rose to move—

"That the Bill be re-committed to the former Committee."

"That it be an Instruction to the Committee that they have power to insert a provision in the Bill amending the provisions of 'The Rathmines and Rathgar Improvement Act, 1885,' relating to the qualification to vote at the elections of township commissioners so as to make the provisions of 'The Poor Rate Assessment and Collection Act. 1869,' applicable to such qualification."

He said the Amendment was intended to set right a defect which existed in the Bill at the present time. As regarded the merits of the Bill, he did not think there would be any difference of opinion; and he apprehended that the principal argument against the Amendment which he was moving would be that it was not right or proper that such questions should be raised and decided upon Private Bills such as that before the House. As a general rule, on questions relating to particular municipalities, it was not proper or desirable that the broad question of electoral representation should be raised; but he would remind the House that the Irish townships were very different in respect of those matters from places in other parts of the Kingdom. In Dublin the whole electoral law had been regulated, not by Public, but by Private Statute. Private Acts were in operation in the half-dozen townships scattered around Dublin. In the case of Rathmines the original voting system was carried out under the Statute which constituted the townships. Six years ago, in dealing with a Private Act, the House introduced electoral clauses into it; and he was not aware that there was any objection to any provision being included in a Private Bill so long as it did not encroach in any way on any general Statute. So much, he might say, for the argument to which he had referred as likely to be urged against the Bill. Another reason which he would urge for the adoption of the Amendment was that, being furnished with a suitable opportunity, the House would see that they had here a striking example of the necessity of local control. The Bill was introduced in consequence of a gross blunder made by the Governing Board in the township, involving a question of expenditure—the expenditure of a sum of from £80,000 to £85,000. The Commissioners had promoted a Bill for the purpose of erecting water works. They got into litigation, and the case was before the Irish Courts, and afterwards before the House of Lords, and the decision went against them. Had such a blunder, involving such an expenditure, been committed by a body of Nationalists, the Kingdom would have rung with the facts, and it would have been suggested that those were the kind of people they in England were asked to grant the control of their own affairs. They had an example of the kind from the other side in the promoters of the Bill before the House. He did not propose to do anything very exceptional or very abnormal. There was nothing of that character in the Motion that he had before the House. All he asked was that they should extend to this township the law that at present existed throughout the length and breadth of Great Britain. He need not go in for the question of compound householders of Great Britain; but he held that the provisions of the Statute of 1869 should be extended so far as it related to this particular municipality. The franchise at present existing was one established by a Private Act of 1885, by which it was provided that all male persons rated for poor rate were entitled to vote. Primâ facie, that should qualify everyone who was so rated; but, in consequence of a general enactment in premises under £4, the owner was rated and not the occupier, so that large numbers were excluded from benefits which they were entitled to enjoy. He said that the occupier should have a municipal vote just as he had one in the case of the Parliamentary franchise. He understood that the hon. Gentleman who represented the division of Dublin County in which Rathmines was situated intended to oppose this Bill. How could the hon. Gentleman defend the proposition that those who were qualified and competent to return him to the House of Commons were not competent and should not be qualified to vote for the return of a Commissioner to the Local Board? Putting the matter that way before the House, was, in his opinion, showing the necessity for the Bill. There could be no kind of logic in arguing as he had suggested. He could understand the logic under the old law—that a man should not be allowed to give a municipal vote unless he paid a municipal rate. That would be logical enough; but it was a fact that in this municipality a great many who were paying taxes had no votes, and many who were not paying had votes. There was no reason why the payment of the assessment of the poor rate should be taken into account in this way. The £4 rating, he would point out, meant a rental of £7 or £8, so that really the law had the object of setting up a rental franchise of £7 or £8. It would be said, no doubt, that his proposal would mean the creation of an anomaly; but he did not attach weight to that view, for, as a matter of fact, the Irish municipal franchise law was full of anomalies. They had various sorts of franchise. Ten places had one sort of franchise; Belfast and Dublin had franchises differing from each other; other towns had a £5 franchise; others, again, a large number, were under the Towns Improvement Act of 1854. The Dublin townships are all governed by franchises of their own. It was clear, therefore, that the argument of anomalies fell to the ground. He might further point out that in this very township of which he was speaking there was in force a law that existed in no other part of the United Kingdom—that was, the municipal vote was conferred after four months' occupation. It could not, on the whole, be fairly urged that there was reason to talk of anomaly, for, as they saw, there was an anomalous condition of affairs in existence already. He asked them to simply look at the law as it at present stood throughout the length and breadth of Great Britain as regarded the question of the franchise. He did not want to detain the House; but he could say that the grievance of which he had to make complaint was very keenly felt. There were 4,500 houses, and less than 2,000 of the occupiers had votes. Surely those who could vote for Imperial purposes, sending Representatives to that House, were entitled to vote on the local issues involved in municipal questions? He trusted the House of Commons would redress this glaring grievance by adopting the Resolution which stood in his name.

said, he did not think the hon. Member for Cork (Mr. Maurice Healy) need have apologised to the House for taking up its time, for, speaking as Member for the constituency with a portion of which the Bill proposed to deal, he would like to tell the House that the question was one of very serious importance. He thought it his duty, as Member for the division, to put the case as it had been stated to him—to put himself in the position of the ratepayer, and to state the case for the ratepayer fairly. Before replying to the Member for Cork, he could not do better than give the House a true history of the Bill under consideration. The primary object of the Bill was to legalise certain changes that had taken place and that were found to be necessary, but which led to litigation. The Member for Cork spoke of the matter as a gross blunder, and he justified his Amendment in that way. All he had to say about it was that the Commissioners had not spared the expense necessary to secure the services of the best water engineer available; and if there had been a blunder—he believed it might be a pardonable miscalculation—it was simply a technical blunder on the part of the engineer. The litigation arose from the fact that the works were constructed in a manner at variance with the provisions of a previous Act of Parliament. Certain mill-owners felt aggrieved; they felt that their interests were affected, and they brought this action before the Master of the Rolls in Dublin, who decided against the Commissioners. The case was then taken before the Court of Appeal in Dublin, where four Judges unanimously decided in favour of the Commissioners and against the judgment of the Master of the Rolls. Then it was carried to the House of Lords, where throe Judges decided against the Commissioners and two in their favour. So that they had four Judges against the Commissioners and six in their favour. In the end the Commissioners entered into negotiations with the mill-owners, and the result was that the claims of the mill-owners were adequately conceded, and certain changes in the water-works—in their coustruction—were made; and this Bill was mainly for the purpose of legalising those changes. He could say that the action of the mill-owners in this matter had been very generous and patriotic. They could have put the Commissioners to an expense of £30,000; but, if the Act were passed, the expense would probably not exceed £25,000. The improvements were to be carried out by the 30th of August of the present year, and, unless the Bill was passed by that-time, the people of the township would be left without water. He ought to mention that there were subsidiary objects in the Bill, such as the acquirement of a certain open space, the acquisition of additional public buildings, a town hall, and other matters for the improvement of the township, which would involve an expenditure of £20,000. No objection had been raised by anybody to the objects contained in the Bill, and it was taken for granted that in accordance with precedent any objection to the Bill would have been taken at an earlier stage. The present Motion was entirely out of Order as being beyond the scope of a Private Bill, and there was no precedent for inserting at that stage a provision which was foreign to the objects of the Bill, and which was covered neither by the Preamble nor by any of the Parliamentary Notices. He was aware, however, that there were two precedents. The first arose in 1885, when, owing to the action of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean, the existing £4 franchise was incorporated in the Rathmines Township Act. This, however, was done at a much earlier date in the progress of the Bill, and the reason of the right hon. Baronet for taking that course was that as Chairman of a Royal Commission on Municipal Franchises certain facts had been brought to his notice which rendered such a change in the Bill imperative. The hon. Member for North Kerry, speaking in 1887, bore testimony to the excellent manner in which that change had operated. There was a second precedent on which the hon. Member who introduced this Motion no doubt relied, and that was the Belfast Drainage Bill of 1886, and the importance of that was due to the fact that it cited the action of the House in the Rathmines Bill as a precedent. He wished, however, the House would bear in mind the criticisms of the present Chancellor of the Exchequer upon the question as to whether it was convenience to introduce Motions, such as that of the hon. Member for Cork, upon the last stages of Private Bills; the opinion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was that if broad questions of policy were to be allowed to be raised in this way on Private Bills it would have the effect of throwing the whole Business of the House into confusion by allowing miscellaneous questions of a public character and of immense importance thus to be brought on for discussion. There were peculiar circumstances in the Belfast case, too, which did not apply to the present Bill, for it was alleged that the Belfast Bill had been put forward stealthily. On the occasion of its discussion, the Rathmines case was admitted to be a bad precedent by the Government; and now, if they were to make a now precedent on the lines of the Motion of the hon. Member, he believed it would make matters a thousand times worse. They would be introducing an entirely new practice into the House, and he maintained that there was absolutely no precedent for introducing a Motion of the kind at the stage at which they had arrived. It was impossible to see what the limits of such a practice would be. For instance, he could not see what was to prevent the hon. Member grafting a Local Veto Motion on the Bill. He would ask the hon. Member to remember that this Bill had been introduced for a specific purpose, and that it was the wish of the ratepayers that it should become law. The hon. Member who proposed this Motion did not pretend that be had any support behind him whatever, and he could not point to a single Petition or Resolution against the Bill.

I am not opposing it.

If the Bill were amended in the manner proposed by the hon. Member its entire scope would be changed. He was not arguing that the franchise ought not to be changed. The Irish franchise was full of anomalies, which would have to be dealt with sooner or later by a Public Act; but that was no reason why they should now take action which would endanger the whole Bill and would put the promoters to additional and unnecessary expense.

said, he wished to point out that the precedent of Belfast was a much stronger precedent than the case now before the House. The hon. Member who spoke last was right in saying that there was a broad distinction in the two cases; but the distinction was this—that in Belfast the franchise was regulated by Public Statute, and a change was sought to be effected by means of an Amendment in a Private Bill, whereas in the present case the franchise was regulated by Private Statute, and an Amendment of the Statute was proposed in the only legal, logical way—namely, by an Amendment on a Private Bill. It seemed to him, under those circumstances, that the quotations from the Chancellor of the Exchequer fell to the ground, for now it was proposed to amend the franchise in the same way that the franchise was created. He did not think any consideration ought to prevent them doing a thing if it was a good thing to be done, and if no practical inconvenience would be created by doing it. The hon. Member who last spoke admitted it would be a good thing to amend the franchise in the direction they suggested.

I said nothing about the direction of the proposed Amendment. All I said was that the question of the franchise would have eventually to be dealt with.

said, that, of course, he accepted the hon. Member's statement; but surely he was entitled to assume that, as so able an advocate had not a word to say against the proposed Amendment, its principle was a good one. The Bill would not necessarily be delayed if this Motion were adopted. It would create no real grievance to the Rathmines Town Commissioners, and the addition which it would entail to the Bill would be very slight indeed. He ventured, therefore, to submit that the Amendment was a proper one to be made.

said, he wished to adduce a few reasons in support of his argument that this was not a right thing to be done. In the first place, the hon. Member who made the Motion before the House was not proposing to remove an anomaly, but he was seeking to create one, and in doing so he was also creating confusion. It was a very strange and most inconvenient proposal. As his hon. Friend had shown, this matter had not come before the House through any mismanagement on the part of the promoters of the Bill. They had done everything in their power to perfect it, as was proved by the long course of litigation through which he went and the fact that six out of the 10 Judges before whom the case went decided in favour of the Commissioners showed that they had very strong reasons for their action. It was not accurate to say that this was a proposal to assimilate the municipal franchise of Rathmines to any franchise that existed in this country. Quite the contrary, for it was proposed to introduce into this Bill a municipal franchise which existed nowhere in England or Ireland or anywhere at all. The franchise in Rathmines at present was the normal franchise in Ireland. There were 117 municipalities in Ireland, and of these 90 had a £4 franchise—the franchise which existed in the present Bill—two had a lower franchise, and the remainder exceeded £4; and yet on the Third Reading of this Bill it was proposed to completely alter the franchise. That was a startling proposition which he believed neither the Commissioners nor the ratepayers could consent to; and he argued that if it was inserted in the Bill in its present form it would be fatal to it. He might be asked what was the franchise in the neighbouring townships. The reply was that it was a higher franchise, and yet they were to be invited to specially interfere in the case of Rathmines, and to give it a lower franchise than its neighbours. He hoped that the House would not introduce this extraordinary new franchise with a four months' qualifying period, seeing that it existed nowhere else, and Rathmines was not now suffering from any grievance.

denied that any attempt had been made by the last speaker to answer the arguments of the hon. Member for Cork. It was admitted that a change in the franchise in the direction proposed in this Amendment was desirable and necessary. It was not contended that the Rathmines Commissioners were a model body; indeed, their proceedings in regard to providing waterworks proved the contrary, as they had gone to work in the most expensive way possible, and were seeking to introduce a costly and impure system. Had they been sensible men they would not have acted in that manner, nor would they have dared to act so if the franchise had been lower. In the case of Belfast, his hon. Friend the Member for North Kerry (Mr. Sexton) had, in consequence of the magnitude of the problem involved, to make an entirely new proposition to the House. In the present case it would be quite in Order to insert a provision respecting the franchise in the Bill; and no delay would occur in the passage of the Bill if this were done. All that was proposed was that the entire body of the ratepayers in the township should have a voice in the expenditure of a large sum of money. It was, no doubt, the ease that the Commissioners took a vote upon the Bill; but the advertisement calling the public meeting at which the vote was taken appeared only in a newspaper which had a very limited circulation in Dublin, and none at all among the class of people who claimed the franchise. Under these circumstances, he appealed to the Liberal and Radical Members to give effect to the principle of the extension of the franchise, so that all those who paid rates either directly or indirectly should have a voice in the election of the Commissioners.

said, the question could be put into a nutshell. In the first place, it was an extraordinary thing that the opposition to a Private Bill concerning the suburbs of the City of Dublin should come from the Counties of Cork and Roscommon.

, interposing, said, he knew Rathmines very well, and was deeply interested in its prosperity.

said, the hon. Member's statement did not at all affect the remark he had just made. Although the City and County of Dublin had six Members, not one of them had raised his voice against the Bill. The matter was not one of Party politics at all. Indeed, hon. Members had received a Whip in favour of the passage of the Bill in its entirety, signed by some of the leading Nationalists of Rathmines.

We are not opposing the Bill.

said, the Whip had been issued in opposition to the opposition of the hon. Members. The question of the merits of the Bill was a very simple one. The Rathmines Town Commissioners, some time ago, erected waterworks at a cost of £150,000. The final Court of Appeal had decided that those waterworks were not constructed according to contract, there having been a conflict on the point for something like two or three years. The mill-owners, who sought and obtained an injunction against the Commissioners, had now come to terms on this Bill, and hon. Members opposite were asking the House to prevent the carrying out of a perfectly reasonable settlement which had been arrived at by the parties to the litigation. As to the question of the extension of the franchise, he himself, since he had entered the House, had voted at every opportunity for the extension of the municipal franchise, and he had been the first Member to support the hon. Member for Kerry (Mr. Sexton) in his proposal to extend the franchise in Belfast. That proposal, however, was made in the form of a separate Bill, so that it was really no precedent for the present Amendment. It was not a very convenient course to amend Private Bills in the way proposed, and he held that the House of Commons ought not to put difficulties in the way of a public body conducting the affairs of a prosperous township when they came forward with a proposal like that which was embodied in the Bill.

This is not a measure on which the Irish Government, as such, has any view, or is in any way involved. But a considerable number of representations have reached me about it, and perhaps the House will not be sorry if I state the course which I think my hon. and learned Friend opposite (Mr. M. Healy) might most advantageously pursue. I agree with him entirely in the principle he desires to establish. I am entirely with him in the desire to see the franchise extended in the direction he indicates, and I have not been very much impressed by the argument of the hon. Member for South Dublin (Mr. Horace Plunkett) as to the question of precedence. I do not think that, the argument that there is no precedent for re-committing a Bill originating in the Lords carries us very far. At the same time, I am bound to say that practical inconvenience of the gravest kind will almost certainly follow the adoption of this Amendment. I know the Instruction is intended to he of a permissive character, and that the Committee might decline to accept the proposal it embodies; but we cannot deny that a great deal of time would be taken up by the proceedings which would have to take place, and we cannot hide from ourselves that it is perfectly possible that, were the intentions of hon. Members carried out and a provision for the extension of the franchise inserted in the Bill, the measure would have to go again to another place where it is not very hard to foretell the fate which would be in store for it. The result would be that the Bill would not pass the two Houses by the 1st of August, which is the latest date at which the measure can come into operation if the Instruction is to be complied with. I do not think it would be fair to leave the 25,000 people of Rathmines in the condition in which I think they would be left if the measure did not pass, and I would suggest to my hon. and learned Friend that he should withdraw the Instruction.

As Chairman of Ways and Means, I am the Chairman of the Unopposed Bill Committee before which this Bill was brought. In case this Instruction is carried, and after the speeches which have been addressed to the House to-day, I do not think anybody could regard the Bill as altogether unopposed. I, therefore, think it will be my duty to scud it before an opposed Bill Committee.

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, during the five years ending March, 1892, charges were repeatedly made by Petition and otherwise, from the inhabitants of Trinidad and Tobago, against the Chief Justice of those Colonies, of interviewing and advising intending litigants; encouraging speculative litigation and fraudulent conduct in Court; using intemperate language on the Bench; and illegally dispensing with the Statute Laws; why the charges that were made were never brought against the Chief Justice by the Governor in Executive Council in the usual course; what steps have been taken, or are proposed to be taken, to provide for a speedy and effectual method in the future for dealing with similar charges; and whether he will lay upon the Table of the House the late Report of the Trinidad Judicial Inquiry Commission?

The late Chief Justice, whose conduct was impugned, has died, and the Court has been entirely reconstituted. No special arrangements are necessary for dealing with similar charges in the future. There are certain well-defined and well-recognised modes of procedure under which action can be taken in the Colony, and it is not desirable that the Secretary of State should interfere where recourse has not first been had to the usual constitutional action. The Report will be laid on the Table; but, as it is very bulky, it seems undesirable to incur the expense of having it reprinted.

I have to ask the leave of the House to bring in a Bill for the equalisation of rates in the Metropolis. The Bill is only carrying out the unanimous Resolution passed by the House on February 24 in the present year—a Resolution which the Government pledged themselves to give effect to. The scheme is one which cannot be critically examined until all the details are before the House, and no advantage can be gained by having a Second Reading discussion on the First Reading. The principle upon which the Bill proceeds is to ask Parliament to levy, or rather to ask the County Council to levy, throughout the whole of the Metro-polis a uniform rate of 6d. upon the rateable value of London, and to distribute that rate amongst the Sanitary Authorities of the Metropolis according to the respective numbers of their population. I think the House will see, when it has the details before it, that the relief is given where it ought to be given, and burdens imposed where burdens ought to be imposed.

said, that, in view of the opinion expressed by the House on February 24, it would be a waste of time to debate the principle of the Bill now; but he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would understand that on the Second Reading they would have to critically examine the details. While most hon. Members on his side of the House were in favour of further equalising the rates in London, they reserved to themselves full liberty of discussion upon the details, and of considering very critically the means by which it was proposed that the principle should be carried out, it being desirable that the responsibility and independence of the existing Local Authorities should not be unduly diminished.

said, he rose to call attention to the course pursued by. Her Majesty's Government with regard to Egyptian affairs; and to move—

"That the time has come when effect should be given to the declarations of successive Administrations as to the Government of Egypt."

It might not be necessary to go into the history of the military interven- tion in Egypt. The present military occupation of that country was not necessarily the consequence of the military intervention itself. On the history of that military intervention in the year 1882 the two sides of the House had never agreed—there had never been agreement between them as to the circumstances which had brought about the military occupation. The view of the Liberal Government, which was very often stated in the House and in the country, was that the first Control—the Control established by the late Lord Derby—although one which the Liberals could not oppose as a Party—being a financial Control which did not amount to an intervention by the Government in the general affairs of Egypt—was, nevertheless, a somewhat dangerous experiment which had to be watched with a great deal of attention, and that view was expressed with almost prophetic force by the present Prime Minister in an article which he wrote on the Egyptian Question during the time of the first Control. The first Control was a financial Control. It arose out of the mission of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for St. George's, Hanover Square (Mr. Goschen). The Controllers were not nominated by their Governments, and they were, at all events nominally, the servants of the Khedive of Egypt. A change occurred in the situation at the end of 1879. In November, 1879, there was sot up a second Control, which had been known as "The Salisbury Control." That Control constituted a direct intervention in the affairs of Egypt, and, in his opinion, military intervention after that was only a question of time. The second, or "Salisbury" Control was very sharply opposed by very many Liberal Members who still had seats in the House. They foresaw and tried to get others to foresee many of the evils that had since happened. The Cotrollers occupied seats in the Government of Egypt. They were nominated by their respective Governments, but they were no longer servants of the Khedive—they represented in the Councils of Egypt the actual voice of the foreign Governments by whom they were nominated. The very natural result of this sharper form of Control was that Egyptian national feeling began to be excited against the foreigner. Lord Salisbury was beaten in March, 1880, but the Liberal Administration which followed did not reverse the policy of the Control, although they set themselves to reversing the policy of their predecessors in almost every part of the world—notably in India, where it was necessary to withdraw the Viceroy.

He resigned.

said, that at all events the policy of the Control was not reversed—the incoming Government accepted it with all its consequences. It would have been difficult and dangerous, only three months after the Control had got into working order, to have changed the whole system. However justly and severely they might have condemned Lord Salisbury's Control of November, 1879, they must remember that it had only become an actual fact in Egypt from February, 1890, and, it would be admitted, considerable trouble was likely to ensue in an Oriental country from a sudden reversal of policy. But after the creation of the Salisbury Control and the revolutionary acts of the Arabists, the Joint Note was probably unavoidable. He was himself prepared to take his share of responsibility for the Joint Note, although it had been issued by a Cabinet of which he was a mouthpiece, not a Member, and, oddly enough, without his previous knowledge: for, although he was in the Foreign Office service at the time, he was abroad on Government business and did not see the draft. After the Joint Note the Cabinet, of which he was still at that time not a Member, thought armed intervention necessary, though they deplored the earlier engagements which had in their opinion, and in that of the then Tory Leaders, though not of the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington, nor in that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge, made it necessary. The intervention, supported by the two Front Benches, was a matter as to which there was a difference of opinion. As regarded a majority in the country, intervention in the East was always judged by subsequent events, although these events did not affect the principle. In 1860 the intervention in Syria was not only, like that in Egypt, generally popular at the time, but, unlike that in Egypt, remained popular. It made the fame of Lord Dufferin. It was as popular in France, which found the troops, as in England, which found the Commissioner. War was averted and the troops withdrawn. The Bedouin might easily have made of the Syrian intervention the partial failure which the Soudanese made of the Egyptian. The principle in each ease was the same. The occupation which followed the intervention had not been a necessary consequence of the intervention. It would have been possible to come away a few months after the expedition, when Sir Evelyn Wood had reported the Egyptian Army, with its British officers, fit to stand alone. Personally, he himself could take only his share of a collective responsibility that we had not come away at that moment. The time had not arrived—would only come after the death of all concerned—when it would be possible to distribute the blame, if blame were due, or praise for the troops remaining there. In the meantime, all must be content to take any blame that might have to be allotted, merely pointing out that the Government had been going to leave Egypt when the obstinacy of the Native Government, against their advice, caused the Hicks disaster and led to the general uprising of the frontier tribes. To stay in Egypt was contrary to the settled policy of this country. Lord Palmerston had expressed it in these words—

"We do not want to have Egypt. … We do not want the burden of governing Egypt."

It had been contrary to the promises made at the time we went there. In October, 1882, the then Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord Cromer, had written most powerfully against a protectorate and in favour of evacuation; and, although he now held a different view, Lord Cromer could not easily undo the effect of his own reasoning, which had greatly influenced him (Sir Charles Dilke) and others. No positive step of withdrawal had been taken before February, 1883. On the 15th of that month Sir Stafford Northcote, in the Commons, complained, with a sneer, that the Government

"Held forth a prospect of withdrawing the Force in six months or in half-a-century."

Lord Hartington, in reply, had said that Sir S. Northcote

"In the first period of time he suggested, has stated with probable accuracy the length of time that it may be necessary to keep our troops in Egypt "

—that was six months. In August, 1888, his right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle had quoted these words of the present Duke of Devonshire, and had quoted also a promise by the then and present Prime Minister, and asked if there was any change. The right hon. Member for Midlothian, in reply, introduced the word "stable" as representing the state of things which we desired to leave behind us, and from that time forth fairness bade him carefully point out that it had figured in all the promises. The promises, however, were very strong. As early as March, 1883, Lord Dufferin had pointed out

"That the permanent military occupation, … being contrary to the repeated declarations of Her Majesty's Government, was not an idea to which he could give the slightest encouragement."

On the 9th November, 1883, the order for the evacuation of Cairo had been given, and the Prime Minister, naming it, called it

"A subject for congratulation which will offer a new testimony to the world that we have been in earnest in the declarations that we have repeatedly made."

All the Powers at that time believed our promises, but Austria was in the habit of asking us from time to time when they would be kept; and we replied to her in January, 1884, disavowing not only the idea of annexation, but also of protectorate. In February, 1884, Lord Derby, speaking for the Government, said—

"From the first our … intention has been to withdraw our force as soon as circumstances allow. Lord Hartington spoke a year ago of hoping we might do it in six months. He was sanguine … but do you doubt that he was sincere? We know why the intended evacuation was delayed. The war in the Soudan is the sole, the sufficient cause.… We wish to help Egypt out of her troubles, but we do not wish to turn Egypt into a British Dependency. … We have always looked forward to the time when our powers should be at an end."

On the 15th February the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle declared that annexation (but he would not deny that his then argument applied to even a long continuance of occupation) "would be giving hostages to France;" and he went on to say, "Fare- well the blessing of the silver streak!" Four days later Lord Hartigton explained that some Conservatives desired

"The substitution for the Dual Control of a single British Control, for which permanent military support would be necessary. … The administration of all departments of importance by Englishmen. …Their system would build up nothing … prepare nothing. When at any time our military support … was withdrawn that system must necessarily fall."

The present Duke of Devonshire went on to taunt the Conservative Party with being, in fact, unwilling to accept the policy of protectorate put forward from the Radical Benches by Mr. Cowen, whose speech they cheered. Sir Stafford Northcote, in reply, said on the same day—

"Our interest in Egypt is not to expand our territory, not to annex that which does not belong to us, not to extend the boundaries of our Empire."

On the l5th of June, 1884, France had explained her policy. She pronounced the condominium to be dead, and said she spoke only for the collective interests of Europe. The Government of the Republic was willing to come under an engagement never at any time to occupy the country. Its declarations were

"Inspired by the confidence that Her Majesty's Government will not hesitate on their side to confirm distinctly "

their declarations that they would

"Evacuate the country when order should be re-established."

Lord Granville, in reply, on the next day, declared that—

"Her Majesty's Government … are willing that the withdrawal of the troops shall take place at the beginning of the year 1888."

Her Majesty's Government would

"At or before the expiration of the occupation, propose to the Powers and to the Porte a scheme for the neutralisation of Egypt on the basis of the principles applied to Belgium."

On the 11th August the right hon. Member for Bristol made a pronouncement upon the question—

"I do not think that anyone who has considered this question imagines that we could act in reference to Egypt otherwise than in accordance with our Treaty obligations and the general opinion of Europe, and I should be very glad to see the day arrive when it might be no longer necessary for a single soldier to remain in Egypt."

In 1884 and 1885 we induced France to enter into conferences with regard to Egyptian finance and the Suez Canal, by means of the proposal that, on the termination of our occupation, there should be this "neutralisation of Egypt, on the basis of the principles applied to Belgium." Early in 1885, when our troubles with the Arabs had been at their height—even at that most difficult of all moments—the promises had been renewed. On the 26th February, Lord Derby had said—

"We do not propose to occupy Egypt permanently. On that point we are pledged to this country and pledged to Europe, and if the contrary policy is adopted it will not be by us."

On the same day Lord Derby had said that—

"If he thought the Opposition agreed in the policy of terminating our responsibilities in Egypt as early as possible, and if the House believed the Opposition could better accomplish that purpose, he would gladly resign his seat."

Taking up the phrase "stable Government," he ridiculed the idea of a Government more stable than that existing being set up, unless it were, in fact, a British Government. He asked if the Conservative Party intended to take up the position that—

"he sacrifices of England entitled her to claim exclusive influence in Egypt. … Is that your proposition?"

Some noble Lords on the back Benches said "Yes," and Lord Derby replied—

"We went to Egypt having made the solemn declaration to Europe that we did not intend to do what you now ask us to do. We made that declaration in the name of the English Crown and with the authority of the British Parliament."

After describing

"the sacrifices which a permanent occupation of Egypt would entail upon us,"

he wont on—

"For my part, I adhere firmly to the declaration which the Government made when they first entered Egypt."

On the next day Lord Kimberley, speaking for the Liberal Party, said that there was no difference between the Parties.

"Any Government would endeavour to … secure our interests in Egypt, and as early a retreat from it as may be possible."

So much for the period when the Liberals were in Office. When the Conservatives came in they at once sent Sir Henry Wolff to Constantinople on the Special Mission of August, 1885, on the Egyptian Question. The very first thing they did was to enter on fresh negotiations on this subject. They, indeed, worked hard at it until they concluded a Convention, which, refused as it was by the Turks and the French at the time, could now, he thought, be obtained if it were pleased. The first promise of the Conservatives had been taken word for word from those of their Predecessors. It was dated the 26th August, 1885—

"Her Majesty's Government had no idea of annexing Egypt, or of establishing a Protectorate."

In October, 1885, there had been concluded a preliminary Convention, the terms of which pointed towards evacuation; and the matter then somewhat slumbered until Sir Drummond Wolff's Mission was taken up again in November, 1886. On the 4th November Her Majesty's Government delivered a Note to Turkey, in which they reiterated their assurances, rehearsed the terms of the Convention, suggested concessions from the other Powers, which

"will render the termination of the British occupation practical at a comparatively early date,"

and concluded by saving that the above proposals were made with a sincere desire to render the British occupation as brief as possible. On the 9th of November Lord Lyons explained what the French Government had said to him in reply to what they had heard as to our intentions. The French Prime Minister was willing to consider the necessity of a provision for the temporary return of our troops in the event of disorders. On the 13th November the French Ambassador declared that his Government were "prepared to accept it," meaning the stipulation as to return. On the 17th December Lord Lyons informed the French Government that—

"Her Majesty's Government were anxious to be relieved of the burden which was entailed upon them by the occupation of Egypt."

The Home Government then declared their intention of discussing the details of

"Arrangements to be made prior to the withdrawal of the British troops with a view to … putting them in the shape most likely to be acceptable to the Powers."

In January, 1887, the Government wrote fully on their views. They desired to retain

"An adequate number of British officers in positions of command in the Egyptian Army."

Subject to this, they declared

"The object which the Powers of Europe have in view, and which it, is not less the desire of Her Majesty's Government to attain, may be generally expressed by the phrase 'the neutralisation of Egypt.' But it must be neutralisation with an exception designed to maintain the security and permanence of the whole arrangement."

This was the right of re-entry, which they had obtained from France, and of which Lord Salisbury wrote—

"There is no danger that a privilege so costly in its character will be used unless the circumstances imperatively demand it. … Her Majesty's Government are very far from intending to use such a power, if it should be reserved to them by Treaty, for the purpose of exercising any undue influence or creating a Protectorate in disguise; still less for unnecessarily renewing an occupation which has already imposed so many sacrifices upon Great Britain."

These sacrifices had not diminished since that time. The sacrifices imposed by the occupation of Egypt on this country had increased and were likely to grow. The monetary sacrifices to which Lord Salisbury alluded were considerable. The other night the Chancellor of the Exchequer appealed to them on the grounds of economy to save money on every side. The right hon. Gentleman well knew that the occupation of Egypt was a very costly matter to this country, and that the amount of money which Egpyt repaid towards the charge for the British troops was very different from the sum they cost, and was ridiculously small compared with the full cost as borne by India in the case of India. On the 4th March, 1887, Sir Drummond Wolff declared on behalf of the Government—

"We consider the time arrived when a permanent settlement of the country could be fixed which would give to no one Power any undue preference.… Our only national interest is to keep the highway clear."

We had handed to the Turks a Memorandum, in which we explained to them what was meant by neutralisation, and quoted the case of Belgium. In April we had agreed to fixing a term for the conclusion of our occupation, a term which Sir Drummond Wolff thought should be shortened, and he pointed out the great cost to the British Government of the maintenance of the troops in Egypt. The Austrian Government had also been pressing our Government to come to an absolute conclusion of the occupation, and had informed our Ambassador at Vienna of that which was still true—

"That the Egyptian Question was the one obstacle to the establishment of perfect confidence in England on the part of the Sultan."

Sir Drummond Wolff was directed to inform the Turks—and did so in the same month—

"That it in no way enters into the views of Her Majesty's Government to establish themselves permanently in Egypt."

The Convention was then signed, and Sir Drummond Wolff, in explaining it, made some important remarks, which were approved by the Government at home. He declared that—

"The drain on the military and financial resources of England rendered it most desirable that an end should, as soon as possible, be made to a position of so delicate and dangerous a character. … As to the policy of annexation, … the objections are, to my mind, overwhelming. It would have been a violation of the traditional policy of England, of her good faith to the Sultan, and of public law. In time of peace it would have exposed her to constant jealousy and danger. In time of war it would have been a weak point, entailing a perpetual drain on her resources."

This language of Sir Drummond Wolff was the language of the Government, for it was approved in the usual form, and the approval laid before Parliament; and after the ordinary approval it was again approved, for Lord Salisbury, on the 22ud July, declared on the whole correspondence that the negotiations had

"Had important results in defining formally the character of the British occupation of Egypt, and the conditions which are necessary to bring it to a close."

On the 10th June Lord Salisbury had defended the Convention in Debate—the same Convention which the present Government might have had, he thought, from both Turkey and France. Lord Salisbury said that—

"It was not open to us to assume the protectorate of Egypt, … even supposing … that such a course … would be consistent with International Law and the interests of this country. It was not open to us, because Her Majesty's Government had over and over again pledged themselves that they would not do so."

These words of the Conservative Prime Minister were his case. The matter had slumbered for a time after the Turks had failed to ratify the Convention, which at the present moment they would be willing to ratify. On the 20th December, 1888, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. Member for St. George's, Hanover Square, had again repeated our assurances—

"We are pledged before Europe not to occupy Egypt permanently. I say distinctly that we do not look upon the occupation of Egypt as strengthening the position of this country."

This was the position, then, of two Liberal Governments and of two Conservative Governments in succession: that we ought to leave a stable condition of affairs behind us, but that our occupation must be brought to an end, both because we were pledged, and because the occupation was a burdensome weakness to this country. On the 20th August, 1889, Lord Carnarvon brought the subject to the notice of the House of Lords. Lord Salisbury replied—

"To say that, in despite of all we have said, … we will … declare our stay in Egypt permanent" would show "an insufficient regard to the sanctity of the obligations which the Government of the Queen have undertaken and by which they are bound to abide."

This concluded the list of official or Government pledges so far as he should quote them. If ever a country was committed to bringing a temporary occupation to an end, this country was committed in the Egyptian case. As to the views of the present Government there could be no doubt. The first reference to the matter during the Election period was that by the present Chief Secretary for Ireland at Cambridge, in which he rightly traced to the occupation every evil which affected the country in the conduct of foreign affairs. He asked what was "the cost, the whole cost in weakness? England in Egypt is a vulnerable England"; and he spoke of "the bootless disadvantages and dangers to which it exposes us." Then came the speech at Newcastle of the present Prime Minister, in which he alluded to our occupation of Egypt as an embarrassment and a weakness; and the organ of the Liberal Party, in commenting upon that speech, exclaimed that it was a "noble thing to govern Egypt as we govern her. But it is a still nobler thing to keep our word." Up to the present time we had not kept our word, but we had not broken it. Such a state of things could not long continue; and it might have been more prudent, after joining with the Conservatives in declaring the occupation to be a weakness, to have, at the commencement of the acts of the Administration, done that which in somewhat similar circumstances of delicacy Lord Granville did in 1880—made our own proposals in our own way to the Powers. The last official statements which had been made upon the question were those of the 10th February 1892. Lord Kimberley, speaking as the Leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Lords, spoke of the occupation of Egypt as

"Fraught with great advantages to that country, the long; continuance of which is, however, fraught with great disadvantages to our Empire."

Lord Salisbury had replied that Lord Kimberley's speech constituted

"A sound and orthodox statement of the view that has always been held upon both sides."

That was the latest utterance of Lord Salisbury on this question. The present Prime Minister possessed a considerable advantage in dealing with this question over any other living statesman who could be named. He had always been guided by principle in regard to it; while too many others were, for one reason or another, open to the reproach that they had been at times animated by considerations of mere expediency. The plan which was suggested was that which had been admirably expressed by the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington in the following words:—

"I advocate the placing of Egypt under the guarantee and guardianship of United Europe, so that, no one single Power shall be able to exercise there superior influence to another, so that collective authority shall restrain individual ambition. In a word. I plead for the real emancipation of an historic land and the true freedom of an ancient race."

In the same speech, curiously enough, the noble Lord had quoted the prophetic words which had been written by the present Prime Minister in 1877 to the effect that an occupation of Egypt meant a farewell to all cordiality of political relations between England and France. The noble Lord also had protested in eloquent language, upon purely British grounds, against a military occupation "by the already over-burdened Forces of the British Crown." The case for negotiation was overwhelming, and had been overwhelming from the moment when the Government came into Office. Their Predecessors might say—"We tried, all but succeeded, and failed through French obstruction." The present Government could make no such plea, because they might have had the same Convention which had previously been refused, or a better one if they could have drawn one better. He was far from saying that it would have been possible for anyone to complain if in settling this question the Foreign Secretary had insisted on dealing at the same time with other outstanding questions in which the late Government, instead of going right, as they had on this one, had gone wrong; such questions as Newfoundland and Madagascar. But negotiation, cither by itself or to include other outstanding questions, was an obvious duty which he thought had been too long neglected. It was for us to make our own propositions—not for us to wait for France. The present reply, made by many, was to admit everything—to admit the pledges, to admit the burdensome weakness of our position, the drain and danger to the Empire, but. to plead (hypocritically in some cases, he much feared,) our duty to the Egyptians. Now, it was a curious thing that there was nobody in Egypt who wanted us. The late Khedive was an admirable, cautious, wise, prudent, timid man; absolutely dependent, as it would seem, on us. But he did not want us to stay. The present Khedive was as different as one man could be from another. He was a man of very considerable power, perhaps somewhat rash. He did not want us to stay. The late Ruler saw no difficulty in maintaining himself under the arrangements that were proposed in the Wolff Convention. The present Ruler saw no difficulty. The statesman that we had placed at the side of the present littler, our own man, Riaz Pasha, who had had more experience of governing Egypt than almost any other man, was anxious that we should be gone. In all Egypt there was nobody of weight that wanted us except our own officials. Some maintained that the peasantry would be oppressed, whatever the influence of Europe, if we should leave. It was the actual presence of our troops that, was necessary for their protection. But the peasantry themselves did not think so; and all who knew the circumstances were of opinion that they preferred Rulers of their own. If negotiations were not soon entered on, this matter would be brought to a pretty definite test. We had insisted on the adoption of Liberal institutions, the formation of a National Assembly, but we had never called this Assembly together for the purpose of acting on its advice. It was the intention of the Khedive and Riaz to let it meet. Could anyone doubt what would be the opinion of that Assembly when it met? What were we going to do when the Khedive, and the Prime Minister that we had given him, and the National Assembly declared their course? Were soldiers to be sent to arrest the Khedive in his bed, or was the National Assembly to be turned out by British force? Some said that the Dervishes would give trouble. But their best leader, the man who had destroyed Hicks, had marched on Egypt with his picked men; he had been met by the Egyptian Army commanded by British officers, before the British troops came up, and he had been destroyed at Toski. Toski showed that Dervishes died of hunger and thirst like other people, and that they were unable to reach the Egyptian frontier in formidable force. Some quoted the opinion of Lord Cromer, but Lord Salisbury had that opinion before him and deliberately decided not to stay; and it was hardly necessary to point out that an opinion given in the country—in Egypt, on local grounds—could not take into consideration those International sources of weakness of which the Prime Minister had spoken. The one argument which had something in it was that Egyptian Stocks were sensitive and that Egyptian Funds would fall. But, on the other hand, France had also immense interests in Egyptian Stocks, and this very fact would make it certain that any Government of France would not desire to see rash steps taken to bring about an inconsiderate evacuation. When we were told that we could come out when the work was done, he must point out that it was as much done as it ever would be. As a great official in Egypt that he could not name—for he was referring to a private conversation—had said to him—"If you want us to go you must give us different orders." In other words, everything had been done, in spite of our language, to make going difficult, to keep the late Khedive in leading-strings, to impose our will upon the present Ruler. The last consideration that he would name would be his own conception of the extent to which the occupation hampered our policy. Newfoundland, Madagascar, Heligoland, the lost "British road from south to north" in Africa along the lakes, were the evidence of the dead weight of the Egyptian occupation. He had given some consideration to the strategic problem. Our pledges were pledges, and no doubt it was our duty to come out even against our clearest interest; but he should have let somebody else propose it, as far as he personally was concerned, if he had not been as convinced as Lord Salisbury was that in a military and strategic sense the occupation was a burdensome weakness. Egypt was strategically an island. It was ours in war if we retained our command of the seas. If the command of the Mediterranean was lost our force in Egypt was locked up and thrown away. There were some who were indiscriminate in these matters, whose one idea was to grab all and keep all; but he himself was not averse to an extension of Imperial responsibilities when good ground was shown. He had fought, even against the Navy, for the retention of Port Hamilton, and he had fought with the Indian Authorities against the Government at home for the retention of the Pishin Valley, just as he had fought against the Indian Authorities and with the Government at home for the evacuation of Kandahar. These questions could not be solved by any general rule. Each must be considered on its merits, and the merits were against the Egyptian occupation. If negotiations were not begun he should have to ask himself what course he himself, and any who might agree with him, should take when, in the future, Divisions were taken on the Votes for men in Egypt, and on the Agent's salary. He thought that it would be a grave mistake to come out of Egypt suddenly and without due International preparation; but when he considered what were the dangers of staying there he must retain his freedom to vote for the least dangerous solution, that of instant evacuation if reasonable negotiation could not be secured. His own policy, however, was that of the two last Liberal and of the two last Conservative Administrations. He attached no importance to any particular word. The word "neutralisation" had been that of Lord Granville in 1884, suggested, he thought, by himself and others who, perhaps, had now changed their minds; it had been the word of Lord Salisbury in 1887; and when he was told by some hon. Members of the House, who had also changed their views, that we must stay, in the interests of the Egyptian people, he replied that it was our duty, with due regard to our pledges, to look first to our own interests—that our position was too dangerous for us to do aught else; that it was against our interest to stop in Egypt, as had been shown by Lord Salisbury and Lord Kimberley, by the right hon. Member for St. George's, Hanover Square, and by the Prime Minister; and that in our own interest it was our duty to secure Lord Salisbury's Convention, with the power of re-entry given by it, or some equivalent arrangement. Lord Rosebery in his recent Despatch, and towards the end of it, had used a phrase which declared that under certain circumstances it would be necessary for us to call a Conference. If we were not to have the Wolff Convention a Conference would be necessary. But he feared that the policy of the Despatch was to wait until circumstances of danger arose, and then to propose it. It surely would be far better, without waiting, at once to suggest the Conference. He would urge upon the Government the expediency of not waiting for other people—of not waiting until proposals were made to us by France: but to put forward our own policy was the best course in redemption of our pledges and in the maintenance of our interests. He concluded by moving his Amendment.

My right hon. Friend docs not require to offer any apology to the House for the very interesting and lucid review which he has given us of the history of the Egyptian Question, or for the extent to which he has gone in citing and pressing upon the attention of the House the many and singularly accordant declarations of principles which have proceeded from responsible Ministers and others on both sides of the House in respect to our present occupation of Egypt and the character of that occupation. I am very glad that my right hon. Friend has not found any cause to object to what has been actually said and done by the present Government, while he wishes them to say and do what they have not yet done. He has discussed the recent declaration of Lord Rosebery, and I think I can say with perfect safety that there is no foundation for the apprehension, which he did not seem to entertain, that the declaration was intended to convey the sense that it would be a wise policy on our part to wait in Egypt until circumstances of danger and difficulty arose, and then to make those circumstances, and those circumstances alone, the ground for proceeding to arrange the necessary measures for evacuation. That construction, I can assure my right hon. Friend, may be entirely laid aside as not having entered into the mind of anyone who has been called upon, so far as I know, to take in view this important and very grave question. I cannot do otherwise than express my general concurrence both in the historical outline and also in the declarations of principles which have been cited in the speech we have just heard from so many sources, that the occupation of Egypt, viewed with respect to the interests of this country, is in the nature rather of a burden and difficulty, and in given circumstances a risk; that the permanent occupation of that country would not be agreeable to our traditional policy, and that it would not be consistent with our good faith towards the Suzerain Power, while it would be contrary to the laws of Europe. All these declarations adopted by my right hon. Friend are declarations which I do not think will be seriously contested in any quarter of the House. At any rate, my right hon. Friend has supported them with a mass of evidence very difficult indeed to deal with by those who wish to set up an opposite view. My right hon. Friend has anticipated that the answer would be made to him—and I suppose he meant an answer on the part of the Government—that a duty to Egypt has arisen the effect of which is virtually to cancel those declarations.

I did not go so far as that. I did not speak of the Government. I gathered the opinion from conversation with hon. Members of the House.

I think that might be inferred from the speech; but I wish, at any rate, to combat that inference. I certainly shall not set up the doctrine that we have discovered a duty which enables us to set aside the pledges into which we have so freely entered. I do not at all disguise that the burdens and the risks attending upon this occupation have been accompanied by one great compensation, and that great compensation has been the enormous benefit which has been conferred upon Egypt, not only by the maintenance of peace and tranquillity, but especially, I hope I may say, by the unmeasured improvements which have been introduced into its law and finance. I will not now argue how far that consideration ought to enter into our view; but an indefinitely prolonged occupation has passed out of our view—I do not say out of our competence as a Naval and Military Power, but out of our competence as a State bound to observe and set an example of honour in respect of its engagements to other nations. Of course, it would be quite within our rights to invite the Powers of Europe to a Conference, together with the Suzerain Power, and to lay before those Powers—if it be really our opinion—the change of circumstances which has taken place, the great benefits which have arisen from our practical intervention in the government of Egypt, and, consequently, the sense which we entertain that a new arrangement ought to be made, and that Egypt should remain, if not permanently, yet without any strict limit of time, under tutelage, instead of being restored to anything like her independent action subject only to the relation she holds to the Suzerain Power. We might do that with perfect honour; but the thing we cannot do with perfect honour is either to deny that we are under engagements which preclude the idea of an indefinite occupation, or so to construe that indefinite occupation as to hamper the engagements that we are under by collateral considerations, and so virtually to relieve us from them altogether. Beyond that our course is free and open, in an assembly of the Powers of Europe, to recommend—and to act on the recommendation as far as our title goes—that which we believe to be best for the welfare of this country. So far, therefore, I am able to travel with my right hon. Friend; but when I come to regard the question of his Motion upon other grounds, I am bound to say that I venture even to hope that he does not himself propose to force it upon the consideration of the House with a view to a definite opinion, and to lay down the grounds, which I think are very clear, which show that such a Motion ought not to be adopted by the House. We have to consider not only Egypt, but the rights and the peculiar position of the Suzerain Power, and we have to consider also the position of the five other Great Powers of Europe. It is a very nice matter to determine what and when and how any steps should be taken by Her Majesty's Government in this matter. My right hon. Friend has given his opinion that we should probably have acted with more wisdom if we had produced a plan of our own upon entering Office rather than that we should have waited even for the most limited period to sec what communications would be made to us. But I think that he has omitted to take into view this rather important fact: that the subject was already open, and that the British Government under our Predecessors were in what I may call a more passive condition—that they had ceased to be the actual proposers of any plan, as they had been in the case of the Drummond Wolff Convention, and that they were receiving from time to time overtures or communications from the Turkish Government, and were also in communication with France upon the matter. There is no special title on the part of France to intervene on this subject. Her rights are no different from those of others, but, at the same time, it must be borne in mind that we have had practically a great many communications with France upon the subject, and that rudely to break off from any recognition of the special part which France has taken in the Egyptian negotiations would not be quite consistent, I think, with our friendly relations with that country, and undoubtedly it would not be a step politic in itself. I give great credit to Lord Salisbury and his Government for the Drummond Wolff Convention; but here is a point on which I am afraid that I am not quite at one with my right hon. Friend. He says that it is in our power to revive and extend that Convention. That, as an announcement from him, is one of great interest; but I am bound to say that I have never heard from any quarter—certainly not from any quarter of authority—that the reasons which induced Franco to obtain through Turkey the rejection of that Convention have ceased to operate in such a degree and manner that Franco is ready to withdraw that objection and to allow of the ratification of the Drummond Wolff Convention. That is a point of great importance, and in regard to which I am inclined to think—I am bound to say—there are strong presumptions leading to the belief that the Drummond Wolff Convention is, in its actual form and not in the principle underlying it, a thing of the past, and cannot in that form be satisfactorily revived. It would be a very strange step on our part, without any intimation from any quarter, to assume that the attitude adopted some time ago by. the Suzerain Power and by France had been altered. I am bound to admit that the state of things after the rejection of the Convention is identical with what it was before the rejection; and it seems rather that—if the movement were practical—some modified form of that Convention should be devised in order to hold out the hope of a successful and satisfactory issue. I think, considering the nature of this case, and the multitude of parties who are to be called upon to act, either independently of one another, or at least having a considerable power of action as if they were independent—it is quite clear that the position is a delicate one; and the House will feel, as I assume they will feel, that it will be unwise to bind the hands of the Government by any preliminary declaration. By all means let us gather from the declarations of hon. Gentlemen who are competent all the light we can obtain, so as to be enabled to estimate carefully and accurately our means of action. But, Sir, there is a circumstance to which my right hon. Friend has not alluded, and which appears to me to have a very important bearing upon the question whether any expression of opinion should be sought from the House of Commons at the present moment. It is true that there has been no important step taken by the Government bringing within near view the evacuation of the country; it is true that. France made a friendly overture, through M. Waddington, so long ago as the end of October or beginning of November, wishing to know whether Her Majesty's Government were prepared to enter into friendly negotiations with France on the subject; it is also true that the answer to that communication was that if Franco had suggestions to offer they would be received in the same friendly spirit in which they were tendered. When any communications are received through the Turkish Ambassador, my right hon. Friend may rely on it that there will be no indisposition on our part to extend to them our friendly consideration. But surely we cannot speak in this matter without taking the view of abandonment at some future date. There was a time when there was in Egypt a man in power in whom the British Government, as well as other Governments, placed complete confidence. But in January last—I do not remember the exact date, but in January at all events—on the ground of ill-health, he was summarily dismissed, and a gentleman was designated in his stead as Prime Minister in whom the British Government were not able to repose the same confidence. While we continue in Egypt there is no satisfactory method to pursue except a harmonious and cordial co-operation with the existing Government. But that event of January, brought about in a moment of haste—it is not necessary to impute anything worse than haste—led to serious misapprehension with respect to the maintenance of public order in Egypt; and, as Lord Rosebery has pointed out, our position with regard to public order in that country is one of the greatest difficulty and delicacy. We are responsible, not only to the people of Egypt, and to our British subjects in Egypt, but likewise to the subjects of other Powers. Occurrences might arise which, in the event of disturbances following them, might assume a most embarrassing aspect. It was from no wish to further complicate our position, but from a very serious consideration of the military condition of affairs in the country, and upon advice which we received from military as well as political authorities, that we considered it necessary to increase the British garrison. Only three months, practically, have passed since that was done; and I put it to my right hon. Friend and to the House that after the danger of last January, and after the stops we took upon it, you must allow a certain moderate interval of time to elapse before you can assume that we have returned to the normal position in which we stood before these events happened, and to the condition of affairs at the time when the communications took place. My right hon. Friend did not advert to that; but upon a question of this kind he will see that it is very far from an indefinite resort to the argument of inconvenience when I say that there is an inconvenience of a character of an important difficulty involved in this matter. For a period those occurrences of January made it the first duty—I go so far as to say the exclusive duty—of the British Government to consider the means to be adopted for preserving, not merely from infraction, but from menace, the security of the position of Egypt. That being so, I hope my right hon. Friend will not be inclined to push me further. The British Government has been the willing recipient of any communications addressed to it on the subject of affairs in Egypt. I am not aware that a time has come or circumstances have occurred which make it our duty to depart from our attitude, and certainly we have done nothing to repel or discourage any friendly communications upon a question which we all own to be simplicis juris a question of European law, and upon which we have no rights which we can set up against the rest of the world. There is no reason to look forward with misapprehension as to the future, or for anyone to say that we shall rue our action in the matter. The only condition precedent in Egypt to render communication possible is that there shall be no misapprehension that the immediate and permanent condition of the country is one of peace and security. I should not be doing justice to the question if I were not to say something upon the character of the late Khedive. I believe him to have been honourable, honest, unselfish, and without any prepossession or prejudices whatever. It was that spirit which enabled the British Agents to conduct their negotiations, and I am also open to say he was a man of great competence to discharge his duties and to take a sound and courageous view of the situation; and we may expect from the Prime Minister, as from the Khedive, all that may be necessary to enable us to fulfil our duties in the future. Now, having said this, in justice to all parties, I again venture to impress upon the House that we must be most cautious to avoid any proceedings which might by any possibility tend further to complicate the situation against those who are necessarily your Representatives under the circumstances in regulating a matter which, as all must see, calls for the exercise of the utmost vigilance and circumspection. It is the more easy to make that appeal, because I think it would be impossible to refer to any matter which has been so many years before the public, and in which the substantial declarations of responsible persons have been so much in accord. The position is one depending upon a multitude of points of which advantage might be taken, were there any disposition to take that advantage in a hostile spirit, and if that accord did not prevail among us. I do not at all want to preclude the full expression of views—though some of those views may not be identical with our own—as to what is politic for Egypt; but nothing but mischief could result from unduly pressing us in regard to this matter at the present time, or, on the other hand, that any unfortunate regulations should prevail to complicate and embarrass further communications.

said, the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister fully recognised that they were bound in honour to make their occupation of Egypt a temporary one—that it would be contrary to their interests it should be anything else. He recognised the desirability of, as soon as possible, allowing Egypt to be free from English control. He referred to the Wolff Convention, and he spoke of proposals which, if they were made by other Governments, would be favourably considered. But the right hon. Gentleman, above all, recognised that they were bound in honour to leave Egypt as soon as possible. He said, however, that the present moment was inopportune for their withdrawal, owing to the recent disturbances at Cairo. Now, the lesson to be learnt from those disturbances was, he believed, that the sooner they left Egypt the better it would be in their own interests. They gathered from those events that the whole country was opposed to their remaining—that they were remaining against the wishes of all the leading politicians—["No, no!"]—and against the wishes of the fellah population. [" No, no!"] No! What proof was there that these classes wished them to remain there? [Laughter.] If there were a French force remaining in this country, would it be a question for laughter whether the English people desired them to remain? Every nation desired its own independence, and the Opposition seemed to think it right in Englishmen and Europeans to have that aspiration; but when it came to Orientals, then the Opposition seemed to think they were made to be governed, and it was a crime on their part to think of governing themselves. No doubt the Administration of Egypt was infinitely better than it was when they went there; but it was understood that they went to build up some Native Government, and that as soon as they had done that they should go. But they could not teach persons to rule themselves by keeping them under tutelage, by nominating the Khedive's Ministers and Governors, by maintaining a vast network of European officials. They heard a good deal about the National Assembly; but how often had it been called together? Had they in any way encouraged it to act? They appeared to consider that they were to be a Parliament to the Khedive, and that they were to dictate everything to him, and, if he did not approve of then advice, he would probably be turned out of the country. Very different views were adopted when the Liberal Party were in Opposition. On one occasion, on the Vote for the number of men in the Army, he moved that the total should be reduced by the exact number of the Army kept in Egypt; and every Liberal in the House voted with him, with the present Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. John Morley) at their head. He did not recollect, but perhaps the right hon. Gentleman spoke in favour of reduction.

No, no!

He did not speak, but, at any rate, the right hon. Gentleman did not think it necessary to controvert anything he had said, but went into the Lobby with him. Surely, after that, he might say that if the Liberal Party had a single principle in foreign affairs, it was committed on this point.

I did not vote for it.

said, everyone who was in the House at the time voted; perhaps his hon. Friend was not there, or, Gallio-like, he did not care, and kept away. To the best of his recollection, the Chancellor of the Exchequer honoured him with a vote. On such occasions he always kept his eye on the Front Bench, and he knew the Prime Minister was not present, but all his lieutenants trotted into the Lobby on that occasion. When the present Government came in he rejoiced greatly; he said they were not only going to have Home Rule and some of the reforms in the Newcastle Programme, but they were going to get a Radical, anti-Jingo foreign policy, and the first step would be to make it clear that they were going to withdraw from Egypt. The Prime Minister now said they were awaiting proposals from France and from Turkey; but, supposing neither France or Turkey made any proposals, were they not to make proposals themselves? The Prime Minister admitted that they were bound to bring their occupation to an end, and that dangers were involved in their remaining. Then, what was to be done? What action was to be taken if no proposals were made by France or Turkey? He could understand the Governments of France and Turkey saying—"We await the proposals of the British Government." He sincerely hoped the present Prime Minister and his Government would remain in power during the full term of that Parliament, six years; but he could not help knowing that accidents sometimes occurred, and a Government did not remain in power for six years. It was humanly possible the present Government might not do so. What would happen if the Prime Minister went out of Office leaving Egypt as it was now? What could then be urged against the Conservatives continuing the same policy? He admitted that all on the Ministerial side were not agreed about this occupation of Egypt; but, speaking generally, it was a strong view of the Liberal Party, in and out of Parliament, that the occupation should be brought to a speedy end. It would be playing into the hands of those who desired not only to continue the occupation of Egypt, but also to make further annexations in Africa, if a Liberal Government remained in Office a certain time and went out without taking any action towards withdrawing from Egypt. His right hon. Friend (Sir C. Dilke) would do right not to take a Division. [Laughter.] Well, what was to be gained by a Division after the assurances given by the Prime Minister? This Debate had elicited from him the most solemn assurances that it was their duty and interest to leave Egypt as soon as possible; that he was far from adopting the views of some hon. Gentlemen, who thought that because they had got there they ought to violate their own words and remain for ever, because they thought it was to their own interest or that of Egypt that they should do so. It was clear that their policy was not one of continuous occupation of Egypt, and that they would withdraw as soon as they could.

said, that his right hon. Friend the Member for the Forest of Dean (Sir C. Dilke) had carefully avoided referring to anything that would tell against the case he had presented to the House; but it could be proved that the situation was not exactly what he had represented it to be. The right hon. Gentleman had not referred to the responsibility they had incurred, and to the compulsion that rested upon them to remain until they had carried into effect all that they had undertaken. How did the occupation come about? In 1879, when they had a Conservative Government in Office, measures were taken for removing Ismail Pasha from the Throne of Egypt. He ventured at that time to point out what the result would be—namely, that by taking the action the Government did they would make themselves responsible for the government of Egypt. This was not admitted at the time by the late Sir Stafford Northcote (afterwards Earl Iddesleigh); but afterwards Sir Stafford Northcote said to him personally—"You were right and I was wrong; and the action taken has involved us in responsibility for the government of Egypt." How did that come about? They had been obliged to take upon themselves the duty which in 1879 he ventured to indicate would fall on the English people. In January, 1883, Lord Granville, in a despatch to the Foreign Powers, said the position in which Her Majesty's Government was placed threw upon them the duty of "giving such advice as would secure the elements of stability and progress." Consequently, they were under no obligation to leave Egypt until the elements of stability and progress were assured. On January 4. 1884, a similar statement was made in a despatch addressed to Sir Evelyn Baring. At that time the greater part of the foreign population of Egypt were pressing upon Her Majesty's Government the desirability of accepting the suzerainty. We declined, however, to do so, because we were not anxious to add to our dominions. At the same time, we took on ourselves the responsibility of remaining in Egypt until the object with which our troops had been sent there was thoroughly accomplished. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean (Sir C. Dilke) had taken care to avoid all reference to what they had done for Egypt during the last 10 years. After four years spent in overcoming French opposition, foreigners had been made liable for House Tax just as the Egyptians had always been. The equalisation of the Stamp Duties, which was also proposed by Her Majesty's Government, had also been opposed by France, and had had to be abandoned in consequence of the opposition of French and other residents in Egypt. Turning to finance, everyone would remember that the Law of Liquidation was passed in 1880, Egyptian finance having become simply impossible. Day after day loans had been raised at usurious rates of interest, the result being that Egypt had been brought to the verge of bankruptcy. By the Law of Liquidation interest was reduced, and for a time an endeavour was made to place the finances of Egypt on a permanent footing. Not very much was accomplished for a year or two, but later on a most magnificent harvest of prosperity resulted. Lord Cromer, in the Report laid before Parliament in March last, stated that the Revenue of Egypt in 1892 was £10,364,000 and the Expenditure £9,595,000, showing a surplus of £769,000, which was larger than the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been able to show for England itself. This fact alone was enough to prove what a difference British administration had produced in the Egyptian finances. It had been brought about by honest administration, and by the reduction of the burdens upon the people. There were two things which used to cause the fellaheen to suffer beyond all endurance. One was the exactions of the tax-gatherers and the other was the corvée. The first had been stopped and the second had been abolished. They had so maintained the credit of Egypt that they were able in 1890 to convert her Debt. Indeed, our administration had been of the greatest benefit to the Egyptian people without costing the English people as much as the right hon. Gentleman had alleged. A large fund had accumulated in consequence of the economies of former years. It amounted to £3,391,000, the General Reserve Fund being £1,958,000, the Special Reserve Fund £777,000, and the Conversion economies £656,000. The reason why this fund had not been spent in ways useful to Egypt was that France had made it a condition of her consent to the conversion of the Debt that there should be no expenditure of the fund without her consent. The only thing her consent had been given to had been the payment of £110,000 towards the cost of the abolition of the corvée. He was justified in saying, therefore, that Egypt was suffering not in consequence of English action at all, but because of the interference of other countries in her financial arrangements. What had they done for Egypt? They had reduced the tax upon salt, which was a necessary of life to the poor people, and which was a Government monopoly, by 40 per cent. They had abolished the tax on sheep and goats, and the licence-tax on trades and crafts. By these means they had conferred the greatest benefits on the people of Egypt. At the same time the Revenue had been increased by placing a House Tax upon foreigners, reducing excessive salaries, and reforming the accounts. As far as possible the tax - gatherers had been prevented from oppressing the people and the officials had been taught to perform their duties honourably. A still greater thing had been done. Egypt had had a series of crops utterly unknown in former years, the reason being that Egyptian agriculture depended on the question of the supply of water at the proper season of the year. If the canals, the storage, and the barrage were neglected, the difficulties of the supply would be increased a thousand-fold, and many of the poor people of Egypt would be deprived of water for their crops. They had not only secured a steady and regular supply of water at the proper time, but had increased the amount of storage, added to the number of the canals, and altogether re-established the barrage, the result being not only to reclaim thousands of acres which had become unproductive, but to entirely re-establish the prosperity of the people in the Delta. The railway receipts had also increased in a most astonishing manner, one reason being that the Administration was honest, and the other that moder-European facilities had been introuduced. Whereas in 1890 the railway receipts wore £1,400,000, in 1891 they were £1,630,000, and in 1892 they were £1,680,000. The various improvements which had taken place in Egypt were much to the credit of the small band of Englishmen who had undertaken the responsible task of endeavouring to re-organise the Government of Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Dilke) had talked about £500,000 a year as being the cost to them of keeping troops in Egypt. As a matter of fact, however, they had received from the Egyptian Government more than the cost of maintaining the troops in Egypt; and, as they had not increased our standing Army, they had really gained rather than lost by the transaction. He thought he knew the English people well enough to say that they would have been prepared to bear a small burden, if necessary, in order to confer such great benefits on the Egyptian people, and to maintain the great highway to India, which was, after all, the source of much of England's greatness and prosperity. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Dilke) and the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) pressed for an immediate withdrawal of the troops from Egypt. If their wishes were carried out, the result would be that the laborious system of Government they had established would be almost completely overthrown. They must remember that there were in Egypt many people who belonged to the old governing classes, who had been removed from Office, and who, formerly, were a source of corruption. These classes were ready to return, and to pursue their ancient methods. We had turned these people out of Office, and had brought in better men, who had done their duty to the people of Egypt. If we now retired from Egypt what would be the result? A return of corruption would follow. Works for water storage, canal construction, and similar undertakings had been carried out under great difficulties, and were still in progress owing to English enterprise. All this would be brought to an end were we to retire. He did not think the Khedive desired to see the present admirable system of administration departed from. It would not be to the interest of the Egyptian people, and the English people would not desire anything of the kind. As to the question of our obligation, as he had pointed out, it had been stated in a Despatch of Earl Granville that we should never leave Egypt unless we had established a stable Government, with a prospect of permanent success. We had not done that yet completely. The present difficulties in Egypt it would require years to get over. He did not think that Lord Cromer was active in interfering in Egyptian affairs. Lord Cromer was only in the background, contenting himself with giving his advice when it was necessary: but a knowledge of the fact that he was there would be a source of strength and not of weakness to Egypt. He did not think that the right hon. Baronet had made out his case that, as a matter of obligation, it was our duty to retire from Egypt when we had not yet completed our work, nor had he shown that we had promised any European Power that we would do so. He had, therefore, heard with pleasure the declaration of the Prime Minister that he would not undertake to do more than he had promised. No one could say when the day would arrive when it would be our duty to retire, but, in his opinion, it would not be for years; and, therefore, the right hon. Baronet must make up his mind to see for many years the English hand still strong on the Egyptian rudder.

thought that, before the Debate closed, something should be said from those (the Opposition) Benches. He earnestly hoped that the House would cordially support the Prime Minister. He would not say a word as to the right hon. Gentleman's speech lest he should impair its effect. But the right hon. Gentleman might be assured that hon. Members on the Opposition side had listened with respectful attention to the statesmanlike dicta which he had delivered that evening. In the very few remarks he (Sir R. Temple) intended to address to the House, he would endeavour to confine himself to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean (Sir C. Dilke). No one would dispute the effect of the very elaborate series of quotations which the right hon. Gentleman had presented to the House. No doubt Members of both Front Benches had declared that Egypt should be evacuated as soon as we had done our duty to that country, but not sooner. So far they were all agreed, and the real question was as to the time of such evacuation. As to this, he hoped the right hon. Baronet would not think it disrespectful if he said that, whatever might be the validity of the first part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech as to obligations to ultimately evacuate, the second part was altogether inconclusive—namely, as to time and mode of evacuation. With regard to the time of evacuation, there were many matters worthy of consideration, such as British interests, our grow- ing trade with Egypt, the vast amount of capital embarked in the country, and the sacrifices which had been made there by the British Government. These were all British interests of importance, but these alone would not decide the question. Then, as to the military question, there was much to be said on both sides. The right hon. Baronet thought that, in the event of war, the retention of Egypt would involve us in peril. But it must not be forgotten that we held possession of such strategic posts and coaling stations as Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus, all stepping-stones to Egypt. A Power, therefore, like ourselves, virtually masters of the seas, ought to be able to occupy Egypt in the event of war. if it ever came to pass that, with our great Possessions in the Mediterranean, and with our Fleet, we could not command the route to Egypt, then we, ourselves, were in danger, and our Empire must be tottering to its fall. If we could command Egypt as a halfway house, no one who knew India would doubt that the possession of Egypt in the event of war would be a great advantage to us. But, again, it was not the military consideration which would decide the question. He ventured, with all respect to the Prime Minister and to other parties in the House, to say that the real question was, What is our duty to Egypt itself? We were bound, no doubt, to vacate Egypt when we had placed the Egyptians in a position to govern themselves for the future. The right hon. Baronet had hardly adverted to this question, although it was the cardinal point. The right hon. Gentleman had touched only the fringes of this cardinal and vital question. He was, surely, bound to have some regard to the achievements, both administrative, judicial, and fiscal, which had raised the name of England throughout Europe, and it also behaved him to consider how far the reforms we had introduced had gone, and had placed the administration of Egypt in a suitable position for future self government, and bow far yet further reforms were needed. To not one of these subjects had the right hon. Baronet given any consideration, though these were the points on which the whole matter turned. The right hon. Baronet had said they were to depend for the future government of Egypt upon a National Assembly which was hardly yet full fledged, which had not yet tried its wings, and which might turn out to be broken-winged. He fully admitted it was most essential that we should endeavour to develop this Local Institution of a representative character, but we must give them a few years' trial before we could form an opinion as to the future of self-government. Had we yet done our duty towards the people of Egypt? We had done our best, and that best had proved fruitful of reforms for which, no doubt, we were blessed by the mass of the people of Egypt. There were probably some leading statesmen in Egypt who desired to be quit of British control; but when any hon. Member ventured to say that the fellaheen, the peasantry, the toilers on the soil, desired that our occupation should cease, he desired to express his entire disbelief. He altogether discredited any such notion. If the British occupation were now to cease, these people would be in lamentation and despair. Doubtless, they looked upon all Governments as more or less trouble some; but they regarded their own native government as oppressive, and they looked to us for reform, peace, prosperity, safety, and protection. To tell him that these people wished us to evacuate the country was to tell him something which he could not, for a moment, believe. Until such time as we had fulfilled our task in Egypt before the world and under Providence, we ought not to evacuate it. He desired to put this broad, plain, and prominent consideration before the House. He was confident that, apart from all diplomatic and juristic considerations, the plain duty which we had undertaken towards an interesting, increasing, extensive, and growing population would induce hon. Members to reject the Motion now before the House by an immense majority.

said, that if we had not yet done our duty to Egypt, as the hon. Baronet said we had not, it was high time we left that country. If, as it was said, we had been in Egypt for 11 years and had not done our duty, it was time for us to leave the people of Egypt to govern themselves. He was not going to reply to the catalogue of benefits that the hon. Member for St. Pancras had read out to them. But the hon. Member could not say what benefits would have occurred to the country if it had enjoyed the benefits of Parliamentary government. We did not know what would have been the state of things if the British Army had not crushed the Egyptian Forces and had not crushed the Parliament that then was doing duty. It was said that the cost to England of the occupation was very little, and that Egypt defrayed the expense of sending the troops there. Sir H. Drummond Wolff had estimated the cost at £415,000; but the right hon. Baronet (Sir C. Dilke) would not be far wrong in his estimate, because we had many more soldiers in Egypt than we had at the time Sir H. Drummond Wolff had made his estimate.

We have fewer.

did not know what the proposition was, but he believed that at the present time we had a larger number of soldiers in Egypt. It was said that we charged Egypt the extra cost of sending out our troops; but if we charged Egypt the same price per soldier that we charged our Colonies—Ceylon and India and the Straits Settlements—it would be much nearer £1,000,000 than £500,000. He could not agree with those who said, "We want a certain number of soldiers; and it is a matter of no importance whether we have them in garrison at home or in Egypt, so long as we have them somewhere. Besides, a certain portion of the necessary expense is saved to us by sending troops to Egypt." He very much regretted to hear the statement of the Prime Minister; but he was not surprised, because he had often seen the Liberal Party out of Office adopt one position and then take up another position directly they crossed the floor of the House. A certain event had occurred; and that event, instead of inducing the Government to leave Egypt before disaster happened, seemed only to make them inclined to remain. The policy of the Prime Minister with regard to Egypt seemed to be entirely one of drift. He did not seem to have anything like a clearly-defined and definite policy. It was to his (Dr. Clark's) mind a moral obligation on the right hon. Gentleman to develop some policy. He had taken us into Egypt in 1885, and he had afterwards admitted that he had made a mistake. The two great crimes of the century against liberty had been the crushing of the Roman Republic by the French Republic and the destruction by England of the attempt to establish Parliamentary government in Egypt. It was considered advisable to support the control—that was to say, to have Englishmen to look after English interests, and Frenchmen to look after French interests. Well, the Chamber of Notables demanded the right to vote the money of the country, and they took upon themselves the right, whereupon occurred the intervention that Mr. John Bright had described as "a sin against God and man." We had been in Egypt for 11 years, and our stay might be indefinitely prolonged unless the advice of the right hon. Baronet were taken. It was said that we were doing good work in Egypt; but so far as the opinion of all classes in Egypt could be ascertained, they did not thank us and did not want us. But we were in Egypt; the crime had been committed; thousands of lives had been lost, and millions of money spent, and the question was, what were we to do? The Prime Minister had no policy but that of drifting, and the end of it would be that the Powers would interfere, or trouble would arise from French intrigues, and we should leave Egypt, perhaps, after ignominy and disaster. What ought we to do? What ought the Liberal Party to do, taking into consideration the position it had adopted throughout this question? If they believed what they then stated—if the Government believed what they had said in Opposition, they would call the Powers together and say, "We said we would leave Egypt when order was established, and would take nothing for ourselves. Order is now established, but we ask permission to stay in Egypt for another 10 years"—that was, if they meant to develop self-government. The Chamber of Notables had taken upon itself larger powers, perhaps larger than the Khedive desired it to have. What had occurred since? The Chamber of Notables had practically ceased to exist, and the Chamber established by Lord Dufferin had collapsed; and, unless the Powers were consulted if we left, the result would be that the old Pashas would govern the country, or somebody else would. If the Powers were consulted, no doubt in the end Egypt would be neutralised, its independence would be recognised by the great Powers, and we should have five or seven or 10 years to develop self-government in the country. It was to be regretted that the Prime Minister had not declared a programme, and he hoped and trusted that the present policy of drift would not end in disaster.

desired to say a few words on this question, as, perhaps, the last Member of the House who had visited Egypt, and as one who had been in the habit of visiting that country for the past four or five years, and who had some means of getting information there as to the wishes of the natives and the largo commercial community at Alexandria. The only remark of the last speaker to which he would refer was the statement that if we had failed to govern Egypt successfully during the past 11 years, the sooner we left it the better. One remark would be sufficient to answer that. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean (Sir C. Dilke) had said, and said very truly, that the Egyptians were anxious for our departure; and, no doubt, the Egyptians, like every other people, were anxious to be free; but he had spoken to many of them, and they had always said that they did not desire that freedom to come at the present moment. The British rule had done two things for Egypt which had not been alluded to. Our occupation had had the effect of improving the administration of the law and improving the system of education. His friends in Egypt told him that the people who used to govern Egypt before our occupation, and who governed it so badly both legally and officially, owing largely to their want of education, were still lurking about the country, ready to assert themselves again as soon as the occupation ceased. He would, therefore, urge that British influence ought not to be withdrawn until those people whom we had been educating had grown up and were able to get the power of government into their hands. That would be the time when Egypt could become a free nation. These were the views he had gathered from his residence in Egypt.

was sorry to have to occupy the time of the House at all, but as he understood that the right hon. Baronet (Sir C. Dilke) did not intend to press the matter to a Division he (Mr. Morton) considered it only right to say a few words as to his opinion. If the right hon. Baronet had intended to go to a Division he (Mr. Morton) should have voted with him, as he had always hold a strong opinion that we had no business at all in Egypt, and that the sooner we got out of it the better for ourselves and for everybody else concerned. We were showing a bad example to the rest of the world in interfering and taking possession of territory which did not belong to us. The Radical Party were anxious to see Egypt evacuated; but that was not the policy of the Tories, or of some Jingoes on the Ministerial side of the House. Their policy was to retain possession of Egypt, and to that policy he, for one, objected. He had been sorry to hear the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister say to-night that France had no more right in Egypt than any other Power. He could not overlook the fact that the French people had constructed the Suez Canal. This country had opposed the construction of the Canal; but in spite of our opposition, the French people persevered, and had brought the undertaking to a successful issue. Therefore, although is was said that we had gone to Egypt to protect the Canal, the French had more right to protect it for themselves and for the rest of the world than we had.

Eighty-seven per cent. of the shipping that passes through the Canal is British.

said, that proved nothing except that we had had the good sense at last to see that the French were right in constructing the Canal. The people who had the most right to protect the Canal were the people who risked their money to make it. There were two reasons why we should get out of Egypt: One reason was, that the occupation cost a lot of money, and he did not think that we ought to spend our money in foreign countries when there were so many people at home wanting aid and assistance. The other was, that as long as we remained there our relations with the French Government could not be cordial. He was aware that some hon. Members on the Opposition side of the House did not wish to be on good terms with the Republican Government of France. If there was a Monarchy or an Empire there, they would wish to be on good terms with France, but they disliked the Republic. He was sure their feelings were not shared by the British people. The people of this country—the democracy—were anxious to be on good terms with the people and the Government of France. There were difficulties with France constantly cropping up, which could not be settled because of our policy in Egypt; and one notable example of them was the French shore difficulty at Newfoundland. It was well-known that that difficulty could not be settled in consequence of the Egyptian Question. The hon. Member for St. Pancras seemed to forget that all we had been attempting to do with the people of Egypt was to rob them. We and other countries had lent them on paper about £120,000,000; at least, they were supposed to be that amount in our debt, but all the money we had ever handed over to them had been about £50,000,000. We had assisted to rob them of £70,000,000, and that fact alone was sufficient to account for the difficulties into which the country had fallen. Why, such a loss would even bring a country like England into difficulties. Egypt had been brought to the verge of bankruptcy, and that was all we had done for her. We had done it for the benefit of British adventurers and company promoters on the London Stock Exchange and elsewhere. Instead of concentrating our efforts upon an endeavour to establish good government at home, we were wasting energy and money on Egypt. Surely the Egyptians had as much right to come over here and endeavour to establish good government in Ireland, and to make the Irish people contented, as we had to go to Egypt for similar purposes. Even if the Egyptians could not govern themselves as well as we could govern them, surely their own endeavours would be more palatable to them than those of the foreigner. When were we to know that Egypt was capable of governing itself? The very moment it showed a disposition towards self-government we stepped in and interfered. We had done that in the Spring of this year. He was afraid there were numbers of people in this country who desired that we should take possession of Egypt altogether, and he was afraid that we should drift into that policy. He thought, therefore, the best thing we could do would be to get out of Egypt as fast as we could. There was some reason to believe that the majority of the Liberal Cabinet were Jingoes, who could not be kept down by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Chief Secretary for Ireland. He could not say how many they numbered, as he had not been in the Cabinet: but it was necessary that those Radicals who acted up to their election pledges should keep a careful watch upon the Liberal Government and keep them up to their mark in regard to their foreign policy. They would not be able to do that by moving Resolutions and not voting for them, because, of course, what Her Majesty's Government feared was not so much talk as Divisions. He trusted, however, that the Debate would do some little good, and that it would have some effect on the Liberal Government. He hoped, also, that the result of the Debate would be to let the Government know that there were a largo number of Radicals in the House who intended to stick to their pledges, and were anxious not only to do justice to the people of Ireland, but to the people of Egypt as well. Above all, let these people have an opportunity of governing themselves. He desired to see this plundering all over the world put an end to. The people of the West End of London no doubt were favourable to this policy, as it gave their class something to do, and provided them with pensions. Let these people, however, start in the future working to get an honest living. The country would be all the better, as well as the world generally. He protested against going into foreign countries for the purpose of destroying people at the expense of the British taxpayer, and hoped that ere long we should, like the United States of America, see the wisdom of settling all disputes by arbitration.

said, the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean (Sir C. Dilke) was entitled to the thanks of the House for bringing before it a subject superior, perhaps, to any other in the Imperial policy of this great country; but he thought that when the Debate was read—as it would be read throughout the whole of Europe—a cer- tain amount of disappointment would be felt at its lame and impotent conclusion. The facts stated were not disputed by the Prime Minister; the inferences drawn from these facts by the right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean were every one of them adopted by the Prime Minister, and yet the right hon. Gentleman entirely ran away from the conclusion the right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean would have him to draw. The House was asked to affirm that the time had come to fulfil the most solemn and oft-repeated engagements entered into by both sides of the House and by successive Governments, but the Prime Minister replies, "The time is not come," for, like the lady in the Arabian Nights, the right hon. Gentleman finds him a new story why he should not be beheaded on that particular morning. The last time the right hon. Gentleman was challenged why he did not come out of Egypt he gave as his reason the existence of cholera. Now, when he was again challenged, he said certain things had occurred in January which prevented him coming out. It seemed, therefore, in the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman, that cholera, or "events in January," were sufficient reason why no attempt should be made to carry out the engagements which successive Governments had entered into in regard to Egypt. He could not help feeling that it was a little hard on the Prime Minister to be called upon to reply to a Motion dealing with foreign affairs. The right hon. Gentleman was First Lord of the Treasury, and not Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Possibly, the right hon. Gentleman had not fully acquainted himself with the mind of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and might not, therefore, feel himself fully able to deal with the subject. But the right hon. Gentleman's own mind had long been made up on the question of Egypt. As long ago as 1887 the Prime Minister saw to the fullest extent the dangers of our going to Egypt, and the dangers of our continuing there. The right hon. Gentleman denounced the project of going to Egypt—not in a speech which might be delivered without care or attention—but in an article in The Nineteenth Century. The right hon. Gentleman pointed out in that article that it was traditional with Russia to make over Egypt to our mercies, and by implication he drew the inference that what it was traditional with Russia to wish us to do was a thing we ought not to do. He went on to say—

"My belief is that the day which witnesses our occupation of Egypt will bid a long farewell to all cordial political relations between France and England,"

and the conclusion of the right hon. Gentleman was—"I, for one, am inclined on prudential grounds to say, 'Hands off!'" But, notwithstanding these solemn declarations of the right hon. Gentleman, he was the first man, in defiance of the moral law and the law of nations, to send a Fleet to Alexandria to bombard it, to occupy Egypt, to upset the Parliamentary Government of Egypt, on the ground that it wanted to vote its own Budget, and to start that occupation of Egypt which had continued ever since. But the first question that arose on the Motion before the House was—"What is our present status in Egypt?" Undoubtedly, an impression was entertained by many people throughout the country that we were in possession of Egypt; that Egypt was ours to use as we wished, and that it would be very foolish to give it up. He did not wonder that that impression prevailed. The engagements with regard to Egypt had been so involved and so departed from by successive Governments that it was perfectly comprehensible that the simple voter should have rather mixed ideas on the subject. But we were in Egypt under certain conditions. We were there under the conditions that no settlement of the Egyptian Question should be come to without the assent of all the Powers of Europe; that our occupation was to be purely temporary, and not permanent; and that we should never seek for any advantage, diplomatic, territorial—or otherwise—through our presence in Egypt that the other Powers were not entitled to. We were in no better position in Egypt than any other Power in Europe, except that we supplied the occupying Army. But he came to the real practical question—"What good had our occupation of Egypt done to anybody?" Undoubtedly, when the occupation first took place in 1882, it rescued the usurers, the Egyptian bondholders, from a most embarrassing position—a position he should have been glad to leave them in. It might be said that we were bound—and he would admit it for the moment, if necessary—to rescue the bondholders from that position; but from 1882 to the present time Egyptian Bonds had constantly risen in value, and if in 1882 we had obligations—moral, or immoral—towards the usurers, those obligations were long ago discharged, because anytime during the last 11 years they could have sold their bonds at a rise. Then it was said our occupation had done good to the Egyptians. He would not deny that a certain amount of good had been done to the Egyptians. Undoubtedly, corruption had been stopped in high places; but it had not been stopped altogether. It was one of the evils of our occupation of Egypt that, whilst Englishmen who went to India made India their home, learned the language, sympathised with the natives, and desired to work for them, the Englishmen who went to Egypt went there only for a temporary purpose: did not, as a rule, learn the language, and, consequently, did not come into direct contact with the natives, communicating with them only through the Syrians and Armenians, who acted as interpreters. The result was, that the Englishmen in Egypt, though extremely well-intentioned and desirous of doing their duty to the best of their power, were unable to deal with the Egyptian races in the admirable, effective, and successful way the native races of India had been dealt with by Englishmen. We sought to impose on Egypt for its good Western methods. Western notions of law and Western plans of administration were very good for Western people, but were entirely un-suited for Orientals. Lord Salisbury, writing in August, 1885, said truly that the cause of true progress in Egypt had been arrested by the efforts to induce the Eastern populations to accept reforms conceived in the spirit of Western civilisation. It had been established by a question he asked in the House a few days previously that the system of enforced labour, which was considered one of the great grievances under which the Egyptians laboured, had not been abolished, but was in full existence at the present moment. He was aware that the kourbash had not been abolished. Anybody who had been to Egypt and who had seen the way government was carried on, and had the candour to describe what he had observed, must be aware that the kourbash still existed. The fact was, that the conditions under which we were in Egypt rendered it impossible that any good government could be carried on there. Again, we were told to look with admiration at the fact that a larger sum had been raised in taxes in Egypt than had ever been raised before. He believed that at no time since the days of Pharaoh had a larger amount of taxation been raised in Egypt than at the present day. But that was not a thing to be proud of, for it was not to the advantage of Egypt. If he wished to prove that good had been done to the Egyptians he would like to be able to say that the taxes had been halved, or at least reduced; but, instead of that, the taxes had been increased, and they were asked to believe that that was for the benefit of the people of Egypt. The effete so called, the incapable Government so called which preceded them, conquered and kept the Soudan and the Equatorial Provinces, which were most important Provinces for the welfare and prosperity of Egypt. They were of enormous strategical and material advantage to Egypt, inasmuch as it was recognised that they commanded the affluents of the Nile. The men who were masters of Khartoum were the masters of the prosperity of Egypt. When this country said they had done good by their occupation of Egypt they must remember that, as regards the Soudan and the other Equatorial Provinces, they had inflicted the greatest possible injury upon Egypt, for those Provinces which had been previously won and kept they had lost and abandoned. But even admitting to the full the claim that benefit had followed upon our occupation, he contended that it was not to the point. It was not the mission of this country to go about governing other people whether they would or would not. If that be our mission he could point out many other countries, even in Europe, where we might beneficially intervene. The important question for us to consider was not whether we had done good to the Egyptians, but rather what good, if any, had the occupation of Egypt brought to this country. Financially, so far from gaining 1d. by the occupation, undoubtedly, at this moment, to follow the calculation of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, the mere expense of the British soldiers that were kept there was £360,000 a year. Out of that Egypt paid £87,000, leaving a net expenditure on the British Army of Occupation of £273,000 a year. Then, commercially, we should carry on exactly the same trade through Egypt as we did now if our Forces were withdrawn. Strategically, Egypt was so situated that it was approached by navigable seas on two sides; the remainder of its frontier was desert, across which Armies could not march. This was the governing factor of the strategical situation in Egypt, for it led inevitably to this conclusion—that Armies were incapable of action upon Egypt, whereas Navies wore capable of coercing it at any moment. That had been proved over and over again. It was proved at the end of the last century, in 1798, when the greatest captain of the age, Napoleon, with the finest Army that had ever trod the soil of Europe, the Army of Italy, conquered Egypt, governed it, and England drove him out, not with Armies, but with nothing but ships; and so to this day Egypt was always safe from Armies and always must be the slave of Navies. So long as England commanded the sea, Egypt would be always at her mercy; although there might not be an English soldier on her shores. All the nations of Europe might occupy Egypt, yet England, with the command of the sea, would have no more difficulty than then in driving them out; and, therefore, he said that strategically there was no advantage whatever to be gained by this country from the military occupation of Egypt. Coming to the Canal, no doubt it had been of great advantage to us, and in time of peace, and still more in time of war, might be of great advantage to this country. But in time of peace no one would over interfere with the use of the Canal, and in time of war we had given it up by the Convention we had signed, to the effect that in time of war the war and merchant vessels of all nations should, like us, use it. So in time of war, with England in the occupation of Egypt, they came to this result—that, assuming we were fighting Russia for the possession of India, and Russia desired to send an expedition throughout the Suez Canal to attack our Indian Possessions, positively the English soldiers would have to allow the expedition to pass through the Canal, and would have indirectly, if not directly, to assist in the passage of that expedition to our Indian Possessions. But, assuming for the moment that this crazy and insane Convention were abolished and that we had to fight for the Canal, the fight would take place not in the Canal itself, but in the approaches to the Canal, either in the Bed Sea or between Crete and Port Said, or between Port Said and Gibraltar. The winner of that action would have full, complete, and unfettered control of the Canal. Then they were told that if we withdrew from Egypt Franco would enter it. The first answer to that was the answer of 1798. France at that time did enter Egypt, and was driven out by England without soldiers, practically with nothing but ships. His second answer was the declarations of M. Waddington and M. Freycinet, on the part of the French Government, that it was not their intention to occupy Egypt. With regard to the effect of the occupation of Egypt upon our diplomatic relations and our reputation for justice, he would undertake to say that the English Ambassador at Constantinople never went into the presence of the Sultan or the Grand Vizier without being reminded in some form or another that England had taken one of the Sultan's Provinces, and that England had ranged herself on the side of those Powers who sought to despoil the Sultan of his dominions. It was not the Sultan alone who felt this, for there wore 40,000,000 Mussulmans in our Indian Possessions who looked up to the Sultan as the head of their faith, and who would think that England had lost her sense of justice. He agreed with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean that we should leave Egypt, but he could not agree with the right hon. Gentleman in his suggestion that the negotiations of 1887 for neutralising Egypt were still open. The reason which caused the Wolff Convention to fall through was nothing more nor less than, as was said in one of the despatches in July, 1887, "the persistent threats of Russia" and the great opposition of France. The persistent threats of Russia they could understand. It had always been the policy of Russia to embroil England with France by getting England to occupy Egypt. Russia did not oppose our remaining in Egypt; she was delighted to see us there, and all our enemies had the same feeling, because they knew the injury it did us. But the Convention of 1887 was, he thought, very fairly opposed by the French. They opposed it on the ground that the right of re-occupation which it gave to England was such that it practically divided the sovereignty of Turkey between England and the Sultan. Under these circumstances, it was natural that not only Russia and France, but the Sultan himself, should have refused to sign the Convention. Those objections still subsisted. If that Convention of 1887 were again to be proposed, the same objections would be felt to it, if not by France or Russia, at any rate by the Sultan; and he submitted that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean was wrong when he said that at any moment they might have the Convention of 1887. As to the neutralisation of Egypt, that, in his opinion, was the worst, the most unsatisfactory, and the most incomplete solution of all. Instances of neutrality were known, and be defied any hon. Member to mention a single instance of neutrality which had served its purpose. In 1802 the neutrality of Malta was guaranteed by the Treaty of Amiens; but that neutrality had fallen through, because this country had retained Malta ever since. The neutrality of Switzerland, which was guaranteed by Treaty in 1815, was violated in 1848 by the Prussian occupation of Neuchatel; and how long that neutrality would last if the struggles between Germany and France were renewed no one could say. The neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed by the Powers by Treaty in 1830; but in 1870, when a period of stress came upon that neutrality, it was felt to be impossible to rely on the guarantee that existed under the old Treaties, and this country found it necessary to make a new Treaty with France on the one hand and Germany on the other to the effect that whichever of these two Powers violated the neutrality of Belgium would find England ranged against her. The integrity of the Danish Monarchy was guaranteed by Treaty in 1852, but they all knew what occurred in 1864. The Black Sea Treaty, also one of neutrality, prohibiting, among other things, the building of warships, resulted in the Conference of London, and in the yielding of every point to an empty affirmation of an infructuous principle. In 1856 there were Treaties which guaranteed the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire; they knew what was the result, and he submitted that these instances were enough to show that no European guarantee of neutrality would be of the slightest effect with regard to Egypt, unless backed up by some Power ready at any moment to take up arms in defence of neutrality. What, then, was his solution of the difficulty? It was the same solution as that which England readily afforded to this same problem at a time when she still possessed statesmen. It was the solution of 1801, following on the action of 1798, when we restored Egypt to its rightful Sovereign, the Sultan. For the benefit, credit, and future of England, there was no better solution to be obtained than that. The Sultan was all-powerful in Egypt, not merely from his political position and his power, but also from the fact of his being the head of the Mussulman religion. He was the only Power that could govern Egypt as it should be governed, or, at any rate, as it desired to be governed; and the Sultan would never fail to meet whatever requirements they might make upon him in reason and justice with regard to the territories of Egypt. The true word of this Debate, the word which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean had suggested, the word which the Prime Minister had not dared to utter and adopt, and the true moral was, "Come out of Egypt."

said, he would not have intervened in the Debate but for the reason that they were not likely to be able to show by their votes in what direction their sympathies were. He was one of those who looked upon our action in this Egyptian Question as a huge mistake. He thought the origin of our disasters dated from the Dual, or Salisbury, Control, for, as a natural consequence, immediately difficulties arose in Egypt we had to intervene, at a great cost of life and money. He would take this opportunity of pleading for the release of Arabi Pasha, who headed the revolt of the Egyptians against oppression, corruption, and persecution. It might be said of the whole history of our interference in Egyptian affairs, "Twere long to tell and sad to trace," and the sooner we could get rid of the ignominy of remaining in Egypt as conquerors of a people struggling to be free the better. It was our duty to our interests, pledges, and traditions as a liberty-loving people to retire from the position in which we were now placed.

rose to call attention to the Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Establishments. Having pointed out that there was nothing of a Party nature involved in the question, he stated that in the year 1886 a Royal Commission was appointed by the late Government to inquire into the Civil Service generally, partly for the purpose of ascertaining how far the organisation under the Play fair scheme was working successfully, and how far the numbers and cost of the Civil Service generally might be reduced without any loss of efficiency to the Public Service. In September, 1888, the Commission issued its second Report, in which they made certain recommendations. The first was that means should be taken to ascertain with regard to each Department what the normal establishment of that Department should be; that power should be given to revise the strength of that Department from year to year, giving the Treasury or some body in the future the power to reduce these establishments as well as to check their growth, which latter was the only power the Treasury up to that time possessed. The second recommendation, briefly stated, amounted to this—that instead of having a large Upper Division and a Lower Division not very much larger, in future, in all Departments where there was a necessity for an Upper or First Division at all, it should be very much smaller, and that the great gulf hitherto fixed either by regulation or by practice between the first and second, or Upper and Lower Division, should be swept away once and for all, and that Lower Division clerks should have every opportunity of rising to a Higher Division, and that promotion should take place by merit only. Another recom- mendation was that there should be uniform regulations and rules governing the administration of all these Departments, and one reason for making that recommendation was in order to facilitate transfers which would have the effect of opening out greater chances of promotion for really efficient servants and enabling redundant clerks to be transferred from one Department to another. The Royal Commission, looking to the fact that in the first place the system of pensions was a very costly one indeed, and in the second place that under the existing system there were very few opportunities of removing from the Public Service servants who had either ceased to be competent or who had risen to a rank in the Service they were not fitted to occupy, felt that some means should be enforced by which these officers could be retired from the Service, and that at the same time there should be a system of pensions which, whilst doing justice to the valuable servants of the State, should cost something less than the system which had hitherto done so much to swell the Non-effective Vote. The first step which the Royal Commission suggested, in order to carry out their recommendations, was to appoint a body which, acting under the Treasury, should have more power to control the Public Service and the various Departments than had been the case up to the present time. The two main faults in connection with the Treasury control over the other Departments of the Civil Service were these:—It had hardly sufficient touch with the other Departments, and it was not able to take the initiative in reforming those other Departments, which he was inclined to think was somewhat aggravated by the fact that instead of the Treasury being a strong body drawing some of the more efficient servants from other public Departments to itself, whenever a good appointment was going in any other Department it sent away one of its own clerks, and so weakened the Treasury, which ought to be a strong controlling body in public administration. The object of the Report of the Royal Commission was to inaugurate a body which should be able to initiate reform; which should be more in touch with the rest of the Departments than the Treasury had been hitherto; and which would not merely be able to prevent any excess in numbers and salaries, but should always be able, when occasion arose, actually to reduce the numbers in a given Department. In order to do that, the Royal Commission recommended that every Department should at once be called upon to draw up a scheme showing exactly how many men would be required to form the Department and what salaries they should receive. He was sorry to say that that recommendation had not been carried out by all the Departments. The opinion of the Royal Commission was that all the Departments of the Civil Service should be treated as a whole, that they should all be subject to the same rules and regulations, and that there should be no privileged Departments. He hoped in future the Government would see that such was the case. There was one Department there was no excuse for—namely, the Foreign Office—which had actually refused to listen in any way to the Government or the Royal Commission, and had not formulated any scheme such as had been suggested. If there was one Department which wanted looking into, and thoroughly to have the public eye brought upon it, so that it should be treated in the same way as other Departments, it undoubtedly was the Foreign Office. There was another Department which had not formulated any scheme—namely, the India Office. He knew perfectly well that the India Office stood in a somewhat different position to the other Departments, because it was not paid for by the English ratepayers, but by the people of India. But he did think, in common justice to the people of India, although that Department could not be brought under the purview of the Royal Commission as not being paid for by the taxpayers of England, there was no reason why it should be treated differently to the other Departments, and the India Office ought to be forced to comply with the new regulations laid down for the Civil Service. This normal establishment, when once it could be formulated, was to be inquired into at once, and periodically. There was also to be a permanent Committee, consisting of an officer of the Treasury and the heads of four other Departments; and this new Committee was to be formed for the purpose, as was stated, of suggesting reforms, securing uniformity of regulations, and facili- tating transfers. The proceedings of this Committee were to be recorded. He did not find any Order of Council dealing with that permanent Committee; or that any steps had been taken to insure that its proceedings should be recorded or its recommendations put on record. He thought that record was an important matter, in order that they might see how often the Committee sat, what evidence was brought before it, and what recommendations were actually made. Nor was he able to see that in the future this permanent Committee was to have any initiation at all; but, as far as he could see, it was only to be called into action when the Treasury consulted it. The great complaint hitherto had been that the Treasury had no initiative, and, therefore, reforms in the Civil Service could not be regularly carried out; but if the Treasury, having no initiative itself, was to call into action a permanent Committee which in itself had no initiative, he was afraid they would be no nearer reform than they were before. He believed it was the fact that neither the Treasury nor the permanent Committee would in the future, any more than in the past, have any power to cut down numbers. That was very important indeed, because not only was it desirable to prevent establishments growing, but occasions might arise when it was quite possible, and indeed desirable, to reduce the numbers in a particular Department. He would pass to the second head of the recommendations of the Commission. The idea was that there should be a small Upper Division and a much larger Second Division, and that promotion from the bottom to the top should be by merit alone, and not by seniority, because he ventured to say that the great curse of the Civil Service up to this time had been that the good and bad had gone up to the top together, and there had been no proper moans of promoting the meritorious and keeping down those who did not deserve to rise. He recognised that at the present time—and it might be for some years—it would be difficult to give promotion to many a man who merited it. Although there was this gulf between the Upper and Lower Division, still there were at the present moment, and might be for some years, many redundant clerks whom it was impossible to transfer to other Departments, whom it would not be fair to other Departments to transfer, and whom it would be ruinous in the interests of economy to pension out and retire from the Service on the present terms for retirement, which were very expensive, and even then the advantages to the Second Division clerks would for some time be small, because they had to face the fact that the Upper Division had got to be smaller in the future; therefore, as a matter of fact, there would be fewer vacancies to be filled by those Lower Division clerks. While promotion by merit involved that the meritorious should rise, it was essential, in order to produce a state of things under which the meritorious should rise, that they should keep down and even turn out of the service those who were really inefficient. If they were going to keep down the inefficient members of the Civil Service it was most essential to do it in the earlier years of their service, as it was more difficult to do it later on. One of the most important recommendations of the Commission, he was sorry to say, had not been carried out. They recommended that with every public servant the first year should be a year of real probation. In that year it should be ascertained whether he was thoroughly fit for the Public Service, because many a man might pass by examination who might not have the qualities fitting him to be an efficient servant of the Crown. He regretted that this valuable recommendation had been taken no notice of whatever.

said that the one year's probation was already enbodied in an Order in Council dated 12th February, 1876.

said, that, at any rate, it was shown to the Commission that that probation was never insisted upon as it ought to be. He passed from that to another test of the efficiency of a public servant which the Commission thought it necessary to insist upon, and that was that during the first six years of a public servant's career in the Lower Division his annual increment should never be granted to him unless he had a certificate issued by his superiors saying he was a person well qualified to have promotion and increased pay. That he knew had been done, but the certificate had not been recorded; and unless certificates of this kind were recorded good-natured superiors were only too ready to regard incompetent public servants with more laxity than if they knew their certificates were to be placed on record, so that if a man they had certified as competent turned out to be inefficient they would be called to account. There was one great evil the House would have to deal with. Before the Commission witness after witness stated that, often when they tried to keep down the inefficient members of the Public Service so that the efficient should be promoted, some Member of Parliament went to the Department and threatened to raise a difficulty in the House if promotion were not given to a particular man. It was the London Members especially who were complained of; and if one of these clerks happened to be a Member's constituent it was more than the life of the head of a Department was worth to refuse the promotion that ought to be withheld on public grounds. This was a thing that, in the interests of the Public Service, all hon. Members ought to protest against. It was deteriorating to the Public Service. He did not say hon. Members were not entitled to speak on general grounds: but they ought not to go to the head of a Department and terrorise him into giving promotion to any individual who did not deserve it. Another thing that ought to be dealt with more vigorously than had been done by Order in Council was the prohibition of private work in office hours and the holding of offices connected with public Companies, which, diverted public servants from their official duties during office hours. A public servant ought not to be serving as a Director when he was required to be in his office, and in his office he ought not to engage in private work. He would point out that it was to the interests of the public servants themselves that they should give their whole time, because if they did not they were not qualified to receive their pensions; therefore, in their own interests, they should be compelled to comply with these conditions. The Commission strongly urged that the rule on this subject should be rigidly enforced, and they then quoted a very admirable regulation of the Colonial Office which, he was sorry to say, was the only office that carried out a strict regulation of this kind. What had the Order in Council done? He thought, to a certain extent, it did really endeavour to carry out the recommendation on this subject; but it was so loosely worded that it failed to effect its object in one or two particulars. In the first place, the Royal Commission did not limit this employment to Companies, but it extended to work of any kind. The Order in Council only limited it to work in connection with the management of Companies. He was told there were several public servants acting as auditors and doing the work in office hours, and, as this was not considered to be management, the regulation was evaded. Then, again, he said that all public servants, both past and future, whether they had been Directors of public Companies in the past, or whether they intended to be in the future, should be prohibited doing work of this kind. But the Order in Council did not carry out the object aimed at. It did not say that Directors were not to be allowed to be Directors of public Companies, but it said they were not to be allowed to accept directorships. It did not, therefore, touch the case of those who were Directors of public Companies at the time this Order was carried into effect. He hoped it would be laid down that during office hours no public servant should be allowed to act as a Director of a public Company. Outside office hours, of course, they had the right to dispose of their own time, but during office hours all public servants, high and low, should be expected to be in their places. The Royal Commission recommended that in every Department of the Civil Service there should be an attendance book, and that every member in the office should be obliged to sign, thus showing when he entered the office, when he left for luncheon, when he came back, and when he left the office for the evening. That rule was to be equally applied to both the Higher and the Lower Divisions. It was no excuse to say that in the Higher Divisions work was sometimes done at home. The influence of example was so great and the efficiency of a Department as a whole so bound up with this discipline that the regulation ought to be strictly enforced instead of being loosely framed and evaded as it was now in several cases. With regard to the Lower Division, the Order in Council was most explicit and, to his mind, most satisfactory. To his mind there should be no distinction. It was not ordered in the Higher Division that the attendance book should be signed. There was no such attendance book in the Higher Division.

The regulation is that an attendance book should be kept in every Department for recording the times of arrival and departure.

wanted to know why there was this difference in the wording of the regulation? In the Lower Division it was required that the clerks should sign the book. In the Upper Division the clerks were not required to sign the book, and, as a matter of fact, they did not sign it. Why was not the regulation enforced in both Divisions? The attendance book lay on the table, but how many of the Upper Division clerks signed it? There was a distinction which the Royal Commission did not sanction, and which he held was thoroughly unfair. Again, the holidays of the Higher Division were much longer than those of the Lower Division.

Second Division.

Yes; Second Division. They should endeavour to make a distinction; but it should not be one that gave an air of superiority to one Division. The interruption reminded him that they wished to change the names of these divisions from Upper and Lower to First and Second Divisions. That was the intention—to put them all on au equal footing. These Second Division men were most meritorious, and many of them were quite qualified to rise into the Higher Divisions of the Service of the State. But these superior persons of the Upper Division were not to be called clerks, but "officers;" the term "clerks" was only for the Lower Division. He thought that was really ridiculous. As he was saying, the Higher Division had longer holidays than the Lower Division. Under 10 years' service the Upper Division had 36 days holidays, while the Lower Division men had only 14 days. Over 10 years it was 48 days and 21 days, respectively. There was another recommendation both in the interest of merit and of economy, and that was that all the services ought to be treated as a whole, so that every clerk should be liable to serve, not only in his own Department, but in any other Department if necessary. In order to carry out that recommendation, it was necessary to warn persons entering the Public Services that they were so liable, and he should like to know whether that had been done? Again, if those changes were to be effective, there must be attendance books, and the hours should be the same; at present, the First Division clerks were only called upon to serve six hours, while the Second Division clerks were required to serve seven. The idea was that the latter should not be called upon to serve the seven hours without extra remuneration. It might be doubted whether they had power to require them to do so. He was sorry that that kind of distinction had been drawn, and more favour shown to the Upper Division than to the Lower. What was happening at the present moment? All the clerks in the Lower Division were serving seven hours; and those who were promoted before 1889 were to get a small addition to their salaries; an addition which was hardly an equivalent—£16 he thought it was.

£15.

said, that was not an equivalent. He did not see why favour should be shown the Upper Division clerks in this matter, and he, therefore, thought they ought to be called upon to serve seven hours as the others did. He was for having the same regulations guiding both Divisions. Another thing was that if they were going to have a system of transfer from one Department to another they should retire all public servants at one age. Sixty-five was the ago fixed by the Royal Commission, and he regretted that there were several Departments which refused to be guided by that rule. The Treasury, however, ought to enforce retirement at a certain age. He had only another remark to make; he would not go into details, as he understood that would be done by those following him. He wished to say a word as to the system of pensions. There were two ways of dealing with them. If properly managed they could be used to secure retirement even before the age of 65 in the case of inefficient or supernumerary servants; and they could be used to effect great economies in cutting down the Non-effective Votes. Up to recent times pensions had been calculated on the last three years of service. The Royal Commission recommended that the calculation should be based on the salary of the last 10 years; and when a Royal Commission, which had gone so thoroughly into the matter, made such a recommendation, as being just and at the same time conducive to economy, no Government ought to disregard that recommendation, and take five years instead of 10 years as the basis for calculation. He was sorry to say that the Government——

The late Government.

He was not referring to one Government more than another. He was sorry to say the late Government was much to blame. This was no Party question; and he brought it up to enforce upon this Government, and any other that might come, that the recommendations of the Royal Commissioners should be carried out. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would bear this in mind. He had only two objects in view. One was to make it much more possible in the future to reward merit in public servants than it was now—it was impossible to reward merit unless the inefficient servants were got rid of in some way—and the second object was to promote economy. As to the reward of merit, he was sure he would be borne out by the President of the Local Government Board (Mr. H. H. Fowler), who sat on that Royal Commission, and who had seen numbers of the Second Division clerks and heard the evidence respecting them, when he spoke of the efficient aid which their examination gave to the Public Service. The examination was undoubtedly one of the best in the interests of the Public Service, and numbers of the men were, in his opinion, qualified to hold the highest offices, and, indeed, to his knowledge, some of the present heads of Departments had risen from the lower grades of the Service. If an opportunity were given to these Second Division clerks of rising by steady degrees, the country would be as well served as it had been in the past, and no country had been better served than this country by its Public Departments.

said, he ventured to intrude upon the House to urge that the claims of the Civil servants, to whom reference had been made, should be considered without further delay. He was glad to hear the hon. Member who spoke last stating that this was no Party question. The claims of these servants of the State deserved a patient hearing, and he trusted they would be heard, and the claims dealt with by Her Majesty's present Government. He hoped sincerely the Government would be willing to listen to what they had to state. As to the Second Division clerks, the proposal brought forward involved no question of additional expenditure. It was not a matter of expense. He was anxious to do what he could in the direction of economy; but, as he had said, there was no additional expenditure involved in this case. The hon. Member who opened the discussion had alluded to the recommendation of the Royal Commission as to the necessity of opening the door to the Second Division, so that they might be able to rise up to the First Division. Well, paragraphs 8, 48, and 115 of the Report showed that, in the opinion of the Commissioners, it was necessary that this door should be opened. If that were the case, and there were meritorious clerks whom they all desired to see promoted, then, he asked, why was it that they had competitive examinations? Was it because they wanted, in the First Division, men of different education, and of a different class, to the men in the Second Division? From an answer which had been given to a question in the House, it would seem as if only 18 appointments had been made from outside during the past five years. But if 18 vacancies had been filled from outside, that had been distinctly to the detriment of those who had waited for promotion. As to the appointments made from the inside during the last five years, he did not think there had been more than about 50 promotions from the Second Division to the First Division. The large majority of these promotions had been in the Inland Revenue Office. None of them had been made while the Royal Commission sat, and the men in the Second Division were waiting in the expectation that something would be done to advance their interests; but they had been disappointed. In the Legacy Duty Office this year there had been an open competitive examination. At that time eight Second Division clerks who had been trained in the Office were promoted, and 11 clerks entered by competition. But. what happened? Why, notwithstanding that the eight who were promoted had been working in the Office and were familiar with all its routine, they were made inferior to the 11 who were brought in from outside. Over the heads of the eight were placed men who had no experience of the office or of the duties, and those who were familiar with the Department would know that these Second Division clerks who had been promoted, and who had frequently had to do First Division work before their promotion, were set to teach their duty to those who came in from the outside and who were placed over their heads. What he wished to know was, why it was necessary that there should be any competitive examination? Was the reason because the Department required men of a different social status in the First Division, and of higher education to the men in the Second Division? If that were so, why wore not the Second Division clerks allowed the chance of entering into the competitive examinations with outsiders? At any rate, they should be allowed that chance. Moreover, the Second Division clerks were anxious to have some answer to the numerous requests they had preferred. They had a right to know what it was that disqualified them from taking the vacancies which now and then occurred instead of having those vacancies filled up from the outside. He was sure the Treasury was anxious to do what was right in the matter, but he thought that many just claims had been overlooked.

said, he desired to address the House for a short time on this matter, because he had more than once brought under the notice of the House the flagrant disregard of the recommendations of the Royal Commis- sion of which the Civil Service complained, and of which they were the victims. The particular class whose case he wished to bring under the notice of the House were the Second Division, and this because their case was one than which it would be impossible to conceive one more hard or more unjust. Nor was there, so far as he was aware, a show of justification or excuse for those broken promises—because promises they were, as he would show the House. He recollected the remarks only last week of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to increase of salaries in the great Government Departments, and he deprecated as much as any hon. Member the pressure which he was told was put on candidates to use their influence to make the State more generous, and to redress grievances which were sometimes wholly imaginary. No such pressure had been put on him, and he would have paid no attention to it if it had been tried. But the case of the Second Division in the Civil Service involved no extra cost to the State. On the contrary, if the just aspirations of the Second Division were satisfied the State would be pecuniarily a gainer, and a system of promotion from the Second to the First Division would be established which would be conducive to the interests of the Service, and which would be in harmony alike with the principles of justice and policy. The Second Division constituted the great bulk of the Clerical Establishments of the Public Offices, and now had considerably over 8,000 clerks. The majority of these had given over 10 years' service, and many over 17 years. They acquitted themselves creditably in the discharge of their duties, and the Ridley Commission, the Treasury, the permanent heads of Departments, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had successively paid high and well-merited tributes to the qualifications of the men who composed the Second Division. Nevertheless, the avenues of promotion had been, and, as far as could be seen, were likely to remain, closed against this meritorious class, and this in spite of a letter from the Treasury in 1884 stating that their Lordships looked forward to the First Division being largely replenished from the Second Division. "Looked forward." Yes; and so did the Second Division clerks themselves. And they were still looking forward. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War told him that afternoon that his intentions which he announced to the House on 11th March remained unaltered. But was it not time to get beyond the stage of "looking for-ward" and of good intentions? The Ridley Commission in paragraph 8 of the Second Report reported—

"We think the door of promotion to all the upper posts should be opened to any clerk who has shown that he possesses the necessary qualifications"

He ventured to submit that this recommendation contained only the rudimentary principle on which any business establishment would be conducted. In such establishments the heads, in their own interest, would desire that the responsible and higher posts should be filled by those whose acquaintance with their work had been matured by long service in their various offices; and surely such expectations of advancement, if not known to be entirely illusory, constituted of themselves a valuable stimulant to industry and zeal, which were in themselves the highest and best contribution to efficiency and good organisation in any office. In paragraph 118 of the same Ridley Report the Commissioners reported—

"The essence of their proposal is to assign a greatly-increased share of work to the Second Division, and in connection with this object to improve their standard of pay, and to attach to their class certain specific staff appointments for which they are specially qualified."

Not only had that recommendation not been acted upon, but it had been flagrantly disregarded.

No, no!

said, the statistics would prove that he was right. He believed that the whole of the vacancies in the First Division during the last four years, instead of being awarded to experienced Second Division clerks, had been given to young men outside the Service who were without any previous training or experience, but were placed by a stroke of the pen above the heads of the older Civil servants. When these young men were imported into the Service over the heads of the Second Division clerks it was the Second Division clerks that trained the new arrivals. The Ridley Commission recommended that the doors of promotion should he open to all deserving clerks. When he stated that, with the exception of the Admiralty, the Chief Secretary's Office, and the Board of Trade—and even there the exceptions were extremely limited—no promotions to the First Division from the Second Division had been made in any Department presided over by Cabinet Ministers, it would be realised that the prospect of promotion held out to the Second Division clerks had been completely illusory and deceptive, and that the recommendations of the Ridley Commission on this head had been flagrantly ignored. But not only was the course taken unjust and unnatural, but it was extravagant, for the salary of a new arrival placed in the First Division started at £150 or £200 a year; if, on the other hand, a Second Division clerk was promoted to the First Division, a vacancy in the Second Division would be created, and the person appointed to fill it would begin with a salary of £70 a year. He did not believe such a system as he had described, unjust and extravagant as he had shown it to be, was approved by right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench opposite any more than he believed it was by the House. Indeed, he thought it would not exist if only right hon. Gentlemen could spare the time to look into the matter a little for themselves, instead of leaving it entirely to the permanent Heads of their Departments. It was with this object that he had ventured to make these remarks, and not, he assured the right hon. Gentleman, from any spirit of insubordination amongst the Second Division itself. In the interest of economy and justice, he commended the subject to the right hon. Gentleman; he hoped it would receive his early attention, and in that case he was confident that a grievance which was unjust, and which arose from unfulfilled engagements and unredeemed promises, would not any longer remain unredressed.

said, he had to thank the hon. Member who had introduced this question for the very fair and candid manner in which he had dealt with the question. He could say the same with regard to the observations of the other speakers. This was not a Party matter, or one affecting the present Government alone. It was a question as to whether the recommendations of the Ridley Commission had been faithfully and fairly carried out. Looking at the importance of these recommendations, he might say that they had been carried out faithfully to a large extent, though he was quite prepared to admit they had not been carried out completely. This was, however, no reason why they should not be carried out more completely in the future. The difficulties of the case were very great. The late Government, through the Treasury, had to deal with the difficulties, and he thought that anyone who looked at the question with an open mind would admit that those difficulties had been dealt with very fairly by the Treasury. He did not say that in every instance the Treasury carried out the recommendations of the Commission, for, of course, they had to encounter difficulties which the Commission were not aware of. He thought he could show the House how far the recommendations had been carried out. One recommendation was that a normal establishment of each Department should be formulated. No doubt that should be done, but the Treasury had no power to deal with the establishment of the House of Lords nor with the India Office, and very little power to deal with the establishment of the House of Commons. The Foreign Office was not included in the Second Report of the Ridley Commission. It was dealt with separately by the Royal Commission in their fourth Report. The only other Department that had not formulated a scheme was the Admiralty, and there was good reason why the Admiralty had not prepared one. It was owing to the large numbers of the Upper Division in that Department. Those numbers were being largely reduced; and as soon as they were brought down to a certain number, the Admiralty were quite ready to bring forward a scheme. In every Department other than those named schemes had been formulated. The next question raised was that of a permanent Committee, upon which point the Treasury did not agree with the recommendation of the Ridley Commission, and had, in his opinion, good reason for not carrying it out. The Treasury felt that, as long as they were responsible, they were the people who ought to decide as to the constitution and revision of the staff of any Department. They had appointed from year to year a Committee to deal with disputed questions of establishments. At the commencement of each calendar year a Consultative Committee, consisting of five members, was appointed. The names of the gentlemen composing that Committee this year were as follows:—Mr. Milner, of the Inland Revenue Department; Mr. Meade, of the Colonial Office; Sir Evan Mac-Gregor, of the Admiralty; Sir Reginald Welby, of the Treasury; and Mr. Courthope, of the Civil Service Commission. The hon. Member opposite (Mr. Hanbury) had referred to the reduction of the numbers in the Departments.

I asked if there was power to reduce the establishments.

There is power.

Who can do it?

said, the Treasury could reduce them. Reductions had already taken place in several of the Departments, but the work of carrying out the Commission's recommendations required time, and none of them would like to do anything harsh with respect to either the Upper Division or the Second Division clerks. The hon. Member opposite said there should be uniform rules and regulations for all Departments. He (Sir J. T. Hibbert) quite agreed that this was a desirable object to have in view, but he did not think it would be practicable, in view of the positions occupied by the two Divisions, to have the same rules in both of them. Hon. Members were aware that the lengths of the holidays were not the same in each Division, although sick leave was the same for both. As to hours, both the Upper and the Second Divisions were being gradually brought under the seven-hours system. An additional payment of £15 had been made to Second Division clerks for the extra hour's work, and he believed that in all the Departments the Second Division clerks now attended for seven hours, and in all Departments, except the Foreign Office, the Home Office, and the Colonial Office, the rest of the establishment also gave seven hours attendance. It had not been thought, however, that those in receipt of the higher scales of salaries were entitled to an increase of pay for the seventh hour. With reference to pensions, the Commissioners had no doubt recommended that the whole system of pensions should be revised, and the late Government brought in a Bill on the subject. Owing to circumstances with which he was not acquainted, not having been in the House at the time, that Bill was not placed on the Statute Book. He quite admitted the force of the reasoning in favour of the re-introduction of that Bill at as early a period as possible. The present Government had their hands full for the moment, and he could not undertake that it should be brought in during the present Session, but he sympathised so much with the objects of the measure that he should use his influence to obtain its re-introduction, if possible, at a later period. Until that Bill had been carried into law it could not be said that the whole of the recommendations of the Commission had been satisfactorily dealt with. Everyone had spoken very warmly of the Second Division clerks. He himself had every sympathy with the Second Division clerks, and he quite admitted that they were well qualified for the work they had to do, and even for the work they might be called upon to do if they were promoted to a higher position. Here a difficulty at once arose. They could not be promoted until there were vacancies; it was necessary to wait until the large number of First Division clerks had been reduced. At the same time, a considerable amount of promotion had taken place during the short time that had elapsed since the Commission had reported. As many as 28 clerks had been transferred from different offices to other offices since the Report was issued, and the promotions of Second Division clerks had been much more numerous than hon. Members fancied. His noble Friend (Earl Compton) had asked why Second Division clerks should not be allowed to compete for the higher appointments like people outside. He (Sir J. T. Hibbert) did not see any objection to their being allowed to compete for the higher appointments. He thought they ought to have just the same opportunity of doing so as young men from the Universities, and they had, in fact, the same opportunity.

I beg my right hon. Friend's pardon. I first of all suggested that there should he no competitive examination at all. If there must be an examination, of course they ought to be allowed to compete.

said, he would deal with the question of open competitive examination presently. The number of appointments of Second Division clerks to the Upper Divisions and to higher posts since the Re-port of the Commission had been as follows—namely, Admiralty 17, Board of Trade 3, Bankruptcy Department 6, Patent Office 1, Chief Secretary's Office (Ireland) 4, Customs 2, Fishery Board for Scotland 1, Inland Revenue 50, Irish Land Commission 2, Local Government Board (England) 5, Local Government Board (Ireland) 1, Public Works Office (Ireland) 7, Science and Art Department 1, Secretary for Scotland's Office 1, Valuation Office (Dublin) 6, War Office 1, Woods and Forests Office 1, or a total of 109. During the same period the number of appointments which had been made from outside by the scheme of examination, known as Class I., was only 18. He did not think the comparison between the two sots of figures was at all unfavourable as far as the Second Division clerks were concerned. As to what had just been said by his noble Friend (Earl Compton), he should like to draw attention to the view expressed by the Ridley Commission in their Report. The Commissioners said—

"It is desirable to secure young men of more liberal education for those posts in the Service which are not simply clerical, but demand a wider and more cultivated view of public affairs than can, as a rule, be expected from youths entering by the lower examination. The Commissioners agree with the Playfair Commission that the best preparation for the Upper Division is not to be found in the purely clerical routine of the ordinary clerkships, though there may be exceptions."

In face of that Report, he did not think the Treasury were to blame for allowing the limited competition which had been permitted during the last four and a-half years. The hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury) had said the Treasury was not in touch with other Departments, and that it weakened itself by sending away its men. He did not think this was at all a true account of the way in which the Treasury acted. He did not think the Treasury were disposed in any way to place themselves in a superior position to other Departments, or to press forward their own members against the interests of other Departments. In conclusion, he had only to say that if time were allowed for carrying out the recommendations of the Ridley Commission, they would be carried out not only with justice, but with advantage to all parties concerned, but at the same time with due regard for considerations of economy. The question would be dealt with in full sympathy with those who would be influenced by the changes recommended by the Commission. His own sympathies were entirely with those who wished to raise themselves to higher positions, and all he desired to insist upon was that they should be capable of carrying out the duties they undertook faithfully and well. The Civil Service of our country was an efficient body, and one which he believed would bear favourable comparison with the Civil Service of any other country in the world. He thought the country was most fortunate in having such a body of men at its disposal, and he trusted that, whatever changes were made, the result would be to strengthen and not to weaken the Service in any one of its Departments.

said, that, as he was a member of the Royal Commission, he should like to say a few words on the subject. The Commission were entirely of opinion that it would be to the advantage of the Service that every recruit who joined the Civil Service should feel that he carried the marshal's baton in his knapsack, but, at the same time, they felt it to be most important that all promotions from the Lower to the Upper Division should be fully justified by the qualifications. Whilst they thought that in the larger number of cases such promotion was most desirable, they took the view that there would always be a large number of posts for which liberal education and very high training would perhaps afford a better qualification than could be gained by mere clerical work in a Public Office. The hon. Member for Preston had spoken as to the desirability of having uniform rules in the Service. That sounded very well, but the suggestion would prove very difficult to carry into effect, because the work of the various Departments differed very materially; and though the rules framed might recommend themselves for favourable consideration on the ground of uniformity, they would be more frequently honoured in the breach than in the observance, and would lead to inconvenience and frequent appeals to a higher authority. And so, again, a uniform seven hours rule had a very catching sound. He, however, preferred the old system, so far, certainly, as the Upper Division clerks were concerned, for under that system they had a loyal body of men who attended their offices prepared to work, if necessary, any number of hours, and staying with the utmost cheerfulness so long as there was anything to be done. He was afraid that, by fixing a limit of hours, they would do away with that esprit de corps which in former times had carried Civil servants through hard work and great difficulties. The hon. Member for Preston had dilated upon what be termed the extravagant charge for technical pensioners. He complained that these men were brought into the Service late in life, and became entitled to a pension after a very short period. But he omitted to mention that they obtained their special knowledge and training at very great cost to themselves, and that what they earned in the Public Service they could more than command outside. Consequently, it was hardly just to them to suggest that they were too heavy a charge on the State in respect of pensions, seeing that they sacrificed much while they were in the Public Service. A good deal had been said about eliminating unfit men from the Service, but it was the House itself that was to a large extent responsible for the retention of such men. The permanent head of a Department might advise the Minister to get rid of certain public servants, and the Minister might be convinced of the wisdom of the recommendation, but political pressure was brought to bear on him, and it became extremely difficult for him to act on the only advice to which in such matters he ought to pay any attention. He hoped hon. Members would take heed of this, for great injury to individuals and to the Public Service was often done, through their interference, out of kindness of heart, on behalf of men for whom they were pressed to use their influence.

said, he had been a little disappointed with some of the observations of the last speaker (Mr. Freeman-Mitford), who had qualified considerably some of the recommendations of the Commission to which he himself was a party, especially by his references to the claims of higher education and to appointments from outside the Service. One of the recommendations of the Ridley Commission was as follows:—

"We think the door of promotion to all the upper posts should be open to any clerk who has shown that he possesses the necessary qualifications for discharging them efficiently."

He thought, in these days of general education, that these advantages, combined with official training, constituted quite as good a qualification as mere general instruction, and he was sure the majority of those who had been appointed to the higher posts had justified the training of which they had bad the advantage in their various Departments. He was afraid that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury—as to whose good intentions he entertained no doubt—bad not completely proved his case on a most important subject—namely, the business organisation of the State Departments. He had declared that the Government had faithfully carried out the recommendations of the Commission "to a very large extent." In dealing with the Employers' Liability Bill, frequent observations had been made about the duty of the State to become an example of the best employer; but what, he ventured to ask, would be said of a private employer who, in dealing with his employés, was able, after a considerable term, only to say that be had performed his obligations "faithfully to a very large extent?" What were the figures the right hon. Gentleman had mentioned? He had told them that 109 appointments had been made from within the office and 18 from outside. He failed entirely to see why those 18 appointments should have been made, at any rate, without the competition of existing Civil servants. The Government had carried out their obligations, but only to a partial extent, and the Civil Service was still asked to "wait." How long? He had some time since the advantage of presiding over a meeting of Civil servants, which was likewise attended by many hon. Members of Parliament of all shades of political opinion, and what they heard there convinced them that the Civil servants were labouring under a very considerable amount of injustice; and although the sense of the meeting was very temperately expressed, the importance of its influence was not to be ignored. Hope deferred made the heart grow sick, and the absence of hope of promotion in the Service was productive of a feeling of despair which could only have most unfortunate results. The absence of prospects of promotion among the Second Division clerks was such as to prevent them hopefully and helpfully rendering to the State a full measure of service, such as would be given when the State recognised its reciprocal liability. He based the claim of the clerks of the Second Division on the ground of justice. A very large amount of stagnation in the way of promotion had been proved, and without the hope of promotion no really good work could be done. He further based the claims of the Second Division very strongly upon the advantage of the State itself. It was a distinct disadvantage when a large portion of the Service felt that the door to promotion was to a very large extent barred; and he was certain that if in private establishments a policy obtained which prevailed in the Civil Service, the work would not be so efficiently done as now in those establishments. He desired, further, to complain of the political disabilities and restrictions which were placed upon Post Office and some other Civil Service clerks and employés in regard to the right of public meeting and conference. The franchise had been conferred, and its usual incidents ought to accompany it, including all ordinary civic rights. For, he ventured to assert it was a distinct danger to the State when effective criticism through such means was denied to those to whom the franchise had been given. Otherwise even the franchise itself might become a danger to the State, owing to the refusal of a right, the exercise of which would secure criticism and sound views. He trusted that these limitations would be removed, especially in the Post Office, where complaint was the loudest, upon which he appealed to the Postmaster General, who was present, and that some of the just causes of complaint which had been proved would be redressed more rapidly than had been indicated by the Treasury.

As a member of the Royal Commission whose recommendations have been so ably explained to the House by the hon. Member for Preston, I wish at once to say I cannot admit that those recommendations form a contract with anybody whatever. The hon. Member had suggested that they form the basis of a contract between the Treasury and the Civil Service. That seems to me to be an absolute misapprehension of the real facts. The Crown empowered a certain number of gentlemen to inquire into the whole domain of the Civil Service, but it was perfectly understood that the Government had an absolute right to reject or to accept their recommendations. So far as the general scope of the recommendations is concerned, the Government have acted perhaps as liberally as most Governments do; but I must repeat my protest against the suggestion that those recommendations are to be taken as forming the basis of a contract. I concur in the recommendation about the promotion, of the Second Division clerks, but I must at the same time point out that the Commission also said they had no doubt it would always be necessary to introduce a very limited number of men by means of a higher examination to fill directly some of the more important posts of the Public Service; and if importance is to be attached to one recommendation, weight must also be given to the other. The fact that only 18 appointments have been made from outside, as against 109 from inside, shows that the authorities are acting on the recommendation. As to the position of Civil servants generally, I say that taking them man for man, post for post, pay for pay, there is no Department in the Kingdom—bank, Railway Company or manufacturing establishment—that pays anything like the Government of this country to its permanent Civil servants, so far as the Second Division clerks are concerned; and when the hon. Member speaks of hope being dead, and suggests that the absence of hope prevents the proper discharge of duty, I think he totally misconceives the position of the Civil servants, the salaries they receive, and the admirable manner in which they perform their public duties. No class of men discharge their duties with greater industry and greater ability, or contribute more to the smooth working of the machinery of departmental government. After the pledge which my right hon. Friend has given on behalf of the Treasury, that the recommendations of the Commission will be still further considered, I hope the hon. Member will rest satisfied with the result obtained from the Debate, and not prolong it.

said, he had been immensely impressed by the strong feeling among the Second Division clerks. Representing as he did a constituency in which many of them resided, he had come to the conclusion that that feeling was perilously close to despair. He had no desire to press the matter too closely, but he did say that the Ridley Commission held out hopes that a bridge would be built across the abyss which stopped promotion. The Government, no doubt, when they put up the bridge had a perfect right to place upon it a gate which could be locked, but his contention was that they were not justified in locking it and placing the key in the tomb of "all the Capulets" at Whitehall. He was, however, very glad to have heard what had been said that evening from the Treasury Bench, for it would encourage the clerks to take a more hopeful view of their position. They would feel they had at the helm a man, in the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, who sympathised with them in their difficulties, and, that being so, the Debate would not have been in vain.

said, he wished again to call attention to the existing system of training poor boys in reformatory and industrial school ships for service at sea as being both extravagant and wasteful in its results, and he trusted that he would receive from the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department a more encouraging answer than he obtained three or four years ago when his own political friends were in power. He made no excuse for bringing the matter forward; its importance spoke for itself, and anything that tended to enhance the efficiency of our reformatory and industrial schools and ships should be supported, as it would improve the tone of our Mercantile Marine and ensure for our Navy a better reserve in time of war. He intended on that occasion to confine his observations to the ships and not to deal with the land schools, and in whatever he said he wished it to be understood that he had no intention to reflect upon the staff of Home Office inspectors. That staff was able and competent, but inadequate to cope with the work which they had to perform, and he contended that, it ought to be increased, and that a Naval Inspector ought to be appointed to inspect the school ships in the place of a landsman. A Colonel in the Army, however distinguished, and an ex-officer of Dragoons, was hardly the right person to inspect boys who were being trained to become seamen, If he were told to inspect a troop of Horse Guards, what would hon. Members think of the matter? Yet he knew something about a horse, and could jump a fence, but he doubted if a military man who came aboard a school ship would trust himself aloft, while if he did he certainly would not know whether the sails were properly reefed or furled. The present system of inspecting reformatory and industrial school ships was a farce, and he had had numerous letters from officers commanding such vessels—men of ripe experience at sea—protesting against it. One of them wrote—

"I don't care who inspects me. Let the Home Office send on board a boatswain's mate, and I will receive him with respect, because he is a sailor and knows his work, but I do object to being inspected by landsmen who can know nothing of what they are called upon to inspect or in regard to the training of boys for seamen."

He did hope that the Home Office would hear this in mind, and that they would have Naval Inspectors and a more efficient staff of instructors for each ship. He would be glad to see more Members take an interest in the subject.