I object, Mr. Speaker, and, further, I desire to give notice that if the Bill is read a second time I shall move an Instruction to the Committee empowering them to inquire into the accommodation provided for third-class passengers by this Company, and to report to this House thereon.

I beg to apologise, on behalf of hon. Members whose names are on the back of this Bill, for asking the House again to postpone the Second Reading. Some fault was found with the promoters for putting down the Bill for last Monday, when Members attended expecting a discussion, and now we have to ask for a further postponement. It will be observed that two points are at issue by the Amendments raised by hon. Members opposite—the question of the taxation of ground landlords and the question of the water supply of the Metropolis, and it has been thought desirable that these points should be allowed to be over until the new Council have expressed a view on the matter, and that they will do in a few days. I hope the House will not object to the Second Reading being deferred till 21st March.

I think we ought to have some assurance that if the Bill is put down for the 21st it will actually be taken then. It is very inconvenient to have to attend so early to support or oppose a Bill which at the last moment is postponed.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if the Law of Guarantees promulgated by the Italian Government, presuming to secure the safety and position of the Pope in Rome, has ever been communicated to our Foreign Office, or in any way officially brought within the cognisance of Her Majesty's Government?

The law referred to has never been officially communicated to the Foreign Office, or brought within the cognisance of Her Majesty's Government, by the Italian Government.

Will the hon. Gentleman say whether any semi-official communication has been made to Her Majesty's Government, or private communication?

Yes, it was privately communicated, in 1871.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if, having regard to the amount of time given to national duty and the service of the country by members of the Volunteer Force, and the expense they severally incur, Her Majesty's Government sees its way to suggest to Parliament some alleviation of their civil obligations in respect of jury service?

I have consulted with my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor, and he informs me that he could not possibly agree to the exemption of all Volunteers from jury service. But, following the precedent of the Militia and Yeomanry, he is prepared to look favourably on the proposal to exempt all officers of Volunteers actually serving in the Force from attendance upon juries. As this matter, however, raises other questions connected with the Jury Laws which require attention, the Lord Chancellor would prefer to deal with it in a Bill which he is himself preparing on the subject.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether the attention of the Government has been called to the declaration of opinion by 5,000 medical men in the United Kingdom to the effect that the habit of opium smoking or of opium eating is morally and physically debasing, and that the drug opium ought, in India as in England, to be classed and sold as a poison, and be purchasable from chemists only; and whether they will call the attention of the Government of India to this important declaration?

The Secretary of State has seen statements that such a declaration is being circulated. The attention of the Government of India will be drawn to the matter by the hon. Member's questions, which will be forwarded to India in the ordinary course.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that a number of bandsmen were attacked on 6th January whilst passing between Charlemont and Loughgall, county Armagh; what steps were taken by the Constabulary, 13 of whom were present during the attack, to bring the assailants to justice; whether an investigation has been held; and, if so, how many of the bandsmen have been summoned, and how many of the assailants; whether the names of more than 40 of the assailants, who formed a portion of this attacking mob, were furnished to the police; whether firearms were used during the assault on the bandsmen and their friends; and if the authorities are aware that a similar attack is in contemplation for 17tli March?

I beg to answer the question. The Constabulary Authorities report that the proceedings referred to were the result of a disturbance arising from the passing of the band through an Orange locality. Firearms were used, but nobody appears to have been injured thereby, the interference of the police preventing what might have otherwise been serious consequences. Steps were taken to prosecute the more prominent persons on either side; but on the representation of the Magistrates at Petty Sessions that it would conduce more to the peace of the district if the proceedings were not carried further they were dropped. As to the last paragraph of this question, I sincerely hope the anniversary will pass over without any disturbance of the peace.

IS the right hon. Gentleman aware that one of the bandsmen has been summoned for carrying arms in a proclaimed district?

That is a different offence altogether.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say if any efforts have been made by the police to ascertain if arms were carried by the attacking Orange party?

I hardly think that arises on the question; but if the hon. Member desires further information I will endeavour to procure it.

But surely the offence of having arms in a proclaimed district is as great on the one side as the other?

The question of the hon. Member refers to a different matter. The question on the Paper has reference to prosecutions for assault on the bandsmen.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether the attention of Her Majesty's Government has been drawn to the danger of scarcity in the Province of Behar, Bengal; whether the Government of Bengal will, notwithstanding the serious failure of the crops in Behar, proceed with the operations of the proposed cadastral survey in that province; whether, as those operations involve the presence of a large number of subordinate Government officials, they are of so urgent a nature that they cannot be postponed until a period of prosperity; and whether the district and other local officers have been asked their opinion as to the advisability of now carrying out these operations; and, if so, whether the Correspondence can be laid upon the Table of the House?

The Secretary of State has received a Report from the Government of India as to the crop prospects in Behar. It is proposed to begin the survey in part of one district about next October. There is at present no reason for thinking that the scarcity, which it is hoped will have abated by August, will prevent the carrying out of this intention. The Secretary of State is not aware that the district officers have been consulted as to the postponement of operations. The Correspondence on the general subject will be presented if moved for, as was stated in answer to a question of the hon. Member for South Donegal on Tuesday.

I beg to ask the President of the Board of Agriculture why Hampshire, which is free from foot-and-mouth disease, should be included in the scheduled counties?

The movement of animals out of Hampshire was prohibited in consequence of the occurrence of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease at Ash, in Surrey, a place quite close to the borders of Hampshire. This outbreak is believed to have had its origin at Aldershot, one of the places to which some of the beasts, amongst which the disease was originally discovered, were sent down from the London Market on 1st February. Aldershot is itself in Hampshire, and in the circumstances I could not but feel that the movement of animals out of that county would for the present be very dangerous.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he intends to take immediate action to alleviate the distress now existing at Enfield Lock owing to the dismissal of a large number of hands from the Royal Small Arms Factory?

It is not the fact that a large number of hands have been recently discharged from Enfield. Out of 2,570 men only 127 have been discharged during the past six weeks, and 33 more are under notice to leave. It is probable that some further reduction will have to be made, but there is no intention of reducing the numbers below what they were before recent and temporary increases. I hope, therefore, that the alleged distress at Enfield may be of a limited character. It is rather difficult to answer questions on this matter briefly; and, as possibly other questions may arise, I would suggest that they should be asked when the Army Estimates afford the opportunity, to-night or to-morrow.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say what he means by a temporary increase? Can he say when the temporary increase was made, and what it was? Also, whether he is aware there is a large amount of distress at Enfield, and no other source of industry in the neighbourhood?

If the numbers have not recently been reduced will the right hon. Gentleman say was an increase made owing to the delay while waiting for the change of plan in the manufacture, and when was the reduction made?

There was an abnormal increase some two or three years ago when we were rather pressed with orders, but since then, I am sorry to say, the work has decreased.

I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether arrangements can be made by which the public can, after Provisional Orders have been confirmed by Act of Parliament, purchase from the Queen's Printers any one particular Order with the confirming portion of the Act annexed, without having, as is at present the case, to purchase a whole series of Orders which are usually annexed to the Confirming Act, and at considerable expense?

:) I am advised that it is impracticable to carry out this suggestion, but I shall be happy to confer with the hon. Member on the subject.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether there is now any objection to publish the results of the experiments conducted at Portsmouth on the boiler ex H.M.S. Polyphemus with induced and forced draught?

The trial of the induced draught system is as yet incomplete, and it is undesirable to publish a single series of experiments on one boiler until the results obtained have been checked by further trials. Arrangements are now being made to carry out such further trials in a torpedo gunboat.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that Maurice Healey, of Kilgarvan, has been arrested, and charged with the murder of Dennis Harrington (a gamekeeper), near Glengariffe, and that he has been remanded 16 times, and kept in prison for four months; and whether he has been connected, or even named in connection, with the crime, either in informations or any other evidence given in support of the prosecution; and, if not, whether he will be compensated for the injury done him?

The proceedings referred to, which occurred nearly a year ago, were fully dealt with in reply to a question put by the hon. Member for West Cork on the 4th June, 1891. Nothing since has occurred to suggest any ground for a claim to compensation on the part of the suspected man.

I beg to give notice that I shall take the opportunity in Committee of Supply to call attention to this subject.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether the Malta Store Accounts for 1890–91 will be available for perusal by hon. Members before the discussions on the Army Estimates, so that the House may have full information of the clothing frauds in the Maltese establishment, whereby the stores are found to be deficient by 118,341 articles of "clothing," including 36,364 pairs of boots, more than 15,000 frocks, and more than 20,000 trousers; and whether the Government has adopted the definition of "public claim" given by the "Brown-low" Committee, which "excludes responsibility for loss or deficiency of stores"?

The Controller and Auditor General has called attention to the clothing frauds at Malta, and his Report has been referred to the Public Accounts Committee. The clothing alluded to was a store of worn-out garments set aside to be sold as old clothes. The definition of "public claim" referred to has been accepted by the Government; but so far from its excluding responsibility for deficiency of stores, the officer responsible in this case has been convicted by Court Martial and sentenced to five years' penal servitude. The store accounts of Malta cannot be made available for the perusal of Members.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland how many applications of sale and purchase under the Land Purchase Act of last year were made to the Irish Land Commissioners last month; how many landlords and how many tenants were concerned in these applications; and what total sums have been applied for, sanctioned, and issued respectively from the passing of the Act up to the present time?

The Irish Land Commissioners report that the number of applications under the Land Purchase Act of last year received during the month of February, 1892, was 180. The landlords concerned numbered 42, and the tenants 180. From the passing of the Act up till 29th February, 1892, the sums applied for amounted to £192,692, and the sums sanctioned to £6,136. No loans have yet been issued.

Has the right hon. Gentleman any idea if applications were made, and, if so, how many on behalf of tenants and not agreed to by landlords?

I hardly understand the question of the hon. Member. Of course, applications do not come before the Land Commission unless landlord and tenant agree.

Has the right hon. Gentleman any information to show in how many cases while tenants have been willing to come to agreements landlords have not been willing?

No, we have no official information of abortive negotiations between landlords and tenants, and no means by which we could obtain such information.

Or non-official information?

Neither officially or non-officially do we know anything of abortive negotiations between landlords and tenants.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, with regard to the fact that the Irish Local Government Board have appointed one of their Inspectors, Mr. Bourke, to hold a local inquiry under the Labourers (Ireland) Acts in Athlone, on the 15th instant, whether this is the first inquiry for the erection of labourers' cottages in Athlone Union held by Mr. Bourke; why was not Mr. Agnew, the Local Government Board Inspector of the district, as on former occasions, appointed to hold this inquiry on the 15th instant; and whether he is aware that, at those inquiries, the sanitary officers of the districts swore that many of the existing cottages were unfit for habitation and dangerous to the public health.

The Local Government Board report that it is the case that Mr. Bourke has been instructed to hold the inquiry under the Labourers' Acts in Athlone Union on the 15th inst. Mr. Agnew did not on a former occasion hold a similar inquiry in this Union. There was only one such previous inquiry in the Union, and that was held by Mr. Bourke. On the last occasion evidence was given by the relieving officers as to the alleged unfitness of some of the existing labourers' dwellings for habitation.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies if he can give any further information in reference to the stoppage of the trade routes from Lagos into the interior; and what steps the Government propose to take in view of the breach of Treaty engagements by the Jebus reported by our Representative at Lagos?

We are still waiting for the Report of the Governor, who, as already stated, is expected back from the interior on the 9th, and will then report as directed on the state of affairs, with his recommendation as to what should be done.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that a Return, moved for by the hon. Member for West Ham, and laid upon the Table of the House, and to provide which great trouble has been caused to the clerks of Licensing Magistrates in England and Wales, is utterly worthless, as failing to supply the particulars desired, owing to the use of the words "Licensed Public Houses," which were taken to apply to fully-licensed houses, while the intended reference was to beershops licensed before May, 1869, and which are still exempted from magisterial control; and whether he intends to take any further steps with reference to this Return?

The Return was obtained by means of a circular asking for the number of such houses now licensed by Justices for the sale of beer or wine, or beer and wine to be consumed on the premises, as were prior to the 1st May, 1869, licensed for the same purpose by Excise licences under any of the Acts referred to in Section 19 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869. This circular was properly adapted to secure the precise information wanted, and did not contain the ambiguous language in the heading of the Return as it was ordered. I have no reason to believe that the particulars supplied in answer to that circular did not refer to beershops licensed before May, 1869. The phrase used is not strictly accurate. A "beerhouse" is, however, in one sense, a "public house" for the sale of beer.

But is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Return applies to public houses and not to beershops at all?

No, I do not think so. I quite agree that the phrase in the heading of the Return as ordered is, as I say, not strictly accurate, but if the hon. Baronet will look at the terms of the circular he will find there is nothing misleading, but that the information is what was wanted.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if his attention has been called to the case of Michael Hannan, of Mondellihy, Drumcollogher, County Limerick, who served notice to have a fair rent fixed on his landlord, Colonel Charles W. White, on 17th March, 1888, but whose case has not yet been heard; and if he will state when the Sub-Commissioners will hear and decide upon this case?

The Irish Land Commissioners report that the case referred to was listed for the Sub-Commission sitting in February 1891, but had to be adjourned owing to the death of the landlord. The case will be relisted for the next Sub-Commission sitting for the Union of Newcastle (West). The date has not yet been fixed.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General what is the usual time that second class clerks are employed in performing temporary first class duties at the Central Telegraph Office in order to qualify for promotion to the higher class; whether this period is of the same duration in every case; and, if not, what are the causes of its extension or diminution; whether, when clerks are employed on duties belonging to a higher class, they are placed on the promotion list; whether it is the practice in the Central Telegraph Office to assign their duties to first and second class clerks in accordance with their abilities, without reference to their salary, service, or class, whereby many of the most important wires are frequently in charge of second class clerks in preference to first class clerks; and, whether, as under the present system it is impossible to prevent one deserving officer being more fortunate than another in obtaining promotion, he will now reconsider the question of the organisation of the staff, notwithstanding the communication already made to the officers of the second class?

(1.) There is no usual time; it varies according to the exigencies of the Service. (2.) It is not known what is meant by the term "promotion list." The qualifications of officers for promotion are considered when vacancies occur. (3.) When duties are being arranged in advance, first class telegraphists are selected as far as possible for the more important duties, but, as in any large office, arrangements are made according to circumstances. (4.) The organisation of the office has, as before stated, been settled quite recently, and I do not think it necessary to alter it. No conceivable system would prevent one officer from being more fortunate than another in obtaining promotion.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been called to the proceedings at the Athy Petty Sessions, held on Tuesday last, when a farmer named Porter was prosecuted by District Inspector Crane, for presenting a revolver at, and using threatening language towards Bridget Flanagan; what was the result of the proceedings; and what steps will be taken by the Constabulary authorities with regard to men of this class carrying dangerous weapons?

The man mentioned was prosecuted as stated in the question. He was bound in sureties to the peace and good behaviour. He alleged that he possessed a licence for this revolver. Inquiries on this point are now proceeding.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this man has been prosecuted by Sergeant Joyce of the ocal Constabulary, for using abusive language, and on the occasion he asked that police protection should be withdrawn from him, and is he under police protection still?

The only information I have obtained is that arising on the question.

If the man has a licence to carry a revolver will that licence be revoked?

I have said inquiries are proceeding as to whether he has a licence or not.

If he has not will he be prosecuted for carrying arms?

It must first be ascertained if he has a licence, and if the hon. Member desires further information he must give notice of a question.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the petition from the people of the electoral divisions of St. Finians, Ballinskelligs, Teereneragh, and Emlagh, in the Caherciveen Poor Law Union, to the Local Government Board, asking for the appointment of a dispensary doctor, has been brought under his notice; whether he is aware that the petition was referred to the Caherciveen Board of Guardians; that the local dispensary committee unanimously decided in its favour; and that the Direct United States Cable Company guaranteed £40 a year towards the salary of the doctor; and whether, owing to the growing importance of the district, the great distance at which the present medical officer resides from it, and the small cost to the Local Government Board, the Government will take into favourable consideration the prayer of the petitioners?

The Local Government Board gave careful consideration to the suggested appointment of a second Medical Officer to the Emlagh dispensary district. There was no evidence that the existing arrangements resulted in hardship to the sick poor, and the Board pointed out that any inconvenience now felt in the district could be met by arranging for a more frequent attendance of the present Medical Officer there. The Local Government Board would not feel justified in sanctioning the proposed additional appointment, as it would involve the possible sanction of similar appointments in dispensary districts having similar areas.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the extra cost will be only £30 a year, that the Cable Company have guaranteed £40, and that the present Medical Officer lives over 15 miles from the district?

I have not the slightest doubt that all these matters were put before the Local Government Board when the inquiry was made.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty if he can state how many of the vessels, as well cruizers as torpedo gunboats, which have been built and equipped for the defence of the Australian Colonies under the provisions of "The Imperial Defence Act, 1888," were accepted by the Admiralty from the contractors without the trials at full steam power having been carried out; were the conditions necessary for the development of the full steam power applied to the boilers of these vessels; and were the full steam trials stipulated for in the contracts made before the Admiralty accepted the vessels?

All the vessels of the Australian Flotilla, consisting of five cruizers and two torpedo gunboats, completed their natural- draught trials at full power before being accepted by the Admiralty from the contractors, and the conditions necessary for the development of this power were applied to the boilers of the vessels. The actual natural draught power indicated during the trials in every case exceeded the specified power, and the air pressure worked out was in two cases only somewhat above the pressure allowed. As I stated in my Memorandum of last year, it was decided by the Admiralty, under the circumstances of the case, to take over the vessels without insisting upon the completion of their maximum forced-draught trials. I may add that the speed of these vessels is two knots higher than that proposed in the original Agreement with the Colonies. I desire to add that the reason why the Admiralty considered it inadvisable to press the class of vessels in question under the maximum forced draught was that it was found that such pressure was liable to damage the boilers and render them subsequently less efficient.

Does that apply to other vessels in the Navy, such, for instance, as the Devastation, the Thunderer, and the Superb?

I am informed that it does apply to the Thunderer. I think there are four vessels which are excepted from the forced-draught power. The term "forced-draught power" is, however, rather misleading.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether, according to the original arrangement, there was to be on the Stranorlar-Glenties Railway a station in the townland of Glassagh, to be called the Letter-trick Station; and whether it is intended to depart from the first arrangement; and, if so, why?

replied: There were originally to be five stations on the line; but the Finn Valley Company, who are to work it, selected seven, and though Lettertrick is not one of these latter, I am informed that, on the whole, with the two extra stations, the wants of the inhabitants will be much better provided for.

I beg to ask the Lord Advocate the name of the new gunboat to be used on fishery service in Scotland, and the speed at which she can steam?

I am informed that the name of the gunboat is the Watchful, and that she can steam at the speed of ten and a-half knots.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say where the vessel is stationed?

I have not made inquiry as to that, but I will do so.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if the members of the Irish Constabulary Force who were employed in the collection of agricultural returns and statistics last summer have yet received any remuneration for these services; and, if not, whether it is intended that they shall be remunerated for this work? I may add that the number of questions appearing in my name is because I anticipate being unable to attend in the House for some days.

Departmental correspondence is proceeding on the subject, and a decision will shortly be arrived at.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General will he explain why there is no delivery of letters in Lucan, County Dublin, on Sundays; and why letters are not given by the local post office authority even if called for by the addressees, although the contrary practice prevails in other parts of Ireland?

There is no delivery by postmen on Sunday morning at Lucan, because the late mail letters are nearly all delivered the night before. Such as cannot be delivered by postmen are delivered to callers between 8 and 10 a.m. on Sunday morning. The question of giving a delivery on Sunday evening was considered some years ago, but the majority of the residents were not in favour of the change, and it was consequently not carried out.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether he will state what steps, if any, have been taken towards improving the position and pay of the rural postmen in Ireland, or if he will sanction the scheme of the late Postmaster General, put forward in August, 1891, by a part of which it was proposed to give an increase of 2s. to their weekly salary, and an annual increment of 1s. up to 17s. per week; and, if so, have any steps been taken to put this part of the scheme into execution?

The rural postmen in Ireland, in common with the rural postmen in England and Scotland, have shared in the benefits of the revision sanctioned in August last, by which men doing a full day's duty, and previously on fixed weekly wages, were placed on a scale of pay rising by 1s. a week, in no case to less than 17s. a week, and in some cases to as high as 21s. a week.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether his attention has been called to a circular issued in his name, and published in Belfast, to the effect that no telegraph messenger will get an appointment as a postman, as such appointments are to be in future given to Army and Navy pensioners; and whether this rule is to extend to the boys now acting as messengers, or is merely confined to messengers to be appointed in the future?

No such notice has been issued at Belfast. The general instructions to surveyors and postmasters, issued under the Postmaster General's direction on the 10th November last, were to the effect that soldiers were, as far as possible, to be nominated as postmen, but that this arrangement was not to interfere with any existing engagements, actual or implied. Telegraph messengers employed before the above date, who had been led to expect employment as postmen, are still being nominated as such when old enough, and in other ways suitable. Messengers employed after that date will, as a rule, not be so nominated; but if on reaching the age of 18 they enlist in the Army, and bear a good character on passing into the Reserve, they will be given a preference over other soldiers for employment in a permanent capacity in the Post Office, and, if so then employed, they will be allowed to count as service in the Post Office half the time spent with the Colours.

I beg to ask the First Commissioner of Works how many men are now employed at clearing out the mud in St. James's Park; and whether, in view of the present exceptionally severe weather and the great want of employment in London, he will see his way to give employment at this work to as many men as possible?

I am informed that early this morning 34 men were at work removing the mud from the lake in St. James's Park, but there was sufficient employment for, say, 16 more, or 50 in all, if suitable men should apply. I may say that as many will be engaged as can be employed with advantage for doing the work with expedition and economy.

Will the right hon. Gentleman inform me whether there were not more than ten or twelve, or at the outside 14, men engaged last week at this work in St. James's Park?

I cannot say; but I have informed the hon. Member that there is sufficient employment for 16 more additional hands.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to the circumstances of an inquest held at Whitechapel Workhouse, on the 3rd instant, on the body of John Sewell, waterside labourer, and at which the Jury returned a verdict of death from want and exposure; whether he is aware that it was stated at the inquest that this man and his son had to subsist on earnings of 2s. a fortnight; and whether the relieving officer of the district had his attention called to this case of destitution; and, if so, why no steps were taken in the matter?

I will answer the hon. Member's question. I have communicated with the Guardians of the Whitechapel Union respecting the case referred to in the question, and I find that it was stated by John Sewell's son at the inquest that his father lived with him for a fortnight, and that during that time the earnings of the father and son only amounted to the sum stated in the question. No application was made to the relieving officer for relief by Sewell, or by any other person on his behalf; but the son stated at the inquest that he frequently urged his father to go into the Infirmary without avail. At last he consented to do so. when his case received immediate attention, but he died on the day following his admission. The Coroner, in his summing-up, stated that no blame could attach to the Poor Law authorities as no application had been made to them for relief, nor did they appear to have any knowledge of the case, until the deceased presented himself at the Infirmary.

I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman if this is the only precaution that is taken in reference to such cases? Would the right hon. Gentleman state what is the duty of the relieving officers, or whether it be not part of their duty to hunt up cases of this kind?

No, Sir, it is not their duty to hunt them up, but to deal with cases which are brought before them.

Yes; but in this case the relieving officer's notice appears, from the right hon. Gentleman's statement, to have been called to the matter.

I stated that the relieving officer was unaware of it until application was made to him for medical relief, and then he gave an order for medical relief.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether a report of certain proceedings, taken from the Irish News, at a Special Court of Petty Sessions, at Bangor, Ireland, held on 20th ultimo, has been brought under his notice; and whether he is aware that Sergeant Boyd, Royal Irish Constabulary, swore, in cross-examination, that he got a specimen of the handwriting of the accused by inducing her to write a "love letter" to one of the policemen in the barrack, which letter he handed to District Inspector Winder; and, if so, will the Constabulary authorities take steps to prevent evidence against accused persons being obtained in this matter?

The Constabulary Authorities report that the sergeant in question acted on his own responsibility.

What will be done? In this case the sergeant was about to prefer a charge against the woman, and without informing her that there was a charge against her he induced her to write what he called a "love letter" for the purpose of making her incriminate herself.

The matter is under the consideration of the Constabulary Authorities.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland what is the number of labourers' cottages proposed to be erected and built in the Tralee Union, County Kerry, and whether anything approximating adequate housing for the labourers in this Union has yet been under consideration?

The Local Government Board report that the Guardians of the Tralee Union have largely availed themselves of the provisions of the Labourers' Acts. The erection of 223 labourers' cottages in that Union has been sanctioned, of which 128 have been already built and 25 are now in progress.

The right hon. Gentleman has not answered the last part of my question.

I think it has been answered. A very large amount of labourers' cottages has been sanctioned already. As to the proposals that may be made for future accommodation I have no information.

Will the Local Government Board sanction the erection of other houses in the district?

I have no doubt of it, if a proper case is made out in each instance.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is proposed to grant any compensation to the Brighton corps of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers for the sums expended by the corps in fitting and maintaining its drillhall and headquarters; and whether any instructions have been given to the Committee appointed by the Admiralty to inquire into this question, or to any Members of that Committee other than those which appear in the Admiralty Memorandum of 13th November, 1891?

Until the Admiralty have received the Report of this Committee it would be premature to state what claims for compensation can be entertained, but the Admiralty wish to act in a liberal spirit towards the corps.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to the proceedings at an inquest held at Wood Green, on the body of Mrs. Wrangle, who died "on a bed of old sacking and rags," and at which the jury returned a verdict of "died from neglect, and want of proper attention and food, resulting in syncope"; was the attention of the district relieving officer called to the case of this poor woman; and was she in receipt of any outdoor relief; and, if not, what report has the relieving officer to make?

I have made inquiry about the case of Mrs. Wrangle, at Wood Green, and I am informed that on the day previous to the death of the poor woman, her husband applied at the house of the relieving officer for a medical order for his wife. He did not apply for food or necessaries, but merely stated that he could not afford a doctor. The relieving officer was himself ill in bed with influenza, and therefore could not visit the house, but he at once gave an order for the attendance of the district medical officer. Neither the husband nor the wife had ever applied for relief before this occasion, and the relieving officer says that the husband has told him that there was plenty of food in the house, and that an hour before she died his wife took an egg.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether his attention has been called to the necessity of a post office at Barnmeen, near Rathfriland, County Down; whether he is aware of the thickly-populated country around Barnmeen, and the very great inconvenience which the want of a local post office involves, and that it was shown at the last Parliamentary Revision Sessions held at Rathfriland the difficulty of proving service of notices of objection sent by post to persons living in Lurgan-cahone, Drumgreena, and the other adjoining townlands; and whether he will consider the advisability of establishing a sub-post office near Barnmeen Chapel for the convenience of the people of the district?

A Memorial has been received for the extension of the official delivery to the places mentioned in the question, and for a wall letter box at Barnmeen; but, as the Postal Service generally in the neighbourhood of Rathfriland is already carried on at a loss to the Revenue, it is not practicable to increase the accommodation.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the old castle and abbey at Athenry, County Galway, has been granted the attention of the Ancient Monuments Preservation Office; and, if so, whether any steps will be taken to preserve these interesting and historical ruins?

I have made inquiries with regard to this matter, and have been told that the abbey is not vested in the Board of Works, and the castle does not, therefore, fall within the scope of the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act. The Board, therefore, has no power to move in the direction indicated in the hon. Member's question.

May I ask whether the attention of the former Secretary to the Treasury had been called to this matter, and whether we had not an assurance given us last year that the Board of Works would see to the preservation of historical ruins?

If the promise was given before my term of office I have nothing to do with it. I am not aware of it, but I will make inquiry.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury if he would state to the House what are the respective annual emoluments received by Sir Edmund Du Cane as a Prison Commissioner, as Surveyor General of Prisons, and as Chairman of Directors of Convict Prisons; and whether any payments or gratuities, in addition to such emoluments, have been made to Sir Edmund Du Cane out of public funds during the last ten years; and, if so, how much?

Sir Edmund Du Cane receives £2,000 a year as Chairman of the Prison Commissioners, and as Chairman of Directors of Convict Prisons; he receives no salary as Surveyor General. In 1880 he received a gratuity of £1,000 in recognition of his services in bringing into operation the Prisons Act of 1887, which transferred to the Government the administration of the local prisons; and last year he again received a gratuity of £1,000 in consideration of his exceptional services in the designing, erection, and superintendence of prison buildings on a large scale, whereby a very considerable saving of public expenditure was effected.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been called to the remarks of the Right Hon. Mr. Justice Holmes, in addressing the Grand Jury of the North Riding of the County of Tipperary at the opening of the recent Spring Assizes at Nenagh, where the learned Judge said—

"I am glad to be able to inform you that there has been no crime of any importance in this Riding since last I had the pleasure of addressing you as Judge of the Winter Assizes";

if he will now consider whether it is possible to withdraw the 24 extra police now maintained at the cost of the ratepayers; and whether he can state what is the amount charged for this extra force?

I am happy to say that it is the case that Mr. Justice Holmes felt himself able, in common with many of the other Judges at the opening of the present Spring Assizes in Ireland, to call attention to the peaceable condition of the country. No extra police force has been chargeable to the North Riding of the County Tipperary for upwards of a year.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he will give the name of the Irish lady appointed on the Subcommittee of the Labour Commission; whether she has had connection as an employer, or otherwise, with any branch manufactory at which women are employed in Ireland; and, if so, what industry; and what are her general qualifications to represent Ireland?

I hear that the lady appointed on the Sub-Committee of the Labour Commission is Miss Mary Abraham. I understand she was not connected with any branch of manufacture, either as employee or otherwise, at which women are employed in Ireland. In making the selection, exclusive knowledge of one industry would not be considered sufficient. What was wanted was general knowledge.

Have not some of them been chosen in consequence of their knowledge in some one branch of industry?

I do not know. Evidently, an exclusive knowledge of one industry would not be a qualification for what would require a general knowledge.

But has this lady any knowledge of Ireland?

I presume that in the opinion of the Commissioners she has sufficient information.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether the post office in the town of Tipperary, occupied for the past 16 years, has been given, up, and the house of an evicted tenant, a widow lady named M'Grath, has been taken as a post office from the hon. Member for South Hunts; and. if so, why, and on, what terms?

The old post office, consisting of one small room, being quite insufficient, has been given up, and, pending the erection of a new Crown post office, a couple of rooms have been taken in an empty house, lately occupied by the constabulary. The terms are £50 a year for one or two years. I am informed that, as a matter of fact, the house was formerly occupied by the late Patrick M'Grath.

May I ask is the arrangement a purely temporary one?

Yes, Sir.

I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, in the choosing of the new site, regard will be had to the fact that there is in reality a trade union dispute going on in the town of Tipperary between landlord and tenant; and whether he thinks it would tend to the public peace to side with the landlord by taking a house from which a tenant has been evicted?

I beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman will he establish a post office in the town of "New Tipperary"?

It is a fact that a site has been taken in the main street on a lease for 99 years, on which a post office will be erected.

Do you mean from the hon. Member for South Hunts?

As a matter of fact, it was taken from the hon. Member for South Hunts, in the main street, on a lease for 99 years.

I beg to give notice that I shall draw attention on the Estimates to this matter, which I regard as very gross partisanship.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether, with a view to obviate the inconvenience and save the expense now entailed upon students of anatomy in Belfast by the obligation to attend a summer term of three months in Dublin for dissection, he will use his influence to have such arrangements made that this term may be taken in Belfast?

The President of the Queen's College reports that there is no obligation on the Belfast students of anatomy to attend dissection in Dublin. Full provision is made in Queen's College, Belfast, for their instruction in the subject.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if his attention has been called to the case of Florence Sullivan, late of the 5th Foot, who, after serving in the Crimean and Indian Mutiny campaigns, was invalided and discharged from the Service on account of losing one eye while on night duty at Cawnpore, and was granted sixpence a-day for twelve months; whether he is aware that Sullivan has since become totally blind; and whether, in consideration of the circumstances of the case, a compassionate allowance will be granted to him?

Florence Sullivan, who does not appear to have been in the Crimea, was discharged while serving in India on account of the vision of his left eye being impaired and that of his right eye defective, from an attack of ophthalmia. There is nothing in his records to show that he received any special injury while on duty at Cawnpore. His claim to further pension has been refused by Chelsea Hospital, and the Secretary of State has no power to grant a pension without the recommendation of the Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital. I may add that his service was under six years and his character bad. There were 23 entries in the regimental defaulter book recorded against him, and he was twice tried by Court Martial. Nothing is known in the War Office of his being totally blind.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the recent calamitous loss of life by fire in American hotels, any, and, if so what, provisions are in force in this country making it obligatory upon lessees and owners of hotels and other houses for the reception of guests, to secure, as far as possible, the safety of inmates in case of fire; and whether such buildings are inspected and reported upon with a view to the prevention of loss of life by fire?

I am not aware of any enactment which imposes the obligation mentioned in the question, or which provides for the inspection of hotels with a view to secure prevention of loss of life from fires.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in many of the monster hotels in Manchester, Liverpool, London, and elsewhere, the people who are condemned to live on third and fourth floors have frequently expressed great alarm?

No, Sir; I am not aware of the fact. I do not think anybody is condemned to live on the third and fourth floors.

In view of the terrible disasters which have occurred, will not the right hon. Gentleman look into the matter, and try to prevent them as far as possible? I shall call attention to it on the Estimates.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the report of the last meeting of the Tralee Board of Guardians has been brought under the notice of the Local Government Board, in which they complain that Lord Headley refused to pay the rates upon several farms, and that the Solicitor to the Board was unable to recover the rates from him; and, if so, whether the Local Government Board will take any steps in the matter?

The Local Government Board report that the matter is still under the consideration of the Guardians. They are not aware of the proceedings referred to.

I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can state what progress has been made in the negotiations with Mr. Henry Tate for the election of a Gallery for British pictures?

I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether any, and, if so, what, steps have been taken to provide for the building on the land recently purchased for the purposes of "Science and the Arts" of a Science Museum, and for the extension of the Royal College of Science so urgently required for the training of science teachers?

As this is a matter which has excited a very large amount of interest, I may, I hope, be allowed to make a fuller statement than that contained within the limits of an ordinary answer. My hon. Friend will have seen by the Correspondence, which was published on Saturday, between Mr. Tate and myself, that the negotiations for the erection of a Gallery for British pictures have not arrived at a successful issue. I regret this extremely. The Government were most anxious to meet the generous offer of Mr. Tate, and not only to house his pictures, but to find a handsome site for the erection of the building for which he offered £80,000. Mr. Tate, I am sorry to see, condemns the East and West Galleries at South Kensington as "tunnel-like edifices," and will not think of them as a home for British Art. We have, on the other hand, such men as Lord Hardinge, Sir Frederick Leighton, Sir James Linton, Sir Henry Layard, Lord Carlisle—gentlemen connected with the National Gallery, the National Portrait Gallery, the Royal Academy and the Water Colour Institute—who not only gave their general impressions, but visited the building at the request of the Lord President of the Council and myself, and signed a Memorial to the effect that—

"Having visited the East and West Galleries at South Kensington in reference to their adaptability for the purpose of a National Gallery of British Art, we beg to state that in our opinion they are adequate in regard to space and well lighted."

Lord Carlisle's opinion was that—

"In the essential matter of satisfactory lighting no Gallery with which I am acquainted is so well constructed."

We had, moreover, an official letter from the Trustees and Directors of the National Gallery, stating that—

"Having had before them a Memorandum drafted by Lord Carlisle respecting the formation of a Gallery of Modern British Art, and recommending the appropriation of the Eastern and Western Exhibition Galleries at South Kensington for that purpose, they desire to express their approval of the proposal generally, and their hope that it will meet the views of Mr. Henry Tate."

I mention this to show that the offers of the Government were at least genuine offers, that they met generally the views of some of the highest authorities on the housing of pictures. I may add that one of the objections raised to the Galleries—namely, that their entrances were mean—is being remedied by it having been agreed by the Commissioners of the 1851 Exhibition that they should have façades in connection with the Imperial Institute, so that they should have a dignified entrance fitting for such valuable collections of pictures as, it was hoped, will be found, and in harmony with the Imperial Institute and with the connecting Gallery. The very idea of these Galleries emanated from men devoted to art. However, as Mr. Tate was not, and is not, satisfied, the Government, on learning that he would erect a Gallery himself at a cost of £80,000, sought to accommodate him with a site. Mr. Tate states that he did not select the disputed corner—namely, the corner bounded to the east by Exhibition Road and to the north by the new Imperial Institute Road; but I have understood throughout that no site at South Kensington would satisfy him that did not face towards Exhibition Road. He himself wrote on the 20th February, 1891, that he would be glad if an offer could be made to him of the site at the corner of Exhibition and Imperial Institute Roads, and added—

"A frontage to Imperial Institute Road only would not do. Such a building must have a frontage to Exhibition Road."

There is land at the west side of the South Kensington plot which might have been available, and is available; but I am afraid that it will no more meet Mr. Tates wishes than a frontage to the Imperial Institute Road alone. Knowing, then, the decisive importance which Mr. Tate attaches to a frontage towards Exhibition Road, when we found, for the reasons expressed in my letter to Mr. Tate, that we could not deal with the particular coiner in question, we offered him another site, with frontage to Exhibition Road, further to the north. Mr. Tate, I am sorry to say, considers this site wholly inadequate, though it would, as I am assured, offer room for a building equal in size and availability to the National Portrait Gallery now in course of erection. It would give room for many hundreds of pictures, and might so be connected to the Eastern Galleries as to afford opportunity for almost indefinite expansion. In conclusion, I may say that, though I can understand the disappointment of Mr. Tate with regard to the special corner in question, I venture to hope that the door is not finally closed on the establishment of a Gallery for British Art. The Government, at all events, will show in future, as we have endeavoured to do in the past, every possible desire to facilitate such a scheme. With regard to the question of the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire, it has been impossible to take any steps towards beginning the erection of a Science Museum or the extension of the Royal College of Science until the question connected with the British Art Gallery has been settled. I, myself, had visions of a scheme, independently of building on that controversial corner, which I had thought might have given ample satisfaction, both for the present and future, to the scientific world, but the matter will now have to be re-considered.

I wish to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has used his influence with the Corporation of the City of London in order to induce them to sell at reasonable terms a site on the Embankment for a Gallery?

We have done our best to see whether we can facilitate the acquisition of such a site by offering to contribute towards defraying the cost, so anxious were we not to lose the generous offer of Mr. Tate. It was, however, impossible to come to terms with the Corporation.

Will the right hon. Gentleman try once more? I think he may succeed.

I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware of the very cramped and unsatisfactory condition under which scientific teaching is carried on at South Kensington? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the conditions by personal observation?

I have examined the site several times. I admit that the scientific work at South Kensington is at present cramped, and I will endeavour, in conjunction with my right hon. Friend the First Commissioner of Works, to find some temporary building to meet the difficulty before the final scheme is adopted.

I wish to ask whether the Report of the Tithe Commissioners appointed last year will be laid before the House?

I am afraid that without notice I cannot give a very precise answer; but my recollection is that the Report has been submitted to Her Majesty, and will shortly be in the hands of Members.

I wish to ask what facilities will be given for discussing the Charter of the Gresham University?

In answer to the hon. Member, I have to say that I hope it will not be necessary to cut short the ordinary Business in order to carry on that discussion. From what the Vice President of the Council tells me, I believe we can go a great way to meet the views of hon. Members in regard to the propriety of remitting the Draft Charter for re-consideration. I think we shall be able to make a statement on the subject on Thursday.

It would be convenient if the First Lord of the Treasury would state the course of Public Business to-morrow and Thursday.

In the event of the first Vote of the Army Estimates being finished to-day or to-morrow we propose to take the Indian Councils Bill first on Thursday. If, however, the Vote is not finished we would keep to it. On Friday we shall probably go on with such Supplementary Votes as have not been completed, and hope to succeed in introducing two Bills that have been hung up.

I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury whether it would not be more convenient if Ministers were present when questions began?

I must say in reply to the hon. Member that I think it extremely inconvenient that either Ministers or Members should be absent when questions are put. I confess that, from such observations as I have been able to make, the second inconvenience is more frequent than the first. Ministers, however, will endeavour to meet the wishes of the House.

I wish to ask whether it is to be understood that the Debate on the introduction of the Irish Education Bill is not to be resumed until Friday?

Unless the discussion on the first Army Vote is finished to-night, that is so.

Will you make it the first Order?

I will make it the first Order if you so desire it.

I wish to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether it is true, as the rumour is in circulation this afternoon, that in view of the London County Councils' election Her Majesty's Government have resolved to dissolve Parliament?

In reference to the question of the hon. Member for West Belfast, I am reminded by my right hon. Friend near me that the Chief Secretary for Ireland will not be back to-morrow. It will, therefore, in any circumstances be impossible to take the Bill referred to by the hon. Member to-morrow. I will put it down on Friday as the first Order.

The right hon. Gentleman has not answered my question.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary when the Returns which were ordered on the 18th February with regard to the prosecutions at Eastbourne will be printed and circulated?

The materials are now with the printer's, and the Return will be ready in a few days.

I beg to move—

"That this House urges upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity that exists for taking immediate steps to secure the completion of the works required for the protection of the Harbour of Esquimalt."

In moving this Resolution I venture to remind the House that this is no new question. A very important Debate was raised on this very subject in the House of Lords on the Motion of Lord Sudeley some years ago; and the fact that that important Debate took place, and the fact that no result has come from that Debate, must be my excuse for troubling the House for a few moments while I endeavour to urge the importance of this question on Her Majesty's Government. I do not propose to go on this occasion into the question then discussed at some length as to whether the fortifications of British Columbia should be at Burrard's Inlet or at the harbour of Esquimalt. I am quite satisfied to leave the responsibility for the decision of this question to the Colonial Defence Committee. But there are a few matters upon which I should like to press for further information or for the announcement of some decision. These are matters which have passed from the region of argument into that of admitted fact. It is an admitted fact that the Harbour of Esquimalt is to be defended. It is, unfortunately, equally incontrovertible that although communications have been taking place on the subject between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Dominion of Canada for the last eight years, no step has yet been taken towards the commencement of the fortifications of this harbour. In the next place, it is also a fact that we have there the only coaling station on the North Pacific; and it is also a fact that the Russian Government possess in the harbour of Vladivostock a most formidable arsenal; war vessels may safely lie at anchor there, and it supplies a fortified position in which they can concentrate as many troops as they require. It is a matter of pressing importance to us if we are to have the control of the North Pacific Ocean. That has been substantially recognised by Her Majesty's Government within the last few years by a contract entered into for the provision of a line of steamers between Vancouver and China and Japan, that line of subsidised steamers being capable, in case of need, of being used as armed cruisers for the protection of our commerce. It is not necessary for me to remind the House that if a subsidised line of steamers has been created and subsidised, that that line should have a harbour to which they could be sent when they needed a supply of coal or repairs. The same remarks will apply with regard to Her Majesty's regular armed vessels of war. It is sometimes said that we might safely rely upon the regular armed vessels of war in the Pacific; but it should be considered that in the event of being engaged in hostilities with other Powers, these vessels would also be required for the protection of our own commerce, or to carry out offensive operations against the enemy. I would further add that, by the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, an alternative route to the East has been provided. It may be of the greatest importance to this country, in the event of the Suez Canal, for one reason or another, becoming unavailable for the transport of troops or supplies; and it is needless for me to say that, should an enemy obtain possession of the western terminus of the Canadian Pacific Road, its value to us would be absolutely gone. This only tends, I think, to fortify my argument that we should have at least one safe harbour on the British Columbia Coast. While it is unfortunately the case that no commencement has yet been made with regard to the fortifications necessary for the harbour of Esquimalt, I do not charge upon Her Majesty's Government that they have totally neglected the important interests connected with this harbour. On the contrary; I believe that many of the most important questions existing between the Home Government and the Government of the Dominion of Canada have been definitely settled. The armament has been decided upon, and provision made for submarine mining stores. I regret not to see in this year's Estimates any provision set down for carrying out the works in connection with this harbour; and I cannot but entertain some apprehension that the guns which have been already designated for the defence of Esquimalt, and which were described so fully by Lord Harris some years ago in another place, must have been devoted to the equipment of other ports. Of course I speak with no full knowledge on this subject, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War will correct me if I am wrong; but I am under the impression that the Government of Canada have agreed, as a matter of fact, to provide sites for the necessary barracks to be built at Esquimalt; that they have undertaken to bear considerably the larger part of the initial cost of the construction of the fortifications; that they are prepared to maintain these fortifications, when erected, in a state of efficiency; and that they are also prepared to supply the larger part of the garrison which is estimated to be required for the defence of this harbour, and prepared to augment this garrison as soon as the development of the population of British Columbia warrants them in so doing. If I am correct in these facts, the dispute between Great Britain and Canada appears to be narrowed down to this: is this country prepared, or is it not prepared, to find a very small portion, temporarily, at all events, of the garrison required for the defence of the harbour. Above all, it would only be necessary for this country to supply a part—a very small part—of the artillery and engineers. Undoubtedly, Her Majesty's Government would have to provide barrack accommodation for that force; bat I am under the impression that the force would not be more than a few scores of men, and to pay for that accommodation could not be a very serious or costly affair. And Her Majesty's Government are also expected to bear some portion of the initial cost of making the fortifications. Now, I do not wish to say that I am holding a special brief for Canada. I regret very much that the Dominion Government has not been able to comply entirely with the requisitions or exigencies of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the undertaking to complete the cost of these fortifications; but I think there is something to be said why this House—why Her Majesty's Government—should deal in a broad and generous spirit with the Government of Canada with regard to this question. I would remind the House that by the terms of the Confederation Act of 1867 the Government of Canada undertook to apply 1,000,000 dollars annually in placing the defences of Canada in a suitable and proper position; and I believe, as a matter of fact, that it is undoubtedly the case that there has not been one single year since 1867 in which the Canadian Government have not far more than fulfilled this part of the contract, and have been applying a larger sum annually than they were bound to apply in providing for the defence of Canada, and also by the construction of the Inter-Colonial Railway. In consequence of the greatly increased facilities afforded by the aid they have given to the Canadian Pacific Railway, the people of Canada have done a work which has been of the very greatest value to Her Majesty's Government in this country—in making this alternative route which I have just referred to, and which has done so much to strengthen the general defensive position of the Empire. Under these circumstances I would appeal to the right hon. Gentleman, who has already shown so much interest in this question of the defence of our Colonies, to bring his interest to bear with his colleagues to induce them, if need be—and notably the Chancellor of the Exchequer—to make the very small financial concession to Canada which may be necessary to insure the early commencement of this work. When we consider that it cannot be more than a question of a few thousand pounds to build a barrack for the small force, and for the erection of fortifications—when we consider the terrible dangers our commerce is exposed to by leaving Esquimalt Harbour in its present undefended position, I do feel that this is not an ordinary question, and not a question for haggling with the Colonial Legislature over a matter involving such a small pecuniary sacrifice, when at the same time it so largely affects the safety and dignity of the Empire. Her Majesty's advisers cannot but feel that, in the case of war, the existence of these fortifications must be of the utmost value; and as we are now happily at peace with our neighbours, this is the best time to set about the work. For this reason I venture to move the Resolution which stands in my name, and to press the question most earnestly on Her Majesty's Government.

I can only say, speaking for the Service to which I have the honour to belong, that we are all grateful to the hon. Member for Exeter for having drawn attention to this important question. We have all been living, apparently, in a fool's paradise. We supposed that the promises which were made four years ago with regard to these defences had been undertaken and carried out. We now learn that everything is practically where it was. I hold it is an Imperial question, but I do not think that the whole expenses should be thrown upon the Imperial Parliament. I think this harbour is essentially a naval basis, and I hold with my colleague officers that this Naval Station should be garrisoned by Naval Marines and Naval Artillery. Lest the Secretary of State for War should have any hesitation about the proportion to be paid by the Imperial Government, I wish to point out that the expenses of the Indian Station is paid partly by the Indian Government, and partly by this country. This country pays the greater share of that expense, and India pays a portion, but I do not know what portion. I hope the Secretary of State will give this matter very close and serious attention.

I do not think that anybody will dispute the importance of the Harbour of Esquimalt to this country for the purpose of fortifications and also as a Naval Station. The Pacific Railway may be of importance to us in time of war, but I do not think that it enters into the present question very much. The works at Esquimalt should no doubt be completed, but I think in this case we may fairly expect that Canada should do something more than she has done as yet. A certain Return has been lately circulated in the House showing the sea-borne commerce of Canada and the amount which she contributes. She does not contribute towards the up-keep of the Imperial Navy at all. India, however, does contribute towards the cost of the Imperial Navy. So that there is no parallel between the two countries in this matter. I do not think Canada has shown any great readiness to bear her fair share of Imperial burdens at present, and until some greater readiness is shown by Canada I think there will be some hesitation in urging the Government to spend further sums of money for the defence of Esquimalt. If the line to China and Japan has been subsidised—and I think it has been properly subsidised—that is an additional reason why Canada should make some special effort to bear her fair share of the Imperial burden.

I give my full support to the Motion brought forward by the hon. Member for Exeter, and I only rise for the purpose of asking the Secretary of State for War if he is aware that in the Session of 1888 a Commission was appointed by the Senate of the United States for the purpose of inquiring into certain matters connected with certain acts done by England and her North American Dependencies, and I wish to know if the two volumes of evidence taken before that Commission has been brought before him? They contain a whole scheme of attack by the United States upon British Columbia, "if they" (that is, the British Government) "will not sell us British Columbia." I think that whole scheme is well worthy of the attention of those to whom the defence of the Harbour of Esquimalt has been entrusted.

I heartily agree to a great extent with what has been said by the hon. Member for Exeter. I think, however, that there is great difficulty in the way of devising proper fortifications for Esquimalt, and I think the Government ought to consider whether it is worth while fortifying the harbour, or whether the works should be transferred to a more suitable point.

I recognise the importance of the observation of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, and I may say, in reply, that I am not at all prepared to go back from the clear policy of the War Office in the matter of the defences of Esquimalt. My hon. Friend behind me (Sir Stafford Northcote) has pointed out with great force the importance of Esquimalt. He also explained that Esquimalt has grown in importance in consequence of the opening of the Canadian Pacific Railway and the further development of traffic that has taken place in that direction. There is no doubt, not only from an Imperial point of view, but also from a colonial point of view, that the importance of Esquimalt has enormously increased during the last few years, and if there were reasons eight or nine years ago for defending it, those reasons have enormously increased since that time. My hon. Friend behind me (Mr. Staveley Hill) has called my attention to a discussion on the subject that has taken place in the United States. I am sorry to say that the report has not been brought to my notice. I shall be very glad to look into it. But, Sir, that does not alter my general conclusion that Esquimalt ought to be defended, nor can I help expressing my great regret that the defences of Esquimalt have not yet been completed. I feel it all the more because the general defences of our coaling stations have almost reached, in all parts of the world, a successful conclusion. This is one of the stations, to my intense regret, that remains unfortified; and I cordially desire, whatever the reasons may be that have occurred to prevent the completion of the defences, that these may be removed, and that we may be enabled to see, in a short time, Esquimalt in a properly defended state. I do not agree with, my hon. Friend in the general statement that he gave as to the cause of this delay. There has no doubt been a great deal of correspondence between the Imperial Government and the Government of the Dominion, a correspondence extending over a great many years and embracing a good many points of difference. But everybody who looks at that correspondence will see that there were two essential principles that must, that ought, to govern the manner in which this place is to be defended. Generally speaking, what we have put before the Dominion is this: that we ought to provide the guns and even something more—namely, submarine mining stores, skilled superintendence, and the plant; but that Canada should provide the sites and construct the fortifications on which the guns are to be erected, and likewise maintain these fortifications. I do not think anybody will say we are dealing hardly with Canada in the matter. In Australia—in Victoria and New South Wales—they are there undertaking the whole cost of their defence, and the Imperial Government have to pay nothing at all. They have gone further—they have even contributed something towards the support of a squadron intended for the local defence of Australia. In the case of the Cape, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, and Mauritius—in these cases we have laid down this general principle: that the colony ought to provide the sites and build the works, but that we in this country will gladly supply all the necessary armaments. Therefore, I do not think we are dealing unfairly with Canada. We have undertaken to provide the guns, and they are in this country ready to be sent out at anytime. But the works on which they are to be mounted have not yet been commenced by the Government of the Dominion. There are some subsidiary questions, apart from that, which have also arisen, but I am sure we have tried to deal with those also in a thoroughly liberal spirit. The main garrison must, of course, be provided by the Government of Canada. Halifax is one fortified place where the Imperial Government have provided everything—structure, fortifications, armaments, and a garrison. In the case of Esquimalt we think it, only reasonable that Canada should provide a garrison, and that we should train it to enable it to fill that place it ought to fill. The Admiralty have undertaken the responsibility with regard to this. They have sent a certain number of Marines to undergo training in submarine mining, and any day these men are ready to go out to Esquimalt to instruct the people of Canada as to the proper means of laying and using submarine defences. Therefore, I think the Government of this country has shown its willingness to come to an arrangement and to spend its money in order to secure that this place should be fortified, and I do not think it can be justly charged against us that we have not done our best. I do not for a moment desire to raise any question of recrimination between the Imperial and the Dominion Governments. We have recently sent telegrams urging that these defence works should be undertaken and carried out; but I am quite sure, as things stand at present, that Canada has also determined that these works should be carried out. The new Minister of Militia and Defence is, I believe, keenly imbued with the desire that they should be carried out; and I am persuaded that, with his assistance, no obstacle should stand in the way. On the part of the Imperial Government, I must say that we will spare no effort to co-operate with him for the purpose of removing any difficulty or explaining any questions that remain unsolved between the Colonial and the Imperial Governments. And I feel sure that both Governments will desire to remove the reproach that has rested on them jointly, and allow the defences of Esquimalt to be completed as soon as possible. I cannot accept the Resolution of my hon. Friend behind me, though I desire that its spirit should be carried out, and that Esquimalt should become a thoroughly and an efficiently defended part of the Empire.

In my opinion, the tone which the right hon. Gentleman has adopted is not a justifiable tone. I do not know what communications the right hon. Gentleman might have had with the present Government, or Ministers in the Government of Canada responsible for these matters, but I can assure him, having within the last six months spent some time in Canada, that there is a very strong feeling amongst all sections of the Canadian people that expenses of this kind should be almost, if not entirely, borne by the Imperial Government. What is the object of these fortifications? It is to provide against contingencies arising out of war; and if war should take place, it would be in the interest of this country, and in the interests of the Government of this country, and not in the interest of Canada, that Canada should be fortified. It is altogether a question affecting this country and this Government. I do not think the Canadian Government have very much to do with the matter at all; and in view of the very strong feeling that exists in many parts of Canada in favour of annexation with the United States, it is a stupid and an unwise thing for the Government of this country to haggle about the spending of a few paltry pounds and to leave a place unfortified which it is advisable should be fortified, simply because there are some difficulties with regard to these few pounds which the Government have not considered it advisable to spend. I do not think the Secretary of State for War gives any adequate reason why Canada has not undertaken what he considers to be its share in this undertaking. He told us a very remarkable thing, that the guns are all ready and that the men are all ready, and yet not the smallest step has been taken by the Canadian Government towards the fulfilment of its part of the arrangements. Why did the Canadian Government not commence these works if they had any intention of commencing them? The reason was this: that the Canadian people are altogether opposed to being bargained with by the Imperial Government in the matter of an expense which ought to fall on the Mother Country. The opinion in every part of the country I visited was, with regard to these Imperial fortifications, that so far from the Canadian people being interested, the cheapest and the best thing for the Canadian people would be to cut their connection with this country altogether. Whether that is a right or a wrong feeling I do not inquire, but it is a very widespread feeling, and you will increase that feeling if you say you will not fortify an important station like this simply because Canada will not spend some money. If war arises it will not be a war caused by Canada, and I defy you to show me any considerable opinion in Canada that the fortification of this place is a thing necessary for Canada or the Canadian, people. The people of Canada are in two minds as to whether their connection with this country is an advantage to them or not, and whether their connection is not more likely, in view of a European War, to get them into a trouble that they would otherwise avoid. I should like to hear some intelligible reason why the Canadian Government have absolutely not turned a single bit of soil or laid a single stone to carry out this work, which is declared to be of the greatest importance. Why are the Canadian Government not moving? The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War says he hopes the newly appointed Minister of Militia and Defence will do something. Can he give us any official information on that point? Everything is at a standstill. The guns are rusting, the instructors are employed where they are not wanted, and all because this Government will not spend a few pounds. It is a situation that is thoroughly discreditable to the Government and to the War Office. It might, and it ought to, have been avoided. The Government ought first to have ascertained what Canada would do. If they found that Canada would do nothing, then they should have spent the money themselves. It is a mistake to imagine that because in Victoria and New South Wales the Government have spent money that people will do it everywhere else. We ought to get clear and explicit statements from the Government on these points: first, whether the Government have any information leading them to believe that the Canadian Government intend to commence these works; and, secondly, whether, supposing that they have no information on that point or in the event of a refusal, are the Government going to construct these works themselves?

I desire to thank the Secretary of State for War for the very fair and generous statement he has laid before the House. I entirely dissent from the views of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Fermanagh, that there is any desire on the part of the Canadians to sever themselves from the Imperial connection.

The hon. Gentleman would not I am sure wish to misrepresent me. What I said was that there is a strong feeling manifested at elections and elsewhere in favour of annexation with the United States. If you want to strengthen that feeling tell them the Imperial Government will not spend a few pounds.

The hon. Gentleman says it has been a test, question at elections, but I know, and I have travelled a great deal in Canada, that both parties repudiate the idea of annexation. Mr. Mercier, then Prime Minister of Quebec, who went to Paris to negotiate a loan, and who said he looked forward to the time when Canada would be independent, was recently disgraced in the Law Courts and his party routed all along the line. From Montreal to British Columbia I addressed meetings last year, and I can say of the people there that they are enthusiastic supporters of the British connection. They say, in the words of the late Sir John Macdonald, "Britons we were born, and Britons we will die." Esquimalt is in Vancouver, and the inhabitants of that Island are very warmly attached to the connection with the British Empire. Their allegiance will not be weakened by the statement of the Secretary of State for War to-day. He has offered to do as much as any British Minister has ever offered to do in the circumstances, and the majority of the people of Canada will uphold him, and will repudiate the statement of the hon. Member for Fermanagh.

I think the answer of the Secretary of State for War was eminently fair and eminently satisfactory. In matters of this kind we must lay down some principle, and the principle promulgated by the right hon. Gentleman is exactly similar to that which obtained when I was at the Colonial Office. That principle was that the Colony should find the site, and that the Imperial Government should provide the guns. In this case the Imperial Government have offered to go further. I do not desire to contrast the conduct of the Canadian Government with that of the Australian Governments—though the conduct of the Canadian Government does not compare favourably—but I wish to express my regret that an arrangement has not been arrived at on the lines laid down by the Secretary of State for War.

I think the entire cost of defending Esquimalt should be charged against Canada, than which, in the Imperial connection, there is no colony more expensive to maintain. In the North Atlantic and on the West Coast we are obliged to maintain a squadron of ships for the purpose of defending Canada.

The view I take of this subject is that the Government, for their own reasons, desire to have coaling stations for the general good of the Empire. The Canadians have a right to expect that if the Government use their soil, or a portion of it, for those stations, that you ought to be prepared to bear the whole expense. I think it is very unwise to pursue a cheeseparing policy in controversies of this kind. This country has already lost enough by a cheeseparing policy. But the Government appear about to insist upon having their full pound of flesh out of the Canadians until they put themselves out of North Canada. The hon. Member for Belfast must know there are people in Canada, besides those he has spoken of—the Orangemen—who declare that as Britons they live and as Britons they will die. The Records of this House supply plenty of evidence of that fact, even before the American War of Independence. They were rising then to a high state of things—they were ready to die for Britain, and they went forward and died like Britons, but not for Britain, but for American independence. It is not a wise policy to deal, with the people of Canada in the way proposed—with those of them who are not at all so loyal to this country as may be supposed—and I do not see they have any reason to be so, because they are perfectly able to govern themselves. I think they might be left for themselves to decide whether they will remain under the Crown. You want those coaling stations for your Fleet in cases of emergency, and surely they are worth paying for there as well as anywhere else. There are many other places where you would be glad to establish coaling stations, and where you are willing to go more than four-fifths of the way in the matter of expense. In this case I think the Government ought to be prepared to go the whole way. The hon. Member for Belfast hopes there may be a new Government in Canada, and that they will do certain things. But the hon. Member forgets that a new Government will have come into power in England at the same time—that they will be responsible to us and not the Government of Canada. And the present Government ought to be prepared to do this as becomes the British Government.

Although some delay has occurred in carrying out this matter, we have a firm belief that the Canadian Government coincide with Her Majesty's Government in the determination that these fortifications should be proceeded with. I think the hon. Member for North Fermanagh will admit, in reference to the suggestion he has made, that if we should state to the House definitely the course which the Government would adopt in the event of the Canadian Government refusing to bear their share of the cost, and were to tell the House that Her Majesty's Government would at once go on with the work, we should hardly strengthen the hands of a Canadian Minister in proposing to the Dominion Parliament to furnish the necessary funds. I am, therefore, not in a position to make a statement such as has been asked for. One other point requires attention. It is assumed that a few thousand pounds alone are needed to complete the defences, but there is a considerable sum involved in this matter. The amount Her Majesty's Government will have expended when the stores are sent out will be something like £50,000, and the amount that will fall on the Dominion Government to be expended on the works will be about £30,000. Therefore there is considerable pecuniary responsibility upon us already—more than which we should be averse to undertake. We have no reason to suppose that there will be further difficulty, but every reason to hope that the matter will be shortly in process of settlement, and that the defences at our coaling stations will then be completed.

, in calling attention to the Army Estimates and the efficiency of the Army in relation to its cost, said: I express no opinion as to whether our total force is adequate or inadequate, because no ordinary Member of the House has any information whatever on the subject. But a question which this House will have a right to have answered when these Estimates are presented is, how is this Estimate arrived at? This information is, perhaps, more than ever necessary just now, but I do not blame the Secretary of State for War for his action in this matter, because I know he is under the advice of the Military Authorities in this matter. But we are approaching consideration of these Votes even at shorter notice and with less information than we ever did before. The Estimates have been out a very short time. I, for one, have not seen even the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, and the very important evidence taken before the Wantage Committee has not been submitted to the House. But there are two subjects on which we never get any information when these Votes are submitted, and which are very important. Lord Charles Beresford, who, I suppose, knows as much about the Navy as any man in the country, has lately said, addressing a letter to what might have been a future constituency of his, that he will return to the House with the most important questions, and that the first he will raise will be on the consideration of these Estimates, and whether, in the Government Estimates for the Army and Navy, due consideration is given to the requirements of each Service for the sister Service in framing the Estimates for the other Service. But I will confine myself wholly to the Army. What evidence have we ever had submitted to us that the total cost which we have to vote is adequate to the real responsibility of the country? There lately appeared an article in the Fortnightly Review of a very friendly nature under the signature "B," which might have come from an official source. That article says—

"One of the most important matters is whether, when these Votes are submitted, they have been framed with a due regard to the responsibilities which this country has to face."

We have undoubtedly only this fact before us: these Votes are submitted to us on the word of politicians, whatever Party may be power, and we put implicit confidence in their word. But I think, at the same time, we ought to have the evidence of experts, and we ought to be quite sure that they are experts who are able to form an opinion as to the real responsibility of the country, and that the Estimates which are placed before us are adequate to our responsibilities; also that those Estimates have been framed in accordance with the permanent interest of the country, and not merely for the passing purposes of a Party. There are three points on which I do not think anyone will differ. Lord Wolseley says that if the Army must be small it must be also the most perfect fighting machine in the world. If it is to be made so, preparation must be made in time of peace, and we have now had a long interval of peace: but I am afraid that by neither one Party nor the other has that peace been made sufficient use of to turn the Army into a perfect fighting machine. Nearly everybody will agree with me in saying that for what we spend upon the Army we ought to get a perfect fighting machine. This is not merely the opinion of civilians alone. Civilians sometimes get warned off any discussion of military questions by officers of a certain type. But is not this a subject which concerns the taxpayers of this country, and on which they are capable of forming an opinion? Is organisation not a thing with which civilians can deal as well as any military officer? Sometimes those officers speak as if the restoration of numbers, the rights of purchase officers, and the Divine right of officers of the Guards to live out of barracks, were the only things to keep the British lion on his legs. But that is not the opinion of most civilians, and it is not the opinion of Lord Wolseley. Lord Wolseley says:—

"The country pays for an inferior article a price which should be ample to give it a most effective fighting machine."

I am sure he adopted a wise policy when, he denounced the War Office for not taking the country into its confidence and not telling the whole truth. If you do not tell the truth the people of this country will become more and more suspicious when they know the facts as to the scandals that occur every year. In those circumstances it becomes much more dangerous for the War Office to keep back from the English people the truth of the case. The only remedy, as a rule, is more money. I believe if the English people were taken into the confidence of the War Office—if they were told that money was absolutely necessary, and were convinced that the money was well spent—I believe the War Office would get any amount of money at once. But Lord Wolseley says that we are spending too much upon the Army as it is. What is the price we have to pay? We spend over £50,000,000 a year, of which the smaller half goes to the Navy and the much larger half to an inefficient Army. On that Army we spend more than Germany, more than France, and almost half as much again as Russia. The article in the Fortnightly Review, to which I have referred, states that in the years between 1881 and 1888 France spent annually £28,000,000 upon her Army, Germany £28,250,000, and Russia £33,000,000; but there has been a miscalculation with reference to the rouble. I shall say little about Russia, because we have no means of making any accurate calculation as to what her expenditure is. I will confine myself almost entirely to Germany and France. In 1891 the expenditure of France was £28,500,000, and of Germany £20,250,000. Sir Charles Dilke has calculated that these figures are too low, and that, in fact, the ordinary average cost of the Armies of Germany and France is something like £31,000,000. But then, with reference to the Army of Great Britain in India, the Estimates amount to £17,750,000, of which India pays £14,250,000 Then we have £1,500,000 for barracks, giving a total of £33,500,000, or two and a-half millions more than either Germany or France. There is this remarkable fact—that provided Germany spends 31 millions a year now and we spend 33½ millions, Germany during the last ten years has actually gone up 53 per cent., whereas our expenditure has been pretty much the same for the last twenty years. And when we know the Army that Germany could put into the field only ten years ago, with its expenditure 53 per cent. below what it is at the present moment, and when we compare that Army with ours, we can see that we should have an efficient Army. I am not now speaking of the Indian Army, but before passing from this subject I should say that from all we can hear the 74,000 British troops we have in India and the body of native troops are about the finest set of men in arms that any country can show. We have shown on the Estimates a sum of £20,645,000, and it must be remembered that there is in addition a loan of one and a half millions, as well as the enormous work of defence which is done by our Navy, to an extent, perhaps, that the Navy of no other country in the world does for its defence. Of course, that is only the gross sum, but anybody looking at the Army Estimates would suppose that, after the Appropriations in Aid have been allowed for, all we spend on the Army at home is 17½ millions. But that is not the case. Looking at the Vote we find a sum of £87,000 contributed by Egypt put down as an Appropriation in Aid.

It is an extra expense.

I should like to know how it is an extra expense. I should like to know how that is worked out. There are two items which certainly do not mean extra expense. I find, for instance, £250,000 contributed by the Colonies. That, surely, is an ordinary expense of the Home and Colonial Army. Then there is £850,000 contributed by India towards the Home Army, not towards the passage of our troops going to or returning from India, but wholly and solely for the cost of training Home battalions. I think that is an enormous sum to charge upon the people of India, when they really get no return for it whatever. There are other Appropriations in Aid, some of which, I think, are liable to dispute. There is something like a quarter of a million which goes for stoppage of soldiers upon their clothing. That is an Appropriation in Aid which will not form an Appropriation in Aid in any further Vote. That leaves, practically, a sum of £19,000 charged upon the Estimates, of which £17,500 goes more to the Home Service than the Estimates would lead us to believe. What do we get in return for this money? Nobody can say we have got a very fine Army. The establishment of efficient troops only amounts to 627,000 men, and by some remarkable process that 627,000 includes 74,000 on the Indian establishment, actually serving in India, not one penny for which is paid for in the Home Estimates. Therefore, practically, all the troops we get for this £19,000,000 are 544,000, to which have to be added 3,000 for miscellaneous staff, giving us a total of every conceivable man of only 557,000 compared with this £19,000,000. Those are simply the numbers of men; the Estimate says nothing about the number of horses or guns, or organisation. These are simply the men, and if we are content with such an Army, then we shall be content with what Lord Wolseley calls "a fuss and feathers Army, led by bow and arrow Generals." Then, of course, the mere numbers of the men is not all we have to look to. Those numbers have the unfortunate effect of deluding the ratepayers into the belief that they are getting a return for their money, and that the country is getting a good Army. We ought not to be content merely with counting heads, but should go a little further than that even in numbers. Russia can show an army of 1,800,000, besides Cossacks; France can show an Army of 2,800,000; Germany can show an Army of 2,301,000 under 12 years' service, corresponding to our own men and the Reserves. And she has 445,000 horses and 3,982 guns. This is simply the Army on active service, and does not include the Landwehr. More than that, the troops I have mentioned in Germany and France are homogeneous; they form an Army highly organised and properly mobilised for war. I believe our own men are equally brave, and, if properly organised, just as efficient as any men we ever had before. I believe, so far as bravery is concerned, there is nothing amiss in the British Army. But, unfortunately, the troops are not homo- geneous; they are not in proportion; they are not armed alike; they are not divided into Army Corps; and they could not be rapidly mobilised. This is a scratch Army, which includes the Volunteers, who are 42,000 short, the Yeomanry are 30 per cent. short, and the Militia 20 per cent. short, of their numbers; and with them the Corps serving in the Channel Islands, in Malta, St. Helena, and in Bermuda. It also includes 138,000 regulars, of whom 90,000 are declared by the Report of the Wantage Committee to be inefficient. I should like to see the evidence before accepting that statement. If these troops are inefficient without the Reserves, then you might say the same thing of the battalions of the German Army also. Then we are told with regard to the cost, "No doubt it is a miscellaneous Army, but it is a paid Army, and your cost is enormous as compared with that of the German and French Armies." After all the officers of the German and French Armies are paid, and the non-commissioned officers very highly indeed. Germany spends £8,000,000 a year upon them, and France a little over £7,000,000. But ours is by no means a wholly paid Army. In two-fifths of the whole force—the Volunteers—neither officers nor men are paid, and in another fifth—the Militia and Yeomanry—the officers and men are only paid for a very short period in the year, 28 and 12 days respectively, I think, and the cost is charged to Vote I. Therefore, as a matter of fact, only two-fifths of the Army are paid daily. I have taken the trouble to find out what is the actual pay of privates in the British Army, so that a fair comparison can be drawn between the British Army and the German and French Armies. I find that the regimental pay of the warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and privates is £3,355,000, and I do not think it an unfair reduction if I take the £335,000 as the pay of the warrant and non-commissioned officers. That leaves £3,000,000 as the pay of the privates. I add the deferred pay of the men on the whole Service £335,000, the good conduct pay £110,000, soldiers' pensions £750,000, which gives a total of £4,195,000. I add to that the cost of the Reserve £605,000—beyond their pay the cost is nothing at all—this makes the total pay of the privates in the Army and Reserve £4,800,000. Then I have to consider the pay of privates in the Yeomanry and Militia, and I think I am taking a low estimate when I take for the Militia £250,000 and for the Yeomanry £25,000, which added to the previous total gives a little over £5,000,000 a year as the pay of the privates in the regular Army and Reserve. Deducting that £5,000,000 from the £19,000,000 I have mentioned it leaves £14,000,000 as being the cost of the British Army after deducting the pay of the privates. In order to be quite fair, however, I will add another £1,000,000 to the deduction, taking only £13,000,000 as the cost. That gives a cost per head in the Armyand Reserve—after deducting the pay of the privates—of £23 10s. How does this compare with France and Germany? Germany pays £13 10s. per head, and France £11 10s. per head, the cost, therefore, being in one case a little more than half, and in the other considerably less than half that of our own troops. I shall be told that it is making too great a concession on the side of the British Army to take in all these heterogeneous troops, and that the homogeneous troops only of three countries should be taken for the purposes of comparison. The comparison is then much fairer. Deducting the cost of Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, £2,200,000, leaves £16,800,000 for the Regulars and Reserve. From that you have to deduct the pay, £4,800,000, which leaves £12,000,000 to be divided among the 210,000 men who form our Regulars and Reserve. That gives the total cost per head in the Regulars and Reserve, after all these deductions, at £60, as against £13 10s. in Germany and £11 10s. in France for the corresponding troops. That is an enormous difference, and I want to know where the leakage is. Somewhere in these Army Estimates we must spend money wastefully and foolishly. I shall be told, probably, that the comparison is unfair, because we have a small Reserve and France and Germany have large Reserves. I should like to see our Home Army smaller than it is and a much larger Reserve; we should have a more efficient Army, which might be better organised than at present. That is the recommendation of no less distinguished a person than General Roberts himself, to which I shall have to refer later on. The German Army on a peace footing consists of 468,000 various forces and one year Volunteers, making at least 500,000; but I am unable to get the relative cost of the men on a peace footing and the enormous Reserve. Therefore, to avoid any exaggeration I am prepared to throw in the whole of the Reserve of the German Army as though they cost nothing at all, and to put the whole cost on to the 500,000 forming the standing Army, and then to draw comparisons between it and our regulars. I find that we have to divide £11,500,000 amongst 140,000—having deducted our Reserve—which gives an expenditure of £83 per head as against £60 per head for the German Army, after the cost of the whole Reserve is credited as costing nothing whatever. That shows that somewhere or other we are paying a good deal more for this Army than we ought to do. There is also this point to consider—that the German Army has a great deal more to do with the defence of the German Empire than our Army has to do with the defence of our Empire. A considerable part of the defence of our Empire is thrown on the troops in India, but most of all it is thrown on the Navy, so that we have to consider that with these large sums spent, and inadequate results, a large portion of the defence of the Empire is thrown elsewhere. We have also to consider the fact that we are undoubtedly short of horses and of guns, and that even some of the guns we have which have been praised most highly—the 12-pounder guns, supposed to be the best in the Service, of which 282 have been served out already—are shown by Colonel Tylers' Report to be by no means the good arm we have hitherto supposed them. Yet, that is the arm with which the greater portion of the British Army is furnished. We have not the same rifle in the whole of our regiments, and in India there are two or three different kinds in use—the Snider, the Martini-Henry, and the Magazine—which might lead to serious complications in case of war. After saying all this, I have left out a most important consideration—more important even than personnel, than materiel of war—that is organisation for war. The great curse of the British Army is that it is too much a peace Army; it is not an Army fully equipped and prepared for war. The best personnel and materiel for war would be almost useless without organisation. In these days war breaks out suddenly, and we cannot rely, as in the old days, merely on the courage of our soldiers; we must see that those who direct our Army in time of peace give us good organisation, so that the courage of our men shall not be thrown away when the time comes. Why did the French Army—brave as it was—succumb before the German Army in 1870? You have only to read the official account of the Prussian Staff to see why it was defeated. That account tells us three things. First, it was the centralisation of the French Army which caused its defeat. Is not our Army centralised at the present moment? Is not the whole organisation centred in London? Are not the manufacture and supply of materiel too much centred in one spot, as at Woolwich? Is not the training too much centralised in one Army Corps at Aldershot? Another cause of the failure of the French Army was that it was not properly divided into Army Corps. How many Army Corps have we out of our 550,000 men at home? I am told that we have certainly not got two Army Corps, and I doubt if we have even one without borrowing men from other regiments. That is not a creditable state of things. Another cause of the failure of the French Army was that it had no efficient manœuvres. Look at the constant manœuvres of the German Army, in which the men are trained for war every year, not in Army Corps—that would probably be too expensive—but in divisions. If we could do the same thing how much it would add to the efficiency of our Army. I am glad to say that my right hon. Friend, the present Secretary for War, has done something towards instituting manœuvres for the Army, and I wish the people would back him up more. If our Army is to be efficient we must have manœuvres on a larger scale, so that the various arms can work together, and the men be commanded by the officers who would lead them in time of war. There is another point I should like to refer to. The safety of this country is even more important than the preservation of the rights of common, and I hope my right hon. Friend will hold himself stiffly and firmly—in face of the opposition growing up—in what he is patriotically doing in the New Forest, and provide this country with manœuvring grounds and proper rifle ranges at which our soldiers can be properly trained. My right hon. Friend sometimes thinks I am attacking him, but nothing is further from my intention, for I believe he is one of the most efficient of War Ministers—I do not say that from a Party point of view, for Party ought to have no place in these questions. I should attack anybody whom I did not think was doing his duty patriotically; but the more one studies these matters the more one realises the enormous difficulties with which the Secretary of State for War has to contend, and especially so in the case of my right hon. Friend. I wish to refer to a very serious point. We have had a system on which our Army ought to have been organised. That system has been in existence for 20 years, and yet, forsooth, we have a Report from the Official Committee of the War Office, which tells us that our Army is in its present inefficient condition because that system has never been carried into practice, though the people of this country believed that it was being carried out. The most important parts of the system have been neglected, and Secretaries of State have never had the backbone to insist that it should be rigidly carried out. How is this? I know the weakness of War Ministers, due to remaining in office for but a short time, and excuses must be made for that, but there is some strong body of men opposed to all reform Lord Wolseley pointed to them pretty plainly when he said that we have plenty of officers willing to see our Army fitted to meet modern requirements, but that we have a body of generals and others who sit on these men. We have a right to know who are the men who for 20 years have been thwarting this system, and I hope my right hon. Friend will be able to throw some light on the point. He told us another difficulty himself when he spoke at Hammersmith two or three months ago. He said that when he came into office five or six years ago he found that there was practically no organisation of the British Army, and that hardly a stop had been taken in that direction. That is a startling statement to come from the responsible Secretary for War, it is almost incredible, and I hope we shall have some explanation to weaken that statement. The important point for our consideration at this moment is, have we an efficient Army? My right hon. Friend has without doubt made great steps forward, but I should like to have that organisation tested, because I read in the article, favourable to the War Office, already quoted, that the writer has grave suspicion as to whether a great deal of this improvement in organisation is not merely an improvement on paper, and he suggests that the country should have not merely the statement of my right hon. Friend, who as a civilian cannot speak with authority on the matter, but the expert opinion of the highest and most reliable officers that can be found, as to how far this improvement is real. Sir Arthur Haliburton, the representative of the War Office, tells us we have no organisation even for sending a couple of Army Corps abroad for our small wars. He says it would take a good time to organise them, but fortunately it would take still longer to get the ships to carry them, so that perhaps, after all, it does not very much matter. I should not think that explanation will be satisfactory to those interested in the matter. There is another point. Is it possible that at this hour of the day, when we have heard so much about organisation, that we have nothing corresponding to what is called abroad Chief of the Staff. I have read a most valuable work by Mr. Spencer Wilkinson, and he makes out clearly that we have no Department in this country which makes a constant duty, not to attend to routine, but to see that our Army is thoroughly efficient and in a state of preparation for war. We have an Intelligence Department, but the Head of that Department has not even a seat on the General Council at the War Office, and has no independent authority. What would the Germans have said if Count Moltke, the Chief of the Staff, had had no voice in the administration of their Army? I have seen a series of letters on the German Army, and one of them points out that if there is one thing which makes that Army the perfect fighting machine it is, it is the sense of responsibility from the top to the lowest private soldier. There is no piling all the responsibility on one man, as on the Secretary for War or the Commander-in-Chief in the case of the British Army. The result of this graduated responsibility is that, if anything goes wrong, somebody is able to put his finger on the man who is responsible for it. How is it possible that an Army, organised in the way in which ours is, can be anything but a gross muddle of an Army, and an Army which, if war should unhappily break out, would launch us again in some of the cruel incidents which happened at the beginning of the Crimean War? I have only one word more to add, and it is that I believe the whole cause—or, at all events, a large portion of the cause—of this mischief is the way in which our Army is constantly moving about between England and India, and between England and the Colonies, and, even when it is at home, constantly moving from one barracks to another. If our Army is kept in a state of perpetual motion how can you ever have any greater unit than the battalion, which is our present condition? How are we to remedy that state of things? What is the suggestion of Lord Roberts on the point? No less than eight years ago Lord Roberts, writing an article in the Nineteenth Century, says the only way is to do away with the seven years' service. He says that seven years is neither a short nor a long service, and it has a most mischievous effect on the Army. He suggests that we should go in for a long service Army for foreign service, and a short service Army at home; or, in other words, a twelve years' service for India and the Colonies, and three years at home. Then you would be able to carry out the territorial system which, up to the present, you have never been able to do. The opinion of Lord Roberts on this subject is of immense value; and if the long service system were adopted, you would get out of the difficulty of constantly shifting your soldiers to India. Why should the men be so constantly shifted between England and the Colonies? Admirals have got up over and over again in this House and declared that the Marines were the proper men to garrison the Colonies, and common sense seems to point in that direction. If you get your long service Army for India, your short service for England, and have the Colonies garrisoned by Marines, you have only got your short service Army in England to deal with. Many men would join the Army for three years who would not join for seven; and there are many men who would like to join for foreign service again, but will not join to spend part of the time at home and part abroad, and be separated from comrades whom they know and officers whom they trust. That is the only way to carry out the territorial system which Lord Wantage's Committee declares you ought to carry out. The advantages of the system are numerous, and the result will be to turn our Army from a "fuss-and-feathers army" into an effective Force. Under this system you would throw upon commanding officers a great deal of work which is now badly done by the War Office. You would get a much cheaper Army, and you would get not only a larger Reserve, but a trained Preserve. At present your Reserve is not trained, and I know the difficulties that the Secretary for War has to contend with in this respect. I know that the managers of some of our large Railway Companies—the Midland was one, I believe—have refused to take Reserve men into their service, and I think these large companies which have had large concessions granted to them by this House ought to show more patriotism. But the fact is our Reserve is so small that employers fear, should a war break out, that the particular Reserve man to whom they might give employment would be selected. If your Reserve were larger, the chances of any individual man being taken would diminish. I hope I have persuaded the House that my figures are not exaggerated, and I hope that the Secretary for War, whatever he may say about my opinion, will not allege any exaggeration. I admit the to enormous difficulties that the right hon. Gentleman has to contend with, and I know that the present Secretary for War has done much for the matériel and personnel of the Army, and for the organisation of the Army, but I am quite certain that much remains to be done. It is not enough to get the men; it is not enough to get the money. The taxpayers of the country will not grudge the money for an efficient Army, and the working classes will not grudge the lives and the blood of their brothers and of their sons if they are sure that those lives will be protected by proper organisation. It is no good sending these men to the shambles, as you would send them, if that organisation is not full and complete. This is not the day of soldiers' battles, and I am quite sure that no more popular thing could be done by any Secretary of State for War than to put his shoulder manfully to the wheel and resolve that, whether the system be long or whether it be short, he will do his utmost to see that the Army works upon a regular system, and that that system is fairly and completely carried out and that the organisation is placed upon a sound and permanent footing. If no other considerations will induce the Secretary of State for War to struggle to that end, I hope political considerations will induce him; and I would have him know that the men whose daily bread depends upon the defence of our home and Empire—the working classes — still recollect the disastrous history of 1853 and 1854. They will soon be reading, in the Report of Lord Wantage's Committee, that the state of our organisation is almost as bad as it was in 1853; that the short service system has made no progress, and that we are halting between two systems. These are the men who now cast the balance between the Parties. They are Party men, and their Party is dear to them; but their country is nearer and dearer to them, and the lives of their relations are even nearer and dearer, and a heavy retribution will fall upon any War Minister who does not supplement the bravery of the soldiers by a full and efficient organisation, and by supplying them with ample materials of war of the best character.

I have great pleasure in supporting the Motion of the hon. Member for Preston. He has shown the difference in the cost of our Army and the Armies of France and Germany, and I venture to say that the utmost that we can do for our expenditure is to put two, or perhaps three, Army Corps into the field with an insufficient transport and short of horses. All we can do in India is to put 70,000 men on the North-Western Frontier. I know it can be said in answer to this that our Army depends entirely on voluntary enlistment, and that half of it, or more than half of it, is always serving abroad on the other side of the world or in the tropics. I do not suggest that it is the fault of any particular Department, or of any particular Minister, that such a state of things has obtained; and I should like to express my belief that never since the days of Mr. Cardwell, never for 20 years, have we had a more efficient Secretary of State for War than we now have in my right hon. Friend (Mr. Stanhope.) He has removed many grievances which existed. He has given the Magazine rifle into the hands of our troops, and he has increased the comfort of the private soldiers. He had the courage to ask the House to devote a very large sum of money to the improvement of the barracks, and he has put an end to the régime under which we had guns that burst, swords that broke, and bayonets that would not pierce through butter. He has given us a most efficient Indian Army, but in doing that I think he has rather sacrificed the Home Army, which costs £17,500,000, and is practically inefficient. The Report of Lord Wantage's Committee is practically to that effect. The Commander-in-Chief has stated that a number of battalions are inefficient; the Adjutant General says the same. Sir Evelyn Wood declared that the Home battalions were nothing but a nursery. There has been a Minority Report in connection with the Wantage Committee. It certainly appeared to me, that whereas the War Office expected that Committee to bless them, the Committee turned round and cursed them, and in order not to allow the Report of the Committee to have a single day start, the War Office rushed out the Report to which the name of Sir Arthur Haliburton is appended. One of the principal motives of the Army manœuvres was to give general officers an opportunity of dealing with large bodies of men, and it is in this respect that I represent that the Secretary for War and the War Office have not achieved what is required. Last summer at Aldershot the biggest number of men we could turn out was 14,000 and these were cut up into four divisions. No general officer has a chance of manœuvring more than 5,000 men with 13 guns and a weak squadron of Cavalry, and this has to be compared with the 120,000 men manœuvred by General Saussier in Champagne, and with the five Army Corps which paraded before the Emperor William on the Saar. The troops at Aldershot were not only deficient in numbers but they were deficient in physique. In one regiment which had a march of 13 miles 100 men had to fall out on account of weakness. Last year 19,500 men were enlisted to the Infantry, and 11,500 of them were under 5 ft. 5 in. The Times correspondent, writing of the Autumn Manœuvres at Aldershot last year, said that the regiments were composed not of boys but of young children. Going more into detail with respect to the Militia, there is no mystery made of the fact that of a force of 67,500 men something like 40,000 are under the ago of 20, and therefore unfit, according to the Regulations, to go to India. The official view of the Army of course is that it is liable at any moment to be sent abroad on foreign service, to garrison our possessions, or to do anything that is required of it. But it may be worth while for hon. Members to ask what is the actual condition of these soldiers who are to be sent abroad on foreign service, and to that end I have taken some figures with respect to these battalions. In one battalion I find the regulation strength is 1,100 men, and the actual strength 914. Out of these 458 are forbidden to go to India on account of being under age, and as a matter of fact only 226 are fit to go abroad. In another battalion of 1,040 men, 800 are unfit to go abroad because they are under age, and in a third, with a Regulation strength of 800 and an actual strength of 600, the number unfit for foreign service was 300. That is not a satisfactory state of things. The position of the Cavalry is not much better. Each of the large regiments is supposed to turn out between 180 and 320 horses—I know one which turned out only 117—and I see the numbers now stand at 11,000 men and 5,600 horses, or about one horse for every two men. The Yeomanry, I think, can hardly be treated seriously as a fighting force, and the Militia has been described as a patent and recognised fraud. Although I do not go quite so far, perhaps, as that, I must admit that there is a very considerable basis for the criticism. The established strength of the Militia is 135,000 men, and the number accounted for last year was 113,000. Of that number 4,000 were on leave, 8,000 were deserters, 12,000 had volunteered for the Line, and should not be counted twice, for you cannot count one man as belonging both to the Army Reserve and to the Militia. When you make these deductions from the numbers of men at the annual training, and remember that they have no musketry exercise whatever, I think you will possibly come to the conclusion that the writer in the Times was not very far wrong in describing them as a patent and recognised fraud. Then with respect to the Artillery: foreign nations allow about five guns to 1,000 men, but the allowance in the British Army appears to be about half a gun to 1,000 men. I have taken three batteries haphazard for statistical purposes, and I find that in one battery of an established strength of 157 men 57 are unfit to go abroad. In one of 151 men, 109 are unfit on account of age, and the third battery which I selected had to wait for some time to go to India until the men had grown up; that was until they had passed the age of 20 years. Next with regard to the Reserve: that has increased, and I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on the fact that the Reserve this year will number 78,000 men, but I cannot help thinking that this will do no more than fill up the gaps in our First Army Corps, and in our Army in India and in other directions, and bring the Army up to a proper war footing. The Committee has made certain recommendations in reference to the increased efficiency of our Army. One is that the soldier should get his free kit and free rations, and another is that employment should be found for the Reservists. I am not going to trouble the House with my ideas upon these questions, because I have often stated them before; and I only desire to say that if hon. Members wish any information in reference to the status of the Reservists, I would advise them to read Mr. Arnold White's book, which will show them the number of Reservists lying out at night in Trafalgar Square and in other places of the kind. Of this I am certain, that we shall never find an efficient home Army until the War Office establishes a bureau for the purpose of finding employment for discharged and Reserve soldiers.

My hon. Friend the Member for Preston, in supporting the Amendment standing in his name, has instituted a comparison between the costs of the British and foreign armies—an old task which has been again and again undertaken, and always, I am afraid, with indifferent results. But those of us who have followed this matter for many years know how difficult it is to arrive at any accurate result by such a method. In his estimate of the cost of our Army, my hon. Friend was reduced to conjectural figures; that one Service cost so much and the other so much, and then he compared them with the cost of a foreign Army.

My estimates were taken from the War Office Estimates.

Yes; but my hon. Friend, in making out a very interesting analysis of the pay of several branches of the Army, was obliged to jump at conclusions with regard to a great many items. The real position is this: that our Estimates have the advantage of exposing to the country, on the face of them, the whole of the expenditure of the country for the military service; whereas, in foreign countries with which comparison is instituted—in France, and in Germany especially—the so-called public expenditure does not include anything like the real cost of the Army. What you have to remember is that the foreign Army—the German Army, for example—takes away from the community an enormous mass of useful and money-creating labour; and you have to recollect the fact that the whole civil necessities and interests of the community are subordinated to the Army of such a country; and if you come to reckon up between us and them the cost of the Services, this fact will make a material difference. Take an instance. If the German Government wish to carry out manœuvres on a large scale, there is, in the first place, an open country, with no enclosures. There is nothing to injure. They can move their troops wherever they please at small cost, and the civil trade and the railway traffic are at a standstill until troops are moved. The troops are billeted on the inhabitants, and in every respect the country is placed at the disposal of the Military Authorities for this purpose. But in this country, if large manœuvres took place, the first thing which we would have to undertake would be the introduction of a Bill, setting up a Committee or a Commission to assess the damages that would be inflicted on the farmer, landowner, or other inhabitant in the district. The railways would make a good bargain with the War Office, and the country would have to pay for everything at high prices. Therefore, hon. Members can understand how different is the position of a foreign country and ours in undertaking the same work. This is, of course, only a simple instance; but it is a good instance, as showing how different are the relations which subsist between the civil interests and the military interests in the two countries. It can hardly be estimated in figures, but it enormously affects the annual expenditure. On the general question of Army organisation, I would venture to advise hon. Members of the House to exercise great caution in accepting views on so complicated and difficult a subject as this, unless those views are the result of actual experience in the endeavour to reconcile the conflicting and apparently irreconcilable conditions of the problem. Let me remind hon. Members that we cannot in this country indulge a desire for theoretical perfection in our Army organisation. There is no tabula rasa on which we can proceed. We are tied on the one hand, by traditions and prejudices and habits which it is hopeless to overcome, and to ignore which would be fatal to success. We have to humour the feelings of those classes from which the Army is supplied. We have to fulfil obligations and to discharge duties which are not in the least recognised by any other Army in the world. It must be also remembered that when appeal is made to the opinion of those who, in the jargon of the times, are called "experts," that they have too often only seen one of the many sides of the question. An officer who has passed most of his service on the Staff does not appreciate sufficiently and allow for the laborious duties of the regimental officer, and the close insight which those duties gave into the character and feelings of the soldier. The regimental officer, again, is apt to be chiefly interested in the success and efficiency of his battalion; and he regards the whole question from that point of view. The Indian officer, on the other hand, however exalted and distinguished, may have lived long in India and lost touch with the ideas prevalent in this country; he may have very little idea of the task involved in the supply of an adequate Indian Army. These authorities may thus fail to grasp fully the scope of the problem, and are therefore misled. I am sure that I shall be borne out when I say that those who know the most, and who have thought the most, of this multifarious and complex question will be the least disposed to give any dogmatic opinion upon it; and, on the other hand, when we hear a sweeping condemnation expressed of this or of that, we may safely set it down as the outcome of a casual visit to Aldershot, or of the acquisition and assimilation of the views of some individual officer who, however intelligent and capable in his duties, after all takes only a partial view of the case. Speaking for myself, as my fortune has led me to follow these matters for some years, I would say that I am not one of those who think our Army system by any means perfect, whether in regard to civil administration or military organisation; but I wish to give some reasons why we should not rush into some of the changes which in recent months have been strongly pressed upon the public, changes which are many of them reactionary in their nature, and which I think would not have the good effect that is expected from them. The whole subject has three separate branches. First of all, there is the question of the administration of the Army and the distribution of duties among the high officials at its head; secondly, the question of organisation, especially of the Infantry, with reference to efficiency; and, thirdly, the question of recruiting, and the relations between the Army and the recruiting classes. As the first of these branches has been reported upon by a Royal Commission, of which I was a Member, and as that Report has been discussed in the House, I think I need not now refer to it. But with regard to the second and third points—the organisation of the Army and recruiting—I am extremely sorry that we have to speak of the Report of Lord Wantage's Committee without seeing the evidence upon which the Report was based, and I confess myself that I am still more anxious to see not the evidence but the Appendices, which may contain the facts and figures upon which the conclusion was based; because the Report makes very startling and extensive recommendations without any attempt to estimate the financial effect of these recommendations. Nor is there an analysis of the facts which would show us to what really the evils complained of are due and how the recommendations would remove them. This is, in fact, a very good instance of the evil which arises from the appointment of such Committees, composed of gentlemen who, however able and patriotic, have no responsibility, and would never have anything to do with the business of finding the money to pay for what they recommend. The only estimate, I believe, that was made was made by Sir A. Haliburton, who dissented from the Report, and he puts it at £1,500,000; and, in addition, there is a corresponding cost to the Indian Government which would have to pay its share; and also, in consequence of some of the recommendations, there would be a large increase in the Non-Effective Vote. In some journals of great importance I observe it was said that these recommendations should be adopted, even though they were costly, and that the money should be found by decreasing the Non-Effective Votes. But that is precisely one of those things which lets us see the state of mind of some of the persons who write upon military subjects. The Non-Effective Votes are precisely those which are the least susceptible of being arbitrarily reduced, because they merely embody the result of obligations long since incurred, and of promises made to officers and men which cannot possibly be broken. As a matter of fact, we might adopt a policy which, in 15 or 30 years, might effect a decrease in those Votes; but, at the present, we are bound by obligation not to meddle with them. I regard it as satisfactory that, at least, this Committee has authoritatively acknowledged, once for all, that there are three systems to be accepted as essential—first, short service, with a Reserve; second, the territorial system; and, third, the system of twin battalions—the system which does not allow one battalion to remain helpless without any assistance from another. First, as to organisation, we hear a good deal of the non-efficiency of the territorial battalions. But before we talk so, we ought to determine for what purpose these battalions are maintained. We differ entirely from other European countries which have to defend their own frontiers in times of war and invade the enemy's frontier. Their enemies in war will be in a co-terminous country with railways reaching to and through the country; and they must be ready at short notice to embark in what may be a great European war. But what have we to do with a great European war? I venture to say that there is no man in this country who can contemplate our taking part in a large European war. What we have to do is to garrison India, to protect our Colonies, and to defend our own shores from invasion; but as to taking part in a great European war, we have neither the amount of force, nor have we the intention to do it. We are not justified by the amount of our Army, and we do not wish to have an Army sufficient for the purpose. The hon. Member for Preston has talked about our having two Army Corps ready for small wars. But those small wars occur mostly in other climates among uncivilised peoples, and what is wanted generally for our small wars is not a force on the European footing, or with the European proportions of horse, foot, and artillery, but a specially-organised force adapted to the country in which the fighting is to take place. The complaint, however, is that the battalions in the Home Army are exhausted by men constantly passing out of them, either as drafts or to the Reserve; but that is the very purpose for which they exist. It is not intended that our Home battalions should be always fit to take the field, and it is clearly shown by Sir A. Haliburton, not by an ex cathedrâ statement of his own, but by figures which cannot be disputed, that, comparing the average foreign battalion with an English one, if we were called on to mobilise one of these despised battalions, it would be in a better condition than a German battalion in similar circumstances. Lord Wolseley has said that the battalion, after the drafts had left it, was "like a squeezed lemon"; hardly an accurate metaphor, for a squeezed lemon is fit for no further use, while the battalion might be better likened to a tree from which fruit may be taken year after year, and which is every year bearing fresh fruit. No doubt this system imposes upon regimental officers and noncommissioned officers most irksome and thankless duties. It was much more pleasant for these officers in the old days, when the battalion was made up of well-trained soldiers of long service, and always presented a good appearance; but they must be governed by the sense of patriotism and duty, and with the knowledge that by their labours the defensive forces of the Empire are being supplied in a more effective way than has ever been the case before. My hon. Friend the Member for Preston has alluded to the organisation of the Infantry in twin battalions, and has said that this organisation has never been carried out. He speaks, in fact, of there being no organisation; but the truth is, that this disturbance of the system to which he refers only affects a few battalions. It cannot be perfectly worked while we have more battalions abroad than at home, but it has always been expected year after year that some of those battalions might be brought home. Proposals have been made that we should alter our organisation or raise battalions at home in order to reestablish the equality. I should be very sorry to see that done, unless it was absolutely necessary. If the organisation were to be altered at all, it must be not by unlinking battalions, but, on the contrary, by doubling up still further, so as to give us such elasticity as we find in the Guards, the Rifle Brigade, and the Royal Artillery. If the battalions in the Colonies could possibly be brought home, that would meet the case better than any other way. A word or two I shall say with regard to recruiting. I have already said I am not prepared, for my part, to give any countenance to the adoption of these large proposals of the Committee, unless on very strong evidence. But there is one thing which I do think there ought to be no mistake about at all, and that is that, whatever the money terms of a soldier's enlistment may be, they should be made perfectly plain to him; there should be no suspicion, no ground for doubt. I do not say there is; but if it is asserted there is—if there is any word, any phrase used which in the mind of the stupidest of men would give rise to the idea that he was entitled to more than he ultimately gets—I think that this should certainly be remedied; but I do not see that any case has been made out for increasing the total emoluments of a soldier. His emoluments now are greater than they have been within the memory of any living man; he is better housed, better fed, and better attended to in every way, and everything has been done that could be done to make his position reasonably comfortable, and also to make his life as similar to the life he would lead as a civilian as it possibly can be. The men we get now into the Army are men of education, and therefore men who will not put up with the old treatment which was too common in former days. As to the terms, the duration of time for which he is to serve, which is a most important point, the hon. Member for Preston quoted from General Roberts, who has given an opinion in favour of dividing the Army into parts, one of short service for Home purposes, the other of longer service for India. That is, again, a thing we have heard proposed times without number, but there have always been alleged the most serious objections to them; the objection that an Army serving solely in India would inevitably deteriorate, and the objection of want of variety and experience for the Home Army. The present system may have its inconveniences; but in consequence of these strong objections I do not think that that alternative proposal is very likely to be adopted. And, although I quite agree with my hon. Friend that seven years with the Colours is a long time, and that we should get a much larger Reserve more rapidly by having a shorter service, yet I think that the great object must be to make the terms of service thoroughly elastic. We have a voluntary Army, and I should like to have a man to think of himself as a Volunteer all through his military life; and, with that view, that he should have the opportunity of staying in the Service or leaving it at as many intervals as possible. And if we can accomplish that, I think it would be better than laying down any rigid rules. So far as pay is concerned, I do not see any evidence that the pay is insufficient—there is no evidence at all in the Report offered of it, except the mere opinion of the Committee. On the other hand, we have every reason to believe, from the Reports of the Inspector General of Recruiting, that we are able to get as many recruits as we want. As to the objection that these recruits are too young, I do not think that is made out. It is an old objection, and it has been considered so long that it is hardly worth while going over it again. If you aim at a higher age—over 18—you will get in this country as recruits men who have tried some other calling and have failed—men who have more or less broken down; and I think that most military men will agree that it is better to capture a recruit at 18, and train him up as a soldier, than to take him at a greater age. The extreme youth which is undoubtedly manifest in any ordinary battalion seen in a garrison town is at once counteracted when the battalion is required for actual service by the presence of the men from the Reserve. Another proposal, but one which is not likely to be adopted, and which I hope never will be adopted or even favourably looked upon, is the idea of inducing the men in the Reserve to come back to the Colours; because, after being at infinite pains and trouble to create a Reserve, to proceed practically to bribe the men to come back to the Colours in order to increase the strength of the battalions at the expense of the Reserve—I think no one can justify that as a reasonable or sensible course. I trust, therefore, there will be little support given to the main proposals of this Committee—at any rate, from this side of the House, which is supposed to be the side where economists mostly dwell. There is no doubt that the cost of the Army, as my hon. Friend said, is great—almost appalling; but all the circumstances of our Army go to increase its cost. It is the imperative duty of Ministers and those who advise them to keep the cost down and prevent its growth, but there has not been great opportunity for this of late years. The right hon. Gentleman has lived and had his responsibility cast upon him in times when we know great calls were made upon him; especially the discoveries of science and the invention of new arms have necessitated enormous expenditure both in guns and ammunition. There has also been a great improvement in the soldier's condition. We have seen the consequent increase in Military Estimates that has taken place in recent years. We must all lament it. At the same time I cannot but hope that, at all events, this flow upwards may soon be checked. I am prepared to support any reduction of expenditure which is reasonable, and where the expenditure is not absolutely necessary for efficiency — wherever, in our elaborate system, it is possible to introduce any reduction. And let us hope, when a reduction is proposed by any Minister, the opposition will not come from those traditions and vested interests I have spoken of, through Members of the House of Commons, because I am bound to say my experience of the interference of Members of the House of Commons, shows that it is in the direction of increased expenditure rather than In the direction of diminishing it. I am, at all events, not prepared to urge upon the responsible authorities a large expenditure, which is not proved to be necessary, and which, in my opinion, so far from augmenting, would actually diminish, the efficiency and fighting strength of the Army.

The fact that our Army is a voluntary Army and all other Armies forced Armies makes not only a difference in the cost of clothing, but in the cost of housing, and everything else with which the soldier is provided. I venture to say it is too late in the day to make speeches comparing the cost of our Army en bloc with the cost of the Armies of Germany, France, and other nations. Since the date of the Committee on which the noble Lord the Member for Paddington sat six or seven years ago, anyone who finds fault with the expense of the Army is bound to put his finger on the specific point to which he objects and explain that it is not wanted, or that it costs too much. How should we reckon the expense of our Army? It is the insurance of the country, and should be reckoned with reference to expenditure in byegone years, and with reference to the population and wealth of those days and the population and wealth of these days, and with reference to the work the Army had to do in those days and the work it has to do in these days; and we should also allow for the great increase in the cost of providing, whether men or guns, or pay, or anything else. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Edinburgh (Mr. Childers), whom I regret not to see here, made a speech at Pontefract in 1883, in which he contrasted the expenditure of the Army and Navy together with what it had been 15 years before per head of the population; and he arrived at the conclusion that it cost 2s. 11d. per head of the population less than it did 15 years before. The right hon. Gentleman, with pardonable pride, attributed all this saving to his Party's economy, and, no doubt, economies had been very carefully considered; but he forgot the growth of the back that had to bear the burden—that is, that the population had increased about 3,000,000 in the course of that time. And when you come to consider the Army, you must consider the growth of our nation—its growth both in wealth and population. There have been letters appearing in the papers with reference to the Army, some with and some without justice; but I may say this: that our present system passes through the different arms of the country a number of men—I should say, 50,000 men per year—who are, to a certain extent, trained to bear arms. These men, for many years after their service, would many of them be available for an emergency, and you may trust something to the spirit of the country. I must say that I certainly believe we must continue to get the men young, or we shall not catch good men at all, and that it would be a fatal mistake to attempt to take no men unless they are 19 years of age. The Report of Lord Wantage's Committee does disclose very serious questions. Like other nations which have had an extended Empire, we are sacrificing the Home Army to that in our distant provinces. I think that the establishment of the regiments in India is too large, and that the establishment of the regiments at home is too small; and I think that the Home battalions are most certainly not efficient—I mean not efficient for a small war in which a Reserve is not available, except such men of the Reserve as may volunteer. With reference to the system of two battalions—one at home and one in India—the Committee recommended the formation of several battalions so as to complete that system. I recollect, when that system was formed, it was felt that there was no elasticity in it, and that the smallest thing must upset it; and the smallest thing has upset it. I agree entirely with the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) in saying that any change of system ought to be in the direction of further grouping. I do not blame the War Office Authorities of the day; the difficulties they had to contend with were enormous. But the grouping of more regiments would undoubtedly have been better had it been possible. In the recommendation of the Duke of Wellington to the War Minister of Spain in 1814, he says, referring to the Spanish Army, and to a previous recommendation of his that it should be formed in regiments of two battalions, that it would be a more economical arrangement if the Spanish Infantry regiments were formed into three or four battalions. I do not suppose that it is possible to alter the organisation of the Army, and as it has undoubtedly given a military framework to the Reserve Forces in the districts, it has, to a great extent, succeeded. But I should like very much, if possible, that the War Office should be able to determine the direction of recruits to a greater extent than at present, so as to put them in the battalion in which they are wanted. It has always seemed to me that the trained soldier fit to go to India should receive a penny a day extra provided he engaged for general service. I think we are much indebted to the present War Minister for the manner in which he has decentralised the stores and made preparations for the unseen Army—the Reserve—of this country to be ready for mobilisation and available for service if, unfortunately, it should ever be required.

Although, during the administration of the present Secretary for War, there has been an immense improvement effected in the way of organisation, still I think that a great deal yet remains to be done. Referring to what Lord Wolseley had said, just now the hon. Member for Preston spoke about bow-and-arrow Generals. I should like to say that if you do not give your Generals plenty of troops to exercise, you will probably have them bow - and - arrow Generals. Arrangements should be made so that we may have practically in time of peace experiments such as are carried out in time of war. But there is always a difficulty raised in this country about obtaining land for carrying out these experiments, because you cannot carry them out without interfering, to a certain extent, with the rights of property and the rights of individuals; but I think myself people ought to show a little more patriotism than they have done, especially in the case of the New Forest. The Report of Lord Wantage's Committee, which has just been referred to, is a very valuable one, inasmuch as it points out the defects which exist in the Service. I do not think it matters a bit whether you have long service or short service; but whatever service is adopted you ought to take all the steps necessary to make your regiments efficient. At the same time, it is admitted by even the War Office Authorities themselves, that the regiments are not efficient. I am not blaming the Secretary for War however. There has been an immense amount of money spent on the Army. I do not think there is much more money wanted to be spent; but if there is, I think it should be spent in another direction. We want devolution of responsibility, rather than concentration of it. I have very great pleasure in bearing testimony to the good the present War Office Authorities have done. I only hope they will go on in the right way, and I hope that we may have some results from Lord Wantage's Committee.

I beg to call attention to that portion of the Report of Lord Wantage's Committee which has reference to the pay and position of the soldier. As one who entered the Army about 40 years ago, during the Crimean War, I wish to support the recommendation that the private soldier of the Infantry should receive 1s. a day, free from all compulsory stoppages which are not due to his own negligence or misconduct, for I am quite sure it would be a great benefit to the private soldier if he could obtain these advantages. When I first entered the Service the conditions were very different from what they are now, and I think the time has arrived, seeing what difficulties there are in getting recruits, when a recommendation of this sort should be taken advantage of, and I hope the Secretary of State for War will give it his best consideration. One matter has occupied my mind for many years, not only as a soldier, but as Member of Parliament, and it has reference to the stoppages for a sea-kit. When soldiers are ordered to India or to a foreign clime, I know it is a very great hardship upon them to have to provide themselves with a sea-kit, and I hope attention will also be paid to that matter. Another recommendation of the Report of which I approve is that which recommends that men of good character who have left the Colours for not less than six months, but not more than twelve, may be allowed to return. As an old soldier, I think it would be a very good thing if they were allowed to do so. They cannot often obtain the employment they expected, and it would be wise to allow them to come back and serve towards earning their pension, as many of them are anxious to do. Many soldiers find that civil life is not what they would desire, because, owing to the short service system, their places have been filled up as soon as they left their employment, and the masters tell them they want them no longer. The short service system is a system which I, as an old soldier, cannot and will not support. Another part of the Report refers to deferred pay, and what is stated in the Report is based on evidence, some of which is not altogether satisfactory. It is a subject which many of us, not only in this House, but out of it, are very much interested in. From my own experience as a country gentleman, many old soldiers have come to me asking for relief, and they tell me that the deferred pay is a mere sham, and no good to them. They receive the money at one time, and when the soldier, who is open to various influences, gets a certain amount of money in his hands, he is likely to spend it as many others are; and, therefore, I believe the deferred pay question is one which ought to be seriously considered by the Authorities. With regard to the Guards—a regiment I had the honour to serve in for a number of years—I trust the Secretary of State will do all he can to accede to the recommendations of this Committee. The Guards are a body of men who have done good and honest service, not only in London, but in foreign countries when called upon to do so, and I am sure my hon. and gallant Friends near me will agree with me that old Guardsmen and present Guardsmen are very much indebted to the non-commissioned officers and men in the Service, who have done their duty so bravely and honourably. The recommendations with regard to the Guards are that—

"The number of non-commissioned officers specially detailed for recruiting duties should be increased, and made supernumerary to the establishment of regiments";

and that—

"the Guards' duties in London, especially at night, should be reduced as much as possible, compatible with the proper performance of functions of State and the military training of the men."

The duties of the Guards at night have been considerable, and I believe medical officers have stated that those night duties have been very detrimental to the health of the men. Another recommendation of the Committee is that—

"efforts should be made to increase the proportion of old soldiers in the ranks of the Guards, by encouraging smart men of good character to extend their service with the Colours, and re-engage for pension."

It is owing to the short service system that we have not been able to get men of these ranks, as we were formerly, to carry out the onerous duties which may be imposed upon them, for we depended on the non-commissioned officers—not only the sergeants, but the corporals—for the maintenance of discipline and order in the barrack room. There is one recommendation with regard to Line regiments which I strongly advocated while in Opposition from 1880 to 1885, when I objected to his old clothing being taken away from the British soldier. I wish to impress upon my right hon. Friend the commendation that the old clothing shall no longer be taken away from the private soldier, for I believe the adoption of the suggestion of the Report will be very much more for the benefit of the British soldier than the arrangement which exists at the present time.

Sir, I abstained from addressing the House at an earlier period, because I know it is much more in accordance with constitutional practice and with general convenience that the Minister who, for the time being, is responsible for the Army Estimates, should have an opportunity of laying, in one statement, his view of the condition of the Army, and of what he proposes for the year, before the House of Commons. I do not think that it will be thought presumptuous on my part, considering all that has recently been written about Military subjects, if I venture to occupy the attention of the Committee for some little time. But certainly with a good deal of what has been written I have little or no concern. Much of it has been founded upon reports and evidence relating to a state of things which has passed away, while absolutely ignoring the reforms which have been introduced and the consequences which have come from them; and I am afraid also that much has been written which may have the effect, although I know it was not the intention, by painting unfairly, in the blackest colours, the conditions and disadvantages of the Army Service, of discouraging recruiting. For my part, I want to approach, without the smallest prejudice, the consideration of all these questions, which can alone in that manner be satisfactorily dealt with. Now, Sir, a good deal has been said with regard to the amount which we are at present expending upon the Military Service. I am afraid that anybody who endeavours to make an exhaustive or complete comparison between what we expend in this country and what is expended in foreign countries on the Military Service is attempting an impossible task. The conditions are wholly different, and I do not think that even the most acute intellects, applied under the most favourable circumstances, could possibly be able to present to the country a really fair comparison between what we are spending in this country and what they are spending in France and Germany. I know very well for myself, who have tried, during the last few years, to arrive at such an estimate, the task has proved beyond my powers. I had two years ago the assistance of a man, second to none in that respect—a man who had given very special attention to the subject of the expenditure in France and in Germany. General Brackenbury furnished the Committee on the Army Estimates, and afterwards furnished me, with all the information which he could collect to enable him to make any comparison between what was being spent both in France and in Germany and here, and I am bound to say that even that in- formation was of a meagre description. He pointed out with very great force that when you came to compare expenditure in this country with what took place in France and Germany, you had to compare, to some extent, the conditions under which that expenditure was made, and he proved, I think, beyond any doubt, that if you were going to pay the German Army, to clothe the German Army, to feed the German Army, and to give the German Army generally the same advantages which you give to the Army in this country, you must begin by adding £9,000,000 sterling to the Estimates of Germany. I do not want to go into these comparisons now, because I have a good deal to say to the Committee; but I should like, without going further, to say that General Brackenbury pointed out the insuperable reasons why we could not make a fair comparison between what we are spending in this country and what they are spending in France and Germany. First of all, of course, we have a voluntary system in this country, whereas they have a compulsory system in those countries; secondly, the cost of living in England is altogether different from the cost of living in foreign countries; and, thirdly, the larger salaries which are paid to officials in this country are not confined to Military Departments, but extend to every Department of the Government of this country. These three conditions alone make a difference which it is almost impossible to estimate at its full value, and which led General Brackenbury to the conclusion, after the most impartial and careful inquiry, that he could not say that we in England were spending an undue sum on the Army, as compared with France and Germany, and that if we were enabled to achieve certain results—about which I shall have something to say presently — our expenditure in this country would compare not unfavourably even with that of France and Germany. Well, we have given the House of Commons every opportunity of examining our expenditure. I do not deny for a moment that this volume of Army Estimates is a very formidable document for any Member of the House of Commons or anybody in the country to take up. It has been examined, let me remind the Committee, very carefully by a Committee presided over by my noble Friend the Member for South Paddington (Lord R. Churchill), which sat for two years. That Committee examined every Vote. It called whatever witnesses it chose. If I may say so without offence to the Chairman, it took whatever course he thought desirable to elucidate what he thought it necessary to elucidate. There were representatives of the War Office on the Committee, but they had very little voice either as to the witnesses to be called or as to the manner in which they were examined. The result of the examination by that Committee was a Report, or a series of Reports, recommending certain reductions of expenditure in various directions, and every single one of those points has been taken up and dealt with by us since that Committee sat. In the course of their investigations there were various points brought out, which showed that the amount we were spending upon certain important services was inadequate, and the consequence has been that the inquiry has led to an increase of expenditure. We have since that time presented to the Committee every year a short Table, showing in the very best manner that we possibly can what we get for the expenditure we undertake. It is now printed in the Army Estimates, Appendix 21, but formerly it was circulated as a separate Paper; and there everybody can find, if he chooses, the cost of the separate arms of the Service, the cost of every institution connected with the Service, of every educational establishment, and he will find further what the cost of a soldier is in this country. I think it is worth mentioning that we take here the cost, not only of the private soldier, but of warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers, and include in it his clothing, rations, fuel, transport, equipment, ammunition, barrack accommodation, medical attendance, and all the costs of paymasters and chaplains, the prison staff, schools, and libraries, and the result is that we arrive at a sum which, divided by the number of men in the Army, gives an average charge of £56 per head. I want the Committee to notice that figure, and I want anybody to look into this statement, and tell me if they do not think, looking at the cost of labour generally in this country, we do not get the services of the private soldier, with all these advantages, at a moderate sum. Now, Sir, I turn from that particular question of expenditure, to more general considerations. Of course, like my predecessors, and certainly like my successors, I am very anxious indeed, not only to keep down expenditure, but to strike off every possible item of expenditure that it is possible to save. My hon. Friend the Financial Secretary and myself may claim, during our term of office, to have cut off a large number of items where we felt that we could do so with justice and consistently with the efficiency of the Army. But, unless you come to deal with the great items of expenditure as a whole, I cannot hold out any hope that it is possible to reduce the expenditure to a very large extent. You may examine as you like; the Committee under my noble Friend the Member for South Paddington (Lord R. Churchill) examined it, and the result which it always arrived at was that though there were minor items by which you can reduce the expenditure, you cannot largely cut down the expenditure on the Army unless you reduce the number of men, or reduce the stores, or cut down the Non-Effective Vote. It is quite clear, much as any of us desire to keep down the Non-Effective Vote, it is very difficult to do so; and much as I have tried to do it, under considerable obloquy, it is the fact that, having regard to the conditions of the Army, having regard to the promises that were made to the officers and men who have entered the Army, you cannot hope to reduce by one stroke of the pen the Non-Effective Vote. Nobody will suggest that we should reduce the number of men. Can you reduce the stores? Perhaps in a few years time, when we have built up our reserve of stores, and furnished the Army with the new weapons now being supplied, it is possible that the time may come when the Vote for Stores may be considerably reduced. Certainly, at the present time, I do not feel justified in recommending the Committee to think for a moment that that Vote can be reduced. I am bound to say that while sympathising with the desire to reduce expenditure, and while striving to reduce it wherever I possibly can, I am not prepared to hold out to the Committee and the country any reasonable hope that, while we maintain the number of men and try to make them efficient, the expenditure on our Army can be extensively cut down. Now I am coming to some of the increases in expenditure which have taken place during my administration, and I want to dwell on some of the questions which have been raised in the course of the evening and out-of-doors with respect to the Report of Lord Wantage's Committee. I should like, in the first place, to remind the Committee that this Committee was appointed by myself. I saw the necessity for inquiry into the question of drafts, and when I saw the necessity for that inquiry I did not hesitate to ask that Committee to assemble to inquire into that question, and to advise me and the country as to the best means of dealing with the difficulties which had then arisen; and when I see sometimes in the papers the statement that I have any hostile feeling towards Lord Wantage's Committee or its Reports, all I can say is, if it were likely I could have entertained any such feeling, I never should have appointed the Committee at all. I appointed it because there were subjects which required investigation, which in this House and out of it were pressed on me again and again, and therefore I determined to ask a Committee which had my confidence to undertake the investigation. Lord Wantage's Committee devoted itself to the work with the greatest possible industry, and have produced a Report which shows signs of great labour on their part, and a desire to arrive at a proper decision on all the points, and more than all the points, submitted to them. I do not want to discuss the recommendations of that Committee now; it would be premature on my part to do so. The Report lays down principles of great importance, and proposes expenditure of very great magnitude. I have not yet had the opportunity of consulting my military colleagues at the War Office with regard to the Report, and I feel sure that no one in this Committee would think for a moment that I should be justified in speaking generally on the proposals contained in it. Of course, it is obvious that that Report has generated a good deal of difference of opinion, and that difference of opinion is really much more serious than appears at first sight. I stated last year two sides of an important question, its advantages and disadvantages—I mean the question of deferred pay. That question I referred to the Committee as underlying practically a great many other proposals, and I asked the Committee for an opinion with regard to deferred pay. No one will doubt, even after the Report of the Committee, that the question how you are to deal with deferred pay is still enveloped in doubt. The Committee itself made the recommendation, without giving any reasons for it, that deferred pay should be abolished, and a small gratuity substituted for it. But four Members of the Committee dissented totally from that recommendation, and here I am bound to say I am exceedingly sorry that the evidence taken before the Committee is not available for reference to-night, because there is a very remarkable document which was referred to by the minority who dissent. That document gives the opinion of a large number of Reserve men—40,000, I believe—on the question of deferred pay. They were asked what was the result of deferred pay, and was it an advantage to them or not? The vast majority of the men said that deferred pay was an enormous advantage, and that when they left the Service it had enabled them to set themselves up for life in a better manner by far than they would have done if they had not had it. I am not now arguing one way or the other; we are entitled to reserve our opinion till we have thoroughly examined the evidence. The evidence taken before the Committee has thrown much new light on the subject, and we cannot hastily say that it would decidedly be better to get rid of deferred pay. Lord Wantage's Committee did not, give an estimate of expenditure, and I am sorry that they did not do so; nor did they enter at all into the question of the results of the recommendations which they made. That omission was supplied by Sir Arthur Haliburton in his separate Report. I want to say one word with regard to his position. He was nominated by me on the Committee as a man of great experience and thoroughly able to advise us on these questions. But it so happened that he had never given any special attention to recruiting; and he joined the Committee as a thoroughly impartial man who had an opinion to form on the subject, and when it came before the Committee he dealt with it according to the evidence and according to the facts given in previous Reports. Certainly, he did not deal with them according to any preconceived notion, or according to any wish expressed on my part. If I had expressed any wish concerning the matter, it might have been that he should not criticise my conduct, but he has taken what I believe to be the perfectly legitimate course of doing so. He dissented, I understand, from the Report of the Committee because he thought the principles laid down in the early part of the Report were departed from in their recommendations. There were two classes of recommendations: the first related to the terms of service, and there he expressed a doubt whether, practically, the extension of the terms of service recommended in the Report would not be inconsistent with the maintenance of the efficiency of the Reserve. The second class of recommendations dealt with the pay and allowance of the soldiers, and there he raised the most natural objection, that it would, in his opinion, fail to accomplish the object we had in view, and even if it were likely or probable that it would succeed, the same result might have been obtained without the great expenditure recommended by the Committee. I think I may sum up Sir Arthur Halliburton's objections to the Report by saying that he took the line that any intelligent and able man was entitled to take when appointed to take part in deliberations of such importance. For my part, I approach the consideration of what the Committee has said with the utmost impartiality; I have no prejudice one way or the other. I have read and studied the evidence solely with the view to arrive at the best conclusion—the conclusion most calculated to advance the interests of the Army. But it must be looked at generally from the point of view, which has lately been so much canvassed, as to the general effect of the existing system upon the Army at home and abroad, and whether, at the present time, we are getting an efficient Army at home, and by the same system are getting an efficient Army in India. What are the facts? I will endeavour to simply state what exists in this country and in India, and then inquire whether the facts warrant a satisfactory conclusion or not. I take the results of the system as they are to be found in the Returns made to us up to the 1st February last. It is an unfavourable time in this respect, that large drafts have been recently sent abroad, but I take it as being the latest Return. We have got in India and the Colonies a force of 103,000 men, and these are all men who have undergone good training, are of good physique, and of an age fit for the climate they have to encounter. Is there a man in this country—there certainly is not in India or the Colonies—who will say that the Army which now exists in India and the Colonies is not thoroughly efficient? It is more efficient for the purpose for which it exists than it has ever been before. Therefore, so far as that Army is concerned, I think we may say that the present system has produced results which nobody can gainsay. Then we have at home an Army of 106,000 men, of whom 28,000 are under one year's service; deducting those we have 78,000 men of over one year's service, in addition to the Reserve, which we all know is close upon 70,000, and will next year be close upon 80,000; in addition, also, we have the Militia Reserve. What does that mean? It means this: that if we had to call out an army to be sent abroad of anything like the dimensions ordinarily contemplated, we could do it with men of full age and training. Look at the figures for a moment. I do not want to deal with Army Corps, for that is an unpopular term in this country; I think it is better to deal with numbers of men rather than with such terms. Suppose we had to send abroad 80,000 men—which is equivalent to two Army Corps—and that we had only to take the men now of sufficient age and training for that purpose, and so fill up the whole of the remainder of the battalions from the Army Reserve, we could perfectly well do it and have still remaining the number of men which I will describe to the Committee. We could fill up all battalions and regiments to their full strength for Army purposes with men of full training and still have remaining in the First Class Army Reserve 31,000 men, and 31,000 men in the Militia Reserve. I do not wish to pretend that every one of the men would be available. When you put men into the Reserve for a number of years you may make a fair deduction for men who, for various reasons, would not be physically suitable or serviceable for a campaign. But it will be satisfactory to the country to learn that we can actually put into the field 80,000 men, and still have remaining 31,000 men in the First Class Army Reserve and 31,000 men in the Militia Reserve, or even if we deduct 15 per cent. for the men who might probably be inefficient, we would still have 47,000 men in these two Reserves, and behind that we should have the men who are rejected at the present time from regiments going abroad as not being in full training nor of one year's service, but who would be available in a few months to reinforce any army we might have in the field. The reason I quote these figures is because I want to show that when people say we have no Army, when they say that our Army at home is entirely composed of boys, the real facts are very different, for the result of our system has been to build up the Reserve, and to give a large number of men of full age and training available to take the field whenever called upon. I can also venture to say this. The force which I have described is a very large force, but I am perfectly certain, and say without the slightest risk of contradiction, that it is the largest force this country has ever had of men fully able to take the field since the time of the Peninsular War. Whatever may be said of our system, it has produced a large number of men available to take the field whenever they may be required; and, in addition to the numbers I have given, there remain behind for the defence of this country the large force generally known as the Auxiliary Forces—the Militia, and 220,000 Volunteers. Now, Sir, the second ground for the charge of inefficiency made against our Army is, that it does not contain sufficient men of long service. I agree that it is most desirable and necessary that—although you should be able to supplement your battalions at home from the ranks of the Reserve—there should be in the ranks of our Army a fair proportion of men of long service. Does anybody realise the enormous importance of the figures contained here, which have been quite recently obtained, in regard to the actual condition of our battalions. There are, no doubt, one or two battalions about which I will say at once that if the figures are true they have not sufficient men of long service; but anybody who looks at the figures will see at once that there are only one or two. I was enormously struck when I studied the figures and saw the high average of long service men in all the battalions of our Home Army. May I ask the Committee to look at page 44, where they will find all the figures, and the result may shortly be put thus: that the average number of men in battalions on the Home Establishment who have served in the Army six years and upwards is 231 out of 793. I suppose there is no man who would not be satisfied with six years' men, and surely they would have a sufficient experience of the Service. I ask the Committee if they think that is a fair proportion? When hon. Members speak of the number of boys, I say there is a fair proportion of men who have served a considerable time in the Army. The third cause of inefficiency is the difficulty of obtaining recruits. I am very sorry that hon. Members have not had an opportunity of studying the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, but that is not my fault. It lies with the Stationary Office. The Report for the past year contains much information that is satisfactory, for notwithstanding the fact that it tells us that the waste of the Army has been greater than during the previous year, the result has been an increase of recruits over waste of 1,000 men. The Inspector tells us that recruiting was brisk, and it must have been brisk to have brought in during the year no fewer than 36,000 recruits. The real difficulty we had to meet was not so much in obtaining the requisite number of men for recruiting the Home Army, as in obtaining the requisite number of men for supplying the drafts for India and the Colonies, and that was the sole reason which led to the appointment of the Committee over which Lord Wantage presided. From the Report of that Committee we have obtained one or two facts connected with recruiting which appeal to be conclusively proved. In the first place, a good many of the causes which led to difficulty about drafts were temporary. The majority of the Committee and Sir A. Haliburton are agreed on that point, and Sir A. Haliburton is particular in explaining the causes that led to the temporary difficulty. In 1882 recruiting was stopped for certain battalions of the Army which had been filled up by Reserve men, and every step was taken to prevent a larger number of men being recruited than was then deemed to be necessary. But when in 1883 these Reserve men went back to the Reserve and left the Colours, this led to a demand for an exceptional number of men who required to be recruited. In 1883–4 a large number of men were allowed to extend their service in India because of the difficulties of drafts which occurred at that moment; and again in 1885–6 the establishment of every battalion in India was increased by 100 men, which led to a larger demand for recruits in this country. The full effect of those measures is now being felt, and we shall continue to feel the effect of these exceptional measures at all events until next year. The result is we have exceptional difficulty in providing for the drafts which have to be sent to India, and I accept some blame myself and for those who are connected with me at the War Office that we did not fully foresee two or three years ago the difficulties in which we should be placed, because we might have taken a different course of action from that which we are compelled to take on the spur of the moment. Of course also the Committee pointed out some permanent causes for the difficulty. They point out the disproportion between the battalions abroad and at home, and they point out the youth of the soldiers. With regard to the first, I fully admit that if the system established in 1872 were to be fully carried out we should have more battalions at home than we have; but if I have sinned in this respect I have sinned in company with my Predecessors. We have gone on the principle, not of increasing the number of battalions, but of increasing the number of men in each battalion. Lord Cardwell thought the system might be worked with a battalion of 520 men; but we have always thought that the number of men in a battalion should be 720, nor is it easy to see how the difficulty with regard to the drafts for India and the Colonies was to be got over by adding to the Army a number of battalions solely composed of young soldiers and recruits. The Committee also commented upon the youth of our troops, but, I ask, are our recruits younger now than they have been for many years past? There was a great deal of evidence to the contrary, and I could quote the evidence of many men of experience to prove that the recruits are not younger now than they were in past years. I think the most satisfactory feature in the Report of Lord Wantage's Committee is that after all they approve the principle of the main lines of the policy upon which our Army is at present being recruited. On the question of long and short service the Committee say it is not open to argument. They express the opinion that under the existing requirements of modern warfare short service would enable us to provide for the rapid expansion of our battalions, and further reinforcement of our troops in the field. Then also the testimony in favour of the territorial system is overwhelming, and it has been shown that the double battalion system is not only the most economical, but that it is the best machinery for providing drafts. Therefore I may say that, whatever mistakes have been committed, there is no ground whatever for going back from the principles adopted in 1872, but that Parliament and the Government should be urged to carry out those principles in every respect. The result of the Report of the Committee, therefore, has been to give a most complete and authoritative approval of the whole principle upon which our Army system is based. But of course, if you accept the principles so laid down, you must be prepared to accept the consequences which flow from those principles. Parliament has accepted the principle of short service, and you must also accept the principle that when you want to put an efficient Army into the field you must fill up your battalions with men taken from the Reserves. Therefore, I think that the famous paragraph in the Report of Lord Wantage's Committee, which contains the opinions of various general officers and of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, is at once unfair and misleading. That paragraph states that these general officers consider the condition of the Home battalions is inefficient. But two at least of these officers were speaking not of the whole Army, but of some special battalions which they thought ought to be made ready in case of small wars; and all of them would repudiate the idea that you ought to rely upon putting an Army into the field without calling upon the Reserve. Under the system established in 1872 by Lord Cardwell, the principle was laid down that the battalions of 520 men were to be filled up in case of need by drafts of men from the Reserve. I do not think I can quote on this point a stronger opinion than that of the Duke of Cambridge, who was examined before Lord Airey's Committee in 1880, when the new system had been in operation some years. The Chairman asked him (Question 3,400):—

"But having recourse to the Home battalion to feed the battalion abroad, does that not denude the Home battalion of all men effective for the field?"

The answer is—

"Yes; and therefore the Home battalion must look to the Reserve. I look upon it that the Home battalion must for service be chiefly composed of the Reserve, and in this way only can it be made efficient for any duties that it may be required for, and, therefore, the Home Army is the Reserve; but made up in this way it is the finest part of the Service that you can have. The Reserve last year (1879) when it came out made those battalions as efficient as you could wish."

With that statement, which is a very strong one, I may leave the case as regards that paragraph to the Committee. Accepting this condition, which is as true for us as it is for all foreign countries, that you must rely on your Reserve to fill up your battalions for active service, it does not follow that our existing terms of service are altogether perfect. We may not have hit the exact proportion of time that a man should serve with the Colours and with the Reserve. It may not be the right time for all branches of the Service, if for some one branch in particular. On these points proposals have been made by the Committee which deserve the careful consideration of the War Office. I am bound to say, however, that some of these proposals struck me at once as proposals which would have the effect of cutting into the Reserve in such a way as to make it absolutely useless for the purposes for which it has been designed; but I may say generally that, while perfectly prepared to consider the proposals of the Committee, I am not prepared, as responsible Minister in this matter, unduly to deplete the Reserves. I am not prepared largely to introduce any system of pensions that we have got rid of so largely by short service, and I am not prepared to keep the men at the Colours so long that when you send them out from your Service they are so old that it is absolutely impossible for them to obtain employment in civil life. Bearing these considerations in mind I shall approach all these proposals with an open mind, but I can hold out no hope that some of these proposals can possibly be accepted. The hon. Member for Preston has been pressing upon the House the question of long service for India, and he bases his position on the ground that we move our Army about a great deal too much. I am sure he will find on looking into the matter that this moving about is absolutely essential in our Volunteer Army. If the service were compulsory we could compel men to serve where we liked. But if it is to be a voluntary Army you must hum our the prejudices and feelings of the men. We cannot always put particular battalions in comfortable and healthy places and others in uncomfortable and unhealthy places; and you will find that if you are to get recruits for the Army you must have some regard for the feelings of the men and the officers, and you must give all a fair turn of the pleasures as well as of the disadvantages of military service. My hon. Friend wants us to establish long service for the Army in India. I do not want to go into that question now; but I should like to say that the reason why long service was given up for the Army in India was because you found you could not get men. So far from there being any evidence now that you could get men for long service, the evidence is in the contrary direction. It is shown conclusively that men are disposed to enlist for short terms, and then if they like the Service, if it is popular and they are well treated, they will re-enlist for a further period. If you are going to try to enlist men for long terms of service, depend upon it you will get back to the condition of things which prevailed when General Peel, standing at this Table, said that long service had broken down.

That was for Home service.

Oh, no, no, no; forgive me. It is long service altogether. If I were to go further into the question, I should like to point out that no one disputes that if you were to establish a long service Army for India it would be very much more costly. If you enlist men for twelve years and more, the cost would undoubtedly be enormously greater than it is now. You are also brought face to face with the question of efficiency, and yet the Army was never more efficient than it is now. Was it so with a long service Army? Can it ever be so with long service in India? Everyone knows perfectly well that it cannot, and I have here figures which prove that a long service Army in India tends naturally to deteriorate after seven or eight years' service. If you are going to try to maintain a long service Army in India, you would have an Army less efficient than the one you now possess.

Is that the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief in India?

The hon. Member has quoted the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and he is of opinion that you might have a longer service in India. But that is not the opinion of most people in this country, nor do I think there is any substantial ground for that opinion. I should like to give some statistics of mortality in short and long service, between the years 1868 and 1872, and between 1886 and 1890, two terms when the two systems of long and short service were in operation. During the first period the number of men per 1,000 who died was 25, and who were invalided 44 annually. In the last four years the deaths had fallen to 15½ and the number invalided to something like 23½ men annually. Thus it is conclusively proved that under short service mortality and invaliding are much less than under long service. There are one or two other matters with which I wish to trouble the Committee. It is said that the defence of outlying stations need not be undertaken by the Army, nut might be handed over to the Marines. This matter has been carefully considered by the First Lord of the Admiralty and myself, and it was approached on my part with a desire to accomplish the object. It could not be done with regard to all our foreign ports, but it might be done with a good many outlying ports which are defended by the Army. But the cost of the Marines under long service would be much greater than the cost of the men now in the garrisons. And, in addition, if you are going to garrison these places with Marines, you must establish a Reserve Force of Marines in this country, and the result would be that we should find it impossible to carry out the plan without a considerable increase of expense. Although I, for my part, speaking from a military point of view, would like to see the plan tried on a large scale; we should not be justified, with the figures before us, in recommending it to the attention of the country at the present time. At the same time the experiment will be tried on a small scale in some outlying possession such as the Falkland Isles, and we shall be able to see whether a system can be devised by which such dependencies can be defended by the Admiralty at less cost than by the Army. If the experiment be successful, I shall be exceedingly glad to hand over to the Navy the responsibility for the defence of some other stations. Before I sit down, I wish to put before the Committee one or two considerations as regards our Home expenditure and what we do with it. During our term of Office, speaking generally, the Army Estimates have been increased by about £500.000 a year, and in addition to this we have obtained the sanction of Parliament to the employment of borrowed money for certain urgent and very important works. It may be well, therefore, that I should state some facts with regard to what we have got and what we are getting for this very large sum in order that the Committee may be able to judge to what use the money is being put. The increase has been accounted for partly by the larger number of men in the Army, by the increased grants to the Volunteer Force, and also by additions to our warlike weapons and stores. Almost every other item of expenditure having been carefully overhauled shows some decrease. This result, and also the fact that during this period we have practically had no Supplementary Estimates, testifies to the great care with which these funds have been administered by the War Office. It will be remembered that one of the reforms introduced in 1888 on the recommendation of Sir Matthew Ridley's Commission was that the control of the Financial Secretary should be extended to every branch of military expenditure. In administering these large funds, and in considering all improvements in organisation or in equipment, we have had in view the main object of trying to weld into one practical and effective military organisation all the miscellaneous Land Forces at our disposal. It is a task which had never before been really grappled with, as I can show in a very few sentences. Only partial steps had been taken to allot the troops to any definite duties in the event of hostilities, or to complete the manifold preparations necessary for them to take the field at short notice, and properly equipped. The stores were collected together in a confused mass at Woolwich, no system was laid down for their issue, nor were any complete tables in existence showing the proper war equipments of the various units. As for our fortresses, no definite garrisons had been assigned to them, either at home or abroad. When we came into Office no breech-loading guns had been mounted in any of our coaling stations, although, to the honour of the Party opposite, their defence had been undertaken. And, with the exception of two, no breech-loading gun had been effectively mounted in any of our ports at home or abroad. Very little progress had been made with the submarine mining defence. The Horse and Field Artillery were, with the exception of five batteries, armed with inferior guns. Other countries were manufacturing magazine rifles for their troops; we had not adopted one. No systematic arrangement had been made concerning the troops to be sent abroad in case of a foreign expedition. The equipment for an expeditionary force was not laid down on paper, much less had it been stored in places where it could be readily embarked. As regards home defence, little or nothing had been done to define the part to be played by the Militia or by the Volunteers to enable them to take the field. No steps had been taken towards obtaining the horses required on mobilisation, nor had the necessary staff been worked out and selected. No actual plan existed as to the defence of London, nor were positions where the troops should assemble or concentrate been selected. Our Army was, in fact, a series of disconnected units, our stores accumulated at Woolwich without reference to war under Service conditions, and we had, in fact, no plans ready even for a defensive campaign. And now what has been done? The forces with which we had to deal were, shortly, these: Since 1886 the Establishment of the Army, including the Colonial Corps, has been increased by 2,000 men, mainly in consequence of the necessary provision of garrisons for our foreign ports, and on the 1st of January last the effectives of the Regular Army on the British Establishment stood at a total of 138,718 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. Our Reserve, upon which, like all foreign nations, we depend for strengthening in time of war the peace cadres of our battalions, is expected in April next to reach nearly 80,000 men, and that is a far larger number than it has ever attained, and showing an increase since 1886 of 24,000 men; or, to go a little further back, I may say our military strength of Regulars and Reserve, available for service at home and abroad, shows an increase in the last 10 years by no less than 66,000 men. Of the quality of these troops I speak in dealing with recruiting; but these figures, beyond all question, represent an enormous increase in our national strength. The whole of this force has been re-armed with modern weapons. Sixty-nine batteries of Horse and Field Artillery have been armed with the new 12-pounder gun.

Are there 69?

I am not quite certain, but I think so. All the rifles and carbines in the hands of our Regular troops and in the hands of our Auxiliary troops have been inspected and put in order, and we are gradually replacing them with the new magazine arm. The defective swords and bayonets have been replaced by very perfect weapons of English manufacture. The practical training of these troops, though still insufficient, has been enormously advanced. In 1890, for the first time for many years, two field columns carried out a series of exercises near Wooler, and for the first time in this country Cavalry manœuvres were instituted. Last year Infantry manœuvres, unfortunately altogether ruined by the weather, were held in the neighbourhood of Peters field, and also Cavalry exercises at Alder shot under the Inspector General. In both years extended exercises were carried out in connection with the mobilisation of the defences of certain ports. In the Militia we have a force of over 105,000 officers and men. The Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting shows the physique of the recruits to be very satisfactory; but, on the other hand, in spite of the slight increase this year in its numbers, there is reason to fear that the popularity of the Militia Service has somewhat declined. The system of reducing establishments wherever we found they could not be kept up, and of increasing them where men could be obtained, has been continued with satisfactory results. The recommendations of the Committee which inquired into the Militia two years ago have been mainly carried out at very considerable cost. And I am also trying to train some of the Infantry by brigades, of which three will be formed at Alder shot this year. Further steps are being taken to train the Militia Artillery at the places which they would occupy on mobilisation, and to accustom them to the guns they would have to serve. The greater portion of the Militia are told off to the work of the various garrisons on mobilisation, and it is therefore unnecessary to provide them with an expensive system of transport. But for this force the necessary provision of additional clothing is being made. We have made provision for the necessary increase of clothing in the event of the Militia being called out. The Volunteers on the 1st November last numbered over 222,000, showing a satisfactory increase, especially in efficients qualified for the higher grant of proficiency in shooting, a result which seems to afford the most conclusive vindication of the policy adopted by me in 1887 of requiring greater efficiency with the rifle in return for the increased grant. All these men have now received the equipment deemed necessary to enable it to take the field. A large proportion of the Infantry has been organised in brigades. During 1891, 19 of these brigades attended at camps, and 5 took part in the Easter Manœuvres. There are now 9 brigade bearer companies and 26 supply detachments. The reports upon these brigades are almost unanimous in testifying to the satisfactory progress that has been made—testifying from year to year increased advances. The Artillery Volunteers have been divided into two portions. That part which has been assigned to garrison duties continues to qualify for the defence of the works they would have to man in time of war. I am glad to say that during the past year no less than 1,600 of them have for this year earned the special grant given on this account. Of the remainder, 88 batteries of position have been formed with 354 guns. These batteries have earned most favourable reports during the year, and are rapidly advancing in efficiency. And I hope the House will always be disposed to extend encouragement to this force. And, lastly, financial assistance has been afforded to a company of Volunteer Engineers in London to enable it to join the Field Army to which it has been allotted on mobilisation. The objection is often raised that, without a complete system of transport, this force of Volunteers could not immediately take the field. Well, after the fullest consideration, we have arrived at what. I think, is the common-sense conclusion, not to spend money in organising transport in the localities where the corps themselves are raised. To block the railways at the outset of a general mobilisation with horses and carts would seem to be wholly unnecessary, when we find that we are able without difficulty to obtain the necessary transport close to the probable points of concentration. The general result is that, during these five years, our Volunteer Army has been converted into an organised and well-equipped force, and we think there is no doubt they can be assembled at comparatively short notice at the points likely to be threatened, and in an effective condition to defend the country. And now, Sir, how are the forces I have described utilised for the defence of the Empire? The first step, and one of very great importance, was to organise the defences of our ports and coaling stations at home and abroad, without which our Naval Force could not be free to take the offensive. Submarine mining defences have been provided throughout the Empire at all our ports and coaling stations, which would afford at short notice an effective defence at all our principal ports. The men necessary to work them, with the exception of a few native auxiliaries, are already raised and trained; and the mines are protected by the necessary quick-firing guns. The necessary defence of the coaling stations is practically complete, and even for Esquimalt, where the Colonial Government has, I am sorry to say, not yet seen its way to undertaking the necessary works, the guns have been got ready. The defences of Portsmouth, Plymouth, the Thames, the Cape, Malta, Gibraltar, and other less important stations have been enormously strengthened, and almost all the necessary breech-loading guns are actually mounted and in position. The garrisons of all these ports are told off, and the schemes of defence providing for the special duties of every unit of the garrison have been in many cases laid down in minute detail, including the method to be adopted for food supply and for dealing with the civil population. It will, I daresay, surprise the Committee to know that we have to provide garrisons for 37 ports, at home and abroad, absorbing no less than 182,000 men. For the Home ports we depend, of course, very largely upon Auxiliary Forces, with the special difficulty, as regards Artillery, that whereas the requirements of defence necessitate the assembling of a large force in the South of England, the great strength of this branch of the Service in peace time lies in the North. For Colonial ports we do our best to supplement the necessary minimum of European troops by native auxiliaries. The task, therefore, of providing for the improved land defences of our ports, which has been in itself a gigantic one, has been successfully accomplished during our term of office; and it has required—in addition to the loan obtained under the Imperial Defence Act—an expenditure out of Annual Estimates not far short of £1,000,000 sterling. In addition to the troops detailed for garrisons, the whole of our Regular and Auxiliary Forces at home, with very few exceptions, have been told off to definite duties for Home defence, and the troops to form a foreign expedition have been selected, with the necessary departmental services. The precise equipments for Home defence and for a foreign expedition, so far as is possible, while its scene is undetermined, have been laid down in detail for every unit in the Service. The plans of mobilisation for all the Land Forces at home have been determined on, as well as the positions to be taken up after mobilisation. The ground for these positions has been examined and detailed plans laid down, including the water supply. This has specially been the case for the defence of London. Sites have been obtained for the necessary works, and working plans and drawings, with other details for everything that would have to be done on an emergency, have been prepared. The Staff, whether for a foreign expedition or for Home defence, has been worked out and selected, and detailed regulations as to all that has to be done on mobilisation have been most carefully drawn up. These regulations have been based on the principle of decentralisation; and wherever it has been possible the central authority has been relieved of responsibility at time of pressure. The decentralisation of stores from Woolwich and the placing them in situations where they could be rapidly issued on mobilisation has been actively undertaken and carried far forward. Arrangements have been made to build fresh storehouses or re-model existing buildings for this purpose in 62 different centres, amounting in all to 177 different buildings to be completed. Of these, 110 are finished, and 38 approaching completion, and these include almost all the larger centres, with the result that, broadly speaking, accommodation for over two-thirds of the total stores required for Home defence is now provided at the different stations, and actually in the most convenient positions for the purpose. The stores for the whole Alder shot Division which might be required for a foreign expedition has been placed between Alder shot and Southampton, and could be issued and embarked at once. The registration of horses continues to be most successful. A complete working department for this registration has been formed, and the number at present registered could be easily increased at any time. We have on the register 14,000 horses, of which 3,300 are riding horses and ready for immediate service if required, all of which would make excellent troopers; and it should be remembered that of the horses required to complete the requirements of Cavalry on mobilisation, nearly one-half are draught horses; and the Committee will see that we have made, at any rate, a very good provision for an emergency. And as regards our draught horses, we have arranged with the great railway companies, who have most cordially co-operated with us, to supply us with the neck harness, collars, and bridles of their draught horses. In this matter the greatest difficulty of all in the case of rapid mobilisation has been got rid of. But this sketch of the changes which we have brought about in our defensive strength would be obviously incomplete if I failed to mention the great changes introduced into more than one branch of the Service. The re-organisation of the Supply and Transport Services into the Army Service Corps is complete. The whole administration of these Services has been placed on a purely military basis, and absolute responsibility for the efficiency of these important Services now rests with the Military Authorities. The chief aim of the new scheme is to instruct military officers themselves, in times of peace, in the economical administration of their funds, and to accustom them to the duties which they would have to perform in war; and there can be no doubt that the formation of the new Army Service Corps has tended to efficiency and economy. General officers at home and abroad are unanimous in reporting favourably on the work performed by all ranks of the Corps. The re-organisation of the Garrison Artillery, which took effect on the 1st August last, is being rapidly proceeded with. To each fortress or fort a certain number of specialist officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, have been allotted, based on the requirements of the armament, distinct from the companies of Royal Artillery, and not moved with them in the ordinary course of relief. The continuity of special knowledge of the defences of each fort is thus retained, as well as the experience of the natural peculiarities of each station. Of this permanent Staff, all the officers and more than half the other specialists have been already appointed. Various rates of extra pay have been granted to officers of Garrison Artillery, and to specially qualified non-commissioned officers and men composing the permanent Establishment for each place. The higher technical training is also provided for by the establishment of two schools of instruction, one of which is already at work. And though this far-reaching change is too recent for any real estimate of its value to be formed, the best information of its working which reaches me leads me to feel very hopeful as to its effect in producing economy and efficiency of work, in popularising the Garrison Artillery, and in producing a highly-trained body thoroughly fitted to deal with all the complicated details of modern armaments. The strength of the Army Medical Department has been very carefully reconsidered, and considerable reductions have taken place. The assistance of civil practitioners has been called in, and an Army Medical Reserve was formed in 1888, with the view of supplementing the reduced Medical Staff by a body of officers available for service at home in time of emergency. Much time has been devoted to the arrangements necessary in case of mobilization for the Medical Services and the detailed arrangements for the personnel, the medical equipment, and the necessary base hospitals have been almost completed. I may also mention the question of station paymasters, whose establishment will, we believe, tend very largely to economy; because now, in all the different districts of the country, an audit is carried out upon the spot, and at the War Office we have only a test audit. So far as it has gone, the results of this change have been economical, and I think they will also prove satisfactory I must say a word or two on the supply of warlike stores, of which during our period of office we have had to provide an unexampled amount. A large increase in the Navy was decided on, and, in addition to that, a certain number of ships already constructed required new guns We had to arm our land defences, to introduce new weapons for almost all our Land Forces; whilst India and the Colonies also sent in large demands for heavy guns and other descriptions of warlike stores. In a single year we gave orders to the amount of no less than £6,000,000 sterling, and it is certain that our means of production at that time were nothing like adequate to such a demand But it was also clearly brought out to the evidence taken before Lord Morley's Committee that a large number of war-like stores were pushed into the Service during the Egyptian War in a great hurry and without adequate examination, and it therefore became necessary for us not only to extend our area of production, but to take additional means for securing the quality of the stores supplied to the Army and the Navy. Accordingly three most important steps were taken by the Government, which have produced enormous consequences. First of all we called to our assistance to a much larger extent than formerly the private trade of the country, especially in regard to the production of big guns, in which a few years ago the trade was very little employed. So recently as 1880 the amount of the orders for big guns given to the trade was only £8,600. Even in 1886–7 the value of the orders given to the trade was only £116,000. Since then very large orders have been given, and the result is that whereas five or six years ago the number of big guns supplied by the trade could be counted on your fingers, since April, 1889, we have supplied to the Sea Service no fewer than 478 guns of six-inch calibre and upwards, while to the Land Service we have given no fewer than 174 guns of the same description. Besides these we have supplied guns to India and the Colonies, in addition to an enormous number of breech-loading guns of a smaller calibre, and quick-firing guns which might almost be counted by the thousand. The result is that the supply of guns for the Navy has thoroughly overtaken the demand, and we have practically completed all our requirements for the Land Service. We have supplied all these guns with a reserve of ammunition. In addition we have completed for the Home Army and for India no fewer than 300,000 magazine rifles. The completion of these exceptional and very extensive orders has necessarily diminished the amount of work, both in the Government Factories, and in the private trade; but I have every desire, consistently with the proper maintenance of the Ordnance Factories and with obtaining our goods at a reasonable price, to give at least a fair share, and even more than a fair share, of our orders to the trade. Certainly, I am very strongly of opinion that it is not the proper policy of this country to keep our Ordnance Factories employed in ordinary times at nearly their full strength, because it is of the utmost importance that when any emergency arises we should be able to call upon them for enormously increased work at short notice. On the other hand, it seems to me equally necessary, in the interests of the country, to encourage in every way that is possible those private sources of supply upon which the country can also rely in any emergencies that may arise. It was in that spirit that, when the Lee-Metford rifle was introduced, we gave a fair share of the orders to the trade, in spite of the cheaper rate at which it could be produced in the Government Factories; and in respect of excellence of manufacture we have no reason to regret that decision. The second step was based on the recommendation of Lord Morley's Committee to place all the Ordnance Factories under a single head. The result of our experience has been that both efficiency and economy have been largely effected by this change. The various departments are now worked as parts of one great Government Establishment, and the confusion, and even worse, which sometimes resulted from their former isolated condition has been obviated, if not altogether got rid of. To the present Director General of Ordnance Factories we owe many improvements of the greatest possible value and importance at Woolwich, resulting in large economies, to which I shall hope at some time to have an opportunity of referring in detail. Thirdly, we have entirely separated inspection from manufacture, and every article produced by the trade, or by the ordnance Factories, is equally subjected to independent inspection before being passed into the Service. This step was strongly recommended by Lord Morley's Committee as an act of justice to the trade, and there is a general consensus of opinion up to the present time that the result has been very marked in the improvement of the quality of the weapons that are now supplied. The re-armament which has taken place both in the Land and Sea Service has also involved the introduction of a great many novel weapons, including quick-firing guns and the Lee-Metford rifle. The reports which reach me as to the Lee-Metford, both as regards Mark I., which is in the hands of the troops, and Mark II., which is about to be manufactured for Service purposes, are completely satisfactory. On the former aim the Lewes sight, however well-suited for skilled marksmen, did not appear equally suitable for men in the ranks, and for that has been substituted a sight to which the soldier is accustomed on the Martini-Henry rifle. Various other small changes have been introduced which get rid of the minor defects originally complained of. The difficulty which prevents a very large issue of the rifle to the troops is that of obtaining rifle ranges, and it is a difficulty felt in all parts of the country, and the sooner that the transition stage is passed the better it will be both for economy and efficiency. Further experience with the new smokeless powder tends to confirm the favourable opinions formed of it. It has been tested in extreme cold with most satisfactory results, and though the experiments in India made under extreme heat are not absolutely concluded, so far as they have gone they tend to show it has greater elements of stability than any other smokeless powder. It is now being manufactured both for rifles, field, and larger guns, and, as soon as it is finally adopted as the Service powder, its manufacture by the trade will be encouraged. I hope and believe this powder will turn out to be satisfactory. But as every foreign nation has hitherto failed in attaining the much-desired object of a smokeless powder absolutely stable under all probable conditions, I speak with diffidence, and I do not venture to assert with too great confidence that we have been successful. And now I ought to say a word or two to the Committee as to the progress being made in the improvement of our barrack accommodation. In addition to the powers obtained at home and abroad under the Barrack Act and the Imperial Defence Act, we are carrying on a very large number of sanitary services out of the Annual Estimates, and every effort is being made to raise in this most important respect the general standard of our barracks. And I have every reason to be satisfied with the good work being done by the Army Sanitary Commission, which was revived by me two years ago for the special purpose of insuring that in all the new works the reasonable sanitary precautions suggested by modern science are adopted. In carrying out the general scheme of reconstruction, a good deal of delay was caused by the severe cold of last year, but the work is now being pushed on, and at Aldershot in a few months a large part of the old wooden huts will be replaced by brick barracks of the most approved description, in which everything has been done within reasonable limits to add to the comfort of the soldier. Barracks for five Infantry battalions, three batteries of Field Artillery, the Royal Engineers, and the Army Service Corps are in hand, besides other garrison accessories. Barracks for three more battalions and 870 married soldiers' quarters will shortly be commenced. Plans are also in preparation for additions to the permanent barracks, and for the conversion of the prison at Woking into barracks for two battalions. At most of the other places in England where works are contemplated good progress has been made, especially in London. The improvements at the Albany Barracks are advancing rapidly, and promise to provide good quarters for men and horses, but to make a good job of it it has been found necessary to spend a good deal more money than was originally pro-posed. The quarters proposed for a proportion of the officers of every Guards' battalion are now almost completed. Progress in Ireland has been somewhat delayed by questions arising out of the distribution of the troops. The new Marlborough Barracks, however, are finished and in occupation. The Royal Barracks, so re-constructed as to be practically new barracks, are rapidly approaching completion, and will be occupied in a few months time. The Wellington Barracks, also, are making good progress. At the foreign stations, such as Malta, Gibraltar, and Bermuda, good progress has been made, especially in respect of important sanitary services. To sum up, then, the results of our expenditure, it has no doubt had the effect of generally raising the standard of barrack accommodation throughout the country which was urgently required in the interests both of officers and men, and in no case are we doing more good than in the provision of better quarters for married non-commissioned officers and men. This was one of the most important, objects of my scheme, and it has not only given a great deal more comfort to those men, but it will also have the effect of diminishing the amount now paid for rent and lodging money to the extent of £10,000 a year. In this, and in many other respects the great work now being carried out in our barracks affords special opportunities of adding to the general attractiveness of the Service. I have just one other word to say with regard to the other proposals for adding to the advantages of the Service. I do not want to dwell upon them at length. I touched upon them in great detail last year. I pointed out how the barracks which we were constructing were providing all sorts of greater comforts, such as boxes and other things, which are of great advantage to the men's comfort. I pointed out that we are giving the private soldiers of the country new recreation rooms, canteens, and cooking houses, all of which tend to add to their comfort. And there was one subject in particular which I said had engaged my serious attention, and which I thought, more than any other that had been brought before me required my attention and that of the War Office—I allude to sea kits. I gave that my attention and entered into negotiations on the subject; and I am glad to say, with the full consent of the Indian Government, the stoppages for sea kits are now abolished. The result is, that we have accomplished a reform which certainly caused a great deal of grumbling, based upon reasonable grounds. There is one other subject I should have liked to have dealt with. A Committee sat two years ago to deal with the question of the issue of clothing to the Army. The Committee made a very valuable Report, and I am perfectly prepared to make proposals to the House dealing with the question of the issue of clothing. But it seemed right, as the Wantage Committee had also thought it necessary to enter into that question, to reserve the proposals I had to make on that subject until I received their Report. There is no reason now why I should not be able to put those forward, and I hope before long to be able to tell the House and the country the proposals I have to make, and put the issue of clothing on a satisfactory basis. There are a great many other questions affecting the comfort of soldiers, and I do not want it to be supposed for a moment that any proposal, whether coming from a Committee or from any other quarter, which would add to the comfort of the soldier, is one which I will not endeavour to deal with satisfactorily. I have now to thank the House for the kind attention given to me. A great number of subjects have been recently brought forward connected with the Army. I thought it right to deal, at any rate, with a good many of them. I have not dared to trespass longer upon the attention of the Committee than was necessary, and may I hope they will see in what I have put before them that, at any rate during the past few years, we have endeavoured to add to the efficiency of the Army, and to deal with questions affecting the comfort of the private soldier. I am perfectly conscious that we may not have done all that people may have expected in every direction; but at least, after hearing what I have said, the Committee will be disposed to say we have not been altogether inactive, but have tried to promote the advantage of the Army in all respects.

There is no one who has heard the statement which has just been made by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War who will not judge his administration of the War Office as a great administration. And it is simply because I admire the general conduct of that Department by the present Secretary of State as having greatly strengthened the country that I the more regret that on some of the points dealt with by Lord Wantage's Committee, of which I happened to be a member, I am obliged very seriously to differ from the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman divided the recommendations of that Committee into portions which, however, I will classify differently from the right hon. Gentleman. There were, first of all, the proposals for administrative reform. And, with regard to these proposals, which I think were extremely important, I would remind the House and the right hon. Gentleman that the Committee were absolutely unanimous, and on what I may call the administrative proposals there was absolutely no divergence of opinion on the part of Sir Arthur Haliburton from the rest of his colleagues. And nobody who reads the evidence put before that Committee will fail to wonder why, when these administrative reforms are so obvious, they have not been carried out by the War Office without the appointment of any Committee. I allude to the extraordinary fact that all the War Secretaries of the last 20 years, with the War Office under them, have deliberately endeavoured to work Lord Cardwell's short service scheme, leaving out the most essential feature of that scheme; they have been trying to act not only the play of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet left out, but also with the part of Ophelia left out. That scheme had for its very foundation stone that there should be an equality of battalions at home and abroad, and I have no hesitation in saying that the short service system cannot be worked, and that the machine will come to grief unless these battalions are in some way or other equalised. It is absolutely imperative, in the interests of this country, for the very existence of the short service system, that additional battalions should be located at home, or that the brigade of Guards should be used to take its part in future service in the Mediterranean. And I think a very grave responsibility will be on the heads of the chief officers of the Army when there is ready at the hand of the Secretary of State for War the means of producing these reforms for a very small expenditure indeed, if from any reason of custom or prejudice they refuse to allow the brigade of Guards to take its turn in the Mediterranean. The second class of recommendations are the class which have produced the difference of opinion between Sir Arthur Haliburton and his colleagues, and those recommendations produced the strongest comments not only by the Secretary of State for War, but by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Stirling Burghs (Mr. Campbell -Bannerman). We propose certain modifications in the terms of service. We do not propose to lengthen the terms of enlistment. What was at the bottom of our proposals was to make the Service as easy for the private soldier as possible, and to make the terms of his enlistment as elastic as possible. The strongest remarks have been made in reference to our proposals that, under certain conditions, men should be allowed to come back from the Reserve to the Colours. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Stirling Burghs spoke of inducements to come back to the Colours. We proposed no inducements. All we say is that it is not for the interests of the country that men should go about the country wishing to rejoin the Army, and, because they are not allowed to do so, deprive the Service of recruits by decrying it. Would this proposal seriously affect the numbers of the Reserve? Sir Arthur Haliburton says it will, but I am diametrically opposed to his opinion on that subject. I believe the number of men out of work is infinitesimally small. One service this Committee did was to expose altogether the unfounded belief that the workhouses are full of Reserve men, and that the tramps we see about the country are Reserve men. Nineteen-twentieths of the Reserve men have no difficulty in finding employment. But there is a small fraction of men who have gone back to civil life who do not find it suitable; who made good soldiers, and who do not make good civilians. And it is not in the interests of the country that these men should either go about the country decrying the Service, or should come back to the Service by fraudulent re-enlistment as they do now. Sir A. Haliburton thinks he has found reasons for supposing that the number of men who would come back would be very large. I do not think he can have read the question put to the Reserve men before he made that Report. The men were asked, "Have you ever wished to return to the Colours after leaving them?" It would be a sorry Service if there were not a moment in the Reserve man's life when he thought he would like to come back, and Sir A. Haliburton thinks the number who replied in the affirmative would come back to the Colours. What we say is, that if, after adequate trial of the conditions of civil life, the men wish to come back, they should be given a stated opportunity of doing so. But I come to a more important point, the real point in dispute between Sir A. Haliburton and his colleagues, and between the Secretary of State for War and the Committee. We have quoted the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley, Sir Redvers Buller, and Sir Evelyn Wood, that there is not a single battalion at home efficient except the Guards. Those distinguished men knew exactly what they said, and what they meant; they made no reserve, and they knew also that their evidence would be published. Now, Sir, in face of this, the opinion of the four most competent soldiers in this country, what is the use of figures? A battalion is either efficient or non-efficient, and is there any sane man who would send a battalion to war on the strength of figures in the face of such an opinion? Sir A. Haliburton objects to young soldiers. Never has the country had more thoroughly respectable recruits; their behaviour is everything the country could wish; but they are not only too young—for their age they are weaklings, and that is the whole point. The challenge laid down to the majority of the Committee is this: Your Report strikes at the root of short service and the Reserve. The true champions of short service and the Reserve are those Members of the Committee who looked facts in the face and told the truth. The danger is from those who do not believe things are as they really are. What is a Reserve, and what is it to do? The hon. Member for the Stirling Burghs (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) and the Secretary of State very eloquently denounced the theory that regiments at home ought to be ready to take the field without the Reserve. They pointed out that that would entail a vast expense. You would think that the Committee differed from them; there is no sane man who has ever looked at the question who would say that the battalions at home should be able to take the field at war strength without the Reserve. The Committee say, after paragraph 21, in which they quote the opinion of the distinguished officers named—

"It is true that, as pointed out by the officers whose evidence is quoted above, that it was not contemplated, under the organisation adopted in 1872, that battalions at home should be efficient for active service without being completed from the Army Reserve; but the Committee are in complete accord with them in believing that it was never intended that the Infantry at home should be reduced to the condition described above."

What is a Reserve for? I turn to paragraph 98 of the Report, which Sir A. Haliburton does not dissent from, and I will read what the Committee laid down—

"The functions of a Reserve are—(1.) To raise units (regiments, batteries, battalions, &c.) from the peace to war establishment. (2.) To take the place in the ranks of those men who, being recruits or not fully grown, are not yet fitted to take the field. (3.) To replace in the ranks those men who are found to be medically unfit for service in the field. (4.) After fulfilling the above requirements, to retain sufficient men in Reserve in second line to fill up the casualties occurring at the front until such time as the men left behind as recruits or immature have become sufficiently trained or physically developed to take their place in the fighting line."

How far is the present Reserve of 68,000 men fitted for the functions it has to perform? The Secretary of State for War told the Committee that after it had fulfilled all these functions, there were 31,000 men in the First Class Army Reserve to spare. All I have to say is, that that is diametrically opposed to the evidence given before the Committee by the Adjutant General, and the Commander-in-Chief. The whole point of our contention is that under present conditions there would be a practical substitution of the Reserve for the battalions. I need not quote these officers; I will take paragraph 130 of Sir A. Haliburton's own Report. He says—

"The Reserve required to complete the 65 Home battalions, allowing 10 per cent. for in-efficients, amounts, under Table 2, to 32,240, and under Table No. 1 to only 29,445; but if the whole of the men of less than one year's service shown in that Table were sent to the depot, then 45,110 Reserve men would be required, and this, allowing 10 per cent. for in-efficients, exceeds by 2,742 our total First Class Infantry Reserve."

I was dealing with the proposal for putting 80,000 men into the field, not for putting all the Home battalions on a war footing.

I cannot think it is possible to have 31,000 men in the Reserve after sending out 80,000, and yet not to be able to make up the 65 Home battalions by nearly 3,000 men. We say that the function of the Reserve is to complete the battalions for war service; the result of the present state of affairs is that the Reserve has to be substituted for the battalions for war service. Here is a Return prepared to show what proportion of Infantry of the Line at home are available for the purposes of draft. It will be observed that no man is considered to be available for draft until he is considered to be available for a home or foreign war. According to this Return, 48·8 per cent. of the Infantry of the Line are not available for the purposes of draft because of their youth. That is practically, that half the Infantry at home is absolutely useless for the purposes for which it is maintained. It is not only useless for the purpose of going to India or taking part in a Continental war, but it is useless for Home defence; and Sir Evelyn Wood said that he dare not put these men in Service-marching order. What is the use of such men? But the case is even worse than it appears on the face of this Return. Great numbers of these men have been specially enlisted, and many were under 18 years of age at the time. It is a remarkable fact that the statement of the Inspector General of Recruiting, which was sent to the Committee, dealing with the men who had been specially enlisted between 1st September, 1880, and the 31st August, 1890, shows that when these men were re-measured a year afterwards, in June, 1891, 31.6 per cent. were still under the standard. As an example I will quote the 2nd Battalion of the Suffolk Regiment—a battalion of very young soldiers, all of whom were, however, supposed to be over 20 years of age. That battalion went to Egypt, and the number in hospital per 1,000 was 1,406; that is to say, that every man in the regiment went into the hospital one and a half times. The Secretary of State for War and Sir Arthur Haliburton denied that there was any truth in the assertion that recruits enlisted at a younger age than formerly; but I should like to point out that there is a difference between absorbing in the Service in 1869 something like 10,000 boys into a mass of 80,000 men, and absorbing 30,000 boys into a mass of 64,000 men. The deduction seems to be one of common sense; it is not a question of age of any particular recruit; it is the age of the battalion as influenced by the larger number of young recruits. I maintain that the Committee are the supporters of the Reserve, and that Sir Arthur Haliburton is the detractor. If you have to take 50 per cent. of your Infantry and send them to the depôt, you swallow up your Reserve at once. It seems never to have occurred to Sir Arthur Haliburton that every man you keep with the Colours is a Reserve man to the good. I have no time to go into the question of the supplementary Reserve, but I believe, and the Committee believe, that a very slight inducement would be needed to keep men in the prime of life in the supplementary Reserve. I believe it was a very bold step on the part of the Committee to recommend that better terms should be offered to recruits, but I am prepared to defend that recommendation on these grounds: It would bring in older men and really sturdy lads of 18. There is a very considerable difference in the Army point of view between a well-grown, sturdy lad of 18 and a young lad of 18 who joins because he cannot get good wages in civil life. The terms of the Army will not attract the well-grown lad of 18, and we shall have to do the same as the employers of labour, who find that if they want the best men they must raise their terms. Sir A. Haliburton declares that previous raising of terms have produced no better results; but will he be logical, and say that these rises ought not to have been made? What I say is that Secretaries of State have left to the very last moment raising the terms for the recruits, and if those rises had not been made the Army would have ceased to exist. Then there are three Members of the Committee who consider that the increase should not be given on enlistment, but when the man is a trained soldier. That is a question of opinion, and does not carry with it an alteration in the principle. Last year the Secretary of State put down the value of a soldier's wages at 15s. a week, and I ask what kind of pay is that for a matured man and a skilled man? I maintain that a soldier is a skilled man, and I ask is this a wage that a man would accept in any other branch of industry? The answer is in the negative. My last point is this: If you are not going to deal with the pay, how shall you deal with the discontent that exists in the Army? There is not a single witness who does not agree in stating that a soldier is usually deceived when he goes into the Service. Nine men out of every ten imagine they are going to get 1s. a day, and the whole discontent arises from the fact that he only gets 8½d., and he feels that he has been swindled. I say, without hesitation, that, for the honour of the country, and in order that the dealings between the country and her servants may be fair and square, that the soldiers, pay should not be called 1s., while it is actually only 8½d. I should not be sorry to see the effect of that alteration on the recruiting, and I believe we should not get the number of weakly-developed lads we do mow. But whether the pay is raised or not, the present system, which practically deceives the recruit, must be altered and got rid of. I see no way out of it except by raising the pay. You will not get men for 8½d.; but if you pay 1s. you will get these better-developed lads I have spoken of, and this will not diminish, but will materially increase, the military strength of the country. Sir Arthur Haliburton has said that there are other and cheaper ways of doing the same thing, but the Committee could not discover those ways, and Sir A. Haliburton never hinted that he had any other plans. One word on the subject of finance. It is quite true that the Committee did not go into that matter, because they were not asked to do so. If they had been asked to go into the Estimates, I think they could have shown where some very real economies might have been effected. I entirely deny that £1,500,000 would be required to carry out the recommendations of the Committee. I am one of those who believe that enough money is spent on the Army, but I believe that a large sum could be saved out of expenditure which is now incurred and which is not remunerative to the Service of the country.