This is a Bill which, contains clauses of a complicated and technical, but not of a contentious character, but as it was not opposed upon the Second Heading, and passed through Committee without Amendment, I hope that I may b; allowed to take the Third Reading now.

I beg to move, after Clause 14, to insert the following clause:—

"There shall be repealed so much of Subsection one of Section fifty-five of the principal Act as limits to a period of three months the time within which a Trustee may disclaim onerous property; but nothing under this section shall affect the provisions of Sub-section four of that section."

The object of the Amendment is to restore the law to the position in which it stood in 1869, by reducing the very great costs which are incurred in consequence of the numerous disclaimers which are almost inevitably made under the existing law.

I have now to move the clause which stands on the Paper in my name, namely,

"Section forty-two of the principal Act, relating to power of landlord to distrain for rent, shall be read and construed as is the words 'six months' rent' were substituted for the words 'one year's rent.'"

The law of distress was quite lately greatly modified, and whereas a landlord was able, some years ago, to distrain for two years' rent, he is now limited to one year. It is said that, in some measure, this is an attack upon the rights of the landlord. I am not concerned to answer that allegation, for I only ask the House to deal with the rights of landlords in the event of bankruptcy. It does seem to me that a landlord, at the present moment, enjoys very unfair rights as compared with those enjoyed by other creditors. I would ask the House to remember what the position of the landlord is, as distinguished from that of an ordinary creditor. What does the landlord part with and risk? He risks, in the shape of rent, simply the interest of his money. An ordinary creditor risks a portion of his capital, and under circumstances which are to the great advantage of the landlord, because if the landlord allows his tenant to get into arrear he can always pay himself his interest out of the capital of the unhappy creditor. In this clause I propose to provide that the landlord shall only have such rights as are reasonable. If he chooses to allow his rent to get into arrear for 12 months that is his business. There is not the smallest reason why he should allow his rent to get into arrear at all; on the contrary, he could adopt the system prevalent abroad by which rents are paid in advance. By this clause I provide that the landlord may get six months' rent, and if there is any balance of rent due to him then he will only come in for that with the other and by far the more important creditors. When this Bill was before the Standing Committee this Amendment was moved in a lengthy and, I am afraid, somewhat technical form by myself for the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Brad-laugh). No real attempt was then made to go into the merits of the question, and although acting for the hon. Member I thought it wiser to offer to abandon part of the clause in order to secure a moderate change in the law his proposal met with a very cool reception. Under these circumstances, and in order not to weary the House, I have placed a new clause on the Paper which will, I think, effectually carry out the real object of the longer clause drawn up by the hon. Member for Northampton. All I desire is that the unfair privileges which the landlord at present enjoys shall be restricted.

I hope the House will not enter upon this question. I may remind my hon. and learned Friend that in Committee an attempt was made to extend the interest of the landlord by giving him his rent in full, even after proceedings in bankruptcy had been commenced. That proposal was resisted, and resisted successfully, and this is an attempt to cut down the right of the landlord to get his rent prior to bankruptcy. If we are to enter into the matter, it will undoubtedly raise other and very difficult questions as to what the rights of the landlord are, and will lead to a long discussion and Amendments, if not here, certainly in another place, and the result may be that other and more valuable provisions in the Bill will not be passed. It may be possible on some other occasion to deal with the question of what the landlords' rights are, and to see how far they ought to be altered; but I would respectfully submit that in regard to this particular question the cutting down of the right to recover rent from 12 to 6 months cannot be properly dealt with without taking, counter proposals into consideration, and seeing whether in other respects the rights of the landlord ought not to be altered, and in some respects slightly improved. My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade strongly resisted in Committee the proposition that the landlord should be put in a better position. He was successful, and I think it is not desirable that we should now place the landlord in a worse position.

I am sorry that the Attorney General should oppose this-Amendment, which appears to me to be an extremely reasonable one. The position is not exactly the same as it was when the Bill was before the Grand Committee. The Amendment is objected to on the ground of its complicated character, and the fact that it might raise a number of other questions which neither the Standing Committee nor the House have had time to consider. Now, the proposal is an extremely simple and intelligible one. It deals with the existing law, and it proposes to substitute six for 12 months. The Bankruptcy Bill of 1868 proposed to do away altogether with the preferential rights of the landlord, but in deference to the opinion then expressed, the present clause was inserted. The argument then was that the landlord was in a different position from all other creditors, because he was unable to refuse the credit which constituted his case. He could not turnout his tenant, and although he might become aware in the course of the term that the tenant was a bad tenant he was obliged to allow him to remain until, at all events, there was an arrear of rent. It is said that he ought always to proceed to collect. That is a valid argument, in regard to a certain amount of arrears; but the question is, what is the amount of arrears that should be taken into consideration in order to justify the landlord being placed in a different position from that of an ordinary creditor, and to entitle him to a preferential claim. I may remind the House that the law was altered in regard to the preferential claim of the landlord from two years to one, and the alterations which are now proposed certainly justify a further change from 12 to six months. I do not think that the acceptance of this Amendment would in any way prejudice the passing of the Bill in another place. If the House of Lords choose to throw out the clause, it will then be for this House to say whether they will insist upon it or not. I certainly think that the principle is a just and a sound one, and I do not think that the landlord ought to have any preferential claim which should extend beyond six months.

I do not think anyone can doubt the last point of the right hon. Gentleman who has just addressed the House, namely, that this question raises, a matter of principle, and one that is well worthy of discussion. Under ordinary circumstances, I confess that my own leaning would be in that direction, but at the present moment we are only considering one part of a very wide and important question. When the matter came before the Standing Committee it formed part of a number of clauses which dealt effectually with the whole subject; but I think the present proposal is inferior to that which was submitted by the hon. Member for Northampton, who proposed to give to the landlord, not the right of distraint, but the substitution for it of a limited preferential payment. Now, I think that of the two modes the preferential payment is much the better. For the question is whether a man shall be allowed to be the judge in his own case, and it is perfectly well known that in the administration of the bankruptcy law some landlords may exercise their right of distraint in an arbitrary way by forcing an undesirable and hasty sale of the estate, and the like, and when the hon. Member for Northampton introduced his proposals I certainly thought that they were well worthy of consideration. But at the present moment there is only one part of those proposals left, and it is one which is likely to raise very debateable matter, not only here but elsewhere. It will certainly be seriously contested in the House of Lords, and, notwithstanding the view of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who has done so much to amend the bankruptcy law, I venture to hope that the proposal will not at the present moment be pressed. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Camberwell (Mr. J. Kelly) will be content with having raised the question again, and that, with the consent of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, he will now accept the decision of the Standing Committee.

I am altogether in favour of an Amendment in this direction, and I should be very glad to see a similar alteration made in the Irish Bankruptcy Law. I believe that the rental rights of landlords are far too much considered in all matters of this kind. I do not think that a landlord ought to have a priority of claim over a general and ordinary creditor, and I entirely agree that instead of the right of distraint a preferential right would be more equitable. But, at the same time, I do not admit that a preferential right is a right that ought to be conceded to a landlord, because I think that his claim should be on all fours with that of all other creditors.

If there were any fear that the House of Lords would throw out this Bill in consequence of this clause I should feel inclined to take the same view as the Attorney General; but I am of opinion that the worst thing that could happen would be the rejection of the Amendment, and the House would have plenty of time when the Bill came back to consider whether they would insist upon it or not. The Amendment is certainly a good one, and I hope the House will adopt it.

The next Amendment I have to move is the insertion of the following clause:—

"A deed of arrangement to which 'The Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1887,' applies, and which has been, or is intended to be, duly registered under the Act, and has been, either before or after such registration, assented to by a majority in number and throe-fourths in value of the creditors, as shown by the affidavit as to liabilities filed in accordance with section six, sub-section one, of the said Act, shall not be deemed to be an act of bankruptcy under the principal Act or this Act, and when registered under 'The Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1887,' shall be binding on the minority in number and in value who have not signed or assented to the said deed.

Provided that, in estimating the majority in number, creditors for any amount less than ten pounds shall not be reckoned."

One of the great difficulties under the Bankruptcy Act in respect of deeds of arrangement has been to obtain the assent of all the creditors, owing to the rapacious and unscrupulous requirements of the smaller creditors. The power they have of extorting the payment in full of a debt by refusing to assent to an arrangement has been one of the greatest possible difficulties which commercial men in this country have had to deal with. I would ask the House seriously to consider the question. How is it possible that the large creditor can act in a manner prejudicial to the claims of the small creditor? The larger creditor wants to get as good a dividend as possible, and the more he gets the greater will be the dividend for the small creditor. All I ask is that the unscrupulous use which the small creditor has hitherto made of his power shall in future be confined within reasonable limits. The simple object of the clause is to protect the honest creditors against unscrupulous small creditors.

The Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend is intended to deal with one of the most complicated matters that can be suggested, and the feeling of the Grand Committee was against any such attempt being made in the present Bill. It is a proposal whereby large creditors will be able to force an arrangement upon small creditors. According to a Return obtained at the instance of the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Mr. J. Chamberlain) it appeared, if I remember right, that in 10 large County Court districts in the course of six months, out of 20,000 debts 14,000 were under £20 and 10,000 under £10. The hon. and learned Member proposes that a deed of arrangement, assented to by the larger creditors, shall be binding upon the small creditors. I am satisfied, in my own mind, that the clause now proposed would not work properly, and all who have had any experience of the working of the Bankruptcy Act will agree with me that in dealing with the question it will be necessary to protect the small creditor against the undue weight of larger creditors preventing the administion of the estate in bankruptcy.

I am in favour of the clause with some modification of its details. The question is not so much whether a particular course is desired by large or small creditors, as whether the majority of the creditors consider that it is the most efficient way of winding up the estate. But as I understand the Attorney General to promise to consider the question in a separate Bill, I think my hon. and learned Friend would prejudice his case if he were to go to a Division. I would, therefore, suggest that he should content himself with having brought the matter before the House, and that he should accept the assurance of the Attorney General that the whole question will be dealt with subsequently.

I have had a great deal to do with creditors' meetings in various places; and, as I know the extreme interest that is taken in this subject, I will join with my hon. Friend in urging the withdrawal of this proposal—not because there is anything objectionable in the clause itself, but because it imports considerable controversial matter into a Bill which, whatever it was as originally introduced, has been very much improved in Committee. The commercial community would prefer that the question should be postponed until full justice can be done to it.

I am very glad that this proposal is not likely to be pressed, and therefore it is unnecessary to discuss it at any length. At the same time, I do not like to let it pass out of the control of the House without expressing my opinion that the clause is bad in principle, and that the introduction of any such system into the bankruptcy proceedings of this country would be attended with all the abuses which the Bankruptcy Act of 1883 was passed to suppress. My hon. Friend behind me has said that the universal opinion of the commercial community is in favour of such a clause. I have no doubt that is right as far as the organisations which profess to represent the commercial body are concerned; but there is an immense body of men outside those organisations who do not share that opinion. The effect of the clause would be enormously to multiply deeds of arrangement and to limit the administration of insolvent estates under such official control and investigation, as I believe to be an absolute necessity if commercial morality is to be in any way preserved. I believe the result would be the same as obtained before the Bankruptcy Act of 1883, that is to say that the creditor, with the help of such professional assistance as he can always obtain, would go to one or two large creditors, and would make a proposal which might or might not be a satisfactory or an honest proposal; but which, when accepted by the one or two principal creditors, would be forced upon the great mass of the creditors. The Return for which moved shows that nine-tenths of the creditors in these cases are creditors for amounts of under £50. Then I would point out that the large creditors are not always large commercial people. They are very often either bonâ fide or sham creditors who are friends of the bankrupt, and to whom he goes, very often collusively, to secure an arrangement which can afterwards be forced on the rest of the creditors. Certainly if this proposal is pressed, or if it comes up on any other Bill, I shall give it the most strenuous opposition, believing it, as I do, to be fatal to the Bankruptcy Act of 1883.

The Amendment obviously refers to deeds of arrangement, and if an alteration is to be made in the law in that respect, I think it should be an amendment of that Act to which the hon. Member has referred in such complimentary terms. I venture on this subject to differ somewhat from the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken. For my own part, I think that deeds of arrangement, under proper restrictions for the protection of the rights of dissentient minorities of creditors, and of the public interests in casa of commercial offences, are an essential supplement of any good bankruptcy system. The difficulty is, that this clause does not propose to provide those safeguards and that machinery which are absolutely essential for the purpose of preventing the abuses that occurred under the former Acts, such as that of 1861. I sincerely hope that when the subject is again brought before the House the right hon. Gentleman will be able to give us the benefit of his further consideration of the proposal.

I do not know whether the hon. Member in charge of the Bill will accept the next clause I have put on the Paper: "Board of Trade not to refuse to confirm appointment of Trustee." We were told in the Committee by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade that there was no power to refuse to confirm the appointment of a Trustee, and he no doubt is under the belief that such a thing is not done. Quite a recent case has, however, been brought to my notice. I cannot understand on what principle the creditors who have appointed the Trustee of a deed of assignment as Trustee of the same estate in bankruptcy are not to be allowed to maintain that appointment. I do not doubt for a moment that the hon. Member in charge of the Bill intends next year to amend the Act to which he has referred, but I doubt very much whether he will be successful in the ballot next year. We cannot, at all events, base any reasonable calculation upon it. I am not perhaps, capable of that beautiful belief in the intention of others which I think the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the London University has shown on this occasion. He alluded to a sort of promise on the part of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade to take under his protecting wing some Bill, the provisions of which have never been explained, but which may possibly be introduced next Session by the hon. Gentleman who is in charge of this Bill. I think that is rather a shadowy ground on which to refuse to make any amendment, however necessary, in the present system. I do not want to labour the point, and I may say that if the clause I now propose is not looked upon as important by those who represent more particularly the commercial classes of this country I have no option but to at once withdraw it. I would, however, appeal to the hon. Member in charge of the Bill to consider whether it is not a proposal it would be well to accept.

The hon. and learned Member has but one argument in favour of the clause, and that is that if any person is appointed Trustee of a deed of assignment he should subsequently be Trustee of the bankrupt estate.

No; what I wished to urge was that the fact of a man having been appointed a Trustee of an abortive deed of assignment should not prevent his being subsequently appointed Trustee of the estate.

My hon. and learned Friend has, I think, forgotten that it has been laid down by the Bankruptcy Court, and by Mr. Justice Cave, as a sound principle that where a person has become an accounting party to an estate by virtue of an abortive deed of assignment, he ought not to be afterwards appointed as the person who will pass the accounts. I submit that the Board of Trade ought not to be compelled to recognise the appointment of such a person as Trustee of the bankruptcy.

I do not see why the Board of Trade should be able to prevent the appointment of a Trustee under a deed of assignment as Trustee of the bankruptcy if the creditors wish it. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. J. Kelly) attributed to me a good deal of trust in human nature; but I think we have had a distinct assurance from the Government that they will deal with the question of deeds of arrangement next year. I do not feel as strongly about the proposed new clause as the hon. Member who has brought it forward; but I do not see why the Board of Trade should interfere with the choice of the creditors, and, therefore, if the hon. and learned Member thinks it worth while to go to a Division, I shall certainly vote with him.

I beg to move the new clause of which I have given notice. Its object is to remove a hardship which has arisen under the Act of 1883.

I desire to move the next Amendment which stands in my name, namely, in Clause 1, line 11, to leave out "fourteen," and insert "twenty-eight." The matter is one of some importance. This clause, for the first time, makes an act of seizure an act of bankruptcy. Originally the clause provided that if an act of seizure had lasted for seven days that was an act of bankruptcy, but the hon. Member, in charge of the Bill made some concession. The Sheriff, as most Members know, does not get much, except out of his poundage, and, therefore, if there is any question of his losing the poundage, the Sheriff will take very good care to precipitate the sale. Now, who will lose if the sale be conducted with improper haste? The creditors, and the creditors only. Take the case of a man having property of the value of £3,000 or £4,000, and consisting to a considerable extent of china and pictures. To make out and print a catalogue is, I am told by several auctioneers, a matter of almost a week's work, and therefore it is impossible to suppose that a proper assemblage of purchasers can be got together in 14 days. The result of having the sale within 14 days will be to give enormous advantages to those who are known by the appropriate term of "knock-outers." The goods will not fetch much more than a fourth of their value, and the creditors will be the losers. Why should they lose? What is the advantage of the clause as it now stands? I quite agree with what the hon. Member in charge of the Bill said in the Standing Committee, that the way in which the Sheriff has been allowed week after week and month after month to remain in possession is a scandal, and that something ought to be done to prevent it. But what difference will it make to the estate whether the Sheriff remains in possession 14 or 28 days? The possession money amounts to only about 30s. a week, find the postponement of the sale for another fortnight may mean a gain to the creditors of hundreds of pounds. I have no personal interest in this matter, and I have not pat the Amendment down at the instigation of any person connected directly or indirectly with the Sheriff. I admit that since my proposal was rejected by the Committee I have had several letters from those who are interested in the rights of the Sheriff begging me not to abandon the position I then took up, and pointing out that it was not so much to the interest of the Sheriff as of the creditors that the goods should not be mercilessly and ruthlessly sacrificed. I beg to move the Amendment.

The hon. Member has no need to make any disclaimer of interested motives in making any proposal on this or any clause. I willingly acknowledge his assistance towards the improvement of the Bill. The present proposal raises a question of very considerable administrative importance. The mischief with which the clause proposes to deal is this: There are many cases in which the Sheriff is in possession for weeks or months, and, in consequence, there is a dissipation of the estate, which is especially serious if the estate be small; the debtor continues to live upon the assets, and the creditors are kept at bay while the expenses, only £3 a week, mount up to a considerable sum. I think the House will see this is a mischief to be limited, and in the existing system there is a long delay which should be curtailed. The hon. Member asks me to make a concession for which lam not prepared. In the Committee I undertook to accept 21 days, and since then the hon. Member for West Wicklow and the hon. Member (Mr. Kelly) have convinced me that there are points that deserve consideration. For instance, in the case of a sale of articles of vertu it may be that the services of a particular auctioneer may be required or desirable, and these, perhaps, may not be obtained in a short time. To meet such cases, which are, however, very exceptional, I will so far accede to the wishes of the hon. Member as to substitute 21 days for 14 if he will accept that.

I am afraid I have no choice left me but to accept that, and I will amend my Motion in that sense.

I beg to suggest an alteration in Clause 8, line 38. This sub-section appears to me to be one of the most useful in the Bill, and it will meet what has undoubtedly been a great scandal in relation to the debtor's expenditure. I think the House will appreciate the difference my Amendment indicates between "expenditure" and "extravagance." The word used here is "extravagance," which does not appear to me to quite meet the case, and I propose to substitute the word "expenditure." Extravagance we may assume to be always unjustifiable, though there may be unjustifiable expenditure which yet may not be called extravagance. I think the word expenditure is preferable; I simply put the suggestion before the House.

I think there is no doubt "expenditure" is the better word to use. Extravagance is always culpable, and it is unnecessary to call it unjustifiable.

That is very true, but extravagance is only condemnable except morally—when it comes within the purview of the Bankruptcy Act. Logically and legally the hon. Member may be right, but let me point out the valid reason for retaining the word. A legal and definite meaning has been attached to the words "unjustifiable extravagance" since they have been used in the Bankruptcy Act of 1883 adapted from previous Acts; they have been the subject of decisions, and recognised constructions have been placed upon the words. To alter the word now might, I apprehend, lead to controversy and confusion, and to the increase of cost in re-constructing the law.

I would advise the hon. Member to withdraw the Amendment. The words "unjustifiable expenditure" will lead to a good deal of litigation before the definition would be authoritatively settled.

It would be a great mistake to change the word. The construction has to be settled, and the word "extravagance" gives the cue or indication of what is meant; "expenditure" is but a relative term; it may be large, yet not unjustifiable; extravagance is the point to which the sub-section is directed.

When the Act of 1883 was under consideration, I preferred the word expenditure; but, on the other hand, we have had the opportunity of seeing the enormous opening that would be given to litigation by the alteration of the word, and I still think it is undesirable to alter it.

Still, I think the word "expenditure" is also necessary; and I would suggest that both words should be used, "unjustifiable expenditure or extravagance."

The Bill was so thoroughly discussed in Committee under the able Chairmanship of the hon. Member for East Donegal that I am unwilling to bring before the House any Amendment to the work of the Committee; but my two Amendments together involve a principle which I will shortly state. As the clause stands, though the Court is of opinion that the arrangement or the terms of composition are reasonable and calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, the Court may disallow it, if the bankrupt has misconducted himself in certain ways, and must do so, unless 7s. 6d. in the £1 is to be paid. Now you, are dealing with a case in which the Court is of opinion that the proposal for composition or scheme of arrangement is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, and yet in the one case the Court may refuse to approve the proposal, and in the other cases shall refuse, unless there is a payment of 7s. 6d. in the.£1. But here you are punishing the creditors for the bankrupt's fault. Let the bankrupt be punished if he breaks the law; but if he has only committed a fault, then, whether he ought to be punished or not, I hold that the creditors ought not to be punished, Although it is said that Bankruptcy Law is mixed up with moral considerations, I do not understand a moral consideration limited by 7s. 6d. in the £1. The effect of the clause will be to punish the creditors; but the bankrupt, if he has misbehaved himself, can purge himself of his offence, so to speak, by providing 7s. 6d. in the £1. It may be an advantage to the creditors to get less than 7s. 6d., but the assertion of the moral principle is made to depend upon that sum. When the bankrupt has broken the Criminal Law let him be punished as the Criminal Law provides; but if he has not broken the Criminal Law and has committed a fault, for which you think he ought to be punished, well and good, but do not make the punishment fall upon, the creditors. On these grounds, and taking the two Amendments as hanging together, I move the first.

I admit the importance of this, but it is not possible to agree to the omission of the words. My hon. and learned Friend will observe that the President of the Board of Trade proposes, in conformity with the view he has previously expressed, to leave out the words "may in its discretion," in order to insert "shall," and it seems to be that that is a course that must be adopted. I would point out that in a very limited number of cases is the Court required to refuse discharge; the cases are when the bankrupt has committed a misdemeanour under Section 31 of the Act of 1883; that is to say, where an adjudged bankrupt obtains credit to an amount of more than £20, not informing the creditor that he is a discharged bankrupt, or where he has committed an offence or misdemeanour under the Debtors' Act of 1869, which has been previously treated or described as fraud. Now, it seems to me a serious thing to suggest that when the Court is going to decline to give a bankrupt his discharge on the ground that he has been guilty of a crime, that in that case the Court may indirectly give a discharge by approving of a composition or arrangement. It will be observed that the sub-sections proceed by steps. In the first the Court must refuse, and then, under the second sub-section, an option is given. I confess, knowing how my hon. and learned Friend is the champion of law—and order also—I am surprised he should commit himself to a suggestion that the Court, which must refuse a discharge on account of gross and criminal misconduct, should still indirectly promote a dis-large by approving an arrangement. It is not really a case in which the creditors are involved, because, speaking as a general rule, and not of exceptional cases, if the bankrupt is guilty of such conduct, surely it is better to wind up his affairs in bankruptcy.

I desire to say that the decision of the Committee upon this point was arrived at by a considerable majority against the view of the Government representatives. That the Government were right in refusing the Amendment of my hon. friend near me (Mr. Gedge) I have no doubt, but for the very same reason that he wished to leave out those words, I wish to retain the option given to the Court. I do not wish to punish the creditors for the fault of the debtor. I hope the House will maintain the decision arrived at in Committee upstairs by a considerable majority, even though the Government still stick to their view.

Perhaps I may explain the circumstances that occurred in Committee. The issue was raised twice, first by the hon. Member for Camberwell, who moved to leave out the whole of the sub-section, leaving the action of the clause purely within the discretion of the Court, and this was negatived by a considerable majority; and then, without further discussion, the proposal of my hon. Friend behind me was accepted, substituting "may in its discretion," for "shall," practically giving what the Committee had already rejected. The reason far the present Amendment is obvious. My hon. Friend admits it is right with-regard to the first two paragraphs, namely, if the conditions, in the opinion of the Court, are unreasonable or not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, that the Court should be bound to refuse the proposal, because in that case it would be with, the Court to decide whether the terms of the proposal are reasonable or not, or whether they are or are not for the benefit of the general body of creditors. Then my hon. Friend, taking up the point the hon. Member for Stockport unsuccessfully urged, desires to give the Court discretion to allow composition in cases in which, by Sub-section 8 of the previous clause, it would be bound to refuse the order of discharge of a bankrupt on the ground of dishonest conduct. I hope the House will not accept such a proposition, but will restore the clause to the position in which it stands in the existing law in Sub-section 6 of Section 18 of the Act of 1883. I cannot but think the Committee settled the clause as it now stands under a misapprehension.

With all deference to my right hon. Friend, I hardly think the Committee were under any misapprehension. The matter was decided by a large majority after a discussion on the Motion of the hon. Member for Uxbridge, who, if he were here, would no doubt support my hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Baring). I admit there may be cases in which, in the interest of public morality, it might be necessary to impose pecuniary sacrifices on creditors; but it does not follow that this Amendment is necessary. If the House is not prepared to support the judgment of the Committee upstairs, still may they not trust the Court to deal with the matter wisely when it comes before them. I feel the greatest confidence that in cases suggested by the right hon. Gentleman the Court would act aright, and the discretion may be safely left to it. I would appeal to the right hon. Gentleman to allow the clause to stand as it is.

I venture to express a hope in the same direction.

I would strongly support the Amendment, and the opposite view seems to me to be most extraordinary. If a debtor has committed an offence of such magnitude as to require the Court to inflict on the bankrupt certain punishment, namely, the refusal of a discharge, Parliament has decided that the Court shall have no discretion at all so far as the bankrupt is concerned. The act of the bankrupt is of such a character that it is necessary to impose on the Court the duty of inflicting a severe punishment; but then the hon. Member opposite and others say, "No; although this House has thought it necessary to require without alternative that this punishment shall be inflicted on the bankrupt, the bankrupt shall be allowed to escape scot-free, he shall be relieved from punishment if the creditors can prove to the satisfaction of the Court that, in their opinion, their interests will suffer by the refusal of a composition;"—["No, no,"]—do not be in a hurry; "if they can persuade the Court to adopt their view that the principles of morality and justice should be sacrificed to the pecuniary interests of the creditors." I think it is a montrous proposition. If a bankrupt deserves punishment he ought to have it; and if in the course of that punishment some slight disadvan- tage is inflicted on the creditors, they ought to take the responsibility. After all, what is the damage done to creditors? Whereas the estate would be wound up under a composition in one case, in the other it would have to be wound up in bankruptcy. There are those who take the view that bankrupety always leads to loss to creditors, and that it involves pecuniary sacrifice. I take a totally different view, and I feel certain the future will show that I am justified in that view. We have as yet had no opportunity of comparing the cost of private arrangements with that of bankruptcy. But in this Bill there is a proviso that Return shall be made to the Board of Trade of the costs of winding up under a deed of composition, and I think that when we get that we shall find that compositions and deeds of arrangement are, on the whole, not so economical as bankruptcy. After all, the sacrifice asked of creditors in order that public justice may be done is very small, and may probably prove no sacrifice at all.

The right hon. Gentleman may be right in thinking that creditors will not suffer, but creditors hold a very different opinion. On the one hand, the right hon. Gentleman admits that he cannot prove his proposition, while on the other the creditors base their opinion on a good many years' experience. I should like to state a concrete case. A bankrupt had within two or three months preceding the date of the receiving order incurred an unjustifiable expense by bringing a frivolous and vexatious defence to an action in the County Court. Possibly, at the most, the expense so occurred did not exceed £5, yet the Court in such a case is to have no discretion.

That is exactly a case in which, under this Bill, there will be discretion in the Court.

Well, if the hon. and learned Gentleman says that, I need not pursue the point further. There are cases in which the degree of blame attaching to the bankrupt varies very much, and I think some confidence should be reposed in the Courts. I cannot understand the right hon. Gentleman on this Bench asking us to show no confidence in Courts of Justice by giving them no discretion in these matters. I hope the Amendment will not be persisted in.

I am sorry to criticise the work of a Committee which has done so much to improve this Bill. But I think this clause bears internal evidence that something has gone wrong with it. It is not at all logical as it now stands, though it was so in the Bill as drafted. For instance, the clause now says that in the most serious cases the Court may exercise a discretion as to granting or refusing a discharge; then, in less serious cases that it shall refuse, and that it shall allow the offences to be compounded: and, lastly, it repeats that in any other case it shall have a discretion. All this is illogical and inconsistent, and ought to be rectified by restoring the words originally in the Bill.

It is quite true the sub section is illogical as compared with the following subsection, and one or the other must be amended. The question is whether we are to accept the more elastic rule laid down at first or to make a hard-and-fast line for the Court, and oblige it, under all circumstances, and without exercising any discretion, to refuse to approve of arrangements come to by creditors under these circumstances. I hope the House will stick to the original words, because there may often be special and exceptional matters which should be left entirely for the Court to decide; otherwise, the Court may feel bound to refuse to sanction an arrangement which it considers would be for the benefit of the creditors. It is all very well and very right to punish fraudulent bankrupts, but it is very hard that the creditors should share in the punishment. I am one of those who have confidence in the Court, and wish it to have a reasonable discretion left to it.

I should like to point out, in furtherance of the observation made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham, that it is a mistake to suppose that this Amendment takes away any discretion from the Court, as in the Act of 1883 the words are that the Court "shall refuse to approve of the composition if it is of opinion that the terms of the composition" are not reasonable or best for the general body of the creditors. The proposed Amendment, therefore, does not extend the restrictions on the Court. During the last seven years we have had no experience to show that the present condition of affairs with regard to the discretion of the Court has worked hardship on creditors. I do not state that without authority. I have endeavoured to find out as far as I could what the real facts are, and I do not think a case has occurred in which creditors have substantially suffered through an estate being administered in bankruptcy instead of under a deed of arrangement. I assure the House that this Amendment does not introduce any new principle.

I shall support the Amendment. When the 1883 Act was under consideration in this House, there were prolonged and almost bitter disputes on this point. This is a retrospective clause. It says that after the passing of this Act no composition or deed of arrangement under Sections 125 and 126 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 shall be entered into or allowed without the sanction of the Court having jurisdiction in the matter, and that such sanction shall not be granted unless the composition or liquidation appears to be reasonable or calculated to benefit the general body of creditors. Under the Act of 1869 the Court had very wide discretion, and the experience of the exercise of it was so regrettable that in the Act of 1883 it was found necessary to insert a special section of a most unusual character and in a most unusual part of the Bill—in the interpretation clause—so as to prevent a continuance of the mischief. I think that the arguments which then prevailed are equally pertinent in the present case.

I now move, in Clause 23, to omit Sub-section 3 and insert the following:—

"A creditor may give a special proxy to any person to vote at any specified meeting or ad- journment thereof on all or any of the following matters, namely:—(a) for or against any specific proposal for a composition or scheme of arrangement; (b) for or against the appointment, remuneration, or continuance in office of any specified person as trustee or member of the Committee of Inspection; (c) on all other questions arising at any specified meeting or adjournment thereof."

Perhaps I may be permitted to make a brief explanation. The House is aware that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London has taken great pains to put this question of proxies upon a proper footing, and I am sure my right hon. Friend is very much indebted to him for the labours he has bestowed upon the matter. At the same time he will recognise also that the President of the Board of Trade has endeavoured to meet him as far as possible, consistent with the prevention of certain evils, which we must endeavour to stop. I refer to the system of touting for proxies so as to obtain the control of bankruptcies; but the right hon. Gentleman will see that we have endeavoured to meet that evil by giving the delegate power to vote on various questions, while ensuring the good administration of the bankrupt's estate.

I desire to acknowledge the courtesy of the Attorney General and the President of the Board of Trade. I should no doubt have preferred the Amendment which stands in my name on the Paper. The objections against special proxies have, I think, been removed by the subsequent legislation; at the same time, I recognise that the Government have done much to meet the views of the London Chamber of Commerce, and, under these circumstances, I am ready to accept the words suggested by the Attorney General.

I confess the Amendment now proposed by the Government and accepted by my right hon. Friend behind me is not open to the objection that was taken to his original proposal, and I am prepared to accept it as a reasonable compromise. At the same time, I differ from my right hon. Friend. I cannot see why the difficulties of the case which he puts cannot be met by the provision of a general proxy which can be given to the clerk or person in the employment of the person giving the proxy. No doubt the object of many of those who support the alteration of the law is to avoid the old system under which there was a touting for proxies. A special proxy may of course be given to any person, and consequently to a professional firm. In the vast majority of cases, it will be admitted that to allow a professional firm to vote for the appointment of a Trustee or highly-remunerated official would undoubtedly lead to all those evils that the Act of 1883, in dealing with this question of proxies, was supposed to guard against. I must say that I prefer the law as it stands, and no real case has been made out for a change in the system of enabling a creditor to allow his proxy to act for him, as if he himself were present.

I do not intend to offer any objection to the compromise suggested, but I must say I view with some misgiving and alarm the enlargement of this general proxy system. I entirely concur in the view which the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Chamberlain) has expressed on one or two occasions. Everyone acquainted with proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 is aware of the abuses which crept in under the proxy system. I am of opinion that these abuses have been entirely removed by subsequent legislation, namely, the Act of 1883. I therefore view with some misgiving the enlargement proposed. But, under the circumstances, as the proposition is certainly a considerable modification of the original proposition of the right hon. Gentleman, I am not disposed to offer it any serious opposition.

I now move, in Clause 23, to omit Subsection 3, and insert the following:—

"A creditor may give a special proxy to any person to vote at any specified meeting or adjournment thereof, on all or any of the following matters, namely: (a.) for or against any specific proposal for a composition or scheme of arrangement; (b.) for or against the appointment, remuneration, or continuance in office of any specified person as trustee or member of the Committee of inspection; (c.) on all other questions arising at any specified meeting or adjournment thereof."

The object of this clause is to provide that where the district for which the adoption of the Act is proposed contains a population of 5,000 or more the opinion of the voters shall be taken by voting papers alone, and that where the population is under 5,000 they may proceed either by voting papers or by public meeting. I have an Amendment to move, the effect of which, with consequential alterations, will be to abolish the procedure by public meeting in all cases. Up to the year 1877 the procedure was entirely by public meeting; but subsequent to that a change was made, and the Local Authorities had the alternative given them of proceeding either by voting paper or public meeting. The Preamble of the Act bringing about this change declared that it had been found in many cases that public meeting was an unsatisfactory mode of indicating the general opinion of the ratepayers, and that it was desirable to adopt a more efficacious method of ascertaining that public opinion. I cannot understand why the right hon. Baronet in charge of the Bill should make the distinction he does between populations of under and above 5,000. It is in the small places that the greatest difficulty arises. In a large place if there is an objection to the establishment of a library the objection will be well-known, and effect will be given to the objection; but in small places the matter will not be so well discussed; and if there should be a public meeting it may only be attended by a few persons, and the ratepayers at large may find themselves involved at the will of those few persons in a very heavy burden. Violent agitations frequently take place on subjects of this kind, and we cannot be too careful in our legislation. If the right hon. Baronet will strike out the 5,000 limit it will give great satisfaction. Personally, I am very much in favour of the adoption of the Library Act in all cases where it can be adopted, but I am averse to its being put into operation by the machinery proposed. My Amendments will affect Clauses 2 and 5.

Inasmuch as a poll is demanded in most cases where proceedings are taken by public meeting, I think it would be a saving of expense^* to proceed by voting paper in the first instance. I am as anxious as anyone in the House can be that the Public Libraries Act should be adopted generally throughout the country; but, at the same time, I have no desire that it should be adopted in any instance against the wish of the people concerned. I feel that if there is not a public desire for a Public Library, the establishment of such an institution will not be useful. The hon. Member thinks that, under the clause as it stands, Public Libraries would be decided on without sufficient consideration. I do not agree with him. I admit, however, that the holding of a public meeting may involve unnecessary expense and trouble to the ratepayers, and I am in the hands of the Committee in regard to the Amendment.

The object of the Amendment I wish to move is to meet such cases as that of the borough of Leominster, which gives its name to the division I have the honour to represent. They have recently adopted the Libraries Act in that borough, but a difficulty has arisen owing to the fact that the borough consists of two portions—the one urban and the other rural. Naturally, the inhabitants of the rural portion of the borough feel somewhat grieved that they have to pay the same rate as the urban portion, though, of course, they will derive much less advantage from the library. Many of the rural portion of the inhabitants live a considerable distance from the town. It seems to me that the adoption of some such Amendment as that I propose would facilitate the adoption of the Library Act, as it would then be possible for places of unequal population and rateable value to join together for the purposes of the Act. At present when the rural parts of a district have to be rated to the same extent as the urban parts, they very often will not agree to putting the Act in operation. A number of county parishes surrounding a large village should not be called upon to pay at the same rate as the village, seeing that they would derive much less advantage from the library. I trust the Committee will see its way to the adoption of the Amendment, the effect of which will be to allow the rate to be levied indifferent proportions, on defined parts of a library district. So far as I can see, there is no objection to my proposal. Difficulties in the way of the working of the Act have arisen in the past, and may arise in the future, unless some such alteration as this is made. The right, hon. Baronet in charge of the Bill has no objection, I believe, to the Amendment.

I agree with nearly everything the hon. Member says, but I do not think his Amendment is necessary, because in Clause 8 it is laid down that the expression "library district" means any borough, &c., on any "parish or part of a parish." I do not know whether these words are sufficient to effect the hon. Member's purpose.

I think the hon. and learned Member has mistaken the object of that clause. It is that a library district may be composed of parts of parishes, but my proposal is that the various parts of a district may be differently rated.

I have two Amendments on the Paper to this clause, the object of which is to make it clear that there shall be no additional burden thrown on the rates. In the Libraries Act of 1855 it was specified that the rate should not exceed 1d. in the £1, and I think the wording of this clause would imply that limitation can be removed altogether. This question was fought out very hard, and owing to the attitude of the then President of the Local Government Board the controversy was closed. I think it would be a great mistake to re-open it now.

I am assured by the draftsman that the Amendment is unnecessary; but if, on further consideration, it should appear that there is any ambiguity, I will undertake to have an Amendment to make the matter clear inserted in another place. The object of the clause is to enable the ½d. rate to be exceeded where it is found that the cost has been under-estimated. I do not think there is anything in the clause which would enable the 1d. maximum to be exceeded.

I think the Amendment should be accepted, because it would be quite easy for the right hon. Baronet, if he desired it at a future stage, to re-model the clause. The clause as drawn seems somewhat ambiguous; and as the Amendment would simplify it, I trust it will be accepted. I think it is preferable that the words should be removed.

I do not think there is any ambiguity. It is dangerous for a layman to speak too confidently as to the -wording of an Act of Parliament, but the draftsman assured me there would be no ambiguity about the words. I hope the hon. Member will allow the words to stand; and if on consideration it is thought desirable to remove them, they can be struck out at a subsequent stage.

It seems to me that the last paragraph of the clause simply provides against the danger hon. Members have in view. It says—

"Provided always that nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorise the levying of any rate exceeding 1d. in the £1."

If there is a proviso in one part of the clause and another proviso in another part there is obvious ambiguity. Had we not better get rid of the ambiguity?

To listen to hon. Gentlemen one would think there is some terrible danger about to be incurred. What is it? That a given community may wish to spend more than 1d. in the £1 on a Free Library. I do not regard that as a very overwhelming danger. I can quite understand poor communities wishing to be limited in their expenditure, but I do not see why rich communities should not be allowed to spend 2d. in the £1 if they so desire. I think it is a great evil that the rate under the Public Libraries Act should have been confined to 1d. It is not in the least necessary that Parliament should legislate against the terrible danger that a community should spend what it thinks fit on so excellent an object as a Free Library.

The right hon. Gentleman would apparently be very careless whether there is a heavy rate in a particular district or not.

I think the offer of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the University of London very fair. I agree with him and the draftsman that there is no real ambiguity when the clause is read carefully.

The right hon. Baronet's new clauses ("Power to grant charity lands for library purposes," and "Extension of 18 Vic. cap. 70, 3, 18, to the Metropolis") appear to me to be outside the scope of the Bill.

The clauses are intended to meet cases in which Ecclesiastical Bodies, and other charitable institutions are desirous of giving land for the purpose of Free Libraries, and I think it would be eminently desirable they should do so. I believe there is no opposition to the clauses, but of course I must, Sir, bow to your ruling.

The right hon. Baronet must take another method of getting the clauses inserted.

I do not know whether I should be in order if I allude at this point to the new clauses appearing on the Paper in the name of the right hon. Baronet, and which you, Sir, have ruled to be outside the scope of the Bill. The Dulwich Governors have expressed their willingness—their desire, in fact—to give a site for a Free Library there, and I believe the Charity Commissioners have expressed their desire to carry out the wishes of the Government. The Governors have no power at present to give the site, and, therefore, I appeal to the Government to afford the right hon. Baronet some facilities for amending the Bill in the way he suggests.

I should be very glad, indeed, to see these clauses inserted, and I am sure no Member of the House wishes to put any impediment in the way of the adoption of the clauses. If my right hon. Friend brings the clanses within the scope of the Bill he might, on Report, move that the Bill be re-committed with a view to the insertion of the clauses.

May I hope Her Majesty's Government will help me in getting the Third Reading. I should be sorry to run the risk of losing the Bill by trying to get these clauses inserted.

If the right hon. Baronet means that the Government should give up any portion of their time, I am afraid I cannot promise him that we will give him facilities for the Third Reading. But I cannot conceive that any difficulty will arise in obtaining the Third Reading.

Perhaps, as this Bill was read a second time after 12 o'clock at night, and without any discussion, it may be convenient, as this is the only clause which contains any operating part, that I should upon the clause say a few words in explanation of the object of the measure. As the law stands at present, any imputation, however gross and malicious, upon the chastity or virtue of a woman may be made with impunity, provided that it is made by word of mouth, and no direct pecuniary damage results to the woman. That has resulted in great hardship and injustice, and the state of the law in this respect was strongly denounced in the House of Lords 30 years ago both by Lord Campbell and Lord Brougham as unsatisfactory and barbarous. The object of the Bill is to put an end to this state of things. The only objection that I know of is that trivial actions may be brought if the Bill passes; but the existing law provides against that, because in cases in which it is shown that the words are used merely as vulgar abuse, the Judges always direct Juries that there is no ground of action. These are the grounds on which I have thought it necessary to bring in the Bill. The hon. and learned Member for Durham (Mr. Milvain) who has the first Amendment down, is not present, but I accept the Amendment, which is an improve- ment in the drafting of the Bill, and will move it in his stead.

I am afraid that if this Bill is passed, where words are used which ought not to be used, and which, at the same time, ought not to be regarded as conveying a serious imputation, they will in many cases be made the ground of an action. It is well known that when temper gets the upper hand of a person, he or she very often uses words that ought not to be used, but which cannot be regarded as seriously imputing unchastity. Although there may be cases in which the Judge may direct the Jury that they ought to consider in what sense the words complained of were used, still there would be a number of cases in which hardships would be inflicted. Actions might be brought for words spoken rashly and hastily, and I cannot but think it is rather a dangerous thing to alter the law.

The speech of the Attorney General really goes against the Second Reading, which has already been accepted by the House. [The ATTORNEY GENERAL: Without discussion.] I am aware of that, but the objection taken by the hon. and learned Gentleman ought to have been taken on the Second Reading. The point is this. At present if an imputation has been made upon a man or woman which involves pecuniary loss or damage, he or she has a right of action. The Bill proposes to give a right of action in cases where the most serious imputation which can be made, and which does not result in pecuniary loss, is made. There may possibly be some cases in which actions are brought for the use of some objectionable phrase, but I submit that the safeguard lies in the protection which the good sense of Judges and Juries gives.

I have put down this Amendment because I think it is a very dangerous thing that there should be on the Statute Book anything which recognises that that should be lawful which is said of one sex, while it is not if said of the other sex. I propose to leave out the word "woman" in line 7, and insert "person." Whatever we may think and know about the way in which offences of unchastity in the case of one sex are regarded, it is a very serious thing that it should be on the Statute Book that the law of England recognises that it is not an offence to charge one sex with unchastity.

I quite agree that logically there is something to be said for the view the hon. and gallant Member has laid before the Committee, but practically no mischief would result from the law being what I propose it should be. The fact is, that men do not suffer under the imputation to the same extent that women do. There is not the same practical hardship, or the same danger of an imputation against men being made maliciously. And, moreover, when imputations are made against men they are almost invariably made with a view of damaging the accused in their profession. In such case there is a right of action. The justification of the Bill is that women do not suffer the pecuniary loss to give them cause of action, but they suffer in their characters. While I fully appreciate the spirit in which my hon. and gallant Friend proposes the Amendment I trust he will not think it necessary to insist upon it, because his insistence might endanger the passing of the clause.

I cannot admit that unchastity is the same thing in the case of a man as that of a woman. To impute unchastity in the case of a woman really means ruin to her; but in the case of a man the imputation is generally a trifling matter, relatively speaking, and indeed may be sometimes regarded as a compliment. At any rate, an imputation of unchastity does not affect a man's future chance in life, but it is a serious thing to a woman. I hope the hon. and gallant Gentleman will not press his Amendment.

The remarks of the hon. and learned Member amount to the very strongest argument in favour of the Amendment. If it is to be said gravely in the House of Commons that an imputation of unchastity is regarded as a compliment, I think the Amendment is absolutely necessary.

The speech of the hon. and learned Member for Camberwell leads me to join the hon. and gallant Gentleman in the support of this Amendment, as I entirely approve of the principle which he has laid down. I do not specially advise my hon. and gallant Friend to divide the Committee, but if he goes to a Division I shall certainly follow him into the Lobby.

I have every sympathy with the main object of the Bill. It is, undoubtedly, desirable that a woman should have every protection against a man who endeavours to defame her character. But it must be known to the House that there are no graver scandals in our Courts of Justice than the enormous number of trivial actions brought for libel and slander, especially slander. Although the person who defames the character of an honest and virtuous woman should be made to smart for his conduct in a sensible degree, I think we ought not to provide undue facilities for bringing actions for indiscreet or trivial expressions. Let me point out that unless we introduce some such proviso as this I now have to propose, there will be no sort of power in a defendant, however innocent of the charge he may be, to defend himself against it, except at very serious expense. Even should he prove his innocence of the charge, and the plaintiff is a married woman, he will, if the wife has no separate property, have no sort of remedy against the husband, and though successful in the action will have to pay his own heavy costs. I cannot see there is any injustice in making this limitation; it does not take away, it cannot take away, any right of the woman to vindicate her character in open Court. But, on the other hand, the Bill as it stands gives an advantage to a woman who, at the instigation of an unscrupulous attorney, may commence an action for slander upon trivial grounds, in the hope that a man will be unwilling to face the ordeal of the Court with the prospect of having, in any case, to pay costs, even though he may get a verdict. Such a proviso will prevent, in some degree, the Act being taken advantage of by those who make a living out of bringing frivolous and vexatious actions.

The hon. and learned Member has shown no reason why in this Bill, of which he prefesses himself to be in favour, we should make an exception to the general law. I cannot but think he has forgotten the "Married Women's Property Act," which provides that a married woman can sue and can be sued without joining her husband in an action of contract or tort. I do not find any reason why this particular form of action and means of redress should be taken out of the general rule. It seems to me there is strong reason in the other direction. Cases may possibly arise in which a woman is anxious to vindicate her character, but for reasons not creditable to himself, her husband is not willing to join in an action for the purpose; he may be a party even to the very offence. So far, the Amendment would destroy the usefulness of the Bill.

An Order will be made for good cause shown. I do claim that this is a different action to ordinary action, and particularly liable to abuse. If a person is injured in an ordinary action, the fact is provable, but I think the hon. and learned Gentleman, with his experience, must acknowledge that such actions as these are very liable to abuse. I think it cannot be an injustice to a wife to say her husband shall be joined with her as co-plaintiff. Such extraordinary cases as the hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned, of a husband conniving with a third party to destroy his wife's character, would be amply provided for by the addition of such words as "unless the Court for good cause shown should otherwise order," which I should be quite ready to add to the proposed proviso.

I hope the Attorney General will not consider it his duty to oppose the Bill further. As illustrating the necessity for such a measure, it is only necessary to point a case. A woman, keeping a shop, may be maligned as regards her business, and is entitled to recover damages without proving special damage, but if her personal character is assailed in the worst terms that can be applied to a woman, she cannot recover a verdict unless she can show she has sustained special pecuniary damage. Or contrast the position of two women living side by side, one in a private house, the other in a shop. The latter can recover for damages sustained in her business by reason of opprobrious epithets being applied to her, but she may have no such redress, because she cannot perhaps prove that pecuniary loss has resulted. It is, I think, a position that cannot be defended.

I would also ask the Attorney General not to offer opposition. Although I admit a certain amount of weight attaches to the objection that words thoughtlessly used may be made the subject of action for the benefit of solicitors of a certain class, that should not prevent the passing of a useful Bill. Words might very well be introduced, at a subsequent stage, so that it should be made clear that the intention of the speaker in using the language complained of was to impute unchastity or adultery. I shall certainly vote for the clause as it stands.

I was speaking my own private opinion, but it is not my intention to put the Committee to the trouble of a Division.

In moving a new clause that the Bill shall not extend to Scotland, I do not mean that Scotland shall not have the advantages of the Bill, but I am informed by those who are skilled in Scotch law that the application of the Bill to Scotland is unnecessary, inasmuch as the law in Scotland in regard to slander is already substantially the same as is here contemplated.

In principle, I think the Amendment I propose has the approval of the promoters of the Bill. I believe the promoters would be glad to sec the whole of the Bill extended to the whole country, but that is not proposed, and, probably, would not be found practicable. Then the question arises, how much of the general provisions should be applied when Sanitary Authorities desire there should be the application. As the Bill stands, it is proposed that part I shall be extended to England and Wales in any case, whereas the provisions in parts 2, 3, 4, and 5 only extend to those districts in which they are adopted. The object of my Amendment is to make the two clauses relating to public meetings of universal application throughout the country. I think the Committee will agree with mc that it is very desirable that when a public meeting is called within the area of an urban or Rural Sanitary Authority, the Sanitary Authority should take steps for the protection of the public. I think every hon. Member will have had within his experience public meetings held under circumstances in which life has been in the greatest danger. I know it has happened to me on several occasions. I have attended meetings in a room at the top of a building, gaslights glaring, and crowded with people, sometimes all of one way of thinking, sometimes of opposing opinions, and access to the place of meeting being up a small, spiral staircase, and the lives of all these have been in considerable danger. Now, Clauses 37 and 38 deal only with this subject, and I think they ought not to be contentious, and that every Member will agree they ought to have universal application. Clause 37, which deals with the means of ingress and egress, should be of application everywhere. Clause 38 refers to the safety of platforms erected, or used on public occasions. I think we must admit that the platforms, on which we are asked to take our stand, are not always very safe, and I think there is every reason why, by a few words in an Act, we should obtain security in this respect.

The plan of the Bill is a simple one. It is necessary to make this part of the Bill imperative to give effect to the Bill, but the whole of the rest is permissive, and I feel sure that the best way to insure the whole being carried into operation, in fact and not in form only, is to leave option to the authorities.

I hope the hon. and gallant Member will not press this. I do not know if he is aware of the circumstances under which this Bill comes before us. At the commencement of the Session two Bills were introduced, one by myself at the request of certain Municipal Authorities, and one by my hon. Friend, who has had constant experience on the "Police and Sanitary Committee" of the complaints of Local Authorities of the expense of coming to Parliament to get certain powers not conferred upon them by the general law. I sat on that Committee some years ago, and we recommended the desirability of passing a general Act dealing with all these matters. Although I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend that it would be a good thing if we could find time to provide for general legislation in this direction, in legislation, as in other matters, we have often to stop short of perfection and be content with second best. The two Bills were referred to a strong Select Committee, presided over by the Secretary of the Local Government Board, and the Committee came to the unanimous conclusion that it is desirable to leave the Bill permissive, leaving to the Local Authorities to say if they will or will not adopt its provisions. I have little doubt that we shall in time find it in universal application. I may, without assuming knowledge I do not possess, premise that this is probably the last Wednesday we shall have at our disposal for other than Government business, and I would urge that our only chance of carrying through a piece of useful legislation is to adhere to the permissive character of the Bill. I think we may have sufficient confidence in County Councils and Town Councils to leave them to say "aye" or "no" to the adoption of the Act.

I hope that the Committee will accept the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Fowler.) The object of the Bill is to enable Local Authorities to take advantage of existing legislation for the benefit of those they represent, and I confidently believe it will be taken advantage of throughout the country just as if its operation were made imperative. Such has been our experience of the Notification of Diseases Act. There is the advantage that we enlist the local sympathy and co-operation of Local Authorities, when by more drastic regulation we might excite opposition.

Last year I held an opinion strongly in favour of the proposal in my hon. and gallant Friend's Amendment, but I have been converted by what I have heard from the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ritchie) and greatly encouraged by the reception his last great measure has received throughout the country. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Fowler) said a few months ago that he, at the beginning of the Session, represented the views of a number of Municipal Corporations. Now Municipal Corporations are always enabled to make their wishes felt in the House, but it is somewhat different in regard to Rural Sanitary Authorities, and on their behalf I would appeal to the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Ritchie). They do not always receive at the hands of his Department so much consideration as I think they are entitled to, the reason being, I suppose, that the officials being but human yield to the strongest. Now, the principles of public health are exactly the same in rural districts as in towns, and the causes of consumption are alike in each. I have in mind an instance in regard to a district in Cheshire where the Rural Sanitary Authorities were not able to obtain urban powers, with the result that consumption has prevailed to a terrible degree. If we could obtain general assent I could strongly wish that the whole of the Public Health Act should apply to rural districts as in towns. I trust that the right hon. Gentleman will, when he receives application from Rural Authorities for urban powers, give such applications his most favourable consideration.

I am not sure that these observations come within the scope of the Amendment, but the hon. Gentleman has made a charge against the Department over which I have the honour to preside, that we do not give sufficient attention to the representations of Rural Authorities. In that I can assure him he is entirely mistaken. On the contrary, the authorities we find most difficult to persuade to take action in these matters are in the rural districts. I can assure the hon. Member that in reference to sanitary matters it often requires our most strenuous endeavours to put sanitary precautions into force. The real truth is, the Sanitary Authorities are not always constituted in the manner we would desire.

I may explain that the difficulty I spoke of arose before the right hon. Gentleman occupied office.

It is difficult to understand how it is that this clause appears in the Bill. No doubt the measure is a very useful one, but I doubt if this clause is workable. It provides that if any person turns into any drain pipe leading to any sewer water of a higher temperature than 110 deg. Fah., so as to be likely to cause a nuisance, or to be injurious to health, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £10. Now, I do not think there is any Member of this House who would not every day come under that clause, when he is in the lavatory, for if the water in the basin is too hot he naturally turns it out. I do not know how one is to send hot water into a drain without causing a nuisance. What I would suggest is, that the clause should stipulate that the nuisance should be injurious to health. How can anyone send hot water into a drain without causing a nuisance? All I ask for is that it shall be provided that the nuisance shall be injurious to health. In the neighbourhood in which I reside there are some soap works, and frequently we have to shut our windows on account of the nuisance, which is not, however, injurious to health. We do not claim any right to interfere with the soap-boiler. If we choose to buy him up that is our own matter, but we cannot interfere with his business so long as it is not injurious to health. I will give another case in which this clause would work most inconveniently. A manufacturer has to have his boilers scaled every three months, and unless he is to throw his employ^°s out of work for a day or two, he has to turn the hot water direct into the drains. I contend that the alteration I suggest, which would provide that the nuisance must be injurious to health, would cover all these difficulties. There have been three Bills passed which practically cover this point. There is the Stockton Act, the Scarborough Act, and the Dublin Act. I want to know why the people of London should not be treated in the same way as the people of Dublin in this matter, and only be made liable for nuisances injurious to health. It must be remembered that the general public are not in a position to know when these special provisions are inserted in Local Bills. The question is, is anyone to come under this penal clause simply because he causes a nuisance, although it may not be injurious to health? Of course, if the House does not choose to interfere, it is not for me to continue the discussion; but I do think this is a matter deserving attention, and I, therefore, beg to move the Amendment which stands in my name.

The hon. Member is entirely inaccurate in his reading of the Bill. The words of the Dublin Bill appear in this Bill, and are found in the Public Health Act.

In connection with this clause I wish to draw attention to a point arising under the Scarborough Act. It may surprise hon. Members to hear that Scarborough is filled with courts which are not swept or kept clean. This clause provides that in such cases the Urban Authority shall cause the courts to be swept and kept clean, and shall apportion the expense between the occupiers of the buildings situated in the courts or at the back of which the passage leads in such share as may be determined by the Surveyor of the Urban Authority, or in case of dispute by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction, and such appointment may be recovered summarily from the occupier. But is this the sort of clause which Local Bodies should be asked to adopt? Surely it is hard on the unhappy occupier, who has no control over the court or passage, to render him liable to be dragged before a Magistrate for his portion of his trifling expense—amounting, in all probability, to a few pence—of sweeping out a court in which he may be living only quite temporarily. I beg to move the omission of the clause.

Under the Public Health Act of 1875 it is not in the power of any Local Authority to take over any private road until it has been channelled, sewered, paved, flagged, lighted, &c. It is incumbent on the Local Authorities to see that every one of these things is done before the road is declared to be repairable by the inhabitants at large. Now, the late Master of the Rolls, Sir George Jessel, said, in a case which came before him, that it was important to bear in mind that the expense of future repairs to a road would be much greater if it were not properly made in the first place, and that the interest of the public ought not to be sacrificed to those of the speculative builder or owner of land. With that I think we shall all agree. But, unfortunately, there are cases in which Local Bodies are swayed by questionable motives in taking over roads, and surely there should be some power to say that the works required to be carried out under Section 152 of the Public Health Act of 1875, should be properly done before the liability is thrown on the ratepayers of repairing these roads. I think the House should be careful not to make any alteration in the law which is calculated to throw further burdens on the ratepayers. I beg to move the omission of this clause.

I think it would be extremely unjust to the whole community if this clause were omitted, as great inconvenience arises from want of the power which it would confer.

It seems to me that instead of omitting the entire clause we ought to omit the words on page 17, line 40, "or any of them." That would then make it incumbent upon an owner to do all these works, and it would enable the Local Authority to take over a road in a complete state. It is not, I venture to think, the cost of repairing roads which has to be considered. It is the cost of making them. When a builder has laid out a piece of land for building purposes he is bound, under the existing law, to make a complete road. It is desirable in the interests of the ratepayers that this should be done; but if the clause is passed in its present form a Local Authority will be able to take over a new street or road, which is not lighted, or channelled, or paved. They will be able to take it over if only one of these things is done. It seems to me that we should lay down the principle that when an owner of land makes a new road he should properly complete it before the Local Authority can take it over. The remainder of the clause is right enough. I beg to move the omission of the words in page 17, line 40, "or any of them."

Order, Order! The Question has already been put, "That this Clause stand part of the Bill." It is not competent, therefore, for the hon. Member to move this Amendment.

No doubt there ought to be severe obligations entailed in the taking over of private roads. But this clause practically leaves the matter in the hands of Local Authorities, and if they think the cases are such as to require that the whole of these things shall be done they can insist on it, or they may limit themselves to certain of them. It is a matter which rests entirely with them whether or not they will take over the road. In a Bill which has already passed, the House has practically assented to these very words.

I beg to move the insertion in this Bill of the provision that Sections 171 and 172 of the Public Health Act shall be hereby reenacted. The object of putting that in will be to give additional powers to the Rural Sanitary Authorities. These clauses give power to regulate the charges for the hiring of carriages and boats. Of course, Urban Authorities already possess the powers to make bye- laws, but Rural Sanitary Authorities have them not. I have a particular ease in my mind, which illustrates the necessity for this clause. Thousands of visitors every summer pour into the Menai Bridge Station. If they turn to the right they enter the precincts of the city of Bangor, and should they hire a carriage or a boat there is a defined tariff, so that the carriages or the boat may not be overloaded. But if they turn to the left they are outside the limits of the city, and they may be swindled right and left to any extent by the driver. The boatman may be a person incapable of managing a boat. The carriages may be overloaded, and the people may be charged more than a reasonable price. Well, if the words I suggest are inserted powers will be given to Rural, as well as to Urban Sanitary Authorities, to make these bye laws. I hope the House will admit that this is a reasonable proposition, I can see no reason why this power should not be given to Rural Sanitary Authorities, and, therefore, I move that these words be re-enacted in this Bill.

I think the Amendment is altogether unnecessary, because any Rural Authority may get permission, on application, to exercise these powers.

I wish to express my obligations to, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wolverhampton and to the hon. Member for Wigan for the assistance they have given in the passing of this most valuable measure. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wolverhampton and the Member for Wigan had Bills on the subject, and they most readily accepted the suggestion that all three Bills should be referred to a Select Committee. The result has been in every way satisfactory, and very important improvements have been made in the law in regard to these matters.

I think this is altogether needless. Naturally the Government will take the side of the landlords on this question. Ireland stands badly in need of trees, but the only way of encouraging the planting of them is by the simplification of the procedure under this Act.

I am in entire sympathy with the Bill so far as it encourages the planting of trees, and with that view I desire to facilitate the passing of the Bill. I think that the provisions of the law as to registration ought to be embodied in this Bill, but I believe them to be capable of improvement, and if the Amendment is accepted I will submit a simpler and more workable scheme early in the course of next Session.

I think that that is a reasonable suggestion, and I trust that it will be acted upon.

I think it would be most unreasonable for the Government to call on the tenant to register every tree he plants. If they intend to bring in a Bill next Session dealing with this matter, surely it is scarcely worth while to pass this Bill in its present unsatisfactory form. The hon. Member for Cork who is in charge of this Bill, has over and over again objected to this proposal.

It appears to mc that it would be a great hardship if the tenants should be deprived of their property in the trees they plant merely because of the statute referred to. Had they been aware of the statute they would most likely have taken means to secure their rights, but there is no doubt that they have created the property, and they ought not to be deprived of it.

I will briefly state the reason why we think that this registration should be insisted upon. The main object is to afford some evidence that the trees claimed by the tenant as his property were planted by him. A Bill was introduced in 1888 by the hon. and gallant Member for one of the Divisions of Gal way, which I supported, extending the provisions of the former Acts, subject to this requirement as to registration, in order to secure that by some means or other the tenants should record the fact of their having planted trees. The hon. Gentleman is in error in supposing that if this Bill does not pass the tenant may avail himself of the provisions of the older Acts, which apply only to tenants who hold under certain classes of leases. As the hon. Gentleman was not in the House when I answered a question put to me, I will repeat what I said. I said that although I could not agree to exclude from this Bill provisions for registration which are contained in all the Irish Timber Acts, still I quite admitted that the existing provisions of the old Act were obsolete and cumbrous, and I stated to the hon. and learned Gentleman that next Session I proposed to bring in a Bill to simplify the mode of preserving evidence of the fact that the tenant had planted the trees in respect of which he claimed.

I do not think the Bill will be of very much use if this Amendment is passed. This Registration Act will be passed within a year of planting the trees, and some farmers or capitalists will plant trees as a speculation. No ordinary tenant will get any benefit. What I think you should do, is to give the tenants two or three years in which to register. The great majority of cases are not touched by the remarks of the Attorney General.

I am sorry to disoblige the hon. Gentleman in charge of this Bill, but as Gentlemen opposite will let no Irish Bills through, I cannot let them get any English Bill through. I beg to move that Progress be reported.

The Amendments on the Paper are all accepted, and I would appeal to the hon. Member not to oppose the Bill.

I can assure the hon. Member that there is not a Tory on that side of the House who would be more sorry to disoblige him than I am, but as it is impossible for us to get any legislation through, we must make it impossible for Gentlemen opposite to get any through.

I beg to give notice to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury that, as soon as Supply is reached to-morrow, if the Votes for the Lord Lieutenant and Chief Secretary are combined in one, I shall immediately move to report Progress.

I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman who represents the Government a question which I should have desired to put to the Postmaster General had he been in his place. I want to place before the House the fact that the difficulty at the General Post Office has reached a very critical point at the present moment. The difficulty has arisen in this way. I put a question to the right hon. Gentleman the Postmaster General on Monday night, and pointed out that the men were willing and anxious to avoid any friction, and that they had accordingly accepted the proposal put forward by Mr. Shipton on behalf of the Trades' Union Council, and passed a resolution that no attempt to strike should be made until a report of the result of the intervention had been received by them, provided that no supernumerary labour was introduced to supplant the men during, what I may call, the truce. I had hoped that that representation might have stayed the hand of the Postmaster General, but it may be recollected that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Raikes) met my remarks in an exceedingly hostile manner, and intimated—what was certainly not the case—that the men were backing down and giving in to whatever he might demand of them. Practically he threatened that he would continue to import what are technically known as—I do not use the word offensively—blacklegs. Yesterday these supernumerary hands were put on, and the consequence is that there have been today, at the different post offices, conflicts, not of a serious character, I suppose in consequence of the men naturally refusing to work with those whom they regarded as blacklegs. In the course of the day the Postmaster General, or his subordinates, have insisted on the men signing a declaration to the effect that they will agree not to strike before the 21st of July. The first form of the declaration was that they should not strike at all. I believe that Sir A. Stephenson Blackwood has this afternoon given way to the extent I have stated, and the declaration now asked for is that the men shall not strike before the 21st of July—that is to say, during the time of the intervention agreed upon on Monday night last. It is perfectly obvious that if the men were compelled to sign a declaration of that kind the Postmaster General would be free, during the 12 days, to draft in the blacklegs and to teach them the business. The men ask merely for a recognition of their rights of combination, and for a re-instatement of the men who have been suspended or dismissed because they have stood up for their rights. If the Postmaster General, or his subordinates, insist on the men signing this declaration, or on calling in the police or military, if necessary, for the purpose of turning them out of the Post Office, I need hardly point out the exceedingly grave difficulties that must result. I do ask the right hon. Gentleman not to proceed with these, extreme measures. The men are perfectly willing to sign the declaration which I have read; not to strike before the 21st of July, provided that the authorities on their part undertake not to introduce any additional labour during' that, time, and that the additional labour now employed be got rid of. The men are most anxious not t6 dislocate the Public Service, and if the Postmaster General deliberately employs blacklegs for the purpose of supplanting them, it is an intolerable state of things, and one which, I think, this House ought to take into consideration. It is too late to put a question down on the Paper for to-morrow with regard to the particular points I am raising, and I regret very much that the Postmaster General is not present. If he had been in his place I should have asked him how many men have been suspended in the East Central District; how many in the West Central District; and how many in the Mount Pleasant District; how many supernumerary men have been introduced at each station; and whether it is not the fact that the new men introduced have been in excess of those suspended or dismissed. I, this afternoon, asked permission to go into the Post Office to examine the working of the station, but permission was refused by Sir A. Blackwood. I do not say he was not justified in his refusal; but, in view of the discussions which must arise on the Post Office Vote, I think it would be only right that Members of Parliament should have access to the Post Office. I shall certainly press the right, if I am again refused, to see something of the inner working of the Post Office between now and the time the Post Office Vote comes on for discussion.

I think we have some cause to complain—with all respect to the Secretary to the Treasury, who seems to think it a joke that an inquiry should be made at this period into the state of the Postal Department—that the Postmaster General is not in his place, because he must have expected that some questions would be asked on so important a subject. I have this afternoon received telegrams from commercial men in my constituency, to the effect that they have already been inconvenienced by the state of things at the Post Office, and I wish to know if the Postmaster General is going to take steps to secure the proper carrying out of the Postal Service. I want to know if he intends to persevere, in a policy which will dislocate the Postal Service, or adopt one that will conciliate the postmen, and enable work to be carried on in the regular way. The whole of the Metropolis is in a state of excitement on this question, and we have a right to know something definite as to whether we can expect the work of the Post Office to go on peacefully and properly. I am not going into the details of the case, which have been dealt with by the hon. Member for the Camborne Division. The whole thing will have to be threshed out when we get a chance of dealing with the Post Office Vote. But, in the interest of the general community, I wish to know whether we can depend upon such action being taken by the head of the Post Office as will ensure that the Department will not be disorganised by his conduct. Can the commercial and trading classes rely upon receiving their communications in the way they received them before this crisis came upon us?

I am sorry that the hon. Member should have thought I am inclined to treat this matter as a joke. Nothing is further from my desire. But I would say I think that if anybody has reason to complain it is the Postmaster General. For my own part, I know nothing of the circumstances, but I apprehend that no notice was given to the right hon. Gentleman that questions were going to be asked. I venture to say that it is a little inconvenient that statements of this kind should be made in the absence of the Minister responsible for the Department. I am sure that, if notice had been given, my right hon. Friend would have been perfectly willing to answer the questions put. I myself, of course, am unable to do so.