottish Members, and the Scottish Nation. In a recent illustration, instead of recognizing the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate as a Gentleman who was wearing himself to the bone—or as near to the bone as he could get—in the service of his country, they described him as reposing upon the Treasury Bench in adipose indolence, spread out like Milton's Leviathan—

"Slumbering on the Norway foam, extending many a rood,"

and in no way occupied about Scottish Business, except to turn his back contemptuously on Scottish Members, and to ward off any possibility of getting on to Scottish Business. That was the normal English idea, he would not say of the right hon. and learned Gentleman personally, but of him in relation to the Scottish Members, the Scottish Nation, and Scottish Business. Was that a state of things that it was comfortable for Scottish Members to consider? Then, with respect to their Irish Friends, Scottish Members did their best humbly to support them when the cause of their Nationality was at stake; but he must say, that while he admired their patriotism and the entire engrossment of their minds in matters that pertained to their Nationality, he sometimes wished that they had a little sympathy with Scottish Members, and would give them a small deducted portion of the time which they themselves occupied. In reference to that, he was not sure that the Irish Members paid the Scottish Members the respect which the Scottish Members paid to them; but if he felt any grudge against them on that account, he was amply avenged by the vindictive and punitive and judging power which the accident of certain Scottish Representatives being on the Treasury Bench had directed upon them. He would simply mention the two Law Officers for Scotland and the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland; and if he were vindictive, he would say that he thought the style in which the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate received many of the arguments of Irish Members, particularly those concerned with the distresses of Ireland, was a sufficient punishment. Last night, for instance, the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate, at the moving description of the unhappy man who was driven lunatic by the treatment he received in prison, was unable to restrain his laughter.

I expressly contradict that statement. I would like to explain that it is very difficult sometimes not to be amused at the way in which hon. Members opposite put things. I think they would themselves be very much surprised if we did not laugh; but certainly I never did so in reference to the facts.

said, he accepted at once the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and would at once recall what he was going to say. But he thought he was not mistaken in saying that, in the case of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary, Scotland was amply avenged for any want of attention on the part of Ireland by what he might call the Highland fling which the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary executed—with a superlative amount of finger snapping and the proper amount of shrieking—over the tenderest sympathies and fondest aspirations of the Irish nation. Then, with respect to the third Nationality in this House of Commons—he found that even Taffy, with the larcenous consciousness of that marrow bone hanging about him—even he exalted the horn against the Scottish Nation, and told them to their face that what they had was not a language, but only an accent, just as if the melancholy gibberish which he himself talked at his Cymrodorions and his Eisteddfods, or whatever else he called them, was not in reality a reproach to civilization and a serious impediment to human progress. [A laugh.] What he wanted to say was, that although the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary might laugh, it was really becoming a very serious matter for Scotland and Scottish Members. It took a long time to get some things into a normal Scottish head; he believed a distinguished anatomist had said it was impossible to get a joke into a Scottish head without the assistance of a surgical instrument. That might be; but if so, he was not sure that it was an unmixed calamity; for while he had been in the House it had been his fortune, or misfortune, to listen to some of the most remarkable, and at the same time awful, products of human cerebration, falling from lips strongly touched with that Anglican brogue which was naturally distasteful to ears which had been accustomed to the classical pronunciation of the Saxon speech, and which he was told were English jests; and hearing such things he had felt inwardly thankful for that providential, if pachydermatous, prophylactic which was protecting him from such a painful and hideous invasion of what he would venture to call his mind. But if that were so, there was a limit even to that position of things. He said that now the iron—or rather the irony of the situation—was entering into the Scottish soul. It was 181 years since the Union, and it had taken a long time for the matter to penetrate, but it had been gradually entering the Caledonian mind, and now the hideous joke of what was called Scottish Business in this House had finally got into the Alexandrian cranium; and when once it was there, they might rely upon it it would not be easily removed. It was not like one of the Resident Magistrates of that distinguished Scotsman, the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland, who—he did not say it in an uncomplimentary way—was a reproduction of the Bloody Mackenzie. It showed the remarkable productivity of the Nationality to which he belonged, for, just as in those days his race was able to produce on the one hand the Covenanters, it was also able to produce on the other the bloody personage to whom he had referred, a man of great abilities, of fine sensibilities, of extreme literary culture, but defective in that element of human sympathy without which the noblest endowments were vain and nugatory. But to return from that excursus—now that this idea of the complete contempt in which Scottish Business stood, and in which it was viewed with a certain amount of unanimity by all the three Nationalities re- presented in the House of Commons, was evidenced in the treatment which Scottish Business received, and in the fact that they did not get any attention at all—he begged Gentlemen in the position of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland to remember that this idea having once penetrated to the centre of the Scottish consciousness was not removable like one of the right hon. Gentleman's Resident Magistrates. That was the compensatory element in the alleged slowness and tardiness of the Scottish nature. If it took a long time for an idea to penetrate the Scottish mind, it took eternity itself to get it out. He said in all seriousness the notion of Home Rule for Scotland was now growing—each step being irrevocably assured in the Scottish mind. He was not a red-hot enthusiast in respect of Scottish Home Rule. He did not want his country to sink into a sort of North British Switzerland, very comfortable but very small; into the position of a respectable Vestry among the nations. He should be sorry to see the Scottish democracy dissociated from what he believed the splendid career that lay in the future of the great English democracy. But if they could not get anything done for themselves, they were driven into a position in which they must make a fight for some kind of independence; and they might rely upon it that if Scotland went in for independence at all, it would not be a fractional independence. It would not be a milk and water matter. They were accustomed to stronger drink than that. They should have something worth getting, or they should have nothing at all, but they would not have nothing at all; and therefore they would have something worth seeking. The present state of things must be attributed to the Secretary for Scotland. It was necessary in this matter to have a scapegoat of some kind, and the only scapegoat they could make was the Secretary for Scotland and the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate. When he thought of Dover House; the large amount of money spent in maintaining it; of the Scottish Secretary with his clerks; of the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate with all his attendants; of the hon. and learned Solicitor General for Scotland, and those who obeyed his behests, and the great retinue of offi- cialism which they commanded; and when he also thought of the effect they produced as regards Scottish Business, he was reminded of that celebrated picture of Hogarth's, in which he pourtrayed a great machine with immense motive power, with no end of wheels, with cog and pinion, piston and pulleys, wheel and shaft and cylinder, wheel within wheel, all working in the most intricate and ingenious order and relationship to each other, but all that immense power resulting in simply extracting a cork from a pint bottle. Similarly, the results of the elaborate machinery of Dover House amounted to nothing more than extracting five hours in 12 months from the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury. And yet the right hon. Gentleman stood up, and, with a smile which was "child-like and bland," told them he was going to give Scotland the proper allowance of time by giving them three hours on a Wednesday! That was not according to Cocker. His (Mr. Wallace's) arithmetical calculation of the proper amount of time to be given to Scotland was not three hours, but three weeks—excluding the Autumn Session, of which they would take account when it came on—three weeks of sober, serious, careful, and industrious application of Scottish Representatives to Scottish legislation. This was not a composition which any honest debtor would offer to a creditor. It was not a farthing in the pound. The conduct of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury reminded him of what was said by Lord Bacon long ago when an articled clerk—for he was always sure that impostor Shakespeare would be found out—when he said—"A man may smile and smile and be a——" well, an opponent of Scotch Business. Of course——

asked, what place the First Lord of the Treasury proposed to assign on Monday to the debate which had just closed?

said, the discussion would be put down in the first position on Monday. He trusted the debate would not be continued at great length, in view of the very pressing charac- ter of the Business they had to undertake.

I object.

appealed to the hon. Member to withdraw his opposition. The Business was purely formal; but it would be a serious inconvenience if there was any delay. Indeed, any delay now would prevent the House adjourning as early as they desired.

said, he hoped the Government would meet the wishes of the Irish Members with respect to the amendment in the Bill before the House respecting the application of the Borough Funds Bill to Ireland.

said, he was most anxious to meet the views of Irish Members, and would see that they were carried out. But there was a technical difficulty in the application of the Act to Ireland, and the result might be that municipal boroughs only might have powers which in England were vested in Improvement Commissioners and Local Boards, as well as in municipal boroughs. The Government would deal with the matter in the autumn, so that only a few months would be lost.

said, he did not see why the Government could not accept their Bill, or do something in the matter without any further delay.

said, it was impossible for the Government to accept the Bill brought in by the Irish Members; but he would endeavour to see by Tuesday whether a Bill could not be brought in to meet the views of the hon. Members. There was just time to pass such a Bill.