reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had nominated the following Members to serve on the Standing Committee for the consideration of all Bills relating to Trade (including Agriculture and Fishing), Shipping, and Manufacture:—Mr. Addison, Mr. Arch, Mr. Barran, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Mr. Blake, Mr. Bonsor, Mr. Boord, Mr. Brown, Mr. Burt, Mr. Caine, Mr. Campbell-Banner-man, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Channing, Mr. Jesse Collings, Mr. Colman, Sir Charles Dalrymple, Baron Henry De Worms, Sir Frederick Dixon-Hartland, Mr. Everett, Mr. Charles Fenwick, Mr. Hayes Fisher, Mr. Penrose Fitzgerald, Mr. Gilliat, Sir Julian Goldsmid, Mr. Goschen, Mr. Gourley, Sir Reginald Hanson, Mr. Harrington, Sir John Hibbert, Sir William Houldsworth, Mr. Howell, Mr. Jackson, Sir James Joicey, Mr. Long, Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Macartney, Dr. M'Donnell, Mr. Mowbray, Mr. Mundella, Mr. Murray, Mr. Naoroji, Sir Stafford Northcote, Mr. T. P. O'Connor, Mr. Oldroyd, Sir Richard Paget, Sir Joseph Pease, Mr. Power, Mr. Randell, Mr. Rankin, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Roche, Mr. Round, Colonel Saunder-son, Mr. Sexton, Mr. Thomas Shaw, Mr. Samuel Smith, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir Mark Stewart, Mr. T. D. Sullivan, Mr. Tomlinson, Sir George Trevelyan, Sir Richard Webster, Mr. Webster, Sir James Whitehead, Mr. Stephen Williamson, Mr. C. H. Wilson, Mr. John Wilson (Govan), and Mr. Young.

further reported from the Committee of Selection: That they had nominated the following Members to serve on the Standing Committee for the consideration of all Bills relating to Law, and Courts of Justice, and Legal Procedure which may, by Order of the House, be committed to such Standing Committee:—Mr. Ambrose, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Atherley-Jones, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Bartley, Mr. Beach, Mr. Bolitho, Mr. Jacob Bright, Mr. Brodrick, Mr. Bryce, Mr. John Burns, Mr. Carson, Sir Edward Clarke, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Donald Crawford, Mr. Cremer, Mr. Curzon, Mr. Darling, Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Dillon, Sir William Hart Dyke, Mr. Tatton Egerton, Mr. John Ellis, Sir Thomas Esmonde, Mr. Evans, Sir Walter Foster, Mr. Henry H. Fowler, Mr. Herbert Gardner, Mr. Gathorne-Hardy, Mr. Herbert Gladstone, Mr. Haldane, Sir Charles Hall, Sir Edward Harland, Mr. T. M. Healy, Mr. Staveley Hill, Mr. Samuel Hoare, Mr. Henry Hobhouse, Sir Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth, Mr. Kenyon, Mr. Knox, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Shaw Lefevre, Mr. Lloyd-George, Mr. Lockwood, The Lord Advocate, Mr. Mac Neill, Mr. Matthews, Mr. John Morley, Mr. Edward Morton, Mr. Mount, Mr. Mulholland, Mr. Muntz, Mr. William O'Brien, Sir Charles Pearson, Mr. Pickard, Mr. Picton, Mr. John Redmond, Mr. Bryn Roberts, Sir Albert Rollit, Sir George Russell, Mr. Parker Smith, Mr. Francis Stevenson, Mr. Storey, Mr. Taylor, Sir Richard Temple, Mr. Webb, Mr. Whitmore, and Mr. Stuart-Wortley.

Reports to lie upon the Table.

said, that when the Navy Estimates were laid before the House a promise was made on behalf of the Government that there should be full discussion at a later stage in consideration of the Estimates being quickly passed for the convenience of the public Service, and, therefore, if in the course of his remarks he travelled beyond the immediate Vote before the House, he hoped the Chairman, following the usual practice in the case of a mutual arrangement between the two sides of the House, would allow him some latitude. The Home Secretary had recently made a speech in the country, when he was endeavouring to catch votes, in the course of which he alluded to what he was pleased to term—

"The action of the predecessors of the present Government in regard to naval policy."

The right hon. Gentleman said that they

"Had built a number of additional ships without making any provision for additional men to man them;"

and added—

"If we indulge in such expenditure we shall neither conceal the amount of it nor transfer the burden to succeeding years."

He had hoped that the Debate might have been kept outside Party and political considerations, and he regretted that, for the purpose of catching a few votes in a Scotch constituency, the right hon. Gentleman should have thought it his duty to go to the country and make these assertions on the eve of the polling when no reply could be made to him. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty had made a similar statement in a Northern town, and neither gentleman could have informed himself of what the late Admiralty administration had done, or of what the present Government was doing. As to the charge of not providing for additional men, the Estimates of 1886–87, the last year of the Liberal Administration at that time in Office, provided for 61,400 men, and the Estimates of 1892–93, prepared under the guidance of the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex, provided for 74,100 men, an increase of nearly 13,000. As to the charge of concealing expenditure, it was clear that the right hon'. Gentleman had not opened this year's Estimates. For the first time for many years the Estimates failed to give the cost of the various vessels for the building of which the House was asked to vote money. The information was withheld even in respect to vessels contracted for as long ago as last December. Further, it would have been fairer and more accurate if the right hon. Gentleman and the Civil Lord, in speaking of the transfer of burdens to succeeding years, had added that within the year after the last of the vessels built under the Naval Defence Act was completed, every sixpence spent upon those vessels would have been provided for. The present Government, in fact, would not have any burden cast upon it to pay for the ships built by the late Government. The charge had already been laid on the taxpayers. He thought he would be able to show that the policy of casting the burden upon future years was the policy which had been adopted throughout the present Estimates. He was sorry to have to repeat some of the points he mentioned on the last occasion the subject was before the House. The right hon. Gentleman who answered for the Department in this House was good enough to describe the speeches made before he rose as mist and drizzle. He (Mr. Forwood) was sorry that the sunshine of the right hon. Gentleman's eloquence did not dispel that mist and drizzle. He had asked upon what standard the Board of Admiralty had based their present provision for new ships. Was it based upon naval expert opinion, or upon the exigencies of finance? He could not think it was based upon naval expert opinion. He could not believe that responsible officers in high positions would take to-day so different a view of the strength at which the British Navy ought to be maintained from what they took five or six years ago. Comparing what the Government proposed to-day with the relative strength laid down by expert naval officers in 1888, which the British fleet should maintain in order to cope with a combination of the Fleets of two great European Powers, he found an inferiority of four first-class battleships, nine second-class battleships, eight first-class cruisers, and five second-class cruisers. He knew they were assured that in the succeeding years there was to be an addition to the programme, but -what that addition was to be was carefully concealed from that House. They had this fact established— that if they were to raise the standard of the British Navy up to that position considered necessary by naval officers five or six years ago, it would be necessary to add to the number already provided for those vessels he had just referred to, and they would cost beyond the figures already placed before the country something like £14,000,000. He would, then, ask what provision had been made in order to enable the Government to carry out the incomplete programme which they had actually laid before the country? He had taken some trouble in going through the Estimates for the purpose of obtaining an answer to his question, and he had been compelled to make an estimate for himself as to the probable cost of the new vessels that were about to be constructed. He found that the dockyard ships now in course of construction would cost £7,750,000. To meet that expenditure the Government took in this year's Estimates £2,318,000. If a proportionate rate of progress was to be made with these vessels as was made with those built under the Naval Defence Act, the sum required in 1895–6, instead of being £2,318,000, would be £3,150,000, or an increase on the present Estimate of about £800,000 on dockyard ships alone. He attributed the unequal proportion of expenditure in the present and future years largely to the delay in proceeding with the three first-class battleships and in commencing others. Had those vessels been advanced, as it was intended they should be in 1893–4, there would have been a fairer and more equitable distribution of the expenditure on this Vote. The cost of the two battleships and certain smaller ships that were to be built by contract would be just under £5,000,000. For pushing on these ships the Government only provided in the present Estimates a sum of £874,000. If these vessels were to make substantial progress, instead of £874,000 provided in 1894–5 they would require at least £2,500,000 in "1895–6. Taking the total in the shipbuilding programme of the Government for 1894–5, the amount they proposed to expend, and the amount that must be spent upon them in 1895–6, he found that for 1894–5 £4,500,000 in round figures was included in the Estimates; whereas in 1895–6, if proper progress in their construction were to be made, they would have to find no less than £5,670,000, or an increase of £1,170,000. If that was not concealing the real financial state of the matter from the country, and if that was not postponing expenditure to the future, he really did not know the meaning of the words. But this increase on the Shipbuilding Vote was only the beginning of the increase, for they were promised by the Secretary to the Admiralty that next year there would be an additional programme. If that further programme was to be one intended to raise the strength of the Navy at all to the standard to which it was raised under the Naval Defence Act, there must be a very considerable additional expenditure next year. He could not put that at less than £1,000,000, and he believed the new construction next year would be £2,000,000 in excess of that which was provided this year. One reason given for the position in which the Board of Admiralty found themselves to-day was the excessive expenditure sprung upon them in regard to the cost of new torpedo-boat destroyers. He attached some weight and importance to this point. These torpedo-boat destroyers, of which 43 were to be built at a cost of £1,500,000, of which £1,229,000 was included in the Estimates of next year, were entirely a new departure in naval shipbuilding. Shipbuilding experts in the House would know that one of the latest modern inventions was tubulous boilers. They had been used in France in ships of the Belleville type with fair results for some years, and he had no reason to suppose that in time they would not develop into such a form and character as to be used on a large scale in Her Majesty's Navy. But he thought that before the country was committed to so large an expenditure on a class of vessel fitted with a new description of boiler it would have been better if they had had some of these vessels tested under all sorts of conditions, to see if those boilers really answered the expectations formed of them. He would not hold back in the matter of experiments. No doubt in one or two of these vessels very fast speeds would be maintained; and he hoped they would bear the hard wear and tear under all circumstances. This, however, had yet to be ascertained, and he thought the Government should not have ordered 42 of these boats until a good test of them had been obtained. He knew it would be said that the French Government, or or some other nation, had gone largely into this class of vessels. It was very necessary, undoubtedly, to take care that their Navy was provided with vessels fully equal to the most modern requirements; but they were a class of vessel which could be built in a comparatively short time, and it would, in his opinion, have been far better to have devoted a good proportion of the money set aside for these torpedo-boat destroyers to pushing on the large battleships, which took three or four years to complete. He might mention that he had desired to put one of these tubulous boilers for experimental purposes into a merchant vessel carrying passengers; but the Board of Trade had, so far, declined to grant a passenger certificate for that boiler as being safe. He was bound to say that Lloyd's had consented to the boiler being introduced, but the Board of Trade held aloof; so that they had one Department of the Government declining to allow a boiler] of this description to be put into a merchant vessel, while another Department—the Admiralty-—were putting them wholesale into those vessels on which they depended for the security and welfare of the country. Another reason why there must be a large growth in their Estimates was that the present Board declined to take the warning of the noble Lord the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord G. Hamilton) last year—that if they pushed vessels on to completion they would find themselves compelled, if they wanted to keep the same number of men employed at the docks, to make a greater demand for material; and the present Estimates showed this, for, although they were employing 500 fewer men, and the wages bill was £25,000 less than last year, the quantity of material and contract work necessary to be purchased to give employment to the smaller number of men was £750,000 more than last year. As to the unfair burden which it was said the late Government had thrown upon the future, he found from the Auditor General's Report of 1892–93 Estimates, which had just reached their hands, that £503,000 provided for that year was left unspent by their successors, and but for the Naval Defence Act that sum would have had to be returned to the Exchequer at the end of the year, and then be levied in new taxation in the present year. But that £503,000 did not represent all the surplus supplied by the late Government and unspent by their successors. The stock of naval stores purchased out of the fund the late Government had left had increased in 12 months by no less a sum than £100,000, while the stock of victualling stores had increased by £50,000, and the Admiralty had also been able to undertake further works without additional demands upon the Exchequer. Therefore, this statement of the late Government having thrown a heavy burden on their successors would not bear a minute's investigation. In the present Estimates the Admiralty provided a sum of £2,920,000 for contract work, of which £1,227,000 was for propelling machinery. The Government had discarded the system of the Naval Defence Act, under which, if contractors did not earn the money which the House of Commons had voted during the current year, the balance was available to pay contractors during the year following. It was impossible to estimate that contractors would earn the whole sum in one twelvemonth, and there would be a large amount to be surrendered to the Treasury in the next year. He would now deal with another point which he considered of considerable importance, and that was the employment of Indian troopships. These ships occupied something like 1,600 feet of quay space. Now the Government were asking for an increase in the dock accommodation, and he thought that before they embarked on this large expenditure and on the expenditure in repairing these troopships, they should consider whether they could not save this valuable quay space. Every sixpence that we could save the revenue of India was also of vast importance at the present date. He had asked a question as to the comparative cost of carrying troops in merchant vessels and in these troopships, and the answer which he had received was that the merchant vessel, ton for ton, carried fewer adults, and therefore there was less overcrowding, while the cost was £7 18s. 4d. per head, as compared with £12 0s. 1d. by the Indian troopships. His right hon. Friend had then gone on to say that since the number of the latter had been reduced from five to four, the cost had been reduced to £9 9s. per head. The right hon. Gentleman had said, further, that the hiring of the merchant troopship, which was a vessel belonging to the Cunard Company, was at an exceptionally low figure; but he (Mr. Forwood) would from his own experience say that that vessel was obtained at an abnormally high price, and that if the Admiralty had promised not a period of employment of two months, but the period during which that merchant vessel had been engaged, the hire would not have been within 25 per cent, of what the Government paid. If the right hon. Baronet would give the Peninsular and Oriental and other important Companies trading to India an opportunity of carrying the troops the Government would get the troops carried out at £7 per head, whereas under the present system of their troopship service it cost altogether something like £13 per head. By adopting the system he suggested, the Government would effect a saving of £6 per head, and the troops, instead of being crowded up in the way they were now, would be carried out in detachments of smaller numbers at greater speed and with much more satisfaction to all concerned. It might be said that they had a number of naval men employed in these ships. He said that when they were rather put to it to obtain a sufficiency of men to man their vessels in the Fleet, it was not good policy to lock up their blue-jackets in carrying troops to India, because whilst employed in such service they did not gain that experience which it was absolutely necessary they should gain if they were to be employed in these ships of war. He hoped they should see very shortly the gradual termination of the system of carrying troops by Indian troopships, and the system adopted of carrying men to and from India by merchant vessels. There was another point upon which he should like to say one or two words. They were asked to largely increase the number of seamen for the manning of the Fleet. No one would doubt the propriety of the Government's proposal in that respect, and he was sure it had been cordially welcomed by the House. But they should take care that when they got the men that they gave them and the officers the fullest opportunity of learning their business and gaining sea experience. This country was very much exercised a few months ago by the return of one of their finest ironclads after encountering a terrible gale in the Bay of Biscay, and the first impression upon the minds of the country was that they had an unseaworthy and unsafe vessel; that they had spent millions of money upon this and other sister ships, and that this money, as many people thought, had been almost wasted. Happily, since that statement appeared in the Press, they had had from the very distinguished and able man who presided over the Constructive Department of the Admiralty a Paper upon the performance of that ship at sea, and they had had, in very simple language, the fact brought out that the periods of the swell of the waves in the trough of which this ship proceeded were such as to impart to her her maximum rolling propensity, and that if the commanding officer had pointed her in the, direction she was going she would have been as steady as a rock. Later on, when a gale sprung up, they found the ship was overwhelmed with the sea; her hatches, which had been battened down, were broken open; her ventilators opened, and the water found its way into the stokeholes. The explanation given of the vessel's putting back was that the Captain was afraid there was not sufficient coal on board. As a matter of fact, at the time she began to put back she had double the quantity of coal on board that was necessary to carry her to her destination. He repeated what he had said in this House, and elsewhere, that what they wanted was more experience on the part of the officers of the vessels of which they were going to be put in command. It was not fair to take an officer out of a moderate-sized ship and put him in responsible command straight away of one of these monster ironclads. They must give an opportunity to the officer as well as the crew to know from experience what these vessels did in the seaway. He would give the Committee some facts, so that they might form an idea of the amount of experience the present officers and seamen of the Navy had an opportunity of obtaining. They had a training squadron in which some 1,500 boys were trained, in the training ships or hulks at the ports, into seamen. He was only taking one year's operations. Of these 1,500 boys, the training ships accommodated only 408, so that scarcely one-third of the boys who were trained for the sea at very considerable expense had an opportunity of going to sea in the training ships. He was not sure whether this was the best form of training, and whether it was not better that the boys should be buffetted about in larger vessels, and their duties learned in the vessels in which they would be called upon to fight in case of war. These 408 youths went to sea in the training ships in the fairest weather and in the pleasantest latitudes. The vessels had both sailing and steaming power, and in bad weather they went under steam. These 408 youths out of the 1,500 had only 150 days' experience in the course of the year on the blue water, and the rest of the time they occupied in the ports. What opportunity was there afforded to these young men, therefore, to acquire the art of seamanship? Again, taking six vessels in the Mediterranean Fleet and the Channel Squadron—and these were typical of the rest—he found that the average number of days on which these six ships were out of harbour in one twelvemonth was 80. That meant that they were less than one-fourth of their time at sea. Of those 80 days, they were only 48 days under steam, the average speed at which they proceeded when under steam being barely eight knots. How was it possible they could give their officers fair experience of real sea-going work if they had only 48 days a year under steam? How were they likely to gain from such limited service that experience that would stand them in good stead when they were compelled to undertake the work of dealing with large and heavy ships, which proceeded at a high rate of speed and under such circumstances as would arise in the case of a war? There was another point he should like to mention, and that was the proposal to enlist in the sea service 800 men from the Royal Naval Reserve as permanent or continuous hands in the Royal Navy. There was no one more anxious than he to see the bonds of union between the Mercantile and Royal Navy drawn closer together. He believed that the closer the fellowship they established between the two Services the better it would be for both Services and decidedly the better for the nation. This, he thought, was a very opportune time for looking this matter fairly and squarely in the face. They were calling upon the men from the Mercantile Navy to come and serve as continuous service men on ships of war. As further new ships were required to be built, undoubtedly they should have to look for the manning of the ships more to the Mercantile Navy than they had done in the past. He was sorry to say that, in his opinion, the Mercantile Marine, as the reserve or nursery of the English Fleet, was not improving. He thought the education and training of their modern mercantile seamen was not what it used to be, and as steamers increased year by year the opportunity of training men through the Mercantile Marine for the Royal Navy would grow less and less. Steamers did not take apprentices, the boys they took being for the purpose of looking after the cabins and mess-rooms, so that they could not learn the duties of seamen on board such vessels. The supply of British seamen for the Mercantile Service would become a burning question some day, and had the President of the Board of Trade been present he should have appealed to the right hon. Gentleman to allow the Committee he was going to appoint to also inquire into the means of the better supply and training of men for the Mercantile Marine. Formerly compulsory apprenticeship was enforced, and every shipowner had to take a certain number of apprentices, according to the tonnage of his vessel. For example, when the tonnage of this country was only 3,000,000, the number of apprentices was nearly 16,000. Today, when the tonnage of the country was 10,000,000, the number of apprentices enrolled was only 2,200, showing that absolutely there was no proper nursery or provision being made for the Mercantile Navy. Another point worthy of notice was the growth of the employment of foreigners in the British Mercantile Navy, and he was bound to say that that largely arose from the growing difficulty of finding experienced and sober men to man British ships. In 1860 the number of foreigners was 14,000, or about 9 per cent.; last year there were 31,000 foreigners, or 16 per cent. In addition to that, there had been an increase in the last five years in the employment of Lascars of from 15,000 to 25,000. They had excellent training hulks in which to bring boys up for two years at their ports. The cost of training these boys was comparatively small; but the question was whether, if the Navy could not absorb all the boys that were trained in these ships, the Admiralty might not train a larger number of boys who, after they had served their time, might join merchant ships under contract and strict regulations as to their return to the Navy from time to time for drill, and, in the case of war, for employment on warships? If they got hold of a youth, trained him well, taught him good discipline, order, and cleanliness, they would make a far better boy for the Mercantile Marine, and they could bring that youth as a seaman back to the Navy whenever they wanted him, much better qualified to undertake the duties on board a ship of war than possibly could be any man at present picked up from a merchant ship. Now that a Committee was going to inquire into the manning of their ships, and the question of taking the Mercantile into the Royal Navy, he hoped they would go a step further, and see whether they could not devise some means of drawing closer together the Royal and Mercantile Navies, making one assist the other in the great duties they had to undertake. On the question of manning the Navy he would make an appeal on behalf of the engineers of the Mercantile Navy, and that was that the Royal Navy should offer a better and more satisfactory inducement to the engineers of the Mercantile Navy to become members of the Royal Naval Reserve. The officers of the Merchant Navy were given a retaining fee; a certain number of them were allowed to serve their 12 months on board vessels of war, where they acquired experience valuable to the Navy and very valuable to those mercantile vessels for which they were engaged. But why offer no such inducements to the engineers of the Mercantile Navy? He knew there was a feeling on the part of the Royal Navy that the men who were engineers of their great ships were not in that social position or of that status they would like to see in the ward-room or the gun-room of a vessel of war. He declared that they would find in the British Mercantile Marine as able and competent a body of men—accustomed to drive great ships at a high rate of speed under most trying conditions—as they could find anywhere, and men who, although they would take off their coats, go into boilers, and examine them themselves, were yet such men as one would be glad to meet at the captain's table. All he asked was that they would extend to the Mercantile engineers the same opportunities of joining the Royal Naval Reserve as they gave to the officers of the Mercantile Service; and if they did, and if the Mercantile engineers were made to feel they were part and parcel of the naval defence of the country, he was convinced the Government would never stand in need of fit and competent engineers to manage the engines of their largest ships of war. The Navy was the Service upon which this country depended more than upon any other, and it was their bounden duty as trustees for the public to do their best to have that Service as efficient and satisfactory as possible.

ventured to say that the question which this country had to grapple with at the present time was not so much the ships as the question of getting efficient men to man the ships. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to throw great discredit upon their Mercantile sailors, but he altogether forgot to mention the fact that the British shipowners themselves were more responsible for the present state of affairs than anyone else. They had been told that the British sailor and fireman were not as steady and reliable as the foreigner. His experience was just the reverse. He had had some 20 years' experience of seamen, and he ventured to say that their seamen were steadier to-day than ever they were. In former days sailors used to sign their engagements on sailing ships about a week before the vessels were ready for sea, and they had what they called "a jolly good spree" for the week until the ship was ready to start. That was not the custom nowadays. The men did not sign until a few hours before the vessels were ready for sea, and he could personally testify that the seamen were steadier to-day than they were 20 years ago. it was not because of sobriety that foreign seamen were employed, but it was because the shipowners found the foreign seamen much cheaper. Every year no fewer than 5,000 or 6,000 British seamen were discharged in continental ports, who were receiving each about £4 per month, and foreigners were shipped in their places by the British shipowners at the rate of £3 10s. per month. The right hon. Gentleman had shown that whilst the tonnage of British ships had greatly increased the number of apprentices had decreased very considerably. Again, he lay the responsibility for that state of affairs at the door of the British shipowner. They charged a premium of £50 or £100 to boys who went to sea, and who were worked like slaves and received no wages, and in face of such a barrier they could not expect lads to go into the Mercantile Navy. The right hon. Gentleman said there were very few apprentices on board steamers, and that it was impossible for youths to learn the duties of seamanship in this class of vessels. He disagreed with the right hon. Gentleman as to that, for he believed that lads could learn the duties of sailors very well on board an ordinary steamer. British shipowners would get a large number of apprentices if they would pay them wages and learn to feed them properly, as they ought to be fed, so that they could do their work. The shipowners ought to assist the Government in providing a body of seamen of which the country might be proud. Unless they did that they had no right to complain that the Navy was not strong enough. With regard to the conveyance of troops, he hoped the contracts would not be placed in the hands of the Steamship Companies, as the right hon. Gentleman had suggested, seeing that those Companies did nothing to strengthen the Navy by the improvement of their own service. The treatment seamen got in the Royal Navy was not such as to encourage men to join. They were led to believe that their clothes were found by the Admiralty, but that was altogether a mistake. The men had to purchase their own outfit. The Government ought to pay for outfits and not take the cost of them out of the wages of the men. That grievance would have to be remedied before mercantile jacks would rush into the Royal Navy. Then with reference to the food, when merchant seamen complained of their food the owners told them that it was better than that of the men in the Navy. That was true, but it did not show that it was satisfactory in the Mercantile Marine. In the Navy the men continually complained of having to spend a considerable amount of their wages in food. It was about time the Admiralty remodelled their provision scale. It appeared that the old scale of 30 or 40 years ago was still in force. It was an important consideration for the Admiralty, who spent £200 or £300 in making a man efficient, that as soon as his 10 years were up he was glad to leave the Service and go elsewhere. It would, perhaps, be a surprise to some hon. Gentlemen to hear that the American Navy was largely composed of men who had left the English Navy. There could be only one reason for that, and that was that the conditions of service were better. Then there was the question of promotion. There ought to be nothing to prevent a man from rising from the lowest rung of the ladder to the highest. That was possible in the Mer- cantile Marine, and he ventured to say that mercantile officers would compare favourably with those of the Royal Navy. The time had come when some alteration in that respect should be made. It was a question that would have to be dealt with at an early date. The Admiralty had been advertising for men to transfer from the Mercantile Marine into the Royal Navy, and he understood that not more than 12 had been secured in more than 12 months. They might build ships, but what use would they be if there were no men to man them? From where were the men to come? There were 10,000 first-class Reserve men, but it might be reckoned that half of them would be away when war broke out. Were the merchant vessels to be left in the hands of foreigners? The Board of Trade Returns gave the number of foreign seamen employed in the British-Mercantile Marine as 30,000. He ventured to say the number was nearer 45,000, and if hon. Members would go to the Mercantile Marine offices they would see that eight out of every ten seamen who signed on were foreigners. It would be a sorry day for this country if we had to depend for our food supply upon foreigners. A large number of lads would be only too pleased to join the Mercantile Marine in order to learn the trade of a sailor provided that, after they had served their apprenticeship, they were treated as sailors and not as labourers. In the large shipbuilding yards of the country the very best of our seamen were to be found working as labourers for 21s. and 22s. a week; and if in the Navy the conditions of service were better—if men were not required at 4 o'clock in the morning to scrub the decks—they would not be so eager to leave the Service.

I never heard of a man being required to scrub decks at 4 o'clock in the morning.

said, that he and other Members of the House knew the contrary. They could tell a very different story to the hon. and gallant Admiral, and such treatment would have to be altered. Reasonable conditions would have to be given to the men, and then they might expect to have a good body of merchant seamen ready to volunteer into the Navy. He would also suggest to shipowners who were Members of the House that they should endeavour to give the British sailor a chance of earning his living, and the British sailor would then show his gratitude by being prepared to defend his country in time of war.

said that, whatever else the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken knew about matters pertaining to the sea, he had not a very intimate acquaintance with the internal economy of a man-of-war. He agreed, however, with the hon. Member in thinking that the time was rapidly approaching when Parliament would have closely to inquire into the condition of the Mercantile Marine to ascertain what were the causes which had brought such large numbers of foreigners into the Service, and to see whether some of the conditions might not be altered, so as to make the Mercantile Marine more popular with the people of our country. With reference to the construction of ships, he urged that the Admiralty should always call to their aid a committee of experts, and said that had this course been pursued in the past many grave mistakes would have been avoided. Three of these mistakes would have been avoided in the last 20 or 30 years. With such a committee existing the Admiralty would not have persistently adhered to the system of muzzle-loading guns when it had been proved time after time and year after year that breech-loading guns were much better. The second mistake was the building of low-freeboard ships. He turned to the third great mistake— and he begged the Committee to observe that he was only pointing out these things as an illustration of his argument that they should have a council of officers to whom to appeal. The third mistake was the construction of vessels like the Admiral class. He very much doubted whether a body of naval officers, assisted by naval architects, would ever have agreed to the construction of these ships. Their peculiarities had been pointed out time after time, and by such a council the arguments of his hon. Friend opposite would have received the greatest attention. Another mistake was one which was not so well-known, and which was not so serious perhaps. It was a mistake that had been made even in recent years — putting in boilers too light for the vessels they were intended to drive. That was a point upon which a council of engineer officers, had they been appealed to, would have given sound advice. Taking these four cases, he thought he was justified in saying that they thoroughly marked the disadvantages they had experienced during the past 25 or 30 years in not having a council of professional officers from whom they could get the best professional opinion of the time. But, on contrary, the giving of advice had practically been confined to a small official hierarchy which, in the nature of the case, could not be so good and useful as that of a proper council. He did not mean to suggest that this committee or council should have anything to do with the details. He was speaking generally on broad principles. He did not know what the views of the present Government were, but he had offered the right hon. Gentleman opposite these arguments as founded on experience. Passing to the programme announced by the right hon. Gentleman in his speech, in introducing the Estimates, it included seven first-class battleships and a certain number of cruisers. No doubt it was presumptuous for one who had no recent professional experience to call in question the policy of constructing these ships. Yet he would venture to place before the Committee the reasons which had made him distrust—and which still made him distrust—the policy of building very large vessels instead of a smaller type of ship. The seven first-class battleships, he supposed, would cost £7,520,000, and the question was whether, for the advantage of the country and the security of the Navy, they could have employed that £7,520,000 better. He submitted that it would have been better to have had, say, 12 second-class ironclads of the Barfleur and Centurion class—vessels of an equal speed with the first-class ships, of an equal radius of action, and of equal sea-going capacity. These second-class ships were inferior in weight of guns and in thickness of armour, and in those two matters only could it be said that in any serious thing the second-class battleships were inferior to the first-class. Formerly our forefathers used to build the largest ship with the largest number of guns, confident that that ship would be well able to beat a smaller one. If the line of reasoning were the same to-day, he admitted that he should have no case. But he doubted whether that were true now. He thought it open to doubt whether there was such a great advantage in large guns over comparatively small ones. He would remind the Committee that there had been a curious, silent, change made] in this matter, larger than any that was suggested now. They had entirely, and he thought very wisely, put on one side the 100-ton gun. They had come down to the gun of 67 tons. The 100-ton gun would strike a blow at the muzzle of 55 tons, whilst that now in use would strike a blow of 35 tons. That enormous change had been made, and he would suggest that they might go further, and descend from the 67-ton gun to guns of 30 or 32 tons without suffering any material or great loss. Why did he say this? Because now armoured parts for a ship were, comparatively speaking, limited. The principal batteries on either of the ships could be penetrated by any of the larger guns. They could be easily penetrated by the 30-ton gun, whilst the precision of that gun was the same as that of the 67-ton gun, perhaps better. The distance at which they could be fired was somewhat smaller; but he maintained that, considering the small amount of armour there was in our battleships, part of it being under water, and the heavier portion being confined to the turrets and redoubts, the very heavy guns were not essential and little would be lost if slighter ones were substituted. No doubt the arguments for and against the adoption of lighter guns were evenly balanced. He could only offer a general opinion. It was pretty much the same in the matter of defensive armour, and it was on the balance of argument that he depended. On that balance of argument he said that rather than have the seven first-class ships that the Government proposed to build, he would have 12 of the second - class battleships, designed by the same experts, and which he believed, so far as was known, had proved themselves desirable vessels. By almost a parity of reasoning, while he criticised the Admiralty in regard to their new battleships, he supported them in reference to their new cruisers. When they had built all the vessels they now proposed, the fleet would have been brought to the condition of a very formidable force, which, he thought, would be able to cope with any possible combination that could be brought against it. The Admiralty had been criticised a good deal for the action they had taken last year in delaying the construction of large battleships in order to accelerate the construction of torpedo-catchers. That policy had been criticised from two points of view. It had, first, been maintained that as a policy it was bad; and, secondly, it had been argued that the Admiralty had no right to divert the money given by the Department for the construction of special vessels to the construction of torpedo-catchers. So far as the question of policy was concerned, he agreed with the Admiralty. It had seemed to him for some years that the most formidable danger to which we were exposed in the case of a war with our neighbours across the Channel was that our ironclads would be exposed to the attacks of numerous torpedo-boats coming from a number of ports in the English Channel. This was really a grave danger, and one which the Admiralty could not be too highly commended for grappling with. It had been proved, he thought beyond doubt, that, at any rate at night, battleships could easily fall victims to torpedo-boats. If, therefore, it had been decided that the best way to avert this danger was to build vessels called torpedo-catchers, even though it might be somewhat questionable procedure to divert money from one purpose to another, he thought the policy pursued by the Admiralty was most highly to be commended. They must all assume—it would be monstrous if they did not assume—that at this moment the Admiralty had prepared some plan by which, in the event of war breaking out, they would be able to clear the torpedo-boats out of the various ports on the coast of France. He assumed that the Admiralty had some such plan in their pigeon-holes, and he asked whether, in connection with such a system, an essential feature would not be the use of much smaller ironclads than were built at present. Such small ironclads might form coast defence vessels as well. He confessed that at one time he thought the building of coast defence vessels of comparatively small speed and comparatively sea-keeping duration was a mistake; but he confessed that he had rather come round to the conclusion that, in addition to the ordinary seagoing men-of-war, we ought to have a small type of ironclad, which should be kept almost altogether at home, but might be utilised partly for the purpose of clearing torpedo vessels out of French ports. He regretted that no such vessels had been designed by the Admiralty. Before he sat down he had one other subject to call attention to —in connection with the repairs of ships. Some of our old vessels, like the Monarch and the Sultan, were being repaired at great cost. He believed that something like £100,000 was being spent upon the Monarch, and yet we were not making a thorough job of it, because the old muzzle-loading guns were being kept on board that ship, and also on certain other ships, upon which large sums of money were being spent. Of course, the muzzle-loading gun was a good weapon, although it was inferior to the breech-loading gun, and the great objection to continuing to use it was that inconvenience and danger might arise from having various sorts of ammunition and charges in the reserves abroad. We had suffered from this difficulty even in recent years. A ship armed with these muzzle-loading guns might run short of ammunition whilst serving abroad, and might find on applying to the reserve for a fresh supply that there was none available for use in a muzzle-loading gun. He had been told, also, that some ships after coming home from a foreign station at the end of their commission, and being re-commissioned were sent abroad at once, only to be laid up for five or six months undergoing repairs at a foreign station. It seemed to him that when a ship at the end of her commission arrived in England it would be just as well to carry out any repairs that were necessary in this country. He understood the fact to be that, as a result of the prevalence of this system, instead of the whole of the fleet at a foreign station being fit for service, there might be two or three or four ships laid up for some months in the dockyard. The remaining point he had to mention was one which he had brought forward before, and on which he had never yet succeeded in extracting much sympathy from the House of Commons. He would like to ask his right hon. Friend (Sir U. Kay-Shuttleworth) to look down his list of ships, and see how much complication and trouble arose from the present system of nomenclature and also from the system of classing vessels. There were at present two kinds of first-class cruisers—namely, cruisers with belts and protected cruisers, and there were also second and third-class cruisers. He should like the Admiralty to apply to one of these classes of cruisers the old name of frigate, which had been associated with the Naval Service for 300 years. The frigates had utterly vanished from the Service, although the work which the old frigates did was exactly the work done by the cruisers. As to nomenclature, the Admiralty had got six or seven new ships to name, and he would respectfully appeal to the Government, in selecting names, not to confine themselves to adjectives which were in the dictionary, but to have recourse to great names, great deeds, and great things, all of which would be honoured by being placed on the sterns of the vessels of the British Navy. If this were done, as education advanced, sentiment, which always played its part, would assist in maintaining the loyalty of our sailors for the noble profession of the Navy.

^* said, he had thought it his duty to put on the Paper a month ago a Motion relating to a special point in connection with naval matters, but he had not since had an opportunity of bringing that Motion before the House. He felt very clearly, however, that the present occasion was not one on which it would be convenient for the House to deal with the subject to which the Motion related, and therefore he would not further refer to it on that occasion, although it was a matter of some importance, and one which did involve a matter of charge against the administration of the Department. With regard to the programme which the Committee was discussing, he should like to say, once for all, that it appeared to him to be an honest and straightforward programme, and to bear evident marks of being a naval officers' programme. It sketched out a scheme of additions to the Navy which would be of enormous service if they were carried through. It appeared to him to be a naval officers' programme, not merely or chiefly on account of the ships which it was proposed to add to the effective list, but on account of many of the smaller details, which appeared to him to be almost as important as the main additions to the Navy. He was aware that the power of naval officers to regulate these matters ended at a very definite point, and he was anxious that their powers should not in future be allowed to end at that point. There appeared to be an impression in the House—and there was certainly an impression outside the House—that the present programme was something in the nature of an abnormal effort, and that something very extra special was being done this year for which all who were interested in the Navy ought to feel very grateful. That effect, no doubt, had been produced very largely by the fact that the Naval Defence Act contributions had now come to an end. He believed it would be a surprise to many to be told that the whole amount to be devoted to construction during the present year was not only not more than had been devoted to that purpose in recent years, but was £1,000,000 less than the amounts spent in construction in 1890–1 and 1891–2; that it was only £200,000 more than the average of the five years ending in 1892–3, and that the average expenditure of the last two years, since the present Government had been in Office, was less than the average of the previous five years. This, therefore, was no abnormal effort. The Government were merely asking the House to continue the ordinary process of additions to the Navy, and it was only because the sum which had been contributed out of the Consolidated Fund under the Naval Defence Act was now brought into the ordinary Estimates that there was an apparent excess in the matter of construction over the expenditure of recent years. He was prepared to hear that the public agitation which had preceded this new programme had nothing whatever to do with its initiation. It had been his fate to hear the same argument put forward on three separate occasions when large expenditure on the Navy had been proposed, and it was, therefore, entitled to all the respect due to an old friend. Everybody, however, knew very well that the expenditure on two previous occasions would not have been incurred if it had not been that the activity of the responsible officials at the Admiralty was stimulated by the action of independent persons outside. That was a matter of great regret. Another point with regard to this programme was that, although nominally for a single year, 1894–5, it was really a programme for three years. They were told there were to be nine battleships, seven to be laid down this year, and two being constructed. It was an entire mistake to suppose that those nine battleships represented the programme for this year, for it represented in fact last year, this year, and the greater part of next year. Two of the vessels, whose names had already been introduced to the notice of the House, had been delayed in construction, and it might safely be said that the only reason why those vessels had not already reached one-third of their total advancement was that they had been postponed from causes which need not be gone into, though deeply to be regretted. Those two ships, the Majestic and the Magnificent, were no more part of this year's programme than they were of that for 1880. With regard to two other battleships— Nos. 4 and 5—a nominal amount only was asked, some £25,000 or £30,000, but they would not be commenced within this calendar year. He ventured to doubt very much whether, in view of what had happened during the past 12 months, those two vessels would be laid down during the present financial year. That reduced the number of battleships really to be commenced from nine to five, a matter which ought to be clearly understood when considering this programme. How was this money to be spent? Last year several millions were voted for construction, but that money was not spent for the purpose for which it was voted. No doubt great progress had been made with the Magnificent and the Majestic and the cruisers within the last quarter of the financial year, but if that rapid progress could be made now it could equally have been made months ago. He admitted there was some reason for postponing those vessels for some months, but they ought to have been begun long before they were actually commenced. The House ought to be very vigilant, and ought to take every means to secure that money voted was really expended in the most profitable way, and as soon as possible for the objects for which it was intended. It seemed very strange that it should be possible for so large a sum as that voted last year for building first-class cruisers to be diverted to another purpose. The whole sum intended for the Terrible was devoted to the construction of torpedo-boat destroyers, though he was glad they had been put in hand, and wished more of them could have been completed. If it was competent to the Admiralty to divert £300,000 from the construction of a large protected cruiser to the building of 20 or 30 torpedo-boat destroyers, it would be equally competent to them to divert the money voted for a battleship to the construction of a cruiser or a coal-hulk. It would have been simpler if the Admiralty had told the House that this alteration had been made. He confessed he had been unable to trace any similar case, and it was wasting the time of the House of Commons to vote £400,000 or £500,000 for a particular purpose, and to find some months afterwards that the whole of that money had been diverted to a totally different object. He would say only a word or two upon the subject of construction. In the first place, he was hardly competent to give any technical information to the House, and, in the second, he did not think the House was a competent body to decide such matters over the heads of the Admiralty. But, fortunately, these matters were not dependent wholly upon technical considerations, but upon considerations which were within the information and knowledge of Members of the House. He felt pretty sanguine there would be a development in one direction in the method of construction. A great change had taken place in our canons of construction, and one hon. Member had alluded to a case where we had followed French types. The fact was, that we had spent millions of money in adopting a system directly at variance with the French, and then time after time had abandoned our own designs to follow them. We discarded breech-loading guns in 1860, when the French adopted them, and after 10 years' postponement we followed their example. Again, when we were constructing low freeboard ships the French were building high freeboard vessels; and they were building long cruisers while we were constructing short ones. Our naval officers had protested strongly against those short vessels, and now at last we were at this moment laying down cruisers longer than any others in the world. He had always warmly supported the view that we were making a mistake in the way we were arming our cruisers, putting only one gun forward and one gun aft, whereas every French cruiser of recent construction had from three to five guns forward and aft. Cruisers were intended for purposes of chase, or avoiding chase, and would generally use their bow and stern guns. In that respect the superiority of the French cruisers would be overwhelming. We had actually built 30 cruisers, costing from £250,000 to £280,000 a-piece, with single fore-and-aft guns, hut now only within the last two months orders were sent down for sponsons to he put on to nine cruisers already built, and the same plan was to be followed in the Eclipse, Talbot, and Minerva, and in all the new cruisers to be built. In fact, we were now following the French pattern for those vessels, but the others were still deprived of that gun power. They might hope to see a change in another respect. Every Englishman knew how great a loss our Navy sustained by a shot from an armed top, causing the death of Lord Nelson. The French vessels engaged on the Menam some time ago had, according to photographs which he possessed, armoured tops. Our cruisers, with their armament open on deck, would be exposed to a fire from the French tops in a most dangerous degree. At the bombardment of Bangkok a correspondent had informed him that the French made great use of their armed tops, and that in his opinion, as a competent sailor and gunner, the French gunboats could absolutely have put our gunboat the Swift out of action by sweeping her decks from the tops. He hoped that that would cease to be a possibility, and that we should put armoured tops in our vessels. A large sum had been spent on the Monarch, a ship which he knew to be one of the most seaworthy ships in the Navy. Up to the present she had cost £500,000 sterling, and it seemed a misfortune that we should allow to remain upon that ship four guns which were really of the worst type in the whole Navy. They were wrongly described in the Estimates as 35-ton guns, and were really only 25-ton guns firing obsolete projectiles, and had been so long in the Service that they had practically become smooth-bores, and he hoped the Secretary to the Admiralty would be able to state that something had been done to render them more effective, for if that defect were remedied the vessel might be placed, if not in the first line, at any rate high up in the second. Referring to cruisers, he argued that from our British point of view to be effective they must work in couples. The present neutrality laws were so strict that it would be absolutely impossible for a single cruiser of ours to follow an enemy's cruiser when she took refuge in a neutral port. What happened in the Bahamas during the American War? An enemy's cruiser would run in, and we must remain in the offing or follow her in, bound to give 24 hours' law before we followed her out. A cruiser with 24 hours' law allowed her would certainly escape. Our vessel would have to lie off the harbour with her bottom becoming foul and her fires banked. What was required was to have two cruisers, one to lie inside and the other outside alternately, sealing the mouth of the port, which it would be absolutely impossible to do with a single cruiser. We should not forget the Rossia, the Rurik and other vessels of that type, and make some attempt to cope with them. He urged upon the Admiralty the advisability of our availing ourselves of the material at hand for manning the first-class torpedo-boats. It could not be too often insisted upon that to take crews out of our men-of-war for that purpose was a gross error, never committed by the French. Yachtsmen and men around our coast accustomed to handle small vessels should be employed, and in that way an effective force of torpedo-boats might be provided for our coasts, which would add enormously to the security of this country. Something had been said about the personnel of the Navy. It was not his business to take up the cudgels on behalf of the officers and men of the Royal Navy; but he had received so much courtesy and help from officers and men that he thought they would not resent his saying a word on their behalf. His acquaintance with the men on the lower decks was perhaps as extensive as that of his hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough, but he seemed rather to have over-stated the feeling of resentment existing in the Royal Navy as to the arrangements made for their comfort; but there certainly were causes of complaint which might be removed, though to say that there was any reason for such discontent as was stated was, he believed, a libel. Something had been said about the desirability of increasing the number of commissioned officers from the ranks of the warrant officers. The latter were, no doubt, an enormous element of strength in the Navy, but it would be doing them an ill-service to carry out the suggestion of the hon. Member for Middlesbrough. But they must not altogether forget the commissioned officers. Those officers were certainly not overpaid, as far as money went. As he had once before told the House, for a considerable period of their service those officers received 2s. 8d. a day less than was paid to the compositors who set up in type the Orders of that House; but they were further paid partly in prospects and partly in social advantages. That might be a wrong system, though he did not think so; but things must be looked at as they were, and if they were going to break up the present system they must be prepared with a better one. The general feeling in the Navy was against breaking up the social conditions and organisation of the ward-room. And the warrant officers themselves had never asked for that. The demand of the warrant officers was not a demand for more public money. The demand was for greater social distinction and a better position in the Service. They did not ask to be placed in the wardrooms of our men-of-war as commissioned officers, but they asked for a status to be given them as officers in the Royal Navy, and to ask for more for them would be to do them a disservice. Theirs was a just, honourable, and reasonable demand, and he trusted the warrant officers of the Navy would find some better advocate than the hon. Member for Middlesbrough. Naval officers had few of the social advantages of officers in the Army. For many months in the year they had no society except that on board, and the House should be careful that justice was done to their position. Other matters would come up and would have to be dealt with on later Votes. But one of the most important matters in the whole Navy Estimates was not dealt with here —the dock and mole at Gibraltar. He was at a loss to understand why, unless for purposes of public advertisement and to obtain a favourable notice in the newspapers, this miserable Vote of £1,000 was brought into the Estimates at all. But £1,000 would not pay for the uniforms worn out by the men going to look at the works. The House ought not to be misled by such palpably fictitious statements. Until the Gibraltar question was fairly faced the supremacy of this country at sea was in deadly peril. He trusted that they would see this Programme carried out, and that the neglect which certainly occurred in 1893 would not take place in 1894.

I think everyone who is familiar with this question must have listened with interest to the most able speech which the hon. Gentleman has delivered, and I regret that my hon. Friend has deferred to a later stage in our proceedings and upon other Votes the bringing forward of questions which are more or less germane to the great Debate in which the Committee is now engaged. I do not rise to contribute any personal views of my own to this Debate. But it is perhaps one of the most important in which we shall be engaged during this Session, and I do not think I should remain silent. But what I rose for was to say that I think the interests of business would be served if the right hon. Gentleman would try at once to deal with the points which, up to this moment, have been brought forward. We have listened to four speeches delivered by four gentlemen representing various interests. There was the speech of my right hon. Friend, who spoke with great ability and from knowledge he derived partly from his long connection with the Admiralty and partly from his knowledge of the business of which he is so distinguished a represen- tative. He was followed by the hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. J. H. Wilson), who spoke as the representative of the Seamen's Union. That speech was followed by one from a naval officer on this side of the House, and then came the speech of my hon. Friend who has just resumed his seat. Every one of those speeches was crammed with detail, was marked with great ability and knowledge, and required a detailed answer from the Minister in charge of these Estimates. If the right hon. Gentleman defers his reply to a later period in the evening it will be impossible in the scope of one speech to do those speeches justice. Recollect what we have still to go through in this Debate. We are asked to discuss a programme which, however modestly it may appear in the Estimates, will cost between £20,000,000 and £30,000,000 to have carried to completion, as I hope it will be carried to a completion. In dealing with this we have not only to deal with the actual ships that have to be built, their type, their class, their number, and their cost, but also with the method in which the Government propose to meet the financial liabilities which this great programme will necessarily involve, and these are questions which, if I may say so without disrespect to the present occupants of the Front Bench, cannot be discussed in the absence of a Cabinet Minister and in the absence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I am not asking for his presence now, as I am aware that he cannot be here, but the point I respectfully lay before the right hon. Gentleman is this: It may be that he can completely and adequately deal with all the questions that have been raised, but before this Debate concludes still larger issues will have to be brought on, and as the First Lord of the Admiralty is not in this House it is impossible that they can be discussed in the absence of those who are responsible for the Cabinet policy. I think the time has come when we may receive a reply from that Bench to the speeches that have already been made. There is some advantage in carrying on these discussions with the Speaker out of the Chair, and one of the great advantages of that system is that the Minister in charge can speak as often as he pleases; therefore, instead of covering sheets of paper with notes, I would suggest that before we proceed further, and plunge more deeply into the innermost recesses of this great controversy, that the right hon. Gentleman would deal with the Debate so far as it has gone.

^* : I understood that some hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House desired to offer observations to the Committee, and I thought it only respectful to them that I should not intervene before them in the Debate; but, after the courteous appeal of the right hon. Gentleman, I at once rise to reply to the speeches that have been made. I thought it my duty to take notes of the observations of those gentlemen who have taken part in the Debate, and I rely upon those for the purpose of giving an adequate reply. As the right hon. Gentleman has stated, the speeches made have been in very large detail, dealing with many figures, and if I fail to answer every point raised I hope hon. Gentlemen will not suppose it is out of any disrespect to them. I will first of all address myself to a point connected with the manning of the Navy, which was raised by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, the Member for the Ormskirk Division of Liverpool (Mr. Forwood). He took some notice of a speech made by the Home Secretary, which I did not have the advantage of reading, but I would remind him that in anything I said in the speech I made on the 20th of March, when I introduced these Estimates to the notice of the House, I was careful to say that I did not wish to make any controversial remarks about the late Government on this subject. I at once admit it is perfectly true that the late Government added 12,700 to the numbers of the Navy. That was at the rate of 2,100 a year. But we have proposed to add in two years 9,300, which is 4,150 a year, or rather more than double the average of the late Government. I do not wish to carry it further than this—that a heavy burden has been laid upon us; and when hon. Gentlemen seek to minimise what is being done by the Government they should remember that we are fully giving effect to what is necessary in respect to manning the Navy. I pass from that to the remarks made by the right hon. Gentleman as to giving the men and officers the fullest opportunity of learning their duties. He alluded, in connection with this, to the incident in respect to the Resolution. As the late Government were responsible for the design, the right hon. Gentleman is anxious to establish there is nothing wrong with that ship. While I concur in that view, I am a little doubtful "whether it was quite just, or whether it was in the best taste, to attempt, in saving the reputation of the ship, to cast a slur on the reputation of our officers generally, and of the very gallant and able officer who commanded in particular. The right hon. Gentleman cannot have been aware that when the Resolution went to sea Captain Hall was, unfortunately, suffering from illness.

I was not aware of that.

I pass from that—I lay no stress upon that—and I come to his remark in which he said that officers, before they are sent to sea in a big ship, should have some experience of the management of these ships. Perhaps he is also unaware that Captain Hall commanded with great distinction a very large cruiser, the Blenheim, during the manŒuvres. My right hon. Friend has a panacea for enabling our officers to more adequately discharge their duties; it is a panacea that comes from Liverpool, and it is that they should be sent as passengers in one of the Atlantic liners to and fro across the Atlantic. That is his panacea.

Will the right hon. Gentleman allow me to say he has misinterpreted and is misrepresenting what I said. What I said was, that if there is not afforded an opportunity of gaining experience of large vessels in heavy weather at sea, and if the Admiralty could not afford the coal to keep them so employed, it would be far better that our junior officers should gain experience in Atlantic liners, not as passengers, but as mercantile officers.

^* : The right hon. Gentleman on this and other subjects thinks there is nothing like leather; that there is nothing like the ships that sail from Liverpool, and nothing like the troopships that could be hired there. I think there can be no doubt that our officers can obtain all the experience that is necessary in the management of ships in rough weather on board Her Majesty's ships, and the Admiralty is not prepared to adopt the suggestion of my right hon. Friend. My right hon. Friend criticised the amount of sea training given to officers and men, and alluded to some facts he obtained by means of questions he put on the Paper with respect to the amount of time Her Majesty's ships spent at sea, and the speed at which they run. We are not prepared to admit that you can thus judge of the efficiency that officers and men attain—in the Mediterranean, for example —when at sea. During some period of that time they are engaged in steam tactics. Sometimes they are running at a high rate of speed, but for the most part they are at a low speed. But the officers would certainly not be doing their duty if they were continually to run Her Majesty's ships at a high rate of speed under forced draught. I would venture to remind my right hon. Friend that on these various subjects he has criticised a state of things which existed during, the six years he was a responsible Member of the Board of Admiralty, and I do not know that he took any steps, or that the Board approved of any steps which he may have suggested, for carrying out alterations. With regard to what the hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. J. H. Wilson) said upon the clothing and victualling of the seamen, I would rather reserve any remarks I have to make for the Vote for the victualling of the Navy, with this exception, that my hon. Friend omitted to notice the fact that a seaman receives a free kit when he joins, or an allowance in lieu of it, and an allowance for uniform when promoted to be a petty or a warrant officer. I cannot at all admit what my hon. Friend says respecting the victualling of the Navy. My hon. Friend the Member for West Belfast (Mr. Arnold-Forster) is much nearer the truth when he says the men are well treated both in the victualling and the clothing, and that they are content. Now I pass on to the subject which I think is more immediately before the House today, and that is the various subjects connected with shipbuilding. My right hon. Friend the Member for the Ormskirk Division of Liverpool (Mr. Forwood) made a charge against the Government that they are concealing the cost of the new vessels, and that they are laying the burden on future years without telling the House what that burden would be. Well, there are figures it is not desirable fully to state in the Estimates, while contracts are yet to be obtained in the open market. And in taking that line we are following a precedent set by the late Government. I have the Estimates for 1892-3 before me, for which the late Government were responsible. You will find there that three new ships were announced, and exactly the same course was taken, and no doubt on equally good grounds. The details were not complete, and exactly the same course was taken then as now.

It was proposed to expend £60,000 on the Majestic and the Magnificent.

In regard to the Majestic and the Magnificent, they are being built in dockyards. We are inviting contracts for similar ships, and at the moment when we were inviting contracts it was not desirable to say what was the estimated probable cost in the dockyards of exactly similar ships. There was no desire or intention to conceal anything from Parliament; but we followed the precedent of former years, and had excellent reasons. So much for concealment. I stated, approximately, the cost of the Powerful and Terrible last year at about £700,000; I submitted the amount to the House, and that is on record. Then my right hon. Friend says the Government propose only taking £2,300,000 for new ships and those now building. He knows perfectly well that the early stages of ships are not so costly as a later stage. The Comptroller is satisfied that the amounts in the Estimates are what we are likely to spend on those ships, pushing them forward as rapidly as possible. The House cannot expect us to do more than that. Coming to another criticism of the right hon. Gentleman, he says that the sum provided in the Estimates of 1892–3 for another battleship was not spent. That is going back again to the time when the present Government took Office. What was the amount in the Estimates in that year? It was £10,000, and the late Board of Admiralty left on record a determination arrived at in the month of April—that is, four months before we came into Office—that they would reduce that amount to £5,000, so that the amount which he complains that we did not expend was only £5,000. I may also mention that when we came into Office no steps had been taken towards the building of that ship. The right hon. Gentleman then went into a number of statistical calculations, and I confess I did not follow him then, and do not intend to follow him now. Finally, he asked two questions: First, was the programme based on the advice of our naval advisers? I think the House has already been informed on that subject, and I answer emphatically "Yes, it is based on the counsel of our naval advisers." Secondly, is it the intention of the Admiralty to make the Fleet equal to meeting two Foreign Powers? and I answer that that is our intention. I now come to the points raised by the hon. Member for West Belfast (Mr. Arnold-Forster). I was glad to hear in that interesting and able speech that he spoke of our programme as an honest and straightforward one. I can assure him —I hope he will not mistrust my assurance—it is the full intention of Lord Spencer to carry that programme through if he has the opportunity. He asked what was the reason of the changes made in the expenditure of last year, and he seemed rather to suggest they were changes made by Lord Spencer or the civil members of the Board, and not by the Board as a whole. I think my hon. Friend will see that is a reflection on our naval advisers that we made a change which they did not approve. The changes that were made were most strongly urged on the Board by their naval advisers, and were accepted by Lord Spencer and his civil colleagues, because we were convinced of the extreme importance of these changes. I would deal with one other point of my hon. Friend, and that is, he says a mere nominal amount appears in the Estimates for two of our battleships. The sum is £57,000—close upon £60,000 —and I cannot regard that as a nominal sum. The reason for not taking more is because more cannot be spent upon those two ships in the dockyards, as the dockyards will be fully occupied with other work till the year is far advanced; it is as much as can be spent on them considering the other work of the dockyards. I now come to the many suggestions made, that the money last year was not spent as it had been voted. In regard to the expenditure of last year, I think there has been a good deal of exaggeration, and I would like to remind the House that my hon. Friend himself admitted, in respect to the Majestic and the Magnificent, that two or three months' delay was perfectly justified. When the loss of the Victoria took place the Board of Admiralty would not send out the designs of the new ships until they satisfied themselves that the evidence in respect to that loss threw no new light on the design, which would make it wise to alter the design of those two ships before the actual construction was begun. At the earliest moment, as soon as they were satisfied about the designs, they sent them in to the dockyards. That was the sole reason for the postponement of the Majestic and the Magnificent. I have heard a description of a search the hon. Member made at the dockyard in order to discover the keel of the Majestic. If he had gone to the Admiral Superintendent he would have been taken to the place where, under cover, with great advantage to the workmen and with great advantage to the work, for weeks the operations for building the Majestic were going on. The result of adopting that system is that ships will now be built more rapidly than was the case under the old method, and the Dockyard Authorities have informed me that they may commence to lay keels even later than they did in the case of the Majestic, so very much greater is the progress thus made with the work. The hon. Member has often said that the Majestic is very much behind-hand. Well, in spite of the two or three months' delay which took place through causes not within our control, but owing to the loss of the Victoria, out of £74,500 taken in the Estimates for the Majestic, we have spent £55,215. The Majestic, as I stated the other day, is advancing by leaps and bounds, and she is, we hope, being built more rapidly than any battleship was ever built before. That, I think, answers the point that my hon. Friend has brought forward. Let me state this generally—and I think the House will be pleased to hear it, and it is only just to the Admiralty that it should be stated— that taking labour and materials, which, after all, are the points under control, while contract work is not, so we have spent more in labour and materials on new construction during the past year than we expected we should have been able to spend and slightly more than we took in the Estimates. The Estimate was a very close one, but we were disappointed, as previous Governments have been, in the amount which we thought we could spend on contract work. The contractors do not succeed in earning all that the sanguine expectations of the Admiralty lead them to expect. That has happened year after year. But I am happy to say that our expectations are being more and more realised every year. Each year the performances of the contractors approach the Estimates more nearly than before, and last year they succeeded in approaching them nearer than has been the case in any previous year. I think I may say that the late Government had considerable experience of disappointment by contractors, and they found that their Estimates of what would be spent on the contracting part of the shipbuilding programme were often too sanguine. In 1889–90 they were too sanguine by £349,964; in 1890–91 by £230,443; in 1891–92 by £190,582; in 1892–93 by £146,650; and in 1893–94 by £98,232. These figures relate to contract work on shipbuilding out of Navy Votes. Moreover, under the Special Fund of the Naval Defence Act in 1890–91 there was a short expenditure of £1,016,000 on contract work as compared with the Estimate. I hope we are arriving at a point when we may be able to estimate more closely in these matters. The Admiralty went into the subject with great care, and the result is that we have in the present Estimates attempted, I hope with success, to estimate much more closely. We may again have made a mistake, but we have done our best. While on this subject, will the House allow me to state the actual figures as to the expenditure on labour and materials in the Estimates, and the actual results, because I think them very satisfactory? The estimated expenditure on the Naval Defence Act dockyard-built ships, including the completion of contract-built ships, was £997,600; the actual expenditure has been £1,003,357, so that we have slightly exceeded the Estimate in labour and materials. Ou the further programme our expenditure was estimated at £430,430; we have actually spent £447,511. I do lay some stress upon that, because I have repeatedly given assurances to the House, which are now fully borne out, that we should be able to spend the money we had taken for new construction. Within the last few days a good deal of stress has been laid upon the diversion of expenditure from torpedo-boat destroyers, and I should like to state to the House what has been the actual amount of money thus diverted. In the Estimates we took for 20 torpedo-boat destroyers an expenditure of £237.786, and the actual amount expended in the year on 42 of these vessels has been £27,559, so that when we hear this talk of a diversion it is only a diversion of £27,359.

You have spent £27,000, and you have a liability of £800,000.

The point I am dealing with at the present moment is that of the diversion of money. The amount of diversion has been £27,000, so that not much can be made of that. I will go at once to the further point, and that is whether we ought to have diverted the money at all, and whether we were right in ordering 42 torpedo-boat destroyers. I have already informed the House that the step was taken on the very urgent counsel of our naval advisers, and was unanimously approved by the Board after mature consideration. I should also like to remind the House that it was all done above-board, and the approval of the Treasury was obtained to this change of policy. And what is the policy and practice of Parliament with respect to Estimates? It is this: that Governments ought to adhere to the Estimates as far as possible and not depart from them without the authority of the Treasury. The Treasury exists for the purpose, when the necessity arises, of being consulted by a Government or a Department, and (if it sees fit) of sanctioning a departure from the Estimate. We have obtained Treasury sanction to the step we took. But what is of far greater importance to the House than any question of that sort is the question of policy. I do not think it is desirable to emphasise too strongly the necessity which has arisen, in consequence of action abroad, of supplying one deficiency in our naval strength— namely, our means of meeting torpedo attack. But that was borne in more and more strongly upon the present Board of Admiralty as month after month they continued in Office, and they deliberately came to the conclusion that it was their duty to do a great deal more in the way of provision of torpedo-boat destroyers than they originally put in the Estimates, and in doing so they have had the approval of the House as a whole and of the country. The noble Lord opposite in his speech in the last Debate spoke of the torpedo-boat destroyers as if they possessed no powers of offence. But his view is dissented from by the Naval Members of the Board, who are of opinion that these vessels will prove of great offensive value. Their armament has been designed with that object. And the experimental trials that have lately taken place have shown that these vessels possess considerable offensive powers. I could say a great deal more on this subject, but I do not wish in any way to introduce what may be regarded as controversial matter. I will, therefore, only say that this was an element in our naval security and power which we considered had been somewhat overlooked, and that without additional torpedo-boat destroyers we had not the requisite strength to cope with Foreign Powers.

said, that the point made was not that the money had been ill-spent, but that it was spent for a different purpose from that for which it was asked and voted, and without any notice being given to the House even in the form of a Supplementary Estimate.

The change was made after the Estimates had passed through the House. The announcement was made formally in Parliament—first in a Paper presented in August—that we should spend more money than we originally intended in pushing on the 14 torpedo-boat destroyers. Subsequently it was found that that would not be possible, and it was determined, as a matter of policy of the gravest character, to increase the number of these torpedo-boats to 42, and we informed Parliament of the fact in December, and also obtained Treasury sanction. As to the liability, the whole remaining expenditure on these torpedo-boat destroyers is included in this year's Estimates, and no doubt it is a large liability; but we deliberately say to this House that this is the most essential and most pressing part of naval expenditure we have to bring before Parliament, and we ask the House to ratify what we have done by approving of this liability and placing it on the year 1894–5. On the subject of designs of ships, the hon. Member for West Belfast Division has made some criticisms. These criticisms affect the naval defence ships more than ours. It is perfectly true that sponsons for four guns are being added to eight vessels, and the hon. Member will be glad to hear that we are introducing armoured tops in the masts of some of the new Cruisers. Then the hon. Member for Holderness has suggested that the Admiralty should seek outside advice in the shape of Committees, and he said that had they done so mistakes might have been obviated in regard to a low freeboard and in constructing ships of the Admiral class. The hon. and gallant Gentleman will be surprised to learn that a special Committee, summoned about 25 years ago, and including many representative men, actually considered and approved the vessels of the Devastation class with moderate freeboard.

Will the right hon. Gentleman be surprised to learn that that was in reference to one ship—the Captain ?

That is the recommendation made by one of these Committees, and my hon. and gallant Friend is perhaps a little indiscreet in reminding the House of that case of the Captain.

said, he believed that, as a matter of fact, no Committee reported in that case, though he admitted that pressure was brought to bear on the Admiralty from outside.

Yes, she was pressed upon the Admiralty. The mistakes made in the Captain were not Admiralty mistakes. She was spoken of as "a House of Commons ship." She certainly was not an Admiralty ship. My hon. and gallant Friend is evidently not enamoured of the Admiral class. Is he aware that Lord Dufferin's Committee on Designs in 1871 recommended the adoption of unarmoured ends and central armoured citadels?

^* : Does the right hon. Gentleman say that the unarmoured end, as carried out in the Admiral class, was ever recommended to that extent by Lord Dufferin's Committee?

^* : All I say is that Lord Dufferin's Committee recommended the adoption of the unarmoured ends and the central armoured citadel. I was very glad the hon. Member for Holderness approved of the laying down of the Talbots, and I should like to say a few words in answer to what the noble Lord opposite (Lord G. Hamilton) said on this point. The noble Lord, in the last Naval Debate, argued that it would have been wiser to build four first-class cruisers, capable of taking part in any great naval engagement, rather than the six Talbots. He added: "What we want are big vessels." In Lord Spencer's Statement (page 6) it is explained that the New Programme embraces various types of cruisers, all to be completed within five years. The Admiralty must necessarily decide the order in which these types shall be laid down. In the exercise of this discretion they have thought it best to commence with six Talbots. Although these vessels are styled "second-class cruisers," they compare favourably with the most recent first-class cruisers ( Edgar class) in regard to speed, coal capacity, and sea-keeping power. In armament and protection they are not equal to the recent first-class cruisers, but they are superior to second-class cruisers of earlier construction. The designs have been largely influenced by the provisions necessary for distant service, in the protection of commerce, involving long periods at sea. But the vessels are also suitable for service with fleets as attendant cruisers. They are wood-sheathed and coppered, in order to maintain their speed, without the necessity for frequent docking. They have bunkers equal in capacity to those of first-class cruisers, and will be able to carry 1,100 tons of coal. The length is only 10 feet less than that of the Edgar class. The Talbots are vessels of 5,600 tons. They are 50 feet longer, though two feet narrower, than the belted cruisers ( Orlando type), which rank as first-class. They are of the same nominal displacement as the belted cruisers, but faster, and have larger coal storage. They are not so heavily armed, and have protective decks without vertical armour on the sides. I would point out that the noble Lord has scarcely realised what these ships are; and, although they are named second-class, what a useful addition they will be to the Navy. I must say one word about reconstruction. The case of the Monarch has been mentioned, and the hon. Member who mentioned it objected to our retaining muzzle-loading guns in some of these old ships like the Hercules. But the decision in this matter is not peculiar to the present Board. The hon. Member does not fully take into account, first, that when these ships are reconstructed they receive an adequate quick-firing armament; and, second, that experience has shown that the expense of the structural alterations that are necessary to alter the broadside armoured ships and adapt them for carrying breech loading guns is so very great that the late Government would not face it, and the present Board of Admiralty will not face it. These will be very useful ships with that quick-firing armament in the second line of reserve in case of war. One of these ships was altered by the late Government, and the experience they gained was that it was not worth while to incur that expenditure of money which would, in the opinion of the Board of Admiralty, be better spent on new ships than in reconstructing old ones to that extent. My right hon. Friend the Member for the Ormskirk Division raised certain questions on the Expense Accounts which can best be dealt with by the Public Accounts Committee, and therefore I shall resist the temptation of replying to them. The right hon. Gentleman told the Committee that the Admiralty would have to surrender a considerable part of the money they are now taking in respect of contract work. I hold a contrary opinion; I think we have estimated very closely. But I would put this question to the Opposition, Are the Government taking too much money or are they taking too little? Hon. Gentlemen must ride on the one horse or on the other; it is inconsistent to seek to ride on both. On the subject of troopships, I have to say that communications are proceeding between the Indian Government and the Admiralty. For the present we must use hired troopships, with the exception of the Malabar. What will be done in the future will depend on the negotiations now going on between the Indian and the Home Governments. The case the right hon. Gentleman gives was entirely an exceptional case, the Bothnia being taken at a time when the rates were exceedingly low; so that no comparison of the cost of hiring as compared with Government troopships can be founded upon it. I think I have now answered all the points that have been raised, and I apologise to the Committee for having detained them so long.

^* said, the Debate very properly had not been confined to material, but the subject of personnel had been alluded to by almost all who had taken part in the discussion. It was being realised at last that it was a waste of money and time to build ships without an adequate supply of men to man them. He thought it was admitted on all sides that in the past inadequate steps had been taken to meet the demands bearing on the Fleet. When it was considered that in nine years they had had three programmes, each larger than its predecessor, it naturally followed that the requirements of the personnel, were large indeed. He found in the Navy Estimates of 1889–90 there was a Return showing what would be the total number of ships which would be added to the Navy between. April 1, 1889, and April 1, 1894. That included ships building and those provided under the Naval Defence Act, and the total was 113 ships. Further, they had to add the additional ships since built or projected, and also take within, their purview those that were to be included in what he might term the Spencer-Programme. The estimate most freely relied on was that the Navy in the matter of manning was about 10,000 men short, and some who had a right to speak with considerable authority went so far as to say that 15,000 would be nearer the figure; but he could not help feeling that, although much was being done to catch up these arrears, so far they had fallen very short of the requirements indeed. He ventured to say that the total which was put down in the present estimate — 6,500 men—were altogether inadequate for the requirements of the Service. The first question that arose was how to overcome these difficulties—to find men to man the fleet not only to meet present deficiencies, but to meet future requirements. He ventured to suggest that if more inducements were offered they would not only succeed in getting more men to join the Navy, but, what was more important, would, longer retain the services of those already in it. They found, from the Return published in June, 1890, that the wastage during the first 10 years of a man's service was very large. The percentage of seamen and stokers lost before completing their first term was seamen 46 per cent. and stokers 39 per cent. That was to say, that only 54 out of 100 seamen completed their first term and only 61 stokers. Steps might be most advantageously taken to induce men to complete their full term—that was, 20 years' man's time—instead of leaving at the age of 38. He did not think there was a single walk in life where men abandoned their profession at such an age as 38. They all believed that a man at that period of life was positively in his prime, and it did seem curious that the Admiralty did not take steps to recognise this and offer some inducement for the men to serve on. He would be told, of course, that some men re-engaged, and that those who did not re-engage came into the Seamen's Pension Reserve. That, he admitted, would be a very fair rejoinder were they not face to face with the fact that the requirements for the existing Fleet were not sufficiently met. How could they take satisfaction in the fact that these men fell back into the Reserve when they considered that the Fleet in commission was altogether short of men? There should be some method whereby these men who now retired at 38 years of age might be induced to serve on. If they re-engaged for a fifth term, then they had their pension assured to them. He would offer the suggestion that the Admiralty should allow the men to draw the value of the pension they had earned by a full term of service, while they made it a condition in return that they should re-engage not for five years, but for 12 years. Then they would get the most splendid men, the very pick of the Fleet, serving until they were 50 years of age. It would be impossible for anyone to argue that a man of 50 would not be a desirable acquisition. The commissioned officers, the warrant officers, and the engineers served to that age, and he failed to see why these men who were so serviceable should not continue to the same age. It might be suggested that were the men to draw their pension, which was not very great, ranging only from £28 to £38 a year, they would have an amount of independence which would be detrimental to the Service. But he would point out that when these men left the Navy they had to seek other employment in private life; and speaking with some experience of them, he could say that in civil employment they pursued their work with as much assiduity as they did when under the Service of the Crown. Passing to the general inducements to get men to join the Service, it was becoming well understood by the public outside that the terms and conditions of service were not such as to attract young men to join the Navy. One of the great grievances, and one which had been pushed forward for 25 years in the House, was in respect to warrant officers, which was the highest rank the lower deck could aspire to. When they considered what were the qualifications these men must possess before they reached that rank, that they must have faultless characters and pass stringent qualifying examinations, it would be admitted some attention should be given to their desire for a larger avenue of promotion to be opened for them. Qualified men reached this rank generally at about 27 years of age, and then they were face to face with a blank wall till 50 years of age, when they became Chiefs. Certainly they received some increase of pay at intervals, but it was in diminishing ratio to the time served, which was altogether out of the usual custom of the generality of employments of which one had experience. The request the men made was very simple indeed, that they should be able to secure the rank of Chief after 10 years' seniority as warrant officer, and that after 20 years in that position there should be some new rank obtainable to stimulate their interest in the Service. It had been suggested the position should be called "fleet rank," seeing that that term was in acceptance in the Navy, and he thought that it was a very admirable suggestion. The men naturally pointed out with a great amount of justification that the Army was altogether different in. this respect. There was there not only the open gate for continuous promotion, hut a way to obtain commissioned rank itself. The warrant officers in the Navy, however, were not asking for that. He thought the Admiralty, after the strong expression of opinion they had heard from both sides of the House, would have little excuse for putting these deserving men off any longer. The late First Lord of the Admiralty gave very favourable consideration to their desire in 1892. He (Mr. Kearley) was not accustomed lo sing the praises of his political opponents as a rule, but he did think it was only right to say it was his firm belief, and the belief of many others, that had the noble Lord (Lord G. Hamilton) continued at the head of the Admiralty this question would have been solved long ere now. The expense of this additional rank had been mentioned. The total expense which would occur to bring about the promotion advocated would not exceed £3,000. There was no expectation on the part of the men that after 10 years' service they should all be promoted to be Chiefs, but only that the best of their men, those who had passed such examination as the Admiralty liked to set forth, should be eligible to secure the rank of Chief. They also desired to see not less than 25 of their number advanced to Fleet rank. For the sake of £3,000 it seemed altogether a pity that this inducement and stimulus should be withheld any longer. Then there was the case of the engine-room artificers. Here, too, there was a lack of prospect which prevented many men joining who would otherwise do so. They went into the Navy with all their skill, having qualified by serving an apprenticeship to their trade, while the executive petty officers of the Navy who joined as boys, and were trained at the country's expense, had access to higher rank than that open to the engine-room artificers. The rank of chief petty officer was altogether inferior to the rank they ought to hold. While the pay of the executive petty officer averaged 2s. 9d. a day, the engine-room artificer averaged 6s. 1d. Thus on the pay basis alone it was clear that the rating should be a higher one. Now, in conclusion, he would like to say one word with regard to the stokers. These men, it was generally admitted, were the worst treated in the whole Navy. They were badly paid, they had very onerous duties to perform, and yet there did not seem to be on the part of the Admiralty any intention or wish to encourage the men. By denying to them the re-engagement money it was clear they did not wish them to serve on for pension. The trained stoker was just as requisite for the Navy as the trained engineer. It was very frequently demonstrated who were the trained men, especially in hot climates, for it was no infrequent occurrence for the young hands to be hoisted out of the stokeholes in a collapsed condition, whilst the older and more matured men were not so affected. Last year he called attention to the way the marines were not only underpaid but underfed. The men were given to suppose on joining that they would receive a free kit and rations free. But they soon found it was not so. The clothing served out to them was inadequate, and they were obliged to supplement their daily allowance of food out of their pay, which was very small. He hoped the Admiralty would be willing to recognise it would be to the advantage of the Service generally if they offered more inducements to the men to join and remain. The suggestion he had heard that there should be a Committee of Inquiry to consider such matters was a good one, and he felt sure the Admiralty themselves must begin to recognise that some investigation should be made into the subject.

^* : The Debate has ranged over a wide subject, and I do not propose to follow hon. Gentlemen who have spoken at all closely. I propose to deal with the general policy of Her Majesty's Government since they have come into Office, and especially during the past year. Better late than never is the best that can be said for their new naval proposals. Exactly 19 months after they took Office Her Majesty's Ministers began to awake to a sense of their responsibility for the naval supremacy of England, which means the safeguarding of our maritime commerce, of our splendid Merchant Navy, of our Imperial connections and greatness, and of our food supplies. In a word, Ministers who took Office in August, 1892, did not realise till March, 1894, that our national existence and Imperial strength depend upon the maintenance of British naval supremacy. The then discovery came late, and their repentance was tardy; for their sins as regards the Navy had not been merely passive or those of omission; they had also sinned actively and deliberately. When their predecessors fell from Office they left the plans and orders for three battleships, the Renown, Majestic, and Magnificent, which were to have been begun—the first immediately, the other two within two months. The present Government delayed the commencement of the Renown for eight months, and of the Majestic and Magnificent for 17 and 18 months respectively. Moreover, they allowed the amount spent on the new construction of warships to fall heavily below its normal amount for recent years. Thus their expenditure on new construction for the financial year 1893–4 was £1,475,000 less than that spent during the year 1892–3, for the Estimates of which Lord Salisbury's Government was responsible. The present Board of Admiralty—and Her Majesty's Government as a whole, perhaps even more than the Board of Admiralty—were guilty of this neglect and laches at a time when they were aware that other countries, particularly those who are notoriously our political and naval rivals if not our foes, were making immense efforts to increase their naval strength, and especially their strength in battleships. It was clear that those great Naval Powers, notably France and Russia, were, if not already superior to England in battleships, fast completing new ships, in such numbers and at such speed, that within two or three years those two Powers would be considerably stronger in battleships than Great Britain. Notwithstanding this knowledge, and the constant remonstrances, entreaties, and protests against delay, and notwithstanding the encouragement to do their duty given to Her Majesty's Ministers by the Opposition, it is a fact which would be incredible were it not so well known to be undeniable, that from August, 1892, down to January, 1894, not a single new battleship, excepting the Renown, was laid down by the present Government. France was in 1893 rapidly completing five first-class and two second-class battleships. Russia was completing four first-class and one second-class battleships—a total of 12 new French and Russian battleships. Yet but one single British battleship was laid down in those precious 17 months; and up to this moment only three British battleships have been commenced in the 20 months that have passed since August, 1892. In 1893 the tonnage of battleships launched in France was 29,929 tons, in Russia 12,490 tons, in the United States 30,600 tons, in Great Britain nil. That is to say, while our three greatest rivals on the sea launched in 1893 over 60,000 tons, equivalent to six first-class battleships, England, whose strength, nay, whose very existence depends upon her supremacy on the sea, did not launch a single battleship. I have said nothing of the four new first-class battleships which France is laying down this year (1894), nor of the one new first-class and two second-class battleships which Russia is laying down in 1894. These make a grand total of 19 new French and Russian battleships which will be, by the close of 1894, on the stocks, as against three British battleships now building and the seven promised under the new naval proposals. That is, even after these proposals have been carried into effect, at the end of this year France and Russia will be building 19 ironclad battleships, most of which will be finished by July, 1896, as against our 10 battleships, only one of which can be finished before December, 1896. The deliberate and wanton waste of those 20 months of time may, if we find ourselves engaged in a great naval war in 1895 or 1896— which Heaven forbid!—prove to be big with Fate to this country. I think I am justified in calling attention to the fact that the Government have shuffled and shirked with regard to answers to speeches and questions on the increase of the Navy during the past 20 mouths in a way which the history of no other Government can parallel. Dilatory pleas of every kind, and, above all, the plea of "the public interest," have been recklessly advanced over and over again, simply in order to cover the silence of Ministers and to keep Parliament and the country in ignorance. Turns and twists of language have been made use of, which, to say the least, were dis- ingenuous, in order to keep back public knowledge. Everything with regard to the Navy was darkened and concealed and more or less misrepresented until at length—synchronously with another notable event, and, perhaps, dependent upon it—on March 15 suddenly the clouds of evasion and concealment were rolled away, and the Admiralty laid these new proposals before the country; programme they cannot be called; because what I understand by a naval programme is a distinct and definite plan for the development of the Navy covering a definite period of years, with a fixed number of ships at a more or less fixed cost, with due provision made, or, at least, sketched out, for its completion. The proposals of the Government fall short in nearly every condition of being a practical programme. Only in one condition is there any definiteness. The House has been told that for the present the Government intend to build seven battleships, six cruisers, and a certain number of torpedo-catchers, but we do not know if that is a programme for one, two, or more years. We do not know the periods in which those ships are to be completed, nor how much money is to be spent upon them within given periods, nor how that money is to be provided. In short, when we come to examine the Estimates, the proposals are more like a public advertisement than a serious scheme—very much of the same kind as the long list of measures contained in the Queen's Speech. The justice of my criticism will be seen when on the examination of the Estimates it appears that out of £8,500,000 which those new warships are to cost only £1,360,000 is taken during the present year. According to the late Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, next year £3,500,000 will be required for carrying on at proper speed the building of those new ships that have been begun this year. The proposals have been put down in a happy-go-lucky sort of way with a vague and loose trust in the future. Not an inkling is given as to how this large sum is to be provided. How much of it would be available if the hon. Member for Northampton happened to be master of the situation? That is not an absurd proposition, because the hon. Gentleman has already off his own bat heavily defeated the Government. Suppose the hon. Member for Northampton, with his anti-naval ideas, were master of the situation, how much money would he spend on ships, and at what rate of progress would the ships be built? Perhaps the Government think the provision of this large sum would be a nice bonne bouche to leave to their successors. The same happy-go-lucky policy is shown in the proposals for new works, such as harbours, barracks, and naval establishments. I find that for new works, on which over £4,000,000 are to be spent, only £122,000 is taken in the Estimates for 1894–5. Thus, of all the new naval works the dock at Gibraltar is the most vital and the most needed. It will cost at least £366,000, but only £1,000 is to be spent this coining year on the Gibraltar Dock. The extension of the mole at Gibraltar is also most essential. Yet towards the first extension, which is to cost £85,000, only £20,000 is to be spent this year; and towards the second extension, which is to cost £320,000, only £1,000 is to be spent this year.

We are building a new mole.

I am very glad to hear that, for it agrees with my view of what ought to be done. But that only makes it easier to spend more than £1,000 this year on the second mole. £950,000 is to be devoted to dredging, but only £85,000 this year. The new basin and docks at Keyham are to cost £2,000,000, but only £1,000 is taken this year. This is reducing the Estimates to an absurdity. For the armament of the new ships £3,800,000 will be wanted, yet only £800,000 is taken in the present year. Russia and France are together spending in 1894 over £6,000,000 on new construction, while our expenditure on new construction for 1894-5 will come to barely £5,000,000. The Government proposals, if they are complete, are most inadequate. I will now proceed to pass some strictures on answers given by the Government to naval questions put in the House. Among the answers and statements in this House to which great exception should be taken, I put first that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, in the critical Debate on December 19, 1893, said that—

"The professional advisers of the Admiralty" (that is, the Naval Lords) hold "that the existing condition of things with regard to the British Navy is satisfactory;"

and further—

"That the supremacy of the British Navy is at this moment absolute;"

This egregious misstatement the Chancellor of the Exchequer was compelled, by the threatened resignation of the Naval Lords, to whittle down on December 21 to

"The relative force of the various countries in respect of first-class battleships completed in the present financial year."

Was anything more absurd ever stated in this House? But the Division had been taken on the 19th, and the crisis tided over. The Chancellor of the Exchequer also stated on December 19 that we had 19 first-class battleships ready "in home waters." But he only made up his 19 by counting three ironclads, the Repulse, Revenge, and Royal Oak, which were not ready for sea till three months later, and by rating the Collingwood as a first-class battleship—a most doubtful estimate. Moreover, when he spoke, 10 of his list of first-class battleships were in the Mediterranean, over 2,000 miles away. Again, the misstatements with regard to the commencement of the new battleships Majestic and Magnificent were of the most repeated and extraordinary character. Thus, on the 20th of November, the Secretary to the Admiralty stated that those ships had been begun on August 23 and September 12 respectively.

I stated at the time, with perfect truth, that preparations were begun for the Majestic and Magnificent, and so they were.

This is an instance of the turns and twists of language of which I complain. The hon. Gentleman was asked what new battleships had been laid down since August, 1892, and where and what were the dates of their commencement, and the right hon. Gentleman, in his answer, slipped in the words " preparation to build;" but there was not a Member in the House who did not believe from that answer and from other answers on this subject that those ships were begun four or five months before they actually were commenced. When information was asked for with regard to the French and Russian Navies it was refused, with a brusqueness unparalleled in this House, as inconsistent with "the public interest"; and yet, within a few weeks, Ministers did not hesitate to openly give, for their own purposes, the most elaborate details on the very same points. Further, they publicly discussed and made comparisons between the strength of the French and Russian Navies and our own; and they ultimately published statistics making the same comparisons. The "public interest" disappeared so soon as it suited Ministers to discard it. [An hon. MEMBER: Who provoked it?] Does the hon. Member mean to suggest that it was undesirable that the true position of the British Navy as regards those of other Powers should be made known to the British people? Why should facts that are known to every Government and country in Europe be kept back from our own people? Unless he meant that, there is no sense or intelligence in his interruption. I may also refer to the remarkable fact that in the Debate on the 19th of December the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary to the Admiralty withheld all mention of second-class battleships and of coast defence battleships in their comparisons. The Government deliberately threw away 19 months of most valuable time, although they were fully warned of the great progress that foreign countries were making in commencing new ships and in pushing forward those already commenced. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated, on December 19, that the French had only 10 first-class battleships ready, whereas they had 11; and that the Russians had only four first-class battleships ready, whereas they had six ready. Moreover, he left out of all account the second-class French and Russian battleships, which number 26 as against our 22; and their coast-defence ironclads, which are very numerous, and which in action near harbours would be formidable opponents. For a Cabinet Minister, speaking on behalf of the Government, on such an issue as our naval supremacy, to make such mistakes and omissions is a very grave and most unusual error. The fact is that by the end of the year 1896 France will have 12 first-class battleships and 22 second-class battleships afloat and ready. Russia will have nine first-class battleships and six second-class battleships afloat and ready, whereas Great Britain will then only have 21 first-class and 22 second-class battleships afloat and ready. That is, at the end of 1896 France and Russia will have 21 first-class battleships afloat and ready to our 21 first-class battleships; and France and Russia will have 28 second-class battleships to our 22. By the middle of 1897 the numbers will be, first-class ironclads, 29 French and Russian, as against 25, or possibly 27, British; and second-class battleships 30 French and Russian as against 23 British. This is what the Chancellor of the Exchequer calls making the supremacy of the British Navy absolute. I think it is desirable that more moderate-sized battleships, of the Centurion type, should be built. I would rather see five first-class battleships and three new Centurions built than seven new Majestics. On the other hand, I think we need more very fast and powerful first-class cruisers. The Talbot class are, no doubt, a very fine type of second-class cruiser; but the Russians have in the Rurik the most powerful cruiser afloat, and I do not think it can be said that we are strong enough in that direction. Moreover, the Russians are now building two more Ruriks. We welcome the decision of the Government to build fresh ships and to endeavour to maintain the naval supremacy of Great Britain. But we cannot acquit the Government of negligence in disregarding for so long constant protests addressed to them by the Opposition. Nor can we forget that in the process of putting off their naval proposals, Ministers have made use of devices and evasions which are certainly unusual, and, as I think, discreditable.

^* said, he thought the hon. Member deserved their thanks for importing no little humour into that dry discussion. It required no little courage to make remarks involving charges every one of which rebounded upon himself. It was interesting to notice the extraordinary disposition to reform and to improve the Public Service which animated the breasts of gentlemen who had only just gone out of Office. The hon. Member had reproached the Government with having nothing to compare with the Rurik. Why did not the late Government give them something to compare with the Rurik? That vessel was laid down in 1889. If the late Government was so anxious to keep them to the front so that they should not be surpassed by Foreign Navies, why had they not taken steps to rival the Rurik? What was to be said of a Government which, although they remained in Office till the summer of 1892, had left them without even the keel of a Rurik to go forward with?

^* said, the Rurik was not laid down till 1890, The late Board of Admiralty built the Blake and the Blenheim with a view to anticipating the completion of the Rurik. Information of the great speed of the Rurik was not obtainable until a considerable period after she was nominally commenced.

^* said, if it was not possible for the British Admiralty to get the information elsewhere they could have obtained it by asking him. What the Conservatives always said on coming into Office was that they found the Navy deplorably weak. When the noble Lord became First Lord of the Admiralty he stated that the Navy was in a very weak condition, and only a few months after he made the extraordinary statement that then the Navy had become pre-eminently strong. A little later still he said that the Navy was very weak, and to strengthen it introduced the Naval Defence Act. On a former occasion (in 1879) the Conservatives came into Office, and promised us that a real Navy, and not one on paper only, should be maintained. On the very last night that that Parliament met to discuss Navy Estimates the Government had to admit that during the five years they had been in Office they had not finished a single ironclad of their own commencing. With regard to the great naval scheme which the Government had now brought forward, it was, in his opinion, as good a scheme as they could expect under the circumstances. In all the speeches he had listened to that evening, showing the opinions held on the subject by various hon. Members of that House, there seemed to be one view taken of what our naval policy should be. Hon. Members on both sides of that House seemed to think that the chief thing that it was necessary for us to do at the present moment was to put in hand the building of as many new ships as possible. He held that theory to be radically wrong. A few years ago so many ships were laid down that it was impossible to get them finished within anything like a reasonable time. In his opinion, only those vessels should be commenced which could be quickly completed; and he was convinced from practical observation that the late Government had never done a greater service to the country than when they introduced the practice of quick shipbuilding. In the scheme of the Government last year there was a Report showing the work done in the way of ship-construction during the last 30 years, and, judging from the diagram annexed, the year 1893–4 showed a less amount of new work being built during that period than had been the case during any recent part of that period. A safer standard, however, by which to judge of what the real state of the Navy for any given period was, would, he contended, be afforded by comparing the amount of money that had really been expended upon our ships during any given year. He then came to the proposals of the Government with regard to the future policy that would have to be pursued. In order to understand that, it became necessary to consider the position of the country when the Naval Defence Act was introduced. It was then stated that our Navy was so weak that it would require an expenditure of £21,500,000 in order to bring it up to the standard of efficiency that was necessary for us to possess so as to keep pace with foreign countries. The Government decided, therefore, to spend during the next five years the sum of £2,000,000 a year more than had been the average expenditure on the Navy for the preceding five years. The amount the Government now proposed to spend for the present year was just £250,000 less than had been the average for the last five years. Whatever might be. the real strength of our Navy, it certainly was nothing like so strong as it would appear to be from the list of the ships of the Navy which the Government had had printed, and which Members who did not go into the matter might reasonably suppose represented our fighting Navy. At any rate, eight or nine ships on the list would be of no use at all if war actually broke out—such, for example, as the Camperdown, the Collingwood, the Rodney, and others. It was, therefore, clear that to compare the relative strength of the English Navy with that of any other nation merely by counting the number of vessels possessed by each was one of the worst ways that a conclusion on that important question could be arrived at. He would only say this—that if we were left behind in naval armament to the extent represented by the Front Opposition Bench, the reason was that the Naval Defence Act had not gone far enough. But that was a matter which could only be settled by a Committee of the House, who would be under no obligation to whitewash any Admiralty Board. The question had been asked whether we were wise in building seven first-class ironclads instead of 12 second-class battleships, as there were other Powers with ironclads not larger than our second-class ships. But what he would like to know was whether we, with our tremendous interests at stake, should run the risk which must follow from our speculating in a question of this kind, instead of taking the assured course? The assured course was that every ship we built of the first-class should be unquestionably superior to every ship that was being built anywhere about the world. With that policy, which was a clear and definite one, we could rest securely upon our Navy; but if we began to tamper with that principle; to speculate and say that we would have smaller ships—that we would leave half the armour off here, and half the guns out there—we might multiply our ships by the thousand, but we should be building ships that could not fight or retain our mastery over other nations. Therefore, he approved entirely of the Admiralty policy of building large ships. He was, however, a little surprised to see in the First Lord's Statement an intimation that the new ships were not going to be alike in all respects to the battleships Majestic and Magnificent.

They will be almost entirely alike. The designs are the same.

^* said, he was relieved to hear that statement. What he objected to strongly was the multiplication of differences in our ships. What was the use of having our ships generally alike in design and size if there were internal minor differences—not differences of principle, but of detail, such as would baffle officers and men and make the ships completely strange to them. All those ships should be as precisely alike as it was possible to make them, so that men who were at home in one of them should be equally at home in all. He should, therefore, like to appeal to his right hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty to use his influence at the Board of Admiralty, for the purpose of seeing that no changes were introduced into the internal arrangements of vessels of practically the same shape and size, except for the best of reasons. It was most essential to the interests of the Public Service that all ships of the same class should be alike. He believed he was right in saying that the reason why changes had been made in the Majestic and Magnificent, and why those ships had been made larger than the Royal Sovereign, was because they were to carry a larger coal supply. It would be injudicious to blame the Government for enlarging those ships in order to enable them to carry a greater coal supply, seeing that they were ships which would have to fight at distant stations. Reference had been made to tubulous boilers. The information he possessed did not enable him to criticise the introduction of tubulous boilers, but he should say that the reason given for their introduction by the First Lord in his Minute was not to his mind at all satisfactory. It was said there that the tubulous boilers were introduced with a view to increasing the speed. But if boilers of the old principle were quite right for the Powerful and the Terrible they would he quite right for the other large ships we were going to build. He could not understand the argument that these boilers were introduced because high speed and great power were required in the vessels. He wished to say a word about the minor question of the nomenclature not only of the ships, but of the classes of those ships. The nomenclature of the classes of the ships was discreditable to the intelligence of the Admiralty and its staff. He would only give one instance. Every ship that was, put down in the Admiralty list as a "protected cruiser" was a cruiser of which the first characteristic was that she had no protection whatever, her engines and boilers being the only things on her that were protected. The late Admiral Faraday, when he was in this country, said to him—"The one thing to bear in mind is this: never deceive your sailor. Your sailor will go into battle on anything; he will incur any danger you like to subject him to if only you do not deceive him; but if you tell him he is going to fight under protection, and it turns out that he is not under protection, he loses heart at once." It was a monstrous thing to send our seamen and officers to incur all the chances and mischances of the Naval Service abroad, in what were truly unprotected vessels, knowing that if an accident happened to their vessels they would be held up to the world as men who had had a protected vessel placed in their charge. Neither the present or the late Government were responsible for this system of classification, and he only mentioned the matter in order to get it put right. He had listened with great care to the speech of the late Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood), and he thought it had been much of the type of that of the ex-Civil Lord (Sir E. Ashmead-Bartlett). The right hon. Gentleman had said immense stress on the non-commencement of certain ships. But what did it matter, if the expenditure was not wasted, whether it was devoted to this ship or that ship? If all the ships that were being built were really wanted why should there be any complaint because the Government, in the exigencies of the Service, thought it better to finish one class of vessel before another? His right hon. Friend (Sir U. Kay-Shuttleworth) had stated that the reason why new vessels were not laid down before was that it was thought better to push the existing vessels to completion. He (Sir E. J. Reed) thought that was a perfect answer. It was, in his opinion, much better to complete the unfinished vessels than to lay down new ones. The Admiralty did not deserve the reproach which had been levelled against them in connection with the building of the Majestic and the Magnificent. It was perfectly true that, when building took place, sometimes in open docks, it was desirable to do as much preliminary work as possible under a shed before placing any of it in a dock at all. This, he understood, was the system which had been pursued in regard to these vessels, and it had been found so advantageous, not only in commencing vessels, but in sending them forward, that he thought it a little too bad, after an explanation had once been given, for gentlemen to again reproach the Government on the subject. He should have been very glad indeed if the Naval Service could have undergone greater expansion. Several gentlemen had spoken about the proposals of the Government as a programme. It was a programme to this extent, that it dealt with the ships which the Government proposed to build, but it would be for the Government who were in Office at the end of this year to say what the programme of the following year should be. It might be true that in regard both to contract work and dockyard work the Government that was in Office at the end of the year would be under certain obligations, but he thought the House would be disposed to abstain from adverse criticism, merely because the expenditure of the present year must necessarily mean an expansion of the Navy next year, which would be even greater than that of this year.

said, the hon. Member who had just sat down always commanded attention, because he spoke with a knowledge which few men possessed. He was sorry, however, that the hon. Member had introduced his old argument about the 8 or 10 ships on which he would not like to trust a relative. If the hon. Member was not satisfied with those ships let him exert his great influence with the present Government, and induce them to increase the present programme and to build more ships of a type he was satisfied with. He agreed with the hon. Member in thinking it was not fair to compare the numbers of our ships with those of the ships of Foreign Navies. The true comparison was that of the work which each Fleet had to do. He always took exception to the argument which was so often used that our Fleet should be equal to the combined Fleets of any two Powers. The true comparison was, as he had said, that of the work to be done by the different Fleets. Naval men would, no doubt, have preferred that the policy of the Government should have been embodied in an Act of Parliament, so as to ensure continuity of policy. Though he did not doubt that the intentions of the Government were good, he feared that when the hot fever passed away they might not, if they were in power next year, give the same evidence as they were giving this year of the sincerity of their convictions. Great stress had been laid by various speakers on the objections to the action of the Government in ordering the torpedo-boat destroyers without the authority of Parliament. He wished to speak as a non-Party man on naval questions, and he certainly rejoiced that the Admiralty had practically forced the political branch of the Service to get the permission of the Treasury to order these torpedo-boat destroyers. He was prepared to think that the Naval Lords might have had good reasons for not disclosing their policy in the matter until they were masters of the situation. It was well known to those who had studied the question that the authorities of a friendly Power did not look much to the defence of the Channel by men-of-war, but had the idea of concentrating their battleships at Toulon. The hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. E. J. C. Morton) had urged the consideration of certain grievances which affected certain classes of men in the Service, especially with regard to the promotion and rank of warrant officers. He could not urge that policy too strongly, as he thought it would give great encouragement to the seamen in the Service. He thanked the hon. Member for West Belfast (Mr. Arnold-Forster) for his very able speech, which showed a grasp of naval questions that was rare to find in a gentleman who did not belong to the profession. He must, however, take exception to the hon. Member's remark that naval men were too slow in adopting breechloaders. The reason why the British Navy did not go in for breechloaders for many years was that the Service had suffered very badly through bad breechloaders being supplied to it. He believed it was not until after the Franco-German War that a satisfactory breech-closing apparatus was invented. As to the censure that had been passed on the Admiralty for not converting the guns of the Monarch and other vessels, he thought it was the duty of the Admiralty to see that the taxpayers' money was not unduly thrown away, in view especially of the fact that muzzleloading guns fired as accurately, though not as rapidly, as breechloaders. The suggestion that torpedo vessels should be manned with yachtsmen was not a bad one, although, of course, it would always be necessary to have certain expert gunners and officers on board each torpedo boat. His hon. and gallant Friend (Commander Bethell) had gone in rather strongly for the smaller class of battleships of the Centurion and Barfleur type. He (Admiral Field) only wished that those who took that view had had the privilege of attending a discussion at a recent meeting of the naval architects upon a Paper read by Mr. White on the subject. He (Admiral Field) examined Mr. White's arguments and found that not a word was to be said in favour of the smaller vessels, except that they could go through the Suez Canal and act as flag-ships on the China and Australia Stations. Mr. White, in his Paper, had said that seven Centurions might be obtained for the cost of five Royal Sovereigns, but he himself preferred a smaller number of large ships to a greater number of smaller vessels. He would leave to others the discussion of the question whether there was in the increased number any compensation for the loss of individual power. Arguments had been put forward in favour of a class which would carry more coals; and though that argument had been knocked away, because it was true the smaller vessels equalled the larger ships in speed and in coal endurance, at the same time they were inferior both in offensive and defensive power, and could not hold their own against foreign ships of war, whose armour they could not pierce, but whose guns could pierce their armour. It was important that the public mind should be properly informed on that subject. To effect the necessary saving the calibre of the guns must be reduced as well as the thickness of armour, both on belt and barbettes. The Admiralty, therefore, were carrying out their duty in giving preference to the larger to the smaller class of ships, however attractive the prospect of having seven instead of five might be. He had listened with pained surprise to the statement of the hon. Member opposite, who would lead the House and country to believe that the seamen in the Naval Service were discontented. All he could say was that the officers in the Navy knew that their men were not discontented, and if there was any real ground for complaint on the part of the men their officers would be the first to bring it under the notice of the Admiralty. The officers knew their men and the men trusted their officers, and he defied any hon. Member to attempt to sow distrust between naval officers and their men, whose best friends they knew were the officers who commanded them, and worst enemies such advocates as the hon. Member opposite. The hon. Gentleman and his friends might do good service in protecting the seamen of the Mercantile Marine, but nothing of that sort was wanted in Her Majesty's Fleet. Another speech, too, that of the late Secretary to the Admiralty, had made him very unhappy, because it appeared to imply that he objected to the construction of the torpedo-boat destroyers. Naval Lords at the Admiralty must, with the information at their command, know better than anybody outside the preparations being made by Foreign Powers; and, in his opinion, the Admiralty had rightly determined to supply our deficiencies in that respect, and to supply us with well-designed boats for the purpose, instead of following the example set at the time of the Russian scare of 1884, when 50 worthless and ill-designed vessels were ordered and built in a hurry without the sanction of Parliament. The Admiralty were quite right under the circumstances in ordering those torpedo-boat destroyers without saying a word to the House or anybody about them. Another point raised was with regard to the troopships. He thought the criticisms of the right hon. Member for the Ormskirk Division with regard to troopships were unfair and unfortunate. The right hon. Gentleman stated that transport by Imperial troopships cost £6 a head more than by private ships. But the last Return on the subject, presented in 1891, showed that the cost of conveyance by troopship was £8 14s. 2d. per head, while the cost by hired ships was £10 10s. 4d. The Commander-in-Chief and Lord Roberts were opposed to giving up the Imperial troopships, and he held that on the ground of health, comfort, and discipline they ought to be maintained for the transport of Her Majesty's troops. It was not fair for the right hon. Gentleman to say, in the absence of facts up to recent dates, that transport by the Imperial troopships cost so much more than by private vessels. It was the duty of this country to treat the defenders of the Empire in a proper and humane way, and they ought not to have to put up with inferior accommodation even if it could be obtained on the dirt-cheap principle. The right hon. Gentleman had urged that naval officers should acquire nautical skill and experience in the Mercantile Marine, but he did not think they would learn much by ploughing the Atlantic in merchant vessels. Complaint was made that the Fleet was not long enough at sea. But that was simply a question of coal consumption, and nobody had objected more strongly to the expenditure incurred in steaming at high speed than the right hon. Gentleman himself. Then the late Secretary to the Admiralty had complained that the boys in the Navy were not properly trained. That was like Satan rebuking sin. When in Office there was no greater enemy of the training squadron than the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman wished to annihilate the training squadron, and it was owing not to him, but to the Naval Lords, that it still existed. He hoped the Naval Lords would adhere to their opinion, for that squadron was the best training school the Navy had. A good deal had been said about the deficiency in engineers. If they were in want of engineers, he presumed the Admiralty would know how to tempt them into the Service. He believed that the fierce competition in our Mercantile Service was responsible for the number of foreigners employed in ships of the Mercantile Marine, and he would heartily support any scheme which would bring back to employment in that Service a larger proportion of our own countrymen in place of the foreigners now employed. It was a deplorable fact that the reserve of British seamen on whom we should have to depend in time of war was a diminishing quantity. He must be pardoned for referring to another objectionable observation made by the late Secretary to the Admiralty in regard to Captain Hall, of the Resolution, whose conduct in putting back to an English port under the circumstances was, he contended, perfectly justified and ought not to have been called in question, especially by the late Secretary to the Admiralty. The captain of a vessel had always a discretion in commanding it, and the exercise of that discretion ought not to be called in question without some very good cause. In regard to the personnel of the Navy, naval officers were greatly exercised at the present time as to how they were going to find men to man the ships now in course of construction. On all hands he heard that the Admiralty were at their wit's end to man even ships at present being placed in commission. The officials at the Admiralty were no doubt judges in that matter, but naval men outside were not bad judges of the necessities of the case. A distinguished officer had told him that day that on one occasion he had asked permission to man his own ship in his own way, and he recruited 300 of the best Scotch fishermen on the, coast that he could get. Those were the men they ought to get hold of to put into the Second Class Reserve, but they did not offer them any attraction. This was for the right hon. Gentleman to make a note of. It was the opinion of a man who knew what he was talking about. They did not offer enough inducement to enrol these men in the Second Class Reserve. They were splendid men. They did not want men to go aloft, but they did want men with their sea legs and with some nautical instincts, who could handle ropes and understand steering. They were as strong as giants and had a splendid fighting spirit in them, and they only wanted a little training. This gallant Admiral he was speaking of got 300 of these men, and, having got them, the Admiralty stole them from him afterwards. But the gallant Admiral was one too many for the Admiralty. He met the ship in the Downs which had these men on board, and, being senior officer of the two ships, gave a written order to deliver 100 men at once, and got them. This was an interesting anecdote, and the point was that there was a large reserve of men on the coast of Scotland, and they had not got hold of half the number of men they ought to have. The Second Class Reserve was not up to the standard of the Scotch fishermen. He was sure his gallant friend who had pressed this on him so strongly was on the right tack. They ought to do more to get hold of these Scotch fishermen. They would be most valuable when trained, as they possessed all the necessary requisites except trial at the guns, and they would be amenable to discipline in a very short time. But they did not give a large enough retaining fee. The First Class Reserve men had a very fair fee and pension; the Second Class fee was a thing not worth mentioning. Some remarks had been made about the alterations of the Service, and this was a case in which he thought attention was wanted. He was certain they wanted more men than they had, and here was a way to obtain them. He then wished to draw attention to the Naval Ordnance Vote. Allusion had been made in the Debate by various speakers, especially by the hon. Member for Belfast, about arming our cruisers with machine guns. In the Vote they had £3.56,000 put down for guns of various classes, of which 558 were quick-firing guns, but they were not described, as far as he could see. There was a quick-firing gun now of such great importance, that he hoped the Admiralty would not give an order for any more Hotchkiss quick-firing guns until experiments were carried out in these new 37 millimetre Maxim guns, and were reported on by experts. All officers were of the opinion that torpedo-boat destroyers ought to be armed with the very best machine guns they could find. The way to destroy torpedo-boats would be to hail and rain shot and shell on them. One of these guns was tried in Russia recently against five Hotchkiss guns, each gun being manned with three men only. They were tried in a gunboat steaming full speed past a torpedo, and the Russian Naval Technical Committee reported the fact that one Maxim gun with three men, both in rapidity of fire and effect, was superior to the five Hotchkiss guns. He had no interest in the Hotchkiss or any other gun, but he wanted the Admiralty to take care that they were not supplying the Hotchkiss gun until the experts had reported on the new one. Naval men were all agreed that the only way to repel torpedo attacks at night with certainty was with these Maxim guns. Nothing could live under them. They had all heard of the performances of the Maxim gun in South Africa. He next called attention to a gun at Portland which was not mentioned, though he had been promised that a sum of money would be put down in the Vote for the mounting of the gun. But he did not see it down. He wanted to say a final word about a matter which was very dear to his soul. The Hartington Commission in Clause 36 recommended that through the great mass of business which came under the Naval Lords, and the whole of which could not possibly receive their full personal attention, it appeared to them that the absence of the naval assistants to the Lords of the Admiralty might account for some of the evils which Sir Geoffrey Hornby and others-considered to exist. They further, in Section 39, considered that it would be of advantage that each member of the Board were required to prepare annual Reports of the condition and working of the Apprentice Service placed under his immediate control. That was what they wanted. That was what the Committee upstairs asked, and what they had never had. This practice would tend to mark that individual responsibility for administration of well-defined duties which they desired to enforce. They should get that brought before the Board, and ask the First Lord of the Admiralty to act upon it. It was the Report of the Royal Commission in a strong recom- mendation that that policy should be carried out. They recommended elsewhere that naval assistants should be given to the Naval Lords. Sir Anthony Hoskins, in his evidence before the Committee upstairs on the Navy Estimates, said he was satisfied with the present system of administration of the Admiralty as a Board, though he did not say it was perfect, but he considered it answered all purposes. He could not suggest any improvement, except that each Naval Lord should have a naval assistant, and this would then meet all requirements. Why could not they get these naval assistants? Every year nearly he had asked for them, and they were asked for by the Commission, but they could not get them. They recommended, as an additional reason for these naval assistants to the Naval Lords, that it would be giving the younger officers of the Service, who might some day occupy these great posts of responsibility, most valuable experience for future use, and they would be able to relieve their naval chiefs of a great deal of the detail work of an inferior kind which they could do just as well as their chiefs. It appeared from this Report, also, that the First Sea Lord had not sufficient time at his disposal, but the Service did not wish to see him relieved of his administrative duties, because he would lose touch with the Service. But they did feel that if this recommendation of the Commission was acted upon it would be an enormous advantage to the Service. It would cost little or nothing to the country, because there were many officers now serving on half-pay who, if put in this position, would be of enormous service to their naval chiefs, and they would be doing good and making excellent preparation for some future time. What Sir Geoffrey Hornby wanted was to see more naval men in the Admiralty. He ventured to urge this not long ago in the Press, and urged it then with all respect before the Committee. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not forget this point and the others he had pressed upon him. He hoped he would follow the good example set by the Secretary of State for War when the Army Estimates were under discussion. Someone complained of grievances of the Volunteer Force, and the Secretary of State for War immediately said he would grant a Committee to inquire into the grievances. Would the right hon. Gentleman in the same amiable spirit grant a Committee to consider the various grievances which had been put before him and the Civil Lord on former occasions and again on that night? They had dealt with the dockyarders because they could concentrate their political power, but they did not pay attention to the grievances of seamen and stokers because they were dispersed all over the globe and could not concentrate their political power. He was afraid he had trespassed rather long upon the time of the Committee, but the time he had taken was not too long for an important discussion. On the previous day they had the House crammed to suffocation over a question of minor importance, but it was a curious thing that when the great naval power of England was under discussion they had comparatively empty Benches.

wished to draw attention to the fact that when this Vote was before the Committee before, the right hon. Baronet the Secretary to the Admiralty and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War rather sprang a statement upon the House to the effect that they had deter- , mined upon introducing the eight hours system into the naval dockyards and into the arsenals. He did not hesitate to say that when it was examined by the country it would be looked upon as a far more important question than at the moment it might have struck the House. He thought it was only to be expected that certain parties throughout the country would immediately take the opportunity of endeavouring to follow that example as far as they possibly could. He would put a few figures before the Committee to give an idea to what extent the eight hours system would affect the commercial interests of this country compared with the previous nine hours system. In the first place, it was a most gratuitous act on the part of the Government to introduce the eight hours system. From the representations made by some hon. Members representing dockyards, amongst all the grievances he was not aware that the question of the hours of work was brought forward with that degree of prominence, and was urged with that vehemence which many other points were, and he thought the Government should have hesitated very much before they should have come forward and volunteered to grant not exactly a request, but a sort of dream of an idea, that the House must please certain sections of workmen in the dockyard, although his own feeling was that it was more to gain the approval of a section of the workpeople outside the dockyards. The only section, so far as he was aware, which had brought any pressure to bear upon public opinion in the matter of eight hours had been the miners, and he thought it was well understood, from the very full inquiry which was now being held by the Labour Commission, that there were very divided opinions even amongst the miners themselves. He thought this action of the Government was very disrespectful indeed to the Labour Commission, which they had practically proved. Even with regard to dockyards, where there was now an enormous amount of machinery applied, it became less and less important that men should, by any special extra exertion on their own part, be looked upon as being able to do as much in eight hours as they did before in nine. He felt that this action of the Admiralty in introducing the eight hours system was springing upon the industrial interests of this country a very serious crisis. He looked upon it that it would he the cause in this country of many millions a year of dead loss. The men throughout the country made no complaint whatever about the hours of labour, and the change was made now when the Chancellor of the Exchequer had an empty purse. The time chosen by the Government for making this experiment was most inopportune. He thought the Leader of the Opposition would be able to draw the attention of the country to the very grave mistake which the Admiralty had made. With reference to the question of manning, he thought the Mercantile Marine suffered as much as the Navy for the want of apprentices; and if in any way the Government could encourage the practice, he should be very glad if it became once more compulsory that there should be a certain proportion of apprentices, not only in sailing ships, but in steamers, throughout the country, so that there should be a rising generation, as in the olden days, of those who, having embraced the Mercantile Marine or the Navy as a pursuit, might stick to it for the rest of their lives. He thought they would then not require to bring in so many foreigners to man our fleets; not that we should grumble about foreigners coming to seek work from us, seeing that we went all over the world to obtain advantages from them. He expressed regret that the Government had, he believed, abandoned the rating of the workmen in the dockyards. It was only fair that there should be a difference in the wages of men who did different classes of work. He had heard some say that if pensions were reduced and more wages given it would be to the advantage of the men. But, in case of war, they wanted the men in the dockyards to be perfectly loyal and true—not going to strike and give up their work at the very tune when their services were most required, so that what between rating and pensions they would be able to retain a class of men in the dockyards in time of war which on no other principle they would be able to count upon. He hoped the First Lord of the Admiralty would not lose sight of the remarks which had been made in reference to the improvement in the status of engine-room artificers. He therefore urged the Secretary to the Admiralty to seriously consider this important matter, and to provide under certain conditions and regulations that artificers in warships should be classified as warrant officers. That would meet the wishes of very many first-class men; it would be to them almost equal to an increase of pay, and it would make them more loyal to the Service, to which in the future they would be more and more invaluable.

desired to say a word or two by way of enforcing some of the remarks which had been made in the course of the Debate, and the concluding remarks of the hon. Member who had just sat down. He would not incur the wrath of the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Admiral Field) by suggesting that the men in the Navy were discontented; but he would refer to the grievances mentioned by the hon. Member for West Belfast, and show the accuracy of the hon. Member's statement in that respect. He would take simply the broad fact that of the men who joined the Navy 40 per cent. retired after 10 years' service at the average age of 28. That did not imply much content with the Service. There was no profession, trade, or industry in which that could be said of those employed in it after a long training and an elaborate apprenticeship. What became of these men who left the Navy at the rate of 300 a year? Some went into the service of the great Ocean Liners; and it was absolutely true, as had been said by the Member for Middlesbrough earlier in the evening, that the American Navy was almost manned altogether by men of this class who had left the English Navy after only 10 years' service. He recollected a speech made by Mr. Bayard, now the Ambassador to the Court of St. James for the United States, delivered at the time when, as Secretary to the Navy, he was answering the proposition that there should be a training school for the American Navy, in which that gentleman said that there was no need of such a thing, because Great Britain trained their sailors for them, and they could get, at the age of 28 years, the best trained men for the American Navy.

I think that was during the American Civil War.

^* : My hon. Friend has got hold of an entirely wrong set of figures. Of the seamen 65½ per cent. re-engage, and of the stokers 84½ per cent. re-engage. That disposes of the argument of my hon. Friend.

These men are re-engaged as what?

As seamen and stokers.

said, what he desired to point out was this: that to keep the men who left the Service at the end of 10 years a largely-increased expenditure was not necessarily involved. But consider what they lost by these men leaving the Navy at such an early age! In training alone, apart altogether from pay, it cost for an able-bodied seaman £200, and not only so, but a seaman was not completely trained until he reached the age of 25. It was only after the men had reached 25 that they got the full value of the £200 that had been spent upon each of them. Therefore, as regarded 33 per cent. of the men who joined the Navy, they only got three years' good out of the money that had been expended on their training. If they could induce these same men to go on for another 10 years that would mean they would get four times the value out of them that they got at present, and all that was now lost by the fact that these men left the Service.

A third of them come back at the end of 12 months.

said, he was speaking, of those who did not re-join. He maintained that the amount of money they lost in that way was a considerable set-off against the amount of money that it would require to retain these men for an extra 10 years' service. The question was, what was needed to retain them? It was perfectly obvious that the men could not be kept in the Service when they reached the summit of their career at 25 years of age, and had to wait till 55 before being entitled to their pension. To render the Service sufficiently attractive it was absolutely necessary to open a higher rank to the warrant officers, as was done with the non-commissioned officers in the Army and the Marines. There should be created a fleet rank for carpenter, boatswain, and gunner equal to that of the lieutenant, and commanding the same pay. At the present time there were warrant officers actually employed on lieutenants' duties, and he could not see what objection there could be to recognising the rank of these men and giving them the rank and pay of lieutenants and increasing their number, as it needed to be increased. The warrant officers were willing to undergo an adequate examination for the posts. It only cost £200 to train an ordinary seaman, whereas it cost £1,200 to train a lieutenant, so that it would in that respect be a saving. He had never been able to understand what objection the Admiralty had to putting the Navy in the same position as the Army in regard to the warrant officers, and he trusted they would now see their way to accede to the urgent appeal which was made on behalf of this class of men.

I think the Committee will feel we are discussing this most important subject this evening under some disadvantages, disadvantages which naturally attach to a position of affairs, and for which I am not disposed to hold the Government entirely responsible. It is a misfortune, to a certain extent, that it is so difficult to be able to have one consecutive discussion in regard to naval affairs, taking the subjects in order and keeping them together. We have had a most interesting Debate this evening. Occasionally it has turned upon men, occasionally on the shipbuilding programme, and occasionally on finance, and it is somewhat difficult to arrive at what may be the general feeling of the Committee on any particular subject. I think it would be better if we could discuss a larger number of subjects with the Speaker in the Chair; but right hon. Gentlemen opposite will remember that an appeal was made to us that it was indispensable to finish the financial matters connected with the Navy by a given day, and therefore we fell in with the view of the Government that the Speaker should leave the Chair without any further discussion. But I think it has somewhat damaged the possibility of keeping the subjects as much together as could be desired. There is another disadvantage under which we have laboured to-night —namely, the necessary absence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—an absence which we all deplore knowing the cause to which alone it is due. In his absence it would have been difficult to open up some of those questions connected with finance which are so extremely important looking at the general programme. We have a programme now before the Committee which I believe it would be easy to prove is a programme as large as the programme of the Naval Defence Act; but we have not yet been honoured with any statement of the total expenditure that will be incurred, and it will be our duty to elicit some more positive declaration from Her Majesty's Government as to the future expense which will be incurred. We do not wish to know the particular expenditure on any particular ship, but we want to have some general idea as to the progress of expenditure during the next few years, a knowledge which is absolutely indispensable to this House if we are to form any judgment of the Budget of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I think it will be our duty, and probably that of others, to discuss this arrangement of Her Majesty's Government and to contrast it with those conditions of execution which we believe to be essential to carrying out the plan and which we embodied in the Naval Defence Act, and I am sure the Government will not think it unreasonable if, in the absence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I defer my remarks upon the financial question. I think it would be unjust if I endeavoured to open up such a wide field of discussion to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have to reply; but there are one or two points outside finance which I would lay before the House in the few minutes remaining to me. For my own part, I am certainly disposed to congratulate the Government on the fact that they have submitted to the House large proposals which we hope further explanation may prove to be adequate to the situation, and I am sure there is a general disposition on this side of the House to import only a minimum of Party controversy into the Debates. But right hon. Gentlemen opposite must remember that if there is to be an absence of Party controversy, which for my part I most earnestly desire, no Party capital is to be made out of the Navy outside the House. There have been strong remarks made outside the House, and a controversial tone has been introduced outside the House by some Members of Her Majesty's Government—the Home Secretary and the Civil Lord of the Admiralty—but I hope that in the continuance of these discussions it will be possible to discuss the programme and the means of carrying it out without any resort to Party controversy. Her Majesty's Government is not only to be congratulated on the fact of their programme, but also upon some of the circumstances which they have in their favour. I am not only glad for the sake of the country that this distinct advance is to be made in the number of ships. There is another circumstance on which I congratulate the Government, the House, and the public, and that is the remarkable unanimity with which the proposals of the Government, independent of details, have been received in the House of Commons. I believe that unanimity is worth a good many ironclads. There may have been certain sections in the country, who, no doubt from conscientious motives, have rather put forward the view that there were alarmists in the country who were forcing naval expenditure for other than essential reasons; but that view must be discarded now for good. It is strong evidence which we are able to give to foreign countries that practically we are unanimous in our determination and our desire to push shipbuilding up to that point. It will show that we are dependent on no entangling alliances, that we are not dependent on the discretion of any other Power; but we are ready for every occasion which may arise. It is possible that some disappointment may be felt by those who provide the sinews of war that there is so much difference of opinion as to the ships which should be built and as to whether the expenditure is wise or not. It is a most disheartening circumstance that every successive Board of Admiralty is never able to secure a fair consensus of opinion either from experts or naval officers. My hon. and gallant Friend who spoke a few minutes ago is perfectly acquainted with that. He said the naval officers agree to differ. Well, among the most able of the Lords of the Admiralty are some of the very best naval officers. My hon. and gallant Friend appeared to speak as if the official element was a non-naval element. Surely that is unjust to the Lords of the Admiralty. I was at the Admiralty for some time, and I remember well the officers by whom I was advised. There was no one who gave me more constant advice than the late lamented Admiral Tyron, whose loss we all deplore. He was constantly at my side. He was fresh from contact with the junior captains of the Service, and he was able to represent their views to me. On the other side there was Sir A. Milne and Admiral Beauchamp Seymour—all thoroughly knowing what was wanted. I must not go into more names or I might omit some. I congratulate the Government on the officers whom they now have as their advisers. I admit that when I was at the Admiralty it was one of the most extraordinarily anxious matters to be able to discriminate between the views of different schools of naval officers. My hon. and gallant Friend behind me said he had never known any naval officer who had recommended the low freeboard system. [Commander BETHELL: No, no!] I so understood him; but this system was reported upon by a Commission composed of representatives of naval officers and scientific men, and that Report was signed, amongst others, by Admiral Hornby. It was said by naval officers that half the money was misspent, and my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast (Mr. Wolff), himself a great shipbuilder, said that many millions had been badly spent. I make these remarks because, notwithstanding all that has been said of the differences which exist between experts and naval officers, when we come to look at the matter in a practical way we know that we have ships that, with all their faults, are competent to meet the ships of other countries.

It being Midnight, the Chairman left the Chair to make his report to the House.

Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.

I beg to move the Second Reading of this Bill. It is precisely the same as the Bill of last year, which was interrupted by the close of the Session. It is purely a Consolidation Bill. All parties have agreed to it—those representing the shipping interests, as well as those representing the sailors, and I, therefore, hope there will be no opposition to it.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—( Mr. Mundella. )

said, he did not intend to oppose the Bill, but he would like to be assured that any Amendments in the Bill which made it different from the Bill of 1893 had been approved of by the Joint Committee; also that the Bill was purely a Consolidation Bill, and that nothing had been introduced into it which departed from the general policy of the Merchant Shipping Acts.

Speaking on behalf of a large section of shipowners, I hope the House will allow the Second Reading of this Bill. It is a Consolidation Bill, so far as it is possible to make it. It is clearly not a reform of the Shipping Laws, which need reform, but before reform consolidation is necessary.

It is not a Consolidation Bill; it is far more, and I must object to it.

I can assure the House that it is a Consolidation Bill. On all hands it is desired that this work, which has now been going on for years, should be completed. The Bill is going to the same Committee as last year.

Is it not the fact that the Bill creates two new felonies?

It creates no change whatever in the law.

I must object.

I believe that no one would have been more anxious for the Second Reading of the Bill than the hon. Gentleman, and I trust he will not interrupt the work of the Committee.

said, that if the right hon. Gentleman really gave him an assurance that the Bill was a Consolidation Bill, and that if it turned out to be more he would accept Amendments limiting it to consolidation, he would make no further objection. He had read the Bill carefully; he thought it was more than a Consolidation Bill, and a Bill which ought to be discussed.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a second time, and committed for Thursday.

said, he should like to know whether the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland was willing to accept the addition to the terms of Reference which he had put on the Paper—namely, in line 5, after "1891" to insert,

"And the effect upon the interests of tenants, encumbrancers, and landlords respectively in holdings dealt with under the said Acts."

Unless the right hon. Gentleman was prepared to accept that extension he must oppose the Motion, as, in his opinion, it was necessary that the Order of Reference should be widened. He thought, also, that the House should have some statement from the right hon. Gentleman himself as to the purview of the Reference—whether it was intended to limit the action of the Committee simply to procedure, or whether the Committee would have the power to inquire afresh into the results of land legislation with regard to individual rents? The matter was of great complexity, and would practically land them in a re-trial of a large number of cases. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would accept his Amendment, and unless he was able to do so they must ask for a discussion, in order that they might hear fully the objects of the Government in appointing the Committee.

I do not think that my hon. Friend, or the hon. Gentlemen who sit near him, have any reason to complain of a want of a conciliatory spirit having been shown on the part of the Government in this matter. The hon. Member must admit that I have from time to time altered the form of this Reference with a view to meeting the objections—though I did not think them well founded—of the hon. Member and others. The Order of Reference, as it now stands, is, in my opinion, not at all an adequate description of the inquiry, which I think all Members of the House who understand the present position of the Land Question in Ireland would desire to have. I understood that when I put the Reference on the Paper in the form in which it now appears, that it would dispose finally of all the objections which could be taken to the appointment of this Committee. The words suggested by the hon. Member appear to me to add nothing to the value of the Reference, nor to import any new significance into the Order of Reference. I have made so many efforts to meet objections that I find myself unable to go any further in the way of assenting to the addition of the words proposed. The hon. Member asks that a full statement should be made as to the broad object of this Committee. I think that the object is sufficiently defined in the Order of Reference, and I should be wasting the time of the House without any purpose whatever if I entered into a general statement of the object of the inquiry. I do not believe that this inquiry in the form in which it is now presented to the House is objected to by any hon. Member opposite except the hon. Member himself. The majority of hon. Members from Ireland representing Irish interests of every kind are in favour of the Reference as it now stands, and I hope the hon. Member will withdraw his objection and let the Committee get to work.

said, he would like to point out that on Thursday last he had asked the Chief Secretary a question on this point. The Leader of the Opposition rose and asked the Chief Secretary to confine the Reference to the first portion, and stated that if that were done it would meet with the approbation of all Parties in the House, and that the Chief Secretary might get to work after that as soon as he chose. The Chief Secretary, on consideration, amended the Reference in that direction, and it now carried out what the Leader of the Opposition desired on Thursday last. He could not see that if the words of the hon. Member were added to the Reference much would be gained, especially as his object could be attained by the Reference as it stood. No Irish Member opposed the Committee or the form of Reference—the opposition to the Reference had been entirely left in the hands of English Members—and he thought the hon. Gentleman ought to allow the Committee to get to work on this matter which had excited great interest in Ireland.

asked whether the right hon. Gentleman would consent to move the Reference on Thursday instead of that evening, so that an effort might be made to come to some arrangement by that time? The Leader of the Opposition could not attend that night.

The Leader of the Opposition has already stated his view. I cannot see that anything is to be gained by further delay until Thursday, and therefore I cannot assent to the hon. Gentleman's request.

I object.

Motion postponed till Thursday.

^*

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—( Mr. J. E. Ellis. )

said, that the previous evening the hon. Member for Rushcliffe had voted with the Government for the withdrawal of the whole time of private Members this Session—

^* : Not the whole time. There are Wednesdays and Friday evenings for unofficial Members.

said that, under the circumstances, no exceptional advantage should be given to anybody, and he therefore objected to the Second Reading of the Bill.

Second Reading deferred till Tuesday next.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT (IRELAND) PROVISIONAL ORDER (No. 3) BILL. (No. 115.)

Read a second time, and committed.

LAW LIBRARY, FOUR COURTS (IRELAND) BILL.—(No. 131.)

Read a second time, and committed for Thursday.

Margarine Bill

On Motion of Mr. H. Plunkett, Bill to amend "The Margarine Act, 1887," and "The Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875," ordered to be brought in by Mr. H. Plunkett, Mr. Arnold-Forster, Mr. J. Redmond, Sir R. Paget, Mr. Barton, and Mr. Maurice Healy.

Bill presented, and read first time. [Bill 152.]

Advertisement Regulation Bill

On Motion of Mr. Boulnois, Bill to enable County Councils to make bye-laws with respect to Advertisements, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Boulnois, Sir E. Clarke, Mr. Caine, Mr. Darling, Mr. Benson, Mr. Arnold-Forster, Mr. Smith-Barry, and Mr. Vicary Gibbs.

Bill presented, and read first time. [Bill 153.]

Crown Lands Bill.—(No. 4.)

Read a second time, and committed to a Select Committee of Seven Members, Four to be nominated by the House and Three by the Committee of Selection.

Ordered, That all Petitions against the Bill presented Three clear days before the meeting of the Committee be referred to the Committee; that the Petitioners praying to be heard by themselves, their Counsel, or Agents, be heard against the Bill, and Counsel heard in support of the Bill.

Ordered, That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers, and records.

Ordered, That Three be the quorum.—( Sir J. T. Hibbert. )