said, that since the Debate of 28th June an endeavour had been made to bring about a friendly arrangement between the promoters of the Bill and the representatives of the London County Council with a view to coming, if possible, to a reasonable settlement under existing circumstances. Therefore, he should ask the leave of the House to withdraw his Amendment for the re-commitment of the Bill. That being done, he proposed subsequently to move certain Amendments which had been agreed upon, the net effect of which would be that the number of representatives of the Corporation and of the County Council on the Conservancy Board should each be increased by two.

Question put, and agreed to.

Main Question put, and agreed to.

Bill considered.

Amendment proposed, in Clause 5, page 9, line 5, to leave out "thirty-three," and insert "thirty-seven."—( Mr. J. Stuart. )

Question proposed, "That 'thirty-three' stand part of the Clause."

said, with regard to the remarks of the hon. Member for Hoxton, he might say that this arrangement was understood to be a reasonable and final settlement of the question under present circumstances.

Final?

Final under present circumstances.

said, he would put it that the settlement was a final one upon all points under existing circumstances.

^* said, that if it was supposed that this settlement was a final one he must point out that whatever agreement might be made between the Conservators and the London County Council there were Members in the House who, like himself, could not be bound by their arrangement and accept the present compromise as a final settlement. If, for instance, the Conservators should ask for fresh, financial powers, it would be necessary then that they should re-open the whole question.

said, he thought it might save time with regard to this matter—which had been brought very constantly under the consideration of the Board of Trade—if he stated what were his views upon it. He was very glad that the promoters of the Bill had assented in a fair and reasonable spirit to the compromise suggested. He gathered from the hon. Member for Shoreditch, on the part of the County Council, that if the four additional members were placed on the Board he would withdraw further opposition to the Bill here, and would take no steps to have it opposed in the House of Lords. He thought that, upon the whole, this was a perfectly fair compromise, and one that the House might accept with satisfaction. Of course, it was impossible to say what might emerge in the future. It was quite possible that the financial question might emerge again, or that the shipowners' case might assume a new aspect, and he did not understand that anything more was meant by "final settlement" than this: that the matter was to be deemed as settled, circumstances being what they were. He would like to offer his tribute to the great care and pains which the Committee had taken with the Bill and the services rendered to the cause of pacification by the Chairman and the right hon. Member for Leeds and his hon. Friend who sat behind him.

^* said, be should like to mention that while the shipowners were heartily glad that there had been a compromise, and would now endeavour to forward the Bill by every means in their power, they entirely demurred to the word "final" as applied to the settlement which had been arrived at. The question of the administration of and improved access to the Port of London was a matter of such vital consequence that should new circumstances arise, and especially should any claim for pecuniary powers be brought forward, the question must be re-discussed, and, in in any case, there ought to be inquiry by a Royal Commission or Committee, and that without delay.

said, he might inform the House that he intended to raise the whole question of the administration of the Port of London by objecting to the suspension of the Standing Orders, and so preventing the Bill from being read a third time until he had ventilated this issue. In the compromise which had been arrived at between the Thames Conservancy Board and the London County Council he had no share or part. He represented in the House large and important interests concerned in the administration of the Port of London, and in order that their views might be laid before the House he should object to the suspension of the Standing Orders, which would enable the Bill to be now read a third time.

^* said that, as Chairman of the Committee, perhaps he might be allowed to say a few words. He regretted that the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir T. Sutherland) had thought it necessary to issue a note of warning that he did not adopt the settlement which had been arrived at. He could, not pretend to say that the settlement was not one which would not commend itself to his mind on its merits. He certainly understood, and he thought the members of the Committee understood, that the representatives of the London County Council did accept this settlement, and he believed his opinion would be shared by Members of the House who were also representatives of the London County Council. He would like to say a word respecting the comments made by the President of the Board of Trade with reference to the labours of the Committee which investigated this question. No one could deny that the Committee had attended to the details placed before them with the greatest assiduity. They commenced their labours on the 23rd of April and finished them on the 13th of June. If he might so far presume, he should like to say that no Chairman ever had upon his Committee Members who gave more undivided attention to the circumstances as they were placed before them. When he said that the Committee were unanimous, that there never was a division of opinion, he thought it was strong testimony that they had endeavoured as far as they could to understand the case presented to them, and to decide it upon its merits. He should be extremely sorry—indeed, he would not anticipate otherwise—if the County Council should do otherwise than accept the compromise as a final settlement under what the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade described as "the circumstances of the case." Of course, they could not bind their successors, but as to the thoroughness of the inquiry which had been made there could be no doubt. All the parties were most ably represented, and every point was fought most tenaciously. As matters had turned out, the compromise appeared to him to be the best course to adopt, and he repeated that he hoped the County Council would accept it.

said, that during the many years he had sat in the House he had always supported the judicial decisions of Committees of the House. He had resolutely set his face against the system of private canvass, against bringing private interests to bear to upset judicial decisions; but when that influence was gradually coming to be exercised by powerful bodies like the London County Council, who not only brought private influence but pressure to bear on those who had to rely on their support possibly for continuance in power, then the danger had assumed the gravest proportions. Like the Chairman, he also reluctantly acquiesced in this arrangement. He felt he was submitting, not to a judicial tribunal exercising its judicial office, but to a tour de force. He could not but express his opinion that this practice was tending to bring Committees, and even the House itself, into discredit.

justified the action of the London County Council. The speech of the hon. Baronet who had just sat down would, he said, have been more appropriate as a first edition in 1890, when a very strong Committee gave five representatives to the County Council, and a vote of the House struck them out amid the silence of the hon. Baronet, who now, when it was the other way, felt his conscience deeply touched. He did not wish to embitter the discussion, but he must say that the action of the County Council had been from the first perfectly consistent.

said, he could not congratulate the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Fletcher Moulton) upon the tone which he had adopted after having expressed his intention of saying no word that would embitter the discussion. The hon. and learned Gentleman might have done worse than to have left the hon. Baronet behind him alone. He might say that he and his friends were no more satisfied than was the London County Council with the exact arrangement made by the Committee, but they were prepared to accept it as the result of the decision of a Committee which had had all the evidence placed before it. They had been invited to examine some of the points of view from which the London County Council approached this matter. Well, they were not going to do anything of the kind. They did not acquiesce in this arrangement, but they were not anxious to put the House to inconvenience and trouble, nor did they think that they would be justified in opposing the terms of the compromise which had been arrived at. All the points in dispute were reviewed by the Committee. The London County Council put in their claims, and claims were put in by the other parties interested. Evidence was heard, and the Committee, having heard all that was to be said, arranged the representation upon what they conceived to be an equitable basis. He would like to add that he cordially and entirely agreed with the wise words of the hon. Baronet behind him (Sir G. Russell), because he was certain that if the House, under the pressure of combinations, upset time after time the decisions of Committees upstairs, judicially and equitably given, the House would have more cause to regret it than the parties interested, seeing how unbusinesslike and impolitic a character was given to proceedings in respect of which a decision was arrived at upon ex parte statements instead of upon sworn evidence such as was given upstairs.

said, he thought the worst enemies of Committees upstairs were those who wished to make fetishes of them. In 1890 representatives from the whole of the districts concerned in this Bill, irrespective of politics, came to Westminster and begged the House to reject the conclusion at which the Committee of that year arrived, and the House did so. From the point of view of those who opposed the settlement arrived at in this Bill this demonstrated that it was wise for the House to keep the power of determining the shape which Private Bills should assume in its own hands. Since 1890 there had been another Bill on which the House differed from the Committee in its conclusion and also from the promoters of the Bill in their original clause. He did not, however, contend for a moment that all the decisions of Committees should be challenged. It had been said that the settlement now arrived at was a final settlement. He did not consider that this Bill adequately dealt with the whole question of the Thames Conservancy either with regard to the upper or the lower part of the river. He thought it would be necessary to have a body who would deal with the conservancy of the port and harbour, and another body who would deal with the conservancy of the upper portion of the river. Under these circumstances, while he accepted the compromise he wanted it to be distinctly understood that he reserved to himself the right of taking any action he might think wise on the question in the future.

said, that as a Member of the Committee which had considered the Bill, he did not believe that it was in accordance with sound judgment that the alteration agreed upon as a compromise should be made, as he thought the decision came to by the Committee was the right one under the circumstances. He hoped the compromise would result in the final settlement of the question, and only on such conditions could he approve it.

said that, as a Member of the Committee, he thought someone ought to stand up and pay a tribute to the fairness and the ability with which the promoters of this Bill had presented it to the Committee, and to the willing assistance they had afforded to the Committee at every stage of the Bill. He fully concurred in what had been said by other Members of the Committee as to their still holding to the decision they had come to. That decision was, he thought, a perfectly just and adequate one, and the Members of the Committee assented to the compromise not because they thought it was an improvement, but in order to save the Bill from defeat. He felt that it was of little use to make an appeal to his hon. Friend (Sir T. Sutherland) in this matter; but he must say that no interests were in the discussion of the Committee more fully, carefully, and liberally considered than those which his hon. Friend represented; and he thought it would be very hard indeed upon the Committee, and in the nature of a most serious blow to Private Bill legislation if, on the complaint of one party which had been fully and carefully heard by the Committee, an attempt was now made to reverse the decision of the Committee.

said that, as a London Member, he wished to say a word of protest with regard to the course that was being followed in reference to London Bills. It was becoming a regular thing that London measures, instead of being settled judicially by Committees, were being dealt with as Party Bills and settled by log-rolling outside the House. The London County Council represented a certain political faction, and the result was that every London Bill which came before the House was, after it had passed the Committee, treated as a Party measure.

said, he had been sitting for 20 days on a Committee on a London Council Bill, and he had seen no indication of Party spirit whatever.

said, his argument was not that there was Party spirit in the Committees on these Bills, but that the decisions of the Committees were upset on Party grounds.

^* : Hon. Members must confine themselves to the Amendment before the House.

Question put, and negatived.

Question, "That 'thirty-seven' be there inserted," put, and agreed to.

Other Amendments agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That Standing Orders 223 and 243 be suspended, and that the Bill be now read the third time."—( Dr. Farquharson. )

I object.

appealed to the hon. Member not to persist in his objection. The hon. Member had no chance whatever of succeeding in his opposition; it was a mere question of time, and he thought the hon. Member might in courtesy withdraw his objection.

said, he wished to join in the appeal to the hon Gentleman.

said, he was not surprised that an appeal should be made to him by the two hon. Gentlemen, but he intended that the compromise arranged between these two gentlemen should be discussed.

The Motion being opposed, the Debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed upon Thursday.

moved a new clause, the object of which was to enable the Court to vary deeds of settlement in so far as it might think the settlement rendered unjust by the incidence of the Estate Duty. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Attorney General would be good enough to look at the provisions inserted in the clause—namely,

"The Court may thereupon determine how, as between the persons interested under the settlement, the payment of such duty should, having regard to the interests of such persons, be provided for, and may make such variations and additions in and to the trusts and powers contained in the instrument settling the property as may be necessary for carrying such determination into effect,"

he thought they would admit it was only fair that an arrangement of this kind should be made. When the question was raised in Committee the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed to be under a slight misapprehension that the position of the Exchequer might be endangered. Seeing that since these settlements were drawn up much heavier duties had been imposed, surely the Court ought to have power, on the complaints of the persons interested, to vary the provisions. The amount of the tax itself would in no way be injured. The arguments in favour of the clause were apparent on the face of it, and he ventured to submit that they were reasonable, and only the natural corollary of the creation of a state of things never contemplated when the settlements were drawn up. Further than that the Court would not interfere, unless it was satisfied that the variation would be in the interests of all parties.

New Clause—

(Power of court to vary settlements.)

"Any person who, by an irrevocable instrument effected before the commencement of this, part of the Act, has settled any property may, if Estate Duty has not already been paid in respect thereof, apply to the High Court in the manner directed by Rules of Court to have it determined, and the Court may thereupon determine how, as between the persons interested under the settlement, the payment of such duty should, having regard to the interests of such persons, be provided for, and may make such variations and additions in and to the trusts and powers contained in the instrument settling the property as may be necessary for carrying such determination into effect."—( Sir R. Webster. )

Clause brought up, and read the first time."

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."

said, that though it was true the clause did not affect the Revenue, it involved larger interests. It raised the whole question whether settlements made in the past should be re-opened and re-cast.

Only with regard to the new duties.

said, that that was a serious question, so serious that he was not prepared to face it. Besides, it was a claim which might be raised wherever any particular tax affected the interest of a person, while it might largely affect the settlements by which that person was bound. The proposal, indeed, was so revolutionary that he could not recommend the House to adopt it. He was surprised that it should be made from such a quarter. Not only would it abolish settlements altogether, but every person bound by a settlement would desire to get rid of the burden. The aid of the Chancery Court would be invoked, and all the beneficiaries under the settlement would be made parties to the suit. The result would be universal and expensive litigation. He could not recommend the House to accept the clause.

confessed that he heard with wonder the tremendous care exhibited by the right hon. Gentleman for the sanctity of settlements.

I would much rather abolish them outright than do it in this way.

said, he could not understand why the right hon. Gentleman should prefer to abolish them outright than to do substantial justice according to the wish of the settlor during his lifetime. The right hon. Gentleman was not present when he raised this point in Committee. The Solicitor General, who was then in charge of the Bill, replied that the question largely turned on the fact that the Court could not be expected to know what the wishes of the dead settlor were. Now, according to the right hon. Gentleman, they were no longer to trust even so impartial a tribunal as the High Court. The proposal contained in the Amendment was a very modest proposal. After all, the Chancellor of the Exchequer must admit that his principal interest had been care for the Exchequer, and the Exchequer would not suffer a single sixpence by this proposal. When new burdens were thrown upon the various portions of a settlement, which might entirely vitiate the wishes of the settlor, and if the settlor was actually living and desired to give his evidence before the Court, why should he not be allowed to do so if the Court thought it right? The Court would be absolutely impartial, and he did not imagine the cost would be great. It very often happened that a man whose estate consisted partly of realty and personalty, left the realty and a small sum of money enough to work the landed property to one son and the personal property to the other son. Enter the Chancellor of the Exchequer with his aggregation, and so on, which the settlor never expected, and thereupon the son with the landed property found the little balance of money which he was going to work the property with, on account of the duty he had to pay, would be absolutely useless for that purpose. The intention of the settlor was that the landed property should go to one son with just enough money to work it, and the personal property to the other. [Mr. H. H. FOWLER: That would be a will.] It might be a settlement, and it was quite obvious that in such a case the settlement ought to be re-arranged so that the son with the landed property should not suffer so materially at the hands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to make it impossible for him to work the pro- perty. If that was true with regard to a settlor who was already dead, it was doubly true with regard to a living settlor, because he could be consulted and could tell what were his wishes. It appeared to him perfectly absurd for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to talk about the sanctity of settlements when he was varying, in a most material degree, the effect of settlements by the enormous taxation which he was suddenly imposing. They were not by this clause in any way injuring the sanctity of settlements, but were trying to compensate for the inequality which the Chancellor of the Exchequer would introduce, and they proposed to vest the power to remedy that inequality in a perfectly impartial tribunal, which would not be expensive because it would not be a contested matter, but one of friendly arrangement only requiring the authority of the Court to give it practical effect.

^* said, the noble Lord defended the sanctity of settlements, and at the same time advocated the introduction of a principle which would leave the Court to set aside, modify, or alter a settlement on the application of any one of the parties interested.

Not on the application of any one of the parties.

said, that practically every one of them would have to be before the Court. Whoever initiated the procedure, that would be the practical result. What he did not quite understand was where the injustice would arise in the practical working of the Bill. The noble Lord ventured to use the word settlor in one sense, and he ventured to interrupt the noble Lord and use it in another. The settlements to which the noble Lord had alluded as settlements were made by will. The noble Lord put the case of a testator leaving his real estate and the residue of the property to one son, and leaving his personal estate to another son, and then, said the noble Lord, injustice would be inflicted on the elder son, in consequence of having to pay out of the revenue the entire Estate Duty, whether graduated or not. That would not be so as a matter of fact, between the two properties. After the passing of the Act the testator might alter his will. The will did not come into effect on the date on which it was made. What were the nature of these settlements? In the overwhelming majority of cases they were marriage settlements upon the consideration of marriage, in which property belonging to the gentleman and lady were both put into the settlement, and for the benefit of both. Where did the injustice come in? The settlement case was provided for under Clause 14, which said—

"In the case of property which does not pass to the executor as such, an amount, equal to the proper rateable part of the Estate Duty, may be recovered as follows—namely:—

By the person who being accountable for, or authorised or required to pay, the Estate Duty on any property, has paid such duty from the person entitled to any sum charged on such property, whether as capital, or as an annuity or otherwise, under a disposition not containing any express provision to the contrary."

Therefore, in the Bill as it now stood there was a provision for apportioning the duty—namely, where, under existing settlements, property had been charged with an annuity, or with portions of the settlement, made long before this Act was contemplated, and where possibly some injustice might be assumed to accrue to the parties interested in that settlement if the principal beneficiary was called upon to pay the whole of the Estate Duty and was not able to recover any part of it from the persons entitled. Clause 14 amply provided for such cases as that. That was the provision which was contained in the Bill for existing settlements; settlements made after the date of the Bill would contemplate, of course, the provisions of the Bill and provide accordingly. It could not apply to wills, therefore they were simply dealing with existing settlements, and he would submit that ample protection was given in Clause 14. Look at the precedent they were going to set! He was in favour of marriage settlements. To some extent they were provisions for daughters against the possible future losses of the husbands with whom they might marry, and he was not in favour of stopping that mode of a father providing for his daughter. An executed instrument could not now be set aside without the consent of everybody sui juris; but the noble Lord proposed to break down that safeguard. He proposed that a Chancery suit might be commenced in Order to ask the Court to decide who was the proper person by whom duty should be paid. The remedy would be far worse than the disease. No general principle could be laid down to guide the decisions of the Court, and to attempt to make the Court of Chancery a sort of Controller General of all the provisions of settlements in this Kingdom would be for Parliament to vest in that quarter a dispensing power which he thought the Chancellor of the Exchequer was right in saying would be fatal to the existence of settlements altogether. He quite agreed with the noble Lord that as far as finance was concerned the Exchequer would get the money. On grounds of public policy, and wishing to maintain the sanctity of settlements, he should vote against this clause, and should follow strictly the precedent set in 1853 with reference to the Succession Duty where, when a new tax was imposed, no such proposal as this was made or sanctioned by the Legislature.

^* said, he could not profess to be a lawyer. He consequently approached this question from the point of view of a layman, and he did not see anything in the proposal which was nearly so great an interference with settlements as had been already sanctioned by Parliament long ago in the Settled Land Acts. What did those Acts allow? They allowed the life tenant of an estate to sell the estate and to convert it into money to be invested in certain ways by the trustees. The whole object of the original settlement was probably to keep the land in the family, and this might be changed entirely under the Settled Land Acts, and yet the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down talked of this proposal as if it could be compared with such a vital change as that to which he had referred. What was the proposal? It dealt solely with existing settlements. Practically it dealt, he imagined, almost entirely with marriage settlements, with regard to which the settlors were to come to the Court and ask the Court, having regard to the very large additional burden placed upon settled property by this new taxation, so to vary the settlement as to make the payment of these duties fair as between the beneficiaries of the settlement. The right hon. Gentleman said that point was met by Clause 14. It was not. All that Clause 14 did was to enable the person on whom the real property was settled to deduct from the person receiving any sum charged on that property the proportionate amount of the Estate Duty which was allocated to that sum under the provisions of this Bill. But he said that where existing settlors who had made an irrevocable settlement went to the Court and said they desired, looking to this new taxation imposed, to vary the settlements so as to make them what they would themselves have made them if they could have foreseen this taxation, that such a proposal was a fair proposal, and was as slight an interference with the law of settlements as any he could conceive. It was the commonest thing in marriage settlements, with regard to landed property, to make some such arrangement as this: a jointure reserved for the wife charged on the property; portions to be raised for younger children by trustees out of that property, and the property itself so charged was left to the eldest son. But now, under the system of charging by aggregation and graduation on the principal value first introduced into their system of taxation by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that property left to the eldest son, so charged, would be taxed far more than it would have been under the law existing when the settlement was made. Could the right hon. Gentleman not conceive that under such circumstances the settlors, if they could have foreseen this taxation; would not have charged the property with so large a jointure and so large portions to the younger children, and in all fairness they might come and ask the Court that at any rate the younger children might bear a larger proportion of this new taxation than they would have to bear under the provisions of Clause 14. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for India had referred to the precedent of the Succession Duty Act of 1853 as if it was necessarily to bind them in this matter. They had said that a fresh tax was imposed upon realty by that Act, and yet no proposal was ever made for allowing the settlors of estates on which that new duty was charged to obtain any such alteration in the settlements as was proposed by this clause. The duty imposed by the Succession Duty Act of 1853 was a very small duty indeed when compared with the taxation imposed by this Bill, because, in the first place, it was taxation merely on the life interest of the person taking the estate, and, in the second place, it was not a graduated tax at all, whilst the very argument by which this Budget was defended was the enormous increase of taxation on realty which would result from these two principles of graduation, and of charging estates according to their capital value, which for the first time had been introduced with regard to real property by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It did seem to him that nothing could be more safely guarded than the proposal of his hon. and learned Friend. In the first place, nothing could be done without the application of the settlors themselves. The settlors must be alive, and must themselves apply to the Court. In the second place, the only settlements to which the clause applied were existing settlements made before the passing of the Act. Of course, after the Bill became law it would be open to settlors to frame any new settlements accordingly; and, lastly, it rested upon the Court entirely so to interpret this clause as to make the incidence of the new duty, with its heavy taxation, fair as between the different beneficiaries of the settlement. The Court would be guided in that taxation by the provisions of this clause, and by the wishes also of those very persons who made the settlement, and who would come before the Court to say they would not have made it in its present shape if they could have foreseen this taxation. He very much regretted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as he thought, in this matter had departed from the position he seemed willing to assume when this proposal was first made in Committee in the Bill, and if the clause were pressed to a Division he should certainly vote for it.

said, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had very greatly exaggerated this Amendment when he had said that he would just as soon see settlements done away with altogether. This was simply a question where those who had already made irrevocable settlements, and not having foreseen the present legislation, desired in their lifetime to remodel those settlements with the consent of the Court; He thought it was rather an extraordinary argument for the right hon. Gentleman to say that this would be throwing a great deal of work into the hands of the lawyers. If ever a Bill was brought forward in the House of Commons which might be entitled "A Bill for the promotion of the interests of the legal profession" it was this Bill. He did not think that was a sound argument at all. No persons in their senses would go before the Court unless they had evidence beforehand that the beneficiaries under the settlement would not oppose the application. Then as to having a whole array of lawyers, they could apply to the Judge in Chambers, and having got the consent of the parties to the settlement, the matter could be arranged in half-an-hour without any lawyers at all. He should certainly support this clause if it went to a Division. Settlors would not have made the settlements in the form they had could they have known that this legislation was to take place, and they ought to be allowed to apply to the Court to have permission to revise their settlements in a manner that was equitable, and of which they would be the best judges. He denied that this question only affected marriage settlements. It affected entailed settlements as well, or, it might be, even partnership settlements. But whatever they might be, the whole question was whether the settlement at the time it was made, even if equitable then, was equitable now under the changed circumstances, and they ought to give the privilege of enabling the settlor in his lifetime to get the consent of the Court to remodel that settlement and make it fair between all the parties.

said, the chief argument against the Amendment was that settlements would be shaken. But the Amendment only provided for an alteration of the settlement duties, which was, comparatively speaking, a small matter, would not enable any general revision of the settlement to take place, and that alteration would only be in relation to a perfectly new element introduced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself. The very principle which was now objected to was contained in this Bill apparently from an innate sense of justice. Clause 32, dealing with the Spirit and Beer Duties, made the provision that the additional duty should be added to the contract price. If they substituted for the word "contract" the word "settlement" they would have the application of the same principle, because they had an additional duty proposed, and an additional duty which was not contemplated by the parties to the settlement which was the contract. In the one case the Government varied the contract because of the additional element introduced by the Bill, and in the other case they absolutely refused to do so. He did not agree that this could be done without cost, but it could be dealt with by rules, which might provide that it should come up by originating summons in Chambers.

never heard of such a proposal as this, which was absolutely novel in every way. [An hon. Member: So is the Budget.] The Budget might also contain some novel principles, but what did this proposal amount to? They were to inquire from the people who made these irrevocable settlements some time ago what they would have done if they had known that this duty was to be imposed.

That is for the Court.

^* asked how was the Court to find out, because he ventured to say upon the construction of this clause there was nothing to guide the Court? There was no principle upon which the Court could act as to what they ought to have done, and all that could be extracted from it was that they must listen to what the settlor had to say and, within certain limits, to guide themselves on what he said. There was absolutely no kind of evidence which was more difficult to deal with than the evidence of people who came forward to tell what they did mean in doing a certain thing, because they knew perfectly well, in cases of rectification of settlement, how unsatisfactory that evidence was. Again and again, when people had settled property irrevocably, they did not like the settlement; events altered, and they said this was never intended that the settlements ought to be altered, and there was no more difficult question to deal with than the appreciation of evidence of that kind. But when it came to a case of the evidence of what people would have meant in a set of circumstances which did not exist really as a guide to a Court of Justice, that evidence must be absolutely worthless. His hon. and learned Friend knew perfectly well that such questions were never allowed to be put to witnesses as to what they would have done if so-and-so had taken place. It was perfectly idle to treat any answer given to such questions as evidence at all, and if they said that the Court was to be guided by the general principles of equity and justice he, for one, did not know where they were to be found. No Judge of the Chancery Division would ever take upon himself such a jurisdiction, and he ventured to say that no Judge should be entrusted with such a jurisdiction. There were principles of justice and equity, and good ones too, and one of them was that they should go by what the parties had done, and not upon what they would have done in certain circumstances, or upon any judgment which might be arrived at as to what they ought to have done. A provision already existed in the law whereby the trustees of settled property, if they had to raise a sum of money, could go to the Court and ask how the money was to be raised—whether by the sale of certain Stocks or by some other means. That jurisdiction already existed and was sufficient for the purpose, but the jurisdiction proposed in the Amendment would, he was sure, lead to nothing, for no prudent Judge would act upon it. No one ever thought before of giving such a haphazard jurisdiction as this to a Court of Law; and certainly he thought no one familiar with the subject would ever suppose it would be laid down that the rule which should apply to settlements after the event was what settlors would have done if they had known that those new duties would be imposed.

There are no Tories like the legal gentlemen who support the Government. The Government may advance a policy of the most violent and novel description, and these gentlemen are prepared to support the Government by argument in carrying out that policy. But if you touch one of their particular mysteries; if you tresspass even by a hair's breadth within the traditions of their profession, they are all up in arms, and no change in the procedure of the law, however trifling, is allowed, which does not happen to be in strict conformity with the traditions of the Bar. That is the distinguishing sentiment of English lawyers. Now, what is the principal argument by which they support it? I always observe that their mainstay is the incompetence of the Courts of Law. We have been always in the habit of looking to the Courts of Law as tribunals where not merely certain rules are administered, but where some of those principles of equity and justice, which the Attorney General finds so difficult to discover, may actually be found applied to the matters brought before them. We have always felt that in the Courts of Law we have an impartial body of men prepared to arbitrate on reasonable principles, and prepared to consider the broad equities of any case brought before them, and that at all events they were not—being men of common sense in private life—entirely deprived of that valuable qua lity when they put on wig and gown, and sat themselves down on the seat of justice. The Chancellor of the Exchequer whispers across the Table that that is the fact, and so supports the conclusion I have arrived at. I am unwilling, therefore, to give up what is a perfectly obvious and reasonable Amendment simply because of the argument that Judges qua Judges are too stupid to administer the duties this clause would impose on them.

Too clever.

Or too clever. I do not care which way it is put. But let us consider what we ask the Courts of Law to do by this clause, and what it is the Attorney General says they are incompetent to do. All we ask to have done is that when a settlement is made under different conditions from those that now prevail, the person who made the settlement, if living, and the people in whose favour the settlement was made, may have it varied in that one particular, the circumstances of which have been changed by the action of the Legislature. I say that is the right thing to do, and I say it is analogous to what can be done under the existing law. Under the Settled Land Act the owners of real settled property may go to the Court, and may get leave to sell a mansion house that is settled. Why is it that the Courts of Law may apply the principles of common-sense with regard to a mansion house when settled, but not with regard to any other kind of property when settled? If no better ground can lie given for rejecting the Amendment than that the Judges of the land- very able and well-paid officials—are incapable of doing what any man of equity and common-sense can do, we ought not to reject the Amendment on such a ground, or else the whole machinery by which we established the so-called fountains of equity and justice, which have run dry according to the Attorney General, should be done away with, and another tribunal set up which can carry out the very simple and obvious duties which this House may desire to impose upon them. I earnestly press upon the Government to accept this Amendment. The Government have all through the Bill not been content with imposing a very heavy additional burden on a certain class of property, which their financial necessities, no doubt, may have obliged them to do, but they have made the payment of the duty as onerous and iniquitous as it can be. We have suggested means by which this new burden may be mitigated in its incidence, and the Government have rejected our recommendations for one reason or another, but never for a reason more empty and more technical than that advanced to-day from the Treasury Bench.

said, he could conceive that there would be difficulties in carrying out the proposed clause. First, there was the difficulty of revoking the irrevocable; then there was the difficulty of determining the duty that would arise in respect to certain contingencies occurring at the wrong time and out of their order; and there would be the further difficulty that the Court would be taking upon itself duties that properly belonged to the Inland Revenue at a time when it was most difficult to perform them. But as they had eminent lawyers he did not think those difficulties should deter them from accepting the Amendment. The Amendment provided for the payment of duty on settlements by fixing the rate of duty between the persons interested. The Attorney General said that was a new thing. But it was not a new thing; it ran through the whole Bill. The principle of the Amendment was already in the Bill with respect to real property and to settled property, and what the Amendment proposed was that the same rule applied by the Bill to free personalty should be applied to irrevocable settlements made before the Bill existed. Undoubtedly many hardships would arise under the Bill if the Amendment were not accepted. He admitted the difficulties in the way of the operation of the clause; but those difficulties had been dealt with in other parts of the Bill in respect to other properties, and he thought there was a strong case for providing through the medium of the Courts for the alleviation of those grievances which had been pointed out.

^* said, that if the clause were added to the Bill he did not think it would be frequently resorted to, because there were difficulties which would very much stand in the way of the Court giving to it, as it was drafted, very satisfactory application. But the principle of the new clause was good, and perhaps if the Attorney General turned his legal acumen to the matter he would produce a more satisfactory amendment than the clause on the Paper. He could understand cases in which existing settlements might, with considerable convenience and advantage to the parties concerned, be rectified a little, having regard to the dislocation which the proposed new duties would undoubtedly cause in the operation of such settlements. The principle of the Amendment was novel; but there was a novel principle in the Bill—the principle of aggregation. If a man made a settlement on the marriage of his son ten years ago he could not have anticipated that a new law would be passed by which all the family property-the property in the settlement and the property outside the settlement—would be aggregated, so as to raise the duty from l½ or 3 per cent, to 8 per cent. It would undoubtedly be a matter of great convenience to allow the settlor to go into Court and get the settlement rectified in consequence of the action of the legislature in bringing into operation a new principle of taxation. He did not think the hon. and learned Gentleman who moved the amendment was wedded to the words of the amendment. It might be made to run so as to provide that a settlement might be rectified by the Court in accordance with the wishes of the settlor, provided the wishes of the settlor did not unfairly prejudice the interests of those who were benefited under the settlement. If the clause were amended in that way it would make perfectly intelligible to the Court as to the lines on which the rectification should proceed. He did not see why such a small concession should be resisted by the Government.

Question put, "That this Bill be read a second time."

The House divided:—Ayes 195; Noes 233.—(Division List, No. 159.)

^* said, he wished to move the new clause on the Paper, which would enable a person to provide for the payment of Estate Duty in advance. The clause was conceived in the interest of persons who had to pay Death Duties, but he thought it would also be to the interest of the Inland Revenue Commissioners and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It would enable a man during his lifetime to set aside out of his income small sums of money in order to accumulate a fund out of which at his death the Estate Duties should be paid. He was encouraged in moving the clause by some observations which fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer yesterday. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Great Grimsby moved a clause of a somewhat similar character in reference to insurance, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer intimated that though he could not accept that he would view with favour a proposal to establish an inalienable fund for the purpose of paying duty. He took the case of a man who had a life income out of which he was prepared to save or invest a sum for the purpose of paying Death Duty. The minimum sum that he could put by was £50, and it was intended that once the individual had paid these sums into the Bank of England he should not have power to withdraw them except with the consent of the Commissioners. The sum paid in would be applicable, in the first instance, towards the payment of Death Duty, and would not be liable to duty, but anything over and above the amount required for that duty would go to the executors and become part of the estate and be liable, like any other part of the property, to payment of duty. It might be said that the Bank would not care to undertake these accounts, but in reply to that it was proposed that the Bank should be entitled to some small percentage on the funds so received for keeping accounts. These sums as they were received by the Bank were to be invested in Consols and accumulated automatically. There was a provision in an Act passed by the late Government under which Consols could be bought and dividends accumulated from time to time. Another objection might be, "Why don't you do this by insurance?" but this plan would not prejudice the right of a man to insure. He would imagine cases where insurance could not be effected—where, for instance, the life was a bad one. Besides, in the case of insurance, if the premiums were dropped for half a year or a year the insurance was gone. Under his proposal a man might pay in £50 or £100 whenever he was in funds, and if a long period passed without further payments the amount which remained in the Bank did not suffer. Under insurance the rates that would be charged on bad lives would be so high as to make insurance in their case quite prohibitive. The scheme, he submitted, could not hurt the estate nor could it hurt the Chancellor of the Exchequer, while at the same time it would provide the cash in hand to meet the payment of the duty at the very time when the widow or other relative of the deceased would probably find it most difficult otherwise to obtain it. For these reasons he trusted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would accept the clause, believing that it would be to the advantage of the Inland Revenue Commissioners and the State to accept it in this or a modified form.

New Clause—

(Payment of duties in advance.)

"(1) It shall be lawful for the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, upon the request of any person desiring to provide against any duties which may become payable under this Act in respect of property passing on his death, to open an account with such person (to be called an "Estate Duty Account") into which such person may from time to time pay sums of not less than fifty pounds at one and the same time, to be dealt with as hereinafter mentioned.

(2) Any sum paid into the Estate Duty Account of any person shall be invested by the Governor and Company of the said Bank in Consols, and accumulated.

(3) The Governor and Company of the said Bank shall, upon the death of any person, apply the amount, if any, standing to the credit of the Estate Duty Account of such person, in payment, in the first place, of the duties payable under this Act in respect of such of the property passing on his death as he shall by writing under his hand direct, and shall pay the balance, if any, of the amount standing to the credit of such account to the executor of such person, and Estate Duty shall be levied thereon at the proper graduated rate.

(4) Estate Duty shall not, save as hereinbefore provided, be paid in respect of the amount standing to the credit of the Estate Duty Account of any person at the time of his death.

(5) Any person may, with the consent of the Commissioners, but not otherwise, withdraw from the said Bank the amount for the time being standing to the credit of his Estate Duty Account.

(6) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any sum paid into the Estate Duty of any person within twelve months of his death or the investments thereof."—( Mr. Butcher. )

Clause brought up, and read the first time."

Motion made, and Question proposed' "That the Clause be read a second time."

said, he was obliged to differ from the view of his learned Friend that the proposal could not be objected to because it could neither injure the estate nor hurt the Revenue. It proposed to exempt from the payment of duty money belonging to a category of property that he had before said could not be exempted. The hon. and learned Member said the object of the clause was to exempt from taxation all the money put by to pay the Death Duties. That would involve a serious loss to the Revenue. Supposing the exemption were made general, or all payments of duty were exempted from taxation, the loss to the Revenue would be £500,000 annually. It would affect the whole of the existing Probate Duties. In speaking the other day with reference to insurances, be pointed out that it would be unfair to give any special exemption from the payment of duty to people who made that class of investment. There were many persons who could not be insured or who wanted to employ the money in their business, and therefore could not adopt that particular form of investment. He had also pointed out that a man who might use his money to buy a house would not have the advantage proposed to be conferred. The same objection applied to this Amendment. The hon. Member might be able to go to the Bank of England and invest his money, but Non cuivis homini contingit adire Corinthum. This clause gave an advantage only to the class of persons who could go and run up an account at the Bank of England, and it seemed to be the fault of so many Amendments proposed by hon. Members opposite that they gave exceptional advantages only to the wealthier classes. The Amendment would confer a great advantage upon (he was sorry to have to use the phrase again) the millionaire who, in view of approaching death, could put into the Bank sufficient to pay the duties.

said, he would call the right hon. Gentleman's attention to Sub-section 6 of the clause, which said—

"The provisions of this section shall not apply to any sum paid into the Estate Duty of any person within 12 months of his death or the investments thereof."

said, that still the objection would stand that only the wealthier class of people would be able to take advantage of the clause. They could not take one class of investment and say that it should not be liable to duty.

said, he thought they had some reason to complain of the action of the right hon. Gentleman in this matter. When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Great Grimsby yesterday proposed a clause giving this kind of exemption in the case of insurance affected for the purpose of paying Death Duties, the right hon. Gentleman was more sympathetic than he was now. He told them now, forsooth, that if the clause were passed into law it would only benefit the millionaire.

The richer people.

^* said, he had no doubt the millionaire would be able to invest his money much more profitably than in the manner proposed by the clause. He would not dream of taking advantage of the provision. The right hon. Gentleman had sympathised with the motive which had prompted the proposal to give some kind of advantage to persons who, at great sacrifice and trouble to themselves, saved money for the pur- pose of paying the duties which, according to the idea of the Government, should be paid by them and not by the successor. Well, it would be easy for the Chancellor of the Exchequer not only to sympathise with the motive of the Amendment, but, through the machinery of the Post Office Savings Bank, or some other channel, to enable the poorest persons as well as the richest to avail themselves of the advantages of the proposed clause. The House must, he was afraid, accept the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as a symptom that he had made up his mind to discourage thrift in this matter. The right hon. Gentleman said it would involve a loss of £500,000 a year if this clause became law.

I said that would be the loss if all payments of duty were exempted.

Is it likely that all Death Duties would be provided in this way?

I said that you cannot make exceptional provisions for exceptional investments, and I oppose the clause because it is exceptional.

^* said, that the right hon. Gentleman first opposed the proposal on the ground of its being exceptional, and then on the ground that it would entail a loss to the Revenue. The right hon. Gentleman had shown himself in a previous discussion to be sympathetic with the motive which had prompted the proposal, yet when he was asked to give practical effect to his sympathy he put forward these two pleas. They could only conclude that the right hon. Gentleman had made up his mind contrary to the past policy of the Legislature to refuse to grant advantages to persons who were thrifty, as against those who were not. He regretted the decision at which the right hon. Gentleman had arrived.

said, they were in this difficulty—the right hon. Gentleman complained last night that his (Mr. Heneage's) Amendment did not go far enough.

No.

Yes, the right hon. Gentleman had said that he could not make an exception solely in the case of the insurance offices. Now, when they had widened the Amendment so as to give exemption to money saved for the purpose of paying Death Duty the right hon. Gentleman said he could not accept the proposal, as it would involve too heavy a loss to the Revenue. He (Mr. Heneage) protested against this bugbear "loss of half a million" being trotted out whenever the Government had nothing else to say. He did not believe the acceptance of this clause would involve any loss at all. It would be, at the most, a problematical loss on what they hoped to gain. They wished to do business out of evil. They hoped to gain by the aggregation of policies larger sums of money out of the properties than would otherwise be the case. He did not think they would get anything at all in this way. They would only prevent thrift. The money which would otherwise be put by would be spent or invested in commercial transactions and very often lost. They ought to have much better arguments from the Government before they left off pegging away in the endeavour to obtain a concession on this point.

said, the Government surely ought to grant every facility for accumulating the funds out of which to pay the Death Duties. The proposals which had been submitted from that side of the House were designed to encourage persons during life to provide for the payment of the duties. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had said either that the proposals were "exceptional" or "too general." He should have regard to the fact that successors to estates would, in many cases, have great difficulty in paying Death Duties. The mischief in regard to many landed estates had been that the proprietors had in numerous instances trusted to the future, and provided for their families out of the future instead of trusting to the present. All the proposals which had been made were means by which every encouragement could be given to people during life to provide for this duty. Instead of meeting such proposals with objection the right hon. Gentleman surely should hail them with satisfaction. The encouragement here advocated was not only of advantage to the community, but to the Exchequer as well. The present proposal would only exempt amounts paid into the Bank in sums of £50. This would mainly affect the wealthy classes; but the Estate Duties would fall heavily on the smaller people. There were many persons accumulating small properties of several thousands of pounds whose representatives would find it difficult to procure the money to pay the Death Duties. The Amendment would encourage habits of thrift and temperance. He thought, therefore, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he talked about its being merely for the good of the millionaire, forgot that yesterday and the day before all the Amendments which the Opposition proposed on behalf of poorer persons in connection with this Estate Duty were always met with the same cold comfort. The right hon. Gentleman said then, as he said now, that the matter was small and not worth consideration. The Chancellor of the Exchequer must have an idea that the mere possession of property was a crime to be punished by heavy taxation.

You can spend less money.

said, that this was a proposal in order to encourage people to spend less money, and was framed for that very purpose. Why, then, did the right hon. Gentleman oppose it?

What I meant was, you should spend less public money.

said, he was afraid the Speaker would rule him out of Order if he went into that large question at this moment. He thought the right hon. Gentleman was referring to spending private money; but he would like to point this out: that of all Exchequers in the world, both the last Liberal Government and this one had been bigger than any other. They knew perfectly well why that was so—so many interests had to be squared that the amount of taxation was continually going up. He would rather confine himself to saying that it did seem a most unreasonable and incomprehensible thing on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that instead of hailing with satisfaction every system which would facilitate the accumulation of money to pay these duties, he seemed to set his face against every plan brought forward.

^* said that, judging from the Lon. Member's observations, one might imagine him ignorant of the fact that there were Death Duties in this country at the present time. Under the existing law, if a man died worth £25,000 in personalty, his estate had to pay £1,000 as Probate Duty, and under this Bill not one penny addition would be made on that charge. The deceased would still have to pay £1,000 Estate Duty, no more and no less. Why had not these proposals been made before with reference to probate? With regard to the payment of this £1,000, no exemption could be claimed now under the existing law. What was proposed was this: that whereas under the old law the estate paid £1,000, leaving £24,000 to be divided among the beneficiaries, the duty should only be paid now upon £24,000—in other words, that the corpus of the estate should be reduced by £1,000. That was the real practical working of this proposal. It was not fair to say that his right hon. Friend regarded the possession of property as a crime, or that he wished to penalise the owners of property. They were upon a fair arguable principle on this clause. He was sure the hon. Member who had proposed it would see that its operation could not be confined to accumulations in the Bank of England. If it were agreed to, its operations must be extended to accumulations in the Savings Banks and elsewhere, and, of course, to insurances. They could not pick out any specific mode of investment and say, "If you put your money in that investment it shall be relieved from paying duty." The principle of the clause, if adopted at all, must be adopted as a I whole, that principle being that the sum of money which the State required the property of a deceased person to pay I should itself be exempted from the payment of all duty. There could be no halfway house. If they once admitted the exemptions from the payment of duty, I they could not stop until they had made the concession complete, and they would I have to extend it to Legacy Duty and Succession Duty. They were asked to accept this Amendment on the ground I that it would encourage thrift, but why; were they to encourage it at the expense of exempting saved money for this I specific purpose? Why should not it extend to all savings? The same argument might be adduced in justification of a proposal that the State should offer a premium to every one who saved money. But that would be an untenable and indefensible proposal. He did not understand whether the Member for South Islington had dealt with large or small properties. He knew the hon. Member had done good service in this direction, and he sympathised deeply with his motive. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer had pointed out that the duties upon properties up to £1,000 were exceedingly small, and he did not think any system could be contrived to deal with this case. With regard to intermediate properties where a few thousand pounds had been saved, why should a certain portion of the savings be picked out? People who accumulated property of that class always did it by saving. Why should they pick out a certain portion? Say a man had made £10,000. The duty upon that would be £400. Why should they say that the property was only worth £9,600, and that they were to have £400 as an encouragement for having saved it? What this House had got to face and what the Government had got to face was that the Death Duties at the present time amounted to upwards of 10 millions per annum. The Government now expected that they would amount to something like 13 millions. Anybody could make the calculation as to what was the average amount of duty payable upon that sum per annum. Some hon. Gentlemen thought it was not more than 4 per cent., the Government thought it was rather more. They thought that having regard to the amount which the future Death Duties would bring in the sum that would be exempted from duty annually would be £500,000. That was a sum which the Exchequer could not afford to give up simply in order to reward men for doing that which it was to their own interests to do. It was not fair to say that those who disapproved this proposal on economical and fiscal grounds were the enemies of thrift. What they were not prepared to do was to encourage thrift by gifts of public money.

said, that what he might call the "bankrupt Budget" argument might be an answer to every proposition for alleviation. The Chancellor of the Exchequer told them in each case when they asked for exceptions to be made that it would not be possible if he was to get money out of his Budget. That was a serious argument from one point of view, but it was no argument at all as to whether the principle of exemption was a right one, and as to whether the incidence of taxation ought not to be changed. Surely it was a great confession of weakness for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say in answer to their arguments that the way he proposed was the only way in which the money could be raised. If the exemption were right, a re-arrangement of taxation ought to be effected, so that the Revenue might not suffer, although the exemption was granted. This was not an exemption asked for a particular favoured class in the ordinary sense at all, but for all those alike who chose, in the first place, to exercise a certain amount of self-denial and saving during their lifetime, and who, in the second place, from the moment they deposited the money gave the Government a security for the duty. These were substantial reasons why the clause should be accepted, and he intended to support it.

said, this was one of the most reasonable Amendments which had been submitted. It had been proposed in various ways. Personally, he thought the best proposal was that which suggested that this money should not be entirely released from the burden of taxation, but that it should not be aggregated with the rest of the estate. So far as his hon. and learned Friend's Amendment went, if he went to a Division he would vote for it, although he thought the provision in it limiting the release of the money from taxation to one year from the death rather marred its effect. He did not think the clause was the best form in which the object could be attained, but as it was au endeavour in the right direction he would support his hon. Friend. With regard to the remarks of the Secretary of State for India, there was really no strict analogy between the argument as applied to the existing law and the argument as applied to the Bill when it became law.

said, he understood the Secretary for India to say that if the owner of an estate of £25,000, which was liable to £1,000 duty, were during his lifetime to save £1,000 for the purpose of providing for the duty, and that £1,000 were not to be aggregated, the duty would fall on £24,000 instead of on £25,000. He submitted that that was not so, because the £1,000 would be saved out of income.

^* explained that what he said was that, under the present law, if a man died worth £25,000 he would have to pay £1, Q00, and under the new law the same sum of money and no more would have to be paid. The principle of the Amendment was that the £1,000 required to pay duty should be exempted, and therefore duty would only be paid on £24,000.

said, that was exactly what he ventured to deny. The £1,000 was saved out of income. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India had repeated his fallacy. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Estate Duty would only be paid on £24,000, but he must again assert that it would be paid upon £25,000, and the only question was whether it should be paid on £26,000.

said, as he understood the question it amounted to this: If a man at present worth £25,000 saved £1,000 to pay the Death Duties, when he died his estate, instead of being worth £25,000, would be worth £26,000, consequent upon his savings. The Amendment proposed to exempt that increase from duty.

said, the hon. Gentleman entirely misunderstood the case. In the case given, a man dying worth £25,000 had already paid £l,000 to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that was what the Amendment amounted to. The £1,000 paid into the Bank of England was impounded by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. Surely the right hon. Gentleman and hon. Members opposite could see that if the £1,000 was paid into the Bank of England it would be impounded by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. The House was always being met by the case of Lazarus paying 13s. while Dives paid only 13d.; but when Dives came forward and said, "Take my purple and fine linen—I will give you even the crumbs that fall from my table," the Chancellor of the Exchequer's reply was, "No, I will wait until you are dead." That the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who professed to wish to tax Dives, should refuse to accept duty from him in advance passed comprehension. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, "I will not take it; I will wait until you are dead, and then when you have no property I will come upon your successors, executors, administrators, and all the rest of them." He could see many objections to this new clause, but would not take up the whole time of the Committee by stating them. Among other misapprehensions the Secretary of State for India had been kind enough to tell the House that comparing the old and new systems the incidence of the tax on foreign property passing to a widow or children would be very different. He admitted that there would be an enormous difference. He could quite understand hon. Gentlemen opposite not desiring to listen to argument, for they never descended to argument themselves, however much they might attempt definition. Then the Chancellor of the Exchequer said he would lose £500,000 if everybody accumulated sufficient to pay the Estate Duty. But was it likely that everybody would do so? The right hon. Gentleman defeated his own argument. If everybody liable to the duty provided the money it would take not £500,000, but £700,000 or £800,000, because the Death Duties would be increased 5 6-10th per cent. They were obliged to make their own calculations, because the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had all the figures, would not give them any assistance. He could not understand this resistance of the right hon. Gentleman to this general proposal on the part of Dives to pay this duty in advance. The position of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in regard to this matter was incomprehensible. Under the existing law amounts set apart to pay duties were not taxed. That had always been the principle followed and was set forth in the Succession Duty Act. When it was now proposed out of mere generosity to provide funds before the death for the payment of duties the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to accept the proposal with the utmost enthusiasm.

said, he wondered what kind of reception would have been accorded to such a clause as this if it had been proposed while the Party opposite were not in power. He was confident that if the Chancellor of the Exchequer were to allow his friends to vote as they liked they would vote for this clause. There was more in the proposal than the simple question of gain or loss to the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman was always bringing forward the millionaire whom he used to accuse hon. Members on that side of the House of introducing, but was now himself continually trotting out. It was certainly not the millionaires or very rich men who would avail themselves of the proposed facility; such persons had better means of employing their money, and would probably lose more by putting it into Consols than they would save in Estate Duty. But there was a vast class of professional men and others who occupied a position between Dives and Lazarus, and who experienced considerable difficulty in finding investments, and who if they had this additional encouragement for putting their money in Consols and providing in that way for the duty would find it a prudent course to take. The advantages need not, either, be confined to professional men. The clause might be so adapted as to make it valuable to all classes of persons. He would call the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to this point. This was not a clause, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer originally put it, to help rich men. It might be made of assistance to all persons who put aside a certain sum during their lifetime, not in the way of insurance but of a deposit which could not be withdrawn. It was a very ingenious clause which had been proposed by his hon. Friend to utilise investments in this manner, and he felt sure that, if the clause were read a second time, his hon. Friend would be quite prepared to remove the limit of £50, and to extend the operation of his proposal to Post Office Savings Banks and other institutions of a similar kind. Arrangements were made when he was in Office, as had been previously pointed out in the course of this Debate, by which the Bank of England, for a very small commission, would buy Consols for any person, whether a customer of the Bank or not, and would allow the dividends to accumulate from year to year. That plan had answered admirably; the system was developing and extending; and there was no person who had paid more attention to it, and who ought to be more satisfied with it than the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself. It had been beneficial to vast numbers of persons in the country, and Parliament might well assist such an object. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India had said this proposal might be extended to every form of saving, but that had not hitherto been the principle on which Parliament had acted. The right hon. Gentleman's refusal amounted to this: that Parliament should not encourage thrift by any means. He was not sure that the principle was entirely sound; but, at all events, this was not a principle upon which legislation had hitherto proceeded. At present a larger amount of interest was being paid on Savings Bank deposits than the State could well afford, simply because it was considered that thrift should be encouraged, and no Chancellor of the Exchequer had ventured to diminish that rate of interest. Advantages were given to Friendly Societies of various kinds for making investments in the Post Office, and in many ways the principle was followed of encouraging thrift not by any great outlay of public money, but by favouring certain channels of thrift where greater security was given than in other directions. A proposal which would induce a number of persons in this country to invest in Consols and to hold Consols was one to obtain the advantages of which Parliament might well make some sacrifice. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed to hold the principle that Parliament should not encourage thrift by any sacrifice. Thrift, therefore, was encouraged by favouring certain channels which seemed to offer encouragements to thrift. His hon. Friend had guarded this proposal by providing that the money invested could not be withdrawn. That would constitute a great difference between this and other kinds of savings. Under the present proposal the money invested could not be touched; while, of course, ordinary savings were available in any time of trouble or emergency. This proposal would be a great advantage to the widow and children of any man who availed himself of it. No new principle whatever would be involved in sanctioning the present proposal, for it already existed in the case of the Legacy Duty. The Government had been unable to bring forward any stronger argument against its acceptance than that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the loss which he said the Revenue would suffer. The Secretary for India had asked why such a proposal as this had not been brought forward before. The reason was that no great measure connected with the Death Duties as a whole had previously been submitted to Parliament, otherwise clauses such as this would have been certain to be introduced. There was, he believed, a considerable feeling amongst the public that it would be wise to encourage both insurance and the accumulations suggested by his hon. Friend. In his opinion, however attractive this mode of investment might be, there would be nothing like the loss anticipated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It would not become by any means universal, and, even if it were, the arguments of his hon. Friend had shown that the Exchequer would not lose. If the payment were made out of income and not out of capital a considerable sum would be set apart for the purpose of paying this duty, and it ought not to be aggregated with the bulk of the property. He believed that the clause would tend to the encouragement of thrift, and should give it his support if the hon. and learned Member went to a Division.

said; he had no desire to prolong the Debate, but he had to make a suggestion in the way of a compromise that he thought might render a Division unnecessary. He wished to know whether the Government, if they could not relieve the property in question from the duty, could not see their way to except it from aggregation with the bulk of the property? If the Government would agree to except it from aggregation he should advise the hon. and learned Member not to go to a Division upon this proposal. Of course, if the Government did not see their way to accept the suggestion, hon. Members on that side of the House would feel bound to record their opinion on the subject; but he rather hoped that the compromise that he had suggested to the Government would meet with their favourable acceptance.

said, he was sorry he could not give a favourable answer to the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion, for he had very carefully considered the matter with the assistance of those most competent to advise him upon it, and the conclusion at which he had arrived was that it was impossible to treat this property differently from the way in which other property was treated. There was no sound financial reason for drawing any distinction between the two classes of property, and therefore he could not accept the proposal to exempt the property in question either from aggregation or from payment of duty.

said, he would not detain the House a moment in pointing out to the Chancellor of the Exchequer why this portion of the "deceased man's property," as he called it, should be distinguished from the rest. The Death Duties differed from Income Tax in this case, because the property would represent accumulations during the lifetime of which the man would have no opportunity of making use. Why should not a prudent man, who wished to live within his income and considered he was sufficiently taxed, be able to provide a margin for the payment which would have to be made? If he had an opportunity in his lifetime of transferring the obligations which this greatly increased taxation would represent, was it reasonable or fair that the property which he had set aside year by year for the purpose of meeting that taxation should be subjected to aggregation and to payment of duty upon his death? A distinction should be made in the case of any fund put aside in a man's lifetime year by year, representing his unpaid taxation, and left to accumulate until his death, and that property clearly should be relieved from aggregation for the payment of Estate Duty.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 184; Noes 220.—(Division List, No. 160.)

moved the following clause:—

(Works of Art. Registration.)

"(1) A register or registers of works of art shall be kept by such person or persons, public body or bodies, Corporation or Corporations, as the Commissioners shall from time to time nominate for the purpose (herein referred to as the registration authority), and any person to whom a work of art passes upon the death of the deceased may (if such work of art shall not already be registered in the name of the deceased), upon compliance with such conditions as shall from time to time be prescribed by the registration authority, register in his name in the prescribed manner a description of such work of art, and the registration authority shall thereupon give such person a certificate of registration.

(2) If a work of art forming part of property passing on the death of a deceased person shall at the time of his death be registered in his name or shall within three months after his death, or such further period as the Commissioners shall allow, be registered in the name of the person to whom it passes upon such death, such work of art shall not be aggregated with the other property passing on the death of the deceased, nor shall Estate Duty be paid in respect thereof upon the death of the deceased.

(3) If a registered work of art passing upon the death of the deceased shall be sold before any further death shall occur upon which Estate Duty shall or would but for the provisions of this section become payable, duty shall be paid to the Commissioners upon the amount of the consideration passing on such sale.

(4) Upon payment to the Commissioners of the duty under the preceding sub-section the certificate of registration shall be delivered up to the Commissioners, who shall thereupon vacate the registration and give to the person paying the duty a receipt therefor.

(5) A certificate of registration and receipt for duty under this section shall be conclusive evidence of the facts therein respectively appearing.

(6) The Commissioners shall have power from time to time to make rules for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this section into effect.

(7) If a work of art forming part of property passing upon the death of the deceased shall not at the time of his death be registered in his name, or shall not within three months after his death, or such further period as the Commissioners shall allow, be registered in the name of the person to whom it passes upon such death, such work of art shall be aggregated with the other property passing on the death of the deceased and the value thereof ascertained in the manner in which the value of other personal property passing upon the death of a deceased person is ascertained under this Act.

(8) The expression 'works of art' shall include pictures, prints, books, manuscripts, antique plate and furniture, antiquities of national or historic interest, articles of vertu, and such collections thereof and such other objects or classes of objects as the Commissioners may from time to time prescribe to be within the meaning of this section."

With regard to any probable loss which might result to the Revenue, that could be guarded against by a subsequent clause. It was their duty, in the interest of the country, to keep these great works of art as much as possible in the country, and he believed this clause would have that effect. He hoped, therefore, that the clause would meet with the favourable consideration of the House. The hon. Gentleman said that this new clause followed the lines of the Amendment which he proposed in Committee. His proposal then was that a register should be established and kept by the Inland Revenue authorities, and the argument used against it was that this would be a very inconvenient duty to throw upon the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. Now, therefore, his suggestion was that the registers should be kept by such Public Bodies as might be nominated by the Inland Revenue authorities, his notion being that probably the Trustees of the National Gallery in the case of pictures, and the South Kensington Museum authorities in other cases, would gladly make themselves responsible. There was another alteration as between the proposal which he made in Committee and that which he now set before the House, which had reference to the registration fee and the payment of duty at the higher rate; but he was informed that in the terms he had set it down it would not be in Order. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer could accept his Amendment there was no reason why he should not in some other form attain its object by the introduction of another clause which should be at his own disposal. The effect of the Amendment which he (Mr. Byrne) proposed was that registers should be kept by the proper authorities, and that any persons desirous of registering works of art should, after compliance with the regulations, be exempt from payment of duty until sale took place, when he should be entitled to pay the duty out of the purchase money; and, further, that there should be no aggregation for the purposes of the Estate Duty. The arguments which he put before the Committee in introducing the Amendment were that it was to the interest of the people of this country that works of art should be kept in their midst, and that no temptation should be offered to their possessors to alienate them. That principle had been followed by other countries, and was regarded everywhere as a sound principle. Apart from that, the argument which he used in Committee he still maintained—that if the duty was so enormously increased upon non-productive properties the effect must necessarily be to injure the true interests of Art. People would not spend large sums of money on the productions of the best modern artists if they knew that, in addition to the expense of keeping them, and the uncertainty of and the fluctuation in their value, duty would have to be paid upon their death at a high rate, and that all their pictures would have to be aggregated with such other property as they might leave in order to ascertain what was the amount of duty payable on the whole. He might urge upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer the case of a man who might have in his possession pictures which apart from their value as works of art, he particularly valued because they were the portraits of his own ancestors. A man with £20,000 to leave might have a couple of pictures by Reynolds or Gainsborough which were of historical worth. It was possible that they might fetch on sale £11,000 a-piece. That man might be reduced to the direst poverty, but if he was a man of pride or of sentiment he would not part with pictures in which he had a sentimental interest. Then, supposing he had £20,000 to leave to his family, under the proposals of the Bill the value of these pictures would be aggregated with the rest of the estate, so that he must pay duty upon the £40,000 scale instead of the £20,000. This sentimental interest, whether derided or respected, existed all the same, and was closely bound up with the deepest feelings of a good many people in this country. It was, in fact, equivalent to that feeling which was treated with so much respect when it was called "land hunger" in Ireland. That feeling could not be eradicated from human nature; and he said it was a hard thing to make people pay upon pictures which had acquired a value independently of their worth as works of art simply because they represented the ancestors of the owners. He hoped the House would favourably consider this clause.

Clause brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."—( Mr. Byrne. )

said, it was a painful thing to be always saying "No," but he thought the House understood that the new clauses really raised questions which had been discussed in Committee, and he hoped the Government would not be thought obdurate if they again declared that they could not accept these clauses. When they came to the Amendments to the Bill he hoped it would be found that the Government had endeavoured to carry out the promises they had given in Committee. With regard to the present proposal, he must repeat that it was impossible in a Bill of this character to meet every special case. They must act upon some principle, and, as the Leader of the Opposition had said, the test must be saleable value. To discriminate between particular kinds of property because they had a pretium affectionis was impossible in a Bill of this description, and had never been attempted in any legislation of this character before. He observed that the contention here was that registration would prevent works of art from leaving the country. That reminded him that when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Sleaford Division was supporting the Motion for the adjournment of the House over Derby Day he said that one good reason why the House of Commons should go to the Derby was that it would encourage the owners of English racehorses to keep them in England, instead of selling them to go abroad. That was an admirable argument in its way, but it was discounted by the fact that the horse which nearly won the Derby was sold the very next day to go abroad. [ A cry of "No!"] Well, at all events, the result was that the second best horse in England was immediately sold to go abroad. If it suited the owner he would send them abroad. Consequently he had some scepticism about these specific remedies for preventing pictures going abroad. Neither was he prepared to say that the sale of pictures made them less valuable from a public point of view. On the contrary, he found that very few persons had ever seen some of the most famous pictures until they went to Christie's, and, on the whole, he imagined that the knowledge of pictures was not retarded, but was accelerated, by the sale and redistribution and re-arrangement of pictures which took place from time to time. No doubt a proportion of our works of art went abroad, but, on the whole, the balance of trade was in favour of England. The imports into England were much larger than the exports. The proposed clause relieved the Inland Revenue authorities from the duty of registration, but it left it to them to prescribe what were articles of vertu. He had never seen the word "vertu" in an Act of Parliament before, and he could find no definition of it in the Interpretation Act. Therefore, to ask the Commissioners to prescribe what were articles of vertu was to impose upon them a rather inappropriate task.

said, the right hon. Gentleman seemed to have overlooked the fact that if pictures were settled they escaped Probate Duty altogether, and that settlement was the course followed in the case where a picture was particularly valued. He must say he was surprised at the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer with regard to the exports and imports of pictures, for, speaking with some personal knowledge, he believed that for every good French picture that came to England 10 or 20 went to America.

What I said was that more pictures came into England than went out of England.

This matter was partly one of sentiment and partly one of national importance. The desirability of offering every reasonable inducement for keeping great pictures and works of art in the country was, in his opinion, a matter of national importance, and he certainly had hoped that a reasonable concession would have been made by the Government. The right hon. Gentleman asked how the Inland Revenue was to know whether the works of art existed or were sold. What was the protection at the present time? Everybody knew that documentary evidence had to be sent to Somerset House, and that the possession of such property had to be disclosed. If they could rely upon the affidavit made by the responsible representative of the estate as fair and just at present, they could rely upon receiving information as to works of art being sold. The right hon. Gentleman was not entitled to assume that persons who did not make false statements about the possession of works of art would yet make false statements about those works having been sold. Rules have to be arranged, of course, in order to secure a proper return being made. He would point out that the fact that a register had to be kept would in a few years create self-acting machinery whereby the Inland Revenue would be able to know at once whether or not the works of art really did belong to the persons who had previously registered them. On every death occurring there would be a return made, so that the periods when the Government would be able to claim the duty would be the periods when there would be a change on the register. In this case they were dealing with a class of property which could not be turned into money and was not intended to be—property on which a man never could obtain a single sixpence. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer made light of this Amendment, which was founded upon a natural and just desire not to put on the market property which was worth more from the point of view of sentiment than from the point of view of market value. The proposal made was a reasonable one, and he trusted Her Majesty's Government would see their way to accept it.

^* said, he must express his keen disappointment at the unsympathetic tone which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had adopted. Here was an opportunity when the Government might have well given a helping hand to Art in this country at a time when that help was much needed. He feared that if the owners of pictures had this extra burden imposed upon them it would have the indirect effect of sending from this country a large number of pictures which we could ill afford to lose. He believed the Chancellor of the Exchequer was correct in stating that the balance of trade in respect of pictures was rather in favour of this country—that was to say, that more pictures entered England than left it; but if the right hon. Gentleman would consult those who were best able to give him information upon the matter, they would tell him that during the last 18 months or two years some of the most valuable examples of our older masters had been leaving the country in far larger proportion than at any time previously. We could not afford to part with the masterpieces of Gainsborough, Reynolds, and the other great masters who were dead. Moreover, he believed that every inducement ought to be held out to the getting together of large collections of pictures, because the nation was benefited by such collections, the people who owned them very frequently sending selections from them about the country for purposes of exhibition. In that manner many thousands of people were enabled to enjoy works of art which, if scattered about in various hands, would never be on exhibition at all. There was another objection to the course which the Government wished to take. At present, when a man left a large collection of works of art behind him, he frequently gave directions that they should be sold at a reasonable price, the idea being that it would be some temptation to those who had control of our great national or municipal collections to purchase them. He was aware that the question of sympathy with Art was not a very practical question connected with the discussion of pounds, shillings, and pence, but at the same time he thought articles of art and vertu ought to have been the very last selected for this extra impost. It must be remembered that those who acquired pictures for their own pleasure or for the pleasure of the public received nothing in the way of interest. He thought that this fact ought to be considered in determining the mode of imposing the new duty upon them. The Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed to think that it was as easy to value pictures as it was to value Stocks or shares. The case of the Adrian Hope collection recently sold proved that this was not so. The general opinion was that that collection would fetch at least £100,000, and he happened to know that the lowest valuation that was placed upon it by the most expert person who was called in to value it was £75,000. Well, after the sale had been puffed and advertised in an almost unexampled manner, the collection realised £47,000. This showed that even in the case of a collection on which the attention of so many men was riveted, it was impossible to arrive at a valuation which was anything like the real market value. This case was, of course, only one of thousands. He must protest in the name of the art-loving and art-collecting public against-the want of sympathy with them which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had manifested in his treatment of this proposal.

said, he should like to say one word on behalf of the small collectors. If there was one thing that constituted a greater contrast than another between the small country houses of this country and the small country houses of other countries it was the fact that in almost every one of the former works of art were to be found that had been handed down from father to son. When works of art were in the houses of the people, they had, in the opinion of their owners, far greater value than when they were anywhere else. They became, as it were, an historical record of the various occupants who had held the property. Many of them were ancestral portraits of very great interest. He himself knew many small houses in his own neighbourhood in which there were works of art to which the owners attached the greatest value. These owners were not rich men, but were men upon whom the Legacy Duty would fall with exceptional hardship, and it was very doubtful whether, unless some Amendment were agreed to, they would be able to retain their works of art at all. He did think that the Chancellor of the Exchequer might take the cases of these people into consideration. They were at least as deserving of consideration as those rich people who had formed great collections, and they formed quite a distinctive feature of this country. There was another case which he ventured to submit to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It very often happened that a rich man wished to bequeath to a friend, who was perhaps in humble circumstances, some work of art in which that friend had possibly taken great delight as a memento of their friendship. The friend, if he were poor, would be unable to retain the work of art if he had to pay these enormous Death Duties upon it. It must be borne in mind that no actual value in money would accrue to the inheritor. He hoped that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would, even at the eleventh hour, grant some relaxation in this matter, as he might very well do without inflicting any great loss upon the Exchequer.

said, he felt it was almost in vain to appeal further to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this point, but he felt compelled to do so, not in the interest of any particular person, but in the interest of the English public, who were learning year by year to care more for beautiful things, and especially for pictures. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had almost admitted that his proposals would lead to a great number of sales of great collections of pictures, and had said that picture sales tended to educate the public. No doubt some sales had let the public know for the first time what treasures we possessed in this country, but in too many cases they found these treasures out only to lose them. Nobody seemed to know that there was in a private collection in this country a Dante illustrated by Botticelli until it was sold to the German Government. He did not think that the term "local museums" was an inappropriate one to apply to many of the great country houses in which many fine pictures were safely housed, and to which the public had access.

Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to point out that there is no provision in this clause that anybody should have access to any of these picture galleries? The clause would apply to places where nobody is allowed to see a single picture.

said, he thought that point might be easily met, and he ventured to say, from his own knowledge, that a large number of country houses where there were collections of pictures were open to the public. He believed that in London there were two collections to which it was difficult to obtain admission, but in the country collections were generally open on two or three days a week. In this country we were at the disadvantage of having no public local collections except in Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, and some other large towns. In France and Italy there were very few towns in which there were not to be found one or two public collections containing sometimes, perhaps, one or two masterpieces among the other pictures. The substitute in England for these collections was the collections in country houses. He thought it would be unjust and unwise to break up these collections. If they were nominally, as they were in effect, public collections, nobody would think of suggesting that the State should put a tax upon them with the result possibly of driving them from our shores. It must not be forgotten that there had been people who had lent important pictures to the National Gallery and to exhibitions at Bethnal Green for a long series of years. There was every reason to believe that such action would be repeated more and more in the future as the public appreciated works of art better. He thought that the rejection of this Amendment would strike a damaging blow at the development of the love of beauty which all had been glad to recognise in recent years amongst our countrymen.

^* did not agree with the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the sales of private collection of pictures would lead to such pictures being exhibited in places of public resort. The number of pictures added to the National Gallery each year was extremely limited, whilst the collections formed by Municipalities were there-suit of purchases of pictures very recently painted and which had come either from the studio of the painter or from some well-known picture dealer. As to picture sales having an educational value, he could not agree to any extent with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as the number of persons who went to view pictures that were for sale was very small indeed. It must also be borne in mind that sales of pictures would not add to the number of valuable loan collections that were to be seen every year. He himself desired to see the private collections of pictures retained in this country, and not to have them sent to the Continent, where too many of them had gone in recent years. It was, he thought, desirable to encourage people to keep their family pictures in their own hands. Some regard ought also to be shown for the artists themselves. There was no doubt that if pictures painted by British artists were retained in this country the artists would obtain larger commissions, and art would more greatly flourish here.

I do not propose to detain the Committee at any length on this Amendment, because I have already made more than one speech in defence of its principle, which, I confess, I think an extremely strong one. The Chancellor of the Exchequer dismissed in very brief terms the argument which he described as that of pretio affectionis. He has laid it down that there is really no principle on which the House should accept an Amendment of this kind. I think there is a principle, and that that principle is actually embodied in existing legislation. When you tax the pretio affectionis you impose a burden on an individual which you do not impose on other members of the community. The right hon. Gentleman has, I think, forgotten, when he defends what he calls his principle, that that principle has been already violated by our existing system of taxation. Plate and articles of furniture already in use are subjected under our existing law to the kind of system which my hon. and learned Friend wishes to adopt for works of art generally. This is under a clause of the Succession Duty Act. I do not see that in this case the distinction between probate and succession is material. In the argument I am using—namely, that it is unfair to put a tax on objects the money value of which is not realized—it is irrelevant to tell me that it is under the Succession Duty and not under the Probate Duty that the existing exemptions apply. I will not press this matter further; I will only say with regard to the subject of works of art going out of England that it seems to me quite inconceivable that if, as the result of this duty, some of our great collections are broken up, there would be in future a power of absorbing them within the four seas. I do not believe it; I think that some of them must overflow and go into foreign countries. That actually happened under the Hamilton sale, and you will have it happen far more in the future under the new condition of things introduced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because as a result of the duty far more collections will be broken up and thrown en bloc on the market, and it will happen the more because fewer people will be prepared to buy and invest their money in a kind of private property which brings in no income during their lives, but which, in consequence of the Death Duties and aggregation, will impose very heavy burdens on their successors. For that reason the result of your taxation is, it must be, to bring to Christie's not merely the comparatively small collections that find their way there at present, but very large collections; and nothing will make me believe, in the present condition of things—when America is beginning to be a great competitor in this particular market with English capital—nothing will make me believe that when great collections are brought into the market, large slices of them cannot be absorbed by English wealth, and will not find a market elsewhere, and probably one that will prevent them ever returning to the shores of a country which has shown itself so ill-qualified to appreciate the great treasures which it already possesses. I believe that in this matter, if only we consult the general sentiment of the outside public, we should carry this Amendment, or something like it, by an overwhelming majority. This is not a question in which the rich are concerned so much as the poor, and I believe that if the Members who claim to be the representatives and special exponents of certain sections of working-class opinion were here, they would back me up when I say that they and those who returned them to this House feel as strongly as any other section of the community how great a power in the public national culture these works in the hands of private individuals are, and who would deplore any measure which would drive them out of the country, with a depth of conviction not to be surpassed by any section who have spoken in favour of this Amendment. The right hon. Gentleman is never happy, apparently, unless he can find some excuse for accepting an Amendment that squares with what he calls the principles of his Bill. There are two broad principles I would beg him to remember. One is justice to the individual, and the other expediency to the community, and if we can show, as we have shown abundantly, this removes an injustice to the individual, and that its adoption will confer a great benefit upon the community at large, we do not consider ourselves required to grub about among these clauses to find any principle to justify the proposal now pressed upon the House. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made up his mind, I do not imagine it is worth while for us to expend any more of our powers of persuasion upon his obdurate heart, but we have felt ourselves bound to give him this one last chance of carrying out the policy which I am sure he sympathises with in his heart, and if he will not accept the Amendment in the place of penitence, there is nothing more we can do in the matter. Certainly, we should not be doing our duty, either to the individual owner of pictures, or, what is more important, to the art-loving public, had we not endeavoured, to the best of our ability, to induce the right hon. Gentleman to accept an Amendment which would not injure the Exchequer, and which would greatly benefit the public.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 86; Noes 123.—(Division List, No. 161.)

^* : The next clause standing in the name of the hon. Member for North Islington (Mr. Bartley) would more appropriately Come as an Amendment to Clause 33.

moved the following clause:—

(Works of art exemption from duty.)

"(1) If any works of art are settled as heirlooms any person interested under the settlement may register the settlement with the Com- missioners, and during the continuance thereof the duties payable under this Act shall not be, levied in respect of the works of art thereby settled.

(2) If any work of art settled by a settlement registered under this section shall be sold during the continuance of the settlement, duty shall be paid on the amount of the consideration passing on such sale.

(3) If upon the determination of any settlement whereby works of art are settled, such works of art are not immediately thereupon resettled, and the settlement registered under, this section, duty shall be paid on the value of such works of art.

(4) The expression "works of art" shall include pictures, prints, antique plate and furniture, antiquities of national or historic interest, articles of vertu, and such other objects or classes of objects as the Commissioners may from time to time prescribe to be works of art within the meaning of this section."

He said that this clause was much narrower in scope than the previous one. The House rejected the last Amendment on the ground that inasmuch as these articles and pictures of the character to which it referred were now subject to Probate Duty it was not right there should be any exemption in their favour. But the class of property which the present clause related to had never been subject to duty. Heirlooms were not subject to duty, therefore the objection taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that they were seeking to exempt from Probate Duty property which was now subject to that duty did not apply to the present Amendment. Heirlooms were only heirlooms when they were settled, and in respect to which the owner for the time being could derive no benefit.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,

said, that with regard to the class of property to which his clause related, no realisation could possibly take place, and no enjoyment, in the sense of pecuniary advantage, could possibly be derived. On the contrary, the clause was limited strictly and solely to that property settled as heirlooms, and which must be registered as heirlooms before they could be exempted. He would further point out that if such heirlooms were sold during the continuance of the settlement duty was to be paid on the value realised by the sale, and if there was not an immediate re-settlement, but the settlement itself came to an end, duty was to be paid on the valuable works of art which were not re-settled. There was one class of national property which had not yet received sufficient attention. He referred to ancient documents. It was within his knowledge that there were in possession of private owners most valuable historic documents, which were, in fact, invaluable for the purposes of national history, which could be turned into money and which would produce large sums if not protected from sale. He would point out that his Amendment provided that articles only should be exempt which were such as the Commissioners should from time to time prescribe to be works of art within the meaning of the section. This was a class of property which, at the present time, was not liable to duty at all, therefore, the Bill proposed a fresh tax, and the Amendment was in the interest not only of private individuals, but of the community at large, and was only restoring to that class of property known as heirlooms the exemption they now possessed from being liable to probate or its analogue, the Estate Duty. It was a class of property which the Chancellor of the Exchequer might exempt without outraging his conscience or sense of public duty. He was not asked to exempt or favour in this respect anything which would at the present time be liable to duty; but he was asked to provide simply as a matter of strict justice, that property which was settled and which could not be turned into money should be exempted from the duty which was imposed by this Bill. The clause contained ample safeguards. It was only to be applicable in respect of settled heirlooms which were registered as settled heirlooms, and if sold and turned into money the person who sold them was to be accountable for the duty. He hoped in the interests of justice and fair play that this concession, which affected a very limited class of important national property, would be granted by the Government.

Clause brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."

said, the question of policy involved in this new clause seemed to be precisely the same in principle as that which was discussed in the previous Amendment, and this question was really decided by the previous clause which had been discussed.

The previous clause did not refer to settled works of art.

thought there was a distinction in the consideration whether articles were settled or not; but when they remembered the argument in favour of exemption for works of art was based upon the importance of keeping them in this country and encouraging art generally, and so forth, he did not think the fact that they were settled made any difference. He hoped the hon. and learned Gentleman would not think it disrespectful if he did not repeat the arguments which had been already used and fully discussed. Under the circumstances, he could only say he was very sorry it was not in the power of the Government to accept the Amendment.

^* said, there was a clear distinction between this and the previous clause. The previous clause was broad and general in its terms, and, as they thought, just, but at the same time it was open to certain objections which could not be urged to the present clause. For instance, it related to all these matters, whether settled or unsettled, and their arguments in favour of it were based on grounds which might also be urged in favour of this clause. But there were certain arguments in favour of this which could not be used in favour of the last clause. Prior to this Bill there was no Probate Duty levied on settled works of art such as were referred to in the present Amendment. If they put things of that kind under settlement the owner could not turn them into money; he would be unable to sell them in the market at the best price they would fetch, and surely that was a good argument why they should not be taxed. That principle was recognised by the Legislature in the Settled Land Act, which put heirlooms on the same footing as a mansion house. A man could not sell heirlooms as he could sell other property without making out an imperative case for the sale; and the Court, in considering whether it should order or allow the sale of heirlooms, or mansion houses, must take into consideration not merely the interest of those claiming under the settlement, but the interest of those who come after them; and also that sentimental view of preserving the heirlooms in the family. He knew that an equivalent to Probate Duty and Legacy Duty was at present levied on pictures, works of art, and manuscripts; but the law had always recognised that those things might be under settlement, and he hoped the law would always so recognise it, for otherwise things of great national and historical value would be dispersed, and perhaps sent out of the country altogether. If historical treasures had not been exempt from taxation under settlement, they should not be drawing, as they were now, valuable information from collections of historical manuscripts which had been preserved for generations in the old houses of the country. But under this Bill, if not amended in the direction proposed, the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, or those whose duty it was to assess the value of property for the purposes of the Estate Duty, would insist on a thorough search of old boxes in the mansions of the country to see whether they contained historical manuscripts or rare pictures; and it was certain that the result of such a policy would be to destroy or disperse those treasures. It was in consequence of the existing law, which tended to preserve old manuscripts as heirlooms, that fresh light was being constantly thrown on the history of the country in the past through the agency of those old manuscripts, by the historical writers of the day. For the first time they were imposing a tax which would prevent these collections being made and preserved as they had been in former times; which would render it difficult to keep these valuable historical properties in the country, and thereby destroy for the future all prospect of having further light thrown on the history of the country. The Govern- ment had not paid due regard to the subject-matter of taxation, in imposing equal taxation, in respect to amount, on a thousand sovereigns, or a picture worth in the market a thousand pounds, or on a small estate worth a thousand pounds which could not be sold. It was not enough to support such action by the argument that they were really equalising taxation. There should be exceptions, and now, at least, they had got to a subject-matter in which it was to the public interest that an exception should be made. Men would not accumulate these properties if they were, by being included in aggregation, to augment the duty to be levied upon an estate. He believed the Government had not fully and fairly considered this subject. Hitherto it had always been considered that there was something more to regard than merely how much money they were to get by taxation. The Government ought to have some regard to the subject-matter of taxation. It was not enough for them to say, "We want so much money." They might levy what they required upon other properties if they would spare objects the dispersal of which would do violence to the national sentiment. We had been called a nation of shopkeepers, and he was afraid that under the new development of legislation, as exemplified in this Bill, we would deserve the epithet far more in the future than in the past. He was not one of those who said that in legislation they should be led away by mere sentiment; but, all the same, he believed that if they disregarded national sentiment in taxation they would be neglecting one of the highest duties of the Government of the country.

^* said, he was surprised the Government did not accept the clause, because it seemed to him to be in complete harmony with the professed policy of the Government. The Government were always professing that the object of their legislation was to confer on the people opportunities of improving their condition materially and artistically. He could understand the desire of the Government to break up estates and to destroy the continuance of families associated with the possession of land. But he could not understand this policy of embarrassing the preservation of articles which encouraged the cultivation of artistic tastes in the people. There were a large number of collections of pictures and works of art in mansions in various parts of the country, which for all practical purposes were as much open to the people as if they were housed in our public museums. The owners of those great country houses had generously placed their art collections at the disposal of the people, and there was no more difficulty in seeing them than there was in seeing the art collections in the various public museums of the land.

I do not think the remarks of the hon. Gentleman are relevant to this particular clause. The hon. Gentleman is speaking to the clause which has just been rejected by the House, and not to this question, which deals with the question of heirlooms.

said, his point was that the clause tended to the preservation of heirlooms in families, and that therefore if it were adopted the people would have the same opportunity of enjoying the art collections of the great country houses in the future as they had in the past. The policy which encouraged the preservation in the country as family heirlooms of collections of art treasures was a good policy; but it was a very bad and a very foolish policy to do anything which tended to the dispersal of those works of art amongst dealers and speculators. If the owners were willing to register those art collections they would be placed under an obligation to the public with regard to their preservation; and such a course would be in accordance with the very best desires of all those who wished to see those works of art made available for the cultivation of the artistic tastes of the people. Those works of art could not produce any actual income for the owners, and the benefit of them was, as he had pointed out, enjoyed by a large number of people who visited the great country houses for the purpose of seeing them. The proposal in the clause ought to commend itself especially to the present Government, considering the great, professions they made of their desire to elevate the condition of the people; and he urged them, therefore, not to reject it.

thought that at least family portraits and manuscripts might be exempted from taxation under the Bill. If some such clause as this was not adopted they might find some of the historical families obliged to sell their family pictures, which were national pictures, to satisfy the demands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He knew from personal knowledge that the Bill would impose heavy financial obligations on owners of property; and he was greatly afraid, indeed, that if those art collections were not exempted from taxation as heirlooms, they would be dispersed by sale, and probably lost for ever to the country.

said, he rose to support, in a few words, the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend and leader. He ventured to do so, because art was one of the subjects with which he had rather close relations. The Solicitor General asked why they pressed this Amendment. They pressed it because they were afraid those precious heirlooms would under the Bill be sold and sent away in order that the Death Duties might not be paid upon them. It might be said that the Amendment applied only to settled works of art, and that they were not so easily sold as unsettled works of art. But they really believed that even settled works of art would be sold if the owner was unable to pay the Death Duties accruing upon them. There might be difficulties in the way of selling those works of art; but they believed that if they were not protected in the way proposed in the Amendment, the powers of some Court would be brought into play, and that those works of art would be sold even though being settled. There could be no doubt that no difficulty would arise as to the definition of a work of art under the clause, for if the Solicitor General would look at the last lines of the clause he would find that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue were to be the judges. The hon. and learned Gentleman might say that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue were not qualified to judge in such a matter; but he understood that in regard to levying Probate Duty they were already constituted judges of the value of works of art and of what was the character of works of art. He would give the House a concrete case of the working of the Bill if the clause were not accepted. It was his own case, and possibly it was of some interest. It happened that he was the possessor of a collection of manuscripts which might be of extraordinary value. They contained the signatures of every King and Queen; of every Minister, and of almost every celebrated person of this country for 1,300 years down at least to 50 years ago. He trembled to think what this collection of manuscripts would be valued at by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue when it came to be dealt with for the purposes of Estate Duty after his death. His ancestors had spent a great deal of money on the collection. They had not only collected the manuscripts themselves, which were of great historical value, but they took enormous trouble to have verified in writing the genuineness of the manuscripts, and the history of how they were obtained and of the various hands through which they had passed. He had taken the precaution, with the assistance of his legal advisers, to prevent alienation after his death, so that the collection would come within the term "settled property" under the Act. It seemed to him to be very unjust that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue should place a valuation upon property of that kind, and have it heavily taxed. It might be said that Probate Duty had to be paid upon the collection in the past, and that no complaint of that duty had ever been made. But in those good old days Probate Duty was limited in its percentage, and so equitably administered that none of them felt it, and, therefore, never complained of it; but it became a different matter when his valuable historical manuscripts came to be brought together with his land, cottages, Stocks, shares, Consols, and things of that kind, and not only aggregated, but possibly graduated. In fact, this manuscript collection might possibly raise his estate from one grade into another, and therefore impose a higher charge on the estate, although his successor could get no financial benefit from the collection, as he would be unable to sell it. Examples of this kind might be infinitely multiplied. He maintained that it was not to the best interests of the culture of England that these articles of priceless interest should be denied to coming generations.

^* said, the Government must indeed have a heart of stone if it could resist the appeal of the hon. Baronet. He had thought, whilst the hon. Baronet was speaking, that the stony heart was melting, and that at a later period they would have some practical proof of the fact. It was only to works of art, manuscripts, &c., settled as heirlooms that this clause would apply—a very limited and special class of property, which at present paid nothing in the character of Probate Duty, and at the utmost was, as a rule, liable to pay 1 per cent. Succession Duty. The difference between the 1 per cent, now payable and the 4 or 5 and up to 8 per cent, which would be chargeable in future was, he ventured to think, a very serious matter, and one which the House should long consider before it adopted the scheme of the Government. He was glad to see the Solicitor General in his place, for he, no doubt, would remember the speech of Pericles, which would be familiar to all their minds. Pericles had told an Athenian audience that they cultivated a love of art with a due regard for economy. The Chancellor of the Exchequer cultivated it with a most undue regard for economy, because he found that the right hon. Gentleman economised his love of art when it became a question whether he should support the interests of art or endeavour to get a little more money for a particular year. The right hon. Gentleman invariably allowed the interests of art to fall into the background. He (Mr. Butcher) thought the time had come when, remodelling the Death Duties, and entering on what he might call a new stage of arrangement with regard to Death Duties, they might look on this matter from a somewhat broader point of view. Surely they should reconsider their position as to whether this non-income-bearing property should be treated as liable to the payment of Estate Duty. It was not unreasonable to ask that when they were putting the Death Duties on a new basis they should rise a little above the considerations of the money required for the year, and ask on what broad considerations of policy they must base their Death Duties in their remodelled state. As regarded these works of art and historical collections, they were in a unique position. They were non-income-bearing. No one suggested that they were used for bringing in a pecuniary advantage to their possessors. But they had this peculiar characteristic: that while they were thus non-income-bearing, they fulfilled an essential educational purpose, not only in relation to the individual who possessed them, but as regarded the far wider outside public. He believed that fully 99 per cent, of the great collections throughout the length and breadth of the Kingdom were open to the public, and no step should be hastily taken by the House that would even indirectly tend to lessen them, nor could any gain to the Exchequer in any way make up for their loss to the nation. He maintained that if from fear of having to pay this excessive duty owners felt compelled to get rid of their collections, hon. Members would be inflicting, by allowing this clause to pass, an irreparable injury on the public, who had enjoyed the privilege of inspecting the greater number of these private collections for so many years past. The interests of private individuals were well worthy of consideration, but he put it from the point of view of the public when he said that a great injury might be inflicted on them by insisting on the proposed duty.

said, there was one phase of this subject which had not been considered, and that was that the Amendment did not only apply to large collections of works of art and objects of interest. There were people in humble circumstances who possessed objects which were now of great value, but which were not valuable at the time they were made heirlooms. He referred to letters, MSS., and portraits. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he was sure, knew of many collections of the kind in the country which were now worth a great deal, but which at the time they were first acquired by an ancestor of the present owner were of small value. He had in his mind's eye a collection he had seen in Oxfordshire in which there were some wonderful pictures, which were now worth thousands of pounds, but which when they were first constituted heirlooms were of small worth, having been purchased at small prices in those days. These heirlooms became of great value by reason of the fact that other persons desired to possess them. It seemed to him to be particularly hard that the different possessors of the family portraits, for instance, should from time to time be called upon to pay a heavy duty for the privilege of owning them for their lives. It was not the fault of these owners that other persons desired to possess their heirlooms. There was a high way of looking at this question. It was a great thing to foster an interest in all that connected the present generation with those who had gone before and who, not only amongst the great and wealthy but in the humbler ranks, had helped to make England what she was, and he greatly regretted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed willing to sacrifice even the traditions of the past to secure a few more pounds to meet the exigencies of the present. Let the right hon. Gentleman sacrifice the small amount he would gain in the form of duty on these heirlooms if it was only for the sake of the education of the present generation; and, if necessary, in making the exemption, let him lay down the condition that the large collections should be open to the inspection of the public on certain days. Small collections, of course, could not be dealt with in this way. There were many persons who could only point, perhaps, to a testimonial that had been given to one of their ancestors, and yet the knowledge of that man's noble deed may have spurred others on to risk their lives for their fellow-creatures' good. He himself possessed a small silver cup, of artistic shape, that had been presented to one of his ancestors some hundred and fifty years ago for first raising buck-wheat in this country. In those days that was considered a great thing to do. He did not know what buck-wheat was, not being an agriculturist, but in his humble sphere he valued the cup very highly and desired to retain possession of it. And the sentiment that animated him in this matter was, he was sure, pretty general throughout the country. He feared that if the exemption from duty were not allowed in the case of heirlooms and works of art, the result would be that persons would be disposed to get rid of them. He, therefore, strongly supported the present Amendment, which he hoped would be accepted.

said, he would make an appeal to the House. This was an interesting subject, but the House had discussed it over and over again both in Committee and on various Amendments. He regretted that the view taken by the Government was different from that of hon. Members opposite, but it evidently was different. They could not undertake to deal with taxation, which had for its object equalisation, on the principles laid down by the hon. Member. He hoped that the heirloom possessed by the hon. Member as the result of the cultivation of buck-wheat, which was the best possible food for poultry, would long remain in the family. One point in connection with this subject was worthy of note. All the plans that had been proposed had this effect: As long as a man was rich enough to keep these heirlooms he would escape, but the moment circumstances became such that the articles had to be sold, then his relief would be granted from the payment of duty. A more unsound principle could not be conceived.

said, he thought the right hon. Gentleman was most unfair to the Amendment. The right hon. Gentleman said that the effect of the Amendment would be to provide that where persons were too poor to keep their heirlooms they would not escape duty. If the heirlooms were sold then they would pay duty, but why were persons to be fined if they retained and did not sell their heirlooms and had no enjoyment of them? The right hon. Gentleman said there was the pleasure of retaining them to be considered. The right hon. Gentleman could not have read the Amendment, because the whole force of it lay in the fact that heirlooms were settled property and could not be sold.

Unless with the consent of the Court.

Yes, unless with the consent of the Court. That was in cases where the possessors were driven absolutely to a sale. Hon. Members opposite appeared to rejoice that heirlooms should come into the market, and in this view they were opposed to the feeling which prevailed on his own side of the House that the heirlooms should be retained in the family. It seemed as if the Chancellor of the Exchequer thought that the best use to which heirlooms, manuscripts, and pictures could be put was to send them to Christie's. On this question, so far as sentiment was concerned, there was a distinct issue between the two sides of the House. He was surprised that the right hon. Gentleman, who had become more democratic than the democrats themselves—like the aristocrats who joined the French Revolution—should have shaken off every possible sentiment that heirlooms and pictures belonging to a family should remain in that family. He could not think that the view the right hon. Gentleman had expressed was his real and intimate and personal view. Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite could not wish that it should be made impossible or difficult to possess old manuscripts and pictures—and it must be borne in mind that these things were not exclusively in the hands of the rich. They were sometimes possessed by families who would be ill able from generation to generation to pay duty upon them. Heirlooms should be preserved to the families to which they belonged, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed anxious to treat them in a way that would drive them to the hammer. It was not correct, as the right hon. Gentleman had said, that this subject had been discussed over and over again. What had been discussed was the question as to works of art generally— works of art which did not yield an income. The subject they were now considering was as to settled heirlooms—heirlooms that could not be sold or that could only be sold by going to the Court—and he did not suppose that the Secretary of State for India really desired them to go there. The Chancellor of the Exchequer might fairly have given way, looking at the small number of treasures which were involved. He would remind the right hon. Gentleman that they did not pay Probate Duty, and the concession of this small point would assist the middle classes even more than the rich, while it would satisfy a sentiment prevalent among many classes of the community.

said, that he had been unable to support some of the Amendments bearing upon works of art, but this he could support with a clear conscience. This exemption was contained in the Legacy Duty Act. Plate, furniture, and so on, were exempt so long as they were enjoyed in kind; that was to say, when the possessor was unable to dispose of them. He admitted that when money was obtained for works of art it was reasonable that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should receive duty. He feared, however, that the effect of this Bill would be to impose such a charge on a picture, for example—a charge which might amount to £190 on a picture worth £1,000 if left to a man by a millionaire—that a relatively poor man would scarcely be able to raise sufficient money to pay the duty. He would thus be driven to sell the picture. There were details in the Amendment—as to registration, for example—which might be improved, but undoubtedly the principle of the proposal was a good one. If a man had, say, a picture which he had inherited he would not like to be driven to sell it for a few hundreds of pounds to persons who might wish to represent themselves as descendants of the Crusaders. One might be a poor man and a descendant of the Crusaders, and he might not desire to sell the picture of his ancestor to, say, an alkali manufacturer who might wish to represent himself as one of the "de Brunners" who came over with the Conqueror. No doubt the moment an heirloom was sold it was right for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have his tax.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 95; Noes 143.—(Division List, No. 162.)

^* said, the next new clause he wished to propose was one regarding policies of insurance for the payment of the new duties, and it might say something for his sanguineness of temperament when he suggested that he hoped—and hope sprang eternal in the human breast—he would be able to induce the Government to accept his proposal. His proposition was that if any person desired to provide during his lifetime for the payment of the Death Duties he might effect a special and specific policy to be called the Estate Duty policy, the proceeds on his death to be applied to the payment of the duties and his executor to have no control over the money until after the duties had been paid. This clause, he suggested, was not open to the objection made to a former proposal in regard to providing for Death Duties, for whereas the former proposal was conceived in the interests of the aged and infirm and such persons who were not likely to be able to effect an insurance on reasonable terms, the present scheme was applicable to the provident young and healthy, and, indeed, to every person, whether a millionaire or a poor man, who effected such an insurance as was here contemplated and who paid the premium regularly. Under this scheme a man would be creating during his life, by means of saving out of his income, a capital fund which would never have existed but for this means of providing for payment of duties after his death. The State would gain by the convenience and simplification which would be insured in the payment of the duty, and would not have to look to the man's estate or representative at all, as the money would be paid over by the Insurance Company direct to the Exchequer. He asked the Leader of the House to consider this proposal, not with benevolence, but by reason of its freedom from the economic objections which attached to the earlier proposal. This was not a question of amount, and the adoption of the plan would not involve any loss to the Exchequer.

New Clause—

(Insurances for Estate and Settlement Duty.)

"1. Any person desiring to provide against the duties which may become payable under this Act, in respect of property passing on his death, may effect for that purpose a policy of assurance (to be called an 'Estate Duty Policy ') upon his life.

"2. Any moneys payable upon the death of a person, under an Estate Duty Policy effected by him, shall be applied by the company or office with whom such policy is effected in payment, in the first instance, of the duties payable under this Act, in respect of so much of the property passing on the death of such person, as he shall by writing under his hand direct, and the balance, if any, of such moneys shall be paid to the executor of such person, and Estate Duty shall be levied thereon at the proper graduated rate.

"3. Save as hereinbefore provided, Estate Duty shall not be paid in respect of any moneys payable under an Estate Duty Policy."

Clause brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."

said, he really thought he would be imposing on the patience of the House if he were, for the tenth time he believed, to give the reasons why the Government could not accept Amendments of this kind. Figures or words might, by means of permutations and combinations, be presented in a number of ways. This was only a variation of the question which the Committee and the House had dealt with so often, with this difference, that in the former cases there was, at least, the pretence of appropriating the fund for the payment of the duty, whereas here the person creating the fund might appoint only a small portion of the fund to the Exchequer. Moreover, it would not be necessary that the fund should be created out of income, but might be made who means of evading payment of duty on part of the capital. He had so often wearied the House by answering Amendments of this kind that he would not trespass further upon their time. He would simply say that the same reasons which he had urged before prevailed also in the case of the present Amendment.