, who had the following notices on the Paper:—

"That the Bill be re-committed to the former Committee;"

and

"That it be an Instruction to the Committee to add four additional members to the Board of Conservators as now proposed in the Bill—namely, two representing the Corporation of the City of London and two representing the London County Council; and, further, to make the constitution of the Board of Conservators, as amended, remain in force until December 31, 1896, unless continued by Act of Parliament beyond that date or altered by Act of Parliament before that date,"

rose to move that the Bill be re-committed.

said, it would be very convenient for the House to be informed whether the Motion for the re-committal of the Bill and the proposed Instruction could be taken together.

^* said, the Motion for the re-committal of the Bill can be taken because it is down by Order, but it can only be taken without reference to the proposed Instruction, which is not down by Order; and if there is any objection to the Instruction being taken, it will have to stand over. It can only be taken now by agreement on both sides.

said, he was willing to meet the convenience, of the House, and was ready to move both the re-committal of the Bill and the Instruction to the Committee or to postpone the matter to the following day. He was in no sense desirous of opposing the Bill.

I understand that that course is not practicable. We cannot take both the re-committal and Instruction.

^* : What I said was, that as one was down by Order and the other was not, the Instruction cannot be taken to-day if it is objected to. It is scarcely possible to discuss the re-committal without reference to the Instruction.

Perhaps it would be convenient if I stated what I am prepared to do.

said, the promoters of the Bill would prefer that the Motion of re-committal should be taken that day, because if the Motion was rejected the proposed Instruction would fall through.

^* : The Motion for re-committal is in Order, but the Motion for the proposed Instruction is not in Order, and must stand over unless there is a general consent that it shall be taken. If any technical objection is made, the notice must stand over in accordance with the Standing Orders.

said, he was quite willing to go on with one part or to postpone the whole question until a later and convenient day.

We consider it much better that the re-committal should be taken to-day. If the County Council are beaten on that no more will be heard of the Instruction.

It is a rather difficult thing to deal with the two points separately, but I will do the best I can under the circumstances. But am I obliged to move the Motion in, my name, seeing it would be obviously for the convenience of the House it should stand over till we can take the Instruction?

^* : The first Motion being by Order that must come on today, unless arrangements can be made between the two parties.

said, there was nothing left but to move it under the circumstances. He explained that the object the County Council had in view was not to throw out the Bill, but to so amend the constitution of the Conservancy Board as to add to the representation of the metropolis upon it. During the progress of the Bill through Com- mittee changes had been made in a contrary direction to that desired by the Council and those who represented London. At present London was represented on the Board by ten members—seven from the Corporation and three from the County Council; but the present Bill reduced that representation to eight, while 12 members were given to the upper parts of the river. On previous occasions when the Conservancy Board was reconstituted—in 1864 and 1866—the Bills which ultimately became Acts were preceded by an inquiry by Committee; but the Committee on this Bill had been unable—had not been empowered—to make that extended inquiry which he held to be necessary. Taking interest and population into account, it was felt that a larger representation ought to be ensured on the Conservancy Board for the Metropolis, and that the Bill as it now stood could not be accepted by those who represented London as a satisfactory or final solution of the question. The preservation of the Port and Harbour of London was a very important matter. The question of the London water supply was also involved, and the functions of the Conservancy Board had been very widely extended, while on the showing of the Board itself the funds placed at its disposal were, in view of the work it was to do, very inadequate. At any rate, London ought not to be placed in a worse position on the Board than it was now. In order to ensure that proper inquiry might be made into the whole question of the representation on the Board, the County Council desired that a clause should be inserted in the Bill terminating the Conservancy Board at a given date. He repeated that he had no desire to defeat the Bill; on the contrary, he wished it to pass, and if without re-committal it was possible to move the Amendments he had to propose when the Bill again came before the House, he was quite willing to, do that in order to save time. His main point was that the Metropolis ought to be more fully represented, and to secure such fuller representation was his sole object.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "now considered," in order to add the words "re-committed to the former Committee."—( Mr. J. Stuart .)

Question proposed, "That the words 'now considered' stand part of the Question."

^* : I understand the hon. Member to say he is willing to allow this stage to pass if he can move his Instructions in the form of Amendments on Report.

Yes, I am prepared to do that in order to facilitate the Business of the House.

What is the view of the opponents of the Instruction? It would be impossible for the Motion for re-committal and the Instruction to be fixed for the same day.

We prefer that this part of the question should be debated to-day, because if the re-committal is defeated we shall hear no more of the Instruction. I should like to know whether, if this state of representation is restored, the hon. Gentleman would be satisfied?

said, he was desirous of pointing out the great difficulty in which the House would be placed if they attempted to discuss the Motion for re-commitment without at the same time discussing the questions that arose upon it. He hoped that all difficulties would be got over by some reasonable arrangement on both sides which would enable a settlement to be arrived at without the necessity for spending the time of the House upon it. That might turn out to be the case if the Instruction were withdrawn and the matter allowed to stand over until the hon. Gentleman had put down such Amendments as he desired to move. As he understood, they were at present precluded from discussing the matter on its merits, and he might say he thought it might not be necessary to discuss it at all, so near had the parties arrived at an agreement.

said, he agreed it would be extremely difficult to discuss the questions involved separately, and that it would be a better thing that they should debate the whole matter at one time. He thought, in the meantime, there was a reasonable chance of a settlement being effected, which might save the House the trouble of discussing this matter, and which would satisfy all the parties. He thought a postponement was the best course that could be adopted.

said, he had no desire to interfere with a reasonable arrangement, but he wished to point out that the difference between the Instruction of the hon. Member opposite and of his hon. Friend behind him only represented one feature of the question for consideration. There were a number of other matters which would be affected; and if they were going to open up a decision deliberately arrived at by a Committee upstairs after 28 days of laborious and most careful consideration, the House must, in common justice, admit to the re-consideration not only the persons interested in the Instruction of the hon. Member, but also the representatives of all the other interests concerned. In order to enable the House to have within their view the other matters arising out of the Instruction it would be necessary to place an Amendment upon the Paper. For himself and friends he might say that they loyally accepted the conclusions arrived at by the Committee and did not want to re-open any of them; but if an arrangement was proposed that this present discussion should terminate and the matter raised by Amendments dealing with the points at issue, he must protest, in the name of the other persons interested, of the injustice of such a course, for unless they were allowed to put upon the Paper Amendments embodying their views it was impossible that they could be discussed. If such Amendments were put down they must necessarily prolong the discussion. He repeated that, so far as the up-river constituencies went, they were disposed to accept the conclusions of the Committee as they stood.

^* said, his suggestion was that, both in the interests of the shipowners and the London County Council, it would be better that the first part of the Motion should be withdrawn. The hon. Gentleman made an observation upon the constitution of the Board when—

rose to a point of Order. He said the hon. Gentleman was, as he understood, discussing the merits of the Instruction which had been put down on the Paper. Mr. Speaker, as he took it, had suggested that a discussion of that kind was out of Order.

^* : It was not my suggestion, and I should not presume to make any suggestion to the House; but my opinion was asked, and I said the Motion was in Order, although, perhaps, inconvenient. Technically, as I have said, there would be a breach of Order, but it is a very slight one, which I thought might be permitted in this instance. My suggestion is that both the Motion and the Instruction should stand over to another day, until they can both be put down by Order or treated as though they had been put down by Order for the same day.

said, he should very strongly oppose any alteration of the agreement arrived at by the Committee. Their recommendations were not all that he desired, but he was willing to accept them. If the matter had to be re-opened he should wish to adopt the suggestion of Mr. Speaker, so that the subject whenever it came on should be discussed as a whole.

said, that as the Chairman of the Committee perhaps the House would allow him to say that he felt they were placed in a very considerable difficulty. It was impossible adequately to discuss or even to answer what the hon. Gentleman opposite had said unless they were prepared to deal with the Instruction to the Committee as well as with the Motion to re-commit the Bill. It was obvious that there were questions underlying the Instruction which were of the greatest importance with regard to the Bill as a whole. He wished to join in the appeal that they should act on the suggestion of Mr. Speaker, that the Motion should be withdrawn and put down for another day, when the whole question could be discussed. This matter raised questions of such great importance, not only with respect to this Bill but with respect to the whole procedure of the House of Commons, that he felt it was better that it should be threshed out in a complete discussion.

said, that after the suggestion which Mr. Speaker had been good enough to throw out, and the feeling expressed by the House, he thought it wise to allow the course suggested to be adopted and the Motion to be withdrawn.

^* said, in that case the Motion would be withdrawn and the discussion would be attached to the Motion for re-commitment of the Bill.

said, he understood that the suggestion of the hon. Member for Shoreditch was that he should prefer to proceed by setting Amendments down to the Motion. He should like to know whether it was competent to proceed in that way supposing that the matter should stand over from that day?

^* : In that case the hon. Gentleman might have to ask the House for leave to withdraw, and that leave might not be granted. Of course, if the hon. Gentleman desires it, I will ask the opinion of the House upon the question.

May I not withdraw the present Motion? If an arrangement is come to it will be unnecessary to refer it back to the Committee.

Then I will agree to the postponement until to-morrow. [ Cries of "No!"]

^* : The matter can be formally postponed until to-morrow, and a date afterwards fixed for the discussion.

Debate adjourned till To-morrow.

Mr. Speaker, I desire to call the attention of the House to a question of Privilege of considerable importance. It is not in any sense a Party matter, nor is the Resolution which I intend to propose one of a controversial character. But the matter does raise a question of grave Constitutional importance, and, although it is somewhat technical, I think the House will be glad to have attention called to it. The matter arises out of a Motion which was unanimously adopted by the House on Tuesday with reference to the vacancy in the Attercliffe Division of Sheffield. The Motion was made—

"That Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrant to the Clerk of the Crown to make out a new Writ for the election of a Member to serve in the present Parliament in place of the Hon. B. Coleridge, who, since his election, has accepted the office of Steward of the Chiltern Hundreds."

Now, that is a very unusual form in which to move the Writ in such a case. There is, I think, absolutely no precedent for it. But the Motion is usually one entirely formal, and I do not think that the unusual character of it on the present occasion attracted any particular attention. But I want to call attention to what follows from having carried this Resolution. It is based on two propositions. The first of these propositions is that Mr. B. Coleridge was up to his acceptance of office a Member of this House; otherwise, of course, he could not have vacated his seat by accepting office. The second proposition is that at the time of accepting office the Hon. B. Coleridge was not a Peer of the realm. That, of course, is involved in the wording of the Resolution. He was described as the Hon. Bernard Coleridge, the eldest son of a Peer, but not a Peer; but this also follows from the former proposition, because if he was a Member of the House of Commons at the time he accepted office he could not be a Peer at the same time. Consequently, the House by passing this Resolution has indirectly decided that a man may be a Member of Parliament and not a Peer, although he is the eldest son of a Peer who is deceased. I wish to call the attention of the House to the extremely important consequences which follow from this. Why is it, if at all, that the Hon. B. Coleridge was not a Peer at the time he accepted the office of the Chiltern Hundreds? It can only be because he had not fulfilled a certain formality—that is to say, because the Writ of Summons which calls him to the Upper House had not been issued. But the Writ of Summons is only issued on the application of the person who succeeds to the Peerage, and consequently a person who succeeds to any Peerage will have it in his power to refrain from applying for a Writ of Summons, which is as long as he pleases, and during the whole of such time he will be eligible as a Member of this House and may sit in this House. Of course, the House understands I am not saying this is so, but I do say this follows from the Resolution passed on Tuesday. But that is not all. Not only an eldest son, the heir of a Peerage, who now sits in this House, would have a right to continue to sit in this House, but every successor to a Peerage would be eligible as Member of Parliament so long as he had not applied for his Writ of Summons. My right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary, speaking at Rotherham last night, referred to some proposal which had been made for allowing a Peer to choose whether he would be a Peer or a Commoner, and I think he said it would be a most intolerable thing that a person should be able to exhaust the privileges of the House of Commons and then, when tired of the House of Commons, go up to the House of Lords. That is precisely what we have established by the Resolution of Tuesday last. It will be perfectly possible, if that Resolution is sustained, for a man, say, in the position of the Hon. Bernard Coleridge, to refrain just as long as he likes from applying for the Writ of Summons, and during the whole of that period he will be eligible to sit as a Member of this House. It has been suggested that if the Government are in any way responsible for the Resolution in question—which I do not suppose they are more than formerly—then this Government, which is committed to mending or ending the House of Peers, have really hit upon a means of granting to Peers a new and exceptional privilege—a privilege for exhausting all the delights of the House of Commons, and then, in their old age, retiring to the House of Lords, as to a haven of rest. But what has been suggested to me is that, after all, this may be an invidious way of ending the House of Peers, because every successor to a Peerage who has enterprise, energy, and ambition will probably choose the House of Commons during his period of juvenility, and will only seek the House of Lords when he reaches the stage of decrepitude, I think, then, I have shown that the effect of the Resolution of Tuesday will be to bring about enormous Constitutional changes, and, although I myself am not, prepared to regard altogether without favour some proposition which would allow the eldest son of a Peer greater choice than at present, still the House will probably agree that no, such change ought to be admitted incidentally into our Constitution or without full consideration. I want now to take the other alternative. Suppose that the Resolution is admitted to be wrong, what have we done in that case? In that case, the House of Commons is in a most embarrassing position. It has been induced to make itself ridiculous by saying the thing that is not. It has been induced to declare a seat vacant for a reason which does not exist, whereas the seat was previously vacant a week ago for a totally different reason. It is perfectly evident things cannot be allowed to remain in their present position, and therefore it is I have thought it desirable to call the particular attention of the House of Commons to the circumstances. If the House will bear with me I will proceed to consider what, after, all, is the main question. Was not the Hon. Bernard Coleridge a Peer on Tuesday last before he accepted office, or was he not? I have examined as far as I could—with the assistance which the authorities of the House are always so ready to render—the precedents upon this subject, and I must say they appear to be continuous and consistent. The first one to which I will refer is a dictum of Mr. Speaker Onslow, who was Speaker between 1727 and 1754. I should say that at that time the practice with regard to the vacating of seats by Members called to the Upper House differed materially from our present rule, because in those days it appears to have been the custom, immediately upon the death of a Peer, to move for a new Writ, the seat being held to be vacated thereupon if the heir of the Peer were at the time a Member of the House of Commons. The Writ was moved for—that is to say, without waiting for any proof. And this question having been brought before the House on one occasion, Mr. Speaker Onslow said—

"When a person becomes a Peer by descent, the instant the ancestor dies, the heir becomes a peer, and his seat in the House of Commons becomes immediately vacant, and there is no necessity to wait for the issue of the Writ to call such heir to the House of Peers, for it is only a Writ of Summons to attend his service there, and without it, and though he should never take his seat there; he is to all intents and purposes whatsoever, a Peer of the realm."

That was the state of the law and the custom of the Constitution as laid down by Mr. Speaker Onslow. Since Mr. Speaker Onslow's time, and, I imagine, a little previously to the beginning of the century, a different course prevailed, and it became the habit of the House of Commons to ask for proof that the person who claimed the Peerage was entitled to it; and the best proof of such claim was held to be the issue of the Writ of Summons, of course after examination by the Committee of Privileges of the House of Lords. In 1809 a case arose where General Bertie became Earl of Lindsay, and the Writ having been issued on the death of the Earl of Lindsay, subsequently a writ of supersedeas was moved and carried, because the Writ of Summons had not been issued by the Crown; and the House of Commons, although they had proof of the death of the Peer, had no proof who was really his rightful successor. In 1811 the wisdom of the course which has since been pursued by the House of Commons was, I think, clearly justified, because in that year Lord Dursley claimed the Peerage of the Earldom of Berkeley, and upon his claim a Writ was moved, and a new Member was elected in the place of Lord Dursley. That new Member was Sir William Guy, who sat for the County of Gloucestershire. Subsequently the Peers rejected the claim of Lord Dursley, and the Earl of Berkeley claimed the seat in the House of Commons, so that there were two claimants for the Gloucestershire seat. Subsequently Lord Dursley, or Colonel Berkeley, as he was then called, did sit in the House of Commons again until he became a Peer under another title. But, the House of Commons having been clearly induced into error in that case, I believe I am right in saying that subsequently, without exception, it has always required proof of the rightfulness of the claim by demanding that the Writ of Summons should have been previously Issued. There Was a case in 1830, when Lord Lovaine became Earl of Devon, where an attempt was made to move the Writ before the Writ of Summons had been issued, and the Mover referred to a previous case—that of Lord Carlisle—where the then Speaker had inquired when the Writ was moved whether the Writ of Summons had also been issued. But, attention having been called to the matter, the Speaker had explained that he had only done so as a matter of curiosity, because the seat in the House of Commons was vacated whether the Writ had been issued or not. I wish to call attention to that. The point is this: that, while the Writ of Summons is evidence as to who is the real successor, the seat is vacated by the death of the predecessor, and the seat becomes vacant immediately upon the death of the predecessor, although the House of Commons does not take cognisance of the fact. On the occasion to which I have referred Mr. Speaker Manners Sutton deprecated the issue of a Writ, and said the House would require special and positive evidence that the Member had become a Peer. That positive proof, he said, was to be found in the Writ of Summons, but if that Writ was delayed other proof might be received. The fact of the issue of the Writ of Summons is not the only evidence that would be conclusive. In 1835 there was a similar case, when Mr. Speaker Abercrombie decided that it would be highly inexpedient to direct the issue of a Writ, and said the only safe and certain evidence was that the Member had received the Writ of Summons. In 1840 there was a very curious case, in which the Writ was moved and granted in the case of Lord Stormont, who had become the Earl of Mansfield, while the late Earl was actually unburied. The reason was that Lord Stormont was a Peer of Scotland as well as of England, and in the Peerage of Scotland; there is no Writ of Summons, and the House proceeded on current rumour or general knowledge and did not ask for the special proof of the Writ of Summons. Lastly, there was the case of 1844, where Mr. Scarlett became Lord Abinger, and where the Writ was delayed for a period of three weeks, in order that the Writ of Summons might previously issue. A Member of the House of Commons complained of the delay in the issue of the Writ, and stated that it was a great injustice to the constituency. Thereupon Mr. Speaker Shaw-Lefevre said it was true that when a Peer of the realm died his eldest son ceased to be a Member of the House of Commons; but he explained that the House had no means of knowing whether the claim to the Peerage was bonâ fide , and the only safe course was to wait for the issue of the Writ of Summons before moving for a new Writ. I think the House will see that in all these cases there is one consistent, logical, and plain rule—namely, that the seat in the House of Commons becomes vacant upon the death of the predecessor, but that the House of Commons is justified in not taking notice of the claim until it has been proved either by the Writ of Summons, which is the more convenient and general way, or, failing the Writ of Summons, by some other evidence. The delay of the House of Commons in dealing with the matter must not, however, be held as affecting in the slightest degree the status of the person concerned. That person—that is to say, the heir to the Peerage—is debarred from taking his seat in this House, and his seat has become vacant, whether his claim to the Peerage is admitted or not. I will put a case—an extreme case. Suppose a Peer dies leaving two claimants to the Peerage, A and B. Until it is settled who is the true claimant the whole question is in abeyance. If A and B were both Members of the House of Commons, then if either of them sat or voted in this House he would do so at his own risk and peril, and if either of them afterwards were declared to be the rightful heir his Peerage would date from the death of his predecessor, and if he sat and voted in the House of Commons he would be liable to whatever pains and penalties might attach to that action. The point is—and I will apply it to the case of the Hon. Bernard Coleridge, according to everything that has proceeded from previous Speakers who have dealt with this matter—at the time the Writ was moved and the office of the Chiltern Hundreds was granted to him the Hon. Bernard Coleridge did not exist, but in his place there was Lord Coleridge, the second Baron Coleridge; and Lord Coleridge being unable to sit in the House of Commons, the seat was ipso facto vacant, and it is untrue to infer, as we did by our Motion the other day, that that seat became vacant in consequence of the acceptance of office by the Hon. Bernard Coleridge. I think that is consistent with the position which à priori we should have supposed to be the case. In the first place, the grant of a Peerage is to a man and his male heirs, and as soon as the man dies the heir takes up the title. There is no lapsus , no cessa- tion of continuity. It is just the same in the case of an hereditary title as in the case of a Monarchy:—"The King is dead; long live the King!" The new King takes up the title and obligations on the death of the old King, and in the same way the new Peer is a Peer from the moment of the death of his father or predecessor. I should also add—although it is a small matter—that evidently the view I take of the position is also the view taken by Lord Coleridge himself, because on the day when the office of the Chiltern Hundreds was granted to him under the name of the Hon. Bernard Coleridge, he was writing a letter to his constituents in Sheffield, in which he expressed his deep regret at being forced into the House of Lords, and he signed the letter, "Your grateful friend and servant, COLERIDGE." I deny altogether that it is possible to treat Lord Coleridge as if he were a double-barrelled person. He cannot be Lord Coleridge and the Hon. Bernard Coleridge at the same time. If my precedents are not disturbed, he is, and was upon the death of his father, Lord Coleridge, and, that being the case, it is clear that what we ought to have done was to have waited for the issue of the Writ until the Writ of Summons had been applied for. I assume that the Government would have had some influence with Lord Coleridge to induce him to wait for the issue of the Writ of Summons, and if the Writ were delayed the House would have had full authority to proceed upon other evidence. In no case, I venture to think, is there any precedent under similar circumstances for issuing the Writ before the Writ of Summons had been applied for. I have seen some allusion in the newspapers to a precedent, which it was stated arose in the cases of Lord Russell and Lord Swansea, but I think it will be admitted that the case of a Peer by creation is totally different from that of a Peer by descent. A Peer by creation does not become a Peer until his Patent has passed the Great Seal, and it was competent to give Lord Russell and Lord Swansea the Chiltern Hundreds and vacate their seats, because they remained Members of the House of Commons until the time when the Patent had been passed, but that is not the case in regard to Lord Coleridge. Well, what is it which the Government have done, and what is it the Government have induced the House of Commons to do? In the first place, they have given the Chiltern Hundreds to a Peer. I believe complaint has already been made that the present Cabinet have given too many offices to the hereditary House, and here is another office styled, I believe, "one of profit under the Crown," which has been given to a Member of that House. I admit it is within their right to do that, but then, Sir, what they have done is to give it in the wrong name. They have given it to a person who did not exist, and that is, I think, an irregularity of which the House is entitled to take notice. But, Sir, they have done worse than that. I contend that they have broken the law, and I must call the attention of the House to the Statute which regulates the vacation of seats when office such as that of the Chiltern Hundreds has been conferred. It is the 6th of Anne, chap. 41, section 25, and it provides that—

"If any person, being chosen a Member of the House of Commons, shall accept of any office of profit of the Crown during such time as he shall continue a Member"—

these are the words to which I wish to direct attention—

"his election shall be and is hereby declared to be void, and a new Writ shall issue for a new election, as if such person so accepting were naturally dead."

Well, Sir, the Hon. Bernard Coleridge, or Lord Coleridge, did not accept the office during the time he was a Member. He accepted it after he had ceased to be a Member by the death of his father, and consequently this Resolution if not illegal is exceedingly irregular, and I am not quite certain that it would not be held null and void. It is only in the case of a Member during such time as he shall continue to be a Member that the seat can be declared to be void. In my opinion, therefore, our declaration of a seat as void, based on the assumption of office by a man who was not a Member of the House of Commons at the time he accepted office, was absolutely without legal effect. I must also point out that if it were held to be legal there is a proviso to this section which will have a very curious result, because it runs as follows:—"Provided nevertheless that such person"—that is, the person owing to whose selection for office the seat has been declared void—

"shall be capable of being again elected as if his place had not become void as aforesaid."

If, therefore, Lord Coleridge was a Member of the House of Commons at the time he accepted office, and if his acceptance of office vacates the seat, then Lord Coleridge at the present time is under the Statute eligible for a seat in this House. That is the absurdity to which we have been reduced by the undue haste and precipitancy of somebody or other in applying for this Writ for the Attercliffe Division. I would ask, what was the ground for moving in this matter so hastily? Why could not the universal precedent have been followed; why could we not have waited either for the issue of the Writ of Summons or for proper evidence? As far as I understand from the newspapers, the people of Attercliffe are in no particular hurry. They have difficulties and differences of their own to settle, and a little time would have been of great advantage to them. I am totally at a loss to understand what ill-advised person can have decided that it was necessary to hurry this matter forward with such indecent haste. In any case, the House of Commons is in considerable embarrassment and difficulty, and, under the circumstances, I trust that the Government will make no objection to the proposition which I now venture to submit—namely—

"That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the circumstances under which the New Writ for the Attercliffe Division of Sheffield was issued on Tuesday, 26th June, and into the law and practice of this House relating to the Vacation of Seats of Members who succeed to Peerages."

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the circumstances under which the New Writ for the Attercliffe Division of Sheffield was issued on Tuesday, 26th June, and into the law and practice of this House relating to the Vacation of Seats of Members who succeed to Peerages."—( Mr. J. Chamberlain .)

I do not rise at all to oppose the Motion which the right hon. Gentleman has made. I think it is a very proper Motion. I think that the House should inquire into this matter and settle the law on the subject. But I must state my entire difference from the right hon. Gentleman in his view of what has hitherto been regarded as the law of Parliament on this matter. He referred to a conversation—I think it was between Lord Egremont and Mr. Speaker Onslow—which is reported in an early edition of Hatsell , but he did not refer to a correction of that report which absolutely negatives the conclusion he drew. The proposition laid down by the right hon. Gentleman is this: that a man who is, in fact, a successor to a Peerage ceases to be a Member of the House of Commons from the fact that he is such a successor. He referred to a case in which there were two claimants to a Peerage, and said that if one of those claimants had turned out to be in the wrong, and not really entitled to the title—

I said that the one who was declared ultimately to be the rightful heir would suffer pains and penalties for an act done at a time when his succession was doubtful.

Well, I think the case to which I am going to refer absolutely controverts that proposition. Mr. Hatsell corrected the conversation to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred, and laid it down that until the King, by Writ of Summons, called a man up to the House of Peers, that man could not lose his right to sit in the House of Commons. Under the Statute 3 & 4 Geo. III., cap. 26, it is provided that there must be a certificate given by two Members of Parliament stating that a Writ of Summons has been issued under the Great Seal of Great Britain to summon the Peer to Parliament. Why not certify the late Peer's death? If what the right hon. Gentleman says is correct, and that the death ought to vacate the successor's seat at once, why is this provision made in the Act of Parliament; why does the Act require that before a Writ is issued for the election of a new Member to this House there should be a declaration that the Writ of Summons has been issued? If the right hon. Gentleman is right that requisition is totally unnecessary. There are also the words used in the Order of this House for a warrant—namely—

"To make out a new Writ for the election of a Member for so-and-so in the room of so-and-so, who since his election has been called up to the House of Peers."

Now, why was that rule established? Because you had no proof that any particular individual was the heir. You must have proof. He has got to prove to the satisfaction of the House of Lords the death of the Peer he claims to succeed; he must prove the marriage of that Peer, and he must prove that he is the eldest son and the legitimate son of the deceased Peer. Until this is proved the House of Commons has no right to surmise that the man who is a Member of the House of Commons has ceased to be a Member. In my opinion, there is no ground whatever to assume that, until such proof is given, a Member of the House of Commons has lost his seat. The House of Commons assumed in the case of Colonel Berkeley that he had become a Peer. The right hon. Gentleman says the House may place itself in an absurd position in this case by assuming that Mr. Coleridge is not yet a Peer. Well, in Colonel Berkeley's case, the House of Commons chose to make the assumption that a particular person was the eldest son of Lord Dursley, and had succeeded him. Colonel Berkeley was a Member of the House of Commons, and until the House of Commons has some proof that an individual Member returned by a constituency and sitting in this House is a legitimate heir to a Peerage, it has no right to declare the seat vacant on the ground that he has succeeded to a Peerage. That is the principle which has been acted upon in all these cases. I need not refer to all the cases.

"When it is advisable,"

is said in the last edition of Sir Erskine May's book,

"to issue a Writ without delay in the case of a Member created a Peer, it is doubtful whether the seat be legally vacated until the Member accepts the Chiltern Hundreds or until the Patentis made out."

Of course, that is not on all-fours with this case, but the rule is the same. You have no right to conclude that an individual has become a Peer by succession until you can prove it. Of course, the best proof you can have is that furnished by the House of Lords. After the death of Lord Coleridge there was no man who could sit in the House of Lords in his place until an investigation had taken place, for the House of Lords would not allow anyone to sit there. It is perfectly true that there are two cases which I think throw some light upon the subject. In the case of Mr. Scarlett succeeding Lord Abinger, Mr. Tufnell, who moved the Writ, said there might be extreme cases in which a person, from unwillingness to take his seat in the House of Peers, might cause the suspension of the Writ for an indefinite time if the practice of waiting for the Writ of Summons were allowed. Yes, but for what period of time? It might be for many years. Take a case like that of the Berkeley Peerage or the great Douglas case. There may be a man who claims to be a Peer, and if you wait until the decision of the question whether he is a Peer or not you will disfranchise his constituency during the whole time the matter is in suspense. I venture to say that what we have to do is to regard the interests of the constituency in this matter. The first object of the House of Commons is that every constituency shall as soon as possible be represented in this House, and everything that delays that representation is a wrong to the constituency. If a man either voluntarily or involuntarily refrains from proving, or in consequence of conflicting claims is unable to prove, his right, such a course would disfranchise his constituency for an indefinite period. In that case Mr. Tufnell said that the House acknowledged him as a Peer by descent, and that on the death of his father the notoriety of the event was sufficient ground for considering that the Writ should be issued. The House of Commons cannot take notoriety as a sufficient ground for acting in refusing a Writ in the case of a man who has legitimately vacated a seat in this House. The Speaker, in the case I am quoting, said—

"It is true that when a Peer of the realm dies his eldest son ceases to be a Member of the House of Commons, but the House has no means of knowing whether a claim made by one of its Members to a Peerage be bonâ fide or not, and therefore the only safe course to adopt is to wait for a Writ of Summons. The House will recollect rather a recent case in which a Member of this House claimed to be a Peer and it afterwards turned out that he was not so."

Then he said that the House of Commons ought to require some better evidence of the succession of the son on the death of the father than common report. Then there was a case dated in 1830 in which important statements were made, though I do not say by any means that they settled the law. This was a case of a new Writ, moved, I see, by a relation of mine, for North Nottinghamshire, Lord Scarborough's seat. The Speaker, having heard the statement of the hon. Member and the Motion which was submitted to the House, felt himself called upon to declare that, in his opinion, it was highly inexpedient for the House to direct that the Writ should be issued. The only safe and certain evidence which the House could act upon was that the Member had received his Writ of Summons and had been called up to the House of Peers. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, who at that time was Mr. Goulburn, said that there was another important point of view in which the Government ought to be consulted. Suppose in the case of a contested Peerage the House of Commons had issued a new Writ, on the allegation of one of its Members that he had succeeded to the title, would not that be very prejudicial to the interests of his opponent? If the applicant did not, after all, establish his claim, he would be deprived of his seat in the House of Commons; and then Mr. Goulburn said that he apprehended that, until the Writ of Summons should be issued, a Member should be entitled to the privileges of a Member of the House of Commons. My right hon. Friend must have overlooked this case.

I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. I quoted the whole of it. I did not quote the words of Mr. Goulburn, but I did say that, if the contention were sustained, the result would be that every man who succeeded to a Peerage would have it in his power to sit on in this House just so long as he liked, and need not apply for a Writ of Summons.

I only wish to point out to the House what is the present state of the law as declared by great authorities. True, there is another man whose authority is worthy of great consideration in a matter such as this—I mean Dr. Lushington. Dr. Lushington concurred in the objections that had been taken to the Motion to issue a new Writ on the allegation that a Member had become a Peer before he had been so declared by the Lords, because he submitted that that would be to prejudice the judgment of that Assembly. Therefore, we should be undertaking, if we issued the Writ before the Writ of Summons had been given by the House of Lords, to determine that a man was a Member of the House of Peers, and we might, therefore, on our own authority declare a man to be a Peer whom the House of Lords later might declare not to be a Peer. All must admit that a conflict of jurisdiction of that kind would be most inexpedient, if not, indeed, wholly unconstitutional. Then we are at once brought face to face with this point. The right hon. Gentleman says that either we must wait for the Writ of Summons or for some other proof to be given to this House. How is this House going to obtain proof? Are we going to have a Committee of Privilege to examine whether a man has become a Peer or no? We have never adopted that course before, and it would be a most inexpedient precedent to set up. I quite agree that if a man chose not to sue—if I may use the expression—under a Writ of Summons, he might go on disfranchising his constituency for an indefinite time. That would be a great inconvenience and a great wrong also to his constituency. We might, no doubt, defeat such an attempt by instituting an Inquiry of our own. The only other alternative would be for us to wait for the issue of the Writ of Summons. As I said, there are, no doubt, conceivable cases where it might take a very long time, however much the claimant desired to forward matters, for him to prove his case. What, then, has been the course that this House has thought fit to take? I do not say that it is a course very much to be recommended, but it is the one that the House has always taken whenever a doubt of this kind has arisen. Whenever there has been a doubtful case with regard to a man's right to sit in this House, the way of settling the question has always been to bestow the Chiltern Hundreds, about which there is no doubt, and thereby to preserve the rights of representation in this House to his constituency. The right hon. Gentleman says that we were violating the Statute because we gave the Chiltern Hundreds to a Peer who had ceased to be a Member of the House. That is begging the whole question. It has never been proved yet that he is a Peer. What notice to that effect has this House or the Government received? What notice had they upon which it was possible to act? Certainly none that we can act upon, and, therefore, if there be a doubt in the case, you ought assuredly to give the constituency a right to return its Member by a method which, although indirect, is at any rate certain in its operation. Take the case of Mr. Bagwell, who in 1801 took Holy Orders. It being doubtful whether his doing so rendered his seat vacant under the then existing law, he was offered and accepted the Chiltern Hundreds. Why was that? In order that there might not be the delay and trouble of arguing in this House whether his taking Holy Orders vacated his seat. It was a short and ready method by which delay was removed. So again in 1835 Lord Morpeth accepted the office of Chief Secretary for Ireland, and as there was some delay in making out his appointment he accepted the Chiltern Hundreds in order to save time. Then he offered himself for re-election as Chief Secretary, and was re-elected. What is the suggestion made to us? We cannot move the Writ simply on the death of a particular Peer without having official knowledge that a particular Member of this House is the legitimate heir to that Peerage. In the present case we have no such knowledge with regard to the son of the late Lord Coleridge. We must, therefore, acquire that knowledge somehow. We may acquire it through the instrumentality of the House of Peers or through ourselves. But those inquiries may take time. It is even possible to conceive cases in which it would take a long time to pursue these inquiries, and it is therefore far better for us to cut the knot and remove the delay by the grant of the Chiltern Hundreds. It seems to me that this is a course consistent with all the law and practice of Parliament hitherto. The right hon. Gentleman says, What hurry is there? In my opinion, you ought not to delay a single day longer than is necessary in giving a constituency its right of representation. Why are you to hang them up, to wait for the decision of the case? The period may be short or it may be long; and if you have a method put into your hands by which the constituency can return its Member, that is the best course to take. The right hon. Gentle- man evidently has a great fear that there may be heirs to Peerages who may be not so anxious to go to the House of Lords as he appears to desire them to be. For my part, I should be very sorry to lose them if they could be properly retained here. But if they do not apply for their Writ of Summons and the House of Commons objects to any procedure of that kind, we may set up a Committee of Privileges here to investigate the question whether they have or have not become entitled to a seat in the House of Lords, although they do not choose to take it up, and so determine the question for ourselves whether that title, although not acted upon, vacates the seat in this House. All these things are open to question, and I do not know that they have ever been decided, although I have stated what I believe to be the Parliamentary law and practice. I quite agree that it is right and reasonable that any doubts that may exist should be ascertained and cleared up by a Committee. But I do lay down that it is the business of this House at as early a moment as possible in a doubtful case to vacate the seat in order to restore the rights of representation to the constituency, and not to have a man who does not attend or vote in this House because he may or may not be subject to penalties. But when this Committee is appointed I hope that it will embrace not only this question, but a question that has been frequently discussed here though never settled, and that is what ought to be the proper form for a Member of this House to resign his seat. Everybody has felt that the subject should be dealt with, but no Government has ever taken this question up. The present system is clearly not a satisfactory one. It is what Sir Drummond Wolff called it—an anomalous system; and I think that it would be a matter of great importance that the Committee should inquire into the question and make recommendations to this House which would regulate the whole method of vacating a seat. Therefore, I do not oppose the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman, but would propose that before the Committee is moved for the matter should be postponed for the purpose of considering how the inquiry can have a wider and more useful construction, so as to put the question of vacating seats in the House of Commons on a sound and well-understood basis.

The right hon. Gentleman has done well, I think, in conceding the Committee for which my right hon. Friend has moved, and I am not at all sure that the extension to the Reference he had proposed would be in any respect inadvisable. I feel almost inclined to suggest that, if he is going to make the purview of Reference wider than is necessary to deal with the specific case brought before our notice to-night, it ought to be so extended as to include some inquiry into the most ridiculous and absurd survival of ancient times and different circumstances by which a man on taking Office under the Crown has to resign his seat in this House. The right hon. Gentleman was not content merely to grant a Committee. He thought fit also to argue the case, and I must say that he appears to me not to have listened to the speech of my right hon. Friend—a speech of masterly lucidity, which put the case of the House of Commons and upon which the House of Commons is asked to pronounce. There was not one word in the right hon. Gentleman's speech, from beginning to end, which showed that he had grasped the point aimed at by my right hon. Friend. Not a word fell from him to indicate that what my right hon. Friend had brought before the House was not whether or not the Attercliffe Division should be immediately given the privilege of asking for a new Member, and not whether or what kind of evidence was required before we could take cognizance of the fact that one of our number had become a Peer. The single question to which he called our attention was this—Is a man who succeeds to a Peerage a Peer from the time his predecessor dies, and is he or is he not during that time competent to sit in this House? I boldly say that nine-tenths of the right hon. Gentleman's speech were not addressed to that point at all. He quoted what he called a correction of Speaker Onslow's dictum , but the first correction which he quoted was in the first place not a correction, and in the second place it was not relevant. The right hon. Gentleman also quoted a Statute of George III., which had nothing whatever to do with these points. He also gave opinions with regard to what ought to happen to an heir to a Peerage who was not a lineal heir, and he told us what ought to be done by the Speaker if the House was not sitting, if a, vacancy occurred, and so forth, and so on; but the real question whether a man can sit or vote in this House and represent a constituency at the same time that he is entitled to claim a seat in the House of Lords—that question was never touched on by the right hon. Gentleman until he came to the end of his speech. Nor did he quote an authority on the question except the solitary one of Mr. Goulburn, who has against him Speaker Onslow and Speaker Lefevre, two of the most illustrious of your predecessors in the Chair, Sir, and against him also, I believe, the whole law and practice of Parliament. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman said anything about one example and practice of Parliament which is, I think, conclusive in the matter. Is there a single case in which an heir to a Peerage, after the succession but before the Writ is issued, has voted and spoken in this House? Can a case be produced, and if not, why not? Everyone knows that if a man is competent to vote in this House the Whips would be anxious that he should vote and sometimes speak, and the utmost pressure would be put upon him to exercise his right, at all events in one of these capacities. But the fact that no man, knowing himself to be legally entitled to claim a Peerage, has ventured to exercise his right in this House is conclusive proof in my judgment that by the custom and tradition of Parliament he cannot, and that ipso facto he becomes ineligible to take part in our Debates or represent a constituency of the country. The right hon. Gentleman has argued as if our contention was inimical to the interests of the constituencies, and he has laid it down that if we had our way in this matter the unfortunate constituencies would be deprived for an unduly lengthened period of representation. It is exactly the other way. The consequence of the right hon. Gentleman's action is this—that it will deprive constituencies of the right to return Members to this House. His theory was that if a man chooses to delay applying for the necessary Writ of Summons to the House of Lords, so long will a constituency be deprived of any right to elect a new Member; and, if my interpretation of the law and cus- tom of Parliament be correct, during all that period the Member who is nominally occupying the seat will be incompetent to perform any functions of a Member of this House. I cannot honestly say that I think the right hon. Gentleman's speech has added to our knowledge of the law on this question or has cleared up the mind of any hon. Gentleman. One thing, however, he has done. He has spread joy and satisfaction in the breasts of various heirs to Peerages who would prefer to remain Members of this House than to take a seat elsewhere. Every Member of this House sympathises, I believe, with such a feeling. I think that most hon. Gentlemen really enamoured of the House of Commons regard no misfortune greater than that of being forcibly divorced from its proceedings. But why are we to create an entirely new and privileged class of the community? A man must be either a Peer and incompetent to sit in this House, or a Commoner and competent to sit in this House. If the dictum of the Chancellor of the Exchequer be correct, if Speaker Onslow and Speaker Lefevre and the whole catena of traditions they represent are wrong, we shall call into existence for the first time in our history a body of gentlemen who may sit in this House as long as they please, and when they do not please to sit any longer they may go of right to the other House. That is an intolerable state of things. I do not see why we should endow those gentlemen with these exceptional and abnormal privileges, and I do not doubt that when the Committee which is to be appointed examines the law and the precedents on this subject they will see that my right hon. Friend is correct when he says that a man ceases to be eligible for any work as a Member of Parliament directly he has succeeded to a Peerage—not from the time when the Writ is issued, but from the time when his predecessor dies. If that be so, then it becomes as clear as daylight that the criticisms of my right hon. Friend on the Motion of Tuesday are absolutely well-founded and amply justified. For some electoral purpose with which I do not wish to quarrel or to inquire into, the Government for the first time have started a precedent which carries us far beyond the electioneering expediency of the Attercliffe Division, and which may be the beginning of a constitutional change of far-reaching import. I, for my part, desire to raise even at this early stage of the discussion my strong protest against it. I will not dwell further on this matter. I have vindicated the point of view from which my right hon. Friend and I are agreed on looking at this matter, and I quite admit that it is impossible for this House thoroughly to thresh out all the statutory proceedings and customs bearing on the point.

^* : As the Government have accepted the Motion, the discussion has become almost an academic one. Words, however, have been spoken by the Leader of the House which are of great importance, and if allowed to pass uncontradicted might at some future time be quoted just as the words of Mr. Goulburn have been. I hope the Chancellor of the Exchequer will not feel annoyed if I say that I do not think he has given quite sufficient consideration to this question. When the right hon. Gentleman states that until the heir of a Peer applies for his Writ of Summons he has the right to sit and to vote in the House of Commons he must have spoken without consideration and investigation. A Peer has granted to him a Peerage, and by virtue of the grant the status of the heir is controlled. He obtains thereby certain privileges, among which the right to be a Lord of Parliament is only one; but he is a Peer whether he obtains his Writ of Summons or not. According to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, until the Peer succeeding to a Peerage obtains a Writ of Summons, to be set in motion by the new Peer, he acquires the right by not applying for the Writ of Summons to come to the House of Commons and vote until it suits his convenience to apply for it.

My proposition was this: Until the House of Commons had some proper evidence that a man is a Peer it has no right to treat him as having ceased to be a Member of the House, and during the period when it has no evidence whatever that that man is a Peer it has no right to take a course which would make him incapable of sitting in the House of Commons.

I do not wish to discuss this matter, but I must enter my protest against that proposition. A Peer is disqualified from sitting in this House— [ Cries of "It he is a Peer!"] The Chancellor of the Exchequer says it depends on whether he has accepted the Writ of Summons; but I am sure that on reflection he will see that that has nothing to do with the matter, If a Peer came to the House and voted he would be acting wrongly, and if a Statute had been created enacting penalties—which is not the case—such a man would be liable to a penalty, which is exactly contrary to the proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman should recollect that the summons to the House of Lords has nothing to do with the question, except as a matter of convenience and proof. Scottish Peers are not Lords of Parliament, and they never receive a Writ of Summons, but they are prohibited from sitting and voting in the House of Commons. Their disqualification cannot depend upon the Writ of Summons, nor do we ask for inquiry to be made in that case. What, then, becomes of the proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer? Will he apply his theory to the heir of a Scotch Peer? As he never receives a Writ of Summons, he might, according to the right hon. Gentleman's theory, suspend the representation of a constituency indefinitely, or vote as a Commoner. It was, in consequence of the practical difficulty of proof in some cases, a very grave and serious question what was the real position of the eldest son of a Peer, but he was certain that whatever his position was it would be found that the statement made by his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not be found to represent the law of Parliament upon this subject.

said, that before the Motion was put he desired to put a question affecting the electors of Attercliffe, who were not represented—whether the Writ which had been erroneously issued—[ Ministerial cries of " No, no!"]—or applied for by the Government on Tuesday last, would be withdrawn, pending the inquiry by the proposed Select Committee. He was anxious that this should be done in the interests of the Labour Party in Sheffield, in order that the Labour candidate at Attercliffe might have an opportunity of making the acquaintance of the electors.

No, Sir; I can assure the hon. Member that a Writ rightfully issued will not be withdrawn.

^* said, there were one or two considerations bearing on the subject to which his right hon. Friend the Member for Bury had not given adequate weight. The right hon. Gentleman had not dealt with the point put by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to how the House of Commons was to know that a certain Member of the House was the successor to a Peerage. It was not sufficient simply to say that the moment a Peer died his successor, if in that House, ceased to be a Member of it. How was the House immediately to know that he was or became a Peer? This was a question of principle independent of that as to whom the Member succeeded in the Peerage. It was not a question of the son succeeding a father, but of a Member of the House becoming a Peer. The same principle applied whether a man succeeded his father or 30th cousin. The point was—How was the House to be cognizant of the fact that a Member, for instance, was the lineal descendant of a cousin 30 times removed? His right hon. Friend the Member for Bury had asked, what would the Chancellor of the Exchequer do in the case of the next eldest son of a Scotch Peer who was a Member of that House when his father died? What did the Chancellor of the Exchequer propose to do at the present moment; because, unless report belied him, there was at this moment in the House of Commons, and supporting the Government, the rightful claimant, if he chose to be so, to a very ancient Scottish Peerage. [ Cries of "Name!"] He hoped the hon. Member would excuse him. If he was incorrect, he had no doubt he should be contradicted, but he had always understood that the hon. Baronet the Member for the St. Rollox Division of Glasgow (Sir J. Carmichael) might, if he chose, be at the present moment one of the Peers of Great Britain. If that was so, what became of the principle of his right hon. Friend the Member for Bury? Even if it was not so, it was quite obvious an analogous case might at anytime arise. In the case of the gentleman who the other day succeeded to the Barony of Barnard, had he been a Member of this House, what cognisance would this House have had that he had become Baron Barnard, tracing his descent back 160 years, owing to the death of the Duke of Cleveland? He put that point because it was not so simple as it might be thought. But there was another point connected with Irish Peers. Irish Peers were Members of the House of Lords in one of two capacities, either actual sitting Members of that House by the election of their fellow Irish Peers, or by delegation as the electors of those who sat. If they sat there by election or delegation, in neither of those cases could they sit in the House of Commons; but if they did not sit in the House of Lords by delegation or election— i.e., if they were neither elected nor took part in the election as electors, then they could sit in the House of Commons. That also tended to controvert the statement of his right hon. Friend that it was the fact of being a Peer and not a Peer of Parliament that affected the question. He was very glad that the Committee was to be appointed.

^* said, that perhaps he might be allowed to say a few words from the point of view of a class of Members who had been more than once alluded to in the Debate, and who were not unlikely at some future time to find themselves in the position at present or recently occupied by Mr. Coleridge—[ Cries of "Oh!"]—or Lord Coleridge. In common with some of his hon. Friends in a similar position he had bestowed considerable attention on this matter, with a view to ascertain whether there was in existence or capable of being called into existence any machinery by means of which, even after the deaths of the Peers whom they would succeed, they might continue to show their affection for the House of Commons by remaining in its ranks. In this investigation they found themselves confronted by many perplexities and contradictions of precedent and of authority. On the one hand, they had found the authorities which had been quoted by the right hon. Member for West Birmingham and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition—the authority of Mr. Speaker Onslow and others, who had taken the line that the gift of Peerage implied an ennobling of blood—that was to say, that the moment a Peer died his successor became a Peer. On the other hand, they had the fact, upon which perhaps hardly sufficient stress had been laid, that until now there was not a single case on record in which a Writ for a vacancy created by the death of a Peer had ever been moved in this House—except upon evidence given—or except upon the assurance being made to the House that the Writ of Summons had been issued by the House of Lords, and had been received by the heir to the Peerage. That rule had only been infringed, he believed, on two occasions, when the House of Commons, finding that they had made a mistake, receded from the position they took up, and practically re-established what was a valuable and an unbroken precedent. What else had they on the same side? They had what he could not help regarding as the most admirable conduct of Her Majesty's Government on the present occasion. The Government had taken a step which, it was contended, was illegal, not in giving the Chiltern Hundreds to Mr. or Lord Coleridge—that was nothing, for he imagined that they had a perfect right to give it, and he had a perfect right to accept it, but in declaring his seat in the House of Commons vacant because of his acceptance to the Chiltern Hundreds, and they had described him on the Order Book of the House of Commons as the "Hon. Bernard Coleridge." If he was "the Hon. Bernard Coleridge" clearly, in the opinion of the Government, he was a Commoner and not a Peer. If he was a Commoner, clearly he was a Member of the House of Commons.

But we do not know.

^* admitted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer professed his ignorance, but still, so far as he went, he indicated his opinion that Lord Coleridge practically remained at present Mr. Bernard Coleridge.

Application was made in the name of Bernard Coleridge. Bernard Coleridge, Member of the House of Commons, applied for the Chiltern Hundreds. I had no reason to believe—I have no sufficient knowledge now—that Bernard Coleridge, then a Member of the House of Commons, is a Peer.

^* said, he was very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his interpretation, because he made quite clear his (Mr. Curzon's) point—namely, that in the opinion of the Government Mr. Bernard Coleridge, after the death of his father, remained, and was described on the books of the House as, "Bernard Coleridge."

I do not know that Lord Coleridge was his father.

^* said, he might further support what he was saying by the words actually used by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his earlier speech, in which he indicated that in his opinion a Member of the House of Commons might be treated as a Member of the House of Commons after he had succeeded his father.

No, I did not say that. I offered no opinion on that subject.

said, the right hon. Gentleman had stated that until evidence was offered, this House had no right to vacate the seat on the ground that one of its Members was a Peer. That was a point that they were anxious to see settled. He would welcome as much as anybody in the House the Committee which it was proposed to appoint, and in the meantime he thanked the Chancellor of the Exchequer very much for the valuable consolation he had afforded them.

After the statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he would accept the Committee, but would desire to extend the Reference, it appears to me that probably the most convenient form of procedure would be that I should now withdraw this Resolution, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on behalf of the Government, should bring up another Resolution with au extended Reference at a later day. But if that is to be the case, I must ask the right hon. Gentleman for a further understanding, which I think he will be willing to come to. The matter now raised concerns particularly the constituency of Attercliffe. It arises directly out of the Motion for the issue of the Writ for that constituency, and in my opinion, taking it for what it is worth, it may be that the decision of the Committee will tend to show that the issue of the Writ was irregular, and that may have an effect on the validity of the election, which may, and probably would, come before the Courts of Law. I am only stating what is possible. What I ask in these circumstances is, if the Reference is to be extended to deal with much more than the present case, that the right hon. Gentleman will be willing to undertake that it be an Instruction to the Committee that they should report first upon this question arising out of the Attercliffe case.

was understood to say: I think I must leave that to the Committee. I cannot entertain for a moment the idea that the issue of the Writ is illegal. According to the right hon. Gentleman himself, the seat was vacated before the Chiltern Hundreds were granted and the moment the late Lord Coleridge died. The right hon. Gentleman's objection was to the statement of the ground of the vacation, and therefore I take it the Writ was properly issued. Under these circumstances, no such question as that indicated by the right hon. Gentleman arises.

The right hon. Gentleman will do me the justice to say that I am not insisting that any question will arise. I only ask that this point—the immediate point which I have raised—and the point which alone has justified the Motion for Privilege—should be reported upon first. If the right hon. Gentleman declines to do that I must take a Division on my original proposal.

I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not do that. I should be extremely glad to confer with him as to the form of the Motion for a Committee, and I will consider what should be done with regard to an Interim Report.

I accept that statement, and ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.