said, he thought this was one of the most important Amendments they had had upon this Bill, and it was another of those tests by which they sought to ascertain the intentions of the Government. They had already heard them say that the Parliament was to be a subordinate Parliament; and when they got their answer to this Amendment they would learn further as to the quality of the Legislature which was not to be called a Parliament, but which, it appeared, was to have all the powers of a Parliament. They had spent a great deal of time in speaking— he would not call it discussion, because discussion presumed the existence of two parties; whereas, up to now, they had had arguments and inquiries on the one side, and, on the other hand, they had had nothing but lectures, platitudes, and interruptions, so that up to that moment it could not be said they had had half-an-hour's discussion on the Bill. He hoped the Government had seen they had wasted time enough over this attempt to carry out the policy which they successfully carried out in the country during the past six years—namely, to observe all the issues of this measure. ["Question!"] He expected that; but he would remind hon. Members opposite that they could no longer go on the vague phrase of "Home Rule," which might mean anything, but they now had the Bill before them; and the Amendment sought to elicit from the Government some meaning as to the measure which they had at last been obliged to discuss. Perhaps the hon. Member who called "Question!" had not yet been consulted by the Government as to the answer they should give to this Amendment, because on Friday night a Member said that hon. Members were in "a tight place!" It was the Government who were in a tight place over this Amendment and others that had been brought forward, because they were unable to give a definite answer as to whether they accepted this Amendment until they had ascertained the wishes and had obtained the views of hon. Gentlemen opposite. Hon. Members wore not in any tight place, and they had a perfect right to be silent, seeing they had the Government Bench to say what they wanted said, and to do what they wanted done. There would be a considerable amount of support to this Amendment. His hon. Friend below him the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Storey) he hoped would say something on it, because, in his election addresses, the hon. Member laid down this principle in a most statesmanlike manner—he said the Home Rule he was going to affirm was that in which the Imperial Parliament delegated certain measures and subjects to the Parliament in Ireland; and all that was not so delegated in the Bill he declared should be retained for what he called "the Mother Parliament." He (Mr. Collings) thought that was a very statesmanlike statement. If he consulted the feelings of the Government Bench, he should wish his hon. Friend not to speak, because they were very uneasy under his utterances. But he had no doubt the hon. Gentleman would vindicate his position by speaking on this Amendment. Then there were a large group sitting on that (the Ministerial) side of the House who had in their addresses gone on the same lines, but very much further than his hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Storey). They had been unwilling —at least, they had not expressed their willingness further than to include such measures as Gas and Water and Private Bill Legislation; and he would be curious to know what they would say to delegating from this Parliament everything, with the exception of what was held back by the Bill itself. It might be said it would be difficult to define in a Bill the measures which should be delegated to the Irish Parliament; but the same difficulty existed with regard to those measures which they kept out of the Bill, and which would produce the same amount of discussion and anxiety. In Canada everything was retained in the power of the Federal Government, except those subjects which were delegated to the Provincial Parliament. It was not only due to the Committee, but it was due to the constituencies, that they should know something more about the powers of this proposed Parliament, because the interest taken in the measure by the constituencies, now that the actual text of it was before them, was really astonishing. He should wait with anxiety to know what the Government had to say on the point, if they were allowed by hon. Members opposite to answer. Perhaps the Government would tell them frankly; but, at any rate, there were Members on the Government Bench who had spoken very much on the lines of this Amendment. He did not see his right hon. Friend the Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. H. H. Fowler), who was equal to all and superior to a good many on the Treasury Bench in making his ideas clear and explicit, so that they could all understand them; but if that right hon. Gentleman would give them his opinion on this Amendment, and tell them why the Parliament in Ireland should not be restricted to those measures which were distinctly delegated by the Imperial Parliament, they would be very much indebted to him. At any rate, he hoped their appeals would not be treated as previous Amendments had been treated, but that they would have a discussion upon this Amendment. By discussion he meant a debate in which both sides should give their reasons and arguments, and not waste the time of the House, as the whole Session was likely to be wasted, by a fruitless attempt to get at the mind of the Government with regard to the proposals of the Bill and their intentions regarding it.

I waited because I hoped some Member of the Government would tell us what is the view of the Government with regard to the very important Amendment which has been moved by my hon. Friend the Member for West Derbyshire (Mr. Victor Cavendish), in a speech which the Committee will consider was extremely excellent and well-reasoned. My hon. Friend bears a name which will always be honoured in this House, and I think it will be a pleasure to all sides that he is himself likely to add to its lustre. The Amendment itself has suffered a little, perhaps, because it is one of a series of Amendments; it is only by putting them together that the exact effect of what my hon. Friend proposes can be ascertained. However, I think it is pretty generally understood that my hon. Friend desires that in this Bill we shall specify the powers we are to give, not, as is done here, by giving up all our powers with certain exceptions, but by keeping all our powers except those we specifically delegate. I think the House will see there is a great deal of difference between the proposal of the Bill and that of the Amendment. It is not merely a matter of drafting; it is also a matter of principle. My hon. Friend said he had not thought it necessary to put on the Paper the powers which should be delegated to the Irish Legislature. The fact is, my hon. Friend is not raising that point at all, but is merely raising at the present time the question of the method. If the Government view the Amendment favourably, it would be natural that they, who must know exactly what are the powers which they desire to delegate, should put them on the Paper. If they decline to do that and wish to throw the responsibility on the Unionists, no doubt we can furnish a list of the subjects we should think it safe to entrust to an Irish authority. I imagine the list would be considered rather short and rather incomplete by the Government. The proposal of the Amendment is that the Government should state to the Committee what powers the new Parliament is to have, and not what powers it is not to have. In the first place, I wish to point out that that course would be in accordance with all the best precedents with regard to the creation of subsidiary Legislatures. It would be in strict accordance with the precedents of the United States of America and Canada. They may not appear, on first sight, to be in accordance with precedent in the United States of America, and I must explain that the principle in all these cases has been that the power which claimed supreme authority should state definitely what portion of its power it was willing to delegate. In the case of the United States the separate States all claimed supreme and independent authority before they made the Union, and when they united they delegated to the Central Authority those powers which they did not intend to retain in their own hands. In the case of Canada the opposite course was followed. In Canada it was intended that the Dominion Parliament should be the supreme authority, and the powers reserved for the Provincial Parliaments were all specially delegated to them; whereas all the rest, unnamed or unforeseen, were retained in the hands of the Central Authority. The Dominion Act not only declared the powers to be given to the Provincial Parliaments, but also declared the powers to be reserved to the Dominion Parliament, but with a provision that that was not in any way to lessen the authority of the Dominion Parliament to deal with all such matters not specially reserved to Provincial Parliaments. Now, I would urge, in the second place, that the method which we propose is the more natural and easier way—easier to the Government, I mean, as well as to the Committee—of dealing with this subject. Let me put an illustration. Suppose a man told his friend that he was in difficulties and asked for money, would not the friend be certain to ask, in the first place, how much money was required in order to relieve the difficulties? And if he were satisfied he would advance the sum asked for. Surely he would never hand over his purse to the petitioner and say, "Keep back £5," or some other amount which he would name, "for me and take all the rest," knowing that, in doing so, he might be giving more than was asked for and more than he wanted to part with. The case now is precisely the same. This is a Bill brought in on the demand of the Irish Members. I suppose the Irish Members know exactly what they want; and I assume the Government are willing to give it. Would it not be right that we should state in the Bill what it is the Government are going to give to them, instead of leaving the matter in such a form that we may be giving to the Irish people more than they ask for and more than we want to give? In the third place, I should point out that this plan is the only way of letting the Committee and the country know what it is we are doing. I defy a layman, and I do not believe there are many lawyers who, without more consideration than they are willing to give, could say exactly what it is which, under this Bill, is being given to the Irish Parliament. We retain certain things for ourselves; hut the moment you give the remainder you find heaps of things which you have not retained, and as to which it would be difficult to say beforehand whether the Government would be willing they should be handed over to the Irish Parliament. I will take two or three matters as an illustration, as showing the kind of questions that arise, and which will have to be raised by Amendments to this clause, with the probability that even after we have exhausted our ingenuity in raising Amendments on all the principal subjects that may be discussed, we may still have forgotten something which the Committee would have liked to have brought before it. Take the case of marriage and divorce. That is one of the subjects that is not named by way of exception, and, consequently, would be handed over to the Irish Parliament. I do not know what is the opinion of the Government; but I would ask them, is it their opinion—is it their intention—that the Irish Legislature should have the power of dealing with the question of civil marriages? That is an important question, and one worthy of lengthened debate. It may be the Government do not intend that a matter of this importance should be taken from the Imperial control. If so, it was an omission on their part, caused by the particular way in which they have drafted the Bill. Then there is another question. Foreign trade is not to be in the hands of the Irish Legislature; hut, as I understand it, all that concerns domestic trade will he in their hands. Is it intended they should deal with factory legislation? I do not know the intention of the Government, but would point out this will have to be seriously debated, because we have, by our own factory legislation, imposed very serious obligations in the interests of the working classes upon manufacturers and other persons engaged in industry; and if the Irish Parliament is to be permitted to relieve manufacturers in Ireland from all these conditions, of course they would be in a better position, so far as competition went, than the English manufacturers, and that might be an indirect way of giving a bounty and encouraging and stimulating Irish industry. I say, again, I am not pronouncing authoritatively on the subject; it is one of very considerable difficulty; but I say it is very much fairer and better that the Imperial Parliament should state to the Irish Legislature it is one of the subjects to go to them, instead of leaving it, to be discovered by implication as we are obliged to discover it under the form of this Bill. Then there is another important question to be considered. Navigation is excluded from the control of the Irish Parliament; but does any-one know what it means? I have asked several lawyers, and they have told me that it is open to considerable doubt. It appears to be very doubtful whether merchant shipping legislation is included in the term "Navigation." Do the Government intend that the merchant shipping legislation is to be different in Ireland from what it is in this country? Is a shipowner in this country, upon whom a burden has been placed with the desire of protecting life at sea——

rose to Order, and asked whether the right hon. Gentleman was in Order in discussing these extraneous subjects— subjects that were not in the least connected with the clause?

The right hon. Gentleman is in Order, because the Amendment raises the question of the powers to be delegated to the Irish Parliament.

I am accustomed to these interruptions; but I think that they have got rather low down. Do the Government intend that the shipowners of the country, who object to the regulations imposed upon them, should be able to transfer their ships to Irish ports in order to escape all these regulations and obligations? If so, this will raise a very serious question; and it appears to me that this is one of the questions which might easily escape the notice both of the Government and of the Committee in consequence of the form of the Bill. Coinage is also excluded from the powers of the Irish Legislature. Banking and currency are not included. Banking and coinage will raise an infinity of questions with regard to which it may be extremely doubtful whether the Irish Parliament should be in a position to pass legislation differing from the legislation of this country. I would impress upon the Committee the extreme importance of having all the powers specified which it is proposed to confer, in order that Parliament may not, by inadvertence, find that it has conferred some power which Ireland does not desire, and which it might be inconvenient that it should possess. Under the proposal of my hon. Friend, mistakes, which must be made in forming a new Constitution, were much more easily corrected than they would be under the Bill; because nothing would be easier, if certain powers are granted, and it is found hereafter that something has been omitted which it is desirable to add, than to bring in a Bill making the necessary addition. On the other hand, if Parliament grants more than is wished, or more than is or has been asked for, nothing will be more difficult than to withdraw the power already granted. Under the proposal of my hon. Friend, also, it would be much more easy to treat this question as an experiment. I do not suppose that the Prime Minister is under the belief that he is making a final settlement of the Irish Question. Every reasonable man believes that even if the Bill passes as it stands now it would not be accepted as final by either the Irish Members or the Irish people; and certainly it would not be accepted by the Irish Members and their constituents of the future. The Bill, therefore, must be in the nature of an experiment. If the proposal of my hon. Friend were adopted, it would be open to the Committee to treat the Bill as an experiment, in which case the Committee might think it wise to be very moderate in the concession of the powers to be made, retaining always in the hands of the Imperial Parliament the power of adding more hereafter and averting any mistake now of attempting to secure anything in the nature of a final settlement even by the largest concessions. The question of supremacy is connected particularly with this clause; but the very idea of supremacy goes to the wall if Parliament hands over to another Legislative Authority all the powers which are not expressly reserved. The Supreme Authority always delegates and defines its delegated powers, reserving to itself all the other powers which it does not specifically give away. If the Government refuse this Amendment it will confirm the impression which we have derived from their attitude towards previous Amendments—that, although they are willing to establish what has been described as a paper supremacy, they have no idea in their own minds of creating a real, vital, and satisfactory supremacy. The Prime Minister will no doubt remember that this was one of the points raised early in the discussions of the Bill of 1886 by the present Duke of Devonshire—then Lord Hartington— and as being one of the conditions which were preliminary even to the consideration of the question of establishing a new Legislative Authority in Ireland. Speaking from memory, I think the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) expressed a willingness to give the proposal of that time, now embodied in this Amendment, his favourable consideration if it ever came formally before him. I hope, therefore, that he will give every consideration to the terms of this Amendment.

There is one satisfactory subject in connection with this Amendment, and that is the manner in which it has been presented to the Committee. I join with my right hon. Friend (Mr. J. Chamberlain) in bearing testimony to the excellent performance of the Mover of it, and in expressing the hope that may be entertained of the hon. Gentleman's future. I cannot, however, say as much with regard to the beginning of the Debate this afternoon. The right hon. Member for West Birmingham began his speech by saying that the result of the speech of the right hon. Member for the Bordesley Division (Mr. Jesse Collings) must have been to draw a reply from the Government. I have never in all my life heard a speech which appeared to me to less need a reply. I am surprised that the right hon. Member for West Birmingham has been under any difficulty or doubt as to the mode in which the Government must deal with a question of this kind. It is a misfortune of the Amendment that it does not contain any decisive words. As far as the mere verbal effect of the Amendment is concerned, it looks more like an enlargement of the powers of the Irish Government than their contraction; and it will, therefore, be understood that, though I am not making any objection to the Amendment verbally, yet I object to its obvious and recognised meaning. I do not think that it is a good Amendment verbally considered, because, considering the nature of the reservations which the Government introduce in a subsequent clause, it is right and even needful that there should be a reference to those reservations in the present clause, where they are conferring the main legislative power. There are two methods in considering this question which may be adopted and which have been fairly stated by the right hon. Member for West Birmingham. You may grant by the enumeration of that which is granted, or you may grant by the enumeration of what is not granted. That is really the point at issue. It is quite true that there is one method of dealing with the question which the Government have treated as a matter of drafting, and that is the method by which we have gone through the particular subjects of local government in Ireland winding up the catalogue with a covering clause; but that is not a method of proceeding which need, in any degree, narrow the distance between the Government and their opponents. Therefore, I put it aside. The Government have considered it largely, and their conclusion is that it is not attended with any recommendation of convenience or policy to counterbalance the considerable complication which it would tend to introduce into the provisions of the Bill. What is the meaning and essence of this Bill? It is a Bill to constitute a Legislature in Ireland for the purpose of dealing, I may say, with all properly Irish concerns which are not Imperial concerns, subject, possibly, to some limited reservation like the limited reservation the Government have inserted in the Bill with respect to land; but, speaking generally, it must be well understood that the Government divide the subjects of government as between Ireland and Great Britain into two classes—one, those which are of common Imperial interest; the other, those which are of local interest, or are domestic matters belonging to Ireland. Our object is to reserve, as strictly as it is possible to do so, to the Imperial Parliament the subjects which are of Imperial concern. We have laboured to make enumeration as full as we can make it according to our reflections and inquiries. We do not say that it is complete. It is possible we may not have included in it something that ought to have been included; but that is a detail, and the line can be drawn in particular cases when they arise. But with regard to those matters which are Irish, domestic and local, we do not intend to proceed by giving a subject here and a subject there, and keeping back every other matter to be met by a covering clause. That would be totally contrary to our intention, to the distinct meaning of the Bill, to everything that has been done in all prior legislation of a developing kind, and to the policy and expediency of the case. My right hon. Friend has said that the Bill is in the nature of an experiment, and that the course he advocates would make the experiment more easy. But if the Government accept the Amendment and the consequent Amendments, will my right hon. Friend accept the Bill?

Certainly not.

Just so. I might best describe my right hon. Friend's attitude by a homely phrase which undoubtedly requires an apology, which is, that he intends to deal with the Government on the principle of "Heads I win, tails you lose." In the arrangements of the Bill we are to enter upon a new and complicated investiga- tion; and when you have completed it within this year, or within some future years, you are to wind up——

Surely my right hon. Friend does not contend that it is not competent for us to try and amend this Bill unless we are prepared to accept it?

No; that is not my contention. I am merely unveiling a state of facts. When my right hon. Friend used this honeyed language as to the blessings and benefits of this experimental form, some soft-minded man might think that he was relenting a little in this matter, and that he was ready, in conformity with the precedents in former years, to proceed on the principle of the delegation of certain subjects to an Irish Legislature. There might be some reason in giving way, if we had it authentically that by doing so we could conciliate our opponents without endangering the vital essence of our measure; but as it is, the case is this: We are to undergo the very considerable labour of re-construction, and we are to have our return not is £ s. d., but in nought, nought, nought. My right hon. Friend has raised a number of questions, most of them of vast importance, in order to terrify the Committee; but there is not the smallest doubt of the intention of the Government, which is to reserve effectively, simply, and largely all that can fairly be called Imperial matters, and to give as effectively, as simply, and as largely all that can fairly be called Irish and local matters. My right hon. Friend has enumerated a number of questions. He asks, "Do we hand over the Marriage Law?" Yes, we do; why should we not? Ireland has got a different Marriage Law now from the English law. Why in the world, therefore, are we to convert this Bill into a restricting instead of an enlarging Bill, and to take away from Ireland that distinction in the Marriage Law which she now enjoys and largely prizes?

I never suggested it.

I thought my right hon. Friend did. Someone suggested it. I am aware that there are no Divorce Laws in Ireland. That is a very great distinction in the Marriage Laws in Ireland; and if I am rightly informed, it is one that Ireland highly prizes, and in that I think Ireland is right. As to factory legislation, if the Irish people suffer by it, they will suffer at the hands of men whom they will have chosen to govern them. It is purely a matter of local interest and concern of which the Irish Representatives are best qualified to judge. In such a matter they have every title to judge, and they will need no instruction from England as to the principles of humanity and of the best policy. As to the currency, I am not quite sure whether the language of the Bill as it stands is the best adapted to its purpose; but the intention of the Government is plain: They consider that the standard of value is an Imperial matter, and that that standard of value, and everything touching it, should be reserved. If proposals are to be adopted for introducing a double standard, that will have to be decided in this House. If Ireland were to give power to issue promissory notes, that would be a matter of currency; and would be within the powers of the Irish Legislature under this Bill. But if she were to say that those notes should be legal tender for debt, that, I think, would immediately be a part of the standard of value. Speaking largely and generally, the Government propose to resist as incompatible any limits being imposed on the local Irish concerns, which are to be handed over to be dealt with by the Irish Parliament. The Irish people, according to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham, are to be treated as little children. A child would be given some pocket money, but a very limited amount. Great Britain is to stand in loco parentis to the Irish people; but the Irish would regard the assumption of that attitude with very considerable misgiving, considering what has been the history of Ireland for 700 years. The affection which England has shown to Ireland during that period does not justify proceeding on the parental basis. The difference between the position of the Government and that of the right hon. Gentleman is this: The great measure under consideration has in it something of an experiment, for we have no absolute certainty as to the future. But the right hon. Gentleman recommends one form of experiment, and the Government recom- mends another. The Government method is to concede local affairs and to retain Imperial affairs, and that is the often-tested and always successful plan on which Parliament has proceeded in all its legislation up to the present time. That experience supplies guidance in the present case. But the experiment of the right hon. Gentleman is wholly novel, and one upon which no light is cast by experience in any quarter. It would be at once rejected by those who spoke in the name of the Irish people. The Government desire to avail themselves of all the guidance to be derived from practical results, and these are largely available. Another reason for reserving Imperial subjects nominated, and for granting local subjects not nominated, is that the subjects of common interest between England and Ireland, though of vital importance, could be brought into a very narrow compass. But the great bulk of the business of Government is local and domestic, and this domestic part of the business of Government is continually extending. There are a multitude of subjects now regarded as proper and ordinary matters for the cognisance of Parliament which, when I began Parliamentary life, Parliament would have utterly declined to recognise. The right hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do that not a single man representing the Nationalists of Ireland would travel with him a single inch on the road he pointed out. That form of legislation would attain none of the objects desired on one side of the House or the other. The proper and only method is to reserve Imperial subjects, for two reasons: First, because it is a task which can easily be performed, and which has been performed in the main. If any defect in the enumeration be found later, it can easily be remedied; secondly, because it is impossible to enumerate local subjects. When Ireland proceeds to deal with her local affairs, it is almost a moral certainty that subjects will come up which, in a process of previous enumeration, will never have come into one's mind. The result will be that Ireland will come to the House of Commons to ask for further legislation. Every practical object is in favour of the Government plan. But, over and above all these practical objects, is the great question of principle. What Ireland asks is the restoration or concession to her of the power of dealing with her own local Irish concerns. If that be not given to her, it would be better to give her nothing. Anything else would be a miserable mockery, and a great descent from the lofty elevation at which British legislation has hitherto been conducted. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to the United States. He said that there the States are the supreme power, and that that power limits the subjects which are given to the control of the Federal Government. That is so, but the reason they are limited is that they are few and very easily to be described. There can be no doubt that in the United States a condition of things obtains which does not obtain here. In the innumerable— the multitude—of cases that might be cited, where is one favourable to the right hon. Gentleman's view? Canada affords no example of the relations between a subordinate and a supreme Legislature. One view is that the purposes of local government ought to be left free and open within the proper sphere. The Government desire to do everything to preserve the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament; but it will not be a supremacy which will satisfy the right hon. Gentleman, because the right hon. Gentleman will not admit to be a real supremacy anything but a supremacy which would irritate and reduce Irish affairs to a still more obnoxious position than they occupy at present. But with regard to the assertion of the principle of supremacy, the Government desire to keep it in its absolute fulness—subject to no limitation, except the geographical limitation. They desire to be faithful to their pledges in regard to it; but they desire to be equally faithful in their pledges with regard to the effective grant to Ireland of local government and local administration.

In the course of the speech which he has just delivered, the Prime Minister said to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham, "If we accept this Amendment, will you accept the rest of the Bill?" That is hardly a fair question. The Opposition are surely entitled to ask the Government to accept an Amendment without being thereby bound to accept the rest of the Bill. The speech of the Prime Minister must make it clear to everyone that what Parliament is asked to create is not a subordinate Parliament at all. It is quite true that the right hon. Gentleman has said that the Irish Legislature is to be subordinate to the Imperial Parliament; but, at the same time, the right hon. Gentleman has stoutly resisted the insertion of the word "subordinate" in the 1st clause. If the right hon. Gentleman desired to set up a sovereign and supreme Parliament in Ireland, he could not have employed more apt words for the purpose than are to be found in this Bill as it stands. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to the case of Canada. I am quite aware that in the case of Canada a supremacy has been reserved to the Imperial Parliament, but that supremacy is a purely nominal one, and has no practical effect whatever. Is that the sort of supremacy of the Imperial Parliament which hon. Members opposite intend to reserve in the case of the Irish Legislature? I am not aware of any instance in which this House has interfered with the internal affairs of the Colonies after the grant of Representative Government has been made to them. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister appears to have a confused notion with regard to the affairs which an Irish Legislature should have control over, and those which it should not have power to deal with. For instance, the right hon. Gentleman says that only Imperial affairs and matters of common interest are withdrawn from the control of the Irish Legislature. But, at the same time, the Irish Legislature is not to have control of even denominational education, which would appear to be a matter of local interest, while it is to have control over the law of marriage and divorce. Surely it is a matter of common interest to the two countries that the law relating to marriage and divorce should be the same in both. If a man were hold to be married in England and not married in Ireland, and if his issue were legitimate in this country and illegitimate in Ireland, and could not, therefore, inherit property in Ireland, how inconvenient it would be! It may be said that there is at present a considerable difference between Scotch law and the English law upon this subject, but that is no reason why a third law should be established. Is the Irish Legislature to have power to deal with the Merchant Shipping Act, with the law relating to bankruptcy and insolvency? and will it be empowered to authorise the issue of a paper currency which is not to be a legal tender, and which will have no reserve of bullion behind it? Surely all these are subjects of common interest; and yet the Irish Legislature, as we have gathered from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, is to have power to deal with them. And, moreover, over these questions, which may be determined so disastrously for the two countries, the Ulster Representatives will have practically no control. Again, there is the subject of the Criminal Law. Surely it is of the first importance that the Criminal Law of the two countries should be identical—surely it is a question of common interest? Are we not entitled to ask the House to introduce safer provisions than are given at the present time? Suppose it were proposed to set up a different Criminal Law as to murder from that which prevails now——

There is a different Criminal Law at present in Scotland.

The right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary says there is a different law at present in Scotland. I am sorry to say that is so; but that difference, which we have inherited, is no reason why we should set up differences in Ireland. A difference of any kind is to be deplored. But in regard to any future changes in the law—the Criminal Law—do the Members of the Government and the gentlemen supporting them ever intend that a supremacy should be exercised? Do they intend that this Legislature shall be no more a subordinate Legislature than in Canada, or will they tell us how, or under what circumstances, you intend to exercise a supremacy? I ask hon. Gentlemen do they intend never to exercise that supremacy? Do they mean the Irish Legislature to be a Colonial Legislature? If so, this mode of dealing with the question is the right one to adopt. But if they mean to create a subordinate Legislature, it is clear that the only logical—sensible—mode is to enumerate those subjects which you delegate. Even in the case of the Colonies the rule has not been quite universal. For instance, in the case of New Zealand you gave a Legislature with power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of New Zealand, provided that such laws were not repugnant to the laws of England.

Hear, hear!

There is no clause here to that effect.

Look at Clause 33.

That is a clause which undoubtedly enables the Imperial Legislature to pass an Act "expressly extended to Ireland"—whatever those words may mean—and Irish Acts will be valid so far as they are not inconsistent with that Act. That is what Clause 33 says in singularly inflated language. But that section does not prevent the Irish Legislature from creating a totally different system of laws from those prevailing on this side of St. George's Channel. Under the Bill the Irish Legislature will be perfectly free to legislate as it thinks proper. The right hon. Gentleman will probably say that if there is inconsistency between the Acts of the two Parliaments it shall be the Imperial law that shall prevail. That is true in theory as it is in the case of the Colonies. But when you have given powers so wide as these to the Irish Legislature you will never be able to defend your action if you endeavour to interfere in Ireland. The only way to preserve to yourselves any practical control and right of interference is to part wholly with those subjects on which von do not wish to interfere, and to reserve all those subjects on which you are likely to desire to interfere. Take the Criminal Law, for instance. It would be a great misfortune if that were to become different in the two countries. Is the penalty of death to remain in one and to be done away with in the other? The truth is, that the more light that is thrown on this subject the more plainly it appears that unless some of these Amendments are accepted by the Government the Legislature you are creating is not a subordinate Legislature. The Irish Judges will construe any two Acts which may happen to clash in favour of the Irish Parliament, and will give—and rightly give—a wide and sweeping interpretation to the 2nd clause of the Bill which will practically exclude British control. The presumption will always be in favour of the Irish enactment—and ought to be. It will be held that the Irish Parliament is vested with the widest and most ample powers to say what shall be the law on all subjects that the Legislature can touch at all. Every conceivable subject that can be made a matter of law, with the exception of Clauses 3 and 4, is committed to the Irish Parliament; and in the case of a conflict, as I say, the balance will always incline towards the vast powers of this clause. With that regard for popular Institutions and Assemblies which this House has always exhibited you will not be able to interfere. That would appear to be the clear result of the 2nd clause as it stands now; therefore, for my part, I shall vote for the Amendment.

said, the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had made a most remarkable speech, and had told them a number of things which, speaking for himself, he did not know before. The right hon. Gentleman had said that in some instances laws which wore valid in Scotland were void in England. That was obviously a mistake. He had told them that the Colonial Legislatures were Sovereign Legislatures—oblivious, apparently, of the fact that in earlier days there were a large number of Acts passed by this very Parliament interfering in specific matters that were within the competence of the Colonial Legislatures. But the most extraordinary of all the right hon. Gentleman's extraordinary statements was the one which he put forward, in conjunction with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham, to the effect that all the precedents made in favour of delegation of authority, with the exception of the doubtful case of Canada, were to be found in cases of subordinate Constitutions, and that there were none in favour of the method adopted by the Government. There was not a single precedent in favour of delegation; but in every instance that could be brought forward the precedent was completely and conclusively in favour of the method adopted in this Bill. In the United States there was called into existence—not a subordinate Legislature, not a Provincial Parliament, not an ordinary Legislature of Home Rule—but a life of the nation, a supreme Sovereign Authority which, by its constitution, was Federal in its nature, spreading itself and distributing itself between various co-ordinate parts. That was not a Legislature in point. Then lot them come to nearer illustrations. In the case of Canada, the Australasian Colonies, the Cape of Good Hope, and our Crown Colonies, we had granted powers not specifically, not enumerating them, but according to the stock and well-established form which was the legal formula expressing Home Rule. What was that formula? It was the power of making laws "for the peace, order, and good government" of the country upon whom the Legislature was conferred. That formula was adopted in the case of Canada; and it was a mistake to say—as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham had said—that an analogy in the case of Canada was to be found in the distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion Parliament and the Provincial Parliaments. It was to be found in the grant of Home Rule to Canada in the delegation by the Sovereign Parliament in 1867—in the 97th section of the British North America Act of 1867. By that Act they gave powers in general terms, as they were given them by this Bill; and they made reservations as they did in the present case, with this difference: that in the case of Canada the reservation was made in favour of the Provincial Parliament, while here it was in favour of the Imperial Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham spoke of this system of delegation of specific powers as if it were Home Rule, and as though he were accommodating himself in some way to the desire which was being expressed by those who, with the Government, were in favour of a system of Home Rule for Ireland. That reminded him of the set-off in the historic days of the Round Table. The right hon. Gentleman said, in effect, that the Unionists did not bring forward these Amendments and make these speeches because of enmity to the objects of the Government, but because they wanted to put the Bill into a definite shape. The real object of the Government was not to assist the Government, but to destroy the Bill. They were giving to the Irish people, under this Bill, a restricted form of government, with great safeguards, greater than they had reserved in the case of any of their Colonies. They were giving powers to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the country. It was not desirable to restrict those powers and to have constant friction between the two countries, and constant questions arising as to whether a particular question came within one form of specific delegation or another form of specific reservation. Did the right hon. Gentleman know the amount of friction which had taken place between the Dominion Parliament in Canada and the Provincial Parliaments? Did he know that almost constantly questions which had caused the greatest friction and bitterness came before the Privy Council in consequence of the obscurity of the form of delegation? And did he know that the consequence of the system there was that they had the Dominion Government making one set of laws for, say, Ontario, and the Ontario Legislature making an exactly similar set of laws for itself? It was not difficult to show that there was no precedent whatever in favour of the course which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham proposed, while every precedent supported the course which the Government wished to follow. It was impossible to state what the Irish would want, because they could not define the whole range of questions which must be discussed by an Irish Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman who had last spoken had said they were going to allow the Irish Parliament to make Marriage Laws, and that the result of that would be that they would put the Irish Parliament in the position of being able to annul marriages which had been legitimately contracted. But there was absolutely nothing in this statement. No doubt, any law the Irish Parliament might make would affect persons domiciled in Ireland; but it would not touch persons domiciled on the other side of St. George's Channel; and if it did, the case would be a proper one for the exercise of the veto. In the exercise of the veto in such a case, we should only be following the precedent of what had been done in the case of the Australian Colonies. It was said in support of those Amendments that if they were adopted the Imperial Parliament would be in a better position to interfere if it wished to show that its supremacy was a real one. The reasons advanced by the supporters of the Amendment seemed to him to disclose what lay behind all their arguments touching supremacy. It was evident that what they were aiming at was to so mould the Bill and introduce words into it to alter its form as to render it possible to say, "In passing this Bill, Parliament declared by implication, if not in terms, for the policy of allowing the Imperial Parliament to interfere at every turn to overhaul the work of the Irish Parliament." He trusted that in the course of the Debates on the Bill the Government would not show any weakness—he did not believe they would on this point — but would reject every Amendment, and that, while maintaining intact the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, they would make it plain that they meant to give Ireland Home Rule in substance, and not merely in form or theory. They should make it clear that what they meant to do was to give the Irish Parliament the power of managing its own affairs, and that by rejecting this plan of specific delegation and everything else of a similar nature they would make it plain to the Irish people that what they were endeavouring to pass was a real Home Rule Bill and not a sham one.

said, the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down hoped the Government would reject all Amendments. ["No, no!"] Yes; he had taken down the hon. and learned Gentleman's words. He had said—"I trust they will reject everything." ["No, no!"] Hon. Members said "No, no!" but the hon. and learned Gentleman to whom he referred did not interfere in the matter.

said, he never for a moment had suggested such a thing.

said, the matter was before the House. He had taken down the hon. and learned Member's words. Of course, if he did not mean them it was another matter. Those who desired that the Government should not concede anything were very likely to have that desire gratified, judging from what had taken place since they had got into Com- mittee, because hitherto everything that had been moved by the Unionist Party had been rejected. The hon. and learned Gentleman, in the larger part of his speech, dealt with historic analogy; but the Ulster Unionist Members agreed with the hon. Member for North Armagh, and were of opinion that no historic analogies touched this question in the smallest degree. They desired rather to look at the question as a plain, practical matter, affecting those residing in Ulster in their business and general home relations. Therefore, they thought that references to countries thousands of miles away had no reference to the question at issue. The speech of the Prime Minister differed, in their opinion, extremely from the speech which he delivered on Thursday evening, be cause they were then unable—and possibly it was their own fault—to understand that he gave any information in answer to the inquiries of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham: and he could not help thinking that it was the duty of the right hon. Gentleman, as Prime Minister, to come down to the low level of their capacities, and make them understand the answer he had given. But they could not make that complaint that afternoon, because the Prime Minister had been perfectly clear in the statements he made. The one, great, central illustration to which the hon. Gentleman referred again and again, and which appeared to be the, substance of his speech about treating the Irish people as children—giving them some pocket money and saying that, if they used it well, they should have some more—absolutely failed. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister again and again spoke of Ireland. But there was just one difficulty that arose. The majority in Ireland undoubtedly had the larger number of votes; but the minority had the larger amount of property; therefore, when the Prime Minister talked of giving pocket money to the Irish majority, the analogy failed altogether. It was not a case of giving pocket money to a child to see how the child would spend it. It was a case of appointing trustees or managers over the affairs and properties of other people. The majority in an Irish Parliament would be the managers of the wealth of the minority; and, therefore, it was no insult to the majority of the Irish people to say—"We will give you small powers at first to see how you will exercise them." Surely there could be nothing wrong in stating what were the subjects to be left to the Irish Parliament; and if the Unionist minority were to be treated fairly, it was only common justice to tell them what were the powers which the Irish Parliament was to exercise over them and their property. "But." said the Prime Minister, "this is only a detail." Well, it appeared to him (Mr. Rentoul) that if there was one thing which was not a detail it was just that particular thing. The exceptions should be extended to such an extent as to make the Bill valueless to Irish Home Rulers altogether. The Prime Minister said that the principle was that they should give the Irish Parliament control over Irish subjects and withhold from it control over Imperial subjects. But in 1886 the right hon. Gentleman said it was impossible to make a distinction between local and Imperial subjects; and that difficulty certainly remained at the present time. The right hon. Gentleman said he would unveil the position of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham. He said to the right hon. Gentleman— "Will you accept the Bill if we accept this Amendment? "The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham naturally said "No." "Then," said the Prime Minister, "we have the matter clearly before us. We offer you a Bill; you offer us an Amendment; but if we accept it, you have no intention whatever of accepting the Bill." But this was not the case of a Bill being offered for the acceptance of the Irish minority; it was a Bill thrust upon them by a majority gained by refusing to let the constituencies know what the Bill was going to be. It was on that account that they said that the Government were acting in a tyrannical manner in regard to the Bill. The Government obtained a majority over the Opposition, the validity of which the Opposition disputed, because they said that the mind of the people of the United Kingdom had not been taken, and the question was not fairly before them. That being so, the Prime Minister brought in a Bill and said, "You must pass that." The Opposition put forward Amendments frankly, and said they objected to the Bill entirely; but because they brought forward Amendments was it unreasonable that they should seek to amend it, so that if they were compelled to accept it it might be brought as near their views as possible? Would the Prime Minister wish them to offer no opposition to the Bill at all in Committee?

Yes.

said that a large number of the Irish Unionist Members had intended to take up the line of saying that, because they objected to the Bill in toto, they would take no part in the discussion; but, wiser counsels prevailing, that policy was not adopted. Their position had been stated on hundreds of platforms, and it was that unless the Army interfered they would not accept the Bill.

asked whether the hon. Member was in Order in the observations he was making?

said, the hon. Member was irregular, as he was not confining himself to the Amendment before the Committee.

said, his point was that the Prime Minister had said that the Government had pulled aside the veil of the Opposition, but he (Mr. Rentoul) was showing that they had no veil to pull aside. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham had remarked upon the unbusiness like way in which the question was put in the Bill. He had used the illustration of a man coming to ask you for a sum of money, and your offering him your entire purse with the request that he should hand back what he did not want. It was a very common thing for a husband to settle something on his wife; but it would be an extraordinary thing for a man making such a settlement to say, "Take all my property, but reserve a little for me." Yet something very like that was done in this Bill. All the powers of the Imperial Parliament were to be settled on the Irish Parliament, and then in the 3rd clause certain powers were reserved to the Imperial Parliament. As to giving a man your money on the understanding that he was to give you back what you did not want, he had known that course to be followed in the case of a certain Home Rule Member, and, in the end, not one penny was returned. That would be the experience of the Imperial Parliament if the Bill were accepted. Was it unreasonable that the Ulster Members should want to know exactly what powers were to be given to the Parliament that would be over them? The Irish Parliament would consist of a majority of Home Rulers and a Loyalist minority. Therefore, was there anything unfair in the minority wishing to know the best and the worst at once? If they did, they might perhaps be less reluctant to accept the Bill than they were. Many hon. Members had spoken on this question from every possible point of view. [Ministerial cheers.] Yes, from the point of view of the entire and absolute freedom of the Irish Parliament, and the point of view of the Irish Parliament having such-and-such powers. Looking at the absolute statement of the Home Secretary the other night as to the extent of the power of the Irish Parliament, was there anything unreasonable in asking the Government to accept the Amendment—in asking that they should give the information sought? If that was given, then compel them, if necessary, to accept this Parliament. At any rate, let the Government tell them what the powers of this Parliament were to be in order that they might see how they stood. It was on that ground that he desired most earnestly that the Government should see their way to accept this arrangement, and see whether a policy of conciliation from any point of view would not have some effect. They might find the Ulster Members more approachable than they thought. They, at any rate, wished the Government to treat them as men who were willing to talk on this subject. [Ministerial cheers.] Exactly. When he said that he meant what he said. He had already said it was a question with the Ulster Members whether they should touch the Bill and debate it at all; but now they had consented to debate it with the limited powers at their disposal. They treated the Government as fairly as they could. They told them what their objections were, and then voted against the Bill in the frankest manner.

said, there was one speech he could not understand — namely, that of the hon. and learned Member for Haddington (Mr. Haldane). He said that the, Canadian analogy was no analogy at all. That, he confessed, went a good deal further than the Prime Minister's speech. The Prime Minister had not denied the Canadian analogy. If the hon. and learned Member had been in his place, he (Mr. Russell) would have asked him what Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act really meant if they did not constitute an analogy for the Irish case. Why, in Section 92 of the British North America Act the work of the Provincial Legislatures was set out and the subjects enumerated. Beyond those subjects they could not go; and if they went beyond them, the Supreme Court of Canada would declare the Acts to be un-Constitutional. So far as an analogy could be perfect, this analogy was perfect. It was impossible to say that delegation could not be carried out; for in Canada,, ever since 1867, it had been the law, and no very great difficulties had arisen under it. There was one practical argument in favour of delegation and against reservation. Under Section 4 of the Bill the Irish Legislature was forbidden to endow religion; but the question might arise, what constituted the endowment of religion. It might be found, for example, that the endowment of religion was effected through education. But if the principle of delegation were adopted, it would be impossible for any such question to arise. The powers of the Legislature would be clearly set forth in the Bill itself, so that those who ran could read. Under the system of reservation all kinds of difficulties would arise which, under the principle of delegation, they would be free from. What was the real argument against this principle? One argument used by the Prime Minister seemed to preclude all debate on the matter. The right hon. Gentleman stated with the greatest clearness that the Irish Members would not go one inch of the way with the Government if they adopted the plan of delegation. That was the effective argument on the Ministerial side of the House.

Quite right, too.

"Quite right, too!"—that was a nice confession for a Liberal to make. He had always thought there was a British view of the question as well as an Irish one, and that Irishmen must not ask more than Great Britain would concede. But if the method proposed in the Bill were adopted, for the reason given by the Prime Minister that the Irish Members would not move one step of the way if delegation were attempted, then the Irish Members were the real Leaders of the Liberal Party, though they did not sit on the Treasury Bench. These were the men who dictated to the Government what they should vote for, and what they should not vote for. That was a fine position for the great Liberal Party—that they should be mere hewers of wood and drawers of waters for the Irish Nationalists! He was not very much concerned one way or another with regard to the Amendment, and he would tell the Committee why. He thought delegation the better plan of the two. He did not see, for instance, why the question of regulating the public-house system should not be delegated to a Body in Ireland. He did not see why the English people should decide how many public-houses there were to be in Ireland, and what hours they should remain open. This subject was preeminently a matter for the people of Ireland, and the people of Ireland alone; and, therefore, he was prepared at any time for a system of delegation of that kind. On the broad national question, he was against an Irish Parliament altogether, but thought that the principle of delegation was better than the principle of reservation, and on that ground he should vote for the Amendment.

said that no one had attempted to answer the observation that the subjects to be delegated—if they were to be delegated— were not capable of being enumerated with any approach to accuracy. If they wished to give only a few subjects for the consideration of the Irish Parliament, it would be very easy indeed to do it— as was done in the Canadian Act for the Provincial Assemblies. But that was precisely what the Government and their supporters did not want to do. The object of the Amendment was to limit the Bill: his object was to prevent the Bill being limited. They had been asked by the late Home Secretary (Mr. H Matthews) what sort of supremacy they wished to have over Ireland. So far as legal supremacy was concerned, there was only one they could have, and that was the same that they had over all Her Majesty's Dominions; but he meant, most emphatically, to do everything he could to make the supremacy of Parliament over the affairs that would be discussed in Ireland as small and simple as he could. If the Irish people demanded it, he should find it difficult to refuse that they should have the uncontrolled management of Irish affairs. That subject, however, was not appropriate for discussion now; but he could imagine nothing more disastrous than to create a Parliament in Ireland, and then have constant appeals from Ireland to the Imperial Parliament, encouraging the different Parties in Ireland to contradict or fight one another, with no sense of responsibility, because they would feel that their battles must be fought over again on the floor of that House at Westminster. He would readily vote for a limitation of the powers and opportunities the House of Commons would have of interfering with or regulating the decisions of the Irish Parliament, but he must decline to attempt to further restrict the powers of that Parliament. Treating the Amendment as a very neat method of raising the question whether this was to be a gas-and-water Bill merely or not, he should vote against the proposal.

I beg to move that the Question be now put.

Commander Bethell.

said, that on all previous occasions when the sovereign power had parted with some of its authority, it had delegated the authority so parted with, and limited it to the necessities of the case. The case of Canada had already been mentioned; but the very interesting case of Australian Federation—which, though it had not become law, had been defined very clearly—had not yet been alluded to. In the Regulations which had been passed by the Representatives of the Australian Colonies, it had been clearly laid down that those Colonies should only give up such powers as would be sufficient for the purpose of the common Government, and such powers were very clearly defined. He thought the hon. and learned Member for Haddington (Mr. Haldane) might have given lay Members of the House some further light on the interesting question of the Marriage Laws. He understood from the hon. and learned Member that by this proposal the Irish Parliament would have the power of divorce over people domiciled in Ireland, whilst the British laws would apply to people domiciled in other parts of the United Kingdom. He was anxious to know whether, in the event of the succession to property passing by death, the Imperial Parliament would tax the person who succeeded to Irish property and who would be illegitimate under the British law? The hon. and learned Member had said that, after all, this was the old question of supremacy. No doubt this was so. The Opposition desired to limit the powers to be given to the Irish Legislature. They were not satisfied that the supremacy which extended over the Colonies was sufficient for the purposes of Ireland. They, therefore, intended to do all they could to limit the powers to be given to the Irish Legislature and to destroy the proposal of the Government. The Prime Minister said the intention of the Government was to draw a distinct line between Imperial and local affairs. The intention of the Opposition was to do precisely the same thing, only the Opposition proposed to define the local matters with which the Irish Legislature was to deal, and the Government did not. The Opposition desired to define the local matters in such a way as would clip the wings of the Irish Legislature as much as possible.

said, the question he asked himself in reference to the Amendment now before the Committee was, What was the House driving at? Supposing the House had agreed that some such thing as Home Rule was to be established in Ireland, what particular form of Home Rule was to be set up? Was it to be something corresponding to Colonial Independence, or was it to be that which had been described as Home Rule all round? The hon. and learned Member for Haddington said that Parliament had never intended to enumerate subjects to be delegated. The answer to that was that in all the cases referred to by the hon. and learned Member Parliament had been setting up Colonies practically independent of Great Britain, and over which we had a merely nominal supremacy—a supremacy which, legislatively, had never been exercised, and which in the way of veto had long since ceased to be exercised. If Parliament was going to give Ireland the degree of independence which the Colonies had, he admitted that the Government were quite right in not attempting to define by legislation the objects which the Irish Legislature was to be allowed to legislate upon. If, on the other hand, Parliament was going to set up some relation between Ireland and the Parliament of Westminster which might be followed hereafter by similar relations with Scotland, Wales, and England, the precedent that must, be followed was the Canadian precedent. The speech of the hon. and learned Member for Dumfries (Mr. R. T. Reid) had rather surprised him, as he thought that the hon. and learned Member was an avowed disciple of the principle of "Home Rule all round," and that under these circumstances he would have seized upon the opportunity of making a precedent which might be applicable afterwards to other parts of the United Kingdom. The hon. and learned Member for Dumfries used one argument, and one argument only— an argument which had been previously used by the Prime Minister—namely, that it was too difficult to enumerate the subjects with which the Irish Legislature might be entrusted. But had the hon. and learned Member looked at the Canadian precedent, or did he think that such a small, meagre, and impoverished delegation as was therein contained was not sufficient for the Irish Legislature?

May I interrupt my right hon. Friend to say that I have had some practical acquaintance with this subject of delegation. I assisted my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen in drafting a Home Rule Bill for Scotland. [Laughter.] It is in print. We tried to enumerate the subjects to be delegated to the Scotch Parliament, and found it perfectly impossible to do so.

said, he had no doubt the hon. Members for Dumfries and Aberdeen found it difficult to put a limit, to Scotch ambition. But he submitted they were not all Scotchmen; and it was quite probable that if they tried they would be able to find a sufficient number of subjects to delegate to a Scotch Parliament, as he believed they would be able to enumerate a sufficient number of subjects to satisfy an Irish Parliament. In the Canadian precedent it would be found that in no less than 16 classes of subjects delegated, besides education, agriculture, and emigration were dealt with in separate clauses. Amongst the classes of subjects were municipal institutions, a subject which covered the whole code of laws, and the carrying out of which would give ample scope to the most ambitious Irish Legislature for many years. That was a precedent which ought to guide those who pursued the idea of a system with a Parliament at Westminster with four subordinate Parliaments, the Parliament at Westminster having general powers and the four subordinate Parliaments delegated powers. There was the subject of marriage, which, apparently, it was proposed to give power to the Irish Legislature to deal with. It was true that the Marriage Laws were now different in England, Scotland, and Ireland; but, the difference between the English and the Irish laws on the subject was formal rather than real. Nearly 30 years ago a Royal Commission had been instituted in order to discover, if possible, a means of bringing about uniformity in the laws of the two countries. That object had never been attained. It was an object that every subject of the United Kingdom should desire to attain, but the process adopted in the Bill would make it practically impossible to attain. If marriage were kept for the Parliament at Westminster, uniformity might by-and-bye be obtained; but if it were given as a subject to be dealt with by a subordinate Legislature, he was afraid they might bid good-bye to uniformity in this matter. The Prime Minister seemed to think that the Irish people were distinguished by their views with respect to marriage and divorce, and that he was paying enormous respect to those views by the extraordinary line taken in the Bill. The Irish feeling, in the right hon. Gentleman's opinion, was so strong that persons who might obtain divorce in England could not obtain it in Ireland through the Divorce Court, but they could do so by the process of a Bill in Parliament; so that the feeling which the Prime Minister said should be respected was over-ridden, not by providing a system of Divorce Courts, but by providing the costly machinery of a Bill in Parliament. In other words, Irish opinion might be flouted, but it must be flouted by means of a machinery which involved a considerable amount of cost. That was only an illustration of the difficulties that would result in the future if an Irish Parliament were to be set up with general powers instead of delegated powers. The precedent of the United States Government, which had been appealed to, ought to lead them to be very jealous in retaining general powers at Westminster and in abstaining from giving any largo powers to the Parliament in Dublin. The weakness of the United States Constitution rested on the few subjects that were confined to the Legislative Congress and on the immense difficulty in increasing that number of subjects. He believed that in the United States the best class of citizens had long desired a uniform law of marriage, but the laws of the Constitution prevented them from obtaining their desire by reason of the machinery by which any Constitutional Amendment could be enforced being so cumbrous, unpractical, and difficult to work. They were about to take a step which would make the maintenance of a Common Law and the development of a Common Law in different parts of the Kingdom increasingly difficult. If it was desired to have a Legislature capable of legislating for all the people within the United Kingdom, the real precedent—which was the Canadian precedent—must be followed; but if, on the other hand, it was desired to pursue the ideal Colonial precedent with no supremacy and with the complete isolation and separation of Ireland, then the plan in the Bill was the one to stick to. But if this Parliament desired to maintain a real Legislative Authority at Westminster, he submitted that the plan to be adopted was that of the enumeration of the subjects to be delegated to the Irish Assembly.

said, he had intended to make some observations on this Amendment, but the right hon. Gentleman who had last spoken had so well expressed his views on the question that he would not trouble the Committee very long. He had thought over the question of Home Rule for many years, and when he stood before his constituents he made a distinct promise. He said to them—

"With regard to Home Rule, I think my fellow-townsmen are entitled to a frank expression of my views. (1). I am in favour of the Imperial Parliament delegating to a Statutory Irish Parliament the full control of Irish home affairs, the matters delegated being set out specifically in the Act, and all others being thereby reserved for the decision of the Mother Body."

He did not pretend to have as good an opinion on the Home Rule Question as the 17 Members of the Cabinet; but, although he had not thought about it so much as they had when they sat together, he had thought about it probably for a longer time than most of them, and he had come to the conclusion that if they would enter on this policy of Home Rule—and he certainly was not one of those who began it—there was no tarrying until they came to a Federal system. Therefore, he set himself to this conclusion: that if he voted for Home Rule, he would vote for a Home Rule which would give effective power to Ireland in Ireland, while retaining the Imperial power finally to the Imperial Parliament. He was going to keep the promise he made to his constituency. [Liberal Unionist cheers.] That statement need not have been cheered. Hon. Members would believe him when he said that they had lost votes by their cheers. It was not satisfactory to him to be cheered when he told the House he was going to vote against his hon. Friends. Those who had cheered him did not cheer him for his merits, but because they thought he was going to do some mischief. He could assure hon. Members who cheered that he was not a whit better than the Radical Members were who had been accused again and again of having made promises to their constituents which they had broken. He should like to see these promises. He knew the Radical Members, and he was bound to say that amongst the whole 140 of them, there was not a single one of them that gave a promise to his constituents which he was not going to redeem. If there was anything which would prevent Radical Members from voting for some of the Amendments, it would be the utterances of his right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham. He was going to vote with his right hon. Friend on this Amendment. But his purpose in so voting was to press an effective Home Rule Bill for Ireland which should fit, in with the Federal system, which, rightly or wrongly, he believed to he coming; while the purpose of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham was not to amend the Bill in that direction, but to destroy it. There were thousands of people in the country who saw with sore dismay the right hon. Gentleman taking that line. With regard to the right hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, he really believed there was a lurking honesty in him; and he would ask him whether, when he argued so powerfully that if they were going to have Home Rule they should have this plea of delegation, did he honestly desire to convey that if the Amendment were adopted it would conciliate Liberal Unionist opinion to the Bill? The right hon. Gentleman only laughed at him now. Well, he submitted that if that question were not answered, his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister's position was perfectly right. His right, hon. Friend said—"I propose a plan; it may not be as good as yours; but if you will not help in amending that plan, I will stick to it." If he had not made that promise to his constituents he would go into the Lobby with the Prime Minister, because the right hon. Gentleman, as a practical politician who wanted the Bill to be carried, was justified on having taken a line to stand by it, unless, by giving way on a point, he could conciliate Liberal Unionist opinion; and, if he could not do that, his wisest course was to he strong. Though he believed the right hon. Gentleman's plan was the best plan, he thought that the Prime Minister could have just as easily proceeded by way of delegation, and to define measures, instead of reserving measures; and, as he had given the promise to his constituents, he proposed to go into the Lobby for the Amendment.

I will not endeavour now to deal with each particular safeguard that is contained in the Bill. By doing so I do not think the Committee would escape from having to consider in detail the clause as a whole when the Question is put from the Chair that the clause do stand part of the Bill. Hon. Members must feel that it would be a very strong measure, at the present stage of the clause, to decide that the whole of the restrictions upon the power of the Irish Legislature should be cut away. Undoubtedly the effect of the proposed Amendment would be to enlarge the scope of the Home Rule Bill. It is the first proposal of the kind that has come from the Opposition. I will only make this remark—that the restrictions which the Amendment proposes to sweep away constitute a bonâ fide attempt to narrow the power of the new Irish Legislature; and I must say that the way in which the Nationalist Members have acquiesced in this limitation of the power of that Legislature is most creditable to them, and affords a singular example of the moderation with which they have conducted themselves in this House in connection with the details of this Bill. I may be told that these restrictions are not of much value; but I think it will be admitted that there is not the smallest doubt that if they were swept away it would be regarded as very much enhancing the demerits of the measure. The hon. Member who moved the Amendment said it was not consistent with the respect due to the Irish Legislature to impose any restrictions of this kind. Well, take the very first of them, which prohibits the new Irish Legislature from setting up an Established Church. That, according to the hon. Member, is an improper restriction upon its legislative powers; but that is exactly the restriction that is imposed upon the Federal Legislatures of the United States. In my opinion, it is most improbable that any Irish Members would be in favour of establishing a Church of any denomination, whether these restrictions existed or not. The restrictions have been inserted with the goodwill and entire approval of the Irish Members, in order, if possible, to allay those jealousies which, however unhappy and unreasonable they may be, they find entertained and even enforced in this House. This Irish Legislature has been called, not inaptly, a "subordinate Legislature," and there is nothing at all improper in this policy of imposing restrictions. When we come to the clause, each restriction will he decided on its own merits; but, in my opinion, it is most unreasonable to cut out the whole mass of the restrictions that are contained in the clause at this stage, and therefore I must offer the strongest opposition to the Amendment.