I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies whether Her Majesty's Government has come to any decision as to the abolition of the Paddy Tax in Ceylon; if so, have instructions been sent to the Government of that Colony to introduce legislation to carry that resolution into effect, and by what taxation is the revenue supplied by the Paddy Tax to be replaced?

The Secretary of State has informed the Governor that in his opinion the time has arrived for abolishing the Paddy Tax, but that he does not suggest any interference under existing circumstances with the Import Duty on Rice, nor the imposition of a general Land Tax. It does not appear to be necessary to do more than make certain comparatively slight additions to existing imports in order to make up for the loss of the Paddy Tax, and the Secretary of State has referred this branch of the question to the Governor and the Legislative Council for a further expression of their views.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that the "Small Book," issued from 1847 to 1864, contains the following:—

"Soldiers who shall have been in uninterrupted possession of G.C. pay for six months immediately preceding discharge .… shall have their names registered at Chelsea, and on attaining 50 years shall receive a pension; the like reward on the same terms is extended to soldiers .… who obtain free discharges after 12 years' service;"

and, if so, whether, to be entitled to a pension after 50 years, a soldier must have 14 years' service?

I have carefully investigated the "Small Book" in question, and find it is distinctly stated that 14 years' service with the good conduct badges were necessary to qualify for the grant of a deferred pension. The sentence alluded to was contained in the "Small Book" issued from 1850 to 1854, not from 1847 to 1864 as stated in the question, and as the qualifying words had not been understood it was then altered. I ought, perhaps, to add that the words "Are in possession of distinguishing marks" should be added to the second blank in the question, as they considerably narrow the application.

I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether the Government has decided to effect a reduction in the length of service qualifying for a pension, so as to benefit many of the men who served in the Crimean and Indian Mutiny Campaigns?

In view of the small number of Crimean and Indian Mutiny soldiers eligible for pensions under the Rule requiring 14 years' service, it has been decided to reduce the qualifying service to 10 years under certain conditions as to good conduct. The Chelsea Commissioners have already taken steps to see that the concession is brought into operation before the close of the financial year.

May I ask the hon. Gentleman, Are the War Office informed of the number of men or the proportionate number of men who will be relieved by this reduction in the required service from 14 to 10 years? Also I would ask whether the War Office will consider the advisability of granting pensions irrespective of length of service in all cases where a man has been permanently disabled in and by the service?

The number of cases which can be relieved by the present arrangement is 100 per annum. It would be impossible to give pensions in all cases of men who served in the Crimean War and in the Indian Mutiny Campaign. In all cases where a man has been injured in the Service he will be eligible for a pension. There were 52,000 men in the Crimea at the close of the war, and by actuarial calculation, if these all had a claim to a pension that would cost more than £1,000,000 sterling, and that is beyond the power of the Government.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will lay upon the Table, before the Navy Estimates are considered, a short Return, from 1866 to 1891 iuclusive, showing separately the number of Petty Officers, Seamen, Marines, Engine Room Artificers, and Stokers, who have declined to re-engage at the expiration of their first period of 10 or 12 years' service; the number who re-entered the Navy within 12 months after taking their discharge; the number who may have joined the First Class Naval Reserve; and the total number who have left the service altogether; and whether the Admiralty will consider if steps can be taken on the first entry of boys in our training ships that the engagement then signed shall include five years' service in the First Class Naval Reserve with a short service pension, with a view to retain these valuable men in a Pensioners' Reserve for service in time of war?

I am afraid I am unable to give exactly the information my hon. and gallant Friend desires. It would take the Department considerable time to get out the details for one particular year; but if my hon. and gallant Friend will refer to a Return which was presented to the House in 1890 (No. 287), he will find he will derive from that a good deal of the information he desires. As regards the second question, the matter was carefully considered, and the Admiralty came to the conclusion that on the whole it was better not to act on the suggestion, as it might seriously interfere with the re-engagement of men and with Coastguard arrangements.

I beg to ask the Lord Advocate whether he is aware that Bye-law No. 6 of the Scotch Fishery Board sanctions beam trawling in certain portions of the Firth of Clyde, which Firth was closed to beam trawling by "The Herring Fisheries (Scotland) Act, 1889"; whether he is aware that the fishermen of Largs and other fishing centres situated on the Firth of Clyde complain of the injury which, as the result of this bye-law, is done to their industry, and to the fish supply of the neighbourhood; whether he is aware that the Town Councils of Greenock and Port Glasgow, and the Police Commissioners of Largs, have combined with the local fishermen in attempting to procure the repeal by the Fishery Board of Bye-law No. 6; and whether he will inquire into the circumstances of the case, with the view of procuring the repeal of the bye-law complained of?

The bye-law referred to relaxes the prohibition of trawling in certain waters in favour only of sailing vessels of not more than eight tons burthen. Complaints were made a few months ago substantially as set forth in the second and third paragraphs of the question, and the Fishery Board were directed to hold a public inquiry, with the result that the facts elicited were not such as to justify the repeal of the bye-law.

I beg to ask the Lord Advocate whether he is aware that the Procurator Fiscal of the Long Island District of Inverness-shire has been removed by the sole proprietor of North Uist from his residence at Lochmaddy, the seat of the Courts of Justice; is unable to get a suitable house to rent; and has been refused ground in feu to build upon; and whether, having regard to the Report of the Napier Commission of 1884, recommending official residences for those engaged in the administration of justice in remote localities, he can see his way to obviate the present hardships of his subordinate?

I have ascertained that the proprietor gave notice to the Procurator Fiscal to remove from the house which he occupied, but that since his removal he has been offered a lease of that house on the same terms as formerly, to endure as long as he holds the office of Fiscal. This offer he has not yet accepted. It is the case that the proprietor has declined to grant him a piece of ground in feu; but the hon. Member will observe that such a grant would not result in the establishment of an official residence. Nor do I read the Report of the Commission in 1884 as recommending such an arrangement in the case of Procurators Fiscal.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether Dr. Clibborn, Inspector of the Local Government Board, recently visited Armagh on official duty in connection with sanitary inspection; whether he is aware that he took the statement of the number and condition of the houses from Dr. Gray, who only gave him a rough estimate; what was the nature of Dr. Clibborn's Report; and how many houses in the city were reported as unfit for human habitation?

It is the case that Dr. Clibborn, one of the Medical Inspectors of the Local Government Board, visited Armagh on the 9th February and reported on the sanitary condition of the town. Dr. Clibborn did not take the statement in the matter from Dr. Gray. He personally visited the houses, Dr. Gray accompanying him. Dr. Clibborn reported that he found a large number of houses without yards, or with insufficient yards, and some without back doors. In other cases ashpits, &c. were in an unsanitary state. Five houses were stated to be unfit for habitation. The Town Commissioners are now having them placed in repair.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland what is the number of persons summoned for the attack on the Catholic bandsmen near Loughgall, County Armagh; if the assailants fired shots on that occasion, and, if so, how many of them were proceeded against for illegal assembly and carrying arms; and how many of the bandsmen have been similarly dealt with?

No summonses were issued in connection with the disturbance near Loughgall, County Armagh. As already stated, it was proposed to prosecute some of the most prominent on each side; but, on the representation of the magistrates that it would conduce more to the peace of the district not to proceed further, the proposed prosecutions were dropped. Shots were fired by both parties; but the police were unable to detect any of the persons so concerned with the exception of a member of the band party, from whom a revolver was taken and against whom proceedings are being instituted by the Excise authorities for his being in possession of it without the necessary licence.

Would it not conduce more to the peace of the district to treat both parties alike?

Is it not a fact that the bandsmen were attacked?

I do not know about that, but I understand that the disturbance arose from the band proceeding through a quarter where their presence provoked opposition.

Do I understand that though shots were fired by the attacking party and yet there is no ground for prosecution?

No summons was issued and no proceedings taken, as I have said, in consequence of representations made by the Magistrates. The hon. Member further asks if shots were fired. I have stated that they were fired, but the police were unable to discover by whom they were fired. The only person they could find out was a bandsman, from whom a revolver was taken.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say that the band was proceeding through any place where they had not a perfect legal right to proceed?

I think if the hon. Member desires further information he had better give notice of his question.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether complaints have reached him with reference to the non-delivery of letters on Sundays in the districts of Gulladuff and Moyogall, County Deny; and whether, as the letter carrier delivers letters in the immediate neighbourhood on Sundays, he will give directions for deliveries in Gulladuff and Moyogall?

No such complaints have been received, nor can any trace be found of an application for a Sunday post to the districts named. Any memorial on the subject from the residents would receive careful consideration.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that Mr. W. Jeffcott, who was appointed a Land Sub-Commissioner in January last, is still acting as land agent to Mr. G. V. Hunt, of Kiderry, County Donegal, and whether it is in accordance with the Rules of the Public Service that he should hold both appointments; and if he can state what are Mr. Jeffcott's qualifications for the position of Land Sub-Commissioner?

The Land Commissioners report that the Assistant Commissioner named in the question, immediately on his appointment, appointed a gentleman to perform the duties of land agent until he could make some arrangement to terminate his connection with the agency, and this arrangement the Commissioners understand is being carried out. Since January, Mr. Jeffcott has devoted the whole of his time to the duties of Assistant Commissioner. This gentleman is well qualified for the position, he has trained practical experience in agriculture, and for many years has been extensively employed by both landlords and tenants in the surveying and valuing of farms.

I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he can state the amount received during the years ending 31st December, 1890 and 1891, respectively, on account of the 1s, per cent stamps on bonds and shares to bearer; and whether he intends to continue this stamp duty, considering the trouble and disadvantage involved in affixing year after year adhesive stamps upon such international securities?

The amount received on account of the 1s. per cent duty on bonds and shares to bearer was, during the year ended 31st December, 1890, £94,608, and during the year ended 31st December, 1891, £72,988. With regard to the second part of the hon. Member's, question, I must ask him to remember that no questions relating to intentions can be answered in the weeks preceding the Budget.

I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he can extend the facilities for public access to the riverside walk at the Tower of London to every day in the week, excepting when the wharf is exclusively required for Public Service?

The Secretary of State is not prepared to extend beyond their present limits the facilities given to the public in regard to the Tower Wharf, which, he understands, do not fall far short of those asked for in the hon. Member's question. The wharf is already open on Saturdays and Sundays, and practically on Mondays, and on all Bank Holidays.

I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, as foreshadowed in his reply to a question on 3rd July, 1890, any arrangement can be made with the French and Turkish Governments for the conversion or repayment of the Turkish Four per Cent. Guaranteed Stock and Drawn Bonds, on which an excessive interest continues to be paid by this country jointly with France?

I am unable at present to state whether any arrangement can or cannot be made with the Governments in question for the repayment of the loan mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. It is a desirable object, but of course it is a matter for negotiation with the Governments concerned.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, in reference to the case of Sergeant Boyd, Royal Irish Constabulary, who admitted in cross-examination at Bangor Petty Sessions, on 20th February, that he got a specimen of the handwriting of an accused woman by getting her to write a "love letter" to one of the policemen in the barrack, whether the Constabulary Authorities have yet investigated the matter, and with what result?

The Constabulary Authorities report that there was no wilful intention on the part of the sergeant to disregard the rule in acting in the manner referred to. The Inspector General has had the sergeant's attention specially directed to the rule for his future guidance.

Will the right hon. Gentleman allow me to ask him whether the District Inspector in charge of the case admitted in Court that he directed the sergeant to endeavour to entrap the woman into affording evidence of her own criminality by telling her a lie, by making a false statement; whether any notice will be taken of the conduct of the District Inspector, for whom the sergeant is being made a scapegoat. I have also to ask the Attorney General for Ireland, as he has directed there shall be no prosecution, and as the woman has suffered illness and expense, will he take steps to have her costs paid?

Perhaps the hon. Member will give me notice of his question. There is no reference in the question to the conduct of the District Inspector.

And will the Attorney General give me a reply?

I have had the Papers before me, but I cannot answer without notice, except to say that I see no occasion for taking the unusual course suggested.

Did the right hon. Gentleman apply for information to the officer in question—the District Inspector—and did he not give the whole facts?

The hon. Member will understand that I obtained information from the source whence I should be most likely to obtain it at the earliest moment. There was no reference in the notice of the question to the conduct of the officer since mentioned. If further information is desired all that is necessary is to give notice of a further question.

I will draw attention to the facts of this extraordinary case when the Government asks for a Vote on Account.

I beg to ask the Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education what is the number of Board and voluntary schools with respect to which the Inspector has certified, under Article 85 (b) of the Code, that the means for teaching drawing cannot be procured?

The Department do not possess any statistics on the point, and precise information could not be readily obtained, as many of the schools to which the Inspectors now give the benefit of the exception may be in a different position another year. But I think my right hon. Friend, when he sees the increase that has taken place in the number of those who learn drawing, will be satisfied that the policy of the Department has been successful in enormously stimulating the teaching of the subject, and that without inflicting any hardship on teachers or schools.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland how many loans have been sanctioned to tenants, under the various Land Purchase Acts, in the several provinces of Ireland up to the 1st March, 1892?

The Land Commissioners report that the total number of loans sanctioned to tenants under the Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1881, the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Acts, 1885 and 1888, and the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891, in the several provinces, up to 29th February, 1892, was 23,781. Of these there were in Ulster, 12,554; Leinster, 3,839; Munster, 4,496; Connaught, 2,892—total, 23,781. This does not include the advances under the Act of 1870, which were made by the Board of Works.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he has received any communication from the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland relative to the vacancy on the National Board of Education caused by the death of the Rev. Dr. Hanna, one of the Presbyterian members of that body, and if any appointment has yet been made?

Several applications and recommendations have been received on the subject of filling the vacancy on the Board of National Education. The usual form of representation from the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland does not appear yet to have reached the Lord Lieutenant.

Has a communication been received from the Governing Committee of the Assembly?

I have given an answer according to the information supplied to me on a question in reference to a document received by His Excellency, and the information makes no other reference.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland what are the reasons for the proposed transfer of the police barrack in Fintona, County Tyrone, from the main street of the town to a back and out-of-the-way street, and if the Inspector General has received a Memorial from a large section of the inhabitants of the town protesting against the change?

The Constabulary Authorities report that, in their opinion, the transfer of the men from the present house occupied as a police barrack at Fintona is necessary owing to inadequate accommodation, and to the fact that there has been an undue amount of sickness among the men. The house they have been considering the advisability of taking adjoins the main street, is in a thoroughfare, and is advantageously situated for the discharge of the general police duties. A Memorial against the proposed change has been received by the Inspector General, who has replied, pointing out, in his opinion, the necessity for the proposed change.

I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he has received information that the Hon. Mackenzie Bowell, the new Minister of Militia, Canada, is considering the subject of the defences of Esquimalt; and whether it is likely that the Dominion Parliament will be asked to vote money for the purpose of mounting the guns which are ready to be sent out by Her Majesty's Government?

We have no further official information, but, as I stated last week, I have reason to believe that Mr. Mackenzie Bowell is interesting himself in the subject of the defences of Esquimalt, and we have every confidence that the work will now be carried out.

I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board if it would be possible to make arrangements for drafting through the workhouses to homes, certificated for the purpose, paupers who are very old or so infirm as to be likely to remain inmates of the workhouses for the rest of their lives?

I do not gather clearly, from the question of the hon. Member, what are the homes to which he refers; but, probably, he has in his mind homes of the character of the schools which are provided by voluntary agency, and to which, when the schools are certified by the Local Government Board, children in receipt of relief may be sent by the Guardians contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the children. I am not aware, however, that there are any such homos suitable for the purpose referred to; but, if there were, I should be prepared to give the subject my careful consideration.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is a fact that, notwithstanding the acknowledged dearth of trained Lieutenants in the Navy, the Admiralty have practically suspended retirement of Lieutenants other than those affected by the age clause or invalided, and have thus deprived the country of the prospective services of those officers who have been compelled to resign through pressure of private affairs, and the altered condition of service from that which obtained when the present regulations for leave, half-pay, and retirement were framed; whether it is a fact that some Lieutenants lately resigned have offered to continue their connection with the Service, on a retired or reserved list, even without remuneration, and that this offer has been unconditionally refused; and whether he will lay upon the Table the official correspondence connected with this latter question?

Optional retirement has been for the time been suspended. Those officers who resign might possibly, in the event of war or emergency, render service of a certain value; but such prospective service would be very problematical. The conditions of service have not materially altered since the present regulations for leave, half-pay, and retirement were framed in 1870. It should be understood that a Lieutenant cannot expect to first receive a considerable amount of education at the cost of the State, and then to be allowed to determine his engagement at his own convenience, and at the same time receive a pension for the rest of his life, subject only to the possibility of being called on to serve in case of war. An officer wished, after resignation, to keep the privilege of retaining his rank, right to wear uniform, and position in the Navy List, and offered, in return, to serve on any really urgent occasions and to qualify annually in gunnery and torpedo. It was decided not to accede to his request, as, though the services of such officers might be of some value, the Admiralty would have no hold over them, nor any power whatever of compelling them to serve. The officer thus retained on the list would probably claim retired pay and widow's pension.

Do I understand the noble Lord to say that only one officer made this offer?

So far as I know, only one officer made a proposal in accordance with the terms of the question of the hon. Gentleman, though one or two other proposals were made not strictly analogous to that offer.

I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that Stamp Duty has been claimed on cheques and orders drawn upon the treasurers of Friendly Societies, whether bankers or not, and whether this is in contravention of Section tion 15 of the Friendly Societies Act of 1875; and whether such cheques and orders, if passed through another bank for collection, are still liable to duty?

Section 15 of the Friendly Societies Act, 1875, exempts from Stamp Duty an—

"Order or receipt for money contributed to or received from the funds of the society by virtue of its rules or of that Act."

I am advised that this exemption does not extend to cheques, which are negotiable instruments. There has been no change in the practice of the Inland Revenue Department in this respect, and the distinction which is made is founded upon judicial decisions.

I beg to ask the Attorney General for Ireland if he can now state whether Joseph Porter, a new tenant mi the Luggacurran estate, who was bound over to keep the peace at the recent Athy Petty Sessions for having brandished a revolver at a Mrs. Flanagan of Athy, obtained a licence to carry arms; and, if so, whether it is intended to allow him to hold that licence any longer?

The Lord Lieutenant has revoked the licence held by Porter.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that a man of the name of Michael Shanahan, born in Poona, belonged to the 1st, or Captain Leslie's, Troop of the Bombay Royal Horse Artillery, and served in Afghanistan in 1842 at Candahar, Cabul, and Ghuznee, being present at the re-taking of the latter place by General Nutt in September of that year, and with General Pollock at Cabul when Lady Sale and the other prisoners were rescued; that he also served in the Scinde war under Sir Charles Napier, and captured two flags with his own hand; and was awarded a medal for the Afghan campaign, and another for Scinde; whether the prize money due to him for Scinde remains still unpaid to him; and whether he is aware that Shanahan is now an inmate of the Woolwich Union Workhouse, with a broken thigh, aged, and unable to earn a livelihood?

Shanahan served in the Afghan and Scinde campaigns as stated; but the Secretary of State is not aware that he captured two flags with his own hand, nor does his name appear in Sir Charles Napier's list of soldiers who captured standards. Shanahan's share of the first distribution of prize money was handed over to his Brigade Major for payment to him in 1848. The second instalment was paid to him personally in 1852. The Secretary of State regrets to hear of Shanahan's present circumstances, arising from an accident in 1888. He took his discharge from the Army in 1846, after completing his first period of service.

May I ask the hon. Gentleman if the Brigade Major mentioned, to whom the money was handed over, is Captain Glass, and whether that officer is now dead, and whether the India Office have any information as to what was done with the money?

The name of the officer was Captain Glass, as stated, but I have received no information on the subject of the latter part of the question.

The man only received his money in instalments, and, being in this position, I should like to ask whether the India Office cannot see its way to make some provision for him in his old age?

Of course, I must ask for proof that the money was not paid to Shanahan. I conclude that Captain Glass received the money. It was, undoubtedly, handed over to be paid by him.

I should like to ask whether there was no method of control over this money, or who is the person, the major or the man, who is supposed to have this money?

I should have very much doubt whether the documents are still in existence relating to so remote a period of time. But at the present moment I have no evidence whatever that the money was not paid beyond the statement of Shanahan.

The man is in a state of destitution; he is unable to earn his livelihood, and, unquestionably, he gave great service to his country. I would ask whether the India Office have no means of providing him with pecuniary assistance?

I must ask the hon. Gentleman to give the grounds upon which he bases his representations.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been directed to the fact that, whereas the "free quota" of Constabulary for County Donegal is 300, and the number actually serving is only 280, the county is being charged for ten extra men; and whether he is aware that the late Mr. Forster, when Chief Secretary, admitted that such extra charging, when the free quota was not complete, was not intended?

The free quota of Constabulary at present authorised for the County Donegal is 300. That county has also assigned to it an extra force of 20 men. I am not aware that a former Chief Secretary made the statement attributed to him. It may be that some of the number of the free quota may, as recruits, be in course of training at the depôt in Dublin, which is the training establishment for every county throughout Ireland. Where actual vacancies exist in the free quota of a county an allowance is made by Statute.

I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the Irish Office claim to be entitled to levy anything upon a county in respect of extra Constabulary when the free quota is short of the full number by the amount of the extra Constabulary?

Well, I do not understand the free quota is short in the sense in which the hon. Member puts it. His question certainly goes to show that the number actually serving is 280; but, as I have said, I presume there must be recruits, and that they have not been included in the number actually serving in the district.

I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he will look at the Returns he has himself laid upon the Table, from which these figures have been drawn; and I would ask him whether he will take my assurance that the late Mr. Forster said he was satisfied that it was not intended, where the free quota was not complete, that the extra Constabulary should be charged on the county?

I am quite ready to accept the hon. Gentleman's statement of course as regards what Mr. Forster told him. But I think the difference is as to what constitutes a free quota; whether it is limited to the number actually serving in the district, or includes a certain number of recruits in training.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether, on the retirement, last July, of Mr. Wilson, sub-postmaster at Ligoniel, Belfast, his successor in the premises and business, Mr. William Smyrl, who had been for five years contractor for the conveyance of mails between Ligoniel and Belfast, agreed, upon the request of Mr. Shepherd, postmaster at Belfast, to allow the premises to continue to be used as the post office; whether, upon the suggestion of Mr. Shepherd, Mr. Smyrl sent in to Mr. Shepherd an application for the sub-postmastership, which Mr. Shepherd promised to recommend, and a memorial, signed by nine-tenths of the residents of Ligoniel and the vicinity, in support of the application; whether, no reply having been sent either to Mr. Smyrl's application or the memorial on his behalf, the place of sub-postmaster was given to Mr. W. A. Bell, whose shop was declared by the surveyor, on inspection, to be unsuitable, by reason of inadequate accommodation; whether inquiry has disclosed the fact that the memorial on behalf of Mr. Smyrl never, reached the Secretary of the General Post Office, to whom it had been addressed; and what explanation can be given of this circumstance, and of the transfer of the post office, against the wish of the inhabitants, from commodious premises, used for the postal service for over 40 years, to premises officially declared to be unsuitable for the purpose?

The statement in the first paragraph is believed to be correct. The memorial referred to in the second paragraph does not appear to have reached the Department. The postmaster of Belfast made no such promise as is alleged. The appointment was conferred upon Mr. Bell because (1) Mr. Smyrl was reported to own a public house at some distance off; and (2) Mr. Smyrl's premises are not so centrally situated as those of Mr. Bell. The surveyor has not declared Mr. Bell's shop to be unsuitable by reason of inadequate accommodation.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether he is aware that Eddy Walsh, postman, Kill Piltown, County Water-ford, has carried the mail from Kill to Ballyceveen for the past 16 years; that during the period there was only one mail dispatch per diem Walsh was paid 6s. 5d. a week for his services; that on a second postal dispatch between Kill and Ballyceveen being established Walsh only got an increase of pay of 7d. per week, although compelled to do double his former work; and whether, having regard to the fact that Walsh is obliged to walk 10 miles every day for 7d. per week, he will consider the justice or propriety of increasing his small salary?

I am informed that on the second trip being added several men offered to do the whole duty for 7s. a week, but preference was given to the man previously employed, as he wished to do it. I am also informed that he travels six miles a day, and not ten, in the course of his duty; though on account of his place of residence he has to remain away from home or travel the six miles twice. Still, the Secretary in Ireland has thought that the pay should be increased to 9s.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether he is aware that the postmaster of the town of Kilcubbin, County Down. Thomas Shard, trading under the name of Thomas Shard and Co., is engaged as a potato, coal, artificial manure, and general merchant, and that the confidential telegrams of the other business men of the town must go through the telegraphic office which is controlled by Thomas Shard; and whether, having regard to the fact that the merchants of Kilcubbin regard it as a serious grievance that they should be compelled to disclose the secrets of their business to a competing trader, he will see his way to appoint some independent person as telegraphist?

No such complaint has been received from Kilcubbin, and nothing is known here of the circumstances mentioned. Sub-post-offices are generally held by persons in business, and there must usually be others in the same place engaged in the same trade. The regulations of the Post Office, and the obligations of the persons employed, are very strict, and it is believed that they are generally fulfilled.

I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he assented to the promise given to the House on behalf of the Government by the President of the Board of Trade on the 14th July last, that the fees for the renewal of patents between the fourth and eighth years should be reduced; whether the President of the Board of Trade, in fulfilment of that promise, has submitted proposals to the Treasury for reducing patent fees; and whether effect will be given to those proposals before the completion of the present financial year?

The hon. Member asks me whether I assented to a promise given to the House on behalf of the Government by the President of the Board of Trade that the fees for the renewal of patents between the fourth and eighth years should be reduced. No such promise was given, and, therefore, no assent on my part followed. The words of my right hon. Friend were as follows:—

"My view is that we should consider whether a reduction may not be made in the fees charged in the interval between four and eight years."

The hon. Member will see that my right hon. Friend spoke of considering whether a reduction might not be made, and that he did not give a promise that such reduction should be made. Proposals have been submitted for reducing patent fees, and our policy remains the same; but the question of giving effect to those proposals at once must depend upon financial considerations, with regard to which I cannot speak at present; but certainly nothing can be done within the present financial year.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether he has received from the Cavan Board of Guardians a statement of the facts in connection with the case of "Ryan v. the Guardians of Cavan"; and whether, inasmuch as the damages and costs in that case were thrown upon the Guardians entirely through their obedience to the orders of an officer of the Land Commission, the Government will reimburse the amount of the loss?

Yes, Sir; I have received the application in question. The matter is still under consideration.

I beg to ask the Postmaster General whether he will state what is the usual time that second class clerks are employed in performing temporary first class duties at the Central Telegraph Office in order to qualify for promotion to the higher class; whether this period is of the same duration in every case; and, if not, what are the causes of its extension or diminution; whether, when clerks are employed on duties proper to a higher class, there is any definite intention of promoting them at a certain date; whether the duties in the Central Telegraph Office are assigned to first or second class clerks in accordance with their abilities, without reference to their salary, service, or class position, and whether many of the most important wires thereby are frequently in charge of second class clerks in preference to clerks of a higher class; and whether he can see his way clear to reconsider his refusal to re-open the question of the organisation of the staff, which has been recently communicated to the officers of the second class?

I must refer the hon. Member to my answer to a question almost identical put by the hon. Member for South Down last Monday. To the third paragraph, which is new, I would say no.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he will advise that the law in Ireland be assimilated to that of London, under which the cost of casuals is not borne by a single Poor Law Union; and whether he will introduce legislation under which Irish Poor Law Boards will have the power now possessed by Boards in England, Scotland, and Wales of deporting persons who have become chargeable to them, and who have not been born in the country in which they become destitute?

The question is somewhat a large one, and I am afraid I cannot at present promise to answer it.

I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board whether the cost of casuals in London is borne by a fund common to all the unions of the Metropolis; and what other items of expense are similarly charged?

The cost of the relief of casual paupers and of the provision of wards for their reception is a charge upon the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund, to which all the unions and parishes in London contribute on the basis of their rateable value. The other expenses which are charged on the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund are:—The expenses of the maintenance of lunatics in asylums, and of insane poor in asylums provided by the managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District; of the maintenance of fever and small-pox patients in the asylums of those managers; of medicines and medical and surgical appliances supplied by the Guardians; the salaries of Poor Law officers, whose appointments have been sanctioned by the Local Government Board; the rations of such officers according to a scale fixed by the Board; compensation to officers who are deprived of their office in certain cases; fees for the registration of births and deaths; vaccination fees and expenses; maintenance of pauper children in separate schools; maintenance of indoor paupers to the extent of 5d. per head per day; school fees of outdoor pauper children, and the expenses of the ambulance stations provided by the managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District. I may also say that under the Local Government Act, 1888, a payment at the rate of 4d. per head per day is paid by the London County Council out of the county funds on the average number of indoor poor maintained during the five years ended the 25th March, 1888.

I beg to ask the Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education whether he will consider the advisability of enlarging Section 88 of the New Code, so as to afford relief to schools from which children have been absent owing to the prevalence of influenza or other epidemic disease, by excluding from the attendances which go to make up the average attendance of the year such period of sickness, on the representation of the school managers and the certificate of the Sanitary Authority?

When the Code is in the hand of Members, my hon. Friend will see that words have been introduced which will give effect to his suggestion.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a question of which I have given him private notice—namely, Whether he is aware that Mr. William F. Purdie and his brother were arrested at Auteuil, France, on Sunday, 6th instant, on a charge of picking pockets, that in spite of protestations of innocence and urgent requests they were refused permission to communicate with the British Embassy until the Wednesday following, and that during this interval they were confined with and treated as common malefactors until Thursday, when they were released on parole, their trial and acquittal not taking place till Friday; whether Her Majesty's Government is taking any steps to obtain redress for the indignities offered these gentlemen and to prevent repetition of such treatment to Englishmen in future?

The facts are substantially as stated by the hon. Gentleman. No communication reached the Embassy until 1 o'clock on Wednesday afternoon from Mr. Purdie or his brother. One of the Secretaries at once proceeded then to the Prefecture and urged the release of these gentlemen; but he was told that the release could only be effected if the Embassy would guarantee Messrs. Purdies' honorabilité, and the Embassy not being in a position to do that, some delay took place, but in the evening of that day, Wednesday, a further communication was made to the Prefecture asking that these gentlemen should be released. Unfortunately, in consequence of the absence of the principal functionary from the Prefecture, it was impossible to obtain the release of these gentlemen that evening; but, on Thursday morning when the Embassy were in a position to guarantee Messrs. Purdies' respectability, they requested immediate release, and it was granted on the afternoon of Thursday. The question is a grave one, and is the subject of communications between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government. We trust that the French Government will be willing to redress the injury which has been done and take steps to provide against the recurrence of similar incidents in future.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to the case of David Thomas and Henry Keegan, troopers, who took part in the Balaclava Charge and were both wounded, while the Captain escaped unhurt; whether he has had any representations made to him to the effect that David Thomas died last year in Carmarthen Workhouse, and Henry Keegan a fortnight ago in abject poverty at Birmingham, his limited pension of 6d. a day having expired 29 years ago; and whether, as the Captain has since, in due course, but without seeing any further war service, risen to be Major General, Lieutenant General, and General unemployed, and now receives £1,000 a year, he will cause provision to be made for the families of these men, and take steps to provide against similar sufferings in the case of other old soldiers?

The men referred to were both given whatever was possible under the Royal Warrant. Thomas had long service and had a pension of 9d. a day, which would have been higher but for his very bad record, he having been 46 times in the defaulters book, and seven times tried by Court Martial. Keegan had not served long enough to receive a permanent pension; neither appears from the records to have been wounded, but this is the class of cases which under the concession recently announced it is hoped we may be able to relieve. The War Department has no funds or powers under any Warrant to provide for families of soldiers. Neither officers nor soldiers receive pensions for war service except in connection with wounds.

I beg to ask the light hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary a question of which I have given him private notice—namely, has the Home Office received a Memorial praying for mitigation of the sentence upon Rayner and Eggleton, who are under sentence of death, to be carried out on Thursday next, for the murder of two gamekeepers last December; and is it proposed to recommend Her Majesty to grant the same?

I only received notice of the hon. Member's question after I entered the House this afternoon, and the notice is not put in the form I might desire. I can only say it is a fact that a Memorial has been received at the Home Office praying for the mitigation of the sentence passed upon two men named Rayner and Eggleton; but I must respectfully decline to state, in answer to a question in this House, what advice I may have to tender Her Majesty.

, speaking at a later period, said: With reference to the reply which the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary gave to a question respecting the condemned men Rayner and Eggleton, I should like to ask whether he is aware that there are many precedents in the Journals of this House coming down to quite recent years raising the question of the desirability of extending the clemency of the Crown to condemned prisoners; also when he proposes to announce either to the public or to this House his decision in the particular cases referred to?

I could not answer any question as to precedents offhand; I should require notice. Airy decision favourable to prisoners is made known, indirectly, as soon as it is arrived at.

I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the absence of all mention in his statement of any intention to redress, or even look into, the various alleged grievances of the warrant officers and several grades of chief petty officers, engine-room artificers, and others, is to be taken as indicating that no consideration is being given at the Admiralty to these matters?

I have received from various quarters representations of the grievances under which warrant officers and chief petty officers are alleged to lie, and they have all received the careful consideration of the Admiralty. If my hon. and gallant Friend will put to me any question on these subjects, I will in Committee of Supply give him full information.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether he is aware that the late Mr. Matthew O'Reilly Dease, for many years a Member of this House, by his will bequeathed all his property, amounting to about £50,000, to the payment of the National Debt, although his nearest relations were in a state of absolute destitution; whether he is aware that in 1889 two nieces of Mr. Dease were granted by the Treasury pittances of £50 per annum; whether he is aware that three children of Mr. James M'Donagh and his wife' another niece of Mr. Dease now deceased, who would, if Mr. Dease had died intestate, have been entitled to a share of his personalty under the Statute of Distributions, are living in Dublin, and are in wretched health and indigent circumstances; and whether, having regard to the great hardship of their case, and the benefits accruing to the State from the will of Mr. Dease, the Treasury will see their way to make some provision for them?

Mr. Dease bequeathed his property, amounting to about £50,000, towards payment of the National Debt. Annuities of £50 per annum were bought for the two nieces of the deceased, Misses Isabella, and Mary Walsh. I am advised that if Mr. Dease had died intestate the children of James M'Donagh would not have been entitled to any part of the estate. On that ground the Treasury cannot undertake to make provision for them.

But would not the niece have been entitled to her share under a distribution? Is it not a fact that this unfortunate lady was alive after Mr. Dease's death, and are the Treasury going to close on this enormous sum and leave this lady in want?

I understand the hon. Gentleman to refer to some lady not mentioned in the question.

No, no. You will see it in the third paragraph of the question. Mr. Speaker, I beg to give notice that I shall call attention to this question on going into Committee of Supply.

I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what course he proposes to pursue with reference to the admitted inaccuracy of the redemption table in the Schedule to "The Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1885"; and whether, inasmuch as the matter cannot be dealt with in a Bill introduced by a private Member, the Government will introduce a short measure dealing with the subject?

Without going into the question of whether there is an "admitted inaccuracy" or not in the redemption table, I may say that a clause is being drafted, and a table is being prepared, to take the place of the former table.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will take some steps to prevent the numerous deaths which now take place from the use by children of so-called "toy" pistols?

The question of my hon. and gallant Friend points to legislation; and while I am prepared to consider any reasonable proposals for the object in view, I cannot pledge myself to introduce any definite measure to prevent children from making use of dangerous toys.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War is he aware that great labour and expense was gone to by the late Mr. Hotchkiss for many years before his system of ordnance was brought to the state of perfection which led to its adoption into Her Majesty's Service in 1884–5, which labour and expense were paid for by the shareholders of the Hotchkiss Company in purchasing the business and patents; that, owing to the fact that the Government make the Hotchkiss guns in their own factories, and only give the company orders for the breech mechanisms, &c., required to complete them, and throw open to public trade competition the quick-firing gun ammunition orders, ammunition makers who took no part in the development of the quick-firing gun system have been allowed to reap profits where they had expended nothing in experimental work; and has any protest against this system been made by the Directors of the Hotchkiss Company; if so, has Government taken any action in regard to the same?

We have no know ledge of the steps taken to perfect the Hotchkiss gun before its adoption into the Service; but we have recently received from the Hotchkiss Company a communication on the subject, embracing a number of points extending over several years, and which is now being carefully considered.

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury what steps it is proposed to take in regard to the sum of £25,000 voted towards the expenses of a British and Irish section at the World's Fair, Chicago; will any portion of the amount be allocated towards enabling Irish exhibitors to take part in the Exhibition; and whether the Government will consider the desirability of appointing some gentlemen of experience in connection with Irish trade and manufactures on the Committee which it is proposed to appoint?

The £25,000 was a grant in aid given to the Royal Commission for the Exhibition formed of the Council of the Society of Arts as a supplement to the revenue to be derived by the Royal Commission from other sources. The administration of the total sum is in the discretion of the Royal Commission. The precedents of all former exhibitions will be followed, and Irish exhibitors will have precisely the same facilities as British. There is no Committee to be appointed.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is the intention of the promoters of the Chicago Exhibition that they will have a special Irish section; can he say whether Ireland's share of this Vote will be devoted to that Irish section?

The hon. Gentleman must give notice of that question.

I beg to ask the hon. Member for Exeter whether he will lay upon the Table of the House the Correspondence between the Charity Commissioners and the Governors of St. Paul's School, with reference to the allegations contained in the Petition of the Fulham Vestry, and in the Report of the London County Council; and whether he will state what decision has been arrived at as to the future management of the school?

The Charity Commissioners have made minute inquiry into the working of St. Paul's School under its present scheme, and have discussed the matter personally with the Governors, but no decision thereon can yet be announced. In the meantime, there is no Correspondence which could usefully be produced.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War a question of which I have given him private notice—namely, whether there is any truth in the rumour that instructions have been given to the foremen of various departments at the Small Arms Factory, Enfield, to reduce the output of rifles to 700 per week by the end of March; whether this will not necessitate a further reduction of 400 employés: and whether this is not the smallest number of rifles turned out per week for the last ten years?

I explained to the Committee on Friday night, in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, that, although the number of magazine rifles to be turned out at Enfield per week will be reduced to 700 during the next financial year, the reductions, in consequence of other employment given, will only affect the factory in the same ratio to its highest strength as the other factories in which the manufacture of the magazine rifle is proceeding; and it is not intended to reduce the number of men employed at Enfield below the strength at which the factory stood before the recent temporary increase.

On the question of reductions, what are the reductions that are to take place? How many more men will be discharged in addition to those who are already under notice to be discharged?

I am not able to say the number exactly; but the number will not be brought below the normal number of 2,000.

I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether by the present Volunteer regulations all rules for the internal management of Volunteer corps must be submitted to the approval of "a general meeting of the corps"; whether this regulation was made in the early days of the Volunteer movement, before Volunteer battalions were included in any scheme of mobilisation; whether his attention has been drawn to any inconveniences which arise from the regulations in question; and whether he can so amend the present regulation as to bring it into greater harmony with the present improved military status of the Volunteer Service?

The regulation referred to in the question only carries out Section 20 of the Volunteer Act of 1863, in requiring that matters affecting property, finances, and civil affairs should be decided at a general meeting of the corps, but such a meeting has no control over discipline. No representations have recently been made of inconvenience arising from the practice, but it is not altogether a satisfactory state of the law; and whenever there is an opportunity of amending the Volunteer Act, I think some change should be proposed.

I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he can now state whether the unexpended sum of £40,000 given some years ago for intermediate education in Ireland will be applied for the promotion of Irish technical education?

As I stated a few days ago, I am considering the advisability of applying a portion of the residue of the Customs and Excise grant now payable to the Intermediate Education Commissioners to the cause of technical instruction. To do this, however, legislation will be necessary, and it is desirable to have a full inquiry, which I am making.

I beg to ask the Attorney General for Ireland whether he is aware that an agreement was made early in 1888 between W. B. Leslie and A. M. Leslie, of Courtmacsherry, County Cork, landlords, and Mrs. Hanlon and Mrs. O'Connor, of Wilton, County Cork, joint tenants, for the purchase of the holding; and was the advance agreed upon between the parties sanctioned by the Land Purchase Commission; and, if so, what has been the cause of the delay in completing the transaction?

The Land Commissioners report that a delay has arisen owing to the necessity for taking steps for the redemption of a head rent, and subsequently through a difficulty with regard to the title. The landlords, solicitors are endeavouring to remove this difficulty.

I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury what arrangement of business he proposes to make for the present week? Thursday next is a day on which most of the Irish Members will be absent, and on the day before and after, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to arrange that no Irish business of importance will be taken on those days.

I would ask the right hon. Gentleman not to take the Indian Budget, or the Indian Councils Bill on next Thursday.

I should be glad to know, in common with many other Irish Members, when the Irish Education Bill is to be introduced and read a first time, so that it may be printed and circulated?

I am conscious of the great inconvenience which hon. Members in the House, and many outside the House, have experienced from the fact that the Irish Education Bill has not been introduced sooner. But looking at the position in which Supply is at present, I regret that I do not see any immediate prospect of resuming the Debate on the Irish Education Bill; and still more do I regret that it cannot be printed and circulated. I would remind the House that owing principally, though not entirely, to the amount of time that was taken up last week in the discussion of Private Bills, Supply is not nearly so much advanced as we had reasonably a right to expect, and unless we are fortunate enough tonight not only to get the Navy Estimates, but to make substantial progress with the Supplementary Estimates, it will be necessary for me to put down a Motion to-morrow asking the House for further facilities on the part of the Government. My hope is that we shall be able to make very much more rapid progress with the Estimates than hitherto, and my idea is that to-night we might get the Navy Estimates, and that to-morrow morning and evening we may be able to finish all the Supplementary Estimates, except the Scotch Vote, and the Report of that Vote in which the hon. Member for West Belfast is peculiarly interested—I mean the Irish Teachers' Fund. Supposing all that is done on Tuesday, then on Thursday we shall take the Vote on Account, and on Friday the Vote for Scotch Education, and the Vote that has to be taken in Committee of Ways and Means. That will enable us to introduce the Appropriation Bill on Monday, and to make compliance with the provisions of the Statute. I cannot give more than this general indication to the course of Business, because much must depend upon the rapidity we are able to deal with questions as they arise.

The right hon. Gentleman has just referred to the Scotch Vote for Education. I wish it was for education, but is it not for the relief of taxation?

Yes, that is so.

I rise, Sir, with some reluctance to propose the Resolution standing in my name. Recognising, as I do, the invaluable services of the First Lord of the Admiralty to the Navy, and having sat as a member of the Committee of the Naval Estimates three or four years ago, knowing, as I do, the importance of the economical and other reforms he has introduced into his Department and into the dockyards, I am somewhat loth to offer criticism on a matter which seems so small compared with many connected with the Department over which he so ably presides. From one point of view I hope the House will think I am justified in bringing under notice a subject wholly national and not in the least of a Party character. My Motion is in these terms:—

"That, in the opinion of this House, the disbanding of the Royal Naval Volunteers is undesirable and will weaken the efficiency of the Reserve Forces of the Navy."

Sir, the Act establishing our Naval Artillery Volunteers was passed in 1873. The force was founded by Lord Brassey. It is not a large one, but it might have been made larger if the Admiralty had so desired. It now consists of about 1,700 men of undoubted physique, and I am quite sure there is no finer body of men serving Her Majesty than those in the City of Bristol, and I am quite sure the other forces in the country are equally good. It is a popular Service, inasmuch as there were always more members enrolled than the Establishment permitted. At one time they stood high in official favour, and it was thought that more honorary distinctions were distributed among them by the Admiralty than they ought to receive. Moreover, Lord Brassey, the founder, was rewarded by being made a K.C.B. Now, however, the force is undergoing the chilling blast of disfavour. I am told that the force is found to be no longer of any use, and I believe this change has been brought about to a great extent by the Report of a Committee which sat last year, presided over by a distinguished Admiral, who made the discovery that these men were not sailors, and would probably be sick at sea, and that, therefore, there was no longer any place for them. No one ever claimed for the Royal Naval Volunteers that they were sailors. But whose fault is that? The fault lies with the House, which passed the Act, the first paragraph of which says, that it is lawful to accept the services of any persons desiring to be formed under the Act into a Royal Naval Artillery Corps, and offering their services through the Admiralty I have a right to assume, from the wording of the Act, that it was never contemplated that the Force should be composed of professional sailors, but of individuals whose services might be of value for purposes of Home defence, due regard being had to their fitness to manage boats and guns, and so on. It may be said that these men have not taken the trouble to make themselves proficient, but if you refer to the Act yon will find the Admiralty cannot say that, as an annual inspection of every Naval Artillery Volunteer corps is provided for. That inspection has been conducted by such eminent men as the Duke of Edinburgh, Admirals Vesey, Hamilton, Seymour, Baird, Durant, &c, and in every instance—there is not a single exception—these officers have made a favourable Report. Now, Sir, if this Force has not attained the degree of efficiency required, it must be in consequence of the neglect of these officers, and these officers are not in the habit of neglecting their duty. If they felt that these men had not attained the degree of efficiency required, would they not have embodied that fact in their Report? I can only say that these Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers have been most anxious to have further opportunities of increasing their sailor-like qualities, and rendering themselves more fit for the performance of the duties they have undertaken. After having served for 19 years, to tell these poor fellows with a sneer that they are now no good, and that no place can be found for them, is an act of cruelty. It is not the unanimous opinion of the distinguished officers of Her Majesty's Navy that they can or ought to be dispensed with. I have discussed the matter with two Admirals, and both thought there was room for these men, and that they would form a very valuable adjunct to the Royal Navy. The personnel of the Royal Navy is magnificent, but the Force is insufficient to man the Navy in time of war, and that is a matter which must occupy the serious consideration and anxious thought of those who preside over this Department. I should be glad to welcome a scheme for collecting professional sailors, living ashore, in order that their services might be secured to the country in case of need; but, surely, it is unwise to deprive the Reserve of 1,700 men who, if they cannot reef topsails, can use an oar, can wield a cutlass, and what is more important, can man heavy guns. If the disbandment of these men be insisted upon, you will strike a blow at Volunteering in general; because, probably, some other clever General will discover some other branch of the Volunteer Service that is not composed of proficient men. The position of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers to-day may be theirs tomorrow. At a time when it is considered important to make the defence of this country as secure as possible, is it desirable to throw discouragement upon those who are willing and anxious to assist? My noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty has suggested to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War that he should take pity on these outcasts and allow them to become submarine engineers. But, Sir, they do not want to become submarine engineers. I do not suggest that the House should utter one word of censure on the action of the Admiralty. Doubtless the noble Lord felt it to be his duty to carry out the recommendation of the Committee suggesting this economy. Knowing his kindness of disposition I am quite sure the noble Lord regretted the necessity for such a proposal—a proposal that would cause pain to a large number of individuals who are desirous of doing what they can in a national and a good cause. But, Sir, what I do ask the House to say is this—"We thank you for your economical suggestion, but we do not wish to weaken the Reserve Force of the Navy by the loss of these men, nor do we wish to discourage the spirit of Volunteering, and therefore we deem it inexpedient to disband these Volunteers."

I wish, Sir, to second the Motion of my hon. and gallant Friend opposite. This is a question of patriotism and not of Party, and in asking the First Lord of the Admiralty to re-consider his decision to disband this Force we are not animated by any desire to throw any obstacle in his way. Speaking for myself, I may say that I have supported the noble Lord's policy from the first, a policy which has not only been ably carried out but a policy which was excellent in itself, and which deserved to be successful. But, Sir, the question of the disbandment of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers is not a matter of small importance. I venture to submit, in supplement to the observations of my hon. and gallant Friend, that the present corps of Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer's was raised in response to public opinion. The right hon. Gentleman opposite, who now discharges the duties of Chancellor of the Exchequer, when First Lord of the Admiralty in the Liberal Administration of 1870, brought in the Act of 1873, incorporating this Force in deference to expressed public opinion, and I venture to express the hope that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will not assist in the disbandment of the Force which he himself created. I have yet to learn that public opinion has turned round from the direction it took when the Act was passed in 1873 bringing this Force into existence. On the contrary, I have extracts from The Times of 15th May, 1891, with reference to the Report of the Committee presided over by Admiral Tryon. The Times described that Report as a most unsatisfactory and misleading document, and said it was never intended that the members of the corps should be professional sailors, but boating and yachting men. Professional seamen would be pursuing their usual occupation, and, therefore, would not be available for such service. I agree with the Mover of the Motion in regard to the question of expense. It should be remembered that this corps costs less than any Volunteer Corps, and that is shown by the fact that the whole sum these men receive is 30s. Capitation Grant for efficiency. First of all they received nothing, then £1,000 per annum, which has risen to £6,000; but that is explained from their point of view by the Government giving greater facilities for the training of these men. The number might be enormously increased, because the sum of 30s. is not sufficient to cover the expenditure necessary for their equipment. I fondly hope the First Lord of the Admiralty will not find it necessary to let this Debate go on much further, and that he will accede to the Motion of my hon. and gallant Friend. There are many heads of the Report, which I will not venture to trouble the House with further than to say these Volunteers are prepared to submit to whatever regulations the Admiralty may make. It cannot, therefore, be urged that they are not prepared to conform to the conditions which are laid down for them. It was recently urged that a Marine corps is wanted and should be allowed to be formed in addition to this corps. It cannot be said that our coast line, extending to thousands of miles, is effectually defended in the event of our being attacked by a large maritime power. That being the case, and seeing this force has been called into operation by an Act of Parliament, I venture respectfully to submit to the House that it is not the part of a Minister to do away with such a force upon the recommendation of any Departmental Committee. I hope the First Lord of the Admiralty will see his way to withdraw this disbandment, which comes into operation on the 31st of March, and allow the force to remain in operation for twelve months longer. Those recommendations which he recently urged are less than my hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Hill) was prepared to recommend; but my desire is simply that the force should have a little longer time granted to it. If the First Lord of the Admiralty cannot see his way to do this, then certainly the movement to disband the corps will be one of the most unpopular of any that have occurred during the reign of the present Government. It is said that the corps consists of only 2,000 men and that that is a very small matter. Well, there is no doubt about that, but in looking over the Report I was very much surprised to see the name of one man whom I have known and respected for many years appended to it, I refer to Mr. Thomas Ismay, but I think the explanation of that is to be found in the fact that he rather treated the Royal Naval Volunteers as more or less an antagonistic or hostile force to the Royal Naval Reserve. But the Royal Naval Reserve is a very large force compared with this, which is a small force but might be very useful in time of war for coastguard purposes. I would also refer to the work of another gentleman who has spent 20 years of his life in connection with the Naval Service, in which he is an enthusiast, as well as a large amount of his own money—I mean my friend, Commander Seth Smith, who has deserved well of his country. He has gone, in order to ascertain accurately the movement about Volunteers, all round the world—to Australia, India, the Colonies and elsewhere. Here in this country it is maintained by Admiral Tryon that the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer's are unfit for Naval service and that the corps is not fitted for torpedo work. But the thing is absurd on the face of it. A large number of these men are mining engineers and electricians, others are marine engineers, and to say that these men could not manage a torpedo boat or do service, even on board men-of-war, is out of the question. There must be room in such a Service as the Navy for this small force. 8,000 men have already passed through the Service, and why disband it now, when the good of it is beginning to be felt? Do the Government mean to insert the thin end of the wedge for conscription? I am sure the people of England will never submit to conscription? The Volunteer Force has received the sanction of the country for many years past. The same difficulties were then thrown in the way of the Military Volunteers as are now thrown in the way of the Naval Volunteers. I submit that not only has this Report been thoroughly answered but it has, in historical language, been demolished and pulverised. I beg to second the Motion.

I consider that the Government are acting wisely in giving effect to the recommendations of the Committee which sat in regard to the disbandment of this corps. If the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are patriots, let them join the Volunteer Artillery. Volunteer Artillery corps exist in connection with nearly all our ports, and, after being disbanded, the Naval Volunteers may join one or other of these corps, so that their services would still be available for the country. The men connected with our established Reserve are all able sailors, or fishermen connected with the sea, and in the event of an emergency might be drawn upon. But, almost without exception, the men of this force have not been to sea, do not possess sea-legs, and would be of no use on board a man-of-war in the event of any emer gency. I therefore support the proposition of the Government with regard to the disbanding of the Royal Naval Volunteers.

It seems to me that this corps is worth keeping together. You want your Mercantile Marine manned just as you want your Navy manned, and if, in stress of circumstances, you have to call your Naval Reserve men from their Mercantile Marine duties, there will be gaps in your Mercantile Marine. Here is a force of 2,000 more or less efficient. Everybody knows, who knows anything about this country, that there are a very large number of men who, from force of circumstances, are turned into landsmen, but who at the same time are fond of the sea and habituated to the sea, and it is from this class of men that these Naval Volunteers are drawn. It is true in the case of these men that circumstances often compel them to follow trades and professions; but, nevertheless, they love the sea, are accustomed to the sea, and take pleasure in being upon the sea. If we are in the unfortunate position of finding ourselves at war, the manning of the Navy becomes a matter of extreme importance, and we shall not be in a position to discard the services of any man who may be reasonably capable of performing a seaman's duty. If anybody will take the trouble to discuss the matter with this Naval Volunteer Force, he will be able to satisfy himself that we have men who are reasonably capable of performing such duties amongst our Naval Volunteers. I must say it does not seem to me a wise or expedient thing to disband those Volunteers, and so get rid of the possibility of having their services in the future, considering what a small amount of money the existence of this corps costs the country. If it were a great thing, if some serious expenditure were under consideration, then it might be another matter, but when it costs a practically infinitesimal sum to get the services of 2,000 men, I must say the matter deserves re-consideration. Even at the last moment, it would be a wise thing on the part of the Government to re-consider their position. I know it is stated that these Volunteers could be more useful in another way, but it ought to be borne in mind that they are Volunteers who have volunteered for this particular service because it is service they love. I do not see that they are bound to transfer their services, and obviously they cannot be accused of want of patriotism because they do not choose to undertake the other duties which the Government may suggest to them. I therefore hope the Mover of this Motion may get such support in the House as to induce the Government to re-consider their determination.

I am not surprised at the hon. and gallant Member for Bristol (Colonel Hill) and other hon. Members interested in the Naval Artillery Volunteers calling attention to this subject. I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that it was with great reluctance the Admiralty came to the conclusion that it was their duty, if not to disband the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, at all events to transfer their services from the Admiralty to the War Office. But when I state the circumstances every hon. Gentleman will see that we had no alternative and that we were right in the conclusion at which we arrived. Some years ago the Admiralty had to give attention to a most difficult subject with which they had to deal—namely, the finding of sufficient men and officers to man the Fleet, including both ships in commission and those which are approaching completion. And, before we could arrive at any decision as to the number of men who should be retained on the active list, it was necessary for us to ascertain how far the Volunteer Auxiliary Forces of the Navy could be trusted in an emergency. And, therefore, last year I appointed a Committee, of which Sir George Tryon was Chairman, for the purpose of investigating this particular point. This Committee was composed partly of naval officers and partly of civilians, and I do not think the hon. Member for Bristol (Colonel Hill) or anybody else, will complain of the composition of that Committee. The civilians were in the majority. The decision which that Committee unanimously arrived at was to increase the Royal Naval Reserve, and, on the other hand, to disband or transfer the services of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers to the War Office. And the reasons were quite good. At present it is clearly laid down as part of our system of national defence that the War Office are entrusted with service on land, and that the Navy perform duties on the high seas. Therefore the Naval Reserve men are men who are accustomed to the sea, and come from a seafaring population. It is not a question as to whether a man will be sick or not when he goes to sea, because many of our most distinguished sailors are subject to that malady. The question is, does the man know his work when he is put on board ship? And it is essential that any person associated with the Navy should be drawn from a seafaring population. These Naval Artillery Volunteers were started some years ago when there was not so much attention given to the national defences as is now done. The division between the Admiralty and the War Office was not then so strictly laid down. The intention was to enlist the services of the seafaring population, so that they might be of use in time of war or on the arrival of any cruiser or hostile force. But the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers have fulfilled neither one nor other of these requirements. The first thing that strikes one as regards the composition of this Force is that it is composed almost exclusively of landsmen, men who may have some liking for the sea but who are not sailors, and who have not been to sea scarcely any portion of their lives, as their occupations on shore prevent them going to sea for any considerable time. Therefore, they do not fulfil the first condition of Naval Volunteers; they are not drawn from the seafaring class, and have no practical knowledge of the sea. The second point in the composition of the corps was the large number of recruits. For the last two years there has been a change of 56 per cent. in the total strength of the corps, i.e., 56 per cent. of the corps have less than three years' training. Not only is the corps not composed of the class of men from whom the Admiralty originally hoped they would be drawn, but the great bulk of them are recruits. And there is nothing to show that what has occurred in the past may not occur again in the future. Under these circumstances, the Committee arrived to what I maintain is a sound conclusion. The War Office has established a Volunteer Force associated with coast defence, submarine miners and others, and these volunteers could be very useful if associated with the submarine mining force under control of the War Office. Therefore, the suggestion has been made that we should transfer their services to the War Office. The War Office would then be enabled to take them under their authority. The War Office is quite ready to accept their services, and they also undertake, when those volunteers have been transferred, that their officers should have the same authority and the same honorary rank as at present. That seems to me the only practical way in which to proceed. It has been suggested in many quarters that the Admiralty are influenced by a desire and a wish to strike a blow at Volunteering. Well, I have shown that we propose to increase the Royal Naval Reserve, but it must be recognised that no system of volunteering would convert landsmen into seamen. That fact must be recognised, and the further fact that a number of landsmen might like to be sailors does not qualify them for sailors. What we want is not a Volunteer Force in the Navy, but to get seamen and officers who will put themselves on the register and who will be ready in any emergency to be transferred to other ships. We have never been able, in any mobilisation, to assign any duty to these Naval Volunteers, because they were not sailors, and because the officers had not got the necessary training to enable them to discharge the duties of officers on board a man-of-war. If in the past our Navy has been successful in times of war, we must bear in mind to what that success is to be attributed. It has been mainly due to the superior training of the men, and not so much to the ships. It would be a most unwise thing to lead people to believe that this is a reliable Force, on which the Admiralty could depend in cases of emergency, either in the shape of Matériel or personnel, I have had a good deal of pressure brought to bear on me on this and similar questions, and the larger question of Volunteering. And I may say I recently had a deputation of all the Members from the North of England, asking me to allow the use of northern coal on board Her Majesty's ships. But I pointed out to them that we could not use that coal in time of war. And so in the same way we cannot rely on these Volunteers in time of emergency. I do not think we ought to retain them annually upon these Estimates, and annually vote a sum for them. It was with great reluctance I came to this conclusion. I have endeavoured as far as I can to meet the wishes of those who compose this corps. We will deal liberally with them. When they go over to the War Office they will retain their rank and position. If, on the other hand, these gentlemen do not wish to join the corps under the War Office, special arrangements will be made that they shall be allowed to retain their rank, and wear their uniform. I have done everything in my power to meet the wishes of those who compose this corps, and I hope, under these circumstances, looking to the conclusive character of the arguments in favour of their disbandment, the hon. and gallant Member will be content, with this discussion, and not ask the House to divide.

After what has fallen from the noble Lord, though I regret he cannot accede to my Motion, I will, by leave of the House, withdraw that Motion. I would remind him, however, of the old days in which, when we wanted men to man the Navy, we were compelled to take them where we could get them in times of emergency.

I would like to ask the noble Lord a question. I hold in my hand a letter from the Commander of a London corps, stating that £1,000 had been put on the Estimates, and that that sum has been exceeded already in claims allowed and claims made. I think the right hon. Gentleman has not drawn a distinction between claims made and claims allowed?

Yes, I drew the distinction between claims made and claims allowed.

The claims allowed at Glasgow at present amount to £800.

I have no desire, Sir, to take up any length of time on the very important question which my Motion brings under the notice of the House. When I framed that Motion the Memorandum of the First Lord had not been issued, or I should probably have worded it differently. I was not aware that there was any proposal to increase the personnel of the Fleet beyond what the First Lord told us last year, when I ventured to point out that I thought the proposed increase by 1894 did not sufficiently meet the case. The Memorandum shows I was right. The Committee of Naval Lords made certain recommendations under which the noble Lord proposes to increase the number on active service by 3,100, of whom 1,250 are boys. These boys cannot be recognised as seamen till they have been at least four years at sea, in addition to two years in a training ship. There is to be an increase of 500 in the Marine Force, and 700 in the class of stokers. I see, also, that the stokers in the Naval Reserve are to be increased to 4,000. I do not pretend to be a judge on this question, as naval men outside the Admiralty can only form an opinion from those documents which are placed before them, and cannot grasp the subject as a whole. But I know that naval opinion outside the Admiralty is much concerned as to what steps are being taken to bring up the personnel of the Fleet to what the matériel will be in 1894, and we think the question has not been grappled with in the serious manner it demands. If the noble Lord had said that we should have these men by 1894 things might be all right; but what naval men, and, I suppose, thoughtful statesmen, feel is that it is not enough to simply prepare on paper for eventualities four years hence. We ought to be prepared at once. Lest it should be thought I am exaggerating, I will quote the opinion of a distinguished officer who has been selected by the First Lord to command the Fleet on an important station. At the United Service Institution the other day Vice Admiral Sir E. R. Fremantle, quoting from an article by Admiral Hornby, said:—

"Sir Geoffrey Hornby stated, in an article in the United Service Magazine last year, that 'the 34,400 petty officers and seamen of the Navy, and the 24,500 that are promised on paper from the Coastguard and Naval Reserve, are small numbers wherewith to meet the waste which a war must cause.'"

And he went on to say that the petty officers and seamen of that Reserve, though good individually, were destitute of organisation. That is a rather strong statement, and I think the gallant Admiral has gone a little beyond the facts in the matter of organisation. Sir E. R. Fremantle went on to say—

"We are forced to the conclusion that our present system does not give a force large enough for our requirements, and, admirable as it is in many ways, some change is necessary. This is the universal opinion of naval officers. The quality of our present active force is admirable, but it is inexpansive, its quantity is insufficient, and our Reserves are inadequate."

The question of the sufficiency of the number of officers has also been under the consideration of the First Lord, and he has dealt with it in his Memorandum. But the question has not been faced properly by the enrolment of 230 Naval Reserve officers to serve in the Fleet. I think the First Lord might go further, especially as it is the opinion of distinguished officers that the present number intended for foreign service is utterly inadequate. The list of lieutenants should be brought up to 1,000, the number, I think proposed as a minimum by the First Lord. We have at present 93G, and the minimum number of 1,000 will only be reached in 1896. Are we to wait till that time for the full number? I venture to suggest that no time should be lost in selecting suitable men from the Mercantile Marine, subjecting them, if possible, to suitable training in the gunnery ships, and then inducing them to volunteer for the Fleet. There are already about 90 such officers serving in the Fleet, at which I rejoice. But that is not sufficient. We want to see at least 300 officers from the Naval Reserve, but without training they would be of little use for service, I gather from the Memorandum that the First Lord only proposes an increase of 650 seamen, 1,250 boys, and 750 stokers. I think he will admit that the 650 seamen are inadequate. I cannot pretend to say what number of seamen will be required for the Fleet in 1894, but I can safely say that number will not be sufficient. I am aware that you have a considerable body of pensioners, but of these 10,000 must be over 55 years of age, and you cannot pretend that the whole of them would be available for service in case of war. No doubt many could be used to man the Coastguard Stations when you withdrew the Coastguard Reserve. I gather that the French have no less than 100,000 men ready for service and over 30,000 marines. When the noble Lord has added his 500, our Marine Force will only number 15,000. Most naval men would gladly see that force largely augmented. It is the cheapest force you can train, because you can make it efficient in the shortest possible time. It is a most popular force, and yon could enrol a large number in a very short time, and they could be made good gunners in twelve months, and fit for service on a ship. Yon cannot manufacture boys into seamen in less than five or six years; and the demand is pressing. To wait five or six years for the Meet to be at its maximum is rather trifling with the question. The Marine Force should be brought up to 16,000 this year, and next year add a small number, and so on. They are more valuable than the Naval Reserve, because they are trained in the use of naval guns. Mercantile seamen—valuable as they are—are only trained for a limited time in the year, mostly a month, and that at a week or a fortnight at a time. I would ask the First Lord if the rumour be true that the men on the Coastguard Reserve ships have been reduced by two-fifths? that you have taken them for active service in the Fleet? I do not blame the Admiralty, but you are making up one-fifth of them by boys. Is that wise? It may be necessary to meet the present demand, but surely it is a proof that the personnel of the Navy is not what it ought to be. It is, I see, also proposed to increase the Naval Reserve from about 22,000 to 27,000 in 1896, but a large discount must be taken off that. That shows the necessity of increasing the Marine Force. The noble Lord admits that there is a deficiency of seamen gunners and torpedoists. However good the Naval Reserve, they cannot be gunners and torpedo men. I am told that at present we have no more than 23,000 seamen in the Fleet, and I am further told by competent judges that we ought not to have less than 25,000 able seamen in addition to all the other classes required. The Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood), in a speech some time ago, said that the seamen in the Mercantile Marine had, in the last 15 years, diminished by 20,000, and it is to the Mercantile Marine that we have to look for our chief Naval Reserve. The noble Lord also says that in 1896 our manning resources will not be altogether inadequate, though in certain ratings there may be considerable shortcomings. There ought to be no shortcomings at all; we ought to be prepared for war. The noble Lord says there is a deficiency in secondary gunnery and torpedo ratings, and he goes on to say—

"In engine-room ratings there is a large deficiency, and practically no reserve of firemen or stokers. We propose this year to try to create a firemen's reserve, and the number authorised for the year is 700."

Why do not the Admiralty adopt the practice adopted in the Crimean War, when lads of 17 years of age and upwards were sent to training ships, and called "novices"? Many of them turned out excellent men, and became petty officers. Why not take boys of about the same age and train them at our Naval Barracks for stokers? The number of stokers proposed to be added is inadequate. The noble Lord says—

"A large proportion of the engine-room complements are coal-trimmers. They require little training."

Let us get them, and feel that we have them ready trained for service.

"There is also a considerable deficiency in chief engine-room and engine-room artificers. There is no reserve at present, and this deficiency will require close attention:"

Will it have close attention unless you deal with it? I venture to say this House would vote any money the noble Lord asks to bring up the personnel of the Fleet to the requirements we shall have to face in 1894. He says—

"The estimate of 75,000 for the limit of the establishments on active service made last year by me will require some augmentation."

This is put in the Memorandum to give satisfaction to the House, but it wants looking into closely—

"At present all men and boys under the Naval Discipline Act or borne on ships' books are included in Vote A, and a false impression is thus created as to the number of men available for active service."

A very false impression, unless hon Members look into it. The noble Lor says that there will be in 1892–3, available for sea service, an increase of 3,100 men and boys, of which a large number are boys. The noble Lord adds that the Estimates upon which these conclusions are based are moderate, and represent a minimum. Is the House going to be content with a minimum standard instead of a maximum? I venture to say that under these Estimates the establishment will not be complete for service. We want the question to be faced as it is at present; so that, if any disturbance should arise in the present year, we should not have to go helter-skelter in search of men and send our officers to sea to fight with incompetent men. The Naval Reserve men are not trained men, and not fitted for battle till they have been some time on a ship and received some training. They are able men, and I would not say a word in depreciation of them, but they must have training. The Force which can most quickly be brought into condition for fighting purposes is the Royal Marines, and it is only proposed to add 500 men to that Force. I rejoice to see that 230 lieutenants and 390 sub-lieutenants are to be enrolled in the Naval Reserve during the year. I wish to draw attention to another point. I had a question on the Paper to-day on which the First Lord did not feel able to give me any information—what loss do we suffer every year by ten or twelve years men taking their discharge? Twelve months after their discharge they are eligible to come back, and we rejoice to see them, but how many are lost to the Service by discharging themselves permanently? I am sure the waste must be considerable. I have asked for a Return on the subject, but I have never got it, and have been told it would take so much time to prepare. I have calculated roughly what the waste of ten or twelve years' men is, and I estimate it at at least 1,000 a year, the annual waste in the Service being 3,000. I should like to see these men secured to the Service by being formed into a kind of superior Reserve for five years. I would suggest to the Admiralty the desirability of considering whether, when taking boys on to the training ships, the agreement should not be made to include five years in a first-class Naval Reserve, as well as the ten or twelve years' service. I am told it would interfere with men entering for long service. I do not want to interfere with that; but many of these men are gunners, electricians, and submarine mining men, and I do not see why they should be lost to the Service. These men are most valuable, and you only give them twopence a day increase for re-engagement. That is a very small increase for superior men of ten or twelve years' service, and I would rather see the question considered, with the view of placing them into a first-class Reserve, and giving them a short service pension. You have created a great Army Reserve and adopted the short service system. We do not want that in our Service, but there is no reason why we should not create a Naval Reserve with this splendid material, and yet no effort is made to secure them. There is another point to which I would call the noble Lord's attention. I have had interviews with some of the stokers, who complain that they have no second-class rating, and this is the only class in the Service without it. If some method could be devised for creating a second-class rating, it would give a little encouragement to the stokers and induce men to enter that class. In connection with the short supply of officers, I hear that it is proposed to put three torpedo boats under one lieutenant, the lieutenant to have charge of one, and warrant officers to command the other two. I do not think warrant officers are quite the men to put in command of torpedo boats. You want young officers, full of dash and energy, and not a mature sailor, such as the warrant officer generally is. This suggestion, however, shows how short the supply of officers is. I hope the First Lord will give some reply on the points to which I have called his attention.

I differ entirely from the estimate given by the First Lord of the Admiralty with respect to the number of ships we have in comparison with those of Foreign Powers. In the first place, it will be well to remember that the naval programme was calculated to bring the Fleet up to what we ought to have been in 1889, not to what we ought to be in 1894; and consequently we should now commence to make up for the ships which have been laid down by foreign countries in the interval between 1889 and the present; and I maintain that the three ships laid down do not meet the requirements at all. The grand total of the French Fleet built and building is 67, ànd that of Russia 31, so that these two powers combined have 88 vessels, and we shall have nothing like that even when in 1894 the programme is completed. Now, it appears from the Admiralty Returns that we number 64 battle ships of all kinds, and a great many of these it is well known are no use at all. This shows a marked inferiority, according to their own Return, to France and Russia joined together. I see by this statement that there are to be ten new torpedo boats, and I hope that these boats are much faster and better sea boats than those we have had heretofore. We want, however, more than ten torpedo boats, as that number is nothing in comparison with what France is building. But I would respectfully submit to the First Lord that it would be well to wait and see what is the result of the trials of the Zalinski gun. The intention both of the gun and of the torpedo boats is to place a large charge of powder or some other explosive under another man-of-war. The Zalinski is a long-range gun fired through the air, whilst the torpedo has all the disadvantages of a short range—about 400 yards—through the water, with the liability to be affected by currents and tides. With respect to another point, I should like the First Lord to state whether he has made any inquiries with respect to the use of the fluid fuel which some people contend can be obtained much cheaper, or into the new method of hydraulic propulsion. On page 8 of the statement I find—

"Although it is a matter for regret that such an accident as the grounding of the Victoria should have occurred, yet it has incidentally given strong proof of the efficiency of the system of construction adopted in Her Majesty's ships."

It strikes me as rather a peculiar way of testing the efficiency of building, and I should like to know why the ride for vessels anchoring should not be carried out in torpedo practice? Then, with respect to forced draughts, I consider forced draught, as it has been used in large ships, to be an invention of the Evil One, and I know, also, that that is the opinion of a vast number of naval officers. Then, with respect to the 110-ton guns, there are only six of them afloat, and we are told that only sufficient for ordinary reserve are being constructed. I do not speak of the guns originally in the ships, but we have three spare guns, two new ones and one under repair, which is supposed to be as good as new when repaired. But in November, 1891, three more were ordered, that is, a spare one for every one afloat, which does not show much faith in the durability of these guns. These guns, without anything for mounting, cost £18,000 each, so that the spare guns for these vessels cost £108,000. I sincerely wish the First Lord would face the difficulty of altering these vessels to carry lighter guns. Why not face the initial expense of fitting these vessels with 50-ton guns, which would, roughly speaking, cost half the money and be much more effective.

I rise to a point of Order. The hon. Member is going into a long discussion of the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and is making no reference to the particular Motion now under notice. The proper time, I submit, for this discussion is when we get into Committee of Supply; and to adopt the course which the hon. Member is taking is, to say the least, inconvenient, inasmuch as it will result in two discussions instead of one. I do not quite know, Mr. Speaker, whether that is a point of Order or not, but I raise it for the convenience of the House.

I entirely concur with what the right hon. Gentleman has said, but I cannot stop the gallant Admiral on a point of Order. The question is purely one of convenience, and I do not see my way to stop the discussion.

Is there any Motion before the House?

There is the Question that I now leave the Chair.

Did I not move the Motion of which I had given notice?

The hon. Member could not move it.

My reason for taking this course is that last year we were told, when we desired to discuss the First Lord's Statement, that we could do so at a later stage. Well, the other Votes were only brought forward late in the Session, and at that period of the Session everyone was begging everyone else not to speak, but to let them get away. To continue the Debate. I see here that there were 138 guns which were bad from the first, and I am glad to see that they are to be abolished, for I believe they were bad from the beginning. But these 138 guns are wasted, and 138 guns of some other kind will have to be made to replace them. Who is to blame for this waste of money? I would like to know, also, whether it is still the case, as was put forward in the First Lord's Statement last year,

"That the Navy are merely the users of the articles supplied, and that they have no responsibility, either for the design or the manufacture of the weapons with which they are supplied."

If that is true, the sooner we have a Department for the Ordnance of the two Services—to look after these guns and take the responsibility—the better it will be. Then I see that 225 of the 4–7 inch quick-firing guns have been ordered, and that they have been put into some of the armed cruisers without ever having been thoroughly tested. They have never been sufficiently tried, and have never gone through the regular tests that all guns should go through. I see no mention this year of the Falkland Islands, but I do hope the First Lord will take the advice of those who have been there frequently, before he attempts to make these islands the head quarters of the South Pacific. If he had been there as often as I have, and had spent three years in the Straits of Magellan, he would think no more of the proposal. Before you can get from the Falkland Islands to where commerce or civilisation is to be seen, you have to go over 2,000 miles. It cannot be thought of as a depôt for the South Pacific, and if we unfortunately make a depôt there, unless we keep a large garrison it will be an exceedingly fine place for the enemy to go and seize our coals. It would be much better to buy up one of the hundreds of islands in the Straits of Magellan, or some of the other islands about there, rather than go on making this depôt at the Falkland Islands, which would be utterly useless. I am very sorry to see that nothing is said with regard to lengthening the Mole at Gibraltar, because we all know that this is a very important work—so important, indeed, that I was told that nothing could be spent at Pembroke because of the necessity of spending money at Gibraltar. I hope, before this money is laid out, the First Lord will pay attention to a very important Report by some experienced officers on the necessity for additional guns, or an alteration in the positions of those now in place at Gibraltar. They say—

"They consider that any foreign ships of war—even of a small size—and more especially heavy armed ironclads, could at the present, moment with perfect impunity lay off or steam round out of range of all existing guns on the Rock, but well within the range of their own guns, and therefore would be capable of doing incalculable damage and annoyance to the town and fortress, free of any risk of receiving damage themselves."

I will defer any further remarks I have to make to another time, but I should greatly regret to think that I had been out of Order in bringing this matter forward.

I should like to say a few words with respect to the boilers on these ships; and I will first take the Thunderer, a first-class battle ship, which cost, I believe, £100,000. When the Mediterranean Squadron left Barcelona for Gibraltar a few weeks ago, the vessels had not been very long at sea at an ordinary speed of ten knots before the Thunderer had to fall out of the line. On reaching Gibraltar Admiral Tryon held a Court of Inquiry, and he found that the failure was entirely owing to the construction of the boiler, which is of the type known as double-headed. Admiral Tryon has requested that the vessel may be ordered back to England, and it may be taken for granted that as a battle ship she is useless until she has been re-boilered, and that will cost something like £50,000. The next vessel in which we have a record of failure is the Vulcan, a torpedo-ship. Her boilers leaked on her first voyage, and I believe she has never yet been able to go to sea. The First Lord the other day stated that only £250 had been spent on repairs to the boilers of the Vulcan; but what use can the Vulcan be as a fighting ship if she can only steam something like ten knots an hour? She was designed to steam 18 knots, and before she can be any use she will have to be re-boilered. Her boilers, also, are what are commonly known as double-ended boilers, with single combustion chambers. The next vessel to which I wish to call attention is the Blake. She was designed to indicate 20,000 horsepower, but on her trial she only indicated 14,525. She was built to steam 20 knots, but at her first trial in smooth water she only did 18 knots. She cost £440,000, and having cost this enormous sum we find that she could not do her speed, and that the tubes began to leak. The next case is that of the Blenheim., which went out from Plymouth, broke down almost immediately, and had to return. What I have tried to ascertain is, who is to blame for all these defects? Someone must be to blame. I remember that Lord Charles Beresford, when he was a Member of this House, said that for something of this kind someone ought to be hanged. I do not go quite so far as that, but at all events somebody ought to be called upon to give an account to the country for the reason of these mishaps. To my mind it is not because these vessels have been furnished with double-ended boilers, but because the boilers have been constructed of material that was too light, and the tubes have been too close in their arrangement. The consequence is that the heat has been unequally distributed in the boilers and forced upon the tubes on one side of the boiler; this caused a leakage and a waste of steam. One reason, I think, is to be found in the forced draught which is never heard of in the Mercantile Marine. To my mind forced draught means unnatural pressure on the boilers, which never can be utilised in the event of war. I would, therefore, ask the First Lord to give the House his candid opinion with respect to the use of forced draught, and to tell the House whether he intends to continue its use or to abolish it?

May I reply at once to some of the remarks which have fallen from the hon. Gentleman opposite the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley)? He has spoken of these double-ended boilers as if they are of no use; but let me tell him that some of the most successful of our merchant vessels are fitted with these boilers.

For single combustion.

There is nothing peculiar in the modern boilers used in the Navy. With respect to forced draught also, I may say there is scarcely any large and successful merchant ship now which goes to sea without forced draught, within, of course, certain limits. There is not in the Mercantile Marine the necessity to confine within such a comparatively limited space such a very large amount of power; but, nevertheless, there are advantages in a limited supply of forced draught, which are recognised by all the modern steamship owners, many of whom sit in this House. On the two points referred to there must be some reason other than that given by the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley), and it may be found to arise from some comparatively minor cause which maybe more readily removed than by turning the double-ended boilers into single-ended boilers.

I rise in the interests of time in this discussion. We have listened to two Gentlemen of very great experience, and everyone must admit the interest and importance of what they have said. Everybody must feel that this year especially it is of very great importance that the Ship-building Vote should be very fully discussed and thoroughly understood. The mere fact that two such ships as the Blake and the Vulcan have broken down is of itself a very serious matter for the Navy, and there are also some very important matters with respect to the unexpected and extraordinary delays in the completion of vessels. ("No, no!") I understand from the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty that some of the vessels will not be completed at the time contemplated in the Act of 1889. These are questions which will require to be fully discussed on the Shipbuildine Vote, and I think it would be a mistake that we should occupy much time on a Motion that yon, Sir, leave the Chair in discussing these matters which must be discussed very fully hereafter. Therefore, if the Speaker be allowed to leave the Chair without further delay, I think we might proceed to the Vote for men. I rose to ask the noble Lord (Lord George Hamilton) for an undertaking that the Shipbuilding Vote should not be delayed until the end of the Session as it was last year, because it involves most important consequences and ought to be most fully discussed. We want an assurance that this Vote will not be delayed until July, as it was last year, and then be rushed through without any adequate discussion. Therefore, if you now agree, or at all events with very short delay, that the Speaker do leave the Chair, and ask from the First Lord of the Admiralty a statement and an undertaking that before very long—certainly long before the period at which it has been reached in former Sessions—the Shipbuilding Vote shall be taken, so that there may be full discussion thereon, I think it might be for the convenience of the House.

I certainly, Sir, do not oppose your leaving the Chair. I should like to do so, because I altogether object to your leaving the Chair for any such extravagant proposals as are laid before us at the present time. I know it is no use for me to make any protest. Nevertheless, to me it is a duty, because I represent a busy manufacturing town that owes all its prosperity to trade, and I know that the people I represent have no sympathy whatever with the pirating and ferocious kind of policy advocated by the gallant but most amiable Admirals of the Fleet opposite. That men so kindly as they always are, and so willing to do a benevolent act, should be constantly living upon gunpowder, I cannot understand. We are called upon, according to what is threatened, to spend more than £16,000,000, taking the balances left over, and the annuity taken out of the Consolidated Fund, upon the Navy. I suppose that was never known before in the history of the country. If we could by such extravagance satisfy hon. and gallant Gentlemen opposite, there would be something to be said for it, but, like the horseleech, they are never satisfied. They think we are in an entirely unsatisfactory position, and that this country is the poor and unsuspecting prey of all the brigands of the Continent. The hon. and gallant Member has said that we are not prepared to meet the united fleets of Russia and France—88 ships altogether. Does he ever expect those 88 ships to concentrate against this country? Would any man in his ordinary private affairs pay such a heavy insurance on such a remote and impossible contingency as the concentration of those ships on our devoted shores? Everyone knows that it is never likely to happen. But besides that, the more money we expend, the more unsatisfactory our Fleet appears to become. We were told by a gallant Admiral opposite that it was a duty, whenever a ship was coming to anchor, for a lieutenant to be sent off to take the soundings. I think it would be still more desirable to do so when the ship is steaming. How was the Victoria allowed to go aground? There were no soundings taken in that case. I served on a Committee on the Navy and the Army, and I know the bewilderment of that Committee in the endeavour to find out who was responsible. Nobody ever is responsible for these things. I believe if you could engage a thoroughly practical man, who has been trained to the business, and give him £10,000,000 a year, and tell him—Now, if the Fleet breaks down you will be hung or sentenced to transportation for 20 years—you would have a far more efficient Fleet than at present when you have no personal responsibility. The great shipbuilders get more value than you do for their money, simply because they have a keen personal interest to do the best possible with the means at their disposal. You will never get that under your present system of naval construction and administration, and, therefore, for these £16,000,000 we shall not get so much satisfaction as, under a system of personal responsibility and direction we would get for £10,000,000. It is because I think there should occasionally be heard a word of truth from a section of public opinion, which is growing more powerful year by year, and which will some time or other overwhelm our sanguinary but amiable Admirals that I protest, on their behalf and on behalf of my constituents, against this wasteful expenditure.

I think it would be for the general convenience of the House if I were to fall in with the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby (Sir W. Harcourt), and ask both sides of the House to agree to the Speaker leaving the Chair. We should then get into discussion in Committee, when I or my Colleagues could answer a good many of the questions put to us while you, Sir, were in the Chair. The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down (Mr. Picton) has informed us that he is a man of peace. Well, he has a rather curious method of showing it. His method is that he would put some one, say an Admiral, at the head of the Department with a halter round his neck, and would tell him that if anything went wrong he would be hung. The hon. Member said he represented a peace-loving community. My impression of the hon. Member's constituency is that, if ever they should be deprived of the commodity which they work up through inability to get their material from abroad, and if they found it impossible to earn their livelihood in consequence, they would be just as clamorous as any other sections of the community for the protection which an efficient Navy could afford. Passing from that, however, I think, perhaps, it might be convenient—although I am quite ready to meet the wishes of the House—if I, just for a very few minutes, answered a few of the questions which my hon. and gallant Friend asked me about the personnel, and so get rid of that subject.

No; there are other questions in connection with it.

Well, yes, in the Vote. My hon. and gallant Friend has said that our proposals are quite inadequate, and he assumed that we ought to keep on the active list a sufficient number of men ready to man any ship that in an emergency is at our disposal. Now, anxious as I am to maintain the strength of the Navy, I do not think it is reasonable to expect this country to keep on the active list a number of continuous service men entitled to pensions, who would yet only be required on an emergency. Therefore, what we must do, as reasonable people, is to associate as far as we can an active list with an efficient Reserve, and combining these two, to see that they are sufficient to meet our wants, or to try to make such arrangements as would enable us rapidly to develop these forces into a War Service. My hon. and gallant Friend says that our arrangements are inadequate. The House must allow me just to state what the conditions were under which I made my Report to the House. The question of providing an adequate personnel is a very difficult one—far more difficult than the ordering of matériel—because the productive resources of this country, so far as ships and guns are concerned, are now practically exhaustless. Well, then, I appointed a Committee of naval men to consider this question of personnel, in order to test the figures which, last year, I put down as necessary. The chairman is Admiral Sir A. Hoskins, an officer of great experience, not only Admiral Superintendent of Reserves, not only a Naval Lord for some years, but an officer who had only recently returned from the Mediterranean as Commander-in-Chief of one of the largest squadrons ever stationed there. The Second Naval Lord was associated with him — Admiral Fairfax—who is about to assume the command of the Channel Squadron; Admiral Bedford, the Third Naval Lord, was the other member; and the two secretaries were both naval men, one being a Captain in the Service, and the other the Paymaster, who for many years had been secretary to Commanders-in-Chief abroad. The composition, therefore, of the Committee from top to bottom was naval, and their procedure was this. They first got the name of every ship built or to be ready in 1894, then they took the complement of every ship, and the ratings of every complement of every ship, and having got them they added them all together, and took the total figures thus obtained, and put them against the resources on which we had to rely. The result is, that our resources are much larger than we imagined. I want to lay stress upon that point, because naval men are apt to generalise according to their own experiences. There is no head-quarters in the Navy as is the case in the Army; and the result is that an officer at one place, if he finds there is anything wrong, immediately concludes that the fault applies to the whole of the Service, and at once assumes that there are enormous deficiencies in every other portion of the Navy. Now, the fact is that year after year we have had mobilisation of the troops. Year after year we have added to ships in commission, complements varying from 10,000, to 12,000 men. Last year it was somewhat less; but if ever we got into a difficulty or an emergency, we have a large number of resources which we cannot lay our hands on in times of peace. We have the coastguard; the educational establishments; we have the gun and torpedo ships which could practically be stripped of men; we have pensioners, and retired officers; and in addition to all these we should have the Naval Reserve who can be called out by Royal Proclamation, What I want my hon. Friend to understand is that this Committee has acted on the principle which I have laid down, that when the full requirements in 1894 are put together the number of active service officers and men together with trustworthy reserves should be sufficient to man every available ship. And I also wish my hon. Friend to understand that if the recommendations which I now make, which I think are moderate, and which will certainly entail in future years only a limited increase in the Vote, are carried out, so far as the requirements of the Fleet in 1894 are concerned we shall be in a position to meet them. The recommendations on this Paper are the recommendations of the Committee, and I practically agree with them. This is not a statement made for the purpose of currying favour either in this House or with the public. If for the next few years the personnel of the Navy is treated on the lines I have indicated, I believe we shall be able to bring up the personnel to something like an equality with our requirements, If this statement is not one to give satisfaction to the House or to the community, it is a statement which I make on my responsibility on the best authority I could obtain, and it is compiled by three as competent men as there are in the Navy. With regard to stokers, it will be necessary, I think, to a certain extent to re-classify the duties and rating of the engine room departments. We have an excellent body of men in the stokers now. In physique they are, many of the them, equal to our bluejackets. But the question of re-classification is one upon which I cannot now speak with absolute certainty. The matter is under investigation, and I hope to announce a decision shortly. With regard to the Shipbuilding Vote, that right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby (Sir W. Harcourt), stated that that Vote was taken very late last year—it was taken I think on the 17th June—and he asked for an undertaking that it would not be delayed so long this year. I cannot give an engagement now to the right hon. Gentleman on the subject, nor do I think the First Lord of the Treasury can. The time at which any future discussion must come on must depend on the Business of the House. But I think there is a special reason why the Dockyard Vote should come on somewhat earlier than usual, because the details of the new ships we propose to build are not yet so elaborated as to enable me to state them to the House, and I think the House ought to be in full possession of them before they sanction any expenditure in connection with them. Therefore I will convey to the Leader of the House the representation of the right hon. Gentleman, and I will tell him that so far as I am concerned I think it is not an unreasonable one.

I think it is a monstrous thing for this country to spend £35,000,000 a year, besides borrowed money, for fighting purposes. I hope the time is coming when we shall as a Christian people endeavour to put an end to war rather than by excessive expenditure endeavour to increase it. There is a doctrine that in order to prevent war you must be prepared for it. I think that is all nonsense. When you have large armies such as exist in continental countries, there is always the temptation to find something for them do. It is necessary, no doubt, to keep up the Navy for the purpose of protecting commerce and trade, but it is highly undesirable to waste money in the way proposed. There is one country which is setting an example to the rest of the world in this respect, and that is the United States of America.

The hon. Gentleman says they are increasing their Navy, but it is for the purpose of protecting their trade and commerce, and not for foreign wars. The people of the United States would, not consent to give their Government a large Army and Navy, knowing the temptation there would be to give them something to do. There are one or two little matters in connection with the Navy Appropriation Account that I wish to call attention to. I find in the Appropriation Account and in the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General that it is the constant practice of the Admiralty to make use, generally with the consent of the Treasury, of surpluses in the Votes for purposes not mentioned in the Estimates at all, and, therefore, without the consent of this House. I contend that these expenses should either be brought up in the regular Estimates or in Supplementary Estimates, so that the House might have an opportunity of discussing them. There is a case here of an expenditure for a disused church at Malta, which it appears the authorities had thought was paid for, but owing to the neglect of the law officers the title seems to have been bad, and it had to be purchased a second time. It might be a very good thing to buy a disused church, but we, who are fitting here for the purpose of considering the expenditure of the country, ought to have an opportunity of considering such an item as that. You cannot call that a matter of emergency, and I assume the object in not putting it on the Estimates was to try and hide from us the fact. I find another item of over £1,700 which is not provided for in the Estimates. I will read a letter from the Admiralty on the subject. It is dated 27th September, 1890, and it says—

"In accordance with the request contained in your letter of the 25th September, 1890, I am commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that the proposed expenditure of £1,060 for improvements and alterations to the Commander-in-Chief's house, &c, at Devonport is made up as follows."

It appears from this that in the first place the Admiralty had asked to be allowed to spend this money without giving any particulars. The Treasury were doubtful about it and they asked for these particulars. The items of the £1,060 include a new dressing-room, two new bedrooms, new larders, improving hot and cold water service, electric bells, stables and coach-house, and new fittings and other alterations. Then, in addition to the £1,000, there is a further sum of £725 for improving and altering the existing drains. That could not possibly be a matter of emergency, and it ought to have been put in the regular Estimates. There may be reasons for doing it in this secret manner. I should like to know who this favoured Commander-in-Chief is who has his house done up in this way. I should like to know what a naval officer wants with a stable, a horse, coach-house—what has a horse to do with the Navy? (Laughter.) The hon. Gentleman laughs. Except in connection with the Horse Marines I never heard of horses being required for the Navy. I consider this an improper expenditure, although I do not expect to get very much explanation on that point, because I know the representatives of the Forces on both sides of the House are strong enough to withstand any opposition to the extravagant expenses made in these matters without any previous consent, or any consent of the House. There is only one other matter to which I shall call attention, though I could refer to a great many others. The Controller and Auditor General in his Report calls attention to a final payment, the balance of a contract for the machinery of Her Majesty's ship Seagull being paid, without trial at full speed; and further on he mentions ten ships altogether in which final payment was made without certificates as to trial for full speed. Are the Admiralty in the habit, then, of making final payments without having the final tests, even in accordance with their own contract? I am not surprised at all that there should be so many breakdowns in regard to our ships, and I think this is a matter which should require the serious attention of the Government. The Controller and Auditor General also makes very serious comments as regards discrepancies and irregularities in the books in the store yards. I think we should take the very first opportunity we can of calling attention to these matters and getting some explanation of them; and I trust, at any rate, some day when the democracy are more strongly represented here, and those representing the Forces are not so strongly represented, we may have proper criticism and proper attention paid to the Reports of our own officers. I trust we may have some reply to these matters of general complaint with regard to the Services, especially the Navy, for which the money is wanted, particularly the making of final payment on ships without a final test.

We have now an opportunity of going into a discussion of the statement laid on the Table of the House by the First Lord of the Admiralty. It is a very clear and able statement, and, on the whole, a satisfactory one. It divides itself into two heads: It gives an account of what has been done with the money granted by Parliament up to the present time, also some forecast of what is to be done in the future. I think the latter branch of the subject is more open to criticism than the first. The First Lord of the Admiralty, I think, describes it as a modest programme. I wish myself the noble Lord had gone a little further and taken us into his confidence. We know what it is that he proposes to do now; but I think it is very important the country should know what he proposes to do in the next twelve months. The noble Lord has now been in Office for a very long period; and I think it would be a right and very proper thing for him to tell us what his great experience and the experience of his colleagues shows him to be the programme of the future. It may be that, in the course of a few months, another gentleman may take his place, and I think that this country now, when the elections come on, should be in a position to consider whether the policy of the Admiralty has been a wise one, and whether the policy of the programme which he proposes is a wise one; or whether, on the other hand, we are to take up that policy which was enunciated at Newcastle the other day, and very largely reduce the Army and Navy expenditure. He tells us that the new programme comprises at present only three battle ships and ten torpedo boats. I confess I am disappointed with the programme. A great deal has been said about our want of cruisers. I should like to say that we want both more cruisers and battle ships. I say we should, first of all, have our battle ships. I do not think that we at present stand in the position laid down by the noble Lord of being able to compete with the Navies of any other two countries.

Will be.

Yes; I know the noble Lord said that would be our position in 1894. I am alluding to the present. The noble Lord makes some comparison between the English and French ships, and says—

"In December, 1891 (excluding the Mediterranean Station), there were only 13 French ships on foreign stations, as against 47 of our Navy."

I daresay the attention of the noble Lord has been drawn to a letter in the Times of Saturday last. I have not had time to verify that letter; but it appears to be written by an able pen, and the writer said the figures were not 13, but 31; that the two figures had got reversed, and that 31 was the number of French ships actually in commission at that time, and he pointed out that in the Channel even—

I beg pardon; my figures are correct. I have taken vessels of a certain size, but nothing below a sloop, and we have 47 as against 13 French vessels. If you include every little vessel of both nations, the French have 31 and we have 81.

Yes; I notice that the writer included torpedoes, which was not a fair comparison, and pointed out that in the Channel alone there were ten French ships in commission against eight of the English, and in the Mediterranean the Force of France was slightly inferior. France had a very large number of large ships in the Mediterranean in reserve, and we had none. I still think the noble Lord ought to make some correction in that statement, because it is a very important thing to put before the country. As regards the size of the battleships to be laid down, I am sorry to hear that they are going to be so enormously large as some of the ships built lately; but I hope before these ships are laid down some other size will be adopted. The noble Lord pointed out, I think, very lately the growing importance of the fire of smaller guns, but he did not seem to carry out his views to a practical conclusion, because, if those smaller guns had been found to be more useful than the large ones, why was it necessary to build those large ships when smaller vessels could carry the guns? Because you could get more ships for your money; and I believe it would be better to have ten small ships than six or eight very large ones. As regards torpedo vessels, a good deal has been said about them in the Press and elsewhere. It is a well-known thing that France and many other countries in Europe have far more torpedo vessels than this country. But the noble Lord says the object for which they require torpedo boats is not the same as that for which we require them. I do not follow that argument; but, at all events, he goes on and says we intend to beat these torpedo-boats by vessels of a larger type—what are called torpedo-boat catchers, a well-known Admiralty name for them, which. I think, is a misnomer. But these torpedo vessels, I think, have gone to an extreme in their size. What is the object of building these vessels so large? It is not to gain speed, because we are told here that these vessels are only to be capable of steaming from 17 to 17½ knots. Then about their armament. I think it is a mistake to have these comparatively large, quick-firing guns. We must sacrifice two or three things. We must sacrifice a large draught of water for one thing, and the large number of small guns which we might have in their place; and consequently we shall be spending a great deal more money. For the money which is to be paid for the five ships that yon are going to lay down you might have seven or eight smaller vessels, which would do the work equally well. I am sure the Committee will be glad to hear what has been said of the unfortunate accident to the Victoria. The result of that accident has evidently been greatly exaggerated, and it is very pleasing to hear that the repairs to that vessel only cost £1,500. There is one lesson which we might learn form it at any rate, and that is the great importance of the Malta Dockyard. As regards the docks which have been promised at home, we are promised another dock at Devonport, and I hope that it is going to be a full-sized dock. I look upon it as a most important thing not only that we should have this new dock, but also that there should be a considerable increase in the basin accommodation in that harbour. I think the Committee who have read his statement will agree with me that one of the most important features of it is the undoubted superiority and economy which has been shown in building ships in Royal Dockyards rather than in private yards. I see the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) laughs. I know he differs very much from me on that point. He stated in the House not very long ago that in his opinion the establishments of Royal Dockyards ought to be very much reduced, and that we ought to build our ships in private yards rather than in Royal Dockyards; and I wonder whether he adheres to that statement now. There have lately been great changes in the Dockyard policy of the Government. Last year a very large sum of money was granted for increasing the wages of the men employed in the Dockyards. After all what was done was inevitable. But I should like to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if he can really inform the Committee now taking that rise into consideration, whether the wages of the men employed in Royal Yards are really in the majority of cases on a par with what is received in private yards? The impression at Devonport is that very few of the men employed in the Dockyard receive as much as could be obtained outside; and I do not think it a wise policy to give men in a Royal Dockyard anything like a lower scale of wages than they can receive outside. There is one considerable blot on that scheme of re-organisation, which I think was made last year. Everyone knows that the system of classification which was introduced is a great grievance in the Shipyards. I want to know for what reason this classification was carried out? If it can be shown that it was for the benefit of the Service I will say nothing, but I cannot understand how any benefit to the Service could possibly be obtained from it. If we are to commence de novo in organising our Dockyards, and there had been no such thing as Dockyards before, it might be a wise thing to adopt some sort of classification. But there is this objection: that it is not a new thing at all. The work in the Royal Dockyards has been going on for very many years. The various classes of shipwrights have been employed there for a great number of years, and they have always hitherto worked as one trade. We have on the port side a gang of shipwrights who are being paid 30s. per week, and on the starboard side a gang of shipwrights doing exacting the same work and being paid at the rate of from 32s. to 33s. per week. There can be no sense in that, and I do ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether something cannot be done to modify a system which nobody defends? Sir, there is another subject to which I should like to refer, and that is this—the man whose pension does not fall due until he attains the age of 60 or 65, and who dies before receiving any portion of the considerable sum to which he would then become entitled, altogether loses his pension. There is no arrangement by which that pension or any part of it can be given to his widow or to his nominee, and something should be done in that way following the example of the Insurance Societies. As to the personnel of the Fleet, I can agree with what my hon. and gallant Friend below me said about the scarcity of lieutenants, and I think steps should be taken to raise the number to 1,000, at least. There is another point. During the last year or two there has been considerable difficulty in getting engineer officers of the same kind as we have hitherto had. The qualifications have been reduced. Why? Simply because we could not get the sort of men we got before. In face of that I cannot agree with those who think we shall have no further difficulty in getting engineer officers. Then, as regards the engine room artificers, a very useful body of men, they are by no means contented. Their complaints are not being attended to, and something ought to be done for them; certainly it would be in the interests of the Navy that the higher grades of engine room artificers were given the rank of warrant officer. It is a lasting disgrace that although every year in the Army men are given these higher ranks, there is in the Navy no means of giving commissions to seamen, however able a man may be. As to the chief petty officer's, I am very sorry nothing has been done to remedy their grievances. They complain that they are not treated in the matter of pensions as other classes are and this is a great grievance with them. I understand there has been some little difficulty with the Treasury about the matter; but that I am sure the First Lord of the Admiralty would speedily overcome if once he put his foot down and said that justice must be done. I hope the various points I have raised will receive the attention of the Admiralty.

Sir, I think we have a right to complain of the very incomplete form in which the Estimates have been delivered. They are usually accompanied by a statement of the progress of shipbuilding, giving in detail the work of the incoming financial year; but it is quite impossible for anyone to form, from the Estimates that have been presented, any correct idea of what the Government programme is. We do not know how far the rearmament of vessels, to which the noble Lord referred at the time the Naval Defence Act was passed, is to be carried out, though that is a most important matter. It may be said that this matter can be postponed until we reach the Shipbuilding Vote; but it has often been taken very late in the Session. Last year, though the Session commenced in November, it was taken on the 17th June; in 1890 it was taken on the 8th August; and in 1888 it was not taken until the Autumn Session, on the 13th December. I had put down on the Paper a Motion to reduce the Shipbuilding Vote at that time, but the vessels were half-built before the Motion could come on. I therefore join in the request that the Shipbuilding Vote should be submitted at an earlier period of the Session than has hitherto been the case. With regard to the new programme, as far as it is possible to judge in the absence of the information to which I have referred, and which the Committee have a right to expect, the Admiralty seem to have succeeded in turning out a very satisfactory number of cruisers. But if we come to line-of-battle ships I really do not know what the Admiralty are doing, because we have no information on that point. Some of my friends think they are behindhand with these vessels. I am told, for example, that they have been delayed to push forward the Royal Sovereign. With regard to the vessels building by contract, there is no doubt they are very much behindhand, and I hope we shall have an explanation of this. We are all very much interested in the designs of these new battle ships, and I hope, if not to-night, at least before long, the noble Lord will tell us something more about them. I should also like to know what is to be the calibre of the guns to be placed on board these vessels? I do not share the view that we are getting short of cruisers. I think the number built ought to be sufficient. The Times says these cruisers are the "eyes and ears" of the Fleet. I am rather disposed to look for the eyes and ears of the Fleet to the merchant cruisers. They are faster vessels, and not so liable to break down. I should like to know what the cost of the new torpedo boats is to be, and I should also like some further information with respect to the vessels that are to have new engines and new boilers, particularly the Devastation and the Rupert, and how they are to be manned? With regard to the Victoria, I am very glad to hear she can be made good at a cost of about £1,500. I should be glad to know whether it is intended to bring the Victoria home?

No.

I am very glad to hear that. The cruisers the Admiralty have turned out appeal to have given satisfaction. I understand they have all had satisfactory trials, and all go 20 knots. Are these measured mile trials or the more exhaustive trials recently established?

The new trials.

Now, Sir, as regards the Blake, which is to be the flag ship on the North American station, and the Blenheim, these are the two largest cruisers in the world. They were designed for a speed of 20 knots and 22 knots forced draught, and even if they had come up to expectations they would have been expensive vessels. About the Blake I know nothing, but as to the Blenheim we know from the First Lord's own statement that her forward boilers leaked on the natural draught trial on the measured mile; that she had to go to Plymouth, where the after-boilers gave way, and that she was only able to go 19 to 19½ knots. I am sure the First Lord will admit that that is extremely unsatisfactory. He holds out some hope of getting rid of the difficulty—but at present it is disappointing to have spent so much money entirely on speed and not to have got what we want. These vessels appear to have been built before it was fully realised how important a feature boilers are in vessels going at a high rate of speed. A much larger speed is given to engines and boilers in passenger steamers than it is possible to afford in men-of-war; still the Admiralty might with advantage have consulted some of these engineers who build for the Mercantile Marine vessels, some of which in the course of a year run from 60,000 to 70,000 miles under steam. Now, as to the Ordnance Vote, I congratulate the Admiralty on the accelerated rate at which large guns have been delivered. I see by the Estimates that 51 guns above nine inches in diameter have been completed and delivered as against 27 in the two preceding years. That was quite insufficient for our requirements. If the present rate of delivery is maintained it will be amply sufficient to meet the demand of the new vessels, even if the contractors for the ships keep their time, which at present does not seem likely to be the case. I am also glad, under this department, to acknowledge an improvement in the form of the Ordnance Vote. I have repeatedly asked that the Vote should specify the calibre of the gun we are asked to supply. This alteration has been made, for the first time, in this year's Estimates, and it will bring before the House much more clearly than in the old form, when all the guns were lumped in one sum, what is the policy of the Board concerning our naval ordnance. In connection with this Vote, I should like to ask why we are taking money for five 16-inch guns—only three ships carry the 110-ton gun—making six guns altogether. Is it necessary to have five of these guns in reserve? They cost £18,000 apiece; and in spite of the First Lord's defence of them last year, I am satisfied that they are not popular guns in the Service. I will only say in conclusion, Sir, that while I have to complain of the incomplete manner in which the Estimates have been presented; while I think we are entitled to some further information regarding the delay in the delivery of our vessels building by contract, and some further explanation concerning the Blenheim, and whether she is ever likely to realise not only on the measured mile, but in continuous steaming, the speed she was designed to attain; while I wish information on these points, I desire to give the Admiralty credit for the rapidity with which they have pushed forward the cruisers building in the dockyards, and for the accelerated rate of the delivery of our heavy guns. As to the personnel of the Navy, we are told that there are now many more men abroad than in 1886, and I should be glad if the noble Lord will explain his change of view in keeping so large a squadron on foreign stations.

It will be for the convenience of the Committee if I interpose now in order to afford some reply to the questions that have been raised, and more particularly as to the boilers and as to the pay in the Dockyards. First, as regards the so-called breakdown of some of the recent vessels on their trial. There can be no gainsaying the proposition that the efficiency of a vessel depends upon her boilers, more, perhaps, than upon any other part of her construction; and although, individually, my feeling has been for some time that the boilers that were placed in some of these vessels were inadequate in size and defective in point of construction, yet I am bound to say that, by the light of the information the designers had before them at the time these boilers were proposed and constructed, I think they were justified in the course they pursued. Hon. Members and the outside public are too apt to contrast the performances of merchant ships with those which are expected of Her Majesty's cruisers, and sufficient allowance is not made, as one hon. Member suggested ought to be made, for the difference in the conditions connected with propulsion between a vessel of war and one intended for the Merchant Service. Speed is talked about, and it is said that if such and such a merchant vessel goes at 20 knots, why should a war vessel go at only 18 or 15? These remarks can only come from persons who are not well informed as to what is meant by the relativespeed of vessels. That being so, I should like the Committee to note the particulars of the progressive trials of one of our recent ships which will show what is meant by an increase of speed. The Edgar has a displacement of 7,350 tons. That vessel attained nine and a half knots with an indicated horse-power of 890. Increasing the speed to 14 knots raised the horse-power to 3,600, 19½ knots made it 10,000, and 20 knots 13,000. It would be impossible, within the limited space allowed in a vessel of such large dimensions and large displacement of engines as the Edgar, to supply that ship with boiler power on the same scale that would be supplied to a merchant steamer. A merchant vessel steaming 9½ knots Mould have boilers weighing about 60 tons, and if you are to give a vessel 13,000 horse-power to propel her 20½ knots, you must practically and positively load her with boilers. It is perfectly impossible in a cruiser to apply the same rules that you could apply to a merchant ship. There must be some other mode of obtaining that power which is necessary if we are to have speed in a reasonably sized ship. The engineers and designers of the vessel about which the question has been raised did not adopt the type of boiler which has been used in several vessels of the Fleet, such as the Blake and one or two other ships, without having before them the results of previous experience. In 1885 the pressure of the boilers had gradually increased from about 80 lbs. to 130 lbs. on the square inch. At that time what was called the Northbrook route programme was in progress or in contemplation, and it was proposed by the constructors that they should be allowed to use the triple-expansion engines, and they would guarantee that with boilers of their own design they would give a power far in excess of what had hitherto been obtained in engines of war ships, and upon a comparatively light weight. They were allowed, and I think properly, to make the experiment, and upon a weight of 196 tons of boilers they guaranteed to give a power of no less than 8,500 horses, whilst formerly it required 248 tons of boilers to give a power of only 5,000 horses. These vessels, the Australia and Galatea, were turned out of hand, and their trials were most satisfactory, and, as the result of their trials, further boilers of a similar construction were ordered. The late Chief Engineer to the Navy, than whom there was no more competent and thoroughly able man, whose works are text books in engineering schools at the present day, thought the result which, had been obtained from these vessels was sufficiently satisfactory to justify him in going even further in that direction. I want hon. Members to understand this question. From these experiments the exceptional powers to be obtained were never contemplated to be realised or to be tried except in emergencies, and then only for a comparatively few hours. And on these conditions the vessels were ordered, and the boilers were made of a more limited size even than those that had been constructed for the Australia and Galatea; and when they came to be tried the vessels and boilers did not fail in the sense of not being able to propel the vessels at a high speed, but they failed to produce the power under abnormal circumstances of high forced draught. In other words, it was found, if a high velocity of air was forced into the furnaces to create rapidity of combustion, it led to trouble in the tube plates and in the tubes; and, as the Admiralty never contemplated that this exceptionally high speed should be obtained except on an emergency, it was thought far better not to strain these boilers at the earliest stage of their existence by this excessive pressure, but to test them with that with which they were ordinarily intended to work, not the forced draught, but the natural draught. As regards the natural draught, the boilers have done their work with few exceptions; and, although recent vessels have not been tried at a forced draught, yet I have no reason to doubt, if an emergency arose, and increased power should be wanted, the forced, draught might then be used to advantage. I think it would be a mistake to force new machinery to the highest possible power in the first use without allowing the bearings of the machinery to settle down into their proper faces. It is also a fact that if you require too large a power from a boiler in its earlier stages you may injure it, and it will not produce the normal power which it would produce with ordinary usage. My hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Duff) has been referring to the opinions of mercantile men on this question; but, as far bade as 1887, when our Chief Engineer contemplated putting out to contract more of these boilers, there was some doubt in the minds of some, and my noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty consulted with four leading engineering firms of the country, and asked them the question as to whether, in their opinion, the weight, design, durability, and the maintenance of the required speed would be found in the specifications and designs of our engines and boilers of that day? One and all of the four firms to whom that inquiry was put said:—"You have a good design and specification; they will be durable; they are sufficient, and they will provide the steam required."

Do you refer to the engineers or the engine-makers?

I refer to the engine-makers—four of the largest marine engine-makers in the Kingdom. And, I think the highly technical question of the boilers and engines and the sufficiency of design submitted by the Chief Engineer and endorsed by four such firms as I have indicated was an absolute justification for any Board of Admiralty to proceed upon in regard to the construction of boilers. Certainly, for myself, I must say my difficulties were set aside because I considered the opinion of such eminent firms was much better than that of any man of possibly only limited practical experience. I desire to say further, and to insist on it, that these vessels are not failures in the sense indicated. My hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Duff) questions that. They are failures in this however: they do not attain that abnormally high power for which they were designed. The Vulcan, for example, on her eight hours trial made a speed averaging 19·4 knots per hour, and the boilers did not fail—19·4 knots is a great speed, a wonderful speed—I only know three merchant ships in the world that could do it.

I referred to the Blenhiem.

I had the case of the Blake before my mind. In her eight hours' trial the natural draught was all right, and she averaged 19¼ knots, and with very great difficulties, and that in shallow water. The Blenheim made her eight hours' trial, developed 14,900 horse-power, and made 20 knots of speed with natural draft. After her trials were over there were some leaks in the tube at the ends. It is not at all improbable—in fact, professional men believe—that those difficulties which have been experienced with these boilers will be overcome by an alteration in the fixing of the tube, and that it does not depend upon the question of size or construction of the boilers, but more upon the fixing of the tubes into the tube plates. There are experiments going on which they are confident wall remedy these troubles. However that may be, when the new Naval Programme was laid down in 1889, my noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty was determined there should be no question whatever about the boilers of these ships, and these vessels, cruisers and war ships alike, have boilers from 16 to 20 per cent. in excess of the size and weight, proportionate to their powers, of those placed upon the vessels, such as I have been describing. Those new vessels have all fully come up to the speed and power like the Edgar, and their boilers have given good results, both during trial and after trial. It may possibly be, however, that the smaller-sized boilers used in the vessels of six or seven years ago did not have sufficient steam or water space to allow of the circulation of water which the very high degree of heat, engendered by a forced draught, occasioned; and, therefore, my noble Friend has taken a further step with reference to this question of boilers. He is submitting questions, in connection with any new boilers, to a most competent committee, and it will be seen that a better committee could not be selected when I mention that it will have upon it the chief surveyor of the Board of Trade, than whom no one in this country has more experience of mercantile boilers; the engineer surveyor of Lloyd's, and the superintendent engineer of that great mercantile concern "the Peninsular and Oriental Company. Those gentlemen, associated with three naval engineers, will have under their consideration the question of the type of boilers we are now using. We have no doubt about their being sufficient and good; but to make security doubly sure, my noble Friend has called in this committee to his aid, and I believe that from the experience and knowledge these gentlemen possess we shall have a type of boiler for any new vessels that are laid down which must inevitably give satisfaction. I should mention that, besides the representative of the Board of Trade, and the three naval engineers, there will be the important addition of the principal partner in the firm of Messrs. Humphrey and Tennant, manufacturing engineers, and the Committee will be presided over by that competent naval officer, Admiral Buller. I have mow dealt with the question of boilers, but there are one or two other matters to which I must refer. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Devonport has asked a question as to whether the wages paid in the dockyards are on a par with those paid in private trade. In reply I would say that, before determining what those wages should be, and what advance should be made in the wages at the dockyards, the utmost care was taken to ascertain what wages were paid in private yards engaged in war shipbuilding in different parts of the country. We also asked what these wages were seven or five years before, as our desire was to strike a fair average between what they were in private yards in good times and in times of depression. A fair average rate was struck, and it forms the basis on which the advance was given to the employés in the dockyards. My hon. and gallant Friend asks what is the benefit of classification? I think anyone who considers the matter will see that there must be a benefit in being able to reward the man who attends to his work and shows himself to be a competent and good workman. If you have one uniform wage paid to every man in every trade, whether industrious, skilled, or incompetent, I want to know what incentive there is to a man to display extra ability or attention to his work? The system is an advantage both to the men and the State. For all time there has been a system of classification in the dockyards. All the hired men have been paid varying rates of pay according to the ability and diligence with which they performed their work, and on the establishment list most of the trades had a classification. But it so happens that the established shipwright's trade was one that had not a classification. What was the result? We had a uniform rate of pay for every man who was on the establishment, and that uniform rate was out of proportion to what the hired men obtained; and, therefore, the best hired men would not take a place on the establishment, because they would have to sacrifice too much money by doing so. The establishment, therefore, instead of being a position which was regarded as promotion, and as an incentive to men to do good work, practically became in some cases a refuge for the less competent. It would have been manifestly unfair to put good, bad, and indifferent workmen into the highest rate of pay on the establishment, and, therefore it was essential to grade men entered on the establishment, prior to 1st April last, and so be able to say to those who might be graded at the lower rate of pay, "If you are diligent, you will have a chance of being promoted to the higher rates." That is the procedure as regards the establishment men who are graded; but my hon. Friend asks me if it cannot be modified. I think it can be modified, and in this way: The present rule is that if there is a vacancy in the higher grade of pay among those men who were on the establishment before 1st April, a competent man from the lower grade shall be appointed to the higher grade. But these vacancies will no doubt be necessarily slow, and there will be disappointment. Therefore, my noble Friend has consented to a scheme being drawn up by which there shall be a certain number promoted from the lower to the higher grades every year. That will give the men at the lower rates of pay an incentive to do their duty. As to the question of pensions, it has long been a difficult one. A man does not get the same rate of pay he would get if he were not entitled to a pension; and if he dies the amount he has so sacrificed is lost to his family. But that principle applies to the whole Civil Service—from top to bottom; and if any alteration is made in one rank, it will have to be made in the others. I would call attention specially to a change made in the regulations last year. Previously, while some men were called upon to pay as much as 3s. a week to get the benefit of the pension scheme, others were called upon to pay 1s. or 1s. 8d., and there was no uniformity. We have now established grades of pay at such a rate that, practically, we give to the establishment men pensions costing double that which they pay for during their time of service.

I wish to correct an impression of the First Lord of the Admiralty as to my previous remarks. I was not so foolish as to contend that we ought to keep the whole of our ships due for completion in 1894 with their full complement of seamen and marines without reference to the Reserve. I never intended to make any such proposition, but I wish to emphasise what I said as to the personnel of the Navy being unsatisfactory by quoting Sir Thomas Symonds, who says—

"Admiral Sir A. Hoskins, the present Senior Sea Lord of the Admiralty, admitted in his evidence before a Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Navy Estimates in 1888 that we were 300 lieutenants short. How much more shall we be short, in 1894, when ten battle ships and sixty cruisers are added to our Navy? The Bight Hon. W. H. Smith told me, shortly before his death, that the Navy was much too short of officers. Other Admiralty officials have also admitted the same to me."

I want to draw the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to another matter of importance. It is as to the present system which prevails of allowing admirals to choose their own flag captains without any limit of choice. The recent stranding of the Victoria has drawn public attention to this matter, and, without wishing to cast any reflection upon the captain of that fine ship, I must say I think the present is not a right system, and ought not to be any longer continued. I admit that the custom prevailed in old times, but now the conditions of the Service are entirely altered, and we have enormous battle ships, each a squadron in itself, costing from £800,000 to £1,000,000; and I boldly affirm that the time has come when a limit ought to be placed on the admiral's power to choose the flag captain to command such a ship. I venture to suggest that the question should be considered whether a young officer, be he ever so smart, should be put in that responsible position—in command of a first-class ironclad—unless he has commanded a seagoing ship as captain for two or three years. Until these officers have had experience in command of seagoing ships they should not be allowed to put the national property in jeopardy. The present First Sea Lord of the Admiralty (Admiral Sir A. H. Hoskins), when in command in the Mediterranean, chose a first-class man as his flag captain, who had commanded a ship in the Training Squadron for three years; but I believe there are three Admirals now afloat who have chosen men who have never before commanded a ship as captain. I cast no aspersion on the flag-captain of the Victoria; but such occurrences draw attention to the point I have raised. The Admiral's choice should be limited in the way I have suggested. One word more. A very important Memorandum has been circulated amongst the Naval Members of the House by certain warrant officers, in which they ask for the creation of a new rank—fleet gunner, fleet boatswain, and fleet carpenter. You have already fleet surgeons and fleet paymasters. I express no opinion on the question; but I think it should be considered, as no men do better service than the warrant officers. There is another question to which I have before referred, and which the First Lord said he would look into. It is a great scandal that chief petty officers in the Navy, on retiring, should not have their rank recognised, as is done in the case of their brother officers in the Army. Their rank should at least be recognised by an additional halfpenny a day in their pensions. The noble Lord says the Treasury is not disposed to grant the money. I am sure the House would give it at once. If the First Lord will only make a fresh appeal, and say he has all the Service at his back, I am sure our excellent Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen) would yield at last.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman who spoke last (Admiral Field) complained, with much force, of favouritism in the appointments in the Navy. I have no doubt favouritism exists in other departments, but the gallant Gentleman's complaint is a sufficient assurance that the grievance is felt in the Navy. The real remedy will be to have a more democratic House of Commons, and a more democratic Government. I should be glad to hear that the appointments were made altogether, not because of the class of any particular officer, but on account of his merits and experience; and until that is done we cannot expect to have good officers or an efficient Navy. The hon. and gallant Member declared that more money was required for the Navy, but I think we vote too much money for these Services. It is a question, too, whether the money is properly applied. Those officers who do the work do not get the money; the large salaries are paid to the show officers. The Navy is a popular Service, and I confess that I have an affection for it which does not extend to the Army, which I should like to see done away with altogether; but if this popularity is to remain, favouritism must disappear. I am glad the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Duff) has paid so much attention to the Debate, because in the next Parliament it may be his business to reduce the Vote, and see that the men who do the work get a proper proportion of the money. If he does not do that, he will have to leave the Government, for the House of Commons will be democratic and will insist on these reductions taking place. Then I think we ought to have some information on the subject of the contracts for these boilers.

I gave the explanation which the hon. Gentleman requires, but at the time I spoke he was out of the House.

That was when we went into Committee, and I was not present. As the question was raised before, I think the explanation should have been given when the Speaker was in the Chair. But with respect to these contracts, it seems that it was not only in one case, for which there might have been some exceptional reason, but in the cases of eleven ships that money was advanced to the contractors without a final certificate. That arises from having ships built by contract, but I am at a loss to understand why money should be paid to the contractors for machinery which turns out to be of no use, and which has not been submitted to the final test. If conditions are put in the contracts why are not those conditions enforced? and if they are not, we must expect to have inferior ships and inferior machinery. We want an assurance from the Government that they will not advance money in this way any more, or, at all events, that the contracts should be made in such a form that they can be carried out. We have an efficient Auditor General who brings these things to our knowledge, and it is our business to see that this money is no longer advanced in such an irregular and improper manner. I desire also to call the attention of the First Lord to the subject of high-class explosives. I do not pretend to know much about them, neither do I think the Government know much about them, but I understand they are very dangerous, and it has occurred to me that if we could get all countries to use them the result would be that every one would be glad to give up the use of them, because of the extreme danger, and I think that would be a good job for the world at large. Then, with respect to submarine vessels, it would be a good thing, rather than otherwise, if we could hide them under the water, and I should be glad if the Government could give us some further information on the matter. In the statement of the First Lord, the naval expenditure for the year was put down at £14,240,220, which showed an increase of £35,100 over the previous year. But, as a matter of fact, the naval expenditure for the year was £15,266,811, and thus, while an impression was given to the public that the Navy was costing 14¼ millions, it was really costing a million more. I am afraid we shall see no reduction of the expenditure this year, and perhaps not next, and we shall never get anything done till independent Members criticise these Votes, and insist on reductions. I object to this total expenditure, as being more than is required for the defence of our commerce and business, and I should like to see it reduced by two or three millions. We want, above all, to give notice to the next Government that when we have a more democratic House of Commons, as we shall have after each succeeding General Election, that the country will insist that so much money is not wasted on the fighting departments. (Laughter.) Hon. Members on the opposite side of the House venture to laugh; but though I should be the first to regret it, they may not be here in the next Parliament to see the reduction. I hope the hon. and gallant Admiral will be here, but the rime has unquestionably come when there will have to be great reductions in the expenditure for fighting purposes.

It may be, Sir, that we on this side of the House will not be the only people who will not be here after the next General Election. I entirely agree with the hon. Member who has just sat down (Mr. Morton) that it is the duty of the Opposition to criticise all Government measures, but I would recommend him to remember that there are some subjects which cost men a lifetime of study to master, and we have noticed that some hon. Gentlemen speak most frequently and at greatest length on subjects of which they know least. I would also point out, as showing the deep interest taken in the subject by hon. Gentlemen on the other side, that when the hon. Gentleman the Member for Banff (Mr. Duff) was speaking the whole of the Benches opposite were empty. The hon. Member has spoken of the great danger of high-class explosives, but he has proposed what seems to me to be a far greater danger—lamely, that we should go in for submarine vessels. The Navy is not given to "striking," but I think we should strike if the First Lord of the Admiralty required us to go under water for any length of time. I rose to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will give an answer to the question I put to him this afternoon; and I may at the same time remark that I think the hon. and gallant Member (Captain Price), when he counted the number of vessels in the Channel and contrasted them with the number at Brest and Cherbourg, must have omitted our Coastguard ships, which are now being made thoroughly efficient. Naval men have just been charged with being sanguinary but amiable, but we do not want to fight at all; nor does it in any way rest with us whether we have to fight or not. The motto of our gunnery ship is, "If you desire to have peace you must be prepared for war." That is why we want to be thoroughly armed. My experience, and I have no doubt the experience of other hon. Gentlemen, is that you cannot stop a bully at school by turning tail and running away. But a bully rarely attempts to bully if bethinks the other boy will turn round and hit him. I am entirely in accord with the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Admiral Field) in hoping that the First Lord of the Admiralty will find some way of altering the present system with regard to flag captains. No doubt there are very clever and able officers among them, but the Admiral is very often away from the flagship for months, and then the flag captain has power to make signals and give directions in the Admiral's name, which I know are sometimes extremely annoying to officers very much his senior. Flag-captains have been practically abolished in the Channel. The Admiralty reserve to themselves entirely the right of appointing flag-captains in the Channel Squadron flag ships and the Home ports, and I think, if selection were confined to men who had been at least a year or two in command as post captains, there would be ample material to choose flag captains from. I was sincerely glad to hear from the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) that some modification of the dockyard system is proposed, and that they have found some way out of, at any rate, part of the difficulty. The Secretary to the Admiralty knows well, for he was at the deputation which came here on the subject, that the real difficulty about this question is that the men do not trust each other. They would trust the Admiralty; they would trust anybody else, but they do not trust their own immediate superiors, though promoted from their own ranks. Their fear is that the best men, who, undoubtedly ought to get higher pay, do not get it on account of favouritism and on local grounds. I have letters with regard to promotions in which the writers say that promotions have been given to very indifferent men, because they have a particular turn of mind as regards politics or religion which suits the foremen. I, therefore, hope the noble Lord will see some way of modifying seriously the system of classification, because, upon those local grounds entirely, it does not work well in the dockyards. I have heard to-night one or two curious remarks about the amount of ships we employ and the amount of ships the French employ, but hon. Gentlemen who talk on this subject seem to me to forget that in war time our Fleet would have to be double theirs. No other nation has the ground to cover that we have, or the same interests to protect. Therefore, any comparison with France or any other foreign nation is idle, because there is no nation which has the trade or the colonies to protect all over the world that we have. It is useless, I think, to say that any comparison can be made. I am bound to say that, whether from my sanguinary character, or my amiable character, or both mixed, I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Morton) in proposing that we should reduce this Vote. I think I could tell him some Votes that might be reduced with some better effect, but I do not think he will find that the country would agree with him in reducing the Naval Vote. My opinion is that any amount of money that the First Lord of the Admiralty chooses to ask for the Navy would be gladly given by the country. I have never heard of money for the Navy being refused by this House. Indeed, I was told by a gentleman, who said he heard it himself, that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone) stated on one occasion that he would rather ask for, £20,000,000 for the Navy than £2,000,000 for the Army. I do not say a word against the Army, but after Trafalgar, in those days when people talk about ships costing comparatively nothing, the Navy had £22,000,000, and the Army £11,000,000. Why that position should be reversed remains a mystery to me.

Before the Vote is put from the Chair I desire to offer some remarks on the explanatory statement of the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty. I understood from various statements which the noble Lord made in course of the Recess that he intended to lay before the House in the present Session a programme of a large character in the same direction as that he did in 1889 under the Naval Defence Act. I have felt a great sense of relief in turning to the statement of the noble Lord, that he has abandoned any wide scheme of that kind, or, at all events, has postponed it.

I never said so.

I certainly understood from speeches made by the noble Lord outside the House that he intended to put before us some great programme, and I think I see some indication of an abandonment of that intention in the statement he has laid before the House. Apparently the abandonment has been due to the pressure of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for unquestionably there are difficulties of finance in the present year. Certainly the money available in the Estimates for the current year for new ships other than those building under the programme of 1889 is comparatively small. I find the total sum available for new construction and the laying down of new ships is not more than £75,000, and I am not surprised that the noble Lord should not have submitted any very large programme for the present year. His statement, as I understand it, is mainly directed to an explanation, to a justification of, and to some extent an apology for his naval policy under the Naval Defence Act. The time has not yet come when we can form a full and final opinion as to the result of that measure. The noble Lord himself in the year previous to introducing that measure gave expression to a fear and dread of what might be the result of laying down a very great number of vessels at the same time. He said in the year 1888, in answer to pressure which was brought to bear upon him for the purpose of a large scheme of re-construction and laying down a great number of vessels at the same time—

"Any great and spasmodic increase of the Navy by the laying down by wholesale of vessels at any one time would be most unwise, and a certain portion of the expenditure would be wasted. There was no single instance in the past in which ships laid down by the dozen had not shown defects common to all, which might have been avoided if they had been laid down continuously over a term of years."

I hope these predictions will not be verified, and that he will be more successful than many of his predecessors to whom he alluded had been. But as I said, the time has not yet come for expressing an opinion on this subject, inasmuch as very few vessels which were laid down in 1889, which have been constructed under the Naval Defence Act, have been yet sent to sea, and therefore there is little opportunity yet of judging what the effect of the measure will be. But there are other matters connected with the Naval Defence Act on which, with reference to the statement now before us, I will say a few words. The first is on this point. One of the main objections we took to the policy indicated in the Naval Defence Act was the confusion that it would bring into the Naval accounts, the extreme difficulty, if not the impossibility, there would be in future of seeing what the aggregate expenditure on the Navy would be in any one year. I think that is very well illustrated by the Estimates for the present year. The Navy Estimate for the present year shows an expenditure on the Navy of £14,290,000. That is the total amount voted for the year. With some difficulty I have ascertained, by bringing into the account several other items, that the actual total expenditure for this year is within a very few pounds of £17,000,000. That is provided for in this way. There are £14,290,000 voted for the Estimates; £1,426,000 are provided out of the Consolidated Fund under the Naval Defence Act of 1889; £677,000 represents unexpended balances in previous years, which, under a clause of the Naval Defence Act, may be expended in the coming year, and, I presume, will be expended; and £700,000 is borrowed and will fall on future years under the Naval Defence Act. That, I believe, to be an accurate statement of the actual contemplated expenditure on the Navy for the coming year and the method of providing for it; and I venture to say that very few people could ascertain that or make it out from the statements provided in the Estimates before us. There is another point in connection with the Naval Defence Act which I also wish to allude to. One of the main arguments in favour of that Act was that it would ensure with absolute certainty the completion of the vessels to be laid down within the period provided under the Act, and would remove every kind of temptation from the Admiralty to delay in completing vessels or postponing any work on them. It is worth while to compare the results with expectations, and for that purpose I will ask the noble Lord to look at the programme which was laid before the House in 1889 at the time the Naval Defence Act was passed. I will first call attention to that part of the programme relating to ships which were to be laid down by contract. The Douse will recollect that there were 32 vessels to be built by contract at a total cost of £10,000,000. The payment for these 32 vessels was to be spread over seven years, but the vessels themselves were to be completed, so far as the contractors were concerned, in about three and a half years. The statement then laid before the House showed that on the 31st March, 1892, the end of the present financial year, the estimated expenditure upon these 32 vessels would be £9,160,000, leaving £740,000 only for the year 1893–94. I deduce from that that it was estimated that all these 32 vessels would be completed so far as the contractors were concerned, in the middle of the year 1892–93. What is the state of these vessels? So far as I can learn from the statement of the noble Lord the actual expenditure upon those vessels up to the 31st March, 1892, will be only £5,924,000.

£7,000,000 to the 31st March.

I think the right hon. Gentleman is wrong in that. I have very carefully gone through the statement of the noble Lord, and I understand that, up to 31st March the actual expenditure will be, as I have stated, about £6,000,000, and that during the year 1892–93 the sum of about £2,000,000 will be expended.

£2,419,000.

£2,419,000 will be expended during the year 1892–93, and the residue during the year 1893–94. The vessels will not themselves be completed, for they will then have to go into the dockyards to be completed, and I gather, therefore, from this statement that these vessels are about a year and a half delayed. That is to say, they would take about a year and a half more for completion than was estimated in the year 1889 when the Naval Defence Act was passed. I now come to the dockyard ships. In respect of these ships, 38 in number, I find that the total expenditure was estimated at £11,500,000. A sum of £2,650,000 was to be provided out of the Shipbuilding Votes of the next five years, minus a certain amount which was to be expended upon vessels already commenced before the Naval Defence Act was passed. £600,000 was to be annually expended upon their armaments, but the £2,650,000 upon the Shipbuilding Votes, multiplied by the five years, would produce a larger sum than was necessary for the completion of all these vessels. The actual estimated cost of completing these vessels, so far as the Shipbuilding Vote is concerned, was £8,650,000. I gather from the statement to which I have referred that there ought to have been a surplus upon that part of the expenditure available for new construction in the year 1892–3 of £1,000,000, and for 1893–94 of £2,000,000. The noble Lord will find a note saying that the £3,000,000 which represents the difference between the estimated cost and the provision made out of the Navy Estimates for the five years would be available for either new ships hereafter to be laid down or else might be voted towards a reduction of the Navy Estimates. I wish the noble Lord to look at what the actual provision is at the present moment. So far as I can ascertain, the actual available surplus for the coming year 1892–93 applicable to new ships will be only £75,000, and the estimated surplus on the next year, 1893–94, instead of being £2,000,000, will be £840,000. Adding the two together they come to over £900,000, instead of £3,000,000. In other words, whereas we in 1889 anticipated there would be a surplus on this Naval Defence account of £3,000,000 applicable to the construction and laying down of new ships not to be provided for by the Naval Defence Act, the actual surplus now estimated will not be more than £900,000. I want an explanation from the noble Lord as to these figures, because there is nothing in this Paper which accounts for so large a deficiency. I understand from the noble Lord there has been a rise in prices and in wages, and that accounts for about £1,000,000 on that part of the year. Then I find it stated in one part of the explanatory statement that it will be necessary for the purpose of economically working the Dockyards to delay the completion of the Dockyard vessels, or some of the larger vessels amongst them, so that they will not be completed within the five years specified in the Naval Defence Act. The completion of them will be carried over into the year 1894–5. I gather that the noble Lord contemplates the possibility, for economical reasons, of postponing the completion of the ironclads built under the Dockyard portion of the Naval Defence Act into the year 1894–5. Therefore, if I am right in this, it would appear both in respect of ironclads and larger vessels being constructed by contract, and also in respect of ironclads being constructed in the Dockyards under the Naval Defence Act, that the same result will follow—namely, that they will not be completed within the specified five years, but that their completion will be spread over the future years. I am not finding fault, because I believe that, for Dockyard purposes, it will be necessary not to attempt the completion of all these vessels at the same time. The justification given for it in the explanatory statement, I think, is sufficient and satisfactory—namely, that it will be difficult to complete all these vessels at the same time without withdrawing men from other work in the Dockyards, or, rather, without leading into the Dockyards other men without work. But that appears to me to be an argument against the scheme for laying down so many new vessels at the same time. I believe, therefore, the wiser course is that which had been hitherto adopted—namely, laying down a certain number of vessels in each year and completing these as quickly as possible. I wish to ask the noble Lord a question in reference to the Naval Defence Act. I understand that he intends to expend the surplus of £70,000 which he says will arise from the Naval Defence Act within the coming year and the £800,000 next year upon the construction. Out of the £70,000 which arises this year, he proposes to commence three ironclads. I want to ask him whether he can do that consistently with the Naval Defence Act? As I read the Naval Defence Act any surplus which arises after the completion, or which is estimated to arise after the completion, of vessels laid down under the Act, must be put into the Sinking Fund—that he cannot, without an amendment of the Act, apply any surplus of that kind to the construction of new vessels. Indeed, I go further, and say that I think he must, under the Act, if the vessels in the aggregate which are building in the Dockyards exceed the cost of £8,650,000, provide for the excess by an amendment of the Act. I wish also to ask whether he can carry any surplus arising from the saving upon the armaments, also in aid of the Shipbuilding Vote, under the Naval Defence Act? As I read the Act none of these three processes are possible, and he will be compelled to bring in a Bill to amend the Naval Defence Act. I hope I make my questions clear, but I have very carefully considered the Naval Defence Act, and I have come to the conclusion that if he wishes to avoid amendment of that Act, and to lay down the new vessels which he proposes to the extent of about £70,000, he must increase his Naval Votes for that purpose. There is another point in connection with the Naval Defence Act which I also desire to allude to. I ventured myself, and so did many others on this side, to predict that the effect of that Act—the laying down of a large number of vessels at the same time—what I may call a spasmodic increase of the Navy in this manner—would act as an inducement to other Powers to do the same. I pointed out in the Debates on the Naval Defence Bill mat the probability would be that France and other Naval Powers would follow our footsteps in increasing the strength of their Navy almost exactly in the same proportion as we were proposing to do. I think that the prediction has practically been verified. I pointed out on that occasion that it was the policy of France to maintain its Navy, as far as the ships of real power are concerned, in the proportion to the Navy of this country of two to three. Everybody knows that in the case of the United States there has been a very large increase of the Navy, avowedly on account of the great increase in this country. The same increase has taken place in Prance, especially in the case of the larger vessels, namely, the ironclads, which constitute the real strength of the Navy. I find that we laid down in 1889, under the Naval Defence Act, ten new ironclads, eight of them of the larger size, and two of them somewhat smaller. I find that since that time France has laid down eight ironclads, which include two laid down in 1892. Comparing the ironclads building in France with the ironclads building in England, I find that the English vessels are very much larger than the French vessels. The average of the English vessels is very much larger than that of the French. I also find that during the last three or four years the French Government has paid unusual and very great attention to the repairs and maintenance of its old ironclads; and I think I am right in saying that at the present moment there is hardly a single ironclad of the older type, other than those in course of construction by France, which has not been fully repaired and put in order, and in respect of which the crews are all detailed in readiness in case of an emergency, and arrangements have been made for taking the sea at the very earliest moment. During the same period I think I am not unjustified in saying that there has been some delay in this country in maintaining and repairing the older ironclads. I think the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty admitted that in his explanatory statement, and that he proposed to make some arrangement during the coming year for the purpose of maintaining and repairing these vessels. I venture to think, therefore, that after the Naval Defence Act, in some three years, the relative position of the French and English Navies is almost identical with what it was three year ago. Both countries have laid down a considerable number of ironclads, and France has spent a very considerable sum in maintaining, repairing, and putting into good condition its older ironclads and confining construction to vessels of that kind which constitute the real strength of a Navy. I quite admit that in the case of cruisers we have attained a considerable advantage. I think that a very great advance has been made in cruisers in this country during the last few years; and I observe that France has not paid the same attention to her cruisers as she has paid to her ironclads which constitute the real strength of a Navy. Cruisers, however, do not constitute the real strength of the English Navy; and therefore, for my part, I attach the utmost importance to maintaining our position with regard to other countries with respect to our ironclads which constitute the real force of the country. It is for this reason that I venture to express approval of the scheme of the noble Lord for the coming year. I know there are some people who think that it would be very much more important to lay down a certain number of cruisers than to commence the construction of three ironclads; but I believe myself it is far wiser that we should lay down the ironclads as is proposed by the noble Lord. But I make this qualification—that I venture to doubt whether it is wise to construct vessels of the enormous size proposed. I agree with the remarks made by the hon. Member for Devonport (Captain Price) on this subject. I think it is a very great question whether it is wise to construct ironclads of the enormous size of 14,000 or 15,000 tons; and I believe no other country has followed our example in building ironclads of that size. The French are building vessels of a much smaller size. So that I think it would be wiser to build vessels of a small type, say about 6,000 or 7,000 tons, and have a considerable number of them, than to build a small number of large vessels. After all, numbers constitute a very important element in time of war; and it is not wise to put so many eggs in one basket. And, for myself, I believe it would be better to expend the same amount of money that is to be expended on these vessels in constructing a larger number of vessels of a somewhat smaller size. I must say I am also glad to find that the noble Lord has not given way to the pressure which was brought upon him during the Recess to enter into a great scheme for building torpedo vessels. These vessels may be very quickly built in time of emergency, and may be multiplied almost indefinitely in a few weeks; and considering the uncertainty of these vessels as to what the ultimate best type may be, I think the noble Lord acted wisely in not listening to the advice of those who tried to induce him to build more of these vessels. I must, in conclusion, complain of the want of information in the Estimates for the coming year. The detailed accounts of the Dockyard expenditure are not before us. I believe last year is the first year in the memory of any man connected with the Admiralty when we had not the detailed information before us. As I have said, the total expenditure of the present year on the Navy is £17,000,000, and the amount which appears on the Estimates is only £14,250,000. May I venture to point out to the Committee how very enormous has been the expenditure on the Army and Navy during the last six years. Comparing the expenditure for the last six years of the two Services with the expenditure on the previous six years, I find that the increase amounts to the average of £6,000,000 a year; and the total, excluding extraordinary expenditure, for the last six years, compared with the six previous years, amounts to no less than £34,000,000. That seems to me a very large amount. And I believe I am right in saying that of the £34,000,000 £7,000,000 have been borrowed. I myself, however, never will resist an application made by the responsible Minister of the day for increasing the Strength of the Navy. I have never done so, and I never will do so; because I believe that I should be incurring very great responsibility—but always subject to this qualification and condition, namely, that the money provided for the Service should be provided out of taxation within the year, because I am satisfied that if that principle be maintained we shall never go very far wrong, and that principle is the only test of the necessity for the expenditure, and the only security against its being wasted.

I rise to congratulate the First Lord of the Admiralty on his statement, and also upon the formation of that Committee as explained to us by the Secretary to the Admiralty. It has always appeared to me that in the hands of the chief of the engineers there is a great responsibility. I would point out that there is in the question of naval engineering an essential and very great difference between that of the Navy and of the commercial marine; and I think a very large number of people criticise somewhat ignorantly and adversely the failures, shortcomings, and breakdowns that occur in the Navy, which are reported much more continuously than the shortcomings and breakdowns that occur in the commercial marine. I would not for one instant minimise the mishaps that have occurred to ships in our Navy during the last few years; but I believe the introduction of this Committee now will have a very good effect, and will prove of enormous benefit in getting rid of those large troubles which arise from the use of those essential elements, boilers, in a ship. Somebody has said that the naval battles of the future will be largely fought in the engine room and the boiler room; and that largely may excuse me for troubling the Committee with any remarks of mine on the subject, because I am more or less intimately in contact with these very questions. The statements laid before us by the First Lord are both satisfactory and unsatisfactory. In some cases they scarcely reconciled themselves, in the view of the profession; but I sincerely hope that some form will be discovered whereby the difficulties under which the Navy has suffered will be largely relieved. It has always appeared to me that forced draught in itself has been over-abused. The five hours forced draught trial of the Blenheim, I think, shows in itself that a forced draught is not altogether the dangerous weapon it is sometimes supposed to be; but I venture to point out that the Blenheim on this occasion was under extremely skilful management and in extremely able hands, and it would not always be possible to attain such satisfactory results with a lot of men pitched into a vessel who did not understand the particular ship or her machinery. Now, I trust that the Committee which has been appointed will in its wisdom discover some form of boiler or some form of forced draught, that shall once and for all satisfy the adverse criticism passed with some fairness and propriety on the shortcomings of the vessels in the Service, and that shall enable commanders of vessels to take their ships into action with no fear of a breakdown below, so that that fear which now possesses the commanders of Her Majesty's ships will absolutely disappear, and whatever may be the cost I trust that that form will be largely adopted by the Admiralty.

I feel sure the House will welcome the assistance which it will derive from the practical knowledge and experience of my hon. Friend who has just spoken, and others like him who are acquainted with the difficulties which Naval engineers have to contend with and overcome. No person is better able to speak on this subject than those really acquainted with it; and I think this furnishes the best answer to the different questions put to us on this Bench—why, in the building of vessels we did not take them away and submit them to the maximum amount of pressure? I wish to answer a question put to me by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford. The right hon. Gentleman criticised the Naval Defence Act, of the principles of which he has always been an opponent, and I am bound to say that he did so with fairness. But the right hon. Gentleman sums up his denunciation of the extravagance of the present Government by saying that the expenditure on the Army and Navy during the last six years was £34,000,000 in excess of the preceding period of six years. But from that amount the right hon. Gentleman has excluded the sum of £20,000,000, which was spent on war preparations. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford has always been an opponent of the principles of the Naval Defence Act. The right hon. Gentleman said that the expenditure on the Army and the Navy during the last six years was £34,000,000 in excess of that during the preceding period of six years. But the right hon. Gentleman excluded from his calculation the £20,000,000 which were expended in war and in preparation for war. The great mistake, in my judgment, which the right hon. Gentleman and other persons in his position make, is to judge of the administrative power and success of a Department by the amount of money spent, and not by the return obtained for that money, and it is because of that mistaken and mischievous opinion that we have had numbers of ships without guns and of guns without ammunition. The first business of everybody connected with a Department, be the expenditure small or be it great, is to make the Fleet as effective as possible, and to keep the amount of money as low as possible without detriment to that Fleet. But, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman forgets—at any rate he makes no allowance for the fact—that our predecessors commenced works which they never finished, built forts that they never armed, constructed ships for which they never provided guns, and guns which they left without ammunition. Therefore, Sir, I say that you cannot properly take the question of expenditure into consideration, unless you likewise count the results. Now, the Naval Defence Act was intended to accomplish certain definite purposes. It was a large operation; it involved an expenditure of £21,000,000, and we hoped to accomplish these three objects (1) to give to the House greater information than it has ever had before concerning the ships in the programme; (2) to complete more rapidly that shipbuilding programme, than had ever been done before; and (3) to complete it more cheaply than any shipbuilding programme of such dimensions had ever before been completed. Sir, I do not for a moment say that we have come up to our ideal standard, but we have undoubtedly achieved results far superior to those accomplished in the past. We have given the House an amount of information such as it never had before in reference to the shipbuilding programme and we have accomplished the completion of that programme with a very small excess upon the original estimate; and I believe that, although certain vessels might be a little behind the dates at which we believed they would be completed, they will certainly be much closer to the original dates than under any other shipbuilding programme. Now, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman and others representing the same political views have frequently expressed the opinion that it would be advisable to limit and curtail the amount of work in the Government Dockyards on the ground that it could not be accomplished as cheaply as in the private dockyards. But, Sir, the Admiralty may claim as the result of the reforms and alterations which they have carried out, that they have placed the dockyards on a far better footing to compete with private yards than has ever been the case before; and that as regards con struction, they have put the dockyards in such a position as actually to have beaten the private yards. Therefore, Sir, we may claim that we have, tested by the severe ordeal of the Naval Defence Act, increased the capacity of our dockyards, and worked them up to a far higher state of efficiency than they ever were before. Now, Sir, it is quite true that a certain number of vessels which are being built by contractors will not be built as quickly as we had anticipated. That is not our fault. There was a difficulty in supplying a certain class of material, and thus delay occurred, and it was mainly in connection with armour—the hull and the horizontal armour required for the decks—that the delay has arisen. It is quite true that a certain and a very limited number of vessels may not be completed within the stipulated period, but this may be taken into consideration: that 72 vessels will have been completed in the period at a cost of £21,000,000 sterling; and when that work is put alongside any great private engineering enterprise such as the Forth Bridge or the Manchester Ship Canal, the contrast in the work done by private individuals and the work done in the Government Dockyards is such that there can be no reason whatever for blaming the Government. There have been some cases of delay, but nothing compared to what took place under the old system. The hon. Gentleman asks how it was I permitted to appear in the Paper, which was laid on the Table of the House in 1889, the statement that there would be a surplus of £3,000,000 available for new construction, whereas there is now only £950,000 available for that purpose. In the first place, we propose to reduce by £600,000 the sums on new construction, and an increase of £350,000, which is partly due to an augmentation of wages, and which was to have been on the normal Vote, but which we had to transfer to the Naval Defence Account. Taking these figures, it brings up the Vote to £1,900,000. Then we have an increase to the cost of the dockyard ships, owing to their large size, amounting to £800,000. Further, in addition to the old programme, there is an excess of expenditure of about £200,000, and that makes up the difference. The right hon. Gentleman took the old programme that was drawn up before the financial year of 1889 was closed, and consequently any sum which was unexpended of that large sum was surrendered or transferred, and the amount thus postponed or transferred, together with the additional cost of the old programme, makes up the difference of the accounts. The right hon. Gentleman asks whether the savings can be applied. Well, according to the authorities who interpret this Act, they can be applied this year and next, even though we do not reach the maximum of £2,650,000, but it is not intended to apply them to any other purpose than ships under the Naval Defence Act. We do not this year exceed the maximum under Statute of £8,000,000, which is to be devoted to the construction of these ships, and, therefore, it is certainly not necessary for us, in this particular, to bring in a Bill this year. Whether a Bill will be ultimately necessary is a nice and delicate point upon which I would rather not express an opinion. Then the right hon. Gentleman went on to say that the result of introducing the Naval Defence Act had been to accelerate the expenditure of foreign countries. I know that is an assertion which the right hon. Gentleman has made more than once. I can find no evidence of it. France has not laid down nine ironclads since the Act was passed. She had three in hand before the Naval Defence Act, and the only vessels added are vessels that were laid down since in the ordinary course. France has laid down some smaller vessels for coast defence—four in number—and three large vessels; but the success of the progress of any foreign nation, as I have frequently asserted, is not to be measured or tested by the number of vessels laid down, but by the progress which is made with those vessels. If we concentrate our attention on the vessels we have in hand, and build them 50 per cent. quicker, it does not matter what foreign nations do. If we work up to that standard, our Navy will advance steadily, and foreign nations will be less disposed than formerly to try to regulate their naval expenditure by ours. The right hon. Gentleman objected to large ironclads. I am quite aware his feeling is shared by others; but it is a feeling to which, as long as I have the honour of being at the Admiralty, I will give an uncompromising opposition. If you have an ironclad, it must be a large one. If you have not a large ironclad, it is better to have none at all. Thirty years ago we had a number of magnificent armoured warships—the Warrior, the Minotaur, and the Agincourt, and others—all splendid specimens of their class. They were the biggest ships in existence. One or two accidents occurred and a vessel went aground, and the consequence was that pressure was brought to bear on the Admiralty to build smaller vessels. A number of smaller vessels was built, but the architecture prevailing when these smaller vessels were built was just as faulty as that which obtained during the period of larger vessels was good. Three qualities must be combined in a battle-ship: the ship must be able to give punishment, to take punishment, and must have a certain speed. When its dimensions are diminished and reduced to a certain displacement one of these three qualities has to be abandoned. If our Navy is called upon to act, it must be in foreign waters; and the ships must have speed and great coaling capacity; and, therefore, you must diminish their offensive property—which will make them a mark for the enemy—or their defensive property, if you reduce their size. Therefore, to diminish either would be an error. It is open to question whether you should have armoured vessels at all, but if you are to have them they must be of a certain size. That is the almost universal experience. The biggest vessel in the Navy is the Royal Sovereign. She will cost less than the Hero and the Conqueror, and any naval man will tell you she could knock them both to pieces. Being large and more powerful, the Royal Sovereign could stand the sea, in any weather, and could go anywhere. But that is not the only objection to the smaller vessels. There is another: that you must, if you adopt them, increase the numbers of yourmen—taking them early, and giving them a long training, and, finally, pensions. If you work the matter out from the point of view of figures, and figures alone, it will be cheaper and better to have war vessels which are large and effective seagoing vessels than a number of small ships which cannot keep the sea in all weathers. It is open to question whether in the warship of the future you should have large guns. If you dispense with them you considerably diminish the cost of building ships. It is a great mistake to suppose that the size of a ship necessarily regulates its cost. Whether it is 10,000 or 12,000 tons does not practically make a very great difference in its cost, unless you increase the area of its armament. Certainly I would strongly urge that ships should be of adequate size, and that they should be capable of performing the functions for which they are intended. The ships we propose to lay down will be considerably less costly than the preceding class, because of a new distribution of armour, which will be as effective and much cheaper than that under the old system. We do not propose that these ships shall be armed with guns of the same kind, and the only question we are considering is whether we shall take the 10-inch gun of the most modern type or another type of 12-inch gun. I should add that in these ships the primary object will be to give as large a subsidiary armament as possible. But the details will be laid on the Table before we come to the Shipbuilding Vote, so that hon. Gentlemen will have ample opportunities of putting further questions to me on the subject if they wish to do so. Now, I will answer the various questions which have been put to me in the course of the evening. There has been a good deal of criticism upon the use of the word "modest," which was associated with the programme I have proposed for this next year. But my hon. Friends behind me must not imagine that, because for this particular year we propose only to lay down three ironclads, that is to be the programme for future years. We have shown that there is available for the next five years £8,000,000 sterling for shipbuilding alone; but, as only £70,000 was available this year, I did not think it right to tie the hands of the House as to any decision it might wish to arrive at next year. But next year it will be necessary for the Admiralty to carefully consider—and I think the right hon. Member for Bradford admitted that—how they should develop their programme, so that when the following financial year begins they may be able to lay down a programme which will be sufficient to give full employment to the establishments of the various Dockyards. When the programme is complete, I have no doubt it will contain a number of cruisers. We have this year made considerable advance in that part of the programme, and as two more cruisers will be finished before April, 1894, we shall, under the Naval Defence Act, have made provision for no less than 43 efficient sea-going cruisers. I will now deal with questions relating to the officers and men of the Navy. My hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke called attention to the special request made by the warrant officers that their position might be improved, and more chances given to them of becoming commissioned officers. I have looked very carefully into the request which was sent to the Admiralty within the last few months. In it a comparison was drawn between the warrant officers of the Army and of the Navy, and on the strength of that comparison certain proposals have been made by which the warrant officers of the Navy thought they would be put on an equality with the warrant officers of the Army. In looking through that statement, the first fact that struck me was the very much larger proportion of warrant officers there was in the Navy than in the Army. There are 750 warrant officers in the whole Army of 150,000 men, but in the Navy there are 1,050 out of 24,000 men. Therefore one man out of 24 has a chance of becoming a warrant officer in the Navy; that is to say, the inducement to the blue-jacket to join the Navy is that, if he conducts himself properly, he has one chance out of 24 of attaining to the grade of warrant officer. That makes a great difference, and shows that inducements are offered to men to join the Nary in far greater proportion than they are in the Army. The warrant officers do not complain, according to this statement, of their pay or treatment, except that after they have been a certain time warrant officers they have no sufficient inducement of promotion held out to them, and practically remain during the term of their service in their position of warrant officers. They, therefore, propose that a certain number shall, after ten years' service, be put up to a higher grade, and that a certain number, after 20 years' service, shall be raised to a grade still higher. I looked very carefully into this statement from a general as well as a financial point of view. The financial point of view is that it would cost £75,000 a year, and practically raise the pay of the warrant officer by something like 30 per cent. If we were to do that, we should at once bring upon us demands from every grade in the Navy for an increase; and, one class having had its pay thus raised, it would be only fair to give a similar consideration to the other classes. Consequently, the proposal is not one which, from a financial point of view, I can approve. There are what are called chief warrant officers; but the description is a misnomer, because those who occupy the position of chief warrant officers are commissioned officers, and I think we might fairly consider whether we could not adopt some name to denote that position; and, also, whether we might not increase their number, and thus cause additional promotion. In addition to that, we ought to do our best, in connection with the Ordnance Store Department and other Departments, to comply with the warrant officers' request. There are a certain number of appointments held by commissioned officers at present which might fairly and legitimately be given to warrant officers of a certain standing. I had hoped that it might be possible to create some grade in the sea-going Service equivalent to that of chief officer of the Coastguard, but I find that that is almost impossible. If, however, we cannot go so far as my hon. and gallant Friend would wish, he will see that we are prepared to look into this question in a kindly spirit, and to do our best to meet the wishes of this most respectable class of officers. As to the question of pensions to chief petty officers, I have shown that it has been considered only fair and legitimate that before a large increase, amounting to several thousands a year, is made in the Non-Effective Vote, the experiment should be tried of seeing whether or not the attractions of the Service are sufficient to get men of good character to volunteer for this particular grade. Both my hon. and gallant Friends have called attention to what is rather a matter of discipline regarding the "juniority," if I may use the word, of certain Flag Captains. My hon. and gallant Friends know, however, that this is a very delicate question to consider. A Commander-in-Chief sent abroad has great responsibilities put upon him. In time of war he is absolutely responsible for the great mass of duties connected with the whole area of the station. I do not think it is a reasonable thing to interfere with any man placed in that position, by confining the selection of Staff officers to be placed under him. Commanders-in-Chief have always possessed the light of selecting the officer who should be their Flag Captain. At the same time I think it only right that all Admirals should recollect that the flag ship is the largest ship on the station, and, if the Admiral happens to be absent, the Flag Captain will have to take charge of the navigation of the vessel. And nowadays, when ironclads represent such a large sum of money, I think it advisable that the Commander-in-Chief should select some officer for the post of Flag Captain who possesses some experience in the command of a large ship. No doubt the expression of opinion which has been given in this House will be sufficient, because no Admiral would dream of selecting, when his reputation depends upon the selection, other than competent officers. Moreover, it is desirable that officers of greater seniority should be Flag Captains in the future.

Might I ask the noble Lord for information regarding the duties of lieutenants and the application of senior officers for an increase of pay?

As to the lieutenants, I have to say that no demands have been made by them except for a re-arrangement of duties. It is a small matter, however, which I think the Admirals in command might dispose of themselves. As to the request made by the senior officers for an increase of pay, I expressed my opinion last year, and I am bound to say I can see no reason whatever to depart from the position which I previously arrived at when the officers asked for an increase of pay on the ground that other officers in the Navy were, in their opinion, more highly paid than they were themselves. I am bound to say that I do not think the Admiralty and the Treasury ever ought to raise the pay of any particular grade because it is found that another grade entirely different may have had higher pay. Whether a man is paid sufficient or not ought to be regulated by the work he does. We can get plenty of officers, and they will be sufficient to keep our work up to the requisite strength. I cannot hold out any hope of assenting to the proposals which were made last year and repeated this year; but the Admiralty have made two concessions to the engineers of the Navy. Complaints were made that the Engineer-in-Chief was inadequately paid, and his salary has been raised from £1,000 to £1,300 this year. The second concession is that the engineers should have charge of the machinery of ships in reserve; and this concession will entail an expenditure of £4,000 or £5,000 a year. Beyond that I cannot hold out any hope of acceding to anything that will make this year different from last year. As to the position in the Service of engine-room artificers, what I have to say on that matter has been already covered by what I have said on the status of petty officers. I think I have answered all the questions which have been put to me, and I trust that my hon. and gallant Friends who asked them are satisfied.

I would like to know what the Admiralty are doing, in the first place, with regard to the adoption of high explosives; in the second place, with regard to sub-marine vessels; and, in the third place, with regard to controlable torpedoes? This is not a Party question, and it was brought before the House by one of our most respected ex-Members, Lord Charles Beresford, who particularly drew the attention of the Admiralty to the value of high explosives. They have a minimum explosive force of three times and a maximum of five times to gunpowder, and shells filled with them spread much wider and do far more damage. It is therefore of the utmost importance if they can be safely used for shells. Very great progress has been made with the dynamite gun, which would be useful for firing these shells, and I should like to ask the noble Lord what steps he has taken with regard to it. Are there any of these shells afloat? Are any of them charged with high explosives? If they are considered too dangerous to store on ships in time of peace, are there any in store for use when required? Is the noble Lord aware that other nations are dealing with high explosives, and that a shell charged with them would do immense damage to a vessel of even 14,000 tons? I think we are entitled to some information on these points. At a time when several nations and experts say that high explosives are perfectly safe to use we are entitled to some information as to what the Admiralty is doing in the matter. Then there is the question of submarine vessels. I should like to know what progress has been made with them, and whether any experiments have been made in that direction. These vessels are not entirely under water, but they show very little of their bulk above it, and one of our 14,000 ton ships would be in great jeopardy if an enemy's submarine boat were in its vicinity. These boats have arrived at a practical stage; France has several, Spain has one or two, and Russia has been making experiments. I think we ought to have some statement on this matter from the First Lord of the Admiralty. It is little use looking to the Estimates. I should naturally look for information on these points under the Scientific Vote, but I find nothing there but astronomy; that is very useful, but it does not reply to these questions. There is a third form of warfare which has got into an advanced state — the control of torpedoes, torpedoes which can change their direction. At the beginning of this Session we voted £100,000 to the inventor of one torpedo which was only to be used from land. It is a very clever torpedo managed by two piano wires, and the Admiralty now say they cannot use it. Since that time Edison's electric torpedo has come to the front, and it seems to be of considerable importance. It can be used from a ship as the base of operations, and can be turned upon another ship in any position. It goes perhaps ten feet under water, and if charged with about 150 lbs. of high explosive it would utterly destroy a large vessel; the force of the explosion would set the water-tight compartments at absolute defiance. All these points are worthy of attention, but because they are out of the ordinary run of the work of the Navy they receive no attention from the authorities. I do not believe the British Navy has any secrets at all, and I, therefore, think the First Lord might very well state in what position these points now are in the British Navy.

I wish to draw the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to a grievance of which we have to complain. I mean the practice of boycotting Irish harbours at the time of paying off the sailors in the Navy. Sailors who have sewed a long time in Irish waters are taken into English waters to be paid off. When it is remembered that Ireland contributes largely to the Imperial Exchequer, it is only fair that her people should be allowed to reap some benefit in these matters. I should also like to know if it is the intention of the Admiralty to maintain the buoys at either end of Horse Island in Bantry Bay. Before these buoys were placed ships were frequently injured in the bay, but since they have been placed no such accidents have occurred. I understand that orders have been given for these buoys to be removed. There is no harbour authority at Bantry Ray, and no Local Authority which can maintain the buoys, but they are of such advantage to vessels using the bay that I think they should be maintained. Will the noble Lord also tell us when it is intended to build the Coastguard station at Berehaven? Some years ago I asked the question, and was told there was a difficulty with the landlord.