Member for the Sleaford Division of Lincolnshire, rose in his place, and asked leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance—namely, the recent changes which have been made in the Currency of India, by the closing of the Indian Mints to the free coinage of silver with the sanction of Her Majesty's Government; but the pleasure of the House not having been signified, Mr. Speaker called on those Members who supported the Motion to rise in their places, and not less than 40 Members having accordingly risen:—

said: I make this Motion for the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a really important matter—namely, the changes which have recently been made in the currency of India with the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, and I venture to think that that is a discussion which has already been too long postponed. The postponement must not be in any way ascribed to our fault. Her Majesty's Government, in their discretion, persistently refused to allow any opportunity whatever of discussing this question before the change was made, although repeated appeals were addressed to them by gentlemen on both sides of the House; and since the change was made I found that it would be out of Order to do what I fully intended to do and what I had hoped to do—namely, raise this question upon the Vote on Account, and, consequently, there would have been no other opportunity of raising the question at all until we arrived at the time when the Indian Budget might be presented, which, judging from the announcement made this afternoon, will probably be in the closing days of the Session, and possibly in the month of October. Under these circumstances, I have had no hesitation whatever in resorting to the only expedient open to me—that of moving the Adjournment; and in view of the great importance of this change—the effects which it is likely to produce in all parts of the world, and, indeed, which it has produced already—I do not think that any apology is needed from me for moving the Adjournment. Now, I wish to say at once that whatever criticisms I may find it my duty to make upon the conduct of Her Majesty's Government at home I should find it very hard to blame the Government of India for the action which they have taken with regard to the currency of that country. Their position has been one of quite peculiar and exceptional difficulty. For year after year they have been urging on the attention of the English Government the great and growing troubles of their financial situation, and urging it in vain. This situation, they have pointed out with perfect truth, was owing to no fault whatever of their own; that the source of all their difficulties—namely, the constant fluctuations and the ever-recurring falls in the value of silver—was entirely beyond their control; that it was primarily due to and caused by legislation hostile to silver on the part of other countries; and that—and this is, perhaps, the most important of all their suggestions to the English Government—the only effectual way of meeting it was by promoting an International Agreement for the free coinage of silver as well as gold. This policy they recommended upon grounds and supported by arguments which, to the best of my knowledge, have never been contradicted—which have never been successfully disproved. The substance of those arguments will be found in a Despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, and in a Memorandum by Sir David Barbour which was dated 21st June, 1892, and the effect of which, in a word, was this—that there was no country which would benefit so greatly or would receive such advantages from a uniform standard of value as Great Britain, having regard to the scope of her commerce and the immense transactions of her finance; that it would be a perfectly safe measure; and that it would be a final measure; whilst the adoption of a universal gold standard, even if it were possible, would not be without considerable risks. That is the language of the Government of India, which has been used over and over again towards the English Government in reference to this question. It is impossible, I say, for a responsible Government like that, or for any Financial Minister like Sir David Barbour, to make stronger or more urgent statements and representations than those which I have quoted; and though I particularly desire to avoid anything of dogmatism on a question which I know to be one of peculiar difficulty like this, and though I speak of my own views with all deference to those of others who differ from me, I do not hesitate to say that in the views which have been expressed from time to time by the Indian Government I absolutely concur. But to these appeals, and to all similar appeals, which have been made from time to time successive Governments in this country have persistently refused to listen; and the present Administration in particular have, in my judgment, been conspicuous for their hostility to silver and silver interests, and, indeed, I think that I may say to almost every proposal which has been made to promote the increased use of silver throughout the world. What has been the consequence of this state of things? It has been very simple, and as unfortunate as simple, for the Government of India have found themselves at last confronted with the danger of bankruptcy on the one hand, or the necessity of closing the Mints to the free coinage of silver on the other. It is this latter policy—which is not what they desired—which is open to innumerable objections, and which I believe is full of dangers not only to India itself, but to the commercial interests of the world at large, that has been practically forced upon them by the attitude of the English Government, and which they have at last been reluctantly driven to adopt. Now, that is the position with which we are confronted at this moment. It is not denied, even by the Government of India themselves, that this policy is open to grave risks, and to an almost countless number of objections; and I am bound to say that, in my opinion, it is only right that Parliament should at the earliest opportunity—though Her Majesty's Government have done their utmost to prevent it—consider the whole of this subject, and, above all, endeavour to ascertain what are the grave objections to this policy on the one baud, and what are the compensating advantages to be expected from it on the other. Now, as far as the latter are concerned, I think that they need occupy but little of our time, because, as a matter of fact, the single, the main advantage which was anticipated and hoped for from this policy—namely, the fixity of the rupee and the stability of the exchange between India and England—has not been by any means secured. If the Indian Government continue to be unable to tell their Council bills, as they are at present—and if you ask half the men of business they will tell you that that is what is going to happen—it will not be, and it cannot be, secured at all; and in that case the whole of your scheme will have failed in the special object for which all the risks of your policy, and all the objections to that policy, have been incurred. There remain to be considered the advantages to the employés and the servants of the Indian Government and the gain to the Revenue which the Government will appropriate by artificially raising the value of the rupee. As to the gain to the servants and employés of the Government, it is hardly worth considering. Even if the Government had succeeded in keeping the rupee at 1s. 4d., the gain would have been trifling. As it is, all the advantage they derive is the difference between an exchange of 1s. 2¾d., or whatever it had fallen to, and an exchange of 1s. 3½d., which it is to-day. With regard to Revenue, it is true that the Government will profit by artificially raising the value of the rupee. They will also escape the necessity of a direct increase of taxation. Yes; but how do they do this? They escape it in reality by nothing but taxation in another form, which is not quite so easy for the natives to discover. You escape a deficit in your Revenue by tampering with the currency of India and artificially raising the value of the rupee. But the effect of artificially raising the value of the rupee is to lower pro tanto the value of everything else. Every native who has debts to pay, or who has taxes or fixed payments to make, must give more of his produce in the future than he had to give before, for the purpose of meeting his obligations. Yes, you save £2,000,000—the loss of £2,000,000—of your Revenue. But at what a cost is this accomplished? Why, in order to avoid increased taxation of something like £2,000,000, you are indirectly, and by methods which you hope will not be discovered, going to mulet—and you have mulcted—the native population by ten times that amount. I am aware that that is a grave and serious charge to make, but it is a true charge; and in order to enable me to establish it, as I intend to do, I must ask the House to recollect three things. First, that the closing of the Mints in India to the free coinage of silver would necessarily be followed by a very heavy fall in the price of silver. Lord Herschell's Committee did not deny that. On the contrary, they expected it; and I make bold to say that to everyone who has followed this question with care that it was as absolutely certain that silver would fall as the first consequence of the closing of the Mints as that I am addressing the House at this moment. Secondly, the House must remember that the peasantry of India are, to a great extent, in debt. They have a large number of fixed payments to make, including land taxes and other things which have to be met. And, thirdly, there is an enormous amount of uncoined silver in the hands of the native population at the present time.

What evidence have you of that?

Well, I will give the right hon. Gentleman the evidence in a few moments. But perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will kindly allow me to deal with each of my points in order. As to the first point—namely, the probability of a great fall in the price of silver—that is au accomplished fact already. There has been nothing like it in the history of silver since the world began. Silver in the same period has never fallen so much in relation to its value to gold as it has in the last fortnight. As to the second point—the indebtedness of the natives—I will ask the House to allow me to call attention to one single paragraph in the Petition which was addressed to Lord Herschell, as Chairman of the Departmental Committee. It is called the Memorial of the Industrial Association of Western India, and is addressed to Lord Herschell. After remarking that the steadiness of rupee prices—in other words, that the stability of the silver standard concurrently with the fall of gold prices and the exchange is the most remarkable feature of the situation—they say—

"The heavy burden of ancestral debt on the Indian peasant cultivators is another and older feature which cannot escape the consideration of your Lordships' Committee."

I am afraid it did escape them, for very little notice indeed appears to have been taken of it. Then the Memorialists go on to point out as follows:—

"Your Memorialists observe that the large volume of the gold obligations of the Government is advanced to justify a departure from free trade in rupees. They humbly suggest that the silver obligations of the peasantry are twenty fold greater and more important than the gold obligations of the Government, so that while removing a minor evil a greater one of the same nature, but the results of which it is impossible to foretell, would be substituted for it."

I should like to know where, on the part of the Departmental Committee or on the part of the Government, the slightest attention has been paid to this representation on the part of the native population of India. This Memorial, bear in mind, comes from au Association who are directly representative of the people of the West. And though it is our duty—as I hold it be our duty—as long as we continue to govern India at all, to govern it for the good of the people of that country, I say that the Government have absolutely ignored the protests of these people, and that in the change which you have made you have added enormously to their burdens, and inflicted a grievous wrong upon them. Now I come to the third point. The right hon. Gentleman asked me to give him some evidence of there being an enormous amount of uncoined silver in the hands of the native population. I readily accede to the challenge of the right hon. Gentleman. It is a matter of the greatest possible importance, and, therefore, I hope that the House will pardon me if I deal with it in detail. The authority of the first witness that I shall call will not be disputed. It is the evidence of the present Financial Minister of India, Sir David Barbour, and was given before the Gold and Silver Commission in 1888—of which Commission he was also a Member. Sir David Barbour begins by saying—

"That he has given much attention to the question of hoarding by the natives; that for about eight years he was employed in the interior of the country, and saw a great deal of the habits of the people; that it was beyond doubt that there was a large amount of hoarding both of gold and silver among the natives; and that it took the form of bullion, coin, or ornaments."

In reply to other questions Sir David Barbour said—

"£130,000,000 of gold have been imported net into India since 1835–6, and there was a large amount in India before that date, and nearly the whole of this amount is now in hoard."

That was only four or five years ago. Then he was asked this question—

"Could you give us any estimate of the amount of silver hoarded in India?"

And his reply was—

"From my personal observation and experience, I should be inclined to say that the amount of hoarded silver, exclusive of current coin, was greater than the amount of gold."

Finally, in reply to a question from the hon. Member for North-West Manchester (Sir W. Houldsworth), he said—

"The amount of hoarded silver, not in coin, is nearly equal to that of gold."

Now, there is no greater authority upon this question, I assume, than Sir David Barbour. I will not quote any experience of my own, though it did happen to me to pass a year of my life in that country; and certainly in those days it was notorious—for I had opportunities of going to every part of the country—that the natives of India had an enormous quantity of hoarded silver in the shape of ornaments, which every man and woman, and almost every child, wore; but I think it is clear, from the evidence given by Sir David Barbour before the Gold and Silver Commission, that this was, at all events, a subject that ought to have been examined most closely; and I confess I am surprised, under those circumstances, that the Departmental Committee did not take more evidence—more complete evidence—upon this subject than they appear to have done. I have examined the greater part of the evidence on that subject given before that Committee, and I find that only three or four witnesses were examined upon it at all. The name of one of them is Mr. Mackay. But Mr. Mackay is the leader of the agitation in favour of a gold standard; and his evidence upon this subject, therefore, as an interested person, must be taken cum grano. But even his evidence upon this subject is by no means positive at all. All he says is, that he does not think there has been a large amount of uncoined silver hoarded by the natives; and I am bound to say, from the general tenour of his evidence, it does not appear to be a question to which he had given sufficiently accurate attention. Two other witnesses were examined, who confirmed what Sir David Barbour had said upon the subject. I should like, if the House will allow me, to read the evidence of one of them. One was Mr. Baynes, who says, on this question, that—

"There is undoubtedly a large amount, indeed, of silver hoarded as ornaments by the people."

And then there is the evidence of Sir F. E. Adams, who was asked if he thought it would be serious in its results to depreciate the value of that large amount of silver owned by the natives, and his reply was—

"That is a point, I think, which is exceptionally important, for this reason. Hitherto, the natives, if they have any money saved in rupees, melt them down, turn them into ornaments, and put them on their wives and children. They load them with silver ornaments, but they have always known one tiling—that if a pinch came they would be able to take those ornaments to the Mints and get rupees for them weight by weight. But if you fix the rate at 18d.—or at 16d. as the Government propose—the value of silver in the open market falls below that; and if they wish to sell a few ornaments, when they take them to the Mint they will not get weight for weight, but 20 per cent. less. That will lead to the widest possible dissatisfaction."

I have quoted, so far as I know, the bulk of the evidence given, not only before the Gold and Silver Commission, but given also before the Departmental Committee upon this point; and I take it that, upon the most reliable evidence which has been obtained, there is an enormous amount of uncoined silver in the hands of the native population of India at the present time, amounting, as Sir David Barbour said, to the colossal sum of £130,000,000. This great amount of silver is held as a sort of reserve by the people—a reserve to be used in cases of necessity—in times, for instance, of famine, or in cases of marriage, or upon any great family occasion. Then they take their silver ornaments to the nearest money-lender, and they exchange them for rupees. In fact, this enormous hoard constitutes the savings of the poorer classes of the people of that country; and now, by a single stroke of the pen, by this arbitrary action of the Government, you have depreciated the whole of this enormous property to an extent of which I believe neither Parliament nor the people of this country had not the slightest idea, and yet the calculation is very simple. Perhaps the House will allow me to give them the calculation of the injury which has been inflicted upon the native population by this single arbitrary act of the Government. At the date of the closing of the Mints the price of silver was 38d. an ounce. A week afterwards it fell to 30d., and according to what I see reported to-day the price is 32½d That is to say, it has fallen from 38d. to 32½d., or 15 per cent., since the closing of the Mints. But 15 per cent. applied to £130,000,000 represents a sum of £20,000,000 sterling; and that is the precise amount, I believe, of the spoliation inflicted by this arbitrary action, sanctioned by the English Government, upon the native population of India. It is hardly credible, but, at the same time, I believe it to be absolutely true. And what is more, the Government have no excuse whatever on the subject; because I took it upon myself, being greatly interested in these questions, and having had the opportunity of studying them for some years, to put a question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this particular point on the 16th of June, some considerable time before the decision of the Government was taken. I asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer then that we might have a discussion upon this subject before it was finally decided; because I thought that when the facts were put before Parliament—unless I was entirely in error—it would hesitate before it gave its sanction to a course which appears to me, as regards the Indian people, to be fraught with nothing but mischief and injustice, and I do not hesitate to say that, unless I am altogether wrong in my facts, unless Sir David Barbour's evidence is altogether untrustworthy, or unless in the years since 1888 those enormous hoards have been made away with, that a more flagrant act of public plunder has never been perpetrated by a civilised Government, and if you were to attempt to do anything of this sort in England, the Government perpetrating it would not remain in power for a single week. The people of India are not represented in this House; but, in my humble judgment, it will be more than we deserve if we escape a worse disaster when the native population really begin to understand what is the true meaning of the closing of the Mints to them. The Prime Minister was asked in this House by one of his own supporters whether the Government meant to give any compensation; and he stated in reply that, as far as he was aware, the bullion in the possession of the natives was not affected at all, and there was no necessity to do anything in regard to them. The right hon. Gentleman's exact words were—

"With regard to the bullion in the hands of the native population, it does not appear that any step has been taken, or that they will be in any respect damaged in consequence."

Well, I think I have shown that he was absolutely wrong, and I shall await the explanation of the Government with interest, and I think I am entitled to ask if they are in a position to dispute the evidence I have quoted and the statements I have made; and if they are not, do they intend deliberately to continue to inflict this great wrong upon the natives of that country? This is a question, I think, of great importance, and one to which the House is entitled to an answer. I pass to another point. It is not only the loss which has been inflicted upon the natives of India for which the Government is responsible; but they have succeeded, by this great exercise of financial ingenuity, in convulsing the financial constitution of the world literally from China to Peru. I do not know, I am sure, what the contraction of silver securities amounts to at the present time. I am almost afraid to think of it, but I have heard it estimated variously at from £100,000,000 to £200,000,000 already. I know it must be appalling, and I know it has spread consternation and alarm in financial circles in all parts of the world. The worst of it is that a very large proportion of these silver securities are held by people in this country. I ask the Government this question. Did they take all this into consideration before they gave their sanction to this action on the part of the Government in India? Do they think now that they are justified, by the trifling amount saved to the Government of India, in inflicting these enormous losses throughout the world, and upon thousands of English people who hold silver securities at the present time? These are questions which I am entitled to put to the Government, and to which Parliament is entitled to an answer. There is another point on which I should like to ask for some information. Did the Government, before taking this grave and serious action, have any communication whatever with the Government of the United States? The possible repeal of the Sherman Act was urged by Lord Herschell's Committee as one of the reasons for the recommendation they made. I want to know what was their authority for believing that the repeal of that measure was imminent or impending? I am told on what I believe to be the best authority—authority coming quite recently from persons in America—that before the closing of the Indian Mints there would have been little, if any, chance at all of any successful attempt to repeal the Sherman Act. But now, by your action in hurriedly closing the Mints in India, I think it is quite possible—indeed it is more than possible, it is probable—you will make the repeal of that Act inevitable. If that is so, what we have to look forward to is an immediate further fall in the price of silver; and then all the mischief you have done already, all the losses you have imposed upon thousands of people throughout the world, all the wrong you have done to the native population in India will be pro tanto increased and aggravated, and for the whole of that you will have to bear your just share of blame. Well, Sir, I come to another point. I do not know if the Government have considered the possible loss to the Revenue of India which is likely to arise from the exchange which they have brought about between India and other silver-using countries, and whether it will not counterbalance, or more than counter-balance, the gain which they expect from the artificial raising of the value of the rupee. Nor am I aware whether they have considered or taken any precautions against the dangers of spurious coinage in India, to which in future there will be a great temptation, which did not exist before. But I do know this—that both of these are possible contingencies—contingencies, indeed, of the greatest possible gravity. I understand that there have been some symptoms already of a diminution of Revenue from the export of opium to China; and I have heard whispers quite lately—something more than whispers indeed—that silver, which is all through these transactions still going to India, is being used for the purpose of spurious coinage already. That was told me not more than 10 days ago by a gentleman who may be regarded of very considerable authority on all questions dealing with India. [Cries of "Name!" and "Locality!"] I must refer the hon. Gentleman to my informant. It was told me in conversation, and I do not know whether it would be right for me to state his name without permission. There is one other subject to which I will refer for a moment. It is a question of supreme importance—Will the balance of trade, which hitherto has been favourable to India, under your scheme be maintained in the future? Great authorities tell me that all the probabilities are against it. The first effect of closing all your Mints, and of the great fall in silver which has followed, has been to set up between India and China and other silver-using countries on the one hand, and India on the other, an exchange which is extremely hostile to the latter country. All those silver countries of which I have spoken will in the future be in the enjoyment of a bounty, as against India, upon all their goods exported to that country, which India formerly enjoyed as against England. If, under these circumstances, the balance of trade should cease to be at any time favourable to India—and it is by no means an impossible contingency—then the collapse of your attempt to artificially maintain the value of the rupee will be complete. There are other objections which I desire to refer to, and which are patent to the whole world. You have a silver standard in India which fulfils the first essential of a standard—namely, stability. No one recognises this quality in a standard more emphatically than the Prime Minister. We had the advantage of hearing him speak on this subject on a memorable occasion. He said that the properties of a standard were fixity, steadiness, stability, and continuity. Fixity and invariability, lie said, were the first elements of a standard. Sir, I maintain that you have had these properties in the standard in India. The stability of the silver standard in India is shown by the course of the prices of commodities in that country. The prices in silver have for many years never practically varied. They have remained in that country almost precisely the same, notwithstanding the fact that the prices of commodities measured in gold in Europe and America, where you have a gold standard, have changed enormously during the same time. Well, all this is now to be done away with; you have abandoned the standard which was stable, in order to replace it, if you can, by a standard which has been proved by experience during the last 20 years to be singularly deficient in that quality. You are going to introduce this element of disturbance and of loss, and to inaugurate by artificial means an era of falling prices in India, where, hitherto, they have been so singularly steady. I say, if you can, because it is by no means certain at present that the establishment of a gold standard in India would be permanently possible. As a matter of fact, at the present moment India is in this extraordinary position: that she is actually without any standard of value at all, and the whole of the enormous currency of that country is an inconvertible token currency, with the nominal value of the rupee infinitely greater than that of the material of which it is composed. Surely I may appeal to the House and to the right hon. Gentleman himself whether that is a satisfactory or desirable state of things? It is a truly remarkable thing, and one of the most curious incidents we have witnessed probably during many years, that the present Prime Minister, who has achieved in the past such a reputation as a master of currency and finance, should now come forward in the character of the most prominent advocate at the present time of dishonest money in the world, and that he should regard that as a fitting and proper currency for our Empire in the East. Sir, there is one more objection to which I desire to call the attention of the House before I bring my observations to a close. The action the Government have taken with regard to the currency of India cannot possibly fail to intensify and aggravate the appreciation of gold throughout the world, which has done so much injury already, and of which there has been so much complaint. I know that some people deny that there has been any appreciation of gold at all. Those who take that line and uphold that argument have two other arguments to meet before they can expect their opponents to agree with them. If they do not believe in appreciation, at least they cannot deny that there has been an enormous fall in prices. That is not a matter of opinion, but a matter of fact which cannot be disputed. What is the cause of it? I suppose the Chancellor of the Exchequer will tell me it is the great increase of commodities throughout the world—in other words, it is due to over-production. I defy him to prove it. I do not believe that, in proportion to the needs of the world and the increase of population, there is any greater production now than there was 20 years ago. Have hon. Gentlemen opposite the least idea of what the increase in population is supposed to be? I was looking at some figures the other day which put the increase of the population of the world during the last 20 years at no fewer than 200,000,000 of human beings. Well, of course there has been a great increase of commodities. It is a merciful fact that there has been, otherwise one-half the world at the present moment would be going about naked, and the other half would probably be starved. That is the answer to your plea that there has been no appreciation of gold, and that the cause of the fall in prices is due to an increase of commodities alone. Moreover, if the increase of commodities had been the cause of the great fall of prices during the last 20 years, surely that fall would have been universal. How do right hon. Gentlemen account for the fact that the prices of commodities in silver-using countries have not fallen at all? That is a point which certainly a few years ago was absolutely placed beyond dispute. That is a fact to which Sir David Barbour, amongst others, appended his signature. The fact that in silver countries the prices of commodities have remained constant all these years, in my opinion, points most conclusively and directly to the fact that it is gold which has risen in value, and has been the real cause of the difficulty. Indeed, it seems to me it could not possibly be otherwise, because if you suddenly make a great increase in the demand for any given commodity without any corresponding increase in the supply, that commodity must become comparatively scarcer, and, therefore, dearer than before. It seems to me these are questions which gentlemen like the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who deny the appreciation, and who appear to be rather disposed to treat it with ridicule than otherwise, are bound to grapple with and answer before they take the stand on that position. If that is not enough, I can point to a long list of authorities in support of my view of this question. I can offer them the results of the system of index figures, as worked out by the economists—by Dr. Giffen, by Soetbeer, and Sauerbeck—all of them arriving independently at the same results. I can also refer them to the exhaustive writings of Dr. Giffen—to the speeches of the right hon. Member for St. George's, Hanover Square (Mr. Goschen), the late Lord Beacousfield, and the late Lord Iddesleigh, who signed his name to a Report which connected the fall of prices with the great appreciation of gold. I can also refer to the opinion of the majority of the Members of the Gold and Silver Commission, for although the Members of that Commission were at first equally divided, one of their number—I refer to the right hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Courtney)—has since lie-come a convert to the views which I am endeavouring to lay before the House. With this mass of opinion against them, the onus probandi rests, I say, upon the Government, and on those who dispute the proposition, to disprove the appreciation of gold; and I say that in what they are doing now the Government are going to aggravate all the misery and all the evils that result to nations from a great appreciation of the standard of value. They have already had some warning not to continue in the path which they have begun to tread. Only the other day one of their most respected and trusted supporters resigned his seat in consequence of their attitude—chiefly, as I understand, upon this question, and I believe that others are not unlikely to follow his example. I have only one more question to ask. What is it that has brought about this crisis? The action of India was determined by the failure of the Conference at Brussels to arrive at any understanding, and for that failure I have always held that the English Government and the official Representatives of England were mainly responsible. I am perfectly content to rely upon the statements in the Blue Book. The Indian Delegate is outspoken in his condemnation of their attitude, and declares that nothing but their action stood in the way of an agreement. Then one of the Members of Lord Herschell's Committee said that he was drawn to the conclusion that the Home Government was the only substantial obstacle to the agreement. I think I have said enough to show that there is great danger in the course which the Government have taken, and that the compensating advantages which they expect are not sufficiently great to justify them. The Government alone are responsible for this great change, which is so full of elements of danger and difficulty for the future, not only with respect to India, but, with respect to this and other countries; and the Government should, I maintain, take this opportunity of justifying their policy, if they can.

If I did not know that this subject occupies the mind of the right hon. Gentleman, as it seems to me, to the exclusion of all others, I might be disposed to blame him for occupying an hour or more of the time of the House upon it at this moment. The last half-hour occupied by his speech be devoted to the disputed and disputable question of bimetallism, and his observations had very little connection with the subject of India, if any at all. I do not complain of my right hon. Friend, for I know that if the end of the world were to come—si fractus illabatur orbis—ho would be found in the last hours of the universe delivering an oration upon the subject of bimetallism. But I do not propose to enter into a general argument on that topic. The fact is that I have boon informed by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. A. J. Balfour) that upon that question I am superannuated. He declared in the City the other day that no man over 60 years of age was capable of being converted to bimetallism. Whether he said that because he found that most of the prominent City Authorities had passed that period of life I do not know. Berhaps it was his way of accounting for the fact that he found so few converts in that part of London. At any rate, his declaration must be my excuse for not entering into a general argument upon the question of bimetallism. But when the right hon. Gentleman challenges the conduct of the Government with reference to the Indian currency I am quite prepared to answer him. The course that the Government have taken was indicated to them most distinctly in the Report of the Royal Commission of 1888, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Courtney) signed, although he has since repudiated it according to the right hon. Gentleman opposite. That Report pointed out the dangerous and mischievous effects that bimetallism would have in India if it were adopted. The Commissioners said—

"There would be at least a serious risk of substantial mischief to the people of India.…Any change having the effect of lower- ing silver prices, while taxes and charges remained unaltered, might occasion serious discontent; and if it, were seen to be a consequence of political action, it might create political dangers as grave as any that are likely to result from a continuance of the present conditions, further, if it be true that cotton manufactures in India have been fostered and stimulated by the fall in silver, it would be a serious matter, and certainly likely to engender great discontent, if by an act of the State the manufacturing industry thus created were seriously hampered, if not destroyed. …It would be questionable in point of justice and policy for this country to take from India by legislation any benefits the latter may have derived from changes in the value of precious metals which are in no wise due to such legislation. Although we have not felt ourselves able to recommend that this country should enter into negotiations with the view of establishing a bimetallic system of currency, we have indicated that we are fully sensible of the concessions which have been urged by the Government of India; and we think that every proposal which seems calculated to diminish these difficulties and to ease the existing situation is deserving of very careful consideration, and that an earnest endeavour should be made to adopt any which should appear to promise substantial advantage without the risk of greater evils."

Who is that signed by?

I will tell the right hon. Gentleman. It is signed by Lord Herschell—

Quite so; that is the Minority Report.

So you say, on the ground that yon have converted the right hon. Member for Bodmin. But it is those views that have been adopted by the Government, and by which they are prepared to stand. This Report is signed by Lord Herschell, Sir Charles Fremantle, Sir John Lubbock, Lord Farrer, Mr. Birch, and by the convert, Mr. Leonard Courtney. They also said—

"While we cannot recommend that the Mother Country should run any serious risk in altering its system of currency in order to assist the Dependency (of India), we think that the Government of the latter should be allowed a free hand to deal with the problem as it considers best in its own interest."

That was the position taken up in 1888, and by it Ave abide. We believe that to alter the fundamental principles regulating the currency of this country would be an evil to the United Kingdom and to the Empire. The right hon. Gentleman, who is naturally extremely anxious to east blame upon the present Administration and to relieve everybody else, says that the difficulties of the Indian Government were created by our conduct respecting the question of bimetallism. The right hon. Gentleman says—and says truly—that the Indian Government were in favour of bimetallism. In 1886, when I was Chancellor of the Exchequer, I had the honour to make a reply to a Despatch of the Indian Government in favour of bimetallism; but, in the language of the Commission of 1888, the English Government, and not the present Administration only, have declined to entertain the question of bimetallism. The right hon. Gentleman says that in 1892 there was a Despatch from the Indian Government requesting that bimetallism should be established by International agreement. The right hon. Gentleman said that was a conclusive argument; but did the then Chancellor of the Exchequer think the argument conclusive? What was his action? The Government of the United States desired that a Conference should be called together for the express purpose of entertaining and discussing the question of bimetallism; and the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, very wisely and sagaciously, absolutely declined to allow English Representatives to go to a Conference summoned for such a purpose. But the right hon. Gentleman said that any proposal for the larger use of silver was one very proper to be considered, and he would give every liberty to the English Delegates to discuss these matters. What happened then? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sleaford said—"See what the present Government did at Brussels, which led to these fatal consequences" he spoke of. What did the Government do at Brussels? The first thing that happened at Brussels was that the United States proposed a Resolution that—

"In the opinion of this Conference, it is desirable that some measures should be found for increasing the use of silver in the currencies of the nations."

What was the view of the Conference on that? England was almost the only Power at the Conference that was prepared to support that Resolution. The opinion of Germany was that—

"Germany, being satisfied with its monetary system, has no intention of modifying its basis."

The Delegate of Austria-Hungary said—

"I am obliged to declare I shall be unable to give an opinion on the Resolution, or take part in the vote."

Russia said the same thing; Italy said the same thing; and the Representatives of the majority of the Powers absolutely refused to accept the Resolution. M. Tirard, the French Delegate, asked what was the use of their

"Entertaining any such question after the declaration by their respective Ministers that neither Germany, nor Austria-Hungary, nor England had any intention of modifying their monetary systems, with which they declared themselves satisfied."

That, I venture to say, was a true declaration of the state of the opinion of the Great Powers of Europe in reference to a monetary standard. What was the consequence of the speech of M. Tirard? The Delegate of the United States expressed not unnatural surprise at the course France had taken in the matter. In 1881 France and the United States were acting together in the interests of bimetallism; but in 1892 they ceased to act in that direction. The language of Mr. Cannon, the able Delegate of the United States, was that of extreme astonishment that France no longer favoured bimetallism. But that is not all. When the Conference came to be adjourned, the Delegate of Italy proposed that the condition of adjournment should be that, when the Conference met again, they would attempt to

"Discover an equitable basis for an agreement which should not infringe in any way the fundamental principles of the monetary policy of the different countries."

That meant that if the Conference met again bimetallism was not to be discussed. The Italian Delegate said that whatever was proposed must be something which would not affect the monetary basis adopted in the different countries; but even subject to that condition the German Delegate refused to vote in favour of the adjournment. The Conference was to have met again on May 30; but a telegram came from the United States of America saying that the Conference was postponed. So much for the Conference. What was the position of the British Government at that time? When the Conference adjourned the English and Indian Delegates declared most expressly that the Indian question was reserved, and would be dealt with entirely independently of the Conference, leading the members to believe that it would be dealt with before the Conference met again. Indeed, Lord Herschell's Committee was already sitting. Well, now, what is the charge of the right hon. Gentleman against the British Government? The Indian Government was in favour of bimetallism. The Government said—"We are not prepared to adopt bimetallism yet; but we will consider, on account of the difficulty of your situation, any proposal you may make." The right hon. Gentleman treats this plan as if it were one invented by us, and forced upon the Indian Government. He said that Sir David Barbour was a great financial authority. Of course he is a great financial authority; and if you want to see a most conclusive defence of the plan adopted in India you have only to read Sir David Barbour's statement, presented to this House some days ago. The plan is the plan of the Indian Government. The scheme which has been adopted is precisely the scheme that they recommended, with some slight alteration approved by them. We said to the Indian Government—"We will not adopt bimetallism in India; we think it dangerous and mischievous for India; but any other proposal that you put forward will have the fullest consideration at our hands." I do not wish to labour the matter at any length: but anyone who desires to understand the utter baseless-ness of what the right hon. Gentleman has said in condemnation of the plan has only to read the speech which Sir David Barbour made in the Indian Legislative Council, and which has been laid on the Table of the House. I am not going into the details of the amount of un-coined silver in India. Lord Herschell stated only last night in the House of Lords that that is an entire delusion.

On what evidence?

He heard the evidence. I take the evidence of Sir David Barbour and the Lord Chancellor as worth all the information derived from the sporting tour of the late Minister for Agriculture.

I quoted Sir David Barbour's evidence at great length upon this subject. The right hon. Gentleman has never even touched it, or the evidence I quoted from Lord Herschell's own Committee.

Yes, I have.

No; you have not.

Sir David Barbour is the recommender of this plan. The Indian Government sent it to us. We made a slight modification, which they deemed an improvement and accepted; and, therefore, to quote Sir David Barbour's evidence in 1888 against the plan which he sent to England, and almost at his instance was passed through the Legislative Council in India, is really unfair. We accept all responsibility in this matter. But it was our duty to ascertain what, in the opinion of the Indian Government, barring bimetallism, was the best plan for the people and the Government of India. That was the plan sent home for our consideration by the Indian Government and Sir David Barbour, and which we adopted. That is the plan which, in the language of the right hon. Gentleman, was the arbitrary action of the English Government. What was the arbitrary action of the English Government? We adopted the recommendations of the responsible Government of India. If the right hon. Gentleman thinks he is doing a service to this country or to India by saying that the plan with reference to the currency of India recommended by the Indian Government and sanctioned by the Government at home is a flagrant act of great public plunder, and if he considers that a patriotic line to take, I do not agree with him. What he is endeavouring to do is to incense, if he can, the people of India against the determination of the Government of India, sanctioned by the Government of Great Britain. Will he succeed in that? I hope he will not. I believe that all the arguments upon which he founds his statement are utterly futile; and, therefore, I venture to characterise that statement as mischievous in the highest degree. he says this plan is a spoliation of the Indian people. Who is it that he attacks as the author of the plunder? Lord Lansdowne, because he was President of the Council that passed this Act; he was the head of the Government that recommended this policy; Sir David Bar-hour; aye, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Courtney). I do not mean to say we disavow in any sense our responsibility; but what we did was to gather together what we thought the ablest and most competent body of men to advise us in this matter. They came to the conclusion to recommend this plan, respecting which the right hon. Gentleman thinks it worthy of himself and of the colleagues who sit around him to inflame public opinion in India. With reference to the results of this policy, no man can, of course, undertake to predict. I am willing to take the opinion of men who have recommended it, and of those who will have to carry it out. We accept the whole responsibility, but we did not profess to be as good judges as they are of the financial and social condition of India with relation to this important matter, or of what was the best and wisest course to take in confessedly difficult circumstances. We believe we have taken the best and most prudent method of informing ourselves as to what is the best thing for the Indian Government and the Indian people. We do not believe, with the right hon. Gentleman, that the Government in India or the Indian Council at home have deliberately recommended and carried out a policy of spoliation of the people of India. On the contrary, we believe that, so far from their being guilty of an act of public plunder, they have recommended in the circumstances that which they believed was best for the Indian Government and for the Indian people.

Not for the Indian people.

Is your charge, then, against Lord Lansdowne and Sir David Barbour and the Council in India that they do not care for the Indian people? That is a most undeserved, but a most, heavy censure upon the Government of India. I think we should do them a great injustice if we took any other view than that in recommending this course they recommended that which they considered good, not only for the Indian Government, but for the Indian people. That is the answer I have to give on the part of the Government. We submitted the proposals of the Government of India to the most competent authorities, and we have given it all the consideration we could, and we have adopted and sanctioned the plan of the Indian Government, and carried it into execution. And now the right hon. Gentleman gets up, in the midst of the important business in which we are engaged, to endeavour to make mischief, if he can, in Hindostan. And why? Because he knows that this action is the death of bimetallism. [Cries of "No, no!"] "No, no!" say hon. Members. "Hope springs eternal in the human breast." Hon. Members are more simple than the right hon. Gentleman, who is anxious to make mischief, not only among the native populations in India, but on the Money Market in this country. It is said that the Indian Council cannot sell its bills. That is not the fact. The reason why it has not sold its bills below the present price is perfectly well known, and when the right hon. Gentleman makes a statement of that kind it shows how little be knows of the Money Market. Is that opinion shared by commercial authorities in India? I have made it my business to look daily at what is the opinion in India on this subject. The right hon. Gentleman quoted the views expressed in several of the Indian newspapers, and, continuing, said—"I wonder what is the opinion of Lancashire on this change." The people of Calcutta—and I believe the merchants of Lancashire—do not share the views of the right hon. Gentleman. It is said that we ought to have consulted the United States upon this matter, and that our proceedings may imperil the Sherman Act. But surely that part of the right hon. Gentleman's imputation falls to the ground. Does he suppose that the Government of the United States are particularly anxious to support the Sherman Act? We told the Conference at Berlin that we regarded this Indian matter as a question quite apart from the general question of European currency. We have acted upon the best information we could obtain, and, in my opinion, this miserable Party attack is only made for the purpose of delaying an important Bill. I say you have no right to make currency a Party implement for purposes of this kind, nor to play ducks and drakes with the interests of your Indian Empire in the hope that you may waste an hour or two in intercepting the progress of a certain Bill.

I am aware that my right hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Courtney) has oven a greater title than I have to speak on this question, and I will not intervene between him and the House for more than a few minutes. But after the extraordinary outburst we have just heard, some words from this Bench will, I think, be desired by the House. My right hon. Friend has been accused by the right hon. Gentleman, who cannot even discuss currency without plunging about in these absurd recriminations which are clear to him at all times, and possibly appropriate at some times, but which are certainly not appropriate on the occasion of a Debate initiated in a speech which was not only powerful in argument, but temperate in tone. The right hon. Gentleman has accused my right hon. Friend of desiring to delay more important business.

The right hon. Gentleman accused us of being guilty of a flagrant act of public plunder. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman calls that "moderate" language.

I will come to that point directly. But surely one phrase hardly justifies the long personal peroration which the right hon. Gentleman has thought proper to inflict upon the House. He accused my right hon. Friend of having spoken an hour. I doubt the accuracy of that statement; but, in any case, the right hon. Gentleman opposite has taken just as long to answer my right hon. Friend. This is a question of the very first importance, and no reasonable man will dare to get up and say it is not a proper subject for the House of Commons to discuss. If it be a proper subject for the House to discuss, I should like the right hon. Gentleman to tell us at what other time it could possibly have been discussed. My right hon. Friend was unable to raise it when the Vote on Account was before the House; and as we have been deprived of every other opportunity by the action of the Government this is the only opportunity we could get of bringing the matter forward. So much for the change of impropriety in bringing the subject on at this stage. I pass to the more important question of the view we take as to the general course of the policy of the Government opposite, with whom alone we are now dealing in this matter. I will at once frankly admit that when they acceded to Office the Government found themselves in an exceedingly difficult position with regard to this question. They were not prepared in any way to sanction bimetallism. I admit that that is not a question in which the Government of the day could be expected to take a definite line, unless they felt they had behind them a backing of public opinion in this country which would justify such a great and far-reaching change. But I think they might have gone into the Brussels Conference showing themselves alive to the extraordinary gravity of the situation as regards silver, and desirous of doing what lay in their power to mitigate the evil which every man of common sense, except the right hon. Gentleman opposite, regards as a very serious question—namely, the violent depreciation in the value of silver, and its practical exclusion from a large number of currency purposes which it has hitherto served. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the action of the United States. I am not disposed to defend the Sherman Act, but I should view the condition of a Finance Minister in this country who regarded as a matter of absolute indifference to himself what happened to silver as something approaching to lunacy. Though the right hon. Gentleman has not repudiated the responsibility of his own Government, he has endeavoured throughout the whole course of his speech to throw the responsibility for what has occurred in India upon the Indian Government alone. I quite admit that there were phrases in his speech inconsistent with that interpretation; but I now allude to the general tenour of his speech. Over and over again he said—"This is what you are saying of Lord Lansdowne and of Sir David Barbour. This is what has been recommended by Lord Lansdowne and Sir David Barbour." That statement of the attitude of the Indian Government is not a fair one. They have been forced to take the unhappy step which they have taken, because their connection with this country compels them to adopt a financial system which shall be accepted by the Government at home. The plan they have adopted is not the plan they desired to adopt. It is the plan they were forced by the Government at home to adopt. I do not throw the responsibility on this Government, or any other Government; but I say it is unfair to throw the re- sponsibility on the Indian Government. They took this plan, not as a good plan, but because something had to be done. They found themselves in the position of having to pay a gold debt in England, and that difficulty grew from year to year as silver fell. Like other debtors in an embarrassed position, they looked about for some scheme which would get them out of their difficulty, and they were forced to adopt a scheme which would get them out of their difficulties at any cost. Is any responsible statesman prepared to adopt the plan of an inconvertible currency—a currency as inconvertible and as artificial in its value as was ever issued by any Government in the world? To do that in a country like India is to take a step which every human being must regret, and, in addition to that step, you are forced to this conclusion—that if the plan of the Indian Government succeeds, and if the rupee be appreciated as they hope to be able to appreciate it, the result must be to injure every human being in India who possesses a store of uncoined silver. My right hon. Friend has been accused of endeavouring to sow dissension in India between the Government and the population because he has ventured to point out what is, no doubt, an economic fact. He may be wrong in saying that the uncoined silver amounts to £130,000,000; but of this there can be no doubt—that if the Indian Government do succeed in artificially raising the value of the rupee until it reaches 1s. 4d., the effect must be to turn all uncoined silver into mere merchandise, and, what is more, into depreciated merchandise. My right hon. Friend cannot be accused of sowing dissension between people merely because he has pointed out an undoubted truth of that description. Of course, he neither intended nor did he accuse the Indian Government of a desire to plunder the Indian people. All he stated was that the Indian Government must pay their gold debts; that they are at their wits' ends to know how to do that; that to throw additional taxation on the Indian people to any serious extent would be to shake the very foundations of the Empire; and that, therefore, they were forced to this unhappy expedient of having to substitute for a free and natural coinage a coinage as artificial and as unnatural as any issue of inconvertible paper ever was in the world. I am sure the House will feel that the Home Government and the Indian Government have, rightly or wrongly, been driven to take a step which, since the suspension of the Bank payments in 1797, has never been taken, either by England or by any country under the control of England. It is undoubtedly one of those financial crimes for which necessity may, indeed, be an excuse, but which remains none the less a financial crime. I regret the Government, while admitting they were forced to take this step, have not uttered one word of regret at the adoption of a system which sins, as I think, against every principle of sound finance, and not the least against those principles of sound finance on which the Government are the first to plume themselves. I suppose they will fall back upon the plea of necessity; they will say what we have done is unfortunate, is deplorable, is contrary to every recognised—[Mr. W. E. GLADSTONE and Sir W. HARCOURT: Not at all.] Oh, they do not say that. Then I suppose I may interpret that interruption from the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer as indicating that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's present financial advisers, it is a good system, a defensible system, a system consonant with all recognised financial and currency principles, to establish a form of legal tender the value of which shall depend upon the arbitrary action of the Executive from day to day. That is what yon have done in India, beyond all question. It rests now with the Executive to settle as they please what shall be the value of the rupee. By the exercise of their discretion in that matter, they may, at their own sweet will, increase or diminish the burden of every private or public debt payable in silver from one end of the country to the other, from the Himalayas to Ceylon. That that should be admitted by the Government, not as an unhappy necessity, but as a system which on its own merits they are prepared to advocate and defend, I confess staggers me, especially when I recollect the doctrines of financial purity which they have more than once defended from those Benches. I recollect the Prime Minister only the other day repeating across the House a famous question of Sir Robert Peel's—"What is a pound?"

I have no recollection, but it is a most innocent imputation. I am quite ready to ask the question for the accommodation of the right hon. Gentleman, but it does not happen to be true.

There is no imputation. I suppose there is no harm in my saying it. I cannot believe my memory wholly deceives me in the matter. As I say, the Prime Minister asked, "What is a pound?" And I ask "What, under his new system, is a rupee?" I know what a rupee was under the system that prevailed in India six months ago. A rupee was a certain amount of silver, the exchange value of which depended upon the amount of silver in it and upon that alone. Well, what is a rupee now? It is something which depends for its value not on the amount of silver in it, but absolutely upon the administrative discretion of the Indian Mint as to how many of these inconvertible coins they will allow or not. I should like to know what, in the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman, constitutes a rupee at the present moment? As I have said, the closing of the Mints to the free coinage of silver is a public misfortune occasioned by necessity. How could the Government avoid taking the step they have taken? Granting, for the sake of argument, that bimetallism is impossible for this country; granting, also, that they would not even permit the Indian Government to negotiate with other countries, and granting that something had to be done, what other course could they pursue than that which, as a matter of fact, they have pursued? I will state where the error lays. They have not adequately realised that in the depreciation of silver we are suffering under a world-wide misfortune; that it is not a thing we can despise, not a thing which, from the lordly platform of a single gold standard, we can afford to look down upon and say—"This may concern that country, but not us." England as much as any other country must suffer if silver loses its place amongst the measures of exchange value over a large part of the world. Had they seen that, I think they would have gone into the Brussels Conference in a different spirit from that which, as a matter of fact, animated them; and I believe if they had gone in with a real desire not to establish bimetallism for this country, but to do everything they could to aid those countries that were prepared either for themselves to adopt bimetallism or to find some demand for silver, much might have been done. If they had held out this threat of stopping the Mints in India in such a way as it would have been believed in by other nations of the world, I believe they would have found ready to their hand a diplomatic lever through the operation of which much might have been effected. But they threw the whole of the advantage of the situation away. No one thought this step would be taken by the Indian Government. The nations of the world were of opinion, rightly or wrongly, that the difficulties of the currency would ultimately force England to be bimetallic. They were prepared to wait until that event occurred; and until that event occurred they did not think anything would be done by this country to increase the difficulties and the stringency of the position. There are many ways of telling people what you mean to do, and I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman told them this in a way that convinced them of the danger. After all, the Conference of last year was not the first Conference on the question. Before this our Delegates have held out to the Conference the hope that if something were done by other nations in the direction of bimetallism we would, on our part, engage that the Mints of India would always be kept open for the free coinage of silver. That promise has never hitherto had any effect, because never up to the present time has any foreign nation contemplated the possibility of the Indian Mints being closed to silver. Knowing this was contemplated; knowing Lord Herschell's Committee would very likely recommend this scheme in default of a better one, if the Government had made it clear to all Foreign Delegates that the price of silver was going to be attacked, first in India and then probably in the United States, my belief is they would so thoroughly have frightened some of these gentlemen that something not unimportant might have resulted from the labours of that Conference. In that connection it may be worth while reading a short statement as to the position of France. The Chancellor of the Exchequer appeared to me to entirely misinterpret that position. He quoted at length certain earlier statements of M. Tirard, and he alluded in the briefest possible manner to the latest statement M. Tirard made. That statement is not consistent with the impression left by the right hon. Gentleman on the House that France was hostile to bimetallism. This is the statement I wish to submit to the House—

"Mr. Cannon thought the Latin Union, or, to be more exact, France, in whose name M. Tirard had spoken, was less friendly to bimetallism than England. M. Tirard declared he had said nothing of the kind; on the contrary, he had said that France was bimetallist, and that, if she would not resume free coinage of silver, and if she would not absolutely become bimetallic, it was only because England and other countries of Europe had declared, in the most formal way, that they intended to remain monometallic."

That quotation does not correspond with the impression left on the House by the right hon. Gentleman.

I do not wish to be misunderstood. I stated that what M. Tirard said was that it was of no use Franco going into bimetallism when Germany, Austria, and England would not.

The fact is, that both Austria and Germany considerably modified the position they had taken up to which M. Tirard alluded; and, although these things are incapable of proof, I repeat my strong impression that if Her Majesty's Government had shown the slightest knowledge of the gravity of the situation as regards silver, and if they had made it clearly apparent that their closing of the Indian Mints was not a mere brutum fulmen, but was the beginning of a policy they were prepared to carry out, they would have found other nations would have been not unprepared to assist Her Majesty's Government by some means to prevent the destruction of silver as one of the currencies of the world. I am convinced that this question is one of the first importance to every man in this country; and, although this is not the occasion—and I should be the last man to make it so—for advocating any particular views of my own as to the way in which we ought to solve the great currency difficulties of the world, it is incumbent upon every man in this House, whatever his convictions may be, to realise that there is a great currency difficulty, and that we ought, in no spirit or pharisaic optimism, to set our shoulders to the wheel and to do what we can to rehabilitate what has been, what ought to be if we are to remain prosperous, a great measure and medium of exchange in the civilised world—namely, that silver which has been always associated with gold in carrying on the commerce of mankind.

said that, although there was much in the speech of the right hon. Member for Sleaford (Mr. Chaplin) in which he did not concur, he could not fail to recognise that the great change made in the currency of India was a matter which to a great extent affected the trade of India and also that of this country; and they were anxious to know the intentions of the Government, with reference to which there still remained a considerable amount of doubt. Whether we agreed with it or differed from it, no one could deny that the Report of Lord Herschell's Committee was a very able and interesting document; and if he ventured on some points to differ from the eminent men who constituted that Committee, it was with the greatest diffidence and hesitation. Nevertheless, it had not carried conviction to his mind. In the change which they had recommended in the Indian currency, they seemed to have been much influenced by the experience of France. He could not, however, think that their description of the Freuch currency was correct. They said—

"Here is a currency winch, for all practical purposes, appears to be perfectly sound and satisfactory, but which differs from our own in most important particulars. It is sometimes called étalon baiteux, or limping standard; hut, inasmuch as the Mint is open to gold and closed to silver, the standard is really gold, whilst a very large proportion of the currency is either inconvertible silver or notes payable (at the option of the bank) in silver or gold, maintained without difficulty at the above-mentioned artificial ratio."

It could not surely be called either a satisfactory currency or a gold standard. If they took bills on Paris they were paid in 5 f. pieces. If they had Bank of France notes, the Bank could legally pay them, and did practically pay them, in silver. Theoretically, no doubt, they could take gold to the French Mint and have it coined; but if they did they would lose money, and therefore naturally nobody did. The power of taking gold to the Mint and having it coined was, therefore, no real privilege, and the French standard was not, in reality or practice, a gold standard. It might be asked, then, why are not the gold coins exported; but it must be remembered, firstly, that they could not go to the bank and demand coin; secondly, that it was much below its full weight; and, thirdly, because the amount was limited. To all intents and purposes, then, the French standard was a silver standard. Nor did it seem to him that the Committee fully considered the alternative suggestions which had been made. For instance, the proposal to impose a duty on silver, which appeared to some preferable to the closing of the Mint, was dismissed in a sentence, because they said that, taking the average amount of coinage, it would only produce annually Rx. 600,000, which would not balance the Budget. But it was obvious that it would gradually raise the value of the rupee 10 per cent. The course proposed had raised the rupee from a shade under Is. 3d. to nearly 1s. 4d., or just under 8 per cent. An Import Duty of 10 per cent., in addition to the profit on coinage, would have gradually raised the Rupee 10 per cent., and would therefore have given the Government an increase slightly greater than the present arrangement. In fact, the Committee at the moment forgot the effect it would have on the Exchanges. The suggestion of an Import Duty would have been preferable to the present plan in two other ways. In the first place, it would not have affected the value of silver ornaments, which the natives of India had always regarded as a reserve in times of need. They would retain their equality with rupees. This would be a great advantage, and he was not free from some apprehension as to the effect which might be produced on the native mind, when they found that the Government had taken a step which would lower the value of all their uncoined silver in relation to rupees. The second advantage would be as regards the Mints of Native States. The Committee and the Indian Government treated this matter very lightly, and he hoped they might be right; but, at any rate, the question would not have arisen under the plan of an Import Duty. But what were the intentions of Government? They had entirely failed to elicit any clear or consistent statement. The Prime Minister stated on June 26 that the Government intended to introduce a gold standard into India. A few days ago the Under Secretary told him that the Government did not intend to alter the present law, under which rupees were a legal tender to any extent. In reply to another question on the 21st, the Prime Minister stated that they did not at present intend to issue gold against rupees. Well, then, if they left rupees as a legal tender to any extent, and did not intend to undertake to issue gold against rupees, in what sense did they mean to introduce a gold standard? He put that question to the Under Secretary for India, who, however, gave no answer—that was to say, none of his own; but he gave a reference to a speech by Sir David Barbour, the Finance Minister of India. Now, unfortunately, Sir D. Barbour was no clearer in his statements than the Government in this House. In his speech on the introduction of the Bill, Sir David Barbour said—

"I now move for leave to introduce the Bill, which is intended to amend the Indian Coinage Act, 1870, and the Indian Paper Currency Act, 1882, with the object of altering the Indian monetary standard from silver to gold. It is not intended to do more at present than stop the free coinage of silver at the Indian Mints, and, as a provisional arrangement, to provide for the issue of rupees at those Mints in exchange for gold at the rate of 1s. 4d. per rupee. The making gold coins legal tender, the settlement of the permanent rate of exchange between gold and the silver rupee, and the other measures necessary for the final and effective establishment of a gold standard in India, will be provided for by future legislation and in the light of future experience."

Sir David Barbour, in the Memorandum which he issued, said that—

"For the purpose of introducing a gold standard into India we might stop the free coinage of silver, adopt measures for accumulating a store of gold, and when what was considered a sufficient stock of gold had been obtained, we might open the Mints to the free coinage of gold, make gold coins legal tender, and guarantee, by means of our accumulated stock of gold, the exchangeability of silver for gold coins according to their face values."

That was what he understood was the intention of the Indian Government, and it was quite contrary to the statement made by the Prime Minister that they did not intend to undertake to give gold value for rupees.

Not at present.

Then do they intend to give a gold value for rupees?

Only under such conditions as are mentioned in the very words from which my right hon. Friend is quoting.

But this is what Sir David Barbour said in his Memorandum—

"I do not recommend this plan. The accumulation of a sufficient store of gold would be a measure too expensive for a country situated as India is, and when it had been accumulated and the exchangeability of the silver coins for gold coins had been guaranteed by means of it, there would be a very great risk of the whole stock of gold being drawn away in exchange for silver rupees. If this should happen—and I think it would happen, unless our stock of gold was very large indeed—the gold standard would cease to exist, and we should find ourselves exactly where we started."

Had Sir David Barbour entirely altered the opinion which he expressed in his own Memorandum? He wished to ascertain where they were. He thought that any undertaking to give gold for rupees would be open to two grave objections. In the first place, it would be a tremendous liability for India. The amount of rupees in existence could not be determined with any approach to accuracy. They were estimated in the evidence before Lord Herschell's Committee as certainly amounting to £200,000,000, and very possibly to £300,000,000. Now, suppose that the rupee rose to 1s. 4d., and the Government undertook to give gold for rupees at that price. Then, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had told them over and over again, they could not foresee what the production of silver would be, and it was quite possible that they might have a very great production of silver which might alter the relations between gold and silver, and the contingency foreseen by Sir David Barbour might arise. Suppose, then, that the output of silver increased, and the ratio fell! This was not so very improbable; and if it did happen, the consequences to Indian finance would be absolutely ruinous, and the future state of the Indian Government would be far worse than the position in which they now found themselves. There was another very strong objection. Lord Herschell's Committee pointed out that—

"There is still another element to be considered. If the effect of the proposal of the Indian Government were sooner or later to cause a demand for gold in India which does not now exist, it might raise the value of gold as against all other things, including silver. In other words, the gold price of silver might be still further diminished."

The increased demand for gold would not be confined to its use as coin, but also, in Sir avid Barbour's opinion, for hoarding also.

"It is very probable," says the Report, "however, that the substitution of a gold standard for a silver standard would lead to an increased rise of gold instead of silver for hoarding."

This must tend to raise the value of gold, and he wished to ascertain what were the intentions of Her Majesty's Government in this matter. Were they really going to undertake the tremendous liability of undertaking to give gold for rupees? He sincerely hoped that they would pause before they came to any such determination as that. There were some who seemed to think that monometallists advocated the use of gold, and gold only. That was not so. He was a mono-metallist, but he had always been of opinion that it would be a misfortune if the use of silver were to be abandoned for the purposes of currency. Individually, he did not believe in the great appreciation of gold which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sleaford believed to have taken place. At the same time, he did consider that so great a demand as would result from the adoption of a gold standard by India would tend to raise the value of gold, and consequently to decrease prices. This would be a serious matter. India, no doubt, was fully entitled to arrange her currency with reference to her wants; but such a course would, in his judgment, be injurious to England, and still more so to India. He did not desire to occupy the time of the House by going fully info the effect which would follow from the adoption by India of a gold standard; but he hoped if any such step should be contemplated, considering the momentous results which would follow, the House would be given an opportunity of considering the question. He did not wish to put any difficulty in the way of the Government, or to embarrass them in any way, because it was too grave a subject to the trade and commerce of this country to be made any question of Party. But what he was endeavouring to do was to impress upon the Government that to undertake to give gold for rupees would be a most tremendous liability, and one which he thought they ought not to undertake. Changes in currency were very undesirable, and, although he did not think the step that had been taken was altogether a wise one, still, under the circumstances, he thought the best course they could adopt now was to allow what had been done to remain, and see how it worked. But he hoped that the Government would not undertake to introduce a gold standard into India in the sense in which he understood the gold standard; and if it were really proposed to carry out the suggestions contained in Sir David Barbour's speech in introducing the present Bill, he hoped the Government, before finally agreeing to any such step—which would have very grave consequences—would give the House the opportunity of considering the matter and of expressing their views upon it.

did not wish to detain the House, but desired, on behalf of several of those who sat on his side of the House—supporters of the Government—to state that they regarded with great sympathy, and generally concurred in, the views put forward by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. A. J. Balfour). They believed, with him, that the action taken by the Indian Government was, if a necessary, a very unfortunate evil. Some of them foresaw as long as 20 years ago that this would be the effect of the demonetisation of silver by several European nations. They saw perfectly well that the revolutionary movement could not stop there, and they also saw that it would bring immense misfortunes upon the trade and commerce of the world. It had brought those great misfortunes as they all knew; that 15 of the last 20 years had been years of great depression, which had brought great pressure upon the industrial and working classes, and really transferred a large portion of the capital of this country most unjustly from the hard-working classes to the money-lending classes. It had greatly added to the weight of public burdens and of private debts. All these evils had resulted from the demonetisation of silver and the inevitable appreciation of gold. The Indian Government have now taken the course of closing its Mints to silver, and thereby greatly reduced the value of that metal. The American Government would most probably repeal the Sherman Act, and there would again be a further immense fall in the value of silver until, probably next year, it would be only 2s. an ounce. The effect of that would be to place the nations of Europe and of America, which still retained a very large amount of silver in circulation as a full standard in exchange, in an awkward and dangerous condition. he had one practical suggestion to make, which was this that if there should arise among the nations of the world an agreement that this intolerable state of things could not be continued, and there should be a determination to re-erect the old bimetallic system which existed almost everywhere at the beginning of this century—he said that should such a movement take place in the course of a year or two now, they could offer these nations the certain advantage, on condition of the establishment of bimetallism throughout the world, of opening the Mints of India to the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 1s. 4d. per rupee. He believed it was impossible to go back to the old ratio. Bimetallists must make up their minds to 1s. 4d. to the rupee. If they could offer to do that; if all other countries would do the same—England to retain its present gold standard—it would be a great advantage to all other countries, and might prevent a very serious state of affairs.

I must congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for the London University (Sir J. Lubbock) on having devoted the whole of his speech to the question immediately before us, which can scarcely be said of the distinguished Members who have initiated and conducted the discussion. We had a Motion made to call attention to the action of the Indian Government, supported by the Government at home. We wandered from a discussion of that question into the general question of bimetallism, and into the question of the conduct and transactions of the Brussels Conference. Later on the Debate threatened to circle about the small issue of my personal con- sistency. In what I have to say I shall confine myself, I hope, almost entirely to the matter which has been immediately brought under the consideration of the House. Perhaps I may be allowed to make one or two preliminary observations before entering upon a discussion and examination of the criticisms made upon the Report of Lord Herschell's Committee; and I must, before saying anything more, express my regret that this subject was introduced—unavoidably perhaps—without any kind of notice to those who are intimately concerned in it, so that it was not until about half-au-hour before it was brought on that I knew there was any intention whatever to open an attack on the Committee upon its conclusions, and of course I had no opportunity whatever of consulting my fellow-Members of the Committee. I think the House will pardon me for a moment if I say a word or two upon this question of personal consistency or inconsistency. It is worth while recalling to the House that out of 12 Members of the Gold and Silver Committee, although we were divided into six to six, as to the practical action to be approved we were unanimous, with the exception of two doubtful dissentients, upon the possibility of maintaining an International ratio between gold and silver. Ten were distinct, and the other two only wavering in their allegiance, that bimetallism was a system which could be introduced and maintained, and that if a fit ratio were selected there would be reasonable hope of its being continued and upheld, and the transactions of the world could be conducted on the ratio so agreed upon. That was the conclusion of at least 10 out of 12, and I may say some of the most stalwart Members of the monometallic six, who were in favour of maintaining our gold standard without any alteration, are still unhesitating in their adherence to the conclusion which we laid down at that time, that the bimetallic system could be maintained, and the only question was whether it was prudent or imprudent to adopt it. That was my position when I signed with the other five Members the Report which discouraged any change of our system. A change is a very serious thing. It is a serious thing in itself, and I think it is still more serious in the effect it must have upon the minds and consciences of men. The alteration is one by which, although, in fact, you might fulfil a promise in its truest sense by payment in an altered medium, still it is an alteration which must shock many persons and be difficult to understand, and is likely to interfere with the rectitude and constancy of the public conscience. At the time I signed the Report of those who discouraged any alteration, I was hopeful—although there was appreciation of gold—that that appreciation might be stayed, and, at all events, I thought we had better wait before countenancing any alteration. Subsequent reflection showed me that there was conclusive proof that there had been, I will not say an appreciation of gold to the extent suggested by the right hon. Member for Sleaford (Mr. Chaplin), but a very serious appreciation of gold which has had a very considerable effect upon the social, economic, and industrial condition of this Kingdom—a fact that deserves the most serious attention of all persons concerned in the government of this country. Now, Sir, with respect to the immediate subject before us, we, the Members of Lord Herschell's Committee, had a very limited task confided to us. We were handed over a certain proposal made by the Indian Government, and asked on the part of the Home Government to say—

"Is there sufficient reason why we should not assent to these proposals of the Indian Government? And if you think they should be assented to with a difference, tell us what the difference is which you suggest should be introduced into their plans?"

We were entirely debarred from going outside the question of considering the particular plan; and my noble Friend Lord Farrer and Sir Reginald Welby made an addition to our final Report, in which they called attention to the limitation of the issue submitted to our consideration, and stated that in consequence of that limitation they had not entered upon the examination of questions that otherwise might have occupied our attention. I also, in an additional note, called attention to the limitation, and I took occasion very briefly to say I thought, although bound by that, that our examination of the real issue was very imperfect in consequence of our examination being so limited; be- cause it appeared to me if we were really to examine the whole question as trustees, guardians, and controllers of the Government of India, we should not only examine the plan which the Government of India submitted to our consideration, but we were also bound to take into consideration any action of our own which interfered with a freer choice on the part of the Government of India, so that if our action interfered with what might be a benefit to the Government of India we should reconsider that action. It has been confessed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that what the Government of India proposed to us for examination was by no moans their first choice. If they could have had any kind of hope of obtaining from the Government at home any prospect whatever of the consideration of a bimetallic agreement that was what they would desire. That was what they urged again and again, and it was only when they wore reduced to what we may call practically a state of despair that they fell back on the plan submitted to us, and they said—"Since you will not accede to what we desire, then let us take some other action." As the Government, at home is specially charged with the care and surveillance of what is done in India, they should feel no desire to shirk that which India itself desires; and if they will reconsider the evidence before them, and the opinions and dispositions of other Governments and of other nations, I think they will have reason to believe they are the main substantial obstacles to doing something which would more strictly meet what we know to be the desire of the Indian Government. Putting that aside, the Committee had to consider whether the scheme submitted by the Indian Government was practicable, and whether, if practicable in its essence, they could mould its form in any way so as to remove any objections which might apply to it in its orignal shape. The proposal was simply this: to stop the free coinage of silver, and, if necessary, to reduce the amount of that coin in circulation so as to bring the rupee to boar a strict relation to the value of a sovereign. They suggested that that could be done, in the first place, by refusing the free coinage of silver and limiting the quantity in circulation, and also by admitting the sovereign as a legal tender, or receiving it at the Treasury as the equivalent to a certain number of rupees—giving rupees in exchange for gold, hut not giving gold in exchange for rupees. The argument of the Indian Government was that if you go on reducing the stock of rupees in circulation, you will bring up the value of the individual rupee, so that in the end you may make 10 rupees worth no more than a sovereign, and persons will be willing to come—if you make that an operation of trade—and give a sovereign, receiving 10rupees in exchange. I do not say the Indian Government proposed to screw up the rupee to this extent; I am only stating their principle broadly, so as to be better understood. Some hon. Members will think it an extravagant supposition that you could by any possibility bring about such a state of things as would make the rupee again worth 2s, and so restrict the circulation of the rupee as to bring it up to the gold standard. Whether practicable or not we did, in our consideration of the question, lay it down as a guiding principle and idea of our Report and of action which would be taken upon it that we would do as little as possible to disturb the present value of the rupee. We said, in effect, we will not screw it up to a greater value, much less screw it up to 2s.; but we will, if possible, take it where it is and stereotype its actual value at the moment. And that was practically what we proposed. We assented to the proposal that the Government should stop the mintage of rupees at once; and if they were willing to exchange rupees for sovereigns at the rate of 15 rupees to the sovereign they could afterwards, if necessary, reduce the stock of rupees so that the rupee would come up to 1s. 4d. Experience justifies those conclusions. France has got an enormous gold and silver circulation, but the minting of silver has been stopped there. There is an enormous silver circulation in France, and yet there is practically no depreciation in the franc. Twenty-five francs are still equal to one sovereign, and the relation of the franc to gold is kept up in spite of the enormous quantity of silver by the stoppage of the free coinage of silver. You cannot get in France, as a matter of right, gold in exchange for silver. You must go and ask for it, and you may have to give a small premium in order to get it; but gold and silver do circulate together without any trace of a discount of the one in relation to the other. We believe that can be done in India which has been done in France. It has also been done in Holland and in her Batavian Colonies. There the circumstances are identical with the circumstances of India, though the area is less and the transactions and proportions of currency smaller. The Dutch guilder circulates in the Dutch East Indies as an article of value at a fixed relation to gold simply because the Dutch have stopped the coinage of guilders in order to keep silver at that fixed value. This experiment is now to be tried in India, and I deprecate any conclusions being prematurely drawn as to what the result will be. Of course, it has a great effect upon men's minds; and for a little time some people lost their heads, the value of things went down, and the markets became entirely dis-organised. Such things will occur. They throw little light on the ultimate settlement. I am rather surprised that the rupee has already got so near 1s. 4d.; but allow time to pass so as to permit the stock of coined silver to diminish, and it will assuredly work up to 1s. 4d., just as it has done in France and Holland. I think the proposals of the Committee are not open to the grave charges that have been made against them by the right hon. Member for Sleaford, for they have left things as they were, although they have, undoubtedly, prevented a further depreciation in the rupee. With regard to the immense amount of uncoined silver in British India, upon which the right hon. Gentleman has dwelt, the statements that are made from time to time do not appear to be capable of exact verification. But we had some facts before us that could be verified, and which seemed to point to this conclusion—that the silver which has been pouring into India for so many years has not remained there in the form of uncoined silver, but has passed into the Mints, and that the hoards, apart from personal ornaments—which, no doubt, are considerable—have been and are hoards of coined money. In fact, the hoards which were discovered at the death of two or three great Indian Princes were coined and not uncoined metal; and the value of these will, of course, not he affected by the action the Government has taken. Some figures given in the Report are very instructive, and much more important than the vague estimates put forward by witnesses, and referred to by the right hon. Member for Sleaford. I have now before me a statement of the imports and exports of silver into British India from 1870 to 1893, arranged in quinquennial periods. The statement also gives the amount of coined silver. The first quinquonium shows that the net silver imports were valued at 3,063,000tens of rupees, and the amount coined was Rx.2,931,000, nearly the same amount. In the next quinquennium the net imports of silver were Rx7,000,000, the amount coined Rx.8,490,000. And so I might go on. But the total result for that period is that the net imports of silver were Rx.165,000,000, and the amount coined Rx.152,500,000. Therefore, by far the greater part of the silver poured into India has gone into the Mints and come out in the form of coined rupees, which will not be subject to depreciation, but to appreciation, for, as the currency is contracted, the rupee will go up. The right hon. Member for the University of London favours a plan of import duty. We have no doubt an affection for our own offspring. It was proposed by him in the form of a fixed percentage ad valorem on silver imported into India. That, no doubt, would have the effect of adding a certain percentage to the value of silver in British India; but it would leave altogether untouched the range of variations between silver and gold. They would go up and down as they do now, and the ratio of variation between the two would be subject to continual alteration. What is intended and desired is to have a steadiness of relations between them, and that cannot possibly be secured by the proposal of my right hon. Friend. There is another plan which is extremely ingenious, and which altogether avoids any interference with the internal stock of silver in India, and for which something may be said. It is the plan that silver should be freely received at the Mints from day to day, but subject always to a variation of issue, so that the amount of rupees given out in exchange for the new silver brought in would be reduced in order that the rupees given out should always be of the same value in relation to gold. There must be a constant variation in the seniorage on the silver in order to attain that object. If the silver fell to one-half of its former value, the rupees given out would be one-half the number formerly given out. This is a scheme which requires much care, and, in effect, it would only bring about precisely what is to be brought about by the scheme which we thought we could not recommend the Government to withhold its assent from—that—namely, to give to the coined rupee a fixed although an artificial value in relation to gold. My right hon. Friend the Member for East Manchester (Mr. A. J. Balfour), who delivered a speech of extreme lucidity on the subject, spoke of the present situation of the silver currency in India as one quite unparalleled. Now, it is really not unparalleled, inasmuch as that there is something very like it in the situation, not merely of the currency of Holland, but of France. The value of the 5-franc piece in France is not determined by that amount of silver in that piece. It bears an artificial value through the limitation and stoppage of the coinage of silver in France. Nor do I think he himself has prescribed exactly the limits within which this variation will work. Of course, the upper limit is the limit of 1s. 4d. The lower limit would be defined, of course, by the value of raw silver itself. If the Indian Government surreptitiously and secretly took to coining rupees, that would entirely defeat what is the object of that Government. They would get a little gain from that coinage, no doubt; but their desire is to screw up the rupee in order that their rents may be maintained—that their revenue may not fail would be entirely defeated; and you, therefore, have the best possible guarantee that they will not do anything to depreciate the rupee. The superior amount is 1s. 4d., and the inferior amount is the price of the rupee at the time of the stoppage of the Mints to free coinage; and it will gradually pass from that limit, say, 1s. 3d., by the reduction of the quantity in circulation, until it comes up to Is. Id. When it conies up to 1s. 4d. the circulation will become automatic; for then it would be worth while for the Government to buy silver and coin rupees, since it would be worth while for people to bring gold sovereigns and exchange them for rupees so coined. You secure a gold standard by that process, because you have the rupee brought to an artificial fixed relation to gold, and gold to rupees. Well, Sir, I have only one more observation to make. There is one question demanding the attention of the House—namely, how far the money transactions of the world should be attached to one metal, even if that metal has not appreciated; but that question was not before us. The Currency Committee had no choice—they were compelled to answer the question put before them, and in answering it I take leave to say they took precautions to avoid the difficulties pointed out by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sleaford, and indicated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for London University (Sir J. Lubbock).

said, he thought there was one fallacy into which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bodmin had fallen, and that was in saying the course recommended by the Committee had only kept things where they were, and could be said not to aggravate the evil. It was perfectly true that it had kept the rupee from falling; but the mischief from which trade was suffering was not the depreciation of the rupee, but of silver, and that depreciation had been very much aggravated by the action of the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer complained of time being occupied on this matter for Party purposes to keep them from more important matters. ["Hoar, hear!"] He saw that another right hon. Gentleman who had not been present during the Debate took advantage of that remark of his. ["Question!"] He imagined that this was very much to the question. It was very much to the question whether or not this was a matter of as great importance as the giving of Home Rule to Ireland. He considered, speaking now not as a Party man at all, hut as a merchant, that it was of more importance to a large number of his constituents and others in this country who had placed their investments in silver-using countries, and who constantly found their property immensely depreciated by the action of this Government. Moreover, when they were blamed for bringing forward this question, let it be remembered that they never had an opportunity of expressing their opinion on this action before it was taken. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a speech of considerable duration, did not touch the points raised by the right, hon. Member for Sleaford against this measure. Let him remind the House again of some of these objections. One of them was that it would establish a false system of coinage in India. Not a word was said by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in defence of that course. It was perfectly true that when the Leader of the Opposition said that such a course was unfortunate he said "No, no!" but in a speech of three-quarters of an hour, when he had an opportunity of saying whether or not it was unfortunate, he did not touch that question for a moment. Then let them take another point—the injury to the people of India who had hoards of uncoined silver or silver ornaments. That was a point which was touched upon by the right hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Courtney), who said that the bulk of the hoards of the Prince of Scinde or other Princes was found to be not uncoined but rupees, and that, consequently, such a hoard would not be affected in any way by the passing of this measure. But he would remind the right hon. Gentleman that those of them who believed that there was a large amount of hoards of uncoined silver in India believed that these were the hoards of the peasantry of India represented by the ornaments worn by their wives and children; and, consequently, that what was the case with large Indian Potentates would not really disprove what were believed to be the practices of the peasantry and common people of the country. Then there was the question of trade. People who had placed their investments in silver-using countries had suddenly found their property immensely depreciated by the action of Her Majesty's Government, and very serious injury had, at the same time, been done to the trade of the country. Another point to which the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was called, but which he did not deal with, was the aggravation which would be caused in the general scramble for gold. It was perfectly true that there would be no attempt on the part of the Indian Government to form a reserve of gold; but it was equally true that their action tended still further to depre- ciate silver, and to do away with silver as currency. Ought they not to consider whether the Sherman Act would be injurious or the reverse to this country? However strong an admirer one might be of a system, he would say that it was undesirable for one nation to inflict injury upon another as regarded silver. There certainly seemed to him to be one advantage, and one only, which had accrued from the action of the Indian Government, and that was that it had proved conclusively the extent to which the value of metals depended upon their use as currency. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had jeered at them, and said they should not be so angry were it not that they knew that this was the deathblow to bimetallism. But bimetallists themselves did not think so. He saw a bimetallist opposite him—a supporter of the right hon. Gentleman—who agreed with him entirely in saving that this proved the cardinal proposition advanced by bimetallists, that gold and silver differed from every other commodity in this: that their value must be artificial because their value depended on the action of the law in issuing them, or not issuing them, as currency. Therefore, the objection to this matter was not because it gave a blow to bimetallists, but because it had all the disadvantages urged against bimetallism, rightly or wrongly, and lacked the stability which would be gained by International concord. He would not further detain the House, but he was sure the Chancellor of the Exchequer would agree with him that one who was engaged himself in commerce and had an hereditary interest in this question had a, right to say a few words, however imperfectly he might express himself on the subject. He did not mean to suggest that the Government had any malignant intention of robbing the people of India. He recognised that they had acted at the request of the Indian Government; but he held they were not doing it at the wish of the Indian Government, any more than they could say that a condemned man who had the choice given him of being hanged or shot and chose the latter method "wished to be shot." The Indian Government saw they were going to be bankrupt if they did not take action; they knew that our Government would not allow them to take the measures which they believed would be for their advantage—which had been pointed out by Sir David Barbour—they saw they were between the devil and the deep sea, and they chose the deep sea.

I hope the House will pardon mo in uttering a few words on the great question before it. I think the House has not for many years past discussed a matter so pregnant with great consequences as that we are now considering. Undoubtedly it is a misfortune that in order to bring the subject forward we have had to interfere with another great and interesting discussion; but I am one of those who think that this matter is of even greater importance than Home Rule. At any rate, our discussion on the subject now is opportune, because the Parliament of America has just re-assembled for the purpose, almost the exclusive purpose, of considering the same important question. And we know that in India there is the keenest interest felt as to what will be the ultimate result of the clauses proposed to be introduced there. Both the East and the West are wrestling at the same time with this great currency problem. I can imagine no subject more suitable for Parliament to have the opportunity of expressing its opinion upon than this. It was with the greatest amazement that I hoard of the measures which the Government had consented to and sanctioned with regard to India. They contain three propositions. The first is to tamper with the currency; the second is, in some rough kind of way, to fix the ratio between the two precious metals, or, at any rate, between the rupee and the sovereign, and, in the third place, they propose to do this by means of the most artificial character, resting upon no solid principle—no principle of finality, and no principle, so far as I know, that has ever been recognised and applied in any civilised State in the world before. And if I was amazed at the proposals, I was still more amazed at the source from which they came. It is within the recollection of the House that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, not many months ago, held up his hands in pious horror at the bare idea of tampering with the currency, and mocked at the idea of artificially raising the value of silver, and still more at the idea of giving a ratio. But now the Government of which he is the financial head has come forward and proposed to do these very things. I do not know where to turn for an instance of grosser inconsistency. The action of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the one hand, and his recent utterances with regard to this matter on the other, are in extremest opposition. What is it that the Government propose to do? They propose to tamper with the currency, and for the purpose of their experiment they have chosen a nation six times as populous as our own, and a helpless nation—a nation which is dependent upon us, which has not an articulate voice to speak for itself. It is proposed in this wild and reckless experiment to contract their currency. If Hon. Gentlemen marked the description of the proposed new system which was given by the right hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Courtney), they would notice that he dwelt again and again on the fact that the essence of this system is to contract the currency—to artificially lessen the number of rupees, the ordinary circulating medium, and the standard money of the people of India. I have read the Report of the Currency Commission, and I notice that they say that in India the rupee has shown signs of redundancy. What does that mean? The real meaning of it is that the poor ryot toiling in the burning sun to earn the rupees with which to pay the landowner, and the Government tax, and the money lenders, is getting his rupees a little too easily. They do not cost him toil enough, so the Government, has interfered to increase his difficulty in obtaining the money without which he cannot pay his way. The Government, with heartless and almost incredible cruelty, are deliberately going to increase the ryot's difficulty in obtaining his rupees, and to depreciate the value of his produce. Every rupee the unfortunate tiller in that country obtains with which to pay his way he has to buy, and to buy with his labour; he is not born with silver rupees in his mouth, but only with hands and arms with which to labour for them. And now a Liberal Government, of all Governments, has interfered and tampered with these poor and helpless people's money in a way which will increase the toil they will have to give to procure the means of paying their debts and rent and taxes. Besides that, the uncoined silver which some of them hold— which, whatever be the exact amount, is unquestionably a very large quantity—is also artificially depreciated in its money value by the same change; and the produce of the fields, the great wealth of India, is to be depreciated in price by the arbitrary limitation of the number of rupees. What is now proposed in India may do something to lessen the difference between the sovereign-using and the rupee-using countries; but it will create a new chasm between China and other countries where the rupee is not legal tender but silver is. The Indian people, who, by the plentiful supply of silver, have been spared, during the last 20 years, many miseries which England has been going through while gold has been appreciating, will now have all the difficulties of an appreciating standard artificially imposed upon them. I think it is a grave responsibility for the Government to treat them thus; and it is monstrously inconsistent for a Government which does not believe in artificial changes of values, or in any tampering with the currency, to introduce a mighty change like this, which opens a new train of evils such as these I have described. To my mind what is even more astonishing is that this enormous change—the ultimate issue of which no man can foresee—has been made with out consulting Parliament, though Parliament was sitting at that very time, and we all know that this Parliament contains many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who thoroughly understand monetary questions and the enormous importance of making changes in the standard of value. It astonishes me that this should have been done without giving them an opportunity of expressing their opinion, and of assisting the Government by their counsel and advice. In dealing with the unquestioned difficulty in which India was placed the Government have rushed headlong into this mad and rash change, which has plunged the monetary world into confusion, and may lead to the very gravest world-wide disasters. I think their conduct is worthy of the severest reprobation. Now let me turn for a moment to the effect that this change will have in gold standard countries. The great economical fact of the last 15 years, as will be more clearly realised as years go by, has been the steady appreciation of gold. As Lord Beaconsfield said in 1879—"Gold is appreciating every day, and as it appreciates the lower become prices. "Anybody who measures the value of gold by commodities will find that gold has appreciated 50 per cent. since then, and all the facts in our experience during recent years confirm the fact that gold is rising in value. It is owing to this that those who possess mortgaged land or houses find the mortgage steadily swallowing up the whole of the property. Many who have got a long lease of farms, &c, and have so agreed to pay yearly a certain amount of money, have found the value of gold mounting up so, and the value of produce going down so, that they have not been able to pay their rents, and have been broken. The Irish farmers have found this with their Court-fixed rents, fixed for 15 years. And they now have to face a still greater danger; they are buying the land and entering into a contract to pay a certain amount of gold yearly for 49 years. If the appreciation of gold goes on, the inevitable effect will be that the value of produce will become so low that the arrangement will break down through the inability of the buyer to pay, as Archbishop Walsh has clearly pointed out in a recent pamphlet. This action of the Government in regard to Indian currency can have no other effect in regard to gold than to increase its appreciation, from which we have already suffered such grievous effects. It appears to me that the Government cannot understand what they are doing. They have struck a terrible blow at the poor farmer in the East with one hand, increasing his difficulties and lowering the value of his produce, and with the other they smite in the same way the fanners in the West and in our Colonies, who are surrounded by sufficient difficulties already. I am very glad to have had an opportunity of saying a word or two upon this question; and I do hope that the gentlemen who sit on these Benches, below and around me, will incorporate along with their political objects the all-important one of removing all restrictions from our Mints, and so relieving the agricultural and other toilers of the realm. The Prime Minister has been identified with many great reforms; and if he could only be got to discern the fact that our standard of value is no longer a fixed and steady one, but an instrument cruelly and increasingly op- pressive to the debtor and almost equally hurtful to the producer, and would try to bring about a re-marriage of King Gold and Queen Silver, who together reigned so long over the nations of the earth, he would, I am sure, be doing something which would be to the great and lasting benefit of all mankind. I hope the Government will reconsider the course they have taken with regard to India, and will include in their enlightened advocacy of the principle of Free Trade the no less important principle of free Mints.

I wish to offer a few observations. What was the first necessity from which this agitation began? That there ought to be a gold currency or a stoppage of coinage. There are two considerations, and India has one peculiar consideration, and that is that it has to remit to this country, whether rightly or wrongly, a certain sum of money yearly—namely, £19,000,000 in gold. Whatever you make of silver in India, as far as the people of India are concerned, they do not benefit in the slightest way in the remittances to this country, because they have to remit a certain quantity of produce, which ought to be able to provide £19,000,000 worth of gold in order to pay for the Home charges. Therefore, any effort made of changing or tampering with the currency, or any other plan devised, will have no effect whatever on the necessity of sending a certain quantity of produce according to the price of gold. If gold rises in value, they (the Indian people) will have to send so much more produce; if it falls, they will have to send so much the less, be the proportion of silver what it may in India. In that respect the argument, and the principal argument, held out by the currency people and those who advocated the restriction of silver coinage—namely, that it would be a benefit to the people in India to restrict the coinage—is not borne out by the facts. Nothing of the kind will happen; the people of India will have to send a certain quantity of produce in accordance with the price of gold. So far, therefore, the unique political position of India, which has caused all this difficulty and the embarrassing of the Indian Government, is not in the slightest way improved by the plan the Government have adopted. The agitation began from the loss that the Europeans in India began to suffer for their remittances to this country. No such agitation arose between China and England, or any other country which had not to make any compulsory and political remittances in gold. The original agitation in favour of the appreciation of silver began with the European servants, who desired to have some change in order that they should receive some higher exchange for their remittances than the value of silver allowed. Now, on that point the Government of India made up its mind. The Government of India wanted to give some higher or fixed exchange to the Indian officials for their own remittances only. Now, that was bad enough, and from this place I have complained of that. The Government of India have not paid the slightest consideration to the effect it would have on the people of India. But what is the result of the new arrangement? Here is a rupee artificially made worth 1s. 4d., whereas its real worth may be 1s., 1s. 1d., or 1s. 2d. The change, or whatever the difference will be, is not merely a gain to these Indian officials for that portion of their salaries which they have to remit to this country, but it is an advancement of their whole salary. And not only all the Europeans, but all the native servants, have a higher value rupee paid for their salary in place of that which financially the price of silver would admit. The result is, therefore, that this would-be remedy is a pure loss to the unfortunate taxpayer of India, for he will have to find so many more valuable rupees in order to pay every servant so much more than his salary is. Suppose my salary is worth 100 rupees, I would receive 100 rupees, the artificial value of which will be 110 rupees. And this will apply to all salaries. In that way, therefore, there would be an extreme disadvantage, and the wretched taxpayer will have to find the difference. Next, suppose you take a man who has to pay an assessment of 10 rupees, and to pay those 10 rupees to the Government he has to sell part of his produce. Now, in order to pay the now 10 rupees, he will have to part with 10 to 16 per cent, more produce than he formerly did. In every way, therefore, it is the taxpayer that has to suffer the loss arising from the mistake that the Government have made in adopt- ing this policy. The Government is fortunate in one respect: that the injury that will be done through their plans has been, to a certain extent, modified by what is now happening in America, as many mines have been shut up. In America now there is also a chance of abolishing the Sherman Act, and the result of that will be, of course, a fall in the price of silver. But, on the other hand, if the repeal of the Sherman Act stops the American miners from working their mines, that will save India from the mischief. Our fate depends on the action of the United States. You may bring forth any quantity of abstract argument on one side or the other. The common sense of the matter is that the plan now adopted will simply be an addition to the burdens of the taxpayer; and unless it fortunately happens that the price of silver rises by reduction in its production the future of the Indian taxpayer will be certainly very terrible indeed. I want to say that the chief defect of this plan is that it was not necessary at all; that even from the Government point of view it was not necessary; but that as the plan is taken the whole effect of it is that the Indian taxpayer will have to suffer a great deal of loss in order to carry it out, unless he is saved by the rise in the price of silver. There are many fallacies running about—we heard one from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sleaford (Mr. Chaplin)—to the effect that the balance of trade is in favour of India, and that fallacy has done more mischief and harm to India than any other thing. I cannot now enter into a discussion of it, but I hope to be able to show some time that nothing is further from the fact than to suppose there is a balance of trade in favour of India. I do not want to take up more time, but I want to sum up that the result of the present system will be that the burden of taxation upon the people of India will be very largely increased, unless the silver kings of the United States diminish their production of silver, and allow the price of silver to rise. But all these artificial methods adopted by Government for raising the price of silver will only complicate the currency; and that the Front Bench should be ready to defend a tampering with the currency in India is, to my mind, a very sad thing. I will make just one remark with reference to the position of India in connection with the Front Bench. India under the Crown, in her relations with the Governments here, whether Conservative or Liberal, has, in one respect, been very unfortunate as compared with the time of the rule of the Company. When India was ruled by the Company the Company came before the House as before an independent tribunal. Now the Front Bench and the India Office are so much associated and identified that the Front Bench is put in the false position of defending the despotic, secret, and irresponsible India Office in everything they do. The result is, India is not able to get that redress and that independent judgment of an independent tribunal which she got in the time of the Company. This is made much worse by there being no periodical overhauling of the Indian Administration, and the mischief may go on increasing, till, perhaps, a day may come when it is too late to mend. It is of the utmost importance that the affairs of the India Office and the Government of India ought to be examined periodically; for this simple reason: that the House cannot follow the business or events of India from day to day. The House must have special occasions to study and understand Indian affairs, pass judgment upon them, and introduce necessary reforms. Why should not the Front Bench, as an independent body, sit in judgment upon the India Office, instead of always sitting there in defence of the India Office, no matter whether right or wrong? It is a false position, and injurious to India. We believe that the Government have made a great mistake in interfering and tampering with the currency unnecessarily. We know gentlemen on the Front Bench are against such tampering with it; but they are put in a false position, and they have to defend the very thing they would otherwise not defend. There is no reason whatever why the currency of India should be tampered with while the currency of England should not be tampered with. I hope some plan may be devised by which the Government in England may become an independent tribunal in reference to the conduct of the Government of India, and may hold the Indian Government in check, and control them instead of defending them in everything they do. The present system of Indian administration is in several respects very injurious to India, and whatever is injurious to India must and will be injurious to England. The Chancellor of the Exchequer rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

The new clause standing in the name of the lion. Member for Lanark (Mr. Barker Smith) is not in Order, and would more properly come in on Clause 5 as an Amendment.

said, the clause he had to propose—one prescribing the Oath of Allegiance to be taken, or form of affirmation to be made by Members of the Irish Legislature—seemed to him most important, and one which must have been omitted by inadvertence in the hurry of preparing the Bill. It could scarcely be the deliberate purpose of the Government that the Members of the new Assembly should sit and exercise their legislative functions without first taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Sovereign. The Bill commenced by declaring that the new Legislative Body should consist of the Sovereign and two Houses of Legislature, and he believed it was impossible to point to any Legislative Assembly in any part of the world, under the British Crown, in which the Oath of Allegiance was not taken, or an affirmation made. It surely was not necessary for him to argue the abstract question that it was desirable to prescribe such an oath; but he might say that the principle had been adopted in the case of all the Colonies, and he had taken his proposed clause bodily from the Western Australia Act. They had been told over and over again that this new-fangled Constitution for Ireland was formed on the basis of the Colonial Constitutions. He would like to know if the Government objected to the form of the clause, and intended to bring up a different one? In that case he was prepared to leave the matter to them.

We do not intend to bring up a new clause; but we will at the proper time propose an Amendment to one of the existing clauses which will, I think, meet the hon. Member's views. It will be an Amendment to the 29th clause. It may be convenient that I should now explain our view of this new clause. The Government have not, as was suggested by the hon. Member, by inadvertence omitted all reference to this subject. It is by implication dealt with in Clause 29, by which we intend to bring the Irish Legislature under the general law of Parliament in certain particulars. The 29th clause provides that all existing election laws relating to the House of Commons and the Members thereof shall apply, as far as possible, to the two Houses of the Irish Legislature and the Members thereof; while the hon. Member will also find in the Definition Clause in the amended Bill that the expression "election laws" means laws relating to the election of Members to serve in Parliament other than those relating to the qualification of electors, and includes the issue and execution of writs, the dealing with corrupt practices, the disqualification of Members, and the vacating of seats. It may be that the clause, as explained by the Definition Clause, does not entirely and beyond the possibility of mistake express the intention of the Government, and we shall be prepared to meet the object which the hon. Member has in view by inserting in Clause 29 words providing that existing election laws, so far as respects oaths and disqualification of Members, may not be altered by Irish Act. I do not bind myself to the exact words, but I think the hon. Member will see that such a proposal as I have indicated will meet the object he has in view. The hon. Member for South Tyrone (Mr. T. W. Russell) has a new clause of a somewhat similar nature on the Paper, and I think he, too, will perceive that our method will extend to the Irish Legislature the general law of Parliament in relation to these matters, and that it will better carry out the purpose of the hon. Member than the somewhat cumbrous plan which he has adopted. Perhaps, after this explanation, both hon. Members will be prepared to withdraw their proposals.

said, be quite followed the idea of the right hon. Gentleman, but he was bound to point out that his Amendment, while all very well as applying to an existing Parliament, was hardly adapted to the case of a new Legislative Body. In the House of Commons they knew exactly what course was to be followed when a new Parliament met. The first step was the election of the Speaker; the next was to secure the Crown's approval of the choice made, and then Members came to the Table and took the oath. But in the case of the Irish Parliament it was different. There were no customs by which they were to be guided, and it was necessary to decide beforehand who was to administer the oath. At present under the Bill there was no one authorised to do that, and it did not seem to him sufficient, by inserting a few words in a Definition Clause, to place the new Assembly in the position of going through the process which belonged to the historic Parliament of this country. It would certainly be better if by that Bill they prescribed the first step to be taken with regard to the administration of the oath.

If the hon. Member will refer to the Sixth Schedule he will find his own Amendment is anticipated by the provision that the Lord Lieutenant shall make regulations for the adaptation to the new Assembly of the laws and customs of the British Houses of Parliament.

Does the hon. Member withdraw his Motion?

No, Sir.

I quite appreciate the Chief Secretary's explanation; but when the new clause in my name is reached I should like to say one or two words pointing out how the right lion. Gentleman's Amendment does not quite meet the aim we have in view.

asked if the words in Clause 36, as to the disqualification of persons, applied to persons who might be elected to the Irish Parliament, but would be disqualified under our own laws from sitting in the House of Commons?

Order, order! That does not arise on the proposal before the House.

I should like to understand whether it is the intention of the Government to move the insertion in Clause 29 of the words the Chief Secretary has suggested, for if that be so they will cover not only the Amendment of the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Tomlinson), but the Amendment of the hon. Member for South Tyrone (Mr. T. W. Russell), and, therefore, there would be obviously no necessity for my hon. Friend to move this clause.

Under the circumstances, I wish to withdraw the clause.

I do not think this is the time for asking or determining whether the proposed Amendment of the Chief Secretary does or does not cover the whole of the ground covered by the clauses of the hon. Members for Preston and South Tyrone. That can only be determined when the Amendment is before the House.

I wish to say, in order to avoid misunderstanding, that the proposed Amendment of the Chief Secretary would not cover all the points covered by the clauses of the hon. Members for Preston and South Tyrone. The Amendment would entirely cover the points raised by both clauses in so far as these points are in consonance with the existing laws of Parliament, but there are some respects in which these clauses differ from those laws.

said, if the Chief Secretary undertook that the words he had suggested would be in- serted in Clause 29, he would be perfectly willing to accept that undertaking, but he felt some doubt about the proposed Amendment, for it was just possible that by the operation of the Closure the Government would be prevented from moving the insertion of their own Amendment. He hoped, therefore, that the Chief Secretary would give a clear undertaking that at some stage or other the words would be inserted.

I would suggest the House of Lords.

then rose to move as a new clause—

(Disqualification for Membership of either House.)

"No person shall be qualified to be a Member of the Legislative Council or Legislative Assembly if he

(1) be a Member of the other House of Legislature; or

(2) be a Judge of the Supreme Court; or

(3) be not a British subject; or

(4) be a clergyman or minister of religion: or

(5) bean undischarged bankrupt or a debtor whose affairs are in course of liquidation or arrangement; or

(6) has been in any part of Her Majesty's dominions attainted or convicted of treason or felony."

The hon. Member is out of Order in moving this as a new clause. It can come up as an Amendment to a clause.

said, he begged to formally move the following clause for the purpose of getting a clear understanding from the Chief Secretary on the matter which had already been referred to:—

Page 4, after Clause 7, insert the following clause:—

(Disqualification of ministers of religion.)

"Provided that no person being a priest or deacon in the Church of England or in the Church of Ireland, or being a minister of the Church of Scotland, or in holy orders of the Church of Rome, shall be capable of being elected to serve in either House of the Irish Legislature, and if any such person shall be elected to serve in either House of the said Legislature such election shall be void, and if any person be elected to serve in either House of the Irish Legislature shall, after his election, become or be one of the persons above mentioned, the seat of such person shall immediately become void, and if any such person shall in any of the cases aforesaid sit or vote as a Mem- ber of either House of the Irish Legislature he shall be subject to the same penalties, forfeitures, and disabilities as are enacted by an Act intituled 'An Act to remove doubts respecting the eligibility of persons in holy orders to sit in the House of Commons,' and proof of the celebration of any religious service by such person according to the rules of any of the Churches above mentioned shall be deemed and taken to he primâ facie evidence of the fact of such person being in holy orders or being a minister of such Church respectively."

I rise to Order, Mr. Speaker. Is not this clause subject to your ruling in regard to the clause of the hon. Member for Preston?

The hon. Member is moving it formally in order to clear up a doubt as to what the right lion. Gentleman the Chief Secretary said in a previous discussion, and to that there is no objection.

I wish to ask, Mr. Speaker, whether an hon. Member can move an Amendment formally when it may be put to the House and a Division challenged upon it?

If the hon. Member likes to withdraw, I can put to the House the Question whether permission to withdraw should be granted or not.

said, he was not quite clear as to what the Chief Secretary had promised, and he should not proceed with the clause if the proposed action of the Government achieved what he desired the clause to accomplish. The Chief Secretary had said that the method of procedure which he had suggested was less invidious than his clause. Rut there were two Statutes on the Statute Book now dealing with this question with regard to the Imperial Parliament; and if there had been direct legislation disqualifying ministers of religion from sitting in the Imperial Parliament, surely it could not be invidious to put that legislation in the Act with regard to Ireland. It was merely the sensitiveness of the right hon. Gentleman which led him to say such a thing, for he must have known of the existence of those two Acts on the Statute Book. He should like to understand whether the words the right hon. Gentleman proposed to insert in Clause 29—that was, if they ever reached Clause 29, which was always an important proviso—would achieve what his new clause proposed to achieve; and also, if they did secure that object, whether it would not be alterable by Irish Act? He begged to move the new clause.

The hon. Member thinks I am too sensitive. I can assure him that after six months, more or less, of conflict with him I have quite lost any sensitiveness with which I may have started on my journey. The hon. Member asks me whether I am quite sure that we shall reach Clause 29. That will depend on the hon. Gentleman himself and his friends. If the hon. Gentleman and his friends are content with fair discussion, there is no reason why we should not reach Clause 29 and Clause 36, with ample time to discuss all these points. The hon. Member's suspicions really carry him too far. He asks me will I guarantee that the Irish Parliament shall not alter this proviso. But Clause 29 expressly excludes from the power of legislation by the Irish Legislature the matters there enumerated. Taking Clause 29 along with the Definition Clause, and the Amendment to Clause 29 which, as I have already indicated, we will propose, undoubtedly it will be out of the power of the Irish Parliament to remove any of the disqualifications, for the general principle is that the general law of Parliament in these enumerated matters is to extend to the Irish Legislature. I cannot conceive that anything can be clearer than that statement. Once more I will say that the general law of Parliament is to be extended to the Irish Legislature, and is not to be alterable by Irish Act.

No one desires to deny sensitiveness to my right hon. Friend. This Amendment is intended to soothe him, because last night, when we wished to make the privileges of illiterate voters not apply to Ireland, we were told that you cannot legislate separately for Ireland without legislating for Great Britain at the same time. That is exactly what this Amendment does. It proposes to prevent ministers of religion sitting in the Irish Parliament as well as in this Parliament. If my hon. Friend the Member for South Tyrone wishes to withdraw the Amendment, of course I shall not object; but I would rather see it carried, because I do not believe that it is possible, considering the work we have before us, to reach Clause 29. The right hon. Gentleman says it will be reached if we are reasonable. But who is to judge of that? If Mr. Speaker was the judge we would not complain; but, unfortunately, it is the Government that will be the judge. They may bring forward the guillotine again. [Cries of "Order!"] This is directly in Order. The right hon. Gentleman must give us a guarantee that we will reach Clause 29. But how are we to reach it when we have, before Clause 29, many clauses which have never been discussed at all? I would be satisfied with the words suggested by the right hon. Gentleman, because by these words Roman Catholic priests would not be entitled to sit in the elected bodies in Ireland; but I think we should be assured that, in some shape or other, this Amendment will be introduced. We can introduce it now as a new clause, but we will be at the mercy of the Government if we leave it to Clause 29.

I would remind the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. T. W. Russell) that this is a less barbarous age than the age in which the Catholic Emancipation Act was passed. We have got something like 60 years from that time. In the time the Catholic Emancipation Act was passed they were kind enough to speak of our religion as the Roman Catholic religion. The hon. Gentleman opposite is good enough to apply insulting language to us, and speak of us as the Church of Rome.

I simply took the words of the Statute.

I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon; he did nothing of the kind. I have just been looking at the Catholic Emancipation Act, and it speaks of the Catholic Church as the Roman Catholic Church, and of Catholic priests as Roman Catholic priests.

said, he had not the slightest intention of using any language at which any Roman Catholic would be likely to take offence. He had simply used the words of the Statute which spoke of "The Church of Rome."

The hon. Gentleman has not practised candour upon the House. He wishes to do two things: He wishes to speak of the Disestablished Church in Ireland as the Church of Ireland, which it is not, and he wishes to speak of the Catholic Church as the Church of Rome, which it is not. It is the Catholic Church. The words of the Catholic Emancipation Act are—

"No Roman Catholic priest to sit in the House of Commons."

The words "Church of Rome" are, I admit, in the body of the section, and to that extent the hon. Gentleman is correct. But it was not to make that point I rose. A Catholic priest can sit in the House of Lords as priest, and a Protestant Bishop can sit in the House of Lords. I am not sure that a Catholic priest is not now sitting in the House of Lords. Lord Petre certainly was a Catholic priest, and Protestant Bishops do undoubtedly sit in the House of Lords. It is absurd to say that a disability which does not extend to both Legislatures in England shall extend to both Legislatures in Ireland. The hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. T. W. Russell) belongs to some form of the Presbyterian religion, and he is good enough to allow to the Presbyterian clergyman a seat in the Irish Parliament. There is no disability imposed upon the Presbyterian clergyman of the North of Ireland. The Catholic priest in Minister is to be disqualified, while the Presbyterian parson in Ulster is to be qualified. You cannot make fish of one and flesh of another. We will insist that it is either all ministers of religion or no ministers of religion. Whoever heard of such a proposition? Here are the words—"No person being a priest or deacon in the Church of England or in the Church of Ireland," there being now, happily, no such body as the Church of Ireland, "or being a minister of the Church of Scotland." Very likely the minister of the Church of Scotland is to come to Ireland to be elected a Member of the Irish Legislature. What about the members of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland? What I wish the Government to do is this: Let them disqualify, so far as the Lower House is concerned, every gentleman concerned in religious teaching, including the Presbyterians and the Methodists, and every other sect of that kind. But certainly we will not allow, and we shall object to, one religion—a religion which has been persecuted in Ireland for 100 years—being singled out for a disability continued after the Catholic Emancipation Act was passed. So far as the Second Chamber is concerned, if the analogy is to be followed, I see no reason why the Second Chamber should not remain on exactly a parity with the House of Lords in this country. I shall certainly object to any Amendment that does not simply carry across the Channel a disability in regard to one Chamber and leave us free with regard to the other. For my part, I do this upon abstract grounds of justice. I have not the smallest doubt that the Catholic priests and the Protestant and Presbyterian clergymen will find much more congenial occupation in looking after their own flocks. But we shall not have fish made of one class and fowl of another. You must take them all in or leave them all out.

said, that before they reached the end of the Bill the Government would regret that in dealing with this question they had not accepted his clause, for it proposed to deal with the question in au exhaustive manner in conformity with the social condition of Ireland, and in a manner for which there was ample precedent in colonial experience.

said, he was glad the hon. Member for North Louth had withdrawn the charge he had made against the hon. Member for South Tyrone of being desirous to insult in any way the Catholics of Ireland. His hon. Friend had not the slightest idea of being insulting. The words of the Emancipation Act proved him incapable of that charge. The hon. Member for North Louth had said that if the Amendment were carried it would prevent the clergy of the various Churches from sitting in the Upper House of the Irish Legislature. That was exactly what they wished to do. They had a certain amount of suspicion that the hon. Member was earnestly striving to obtain power for ministers of religion to sit in the Upper House. Was it intended that Archbishop Walsh was to sit in the Upper Chamber of the Irish Legislature just the same as the English Bishops sat in the House of Lords at the present time? The object of the Amendment was to prevent that event taking place.

asked whether the Amendment would exclude clergymen of the Presbyterian Church?

said, they were willing to accept any Amendment to the Amendment which would prevent any minister of any denomination from being able to sit in the Irish Legislature.

said, he wished to make a correction in what he had said. He was under a mistake in stating that the Government gave a pledge with respect to the illiterate voters. The pledge was in respect to the Schedule in which the question of constituencies was treated.

said, that if he understood aright the arrangement which had been come to on the previous Amendment, they were really discussing the matter that had been entirely settled. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Louth (Mr. T. M. Healy) objected to the terms of the Amendment. He objected to the Protestant Church being called the Church of Ireland. But his hon. Friend the Member for South Tyrone had merely adopted the language of the Act of Parliament which disendowed and disestablished that Church, and which provided that henceforth it was to be called the Church of Ireland. The Amendment dealt with details with which the Chief Secretary had agreed. As he understood the arrangement which had been arrived at, the Chief Secretary had undertaken upon Clause 29 to introduce the words—"Except as regards other disqualifications after the word may" in the 1st sub-section of that section. If these words were put in, as he understood the law it would entirely carry out the objection of the hon. Member for South Tyrone (Mr. T. W. Russell), and it would, therefore, be unnecessary to put in the Amendment, moved either by the hon. Member or any other Member. If that was so, why were they discussing the Amendment any further? He understood the Government adhered to their proposal, that the hon. Member for South Tyrone (Mr. T. W. Russell) was willing his Amendment should be withdrawn, and he (Mr. Carson) hoped now that the Amendment might be allowed to be withdrawn.

said, he had not heard of any desire existing in Ireland as to ministers of religion sitting in either House. Such a desire might exist, and it would be convenient and desirable, before a final decision was taken, that some means should be adopted to collect the opinion, and especially the opinion of laymen, of the various Churches in regard to the Upper House. He could conceive that a useful and perhaps a mollifying effect upon society in Ireland might be produced by the presence of some of the higher ecclesiastics in the Second Chamber. ["Oh, oh!"] He thought ecclesiastics of all Churches in Ireland were more temperate in their language than some of those in this House, and he did not apprehend that the presence of the higher ecclesiastics in the Upper Chamber would produce any deleterious effect. It would be desirable, before a final decision was come to, that opinion in Ireland upon the subject should be taken, and he was sure that the House would be willing to defer to what would be the general opinion in Ireland as to the wording of the clause. The hon. Member for South Tyrone (Mr. T. W. Russell) was greatly offended if they called him and his friends Liberal Unionists or Dissentient Liberals. They called themselves Catholics, and expected to be called so by people who pretended to be civil. He would not have thought that the hon. Gentleman would be prepared to introduce a very offensive phrase from an old Act of Parliament reflecting the bad feeling of a past age.

It is from the Catholic Emancipation Act.

That was 64 years ago. In regard to the words proposed to be introduced by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. J. Morley)—that was to say, "except in regard to oaths or the disqualification of Members"—he thought if they decided to exclude ecclesiastics from one or both Chambers of the Irish Legislature, no one who knew Ireland could entertain a doubt that the exclusion, if applied to any Church or Communion, ought to extend to all. He admitted at once, if ecclesiastics or ministers were admitted into the Lower Chamber of the Irish Legislature, possibly it might not conduce to the greater tranquillity of affairs; but this was certain: that if they excluded priests of the Catholic Church and ministers of what might be legally called the Church of Ireland, and if they included any other persons who, though not regularly ordained ecclesiastics within the meaning of the Act of Parliament, were yet ministers of a creed or religion—teachers, or persons who stood towards any Communion in the same relation which the priest or clergyman occupied towards his flock in the Protestant or Catholic Church, they would introduce the most irritating and exasperating state of affairs conceivable, because the great bulk of the people in Ireland were Catholics. There were 3,500,000 of Catholics and 500,000 Protestants, and if the ecclesiastics of the 4,000,000 of people were excluded from the Chamber, and if the irregular ministers who were not ordained were allowed to come in, of course they need not expect that such a state of affairs could possibly give satisfaction. He only rose for the purpose of saying two things: first, with regard to the Upper Chamber, that they ought to further consider the subject; and with regard to the Lower House they must take care, if the ecclesiastics or ministers of any creed were to be excluded, that none must be admissible.

said, that in moving the clause standing in his name he ought to state that he should not have troubled the House with it at this stage, but should have moved it in Committee if he had not been prevented by the Closure. The clause raised a point of serious importance both to the Imperial Exchequer and the British taxpayer. When it was proposed to give large powers of local independence to one part of the Empire they necessarily incurred a certain amount of danger and risk to the Central Government, by the possibility of that part of the Empire thus becoming independent, bringing the Central Power into collision with Foreign Powers, and thus imposing serious burdens upon the Exchequer. To show that danger was no imaginary one, they need only look back to their recent colonial experience. The case of Canada they had presented to their minds at this moment in the difficulty that had arisen between that self-governing colony and her neighbours, the United States. They did not know how much the awkward questions that had arisen about the seal fishery might eventually cost the British Exchequer. Newfoundland was a still more critical instance of this. That Colony had difficulties with France, which did not arise out of any real British interests, but out of the action of the Colonists and the Colonial Government. The Australian Colonies, being further removed from hostile neighbours, had not given them so many causes of difficulty; but even there difficulties had arisen with Foreign Powers. A difficulty, be remembered, arose with China, owing to the refusal, in spite of Treaty obligations, of the Australian Government to receive Chinese immigrants. If they looked back to the Alabama arbitration they would see two remarkable instances in which England suffered very heavy pecuniary loss on account of the action of their Colonists. There was the case of the Shenandoah, in which the arbitrators held that the British Government was responsible for all the acts of that vessel, because she was allowed to leave the Port of Melbourne—["Question!"] He was trying to illustrate his case.

In order to save time, I may say that the Government will accept the Second Reading of this clause.

said, he hoped the Government accepted it upon its merits—[Cries of "Agreed!"] He was quite ready to meet the Government; but after the way in which he was interrupted from the other side of the House he hoped he might be allowed to say a few words. He understood the Government would accept the clause on its merits, as they thought it would safeguard the Imperial Exchequer. New Clause—

(Irish Exchequer to indemnify British Exchequer for wrongful acts of Irish Government.)

"Whenever fey reason of any act unlawfully done or omitted to be done by the Irish Govern- ment or by any member or officer of that Government, any Foreign Power or the subject of any Foreign Power suffers loss or injury, and any sum of money becomes payable out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom by way of indemnity or compensation for such loss or injury, such sum shall thereupon be payable to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom from the Irish Exchequer, and shall be recoverable according to the provisions of this Act."—(Mr. H. Hobhouse,)

—brought up, and read the first time.

I do not think that the clause standing in the name of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Lichfield (Major Darwin) is in Order. It is beyond the scope of the Bill to interfere with the movement of the Militia and Forces of the Crown. These movements are under Statute, and there is nothing in this Bill that gives power to the Lord Lieutenant to assume military duties belonging to other persons.

May I explain, on a point of Order?

It is on a point of Order in which I am ruling. The hon. and gallant Gentleman is out of Order.

Do the same remarks apply to the second clause?

The same argument applies to the second clause also.

asked if he could move the clauses standing in his name?

I am sorry to say the hon. and learned Gentleman is out of Order on both clauses.

said, that whatever might be the opinion of the House with regard to the importance of the clause he had placed on the Paper, there could be no doubt that, apart from the main principle upon which the two Parties on both sides of the House disagreed with regard to the policy of the Bill, there was no question raised by the Bill which showed a greater divergency of feeling and policy than the point which was raised in the clause that he now moved as an Amendment to the Bill. It had often been alleged by the Government, in the Debates that had taken place upon this measure, that their objects and views were identical with the views and objects embodied in Amendments from that (the Conservative) side of the House, and that the views and objects embodied in the Amendments had been adequately met by the clauses of the Bill. That allegation could not be made with regard to this matter; there was no common object on this question between the two Parties; and the views the Government held were divergent and antagonistic to those of the Opposition on this important question. The history of the retention or non-retention of Irish Members had been so remarkable that the Opposition would be open to a charge of culpable negligence if they did not take the first opportunity of raising the question again. The Prime Minister had never made a secret of the difficulty which surrounded the solution of the question. He told Parliament he had chosen one of many evils, and he warned his followers that they would not extricate themselves or this Parliament from difficulty by taking any other course. But his followers declined to listen to him, and the majority of the House declined to be warned by the lessons the Prime Minister had so eloquently and ably exponded. But he had no doubt the country had read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested those lessons, and when the opportunity came would take that opportunity of avenging the treacherous manner in which it had been hoodwinked on this important point. Clause 9 had been called by the Prime Minister an organic detail; but it was impossible to exaggerate its importance to this Parliament and the nation at large. It was one of the principal features which distinguished this Bill from the Bill of 1886. And it was important, not only by reason of the principles embodied in it, but because those principles overshadowed and influenced almost every other clause in the present Home Rule scheme. Without it the Bill might be called a Bill for creating a new Constitution for Ireland; but with it the present Bill not only destroyed the Constitution under which the inhabitants of Great Britain now lived, but presented them with an extremely feeble and infirm substitute. What had been the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the solution of this question? It bad been extremely like their general conduct with regard to the whole of this Bill—the policy of mystery and the system of silence which had consistently attended the whole attitude of their general policy. The scheme of the clause was first stated on the 13th February, and that scheme was not abandoned until the 12th July. Between those two dates, and for the whole of those five months, the general world was led to believe the Government intended to adhere to the scheme they first mentioned to Parliament on the 13th February. The Prime Minister, in that remarkable document in which he traced the history of the proceedings of the Government with regard to this clause, said—"We have desired that nothing should be kept in the dark." He (Mr. Macartney) had failed altogether to trace any effort the Prime Minister or his colleagues in the Cabinet made to illuminate the country upon their intentions with regard to this clause. Members of the House who attended the proceedings of the Committee would recollect it was not until the discussion upon this clause was half concluded that they were able to discover that the Prime Minister had entirely shifted his original position. The right hon. Gentleman would probably say that in the very earliest Debate in that House he informed the House that he opened up the whole matter connected with the retention or non-retention of the Irish Members for the judgment of the House. If it was possible to accept that statement as a tolerably correct version of what absolutely occurred, all he could say was that it was about the most discreditable confession of weakness any Prime Minister had made in the House on behalf of himself or any Government. The present Government had been for years clamouring for Office, on the ground that they alone were capable of formulating a permanent settlement of the Irish Question; and yet when they were confronted with the first organic detail they immediately abrogated their position as leaders of the people and their functions as the makers of a new Constitution, and threw the most difficult and complicated problem out for the random consideration of the House of Commons. But did the Cabinet place their solution on the Table and then leave the House to form a judgment, and not only to form a judgment, but to record that judgment in a free and unbiassed manner? On that side of the House they had listened to speeches from the Ministerial Benches which quite precluded the possibility of accepting that version of the situation. It would be absurd to suppose that if a Division had been taken it would have represented the unbiassed opinions and sincere convictions of the majority of gentlemen who sat on that (the Ministerial) side of the House. They knew from the tone of those speeches, and from statements made elsewhere by the followers of the Prime Minister, that many gentlemen must have hardened their hearts, and voted not in accordance with their real convictions. The 9th clause did not represent the opinions of the Prime Minister himself, or of the Cabinet as a whole; still less did it represent the opinions of the majority of the House so far as they represented the people of Great Britain. The Prime Minister, in his history of this clause, had attempted to argue that the final decision he came to was forced upon him out of regard to his pledges. He would like the House to consider the 9th clause, as it now stood, in conjunction with the statements which the Prime Minister made to the country. The Prime Minister made a speech on the 1st July, 1892, at Edinburgh, and in that speech he recapitulated the five conditions of 1886, conditions in which were to be found principles on which his Home Rule Bill was to be formulated. What was the fifth of those conditions? The right hon. Gentleman said—

"We shall not propose a mere piecemeal or half-way measure, but something which will constitute a substantial settlement of a long-continuing and inveterate struggle, shall give a reasonable hope of peace and satisfaction to the country, and freedom from the intolerable burden which this controversy has imposed on us for the last 50 years."

Now, he should like the House to observe that that was not a condition which, like the other preceding four conditions, stood on a footing by itself—it was an absolute universal condition, which applied not only to every one of the other four, but was applicable to the Bill as a whole, and to every portion of it. The Prime Minister, in his Edinburgh speech, said that there had been no retrocession from that declaration; that neither he nor his Colleagues had ever desired, or at this moment desired, to recede from one sinple iota of that declaration. He must ask the House whether the 9th clause, as it now stood, conformed to the sense of that condition, or to any detail contained in it? The very opening words of that clause showed that, far from being a substantial settlement of a long-continuing and inveterate struggle, it was regarded by the Prime Minister himself, by his Colleagues, and the majority who followed him into the Lobby, merely as a piecemeal and half-way measure. The hon. Member for North Kerry (Mr. Sexton) pointed out, with admirable clearness, that these opening words were necessary to indicate that the arrangement arrived at on Clause 9 was only of a temporary and experimental character. He pointed out in the course of the discussion in the Committee that the whole Bill was a transitional measure, so that, so far from this being an important organic detail attempting in any way to settle even that portion of the difficulty with which it dealt, it was regarded by the Government and their Irish supporters merely as a transitional step—a mere piecemeal or half-way measure which the Prime Minister in his Edinburgh speech bound himself to avoid, and in regard to which the right hon. Gentleman said, if it was not possible for him to avoid, it would be impossible for him to submit the measure to the country. It might be argued that it would be impossible to exclude from the Imperial Parliament the Members from Ireland, because under the present arrangement several important matters had been, either for a short or a long time, reserved to the Imperial Parliament. But he would remind the right hon. Gentleman that that was no adequate reason for retaining the Irish Members. The right hon. Gentleman himself had pointed out that Mr. Parnell never considered this as an Irish question, but entirely as an English question. The Prime Minister went on to say it was thought desirable by himself and Colleagues that this should form no part of the settlement of Ireland, but with regard to which there might be a question of honour. He could not fail to remember how the Prime Minister had treated other questions of honour. In his former Bill the right hon. Gentleman thought it the highest duty of political honour to settle the Land Question before he handed it over to the Government of Ireland. [Mr. W. E. GLADSTONE: Offered.] Well, offered to settle the Land Question, but the right, hon. Gentleman had not attempted to make an offer of that description in this Bill. When it was a question affecting Ireland or his Irish allies, the right hon. Gentleman was most sensitive on the question of honour; but when it was a matter affecting British interests the Prime Minister became sublimely indifferent to questions of honour of which they had heard so much in the country and in the discussions on this Bill. He was at a loss to discover what motive could have induced the Prime Minister to submit to the House a solution so little in accordance with his own views on this question. The right hon. Gentleman had informed them that the British people were in want of discipline, and he had taken that opportunity to offer discipline for which he thought they would hardly feel grateful to him. [Mr. W. E. GLADSTONE: I never said that.] It was perfectly plain, if there were to be incongruities and inconveniences in connection with the policy and scheme of the Prime Minister, it was not Ireland that was to suffer from these incongruities or inconveniences, but the people of Great Britain—the senior partner in the Union which had existed for so many years. The Prime Minister had advanced another reason for the retention of the Irish Members. He stated that the country was in favour of their retention. He (Mr. Macartney) did not know exactly what area the Prime Minister meant by "the country." Certainly, it could not be Great Britain he was alluding to, for at the General Election Great Britain decided not only against this particular policy, but against the whole policy of the right hon. Gentleman. Nor could it be supposed that the right hon. Gentleman derived from his own experience in Midlothian that the country was becoming more favourable to the scheme. He would remind the House that upon the Division which took place upon the most specific question raised in connection with the 9th clause, the majority of Members from Great Britain were decidedly against the proposal embodied in the clause. The Government, upon the Amendment proposed by the right hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Mr. Heneage) to exclude the Irish Members in future from the Imperial House of Commons, taking the House as a whole, had a majority of 31. But if they were to exclude from the figures in both Lobbies the Irish representation, whether Nationalist or Unionist, that majority of 31 was converted into a minority of 25; so that, instead of the opinion of the British Members in that House being in favour of the retention of the Irish Members, it had been expressed in a clear and distinct manner against it. What was the opinion of Carnarvonshire? It was that the scheme was inequitable and unworkable. What was the opinion of Caithness? That this particular proposal made Home Rule impossible. They knew that in Hereford this question was the cause of the right hon. Gentleman losing a supporter. He contended that the right hon. Gentleman could not bring forward any argument to support the contention that there was any widespread or general desire in the country for this scheme which he had finally adopted. The House would recollect that, with the exception of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere), only one Member either for an English, Scotch, or Welsh constituency ventured to speak in favour of the right hon. Gentleman's proposal. He was not surprised at that, because the declarations of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite made at the last General Election must come before them in an inconvenient and unpleasant manner when they contemplated what hard necessity drove them to in the Division Lobby the other day. The Lord Advocate for Scotland was asked on the 30th June—

"Will you vote for any Home Rule Bill which allows Irish Members to continue to vote on English, Scotch, or Welsh business?"

He replied—

"That involves a question relating to a difficult matter. I would prefer, if possible, to see that the votes of Irish Members were confined to Imperial matters. We have suffered so much from the English Members that I should be glad to see some scheme adopted whereby each country should have control of its own local affairs."

He could quite understand hon. Members from Scotland who had adopted the principle of autonomy all round; but this Bill was not a question of autonomy for Scotland, Wales, and England, but a question for Ireland only, and every subject under this clause relating to England, Scotland, and Wales, would be left to the control of the Irish Representatives. Those hon. Members from Scotland who were in favour of the retention of the Irish Members qualified it by the support which they gave to Home Rule, and only looked at it in connection with autonomy for Scotland. There was a Cabinet Minister who was questioned on this subject during the General Election—namely, the Secretary of State for War, who had distinguished himself before by finding salvation on even more intricate matters at a moment's notice. The Secretary of State for War, speaking on June 28, said he did not think it was right that the Irish Members, if retained, should be allowed to turn the scale in such a matter as Scottish Disestablishment; but the other day the right hon. Gentleman voted for a clause which would give the Irish Members such a power. Then the Secretary to the Treasury (Sir J. T. Hibbert) said, on July 2, that he and his colleagues in the representation of Oldham were in favour of the Irish Members retaining their seats in the House of Commons for Imperial purposes only. That was the policy which the Prime Minister laid before the country on February 13, and which was abandoned on July 12, and the two Members for Oldham both changed their minds at the same time as the right hon. Gentleman. The Prime Minister gave further reasons for supposing that the position the Irish Members were to occupy in future in the House of Commons would not matter to the English Members, and would not disturb the proceedings of this Assembly. His first reason was that the Irish Members would be more busy with their own affairs, and that that business would be in Ireland. This Bill, however, provided that the most important affairs which Irishmen would look after would be the questions reserved for the Imperial Parliament, and they cer- tainly would be more busy at Westminster than in Dublin. If, therefore, the right hon. Gentleman had made a mistake, or if he was unsuccessful in 1893 in solving a problem which in 1886 he declared was beyond the wit of man to solve, was he now justified in propounding a scheme which must place the interests of England, Scotland, and Wales in an inferior position to the interests of Ireland, and subject the proceedings of the House of Commons to those intrigues to which reference had so often been made? He contended that his clause was not one which was open to the defects which beset the various solutions that the Prime Minister had offered. It was founded upon what the right hon. Gentleman had himself stated to be the proper view to take of this question—namely, that it was a British question which touched all British interests, and that it could not be regarded as an Irish Question. It covered the question of any future amendment or repeal of this Bill, and it provided that when any such question arose and had to be considered by the Imperial Parliament the Irish Members should be summoned both to the Imperial House of Commons and to the Imperial House of Lords. He could not conceive, from the point of view of the right hon. Gentleman himself, that there could be any disposition to regard the proposals contained in the clause as inimical to the just opportunities which ought to be supplied to the Irish people in the event of any contemplated disturbance of the settlement which the right hon. Gentleman himself proposed. He had only touched upon the fringe of the many arguments that could be adduced to show how far the particular solution which the Prime Minister had presented to the House fell in with what the country had expected from him. It was, in his opinion, in express violation of the direct declarations of honour which the right hon. Gentleman had made to the people of Great Britain at the last General Election. It placed Great Britain under a perpetual succession of the very mischiefs which the Prime Minister himself contemplated must flow from the dangers, inconveniences, and incongruities of the 9th clause; and he could not believe that even at the last moment either the right hon. Gentleman, or the Cabinet, or his followers in the House, would be reluctant to take that opportunity of amending a clause which was not the expression of their unanimous opinion upon this important question. He begged to move the new clause.

I think it my first duty to make my acknowledgments to the hon. Member, and still more to the Leader of the Opposition, for the great compliments they have been pleased to pay to the Bill of 1886. Although the Bill was deemed to be a crude measure, and was, undoubtedly, produced to Parliament after a short period of gestation, yet they have found its terms to supply them as far as it goes with the proper method of dealing with the important question of the retention or exclusion of the Irish Members. I do not complain of the hon. Member for arguing at great length upon this question. The Report stage is, without doubt, intended to give a second opportunity in this House for considering matters decided in Committee, and he, therefore, is in his right in endeavouring to make a detailed argument upon the subject; but I hope he will admit that we also have a portion of discretion left to us, and, although it may be, from his point of view and the point of view of others, not only a privilege, but a duty, to treat these matters a second time in detail, I do not think he will press the doctrine so far as to hold that we also are obliged to answer in detail. I find no fault with the hon. Gentleman for having made charges against the Government, and for having complained of what he called our reserve and reticence, of our keeping matters in the dark, and of our insensibility to principles of honour. I can understand the utility of those remarks from the hon. Member's point of view. They are intended—laudably intended—not to irritate us, but still to stir and moderately excite us to reply to the speech he has delivered, Again I must make my excuses; again I must declare that so far as I am concerned—and I think I convey the sentiments of my Colleagues—we intend to rest under these imputations upon points and matters which have been explained over and over again in Committee, considering it would be a sheer waste of time to go into the questions raised by the hon. Member. The hon. Member has employed a large part of his speech in replying to arguments and statements which I myself have made upon this question, thereby bearing testimony to the fact which I have been urging—that we, who have had full opportunities, and who have availed ourselves of them, of declaring our minds on this subject, did not need to repeat over and over again what we have already stated. Sir, I have been copious in my thanks for the appreciation of the Bill of 1886. But this I must say—that the tribute which is paid to the Bill of 1886 would have been even more acceptable, and would have been of decidedly greater value, if it had been paid in 1886. I see a distinguished array of opponents before me. My memory may be in fault, but I think that the greater part, if not the whole of those gentlemen, entirely declined to give in 1886 the smallest countenance or support to the idea of proceeding without the Irish Members. I think from the silence of those gentlemen that my recollection on this occasion does not play me false. The hon. Member says we have against us the Election of 1886.

Of 1892?

I am speaking of 1886.

I spoke of 1892.

I understood one of the hon. Member's arguments to be that the Election of 1886 had condemned us and our plan—[Cries of "No!"]—and that, therefore, we were to consider it as condemning the course we are now taking.

The right hon. Gentleman has misconceived my argument. I was alluding to a statement in his letter the other day in which he said that the opinion of the country was in favour of the proposal just submitted and carried. I said I did not know what he meant by the country; but if he meant Great Britain, the opinion of that country had declared against his proposal in 1892.

I understood the hon. Member to refer to the Election of 1886. But the Election of 1892 was carried, undoubtedly, with the fullest knowledge—[Laughter]—of what? Hon. Members do not know what I was going to say—with the fullest knowledge that we were about to propose the retention of the Irish Members. Hon. Members will do me the justice to recollect that at no period did we make the exclusion of the Irish Members a vital question. It was never included among the five conditions of the Bill.

It was added.

It was never made one of the essential conditions. My hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) in 1886 stated strongly his opinion that the question of the retention of the Irish Members in the Imperial Parliament might very well be a question worthy of being entertained after a period had elapsed during which the Irish might cope with the crying and immediate exigencies of their situation. And, in treating that suggestion of my hon. Friend, I stated at the time that it appeared to me to be one well entitled to consideration. But our judgment was against the retention. I admit that in arriving at that conclusion I did proceed upon the principle of trusting Ireland, a principle which I am disposed, perhaps, to carry further than others who, notwithstanding, are friendly to Home Rule. What we believed, and had reason to believe, was that the Opposition thought that one of the faults of our plan was the exclusion of the Irish Members, as aggravating the scheme. They thought that if Home Rule ought to exist at all, it ought to exist with the retention of the Irish Members. That being so, we became acquainted in the course of the General Election of 1886 with the views of several of our friends; and at almost every bye-election fresh light was thrown upon this sentiment. While it was our strong presumption and belief in respect of the Tory Party, supported by the even more emphatic and distinct declarations of the Liberal Unionists—[Cries of "No!" and cheers.] I am not speaking of what any other hon. Member thought. I am a better authority on what we thought, surely, than any hon. Member who interrupts? I am speaking of what we understood to be the views entertained by the leading men of the Liberal Unionist Party—namely, that Home Rule, with the retention of the Irish Members, would be less intolerable than Home Rule with their exclusion. Then it was found that the same idea was not universal in our own Party, but so prevalent that it might fairly be called general. Consequently, we had to ask ourselves the question—at any rate, those of us who were specially responsible for the decision of 1886—whether the inclusion of the Irish Members was so objectionable that it was our duty, rather than accept it, to disappoint the Irish nation of its desires and expectations, and to throw over the great cause to which we had pledged ourselves. The consequence was that at a very early period indeed in the history of that Parliament, when paying a visit to Wales, I first declared, and was followed by others of my friends, that as a condition of Home Rule we accepted the retention of the Irish Members, bowing cheerfully to the opinion that was so prevalent. That was the first stepping-stone to our change. And as retention had become a condition of Home Rule, we had next to consider in what manner that retention was to be effected. Possibly in some speech at that Election I set out our intention to propose Home Rule, and our view of the various incidental and collateral questions which were raised by the retention of the Irish Members. I am not surprised at the difficulties which are raised by these questions. There is not one of them which does not raise a difficulty. For example, there is the question whether we are to have one election or a double election for the Members who are to sit in the Irish Legislature and in this House. In the same way we had to look at the question whether Irish Members sitting here were to have a limited or an unlimited vote. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Mr. J. Chamberlain) quoted from a speech of mine to the effect that I would not consent to Irish Members, who had received the power of managing their own affairs, voting in this House on questions affecting British interests. Undoubtedly, I did speak strongly against what appeared to me to be a most formidable difficulty attending the retention of the Irish Members. And then I am taunted with having deviated so much from my original purpose. I have deviated from it to this extent alone: Nothing would have induced me to endeavour to force upon the British people and the Imperial Parliament the retention of the Irish Members with an unlimited vote. We accepted that from the House of Commons, as we accepted the retention of the Irish Members from the country. The hon. Member said that our intention did not represent the opinion of the majority of our followers. [Mr. MACARTNEY: Of the British Representatives.] Yes; observe the singular facility with which hon. Members disunite the United Kingdom, and draw a distinction between one country and another. That distinction, once drawn, may be drawn persistently when it answers their purpose. But I wish to meet fairly the challenge of the hon. Gentleman. No doubt our decision is different from that which we originally adopted, but that was in deference to the opinion of the majority. It is known to all who are conversant with the conflict of opinions which goes on in this House that there are adequate means of ascertaining the opinions of the House of Commons, even if I had not the power, which I had, of referring to actual statements, and to proposals put upon the Paper of the House of Commons, and while, without the smallest doubt, the opinion of the great majority required from us that we should adopt the principle of the unlimited vote of the Irish Members, the dissentients from that opinion might be counted upon the fingers.

hoped the right hon. Gentleman would allow him to say that his statement was founded on statements made by hon. Members sitting behind the right hon. Gentleman, who represented that they knew his views in the matter.

What means had the hon. Gentleman of knowing the opinions of private and independent Members at large compared with the means at the disposal of the Government? He had the usual general means of knowing what the sentiments of the Party were, and I do not think any hon. Gentleman can say that the majority were not in favour of the plan we adopted. I thank the House for hearing me. I do not think it necessary to go further. What lies before us is in honourable fulfilment of our pledges and engagements. Though the conditions which we have now accepted we originally thought less desirable, we have no doubt that it is our duty to accept them and the difficulties connected with them, which are matters of a secondary order, and we hold that it would be a gross error of judgment and a total abandonment of duty if we for one moment doubted as to our obligation to prosecute to the end this great and Imperial cause.

I am very glad that the House has now the opportunity of fully debating this very important question, and is about to vote on a definite issue. The right hon. Gentleman has followed a characteristic course in the way in which he has dealt with this proposal. Of the question of the retention of the Irish Members there are three possible solutions: either the Irish Members may be banished from the House altogether, or they may be retained for certain limited and specific purposes, or they may be retained for all purposes. The right hon. Gentleman has argued in favour of proposals which are not to be adopted, but he has not given the House any argument in favour of the proposal he has accepted, except that he has done so under strong pressure from certain powers, which, however, are more pressed upon than capable of exercising pressure. The Government—to use the right hon. Gentleman's own most singular and most significant expression—has transferred its support to another proposition. It is a very curious Parliamentary situation that the House of Commons will arrive at a decision upon one of the most important questions raised by the Bill by what is in reality a Parliamentary accident, and not in consequence of the argu- ments put forward by the Prime Minister. We have heard the right hon. Gentleman argue in favour of both the propositions—for excluding altogether the Irish Members from the Imperial Parliament, and for retaining them for limited purposes. In 1886 we heard him argue with great force in favour of the total exclusion of the Irish Members on the ground that it would be unfair, when they had obtained the privilege of the uncontrolled management of their own affairs, that they should be permitted to control also English, Scotch, and Welsh affairs when they were not responsible for their action in any way to the electors of Great Britain. But as years went on the right hon. Gentleman came to the conclusion that he could and would try the experiment which he argued against in 1886, of retaining the Irish Members in the Imperial Parliament for certain limited purposes. On the 13th of February last the right hon. Gentleman, with not, perhaps, a very good heart for the work, argued in favour of this latter proposition.

I said I was against that proposition.

I am quite content to accept that. The right hon. Gentleman reminds me of a passage in the "Bab Ballads":—

"These lads did not presume to flout him;

He argued nigh, he argued low,

He likewise argued round about him."

The right hon. Gentleman has certainly argued round about him in this matter. It is certainly difficult to follow him; but lie led the House to believe that, whatever reluctance he might feel in the matter, he was, at all events, arguing in favour of retaining the Irish Members for limited purposes only. We have had one argument in favour of keeping the Irish Members away altogether; we have had another in favour of retaining them for limited purposes, but we certainly have never had an argument placed before the House in favour of retaining them for all purposes.

On the 13th of February I dwelt, in the very strongest terms I could command, upon the immense disadvantage of having in this House a body of Members for the first time here who would stand on a totally different footing from their Colleagues from England and Scotland.

That is so; the right hon. Gentleman argued in the strongest terms in favour of keeping them for all purposes, but the right hon. Gentleman was inviting the House to arrive at an opposite conclusion. [Mr. W. E. GLADSTONE bowed assent.] I am not content with this example of inconsistency. After the 13th February questions were addressed to the right hon. Gentleman from all parts of the House as to the course which the Government proposed to take in regard to Clause 9 in the form in which it then stood. The answers to these questions suggested that he still had, and held, the intention of keeping the Irish Members only for limited purposes.

No.

After the 13th February it was more than once stated that the Government intended to propose to the House the clause as it stood in the Bill. That was not mocking the House with idle words. The question was—Were the Ministry going to support the clause as the Ministry had proposed and commended it to the House? It certainly does seem an odd departure from the ordinary course of Parliamentary practice for the Prime Minister to quote a speech made by him on the 13th February in support of a proposal which he then repudiated, but which he now offers for acceptance.

I dealt with both proposals with an impartiality which is not always observed.

I ventured to point out at the time that the tone of the right hon. Gentleman showed that he had been overborne by the majority of his colleagues in the Ministry, and that he was endeavouring to make them ridiculous by expounding to the House the reasons by which they wore actuated. But we have now arrived at a stage when the matter should be thoroughly discussed in order to ascertain what the opinion of the different sections of the House may be with re- gard to the proposal before us. The proposal is a very simple one, and it may be fairly argued by Members of the House. At present if an Irishman interferes with a Bill which relates to Scotland he knows that he will be punished by having some Bill relating to Ireland interfered with in like manner. The policy of give and take between Members coming from different parts of the British Isles has a good effect on the proceedings of the House. But once detach the Irish Members from the House, and once provide that they can come into the House at any time, and vote upon any Bill which may secure or overthrow the Ministry of the day, and you have then a separate influence in the House which in my belief will be destructive of its usefulness as a Legislative Assembly, and will lead to dealings on the part of Ministries or Oppositions with those Members which will seriously interfere with the efficiency of this House as an instrument of government. Let me point out another thing. There is very serious reason to believe that the result of the detachment of the Irish Members in this way may lead to legislation and administration in regard to Ireland which would be not the willing legislation of the House or the wholehearted administration of the Ministry for the time being, but which would be prompted by a desire to secure so important a Parliamentary support as the Irish Members would be able to give. It is not at all from a Party point of view that I should fear the retention of the Irish Members. There are many matters upon which the predominant feeling of the Nationalists, if they are once free from discussions in this House with regard to the government of their own country, would very likely induce them to strengthen the Tory Party and the policy that Party has in past times supported. It is not in the least because I believe there would be any sympathy between the Nationalist Members from Ireland and the Party which is led by the right hon. Gentleman, or between them and the projects of the Newcastle Programme, that I am opposed to the retention of the Irish Members, but because I desire that neither Party shall be placed in the dangerous position of having ready to hand—and to be ob- tained, perhaps, by concessions which might be of mischief to Great Britain—the support of so large a Parliamentary Body. I am, on this matter, one of those who are not subject to the reproach the Prime Minister has cast upon many Members on this side of the House, that in 1886 they objected to the exclusion of the Irish Members from this Parliament. That, Sir, at all events, is not true with regard to me. From the beginning to the end of this controversy—from the beginning, I should say, for it has not reached, or nearly reached, its end yet—I have taken the same view that the Chief Secretary for Ireland expressed in 1886 and has stated over and again—that one of the chief advantages of Home Rule will be, or should be, that the House will be freed from the perpetual discussion of Irish questions, and so will be able to perform with greater freedom and efficiency the legislative duties which it owes to other parts of the country. The right hon. Gentleman said so in 1886. I agreed with him, and repeated it in many places. I remember, when I went down to my constituents in 1886 on the occasion of the General Election, I there selected that particular proposal to exclude the Irish Members from this House for praise and eulogium. I have always thought, and I think now, there can be no Home Rule in Ireland which will be of any value to this House or to Ireland unless it is made one of the terms of the grant of Home Rule that the Irish Members shall cease to take part in the proceedings of this House. I ask hon. Members with what complacency they would view the state of things that would exist if the Bill passed and 80 Irish Members were to remain in the House, giving, perhaps, according to the calculations made, an available majority of 50 on the Nationalist, side? What would be the consequence? Suppose a measure was brought in for the disestablishment of the Church in Wales. I take that as an example. Is it suggested that that majority of 50 Nationalists should reasonably and properly vote in this House in favour of such a proposal? Surely those who are most enthusiastic in favour of a policy of disestablishment will recognise that that policy can only be effective when it is dealt with by those who have correspond- ing responsibility with regard to themselves, and the Irish Members would be absolutely detached from that matter by every sort of self-interest. Yet the Irish Members would give their 50 votes on the question. I am not sure that they would be given for Disestablishment. They might be given against; but whether given for or against, it would be a vote so entirely detached from any real interest on their part in this Assembly that it cannot be regarded as a legitimate weapon to use in the controversy. It has been said that the Irish Members would be so busy with their own affairs in Ireland that they would seldom come over here to vote, and the Prime Minister has stated that we must depend upon their good feeling to exercise a self-denying reticence, and to exclude themselves from using their power in matters not concerning them. Let me examine both those questions. Would they come over here but seldom? That might be. But they would come over here whenever it was necessary that their Parliamentary strength should be used for the Party purpose of either keeping in or ejecting from Office a Ministry which had promised them as much as they desired, or had refused to make those promises, and had disappointed their expectations. Whenever a Ministry that they desired to support was in trouble, the judgment of the House might be overruled by this foreign body of Representatives—["Oh, oh!"]—being brought over. Yes; it is not a foreign body now, and if I had my will it never should be. But if it is excluded from the ordinary interests and duties which fall upon Members of this Assembly, then the Irish Members cannot complain if they are called a foreign body, imported to serve the purposes of Party. I do not desire to make invidious remarks; therefore, I will not proceed to examine the question of good feeling. I think those who rely on the good feeling of the majority from Ireland, under these circumstances, inducing them not to come here, are relying upon a theory and an idea to which we, at all events, cannot attach very serious importance. But, Sir, I should like to say a word or two on the question from another point of view. I say that it would be destructive of our Parliamentary Institutions here, and that it would have a disastrous influence upon the affairs of this House. But we have to consider it from the Irish point of view. I believe that the continued representation of Ireland in this House would be absolutely fatal to any hope of the success of the Home Rule Bill. If I were to rely on my own judgment and opinion, it might be said that I was not entitled to speak for Irishmen in the matter; and I ought to be suspected. As I am resolutely opposed to every form of Home Rule, it might be suggested that I was conjuring up imaginary dangers with a view to discredit the Bill. I will, therefore, ask the House to allow me to quote from one of the best known Members of the Nationalist Party—the Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool. In the year 1886, at Liverpool, in a speech reported in The Times of April 22, 1886, he said—

"The retention of the Irish Members—especially in their full numbers—is merely the mask for reducing the Irish Legislature to the position of a Vestry or a Town Council. I very much mistake the temper of my colleagues if that be a proposal they will not consider it their duty to resist by every means in their power. It is a proposal that ought to be resisted by every true English Liberal as vehemently as by every Irish Nationalist. For what does it mean? If the full tale of Irish Members were to remain in the Imperial Parliament it would mean that every single act of the Irish Legislature, great or small, would be reviewed immediately by the Imperial Legislature; and if the acts of the Irish Legislature had to be reviewed by the Imperial Legislature the review would not be a formal affair, such as the review of Provisional Orders at the present moment. The review would mean a serious, prolonged, and passionate review of the acts of the Irish Legislature. Can any man in his senses imagine a scheme more antagonistic to the interests of Ireland and of all England, and of all classes in Ireland and of all classes? …. Ireland would be in a constant state of turmoil and unrest. The Imperial Parliament would be the schoolmaster that the boys would always be calling upon to intervene. It is no consolation to say that the Nationalist Members need not attend at Westminster. If they did not attend, the Orangemen would; and it would be necessary to have the attendance of the Nationalists to counteract the evil effects of the Orangemen. Then, if we had in the Irish Parliament some man of baulked or restless ambition, what a temptation it would be to him to transfer his quarrel from the narrow arena of the Irish Parliament to the mighty arena of the Imperial Parliament!"

I could not improve upon that speech. The hon. Member dealt freely and largely with this matter. Was he right or was he wrong? He made his appeal not only to Irish Nationalists, but to English Liberals. He asked English Liberals to save Ireland from the trouble that would come upon her if the proposal were adopted to retain Irish Members in this House. We have had many discussions in regard to the maintenance of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. Many of us were deeply anxious that some provision, and effective provision, should be put into the Bill to secure the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, but I do not believe that anybody in this House, to whatever Party he belongs—certainly not an Irish Nationalist—would desire to substitute for the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament the constant supervision of the Imperial Parliament. But that is what we are to have. It is said against the proposal now to exclude the Irish Members that that has been made impossible because certain matters in which they are deeply concerned have been reserved for a certain time to the Imperial Parliament. That is a condemnation of the Bill, but it is no answer to the present contention. The right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland, talking about the Schedules and redistribution in Ireland, was shocked at the idea that when we had disposed of the Homo Rule Bill we should promptly engage in the consideration of the question of redistribution of seats in Ireland. He asked how, when we had gone through all this controversy, we should like to deal with redistribution in Ireland? Surely the Chief Secretary, notwithstanding his speech on the Schedules yesterday, does not now entertain the vain and delusive hope that when this Bill shall have passed this Parliament will have got rid of the trouble and turmoil of the Irish Question. There is a period of three years and a period of six years in which we are to deal with the land, financial affairs, and other matters; and it is perfectly clear that if this Bill should be passed in its present shape, on the next Session that begins after the setting up a Parliament in Ireland you will have here, as the hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool pointed out, the Representatives of the Orangemen of the North-East of Ireland claiming from this House supervision of the affairs of Ireland, and a steady and resolute defence of their interests against the Nationalists of the other parts of the country; and, on the other hand, we shall have the Nationalists coming here, and obliged to come here, in order to defend themselves against the attacks of the Orangemen. What shall we have gained by Home Rule in that case? We shall have gained nothing for the purposes of the discharge of the great duty of this House in dealing with that which is now considered so trifling that it can be put off to the last few days of the Session—I refer to the Supply Services. We shall have gained no freedom for our legislation, or for the supervision of the affairs of Government. What will Ireland have gained? Ireland will have gained only this—that she will have a second-class Parliament, not attended by her best men, because, as the hon. Member pointed out, she will send her best men to defend her imperilled interests in the larger arena of Westminster—she will have a, second-class Parliament in Dublin which will carry on the enormous powers entrusted to it under this Bill, while she sends 80 of her best men to this House to deal with the reserved questions during the next few years, or, if they have not to deal with these matters, in order to answer those who represent their opponents. I agree that these difficulties have resulted from the reservation made in the Bill, but that is the Ministers' doing. Their Bill of 1886 was, at all events, defective and mischievous as we believed it to be, was a logical production. In 1886 the Prime Minister, strong in his belief that he had an adequate majority to carry his full-considered proposal, gave us the Bill he would desire to pass. In the present measure he has not given us that which he would desire to pass. We have heard from the Prime Minister to-night that the half-hour or 40 minutes of skilful and intricate dialectics on February 13 was simply amusement—an exorcise of his intellectual powers. This time the Government have tried to produce a Bill which will just pass, and this change upon the 9th clause is the result of underground communications with their supporters with that view. Am I not right in saying that this 9th clause, as it stands in the Bill, has not been accepted by the House or by any portion of it? I have read at length what was said by the hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool in 1886. I think the hon. Member for Louth, speaking about a week ago in Ireland, said that, for his part, he preferred the Bill of 1886, by which Irish Members were excluded, as against the proposal made in the present Bill. Are the Government prepared to do what the Prime Minister affects to think he has done—to take the opinion of the House without exercising its power over the pliant fidelity of its followers? In this case neither of two usual courses has been adopted. The Government has not made a proposal which they are prepared to defend, which is the usual Parliamentary course. If they had taken that course and been defeated they would have been following Parliamentary traditions and carrying out the duty which rests on British Ministers of placing before the House and defending a definite policy. They did not do that. What is the other course they could have followed? They could have said this was a matter on which they would accept the unbiassed judgment of the House. If they had done the latter everyone knows that the Irish Members would not come back to this House. The clause as it now stands represents no policy, no plan to which any statesman on that Bench would commit himself. It is a Parliamentary accident, and I shall be glad if the Division makes an end of this preposterous proposal.

said, he did not think the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite, nor the hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment in the first instance, had said much upon the really important point that lay at the root of this clause, which was whether the Irish Members were or were not to have seats in this House in the future. At present, at all events, the bulk of the Conservative Party were for excluding the Irish Members altogether. They had heard again from the Prime Minister that his opinion in regard to the Bill of 1886 had not altered in that respect. The Chief Secretary for Ireland had been conspicuous for honourable pertinacity in holding from the commencement of the controversy until the present moment that Irish Members ought not to remain in that House. He (Mr. Reid) did not say this for the purpose of, in the slightest degree, adversely criticising his right hon. Friend. He knew it was a difficult question; but, inasmuch as the Government said they had been induced to depart from the original method of 1886 by the friendly pressure of those who supported them in the House and the country, he thought that one of those who had put pressure upon the Government should state why they objected to the exclusion of the Irish Members. There was, no doubt, a sentimental reason. He did not think that any gentleman in any part of the House would quarrel with the natural desire to keep as wide as possible the area of the United Kingdom, which was the nucleus of our great Empire. There were other consequences which might follow. Supposing, for a moment, that they were to exclude the Irish Members from the House, what would be the position in a short time? A short time they might be engrossed in the consideration of their own domestic affairs; but after a very little time they would contrast their position with that of the self-governing colonies, which were subject, no doubt, to the Royal veto and Imperial supremacy, though upon the condition that they were hardly ever used. They would find the colonies in complete exemption from taxation by that House, encouraged to maintain military forces for their own defence, and entitled to obtain revenue by taxing imports, including those from this country. What would be the position in which they would find themselves? They would find Ireland, which was a Kingdom before Canada, or Australia, or the Cape of Good Hope had been discovered, fettered by a number of restrictions which he was perfectly certain the self-respect of the people of Ireland would not for an indefinite time allow them to submit to, and ought not to allow them to submit to. And what would be the result? In the first place we ought, if we were going to exclude Irish Members from the House, no longer to exact from Ireland any revenue towards our Imperial resources. We did not ask anything from the colonies, possibly for the reason that we would not be able to get it even if we made the demand. This was the subject of the controversy through which we lost the American Colonies. Would any man in the House be so infatuated as to think that we could treat Ireland in that way when we had before us the result of a similar attempt 100 years ago? Were Ireland in the position of a colony they would be entitled to ask that they also might have some military force at their command. He did not suppose Ireland would ask for it; but they knew that there was a military force in Ireland in 1782; and suppose the relations between Ireland and this country became strained, and Ireland were in the position of a self-governing colony, would she not be entitled to ask precisely the same privileges and rights enjoyed by all the colonies of the Empire? He did not and could not believe that those gentlemen who advocated the exclusion of Irish Members from the Imperial Parliament and the conversion of Ireland into the Constitutional position of a self-governing colony were serious as to this, and had really reflected upon the consequences of establishing such relations between Ireland and this country. Ireland might tax imports from this country—and I am, of course, pointing out the necessary consequences of establishing a Colonial Government in Ireland. What would become of the safeguards that were so profusely scattered throughout the Bill? He understood that right hon. Gentlemen opposite complained that these safeguards were not sufficiently effective nor sufficiently numerous. Be it so. How would it be possible to maintain any of those safeguards, such as they were, if Ireland were to be separated from this country in the sense that Irish Members were no longer to come here, and Ireland was merely in the position of a colony? He thought himself that the safeguards were very effective and more numerous than they should be; but, at the same time, he admitted that it was a wise, prudent, and statesmanlike policy to endeavour, by means of safeguards and precautions of this character, to allay even the unnecessary apprehensions of those who were opposed to the proposed Constitutional change. He must express his astonishment that a Member of the House who claimed to represent Protestant Loyalist Ulster should be found to propose that Irish Members should be excluded from the House of Commons. It was almost impossible to accept the hon. Member's sincerity. If they were to believe the one-twentieth part of the numerous professions constantly made by gentlemen from Ulster, it would be an outrage and injury in the last degree to exclude Ulster Members from the House. For his own part, he did not pretend that he sympathised with the views that the Ulster Members were constantly presenting to the House. He did not think it was a fine and brave attitude for those Members to take up—always to be the first to cast a stone at their countrymen, always to magnify their vices and belittle their virtues. But he did not wish to see them thrust forth from the House of Commons. He looked forward to the time when the doors of the House would be open to the great English-speaking possessions of the Crown, so that they would have a true representation of the British Empire within those walls. Let the doors he opened as much as they pleased, but not for the purpose of thrusting out those who had done a great deal towards establishing the greatness of the Empire. The first proposal of the Government was that the Irish Members should come to Westminster only for the purpose of Imperial affairs, and that was a proposal to which he thoroughly assented. He was quite aware that it opened the door to some inconveniences. It undoubtedly might produce some instability in the Government, because, as the noble Lord the Member for Paddington (Lord P. Churchill) pointed out, there might be two majorities, and there would be no assurance that those majorities would always concur. There was another objection—namely, that there would be some supposed inequality between the Members of the House, and he should be very sorry indeed to see any inequality among Members. These were objections of considerable weight; but they were he thought, much less important than the objections urged to the second proposal, to which the Government had now given their adherence. He believed the Government gave their adherence to the present proposal solely because of the pressure of opinion on the Ministerial side of the House. He thought that his hon. Friends who had driven the Government from their original proposal and induced them to make the present proposal, had taken a very considerable responsibility upon themselves. He was very much afraid that when the time for au appeal to the country his hon. Friends would find they had done an ill-service to the cause of Home Rule by pressing the Government to depart from their original proposal. It would not be easy to satisfy the English and Scotch electors that while their Members were precluded from voting on the main topics of Irish importance, Irishmen should be entitled to vote upon English and Scotch Business. He thought, also, it would be an unwise change from the point of view of the Irish Members themselves. He believed that one great guarantee of this Bill, if it were passed, proving a success would be furnished if the House of Commons refrained as absolutely as possible from interfering with Irish affairs. If Members of that House were constantly interposing and constituting themselves a Court of Appeal from the Irish Legislature, no man who had read the history of the preceding relations of England and Ireland would deny that it would be a constant source of friction; that it would occupy the time of the House, and would prevent Irish statesmen themselves from having that which was the great means of doing their country good—a sense of responsibility—and it would deprive the Irish Parliament of that sense of finality in its decisions which was so essential for its proper deliberations. But while he thought the second scheme of the Government was less happy than the first, he believed that both were quite certain to be temporary. He believed that when once they had departed from the colonial model they could not stop short of the Federal model—which meant Home Rule all round. If English Members were able to discuss English Business and Scotch Members Scotch Business, it would not only relieve the enormous pressure of Business in the House of Commons, but would do away with the inconvenience and irritation caused by the interference of one nationality in affairs that peculiarly belonged to another. That, in his belief, would be the real solution of the question; and, looking at it from that point of view, although he feared that a good deal of capital could be, and would be, made in the country out of this particular method of dealing with the Irish Members, he believed that in the end it would be a matter of very small moment. Home Rule for Ireland was only the first of a series of Bills, and as soon as the constituencies perceived that the real difficulty in the way of the transaction of their Business was the enormous and impossible amount of Business which now had to be discharged by the House of Commons, he believed the end of the question would be very simply and satisfactorily arrived at by the extension of Federalism.

said, the hon. and learned Member for Dumfries (Mr. R. T. Reid) had discussed various proposals, but he had been unable to discover for what particular proposal the hon. Member intended to vote. The hon. Member had commended the omnes omnia proposal now adopted by the Government, although not long ago, in The Contemporary Review, the hon. Member had described that proposal as one that would be

"Unjust to Great Britain, inconvenient, and of a novelty quite startling, because though Great Britain might have inflicted, she had never submitted to inequality."

Was the hon. Member going to vote for this injustice?

Will the hon. Member allow me to make this observation? Not only he, but many others have done me the honour of criticising my statements in that article. Has the hon. Gentleman read the article? If he has, he will find that at the end of the article, which was published in April, 1892, I stated that I would vote for either of the methods for the reason that I am convinced that either of them will lead to Home Rule all round.

said, he was aware of that. In the meantime, the hon. Gentleman seemed exactly to fulfil the description recently given by the hon Member for Edinburgh (Mr. R. Wallace) of Members on that side of the House—namely, that they were not only equal to each other, but equal to anything. But, at least, the hon. Gentleman had had the courage to speak out. The House now knew that, in the hon. Member's view, the scheme of the Government must necessarily lead to a system of Federalism. The Prime Minister had congratulated the hon. Member for South Antrim (Mr. Macartney) on the compliment he had paid to the Bill of 1886. It was, however, somewhat of a left-handed compliment. The Opposition did not love the scheme of 1886 more, but hated it less, than the scheme of 1893. The right hon. Gentleman asked why this compliment was not paid to the scheme in 1886. The reason was clear. In 1886, Members had not to compare with that proposal the worse proposal which was put forward in February, and the still worse proposal which was now before the House. If they now commended exclusion, it was because it sinned by comparison with the rival schemes, and not because it sinned by its own light. The present clause in the Bill was prefaced by the words, "Until and unless Parliament otherwise determines." The Prime Minister had given two explanations of those words. One was that they were intended to denote the experimental character of the whole arrangement, and the other was that the question was a British question, and that it was no part of the settlement with Ireland. The right hon. Gentleman had said that the proper way of ascertaining the opinion of Great Britain was to test it by the vote of the United Parliament as a whole. Surely a more astounding, a more preposterous contention had never been put forward. When the right hon. Gentleman was pressed on the subject by the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Mr. J. Chamberlain), and asked whether he was prepared to act upon his undertaking that Great Britain should have a determining voice in deciding this matter, he said—

"Have they not a determining voice in a Parliament where there are 570 of their Representatives apart from the Irish Members."

As a matter of fact, when the question was discussed in Committee, the majority against exclusion amounted to 31, and the British majority in favour of exclusion on the same occasion was no less than 29. When, however, it was convenient for the right hon. Gentleman to take the views of a particular section of the House he was ready enough to do so.