said, he could not quite agree that the point of view from which the right hon. Baronet had spoken was really the true point of view which was warranted and justified by the history of the facts. The right hon. Baronet first of all dealt with the origin of Kabarega's hostility to the Uganda policy, and he told the House that he considered that hostility to have been provoked mainly by two causes, which were very closely connected—first, by the establishment of a system of forts by Captain Lugard some years ago, and by the garrisoning of those forts with Sudanese troops, who were left without European control, and whose acts were undoubtedly calculated to provoke the hostility of their neighbours. A point with which the right hon. Baronet did not deal was—that when Sir Gerald Portal went to Uganda he insisted upon the forts being withdrawn, and on the Sudanese being placed under the control of Europeans. Since that time the Sudanese had remained under the control of Europeans, and they had had no account from that part of Africa of further excesses committed by those Sudanese troops, one of whose qualities was that they were amenable to discipline as long as a European was over them. Assuming that the causes of Kabarega's hostility were those stated by the right hon. Baronet, they were removed by Sir Gerald Portal, but when they were removed did Kabarega's hostility cease? In the last Blue Book on Uganda it was stated:—

"In September 1893, in accordance with Sir Gerald Portal's views, the garrisons of all the Unyoro forts were withdrawn into Uganda; some few Wanyoro, who were friendly and who feared Kabarega, were granted land in Uganda."

Practically, Sir Gerald Portal did then what the right hon. Baronet was asking that we should send imperative instructions to have done again at this moment. The result of withdrawing those forts at that time was so unsatisfactory, that he thought they ought to be cautious in interfering with the discretion of the authorities on the spot. "The withdrawal from the old forts," it was stated, "was considered by Kabarega as a victory," and, so far from having pacified him, Colonel Colvile found that there were frequent acts of aggression, and that the situation in fact was an impossible one. Colonel Colvile had stated:—

"Kabarega's frequent previous acts of aggression, the death within our territory, at the hands of his troops, of our native officer Shukri Effendi in May last, the fact that he had kidnapped and still holds in slavery 20,000 Waganda subjects, that he had neglected for years past to pay the tribute due by him to the King of Uganda, that his capital is the only remaining great slave trade centre of this part of Africa"

—which he thought of very great importance—"had long given good cause for forcibly bringing him to reason." He had summed that up by saying that Colonel Colville found the situation to be impossible. Some steps had to be taken, and the steps which were taken were the re-establishment of a line of forts, not exactly in the places of Captain Lugard's forts, but so placed as to be best calculated to prevent Kabarega from committing acts of hostility against Uganda. The ground on which the retention of those forts had been justified, was that they were necessary for the peace of Uganda itself, and their maintenance was still justified on that ground. If it did not clearly appear, from the information at their disposal, that they were necessary, he should still hesitate to send more peremptory instructions than had been sent already. The latest information that the Government had was that Kabarega had used a truce, which was granted him by Captain Thruston, simply as a blind, and that after having apparently accepted the truce he had again instigated certain bands of Unyoro people, numbering as many as 1,300, to raise two provinces of Uganda. The object of Kabarega in doing this was to break through the line of forts in order to establish communications with Arabs further south, from whom he could get large supplies of gunpowder. He had not the least doubt that Kabarega wanted those supplies of gunpowder in order that they might be used in a way very disadvantageous to Uganda. They had not the slightest evidence that Kabarega's attitude would be more friendly in the future than it had been in the past. The right hon. Baronet had pointed out that in the terms offered to Kabarega by Captain Thruston certain conditions were made, among others that of becoming a British subject, which were not in accordance with the policy which had been laid down. So late as April 6, they had sent instructions that in the terms offered to Kabarega no such conditions should be insisted upon. The condition which must be insisted upon was that Kabarega should be a friendly neighbour to Uganda, and at present all the evidence at their disposal went to show that he was not willing to accept any such condition. On the contrary, he was still implacable, and he thought the utmost that could be done in the way of sending instructions to promote a peaceable settlement with Kabarega had been done, and until they had further evidence that the authorities on the spot could deal more leniently or by less aggressive measures than they had been obliged to undertake in the past, he thought it would be wrong to send further and stricter instructions than had already been sent. He hoped the right hon. Baronet would see that, as far as the present situation was concerned, the Government had kept faith with the House of Commons, and that they had guided their policy on the lines laid down last year. The Government trusted that the instructions they had laid down with the authorities on the spot would prove to be effective and satisfactory. It must be remembered that it took three mouths to communicate with our officials in Uganda, and therefore that it was unavoidable that much must be left to their discretion. The Government were confident, however, that the new Commissioner who had been appointed—a most able, experienced, and discreet officer—would do his utmost to act up to the letter of his instructions, and at the same time would do everything in his power to so administer the country as to insure peace and to promote its best interests.

, wished to offer one or two remarks in reference to the Amendment. The explanation made by the hon. Baronet on behalf of the Government would, he believed, be regarded generally as very satisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean had gone, in his very lucid speech, to the very root of our whole policy in Africa, but looking to the sparse attendance of hon. Members, and to the time of the Session, he did not think a question of such importance could be adequately debated that afternoon. Though therefore, he should not enter largely into the subject, he wished the House and the public to understand that there were some who took great interest in the question, but did not agree with the views of the right hon. Gentleman. When the occasion offered, he should like to point out that there was one important point on which the right hon. Gentleman had not touched, namely, the view taken or entertained as to the future social and material condition of the populations of the territories in question to be dealt with. The establishment of the line of forts and the flying columns that had been spoken of were, after all, really two indications that our administrations were carrying out the principles of the Brussels Act, and the regulations for the stoppage of the slave trade, and the amelioration of the condition of the nations. Those regulations were arrived at after mature consideration, and the forts and flying columns were only two means for promoting the desirable end referred to. He noticed that the right hon. Gentleman spoke of Colonel Colvile as if he acted simply under his Commission as a Major in the Guards. It was nothing of the kind. He acted under commission from Her Majesty to do great acts of State, and, judging from his own little personal experiences in similar circumstances, he did not think the language used by Colonel Colvile was at all inappropriate. On those occasions it was right and wise to speak the language of high State documents; in fact, it was the only way to make a proper impression on the native chiefs, and also on those Europeans, or semi-Europeans, who were always to be found near the chiefs as their advisers. Both the Under Secretary and the right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean had shown that we had arrived at this state of affairs in Uganda—we had crushed the power of the various chiefs and the opportunities of Kabarega to do evil, but we had not done what in honour we were bound to do—set up some efficient administration in place of that which we had destroyed. That must be the keynote of our future policy in Uganda. It was the only policy, he was confident, that the House of Commons would approve, and he trusted that in view of the great distance of the country, and the consequent difficulties and delay in communication, the Government would shortly take measures to facilitate that communication, and remove the difficulties of transit. He hoped the Government would pursue their policy in Uganda, until they joined hands with the civilised forces of Egypt, and established our influence over the whole watershed of the Nile. If they pushed forward with energy on the path they had adopted, they would certainly be working for the interests and advantage of this country and of East Africa alike.

said, his views were very much in accord with those of the right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean. [Sir E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT laughed ironically. The hon. Member for Sheffield might laugh, but what he said was the fact, and he would point out to the hon. Gentleman that at least the right hon. Baronet spoke on the question with a knowledge of the facts and a knowledge of the geography of the country. He would yield to no one in readiness to give the money necessary for the work in Uganda if it were worth doing. But it was not worth doing, and we ought not to have had anything to do with it. Uganda was so far from the sea coast—1,100 miles and more—and it was so difficult to communicate with it, that under existing conditions, at all events, we should never get any advantage from it. We had no need to be in Uganda, and in the way the Government had taken to get there they had acted contrary to all the traditions under which the Empire had been built up. The sea coast was our true basis of operations. In acquiring territory hitherto our practice had been to occupy the sea coast, and to leave it to the energy and enterprise of private individuals—acting independently of the Government, without orders and sometimes against orders—to push forward gradually further and further into the interior. That was the way we built up our Indian Empire. In that way, and in that way alone, had we been able to establish our sway over the whole of India. If we had begun to build up India in the way we were now pursuing with regard to Uganda, he ventured to say we should not have had in our possession to-day a shred of that Empire. If the object were to establish communication with the interior of East Africa, the far better course would have been to establish a line of communication from Suakin to Berber. To occupy Uganda for the purpose was to begin altogether at the wrong point The story told by the Under Secretary showed that our presence and action in Uganda would be surrounded by difficulties. In regard to the chain of forts, they had been told that after they were first established Sir G. Portal came to the decision to abandon them. They were abandoned, but Colonel Colvile subsequently resolved to re-occupy them; and they were now occupied and armed. Of course those forts would always be a running sore to the wild chieftains in and near such a country as Uganda, and the consequence would be that we should have to submit to our authority being defied every now and again, or to be continually extending our area of control, with the result of ever-increasing expenditure and responsibility. That was one of the dangers we should have to encounter, and of course the danger was greatly increased by the distance of the country from the coast. How could such a large territory be properly governed at three months' distance from Downing Street? Our plan in the past in the acquisition of territory was first to occupy the coast, to work gradually inwards, and to keep communication open from the sea—not to make a Government or official job of the work, but to leave private individuals to work their way on by perseverance and commercial enterprise. Generally speaking, Government undertakings of this kind failed. We did not want to be in Uganda at all. The time had not arrived for us to go there; it might in a hundred years or so, but at present any expenditure in trying to establish ourselves there was a waste of public money. He had always looked on this Uganda adventure with the gravest apprehension. He believed it was an unwise and an unfortunate undertaking, and he should be glad to hear that means were on the point of being found which would enable us to retire from Uganda in an honourable way.

thought it a waste of time to discuss whether we ought to be in Uganda or not. We were already there, and went there with the solemn consent and approval of Parliament, and we should have to remain there. It was merely beating the air, therefore, to talk over and over again about whether we ought or ought not to have gone there. The one and only question which now remained to consider was whether, being in Uganda, we should do our duty there. One thing was plain—that as we were in the country we were bound to exercise control in it. It was quite true, as the hon. Member for Lynn Regis had said, that our proper basis was on the sea coast. Well, so it was in this case, and he contended that the best and safest way of holding Uganda, and holding it with advantage to East Africa and to this country, was to construct a railway from Mombasa to Uganda. As to our duty and responsibility in the matter, there were two reasons for occupying Uganda—the policy of acquiring control over the waters of the Nile, and the stoppage of the slave trade. These were the reasons why we ought to be in Uganda; and he had listened with satisfaction to what fell from the Under Secretary on the subject. He hoped the Government would not be deterred by the arguments of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean from pursuing the righteous course which they had adopted.

said, he had always objected to the Uganda Votes, and he was glad to have an opportunity of supporting the Amendment. He did not believe the suppression of the slave trade had anything to do with this question. In any case, we could not go all over the world for the purpose of suppressing slavery. There was a good deal of slavery to put down in this country. When the Charter was granted to the British East Africa Company the House of Commons was distinctly told that it had no responsibility whatever. Were they to continue the policy of allowing chartered companies to start adventures of this sort, and then to take them over at the expense of the people, when every bit of evidence they had showed that they were of no good to us? At a time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer was refusing all grants in aid of the people of this country, we could not afford to spend the taxpayers' money in a wildgoose chase out in Africa. He was in favour of good honest colonial enterprise, but they knew that Europeans could not live and thrive in Uganda, and that except on the seaboard it would afford no opening for British trade. The continuation of this jingo policy must mean an expenditure of millions of money, and he regarded the Amendment as a protest against future expenditure of this kind. He was sorry that a Radical Government should be carrying out enterprises which were supported by their opponents, and which they condemned in the strongest terms when they were in Opposition. He hoped a more reasonable and liberal policy would be adopted in reference to this matter.

did not think any hon. Member could have listened to the speech of the right hon. Baronet who moved the Amendment without having been greatly impressed by the very strong case which he made out. For his part, he could not understand how any English gentleman could listen to the story of the doings of those who represented us in Central Africa without a blush of shame Such incidents as the boat incident—to which, by the way, no reference whatever was made by the Under Secretary—ought to be made known far and wide in this land, and that men should know that our prancing pro-Consuls in Central Africa were doing these things in their name, and that the Government of this country was putting its hands into the pockets of the taxpayers to pay for such doings. A withering fire upon a boatload of innocent and unarmed natives, who were destroyed, dropped into the river, and so forth! And they were told by eminent authorities on the other side of the House that we were there, and must stay there and spend this money. He did not believe that we ever ought to have gone there, and thought the sooner we came away the better. The hon. Member for Kirkdale rejoiced that, since we had had influence in Uganda, we had destroyed the power of the Princes around. To his mind, that was the greatest condemnation of our African policy. If that policy were pursued, we must go forward until British influence was paramount all over Central Africa. The hon. Member said he did not believe the House would vote for any other policy. He might be right, but there were tens of thousands of voters in the country who did not approve of that policy. If the working men of this country could have listened to that Debate, he did not believe that for a moment they would approve of this encroaching and aggrandising policy in Africa. His conscience would not allow him, whatever Government was in power, to vote this money for Uganda. He did not believe that the people whom he represented desired that the money should be spent in this way, and if the hon. Baronet went to a Division he should deem it his duty to support him.

desired to lodge his protest against the policy of the Government on this question. What right had they to provide means to prop up a number of company-mongers who wished to carry on their enterprises in Central Africa? They could not get a shilling out of the Treasury for useful work in the Highlands of Scotland, and it was very hard lines to find these large sums voted for quite unnecessary purposes.

wished to ask the Under Secretary for the Colonies two questions with regard to South African affairs. Before doing so, he had a word to say with regard to the speech of the hon. Member for King's Lynn. The hon. Member, and those who agreed with him laboured under a misconception and inability to see the great issues which depend upon the whole Uganda question. The hon. Member said he regarded Madagascar as of no importance to this country, and he said the same thing in regard to Uganda. Now, what was the issue in regard to Uganda and our occupation there? It was the future of the whole of Central Africa, the control of the Nile Valley, and the ultimate establishment of a British Trans-African Empire. He was amazed that an hon. Gentleman like the Member for King's Lynn, who had a wide but rather superficial knowledge of many subjects, should show such ludicrous inability to see the important issues involved in this matter. He was sorry the hon. Member was not in his place to hear the exposure of the fallacies which underlay his views. His hon. Friend told them we should follow the analogy of India, but the occupation of Uganda had exactly followed that analogy. Our position in India grew out of the operations of our traders; our occupation of Uganda had grown out of the operations of our traders and missionaries. They were told that the true way of settling the Uganda question was by making a railway from Suakin to Berber, but those who made that suggestion overlooked one main factor, namely, that another great European Power was pressing on towards the upper waters of the Nile, and that the railway from Suakin to Berber, although it might develop the trade of the Soudan, would do nothing to prevent that great European Power from getting control over those important regions of the Upper Nile. With reference to recent events in the Transvaal, the Under Secretary was disposed to find fault with some of them for using the term "Boer Government," but he would remind him that it was Lord Kimberley himself who objected most strongly to the expression "South African Republic." He insisted on its being known as the Transvaal State, and it was only by the process of pushing, at which their friends the Boers were adepts, and by the process of surrender, at which Her Majesty's present Government were equally adepts, that the use of the term "South African Republic" had sprung up. He had tried to obtain information in the usual way about the position of a well-known South African Chief who was threatened with practical extermination or slavery, but whenever any question was raised as to the dealings of the Boers with native races, they were invariably met by the answer that this was a matter of internal policy, and that we had no business to interfere with what the Transvaal authorities saw fit to do. Now, in giving that answer, the Under Secretary was oblivious of the obligations of both this country and the Boers with regard to the native races. He was amazed at the indifference of the humanitarian Radical section of the House to the fate of these unfortunate native races. When the Transvaal was transferred back to the Boers in 1880, the natives sent a unanimous delegation to protest against the transfer. This delegation represented 500,000 natives, and they were not satisfied even by an emphatic assurance that in a Convention their rights would be protected. This promise was confirmed in the Convention of 1881, but it had been a dead letter ever since. This assurance had not been carried out, and our native allies had been practically abandoned. When native chiefs endeavoured to see that their rights and the rights of their people were not invaded, they were subjected to brutal treatment by the Boers. This was the fate of the unfortunate Malaboch and his tribe in August, 1894. That Chief was unjustly taxed by a dishonest Boer Laiddrost. He and his tribe were ordered to move from their ancestral homes to the most unhealthy part of the Transvaal. They resisted, and after a gallant defence were overwhelmed. The survivors were then distributed throughout the Transvaal in a state of practical slavery. It was because Magato was threatened with the same sort of treatment that he was pressing for that information which he contended they had a right to receive on the subject. The Government had no right to tell them they would not ask for information. No Government had ever before deliberately refused to give the House information on important questions of this kind, or taken the course of saying that they would not do so unless their representative in Pretoria saw fit first to send them such information. With regard to the position of the Swazis, he had brought their case before the House on more than one occasion and the Government had done everything they possibly could to avoid giving in formation and to prevent discussion The point he wished to bring before the House was this: The Convention of December 1894, by which that unfortunate people, our allies, were abandoned to their bitter enemies, had not yet been carried into effect. We were bound to the Swazis by the three Conventions, by their services to us, and by the solemn guarantee given Them by Sir Evelyn Wood. But we threw all these things to the winds and abandoned the Swazis to the Boers by the Convention of December 1894. But when that Convention was made the Government asserted in this House that they had taken precautions for the protection of the Swazis against injustice and robbery. The most important step that could have been taken for the protection of the Swazis would have been the formal delimitation and demarcation of their land, pasture and agricultural, and water rights, but no such step had been taken. An independent Commission, on which a British representative of high standing could have been placed, should have been sent to formally delimitate and mark out the rights of the Swazis. That had not been done. Moreover, it was of the utmost importance that a British officer of high position and standing should have been appointed in Swaziland to look after the interests of the Swazi people and report to this country. The Gentleman who had been so appointed was one against whom he did not wish to say anything, but he was not of that position or rank that would be expected in a man filling such an important post. He was a Civil Service Clerk of inferior grade, or rather an Interpreter, and he was suddenly placed in a position of very critical importance in Swaziland. A British officer of high rank, Colonel Martin, with whom the Swazis were acquainted, and in whom they had confidence, was removed from his position, or rather he left it, being apparently unwilling to serve a day longer than he could help under a Government that had betrayed their allies. The second point he wished to raise was this: So far there had been no interference with the practical independence of the Swazis. So long as that was the case the Swazis would be satisfied. But that state of things might not last, and the least interference by the Boers with the rights of the Swazis, especially their grazing and water rights, would lead to desperate conflicts and cause great loss of life. The interview between the Swazi King and the Boer Generals was purely formal. The Boer proclamation had not been translated to the Swazis at the time. The King had steadily refused to accept the £1,000 monthly offered him by the Boers, because he regarded it as a kind of tribute. There was as yet no attempt by the Boers to exercise administration over the Swazis. The Swazis were just as determined as ever to maintain their independence, and they had emphatically refused to accept, or admit that they had accepted, Boer rule. He must ask the Under Secretary to give them an assurance that Her Majesty's Government would oppose the use by the Boers of force to interfere with the liberty and rights of the Swazis, and also to give them some information as to the steps that might have been taken, or be in contemplation, by the Boer Government against the Chief Magato and his tribe.

observed that he should only say a few words in reply to the hon. Gentleman, as he had had an opportunity of discussing this question on many previous occasions, and the hon. Gentleman had had a full opportunity of stating his views at great length during the present Session. With regard to the question of Magato, he was a chieftain within the territory of the South African Republic, and, being such, he was within the jurisdiction of the South African Republic, and we had no control over him. It would be the duty of the English Government, under certain conventions they had with the South African Republic, if any question arose with regard to the treatment of the natives which in any way infringed the conventions, to interfere in the matter, and they should do so. But it was not their duty wilfully and wantonly to interfere in the internal administration of the Transvaal. That was the position taken up by previous Governments, that was the position that had been taken up by the present Government, and no strong expressions on the part of the hon. Gentleman would induce them to depart from it. He was glad to believe, from the latest reports they had received, that Swaziland was at the present moment in a very peaceful condition. Their Acting Consul, Mr. Stewart, in a despatch received only the previous day, and dated April 26, stated that Swaziland had not been in such a peaceful state for the last twelve months, and the only thing that was at all likely to give rise to disturbance there, was the frequent attempts on the part of the hon. Gentleman in this House to disturb the amity between the Swazis and the Boers. He believed the Swazis were not going to take the hon. Gentleman's advice, and he trusted that they and the South African Republic would continue to act as they had done, with tact and discretion in this matter, and, if so, the Convention of 1894 would be carried through peacefully. He was sure that was the view of every Member of the House, including, he hoped, the hon. Gentleman himself, for he could hardly believe that he, in spite of his inflammatory speeches, desired that there should be bloodshed or difficulties in regard to South Africa. The hon. Member stated that the Government had appointed as Acting-Consul in Swaziland a man who was not of sufficient rank to take up that position. The position, however, was a very simple one. After the Convention of 1894 was passed, and the new administration of Swaziland came into force, Colonel Martin, who had so well and efficiently represented the Government in Swaziland for many years past, desired, in the most natural course, his present position having come to an end, to obtain some other position and take up some other appointment. Colonel Martin desired, therefore, to retire from Swaziland, and it became necessary to appoint an Acting-Consul. The Government were anxious to obtain the services of a good and competent officer, and they thought that the final appointment had better stand over until Sir Hercules Robinson had arrived in the country. Under these circumstances Mr. Stewart was appointed Acting-Consul. The Government had full confidence in him, and he had done his work remarkably well. The hon. Member had told them that no officer in the English service could continue to serve under this cowardly Government. The hon. Member insinuated that Sir Henry Loch and Mr. Martin had retired to avoid serving under this Government. That was totally and absolutely untrue. That was all he had to say in regard to the speech of the hon. Member, and he did not think, at this period of the Session, after the many discussions they had had, that he need pursue the matter further.

called attention to the action of Mr. M. S. Constable, Her Majesty's Consul at Stockholm, in publishing in the "Fortnightly Review" an article on the political crisis in Sweden and Norway. He said that Mr. Constable was a gentleman of considerable experience, who had represented that country in Russia and some other foreign countries, and therefore was not ignorant of the duties of a Consul. In spite of the fact that there was in existence a Foreign Office rule which prevented any gentleman holding the position of British Consul from writing in the Press on subjects of a controversial character or corresponding with private persons on public affairs, Mr. Constable had intervened in an acute manner in the exciting constitutional struggle which was going on between Norway and Sweden. He (Mr. Healy) did not propose to enter into the merits of the question, which he sincerely trusted would be settled in an amicable manner between the Swedes and the Norwegians. It was a matter of so much delicacy and gravity between the two countries that a Member of that House would not be justified in giving expression to his sympathies on the one side or the other. If that was the correct attitude for a Member of that House with regard to the question, what was to be said of a gentleman who was practically a member of Her Majesty's Government, drawing a salary for representing Her Majesty in one of those countries, taking an attitude hostile to Norway; and not only that, but doing so with every circumstance of bad judgment and misinformation. There was no subject on which the Norwegians were keener than the accusation that they were in league to surrender one of their northern ice-free ports to Russia in exchange for Russian help to attain separation from Sweden, and yet Mr. Constable, in the current number of the "Fortnightly Review," had written an article containing the following remarkable words:—

"Although Russia during a period of 80 years has made no openly aggressive movement against Norway, she has, nevertheless, pursued her well known methods of preparing a way beforehand. She has done all within her power to encourage her subjects to emigrate into Norrland and settle there, with the result that there are at the present date considerable numbers of Russian Finns inhabiting the neighbourhood of the Varanger. She has also, with the permission of Norway, bien entendu, constructed a railway which connects Russia with the eastern margin of the fjord. Should the Norwegian Separatists get their way, a step, and a very important one, would be gained by Russia. Members of the Party have before now openly advocated the surrender of the Varanger Fjord to Russia. It has even been suspected that they may have entered into negotiations with a view of ascertaining if Russia would be willing to lend them her support in their efforts to obtain a separation, and offering the fjord as the price to be paid for it."

Russia was building no such railway, and consequently Norway could have given no sanction to the building of such a railway. The only railway that Russia was making was towards the Gulf of Bothnia, in an entirely opposite direction. It was not the first time that one of Her Majesty's Consuls to Sweden had come out in public in this way. Her Majesty's Consul at Gothenburg had taken a part which had got him into trouble with regard to the Gothenburg licensing system, with regard to which there was a long correspondence in The Times; but this being a purely social question, there was not much harm, perhaps, in this gentleman giving his views. What was Mr. Constable's explanation for his conduct? He wrote a letter, dated 7th May, which should not have been written by a gentleman in his position at all. He (Mr. Healy) did not see what business British Consuls had writing letters to the newspapers at all. If they had been wronged they should look for vindication to the heads of their Departments, and not rush into print. In the letter referred to, Mr. Constable stated that his authority for the statement that he made with regard to the construction of the railway was the London Spectator. Fancy a man in Stockholm stating that his authority for the assertion that this railway was being made was a London newspaper. Mr. Constable said, that the periodical had such a high reputation in England for carefulness and accuracy that he did not consider it necessary to make any inquiry into the matter. On the 24th of May, Mr. Constable sent a telegram which put either himself or the editor of the Fortnightly Review in a distinctly unpleasant position. This was the telegram—

"It is not unusual, neither is it forbidden by the English authorities, for British Consular Officers to publish articles in native periodicals concerning those countries to which they are accredited on the assumption, however, that they write anonymously, and do not give them an official stamp by attaching their names. Mr. Constable's name has been added to the article in question through a mistake on the part of the editor of the Fortnightly Review without Mr. Constable's authority or knowledge."

He (Mr. Healy) did not propose to decide as between the editor of the Fortnightly Review and the British Consul, but looking at the form in which the article was signed, he was inclined to take rather the side of the editor. The article was signed "M. S. Constable," and in brackets and italics "Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Stockholm," and on the whole he was inclined to doubt that the editor of the Fortnightly Review forged the name of Mr. Constable or attached it without his authority. His (Mr. Healy's) object in rising was not merely to condemn this action on the part of Mr. Constable; it went a little further. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had been good enough to state in his condemnation of the attitude of Mr. Constable that no apology had been demanded by the Norse people. The Norse people had no representative at the Court of St. James. It was a Swede who was their representative there; and, of course, it was impossible to expect that a Swedish Minister at London would demand an apology for an article written in the pro-Swedish sense and insulting to the Norwegian Parliamentary majority. He (Mr. Healy) thought it only fair that in justice to the Parliamentary majority in Norway, Mr. Constable should be requested to publish a letter to Her Majesty's Government or elsewhere retracting this entire article and apologising for having written it, and also apologising for its incorrect statements. This was an insult to the entire Nationalist Party in Norway, and while he thanked the hon. Baronet for the very fair way in which he had met the question, he thought the circumstances of the case required a fuller statement, and he trusted the hon. Baronet would see his way to demand a more formal retractation and apology from the British Consul.

said that, in answer to the allusion which was made incidentally respecting a Report on the Gothenburg system, published some time ago, he should like to say his impression was that a Report on the question was asked for because information was desired over here. He believed the Report was prepared with very great trouble and pains. Whether the view taken was right or wrong, it was a bonâ, fide view. They were continually asked to get information from abroad, sometimes upon more or less controversial subjects. All a Consul could do was to form his own opinion. As to the publication of the article in question by the Consul at Stockholm, he had already admitted that not only was it not wise, but it was not right, that officers in the Consular service should publish articles dealing with controversial matters in the countries in which they resided. They had already conveyed the intimation to the writer that the publication of the article was an indiscretion, and that it should not be repeated. They were also taking some steps to inquire into the accuracy of some particular statements made in the article. He was told that the Consular Officer in question had done very good work in the public service. At any rate, the hon. Member might rest content with the assurance that they had already pointed out the indiscretion and insisted that it must not be repeated.

said, there was a strong feeling that in the course of vivisection experiments cruelty was done to the animals operated upon. Doctors were believed to get callous as to these things, and not to take the same view as people outside. He did not make any complaint against the present inspectors, but he had to ask the Home Secretary whether he would allow persons who were interested in the matter to witness the operations carried on? If that were done the public would be assured as to whether there was any unnecessary cruelty or not. Until that was done he did not think people outside would be at all satisfied with the present state of things. There was a great difference of opinion amongst doctors as to whether vivisection was useful. Parliament, however, had gone so far as to say there ought to be some supervision. He trusted that the supervision would be such as would give confidence to the public.

said, he had no power to order that the public should be admitted to vivisection experiments. The experiments were carried on in private places, and he had no more right than his hon. Friend himself to go into those places. [Mr. ALPHEUS MORTON: "Your Inspector has."] The Inspector visited the places under Parliamentary authority, but neither the Inspector nor he had any authority to authorise anyone else to go there. The experiments were often of a very delicate nature, and could not be carried on properly if the operators were liable to be intruded upon at any moment by representatives of the public. When occasion arose, he would be glad to see the system of inspection was thoroughly efficient. At present there was no real ground for apprehending any cruelty to the animals, but if the hon. Member had any specific case to bring before him he would be quite prepared to inquire into it.

said, that last year certain very grave charges were made against a school in Essex. Those charges were afterwards made the subject of Inquiry at the direction of the Home Secretary, arid the Inquiry resulted in the establishment, to a very great extent at least, of the charges. He was informed that the officer who was then in charge of the school was still in charge. He desired to know whether the money had been issued to the school, and whether, if the issue had not been made, it would be withheld until the right hon. Gentleman had satisfied himself that his own requirements had been met.

was sorry the hon. Gentleman had not given him notice of the question. He was satisfied, however, that there had been a very great improvement in the condition of the school since the Inquiry was held. The school was inspected only the other day, with very satisfactory results. The evils which had undoubtedly grown up had been put a stop to. In his judgment the responsibility for those evils rested quite as much with the Committee as with the superintendent; and there was now every chance of the school becoming prosperous and useful again.

asked the Home Secretary whether he had any information about some of the Irish political prisoners. He was informed that some of them, notably Dr. Gallagher, were in a very serious state of health. It was a positive fact that there was a widespread feeling in many parts of Ireland that Dr. Gallagher had lost his mind. It would be satisfactory to the prisoner's friends and to a large section of the public if the right hon. Gentleman would say whether he had any special information with regard to Gallagher and another prisoner named Kent, whose condition had given rise to anxiety.

regretted that the hon. Gentleman had not given him notice of the question, because then he should have been very happy to make inquiry and to give the hon. Gentleman the benefit of the most recent information on the subject. That, of course, he could not do at a moment's notice. But, taking care, as he did, to keep himself constantly informed as to the physical condition of these prisoners, he could say that he did not think there was any foundation whatever for the suggestion of which the hon. Member had made himself the mouthpiece. He would make inquiries, however, and give the hon. Member the latest information after the recess.

said, that he was careful to guard himself from making the suggestion as his own. It was an opinion which was widely held in Ireland. He would address a question to the right hon. Gentleman after the recess. Whereupon, in pursuance of the Order of the House [30th May], Mr. Speaker adjourned the House without question put.